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367 lines
12 KiB
XML
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="iso-8859-1"?>
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<!DOCTYPE chapter PUBLIC "-//Samba-Team//DTD DocBook V4.2-Based Variant V1.0//EN" "http://www.samba.org/samba/DTD/samba-doc">
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<chapter id="securing-samba">
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<chapterinfo>
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&author.tridge;
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&author.jht;
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<pubdate>May 26, 2003</pubdate>
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</chapterinfo>
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<title>Securing Samba</title>
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<sect1>
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<title>Introduction</title>
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<para>
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This note was attached to the Samba 2.2.8 release notes as it contained an
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important security fix. The information contained here applies to Samba
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installations in general.
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</para>
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<blockquote>
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<para>
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A new apprentice reported for duty to the chief engineer of a boiler house. He said, <quote>Here I am,
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if you will show me the boiler I'll start working on it.</quote> Then engineer replied, <quote>You're leaning
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on it!</quote>
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</para>
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</blockquote>
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<para>
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Security concerns are just like that. You need to know a little about the subject to appreciate
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how obvious most of it really is. The challenge for most of us is to discover that first morsel
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of knowledge with which we may unlock the secrets of the masters.
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</para>
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</sect1>
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<sect1>
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<title>Features and Benefits</title>
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<para>
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There are three levels at which security principals must be observed in order to render a site
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at least moderately secure. They are the perimeter firewall, the configuration of the host
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server that is running Samba and Samba itself.
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</para>
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<para>
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Samba permits a most flexible approach to network security. As far as possible Samba implements
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the latest protocols to permit more secure MS Windows file and print operations.
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</para>
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<para>
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Samba may be secured from connections that originate from outside the local network. This may be
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done using <emphasis>host-based protection</emphasis> (using Samba's implementation of a technology
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known as <quote>tcpwrappers,</quote> or it may be done be using <emphasis>interface-based exclusion</emphasis>
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so &smbd; will bind only to specifically permitted interfaces. It is also
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possible to set specific share or resource-based exclusions, for example on the <smbconfsection name="[IPC$]"/>
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auto-share. The <smbconfsection name="[IPC$]"/> share is used for browsing purposes as well as to establish
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TCP/IP connections.
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</para>
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<para>
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Another method by which Samba may be secured is by setting Access Control Entries (ACEs) in an Access
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Control List (ACL) on the shares themselves. This is discussed in <link linkend="AccessControls">File, Directory and Share Access Controls</link>.
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</para>
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</sect1>
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<sect1>
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<title>Technical Discussion of Protective Measures and Issues</title>
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<para>
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The key challenge of security is the fact that protective measures suffice at best
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only to close the door on known exploits and breach techniques. Never assume that
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because you have followed these few measures that the Samba server is now an impenetrable
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fortress! Given the history of information systems so far, it is only a matter of time
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before someone will find yet another vulnerability.
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</para>
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<sect2>
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<title>Using Host-Based Protection</title>
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<para>
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In many installations of Samba, the greatest threat comes from outside
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your immediate network. By default, Samba will accept connections from
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any host, which means that if you run an insecure version of Samba on
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a host that is directly connected to the Internet you can be
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especially vulnerable.
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</para>
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<para>
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One of the simplest fixes in this case is to use the <smbconfoption name="hosts allow"/> and
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<smbconfoption name="hosts deny"/> options in the Samba &smb.conf; configuration file to only
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allow access to your server from a specific range of hosts. An example might be:
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</para>
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<para><smbconfblock>
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<smbconfoption name="hosts allow">127.0.0.1 192.168.2.0/24 192.168.3.0/24</smbconfoption>
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<smbconfoption name="hosts deny">0.0.0.0/0</smbconfoption>
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</smbconfblock></para>
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<para>
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The above will only allow SMB connections from <constant>localhost</constant> (your own
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computer) and from the two private networks 192.168.2 and 192.168.3. All other
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connections will be refused as soon as the client sends its first packet. The refusal
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will be marked as <errorname>not listening on called name</errorname> error.
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</para>
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</sect2>
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<sect2>
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<title>User-Based Protection</title>
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<para>
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If you want to restrict access to your server to valid users only, then the following
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method may be of use. In the &smb.conf; <smbconfsection name="[global]"/> section put:
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</para>
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<para><smbconfblock>
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<smbconfoption name="valid users">@smbusers, jacko</smbconfoption>
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</smbconfblock></para>
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<para>
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This restricts all server access to either the user <emphasis>jacko</emphasis>
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or to members of the system group <emphasis>smbusers</emphasis>.
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</para>
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</sect2>
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<sect2>
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<title>Using Interface Protection</title>
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<para>
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By default, Samba will accept connections on any network interface that
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it finds on your system. That means if you have a ISDN line or a PPP
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connection to the Internet then Samba will accept connections on those
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links. This may not be what you want.
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</para>
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<para>
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You can change this behavior using options like this:
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</para>
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<para><smbconfblock>
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<smbconfoption name="interfaces">eth* lo</smbconfoption>
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<smbconfoption name="bind interfaces only">yes</smbconfoption>
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</smbconfblock></para>
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<para>
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This tells Samba to only listen for connections on interfaces with a
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name starting with <constant>eth</constant> such as <constant>eth0, eth1</constant> plus on the loopback
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interface called <constant>lo</constant>. The name you will need to use depends on what
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OS you are using. In the above, I used the common name for Ethernet
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adapters on Linux.
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</para>
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<para>
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If you use the above and someone tries to make an SMB connection to
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your host over a PPP interface called <constant>ppp0,</constant> then they will get a TCP
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connection refused reply. In that case, no Samba code is run at all as
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the operating system has been told not to pass connections from that
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interface to any Samba process.
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</para>
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</sect2>
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<sect2>
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<title>Using a Firewall</title>
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<para>
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Many people use a firewall to deny access to services they do not
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want exposed outside their network. This can be a good idea,
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although I recommend using it in conjunction with the above
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methods so you are protected even if your firewall is not active
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for some reason.
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</para>
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<para>
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If you are setting up a firewall, you need to know what TCP and
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UDP ports to allow and block. Samba uses the following:
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</para>
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<simplelist>
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<member>UDP/137 - used by nmbd</member>
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<member>UDP/138 - used by nmbd</member>
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<member>TCP/139 - used by smbd</member>
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<member>TCP/445 - used by smbd</member>
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</simplelist>
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<para>
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The last one is important as many older firewall setups may not be
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aware of it, given that this port was only added to the protocol in
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recent years.
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</para>
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</sect2>
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<sect2>
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<title>Using IPC$ Share-Based Denials </title>
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<para>
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If the above methods are not suitable, then you could also place a
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more specific deny on the IPC$ share that is used in the recently
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discovered security hole. This allows you to offer access to other
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shares while denying access to IPC$ from potentially un-trustworthy
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hosts.
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</para>
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<para>
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To do this you could use:
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</para>
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<para><smbconfblock>
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<smbconfsection name="[IPC$]"/>
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<smbconfoption name="hosts allow">192.168.115.0/24 127.0.0.1</smbconfoption>
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<smbconfoption name="hosts deny">0.0.0.0/0</smbconfoption>
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</smbconfblock></para>
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<para>
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This instructs Samba that IPC$ connections are not allowed from
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anywhere except from the two listed network addresses (localhost and the 192.168.115
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subnet). Connections to other shares are still allowed. As the
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IPC$ share is the only share that is always accessible anonymously,
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this provides some level of protection against attackers that do not
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know a valid username/password for your host.
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</para>
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<para>
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If you use this method, then clients will be given an <errorname>`access denied'</errorname>
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reply when they try to access the IPC$ share. Those clients will not be able to
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browse shares, and may also be unable to access some other resources. This is not
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recommended unless you cannot use one of the other methods listed above for some reason.
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</para>
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</sect2>
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<sect2>
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<title>NTLMv2 Security</title>
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<para>
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To configure NTLMv2 authentication, the following registry keys are worth knowing about:
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</para>
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<para>
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<screen>
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[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa]
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"lmcompatibilitylevel"=dword:00000003
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</screen>
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</para>
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<para>
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The value 0x00000003 means send NTLMv2 response only. Clients will use NTLMv2 authentication,
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use NTLMv2 session security if the server supports it. Domain Controllers accept LM,
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NTLM and NTLMv2 authentication.
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</para>
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<para>
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<screen>
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[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\MSV1_0]
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"NtlmMinClientSec"=dword:00080000
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</screen>
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</para>
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<para>
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The value 0x00080000 means permit only NTLMv2 session security. If either NtlmMinClientSec or
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NtlmMinServerSec is set to 0x00080000, the connection will fail if NTLMv2
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session security is not negotiated.
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</para>
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</sect2>
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</sect1>
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<sect1>
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<title>Upgrading Samba</title>
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<para>
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Please check regularly on <ulink noescape="1" url="http://www.samba.org/">http://www.samba.org/</ulink> for updates and
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important announcements. Occasionally security releases are made and
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it is highly recommended to upgrade Samba when a security vulnerability
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is discovered. Check with your OS vendor for OS specific upgrades.
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</para>
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</sect1>
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<sect1>
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<title>Common Errors</title>
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<para>
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If all of Samba and host platform configuration were really as intuitive as one might like them to be, this
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section would not be necessary. Security issues are often vexing for a support person to resolve, not
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because of the complexity of the problem, but for the reason that most administrators who post what turns
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out to be a security problem request are totally convinced that the problem is with Samba.
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</para>
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<sect2>
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<title>Smbclient Works on Localhost, but the Network Is Dead</title>
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<para>
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This is a common problem. Red Hat Linux (and others) installs a default firewall.
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With the default firewall in place, only traffic on the loopback adapter (IP address 127.0.0.1)
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is allowed through the firewall.
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</para>
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<para>
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The solution is either to remove the firewall (stop it) or modify the firewall script to
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allow SMB networking traffic through. See section above in this chapter.
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</para>
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</sect2>
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<sect2>
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<title>Why Can Users Access Home Directories of Other Users?</title>
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<para>
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<quote>
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We are unable to keep individual users from mapping to any other user's
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home directory once they have supplied a valid password! They only need
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to enter their own password. I have not found any method to configure
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Samba so that users may map only their own home directory.
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</quote>
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</para>
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<para><quote>
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User xyzzy can map his home directory. Once mapped user xyzzy can also map
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anyone else's home directory.
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</quote></para>
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<para>
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This is not a security flaw, it is by design. Samba allows users to have
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exactly the same access to the UNIX file system as when they were logged
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onto the UNIX box, except that it only allows such views onto the file
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system as are allowed by the defined shares.
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</para>
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<para>
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If your UNIX home directories are set up so that one user can happily <command>cd</command>
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into another users directory and execute <command>ls</command>, the UNIX security solution is to change file
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permissions on the user's home directories such that the <command>cd</command> and <command>ls</command> are denied.
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</para>
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<para>
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Samba tries very hard not to second guess the UNIX administrators security policies, and
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trusts the UNIX admin to set the policies and permissions he or she desires.
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</para>
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<para>
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Samba allows the behavior you require. Simply put the <smbconfoption name="only user">%S</smbconfoption>
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option in the <smbconfsection name="[homes]"/> share definition.
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</para>
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<para>
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The <smbconfoption name="only user"></smbconfoption> works in conjunction with the <smbconfoption name="users">list</smbconfoption>,
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so to get the behavior you require, add the line :
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<smbconfblock>
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<smbconfoption name="users">%S</smbconfoption>
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</smbconfblock>
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this is equivalent to adding
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<smbconfblock>
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<smbconfoption name="valid users">%S</smbconfoption>
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</smbconfblock>
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to the definition of the <smbconfsection name="[homes]"/> share, as recommended in
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the &smb.conf; man page.
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</para>
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</sect2>
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</sect1>
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</chapter>
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