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samba-mirror/source3/passdb/secrets.c
Volker Lendecke 7756b4088d Fix memleak
(This used to be commit defc71d4cb)
2003-07-19 11:28:15 +00:00

741 lines
19 KiB
C

/*
Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-2001
Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2002
Copyright (C) Rafal Szczesniak 2002
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
*/
/* the Samba secrets database stores any generated, private information
such as the local SID and machine trust password */
#include "includes.h"
#undef DBGC_CLASS
#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_PASSDB
static TDB_CONTEXT *tdb;
/* open up the secrets database */
BOOL secrets_init(void)
{
pstring fname;
if (tdb)
return True;
pstrcpy(fname, lp_private_dir());
pstrcat(fname,"/secrets.tdb");
tdb = tdb_open_log(fname, 0, TDB_DEFAULT, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0600);
if (!tdb) {
DEBUG(0,("Failed to open %s\n", fname));
return False;
}
return True;
}
/* read a entry from the secrets database - the caller must free the result
if size is non-null then the size of the entry is put in there
*/
void *secrets_fetch(const char *key, size_t *size)
{
TDB_DATA kbuf, dbuf;
secrets_init();
if (!tdb)
return NULL;
kbuf.dptr = key;
kbuf.dsize = strlen(key);
dbuf = tdb_fetch(tdb, kbuf);
if (size)
*size = dbuf.dsize;
return dbuf.dptr;
}
/* store a secrets entry
*/
BOOL secrets_store(const char *key, const void *data, size_t size)
{
TDB_DATA kbuf, dbuf;
secrets_init();
if (!tdb)
return False;
kbuf.dptr = key;
kbuf.dsize = strlen(key);
dbuf.dptr = data;
dbuf.dsize = size;
return tdb_store(tdb, kbuf, dbuf, TDB_REPLACE) == 0;
}
/* delete a secets database entry
*/
BOOL secrets_delete(const char *key)
{
TDB_DATA kbuf;
secrets_init();
if (!tdb)
return False;
kbuf.dptr = key;
kbuf.dsize = strlen(key);
return tdb_delete(tdb, kbuf) == 0;
}
BOOL secrets_store_domain_sid(const char *domain, const DOM_SID *sid)
{
fstring key;
slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_SID, domain);
strupper_m(key);
return secrets_store(key, sid, sizeof(DOM_SID));
}
BOOL secrets_fetch_domain_sid(const char *domain, DOM_SID *sid)
{
DOM_SID *dyn_sid;
fstring key;
size_t size;
slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_SID, domain);
strupper_m(key);
dyn_sid = (DOM_SID *)secrets_fetch(key, &size);
if (dyn_sid == NULL)
return False;
if (size != sizeof(DOM_SID))
{
SAFE_FREE(dyn_sid);
return False;
}
*sid = *dyn_sid;
SAFE_FREE(dyn_sid);
return True;
}
BOOL secrets_store_domain_guid(const char *domain, GUID *guid)
{
fstring key;
slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_GUID, domain);
strupper_m(key);
return secrets_store(key, guid, sizeof(GUID));
}
BOOL secrets_fetch_domain_guid(const char *domain, GUID *guid)
{
GUID *dyn_guid;
fstring key;
size_t size;
GUID new_guid;
slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_GUID, domain);
strupper_m(key);
dyn_guid = (GUID *)secrets_fetch(key, &size);
DEBUG(6,("key is %s, size is %d\n", key, (int)size));
if ((NULL == dyn_guid) && (ROLE_DOMAIN_PDC == lp_server_role())) {
smb_uuid_generate_random(&new_guid);
if (!secrets_store_domain_guid(domain, &new_guid))
return False;
dyn_guid = (GUID *)secrets_fetch(key, &size);
if (dyn_guid == NULL)
return False;
}
if (size != sizeof(GUID))
{
SAFE_FREE(dyn_guid);
return False;
}
*guid = *dyn_guid;
SAFE_FREE(dyn_guid);
return True;
}
/**
* Form a key for fetching the machine trust account password
*
* @param domain domain name
*
* @return stored password's key
**/
const char *trust_keystr(const char *domain)
{
static fstring keystr;
slprintf(keystr,sizeof(keystr)-1,"%s/%s",
SECRETS_MACHINE_ACCT_PASS, domain);
strupper_m(keystr);
return keystr;
}
/**
* Form a key for fetching a trusted domain password
*
* @param domain trusted domain name
*
* @return stored password's key
**/
static char *trustdom_keystr(const char *domain)
{
static pstring keystr;
pstr_sprintf(keystr, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMTRUST_ACCT_PASS, domain);
strupper_m(keystr);
return keystr;
}
/************************************************************************
Lock the trust password entry.
************************************************************************/
BOOL secrets_lock_trust_account_password(const char *domain, BOOL dolock)
{
if (!tdb)
return False;
if (dolock)
return (tdb_lock_bystring(tdb, trust_keystr(domain),0) == 0);
else
tdb_unlock_bystring(tdb, trust_keystr(domain));
return True;
}
/************************************************************************
Routine to get the default secure channel type for trust accounts
************************************************************************/
uint32 get_default_sec_channel(void)
{
if (lp_server_role() == ROLE_DOMAIN_BDC ||
lp_server_role() == ROLE_DOMAIN_PDC) {
return SEC_CHAN_BDC;
} else {
return SEC_CHAN_WKSTA;
}
}
/************************************************************************
Routine to get the trust account password for a domain.
The user of this function must have locked the trust password file using
the above call.
************************************************************************/
BOOL secrets_fetch_trust_account_password(const char *domain, uint8 ret_pwd[16],
time_t *pass_last_set_time,
uint32 *channel)
{
struct machine_acct_pass *pass;
char *plaintext;
size_t size;
plaintext = secrets_fetch_machine_password(domain, pass_last_set_time,
channel);
if (plaintext) {
DEBUG(4,("Using cleartext machine password\n"));
E_md4hash(plaintext, ret_pwd);
SAFE_FREE(plaintext);
return True;
}
if (!(pass = secrets_fetch(trust_keystr(domain), &size))) {
DEBUG(5, ("secrets_fetch failed!\n"));
return False;
}
if (size != sizeof(*pass)) {
DEBUG(0, ("secrets were of incorrect size!\n"));
return False;
}
if (pass_last_set_time) *pass_last_set_time = pass->mod_time;
memcpy(ret_pwd, pass->hash, 16);
SAFE_FREE(pass);
if (channel)
*channel = get_default_sec_channel();
return True;
}
/************************************************************************
Routine to get account password to trusted domain
************************************************************************/
BOOL secrets_fetch_trusted_domain_password(const char *domain, char** pwd,
DOM_SID *sid, time_t *pass_last_set_time)
{
struct trusted_dom_pass pass;
size_t size;
/* unpacking structures */
char* pass_buf;
int pass_len = 0;
ZERO_STRUCT(pass);
/* fetching trusted domain password structure */
if (!(pass_buf = secrets_fetch(trustdom_keystr(domain), &size))) {
DEBUG(5, ("secrets_fetch failed!\n"));
return False;
}
/* unpack trusted domain password */
pass_len = tdb_trusted_dom_pass_unpack(pass_buf, size, &pass);
SAFE_FREE(pass_buf);
if (pass_len != size) {
DEBUG(5, ("Invalid secrets size. Unpacked data doesn't match trusted_dom_pass structure.\n"));
return False;
}
/* the trust's password */
if (pwd) {
*pwd = strdup(pass.pass);
if (!*pwd) {
return False;
}
}
/* last change time */
if (pass_last_set_time) *pass_last_set_time = pass.mod_time;
/* domain sid */
sid_copy(sid, &pass.domain_sid);
return True;
}
/************************************************************************
Routine to set the trust account password for a domain.
************************************************************************/
BOOL secrets_store_trust_account_password(const char *domain, uint8 new_pwd[16])
{
struct machine_acct_pass pass;
pass.mod_time = time(NULL);
memcpy(pass.hash, new_pwd, 16);
return secrets_store(trust_keystr(domain), (void *)&pass, sizeof(pass));
}
/**
* Routine to store the password for trusted domain
*
* @param domain remote domain name
* @param pwd plain text password of trust relationship
* @param sid remote domain sid
*
* @return true if succeeded
**/
BOOL secrets_store_trusted_domain_password(const char* domain, smb_ucs2_t *uni_dom_name,
size_t uni_name_len, const char* pwd,
DOM_SID sid)
{
/* packing structures */
pstring pass_buf;
int pass_len = 0;
int pass_buf_len = sizeof(pass_buf);
struct trusted_dom_pass pass;
ZERO_STRUCT(pass);
/* unicode domain name and its length */
if (!uni_dom_name)
return False;
strncpy_w(pass.uni_name, uni_dom_name, sizeof(pass.uni_name) - 1);
pass.uni_name_len = uni_name_len;
/* last change time */
pass.mod_time = time(NULL);
/* password of the trust */
pass.pass_len = strlen(pwd);
fstrcpy(pass.pass, pwd);
/* domain sid */
sid_copy(&pass.domain_sid, &sid);
pass_len = tdb_trusted_dom_pass_pack(pass_buf, pass_buf_len, &pass);
return secrets_store(trustdom_keystr(domain), (void *)&pass_buf, pass_len);
}
/************************************************************************
Routine to set the plaintext machine account password for a realm
the password is assumed to be a null terminated ascii string
************************************************************************/
BOOL secrets_store_machine_password(const char *pass, const char *domain, uint32 sec_channel)
{
char *key = NULL;
BOOL ret;
uint32 last_change_time;
uint32 sec_channel_type;
asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_PASSWORD, domain);
if (!key)
return False;
strupper_m(key);
ret = secrets_store(key, pass, strlen(pass)+1);
SAFE_FREE(key);
if (!ret)
return ret;
asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_LAST_CHANGE_TIME, domain);
if (!key)
return False;
strupper_m(key);
SIVAL(&last_change_time, 0, time(NULL));
ret = secrets_store(key, &last_change_time, sizeof(last_change_time));
SAFE_FREE(key);
asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_SEC_CHANNEL_TYPE, domain);
if (!key)
return False;
strupper_m(key);
SIVAL(&sec_channel_type, 0, sec_channel);
ret = secrets_store(key, &sec_channel_type, sizeof(sec_channel_type));
SAFE_FREE(key);
return ret;
}
/************************************************************************
Routine to fetch the plaintext machine account password for a realm
the password is assumed to be a null terminated ascii string
************************************************************************/
char *secrets_fetch_machine_password(const char *domain,
time_t *pass_last_set_time,
uint32 *channel)
{
char *key = NULL;
char *ret;
asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_PASSWORD, domain);
strupper_m(key);
ret = (char *)secrets_fetch(key, NULL);
SAFE_FREE(key);
if (pass_last_set_time) {
size_t size;
uint32 *last_set_time;
asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_LAST_CHANGE_TIME, domain);
strupper_m(key);
last_set_time = secrets_fetch(key, &size);
if (last_set_time) {
*pass_last_set_time = IVAL(last_set_time,0);
SAFE_FREE(last_set_time);
} else {
*pass_last_set_time = 0;
}
SAFE_FREE(key);
}
if (channel) {
size_t size;
uint32 *channel_type;
asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_SEC_CHANNEL_TYPE, domain);
strupper_m(key);
channel_type = secrets_fetch(key, &size);
if (channel_type) {
*channel = IVAL(channel_type,0);
SAFE_FREE(channel_type);
} else {
*channel = get_default_sec_channel();
}
SAFE_FREE(key);
}
return ret;
}
/************************************************************************
Routine to delete the machine trust account password file for a domain.
************************************************************************/
BOOL trust_password_delete(const char *domain)
{
return secrets_delete(trust_keystr(domain));
}
/************************************************************************
Routine to delete the password for trusted domain
************************************************************************/
BOOL trusted_domain_password_delete(const char *domain)
{
return secrets_delete(trustdom_keystr(domain));
}
/*******************************************************************
Reset the 'done' variables so after a client process is created
from a fork call these calls will be re-done. This should be
expanded if more variables need reseting.
******************************************************************/
void reset_globals_after_fork(void)
{
unsigned char dummy;
secrets_init();
/*
* Increment the global seed value to ensure every smbd starts
* with a new random seed.
*/
if (tdb) {
uint32 initial_val = sys_getpid();
tdb_change_int32_atomic(tdb, "INFO/random_seed", (int *)&initial_val, 1);
set_rand_reseed_data((unsigned char *)&initial_val, sizeof(initial_val));
}
/*
* Re-seed the random crypto generator, so all smbd's
* started from the same parent won't generate the same
* sequence.
*/
generate_random_buffer( &dummy, 1, True);
}
BOOL secrets_store_ldap_pw(const char* dn, char* pw)
{
char *key = NULL;
BOOL ret;
if (asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_LDAP_BIND_PW, dn) < 0) {
DEBUG(0, ("secrets_store_ldap_pw: asprintf failed!\n"));
return False;
}
ret = secrets_store(key, pw, strlen(pw)+1);
SAFE_FREE(key);
return ret;
}
/**
* Get trusted domains info from secrets.tdb.
*
* The linked list is allocated on the supplied talloc context, caller gets to destroy
* when done.
*
* @param ctx Allocation context
* @param enum_ctx Starting index, eg. we can start fetching at third
* or sixth trusted domain entry. Zero is the first index.
* Value it is set to is the enum context for the next enumeration.
* @param num_domains Number of domain entries to fetch at one call
* @param domains Pointer to array of trusted domain structs to be filled up
*
* @return nt status code of rpc response
**/
NTSTATUS secrets_get_trusted_domains(TALLOC_CTX* ctx, int* enum_ctx, unsigned int max_num_domains, int *num_domains, TRUSTDOM ***domains)
{
TDB_LIST_NODE *keys, *k;
TRUSTDOM *dom = NULL;
char *pattern;
unsigned int start_idx;
uint32 idx = 0;
size_t size, packed_size = 0;
fstring dom_name;
char *packed_pass;
struct trusted_dom_pass *pass = talloc_zero(ctx, sizeof(struct trusted_dom_pass));
NTSTATUS status;
if (!secrets_init()) return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
if (!pass) {
DEBUG(0, ("talloc_zero failed!\n"));
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
*num_domains = 0;
start_idx = *enum_ctx;
/* generate searching pattern */
if (!(pattern = talloc_asprintf(ctx, "%s/*", SECRETS_DOMTRUST_ACCT_PASS))) {
DEBUG(0, ("secrets_get_trusted_domains: talloc_asprintf() failed!\n"));
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
DEBUG(5, ("secrets_get_trusted_domains: looking for %d domains, starting at index %d\n",
max_num_domains, *enum_ctx));
*domains = talloc_zero(ctx, sizeof(**domains)*max_num_domains);
/* fetching trusted domains' data and collecting them in a list */
keys = tdb_search_keys(tdb, pattern);
/*
* if there's no keys returned ie. no trusted domain,
* return "no more entries" code
*/
status = NT_STATUS_NO_MORE_ENTRIES;
/* searching for keys in secrets db -- way to go ... */
for (k = keys; k; k = k->next) {
char *secrets_key;
/* important: ensure null-termination of the key string */
secrets_key = strndup(k->node_key.dptr, k->node_key.dsize);
if (!secrets_key) {
DEBUG(0, ("strndup failed!\n"));
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
packed_pass = secrets_fetch(secrets_key, &size);
packed_size = tdb_trusted_dom_pass_unpack(packed_pass, size, pass);
/* packed representation isn't needed anymore */
SAFE_FREE(packed_pass);
if (size != packed_size) {
DEBUG(2, ("Secrets record %s is invalid!\n", secrets_key));
continue;
}
pull_ucs2_fstring(dom_name, pass->uni_name);
DEBUG(18, ("Fetched secret record num %d.\nDomain name: %s, SID: %s\n",
idx, dom_name, sid_string_static(&pass->domain_sid)));
SAFE_FREE(secrets_key);
if (idx >= start_idx && idx < start_idx + max_num_domains) {
dom = talloc_zero(ctx, sizeof(*dom));
if (!dom) {
/* free returned tdb record */
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
/* copy domain sid */
SMB_ASSERT(sizeof(dom->sid) == sizeof(pass->domain_sid));
memcpy(&(dom->sid), &(pass->domain_sid), sizeof(dom->sid));
/* copy unicode domain name */
dom->name = talloc_strdup_w(ctx, pass->uni_name);
(*domains)[idx - start_idx] = dom;
DEBUG(18, ("Secret record is in required range.\n \
start_idx = %d, max_num_domains = %d. Added to returned array.\n",
start_idx, max_num_domains));
*enum_ctx = idx + 1;
(*num_domains)++;
/* set proper status code to return */
if (k->next) {
/* there are yet some entries to enumerate */
status = STATUS_MORE_ENTRIES;
} else {
/* this is the last entry in the whole enumeration */
status = NT_STATUS_OK;
}
} else {
DEBUG(18, ("Secret is outside the required range.\n \
start_idx = %d, max_num_domains = %d. Not added to returned array\n",
start_idx, max_num_domains));
}
idx++;
}
DEBUG(5, ("secrets_get_trusted_domains: got %d domains\n", *num_domains));
/* free the results of searching the keys */
tdb_search_list_free(keys);
return status;
}
/*******************************************************************************
Lock the secrets tdb based on a string - this is used as a primitive form of mutex
between smbd instances.
*******************************************************************************/
BOOL secrets_named_mutex(const char *name, unsigned int timeout)
{
int ret = 0;
if (!message_init())
return False;
ret = tdb_lock_bystring(tdb, name, timeout);
if (ret == 0)
DEBUG(10,("secrets_named_mutex: got mutex for %s\n", name ));
return (ret == 0);
}
/*******************************************************************************
Unlock a named mutex.
*******************************************************************************/
void secrets_named_mutex_release(const char *name)
{
tdb_unlock_bystring(tdb, name);
DEBUG(10,("secrets_named_mutex: released mutex for %s\n", name ));
}
/*********************************************************
Check to see if we must talk to the PDC to avoid sam
sync delays
********************************************************/
BOOL must_use_pdc( const char *domain )
{
time_t now = time(NULL);
time_t last_change_time;
unsigned char passwd[16];
if ( !secrets_fetch_trust_account_password(domain, passwd, &last_change_time, NULL) )
return False;
/*
* If the time the machine password has changed
* was less than about 15 minutes then we need to contact
* the PDC only, as we cannot be sure domain replication
* has yet taken place. Bug found by Gerald (way to go
* Gerald !). JRA.
*/
if ( now - last_change_time < SAM_SYNC_WINDOW )
return True;
return False;
}