mirror of
https://github.com/samba-team/samba.git
synced 2024-12-28 07:21:54 +03:00
7104002cf8
We missed one case of ignoring "BSRSPYL ".
Merge for 3.0.21c.
Jeremy.
(This used to be commit 7d21cf420f
)
1123 lines
32 KiB
C
1123 lines
32 KiB
C
/*
|
|
Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
|
|
handle SMBsessionsetup
|
|
Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1998-2001
|
|
Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2001
|
|
Copyright (C) Jim McDonough <jmcd@us.ibm.com> 2002
|
|
Copyright (C) Luke Howard 2003
|
|
|
|
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
|
|
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
|
|
the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
|
|
(at your option) any later version.
|
|
|
|
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
|
|
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
|
|
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
|
|
GNU General Public License for more details.
|
|
|
|
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
|
|
along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
|
|
Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#include "includes.h"
|
|
|
|
uint32 global_client_caps = 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
on a logon error possibly map the error to success if "map to guest"
|
|
is set approriately
|
|
*/
|
|
static NTSTATUS do_map_to_guest(NTSTATUS status, auth_serversupplied_info **server_info,
|
|
const char *user, const char *domain)
|
|
{
|
|
if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER)) {
|
|
if ((lp_map_to_guest() == MAP_TO_GUEST_ON_BAD_USER) ||
|
|
(lp_map_to_guest() == MAP_TO_GUEST_ON_BAD_PASSWORD)) {
|
|
DEBUG(3,("No such user %s [%s] - using guest account\n",
|
|
user, domain));
|
|
status = make_server_info_guest(server_info);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD)) {
|
|
if (lp_map_to_guest() == MAP_TO_GUEST_ON_BAD_PASSWORD) {
|
|
DEBUG(3,("Registered username %s for guest access\n",user));
|
|
status = make_server_info_guest(server_info);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return status;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Add the standard 'Samba' signature to the end of the session setup.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
static int add_signature(char *outbuf, char *p)
|
|
{
|
|
char *start = p;
|
|
fstring lanman;
|
|
|
|
fstr_sprintf( lanman, "Samba %s", SAMBA_VERSION_STRING);
|
|
|
|
p += srvstr_push(outbuf, p, "Unix", -1, STR_TERMINATE);
|
|
p += srvstr_push(outbuf, p, lanman, -1, STR_TERMINATE);
|
|
p += srvstr_push(outbuf, p, lp_workgroup(), -1, STR_TERMINATE);
|
|
|
|
return PTR_DIFF(p, start);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Start the signing engine if needed. Don't fail signing here.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
static void sessionsetup_start_signing_engine(const auth_serversupplied_info *server_info, char *inbuf)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!server_info->guest && !srv_signing_started()) {
|
|
/* We need to start the signing engine
|
|
* here but a W2K client sends the old
|
|
* "BSRSPYL " signature instead of the
|
|
* correct one. Subsequent packets will
|
|
* be correct.
|
|
*/
|
|
srv_check_sign_mac(inbuf, False);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Send a security blob via a session setup reply.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
static BOOL reply_sesssetup_blob(connection_struct *conn, char *outbuf,
|
|
DATA_BLOB blob, NTSTATUS nt_status)
|
|
{
|
|
char *p;
|
|
|
|
set_message(outbuf,4,0,True);
|
|
|
|
nt_status = nt_status_squash(nt_status);
|
|
SIVAL(outbuf, smb_rcls, NT_STATUS_V(nt_status));
|
|
SSVAL(outbuf, smb_vwv0, 0xFF); /* no chaining possible */
|
|
SSVAL(outbuf, smb_vwv3, blob.length);
|
|
p = smb_buf(outbuf);
|
|
|
|
/* should we cap this? */
|
|
memcpy(p, blob.data, blob.length);
|
|
p += blob.length;
|
|
|
|
p += add_signature( outbuf, p );
|
|
|
|
set_message_end(outbuf,p);
|
|
|
|
show_msg(outbuf);
|
|
return send_smb(smbd_server_fd(),outbuf);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Do a 'guest' logon, getting back the
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
static NTSTATUS check_guest_password(auth_serversupplied_info **server_info)
|
|
{
|
|
struct auth_context *auth_context;
|
|
auth_usersupplied_info *user_info = NULL;
|
|
|
|
NTSTATUS nt_status;
|
|
unsigned char chal[8];
|
|
|
|
ZERO_STRUCT(chal);
|
|
|
|
DEBUG(3,("Got anonymous request\n"));
|
|
|
|
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status = make_auth_context_fixed(&auth_context, chal))) {
|
|
return nt_status;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!make_user_info_guest(&user_info)) {
|
|
(auth_context->free)(&auth_context);
|
|
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nt_status = auth_context->check_ntlm_password(auth_context, user_info, server_info);
|
|
(auth_context->free)(&auth_context);
|
|
free_user_info(&user_info);
|
|
return nt_status;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_KRB5
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
reply to a session setup spnego negotiate packet for kerberos
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
static int reply_spnego_kerberos(connection_struct *conn,
|
|
char *inbuf, char *outbuf,
|
|
int length, int bufsize,
|
|
DATA_BLOB *secblob)
|
|
{
|
|
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
|
|
DATA_BLOB ticket;
|
|
char *client, *p, *domain;
|
|
fstring netbios_domain_name;
|
|
struct passwd *pw;
|
|
fstring user;
|
|
int sess_vuid;
|
|
NTSTATUS ret;
|
|
PAC_DATA *pac_data;
|
|
DATA_BLOB ap_rep, ap_rep_wrapped, response;
|
|
auth_serversupplied_info *server_info = NULL;
|
|
DATA_BLOB session_key = data_blob(NULL, 0);
|
|
uint8 tok_id[2];
|
|
DATA_BLOB nullblob = data_blob(NULL, 0);
|
|
fstring real_username;
|
|
BOOL map_domainuser_to_guest = False;
|
|
PAC_LOGON_INFO *logon_info = NULL;
|
|
|
|
ZERO_STRUCT(ticket);
|
|
ZERO_STRUCT(pac_data);
|
|
ZERO_STRUCT(ap_rep);
|
|
ZERO_STRUCT(ap_rep_wrapped);
|
|
ZERO_STRUCT(response);
|
|
|
|
mem_ctx = talloc_init("reply_spnego_kerberos");
|
|
if (mem_ctx == NULL)
|
|
return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY);
|
|
|
|
if (!spnego_parse_krb5_wrap(*secblob, &ticket, tok_id)) {
|
|
talloc_destroy(mem_ctx);
|
|
return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = ads_verify_ticket(mem_ctx, lp_realm(), &ticket, &client, &pac_data, &ap_rep, &session_key);
|
|
|
|
data_blob_free(&ticket);
|
|
|
|
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) {
|
|
DEBUG(1,("Failed to verify incoming ticket!\n"));
|
|
talloc_destroy(mem_ctx);
|
|
return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DEBUG(3,("Ticket name is [%s]\n", client));
|
|
|
|
p = strchr_m(client, '@');
|
|
if (!p) {
|
|
DEBUG(3,("Doesn't look like a valid principal\n"));
|
|
data_blob_free(&ap_rep);
|
|
data_blob_free(&session_key);
|
|
SAFE_FREE(client);
|
|
talloc_destroy(mem_ctx);
|
|
return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*p = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* save the PAC data if we have it */
|
|
|
|
if (pac_data) {
|
|
logon_info = get_logon_info_from_pac(pac_data);
|
|
netsamlogon_cache_store( client, &logon_info->info3 );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!strequal(p+1, lp_realm())) {
|
|
DEBUG(3,("Ticket for foreign realm %s@%s\n", client, p+1));
|
|
if (!lp_allow_trusted_domains()) {
|
|
data_blob_free(&ap_rep);
|
|
data_blob_free(&session_key);
|
|
SAFE_FREE(client);
|
|
talloc_destroy(mem_ctx);
|
|
return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* this gives a fully qualified user name (ie. with full realm).
|
|
that leads to very long usernames, but what else can we do? */
|
|
|
|
domain = p+1;
|
|
|
|
if (logon_info && logon_info->info3.hdr_logon_dom.uni_str_len) {
|
|
|
|
unistr2_to_ascii(netbios_domain_name, &logon_info->info3.uni_logon_dom, -1);
|
|
domain = netbios_domain_name;
|
|
DEBUG(10, ("Mapped to [%s] (using PAC)\n", domain));
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* If we have winbind running, we can (and must) shorten the
|
|
username by using the short netbios name. Otherwise we will
|
|
have inconsistent user names. With Kerberos, we get the
|
|
fully qualified realm, with ntlmssp we get the short
|
|
name. And even w2k3 does use ntlmssp if you for example
|
|
connect to an ip address. */
|
|
|
|
struct winbindd_request wb_request;
|
|
struct winbindd_response wb_response;
|
|
NSS_STATUS wb_result;
|
|
|
|
ZERO_STRUCT(wb_request);
|
|
ZERO_STRUCT(wb_response);
|
|
|
|
DEBUG(10, ("Mapping [%s] to short name\n", domain));
|
|
|
|
fstrcpy(wb_request.domain_name, domain);
|
|
|
|
wb_result = winbindd_request_response(WINBINDD_DOMAIN_INFO,
|
|
&wb_request, &wb_response);
|
|
|
|
if (wb_result == NSS_STATUS_SUCCESS) {
|
|
|
|
fstrcpy(netbios_domain_name,
|
|
wb_response.data.domain_info.name);
|
|
domain = netbios_domain_name;
|
|
|
|
DEBUG(10, ("Mapped to [%s] (using Winbind)\n", domain));
|
|
} else {
|
|
DEBUG(3, ("Could not find short name -- winbind "
|
|
"not running?\n"));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fstr_sprintf(user, "%s%c%s", domain, *lp_winbind_separator(), client);
|
|
|
|
/* lookup the passwd struct, create a new user if necessary */
|
|
|
|
map_username( user );
|
|
|
|
pw = smb_getpwnam( mem_ctx, user, real_username, True );
|
|
if (!pw) {
|
|
|
|
/* this was originally the behavior of Samba 2.2, if a user
|
|
did not have a local uid but has been authenticated, then
|
|
map them to a guest account */
|
|
|
|
if (lp_map_to_guest() == MAP_TO_GUEST_ON_BAD_UID){
|
|
map_domainuser_to_guest = True;
|
|
fstrcpy(user,lp_guestaccount());
|
|
pw = smb_getpwnam( mem_ctx, user, real_username, True );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* extra sanity check that the guest account is valid */
|
|
|
|
if ( !pw ) {
|
|
DEBUG(1,("Username %s is invalid on this system\n", user));
|
|
SAFE_FREE(client);
|
|
data_blob_free(&ap_rep);
|
|
data_blob_free(&session_key);
|
|
talloc_destroy(mem_ctx);
|
|
return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* setup the string used by %U */
|
|
|
|
sub_set_smb_name( real_username );
|
|
reload_services(True);
|
|
if ( map_domainuser_to_guest ) {
|
|
make_server_info_guest(&server_info);
|
|
} else if (logon_info) {
|
|
ret = make_server_info_pac(&server_info, real_username, pw, logon_info);
|
|
|
|
if ( !NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret) ) {
|
|
DEBUG(1,("make_server_info_pac failed: %s!\n",
|
|
nt_errstr(ret)));
|
|
SAFE_FREE(client);
|
|
data_blob_free(&ap_rep);
|
|
data_blob_free(&session_key);
|
|
talloc_destroy(mem_ctx);
|
|
return ERROR_NT(ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
ret = make_server_info_pw(&server_info, real_username, pw);
|
|
|
|
if ( !NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret) ) {
|
|
DEBUG(1,("make_server_info_pw failed: %s!\n",
|
|
nt_errstr(ret)));
|
|
SAFE_FREE(client);
|
|
data_blob_free(&ap_rep);
|
|
data_blob_free(&session_key);
|
|
talloc_destroy(mem_ctx);
|
|
return ERROR_NT(ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* make_server_info_pw does not set the domain. Without this
|
|
* we end up with the local netbios name in substitutions for
|
|
* %D. */
|
|
|
|
if (server_info->sam_account != NULL) {
|
|
pdb_set_domain(server_info->sam_account, domain, PDB_SET);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* register_vuid keeps the server info */
|
|
/* register_vuid takes ownership of session_key, no need to free after this.
|
|
A better interface would copy it.... */
|
|
sess_vuid = register_vuid(server_info, session_key, nullblob, client);
|
|
|
|
SAFE_FREE(client);
|
|
|
|
if (sess_vuid == -1) {
|
|
ret = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* current_user_info is changed on new vuid */
|
|
reload_services( True );
|
|
|
|
set_message(outbuf,4,0,True);
|
|
SSVAL(outbuf, smb_vwv3, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (server_info->guest) {
|
|
SSVAL(outbuf,smb_vwv2,1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SSVAL(outbuf, smb_uid, sess_vuid);
|
|
|
|
sessionsetup_start_signing_engine(server_info, inbuf);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* wrap that up in a nice GSS-API wrapping */
|
|
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) {
|
|
ap_rep_wrapped = spnego_gen_krb5_wrap(ap_rep, TOK_ID_KRB_AP_REP);
|
|
} else {
|
|
ap_rep_wrapped = data_blob(NULL, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
response = spnego_gen_auth_response(&ap_rep_wrapped, ret, OID_KERBEROS5_OLD);
|
|
reply_sesssetup_blob(conn, outbuf, response, ret);
|
|
|
|
data_blob_free(&ap_rep);
|
|
data_blob_free(&ap_rep_wrapped);
|
|
data_blob_free(&response);
|
|
talloc_destroy(mem_ctx);
|
|
|
|
return -1; /* already replied */
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Send a session setup reply, wrapped in SPNEGO.
|
|
Get vuid and check first.
|
|
End the NTLMSSP exchange context if we are OK/complete fail
|
|
This should be split into two functions, one to handle each
|
|
leg of the NTLM auth steps.
|
|
***************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
static BOOL reply_spnego_ntlmssp(connection_struct *conn, char *inbuf, char *outbuf,
|
|
uint16 vuid,
|
|
AUTH_NTLMSSP_STATE **auth_ntlmssp_state,
|
|
DATA_BLOB *ntlmssp_blob, NTSTATUS nt_status,
|
|
BOOL wrap)
|
|
{
|
|
BOOL ret;
|
|
DATA_BLOB response;
|
|
struct auth_serversupplied_info *server_info = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
|
|
server_info = (*auth_ntlmssp_state)->server_info;
|
|
} else {
|
|
nt_status = do_map_to_guest(nt_status,
|
|
&server_info,
|
|
(*auth_ntlmssp_state)->ntlmssp_state->user,
|
|
(*auth_ntlmssp_state)->ntlmssp_state->domain);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
|
|
int sess_vuid;
|
|
DATA_BLOB nullblob = data_blob(NULL, 0);
|
|
DATA_BLOB session_key = data_blob((*auth_ntlmssp_state)->ntlmssp_state->session_key.data, (*auth_ntlmssp_state)->ntlmssp_state->session_key.length);
|
|
|
|
/* register_vuid keeps the server info */
|
|
sess_vuid = register_vuid(server_info, session_key, nullblob, (*auth_ntlmssp_state)->ntlmssp_state->user);
|
|
(*auth_ntlmssp_state)->server_info = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (sess_vuid == -1) {
|
|
nt_status = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* current_user_info is changed on new vuid */
|
|
reload_services( True );
|
|
|
|
set_message(outbuf,4,0,True);
|
|
SSVAL(outbuf, smb_vwv3, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (server_info->guest) {
|
|
SSVAL(outbuf,smb_vwv2,1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SSVAL(outbuf,smb_uid,sess_vuid);
|
|
|
|
sessionsetup_start_signing_engine(server_info, inbuf);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (wrap) {
|
|
response = spnego_gen_auth_response(ntlmssp_blob, nt_status, OID_NTLMSSP);
|
|
} else {
|
|
response = *ntlmssp_blob;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = reply_sesssetup_blob(conn, outbuf, response, nt_status);
|
|
if (wrap) {
|
|
data_blob_free(&response);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED from our NTLMSSP code tells us,
|
|
and the other end, that we are not finished yet. */
|
|
|
|
if (!ret || !NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED)) {
|
|
/* NB. This is *NOT* an error case. JRA */
|
|
auth_ntlmssp_end(auth_ntlmssp_state);
|
|
/* Kill the intermediate vuid */
|
|
invalidate_vuid(vuid);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Reply to a session setup spnego negotiate packet.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
static int reply_spnego_negotiate(connection_struct *conn,
|
|
char *inbuf,
|
|
char *outbuf,
|
|
uint16 vuid,
|
|
int length, int bufsize,
|
|
DATA_BLOB blob1,
|
|
AUTH_NTLMSSP_STATE **auth_ntlmssp_state)
|
|
{
|
|
char *OIDs[ASN1_MAX_OIDS];
|
|
DATA_BLOB secblob;
|
|
int i;
|
|
DATA_BLOB chal;
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_KRB5
|
|
BOOL got_kerberos_mechanism = False;
|
|
#endif
|
|
NTSTATUS nt_status;
|
|
|
|
/* parse out the OIDs and the first sec blob */
|
|
if (!parse_negTokenTarg(blob1, OIDs, &secblob)) {
|
|
/* Kill the intermediate vuid */
|
|
invalidate_vuid(vuid);
|
|
|
|
return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* only look at the first OID for determining the mechToken --
|
|
accoirding to RFC2478, we should choose the one we want
|
|
and renegotiate, but i smell a client bug here..
|
|
|
|
Problem observed when connecting to a member (samba box)
|
|
of an AD domain as a user in a Samba domain. Samba member
|
|
server sent back krb5/mskrb5/ntlmssp as mechtypes, but the
|
|
client (2ksp3) replied with ntlmssp/mskrb5/krb5 and an
|
|
NTLMSSP mechtoken. --jerry */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_KRB5
|
|
if (strcmp(OID_KERBEROS5, OIDs[0]) == 0 ||
|
|
strcmp(OID_KERBEROS5_OLD, OIDs[0]) == 0) {
|
|
got_kerberos_mechanism = True;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
for (i=0;OIDs[i];i++) {
|
|
DEBUG(3,("Got OID %s\n", OIDs[i]));
|
|
free(OIDs[i]);
|
|
}
|
|
DEBUG(3,("Got secblob of size %lu\n", (unsigned long)secblob.length));
|
|
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_KRB5
|
|
if ( got_kerberos_mechanism && ((lp_security()==SEC_ADS) || lp_use_kerberos_keytab()) ) {
|
|
int ret = reply_spnego_kerberos(conn, inbuf, outbuf,
|
|
length, bufsize, &secblob);
|
|
data_blob_free(&secblob);
|
|
/* Kill the intermediate vuid */
|
|
invalidate_vuid(vuid);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (*auth_ntlmssp_state) {
|
|
auth_ntlmssp_end(auth_ntlmssp_state);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nt_status = auth_ntlmssp_start(auth_ntlmssp_state);
|
|
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
|
|
/* Kill the intermediate vuid */
|
|
invalidate_vuid(vuid);
|
|
|
|
return ERROR_NT(nt_status);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nt_status = auth_ntlmssp_update(*auth_ntlmssp_state,
|
|
secblob, &chal);
|
|
|
|
data_blob_free(&secblob);
|
|
|
|
reply_spnego_ntlmssp(conn, inbuf, outbuf, vuid, auth_ntlmssp_state,
|
|
&chal, nt_status, True);
|
|
|
|
data_blob_free(&chal);
|
|
|
|
/* already replied */
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Reply to a session setup spnego auth packet.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
static int reply_spnego_auth(connection_struct *conn, char *inbuf, char *outbuf,
|
|
uint16 vuid,
|
|
int length, int bufsize,
|
|
DATA_BLOB blob1,
|
|
AUTH_NTLMSSP_STATE **auth_ntlmssp_state)
|
|
{
|
|
DATA_BLOB auth, auth_reply;
|
|
NTSTATUS nt_status = NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
|
|
|
|
if (!spnego_parse_auth(blob1, &auth)) {
|
|
#if 0
|
|
file_save("auth.dat", blob1.data, blob1.length);
|
|
#endif
|
|
/* Kill the intermediate vuid */
|
|
invalidate_vuid(vuid);
|
|
|
|
return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!*auth_ntlmssp_state) {
|
|
/* Kill the intermediate vuid */
|
|
invalidate_vuid(vuid);
|
|
|
|
/* auth before negotiatiate? */
|
|
return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nt_status = auth_ntlmssp_update(*auth_ntlmssp_state,
|
|
auth, &auth_reply);
|
|
|
|
data_blob_free(&auth);
|
|
|
|
reply_spnego_ntlmssp(conn, inbuf, outbuf, vuid,
|
|
auth_ntlmssp_state,
|
|
&auth_reply, nt_status, True);
|
|
|
|
data_blob_free(&auth_reply);
|
|
|
|
/* and tell smbd that we have already replied to this packet */
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Reply to a session setup command.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
static int reply_sesssetup_and_X_spnego(connection_struct *conn, char *inbuf,
|
|
char *outbuf,
|
|
int length,int bufsize)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8 *p;
|
|
DATA_BLOB blob1;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
size_t bufrem;
|
|
fstring native_os, native_lanman, primary_domain;
|
|
char *p2;
|
|
uint16 data_blob_len = SVAL(inbuf, smb_vwv7);
|
|
enum remote_arch_types ra_type = get_remote_arch();
|
|
int vuid = SVAL(inbuf,smb_uid);
|
|
user_struct *vuser = NULL;
|
|
|
|
DEBUG(3,("Doing spnego session setup\n"));
|
|
|
|
if (global_client_caps == 0) {
|
|
global_client_caps = IVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv10);
|
|
|
|
if (!(global_client_caps & CAP_STATUS32)) {
|
|
remove_from_common_flags2(FLAGS2_32_BIT_ERROR_CODES);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p = (uint8 *)smb_buf(inbuf);
|
|
|
|
if (data_blob_len == 0) {
|
|
/* an invalid request */
|
|
return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bufrem = smb_bufrem(inbuf, p);
|
|
/* pull the spnego blob */
|
|
blob1 = data_blob(p, MIN(bufrem, data_blob_len));
|
|
|
|
#if 0
|
|
file_save("negotiate.dat", blob1.data, blob1.length);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
p2 = inbuf + smb_vwv13 + data_blob_len;
|
|
p2 += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, native_os, p2, sizeof(native_os), STR_TERMINATE);
|
|
p2 += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, native_lanman, p2, sizeof(native_lanman), STR_TERMINATE);
|
|
p2 += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, primary_domain, p2, sizeof(primary_domain), STR_TERMINATE);
|
|
DEBUG(3,("NativeOS=[%s] NativeLanMan=[%s] PrimaryDomain=[%s]\n",
|
|
native_os, native_lanman, primary_domain));
|
|
|
|
if ( ra_type == RA_WIN2K ) {
|
|
/* Windows 2003 doesn't set the native lanman string,
|
|
but does set primary domain which is a bug I think */
|
|
|
|
if ( !strlen(native_lanman) )
|
|
ra_lanman_string( primary_domain );
|
|
else
|
|
ra_lanman_string( native_lanman );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
vuser = get_partial_auth_user_struct(vuid);
|
|
if (!vuser) {
|
|
vuid = register_vuid(NULL, data_blob(NULL, 0), data_blob(NULL, 0), NULL);
|
|
if (vuid == -1) {
|
|
return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
vuser = get_partial_auth_user_struct(vuid);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!vuser) {
|
|
return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SSVAL(outbuf,smb_uid,vuid);
|
|
|
|
if (blob1.data[0] == ASN1_APPLICATION(0)) {
|
|
/* its a negTokenTarg packet */
|
|
ret = reply_spnego_negotiate(conn, inbuf, outbuf, vuid, length, bufsize, blob1,
|
|
&vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state);
|
|
data_blob_free(&blob1);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (blob1.data[0] == ASN1_CONTEXT(1)) {
|
|
/* its a auth packet */
|
|
ret = reply_spnego_auth(conn, inbuf, outbuf, vuid, length, bufsize, blob1,
|
|
&vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state);
|
|
data_blob_free(&blob1);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (strncmp((char *)(blob1.data), "NTLMSSP", 7) == 0) {
|
|
DATA_BLOB chal;
|
|
NTSTATUS nt_status;
|
|
if (!vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state) {
|
|
nt_status = auth_ntlmssp_start(&vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state);
|
|
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
|
|
/* Kill the intermediate vuid */
|
|
invalidate_vuid(vuid);
|
|
|
|
return ERROR_NT(nt_status);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nt_status = auth_ntlmssp_update(vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state,
|
|
blob1, &chal);
|
|
|
|
data_blob_free(&blob1);
|
|
|
|
reply_spnego_ntlmssp(conn, inbuf, outbuf, vuid,
|
|
&vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state,
|
|
&chal, nt_status, False);
|
|
data_blob_free(&chal);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* what sort of packet is this? */
|
|
DEBUG(1,("Unknown packet in reply_sesssetup_and_X_spnego\n"));
|
|
|
|
data_blob_free(&blob1);
|
|
|
|
return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
On new VC == 0, shutdown *all* old connections and users.
|
|
It seems that only NT4.x does this. At W2K and above (XP etc.).
|
|
a new session setup with VC==0 is ignored.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
static int shutdown_other_smbds(TDB_CONTEXT *tdb, TDB_DATA kbuf, TDB_DATA dbuf,
|
|
void *p)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sessionid *sessionid = (struct sessionid *)dbuf.dptr;
|
|
const char *ip = (const char *)p;
|
|
|
|
if (!process_exists(pid_to_procid(sessionid->pid))) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sessionid->pid == sys_getpid()) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(ip, sessionid->ip_addr) != 0) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
message_send_pid(pid_to_procid(sessionid->pid), MSG_SHUTDOWN,
|
|
NULL, 0, True);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void setup_new_vc_session(void)
|
|
{
|
|
DEBUG(2,("setup_new_vc_session: New VC == 0, if NT4.x compatible we would close all old resources.\n"));
|
|
#if 0
|
|
conn_close_all();
|
|
invalidate_all_vuids();
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (lp_reset_on_zero_vc()) {
|
|
session_traverse(shutdown_other_smbds, client_addr());
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Reply to a session setup command.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
int reply_sesssetup_and_X(connection_struct *conn, char *inbuf,char *outbuf,
|
|
int length,int bufsize)
|
|
{
|
|
int sess_vuid;
|
|
int smb_bufsize;
|
|
DATA_BLOB lm_resp;
|
|
DATA_BLOB nt_resp;
|
|
DATA_BLOB plaintext_password;
|
|
fstring user;
|
|
fstring sub_user; /* Sainitised username for substituion */
|
|
fstring domain;
|
|
fstring native_os;
|
|
fstring native_lanman;
|
|
fstring primary_domain;
|
|
static BOOL done_sesssetup = False;
|
|
extern BOOL global_encrypted_passwords_negotiated;
|
|
extern BOOL global_spnego_negotiated;
|
|
extern enum protocol_types Protocol;
|
|
extern int max_send;
|
|
|
|
auth_usersupplied_info *user_info = NULL;
|
|
extern struct auth_context *negprot_global_auth_context;
|
|
auth_serversupplied_info *server_info = NULL;
|
|
|
|
NTSTATUS nt_status;
|
|
|
|
BOOL doencrypt = global_encrypted_passwords_negotiated;
|
|
|
|
DATA_BLOB session_key;
|
|
|
|
START_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
|
|
|
|
ZERO_STRUCT(lm_resp);
|
|
ZERO_STRUCT(nt_resp);
|
|
ZERO_STRUCT(plaintext_password);
|
|
|
|
DEBUG(3,("wct=%d flg2=0x%x\n", CVAL(inbuf, smb_wct), SVAL(inbuf, smb_flg2)));
|
|
|
|
/* a SPNEGO session setup has 12 command words, whereas a normal
|
|
NT1 session setup has 13. See the cifs spec. */
|
|
if (CVAL(inbuf, smb_wct) == 12 &&
|
|
(SVAL(inbuf, smb_flg2) & FLAGS2_EXTENDED_SECURITY)) {
|
|
if (!global_spnego_negotiated) {
|
|
DEBUG(0,("reply_sesssetup_and_X: Rejecting attempt at SPNEGO session setup when it was not negoitiated.\n"));
|
|
return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv4) == 0) {
|
|
setup_new_vc_session();
|
|
}
|
|
return reply_sesssetup_and_X_spnego(conn, inbuf, outbuf, length, bufsize);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
smb_bufsize = SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv2);
|
|
|
|
if (Protocol < PROTOCOL_NT1) {
|
|
uint16 passlen1 = SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv7);
|
|
|
|
/* Never do NT status codes with protocols before NT1 as we don't get client caps. */
|
|
remove_from_common_flags2(FLAGS2_32_BIT_ERROR_CODES);
|
|
|
|
if ((passlen1 > MAX_PASS_LEN) || (passlen1 > smb_bufrem(inbuf, smb_buf(inbuf)))) {
|
|
return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (doencrypt) {
|
|
lm_resp = data_blob(smb_buf(inbuf), passlen1);
|
|
} else {
|
|
plaintext_password = data_blob(smb_buf(inbuf), passlen1+1);
|
|
/* Ensure null termination */
|
|
plaintext_password.data[passlen1] = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, user, smb_buf(inbuf)+passlen1, sizeof(user), STR_TERMINATE);
|
|
*domain = 0;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
uint16 passlen1 = SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv7);
|
|
uint16 passlen2 = SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv8);
|
|
enum remote_arch_types ra_type = get_remote_arch();
|
|
char *p = smb_buf(inbuf);
|
|
char *save_p = smb_buf(inbuf);
|
|
uint16 byte_count;
|
|
|
|
|
|
if(global_client_caps == 0) {
|
|
global_client_caps = IVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv11);
|
|
|
|
if (!(global_client_caps & CAP_STATUS32)) {
|
|
remove_from_common_flags2(FLAGS2_32_BIT_ERROR_CODES);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* client_caps is used as final determination if client is NT or Win95.
|
|
This is needed to return the correct error codes in some
|
|
circumstances.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if(ra_type == RA_WINNT || ra_type == RA_WIN2K || ra_type == RA_WIN95) {
|
|
if(!(global_client_caps & (CAP_NT_SMBS | CAP_STATUS32))) {
|
|
set_remote_arch( RA_WIN95);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!doencrypt) {
|
|
/* both Win95 and WinNT stuff up the password lengths for
|
|
non-encrypting systems. Uggh.
|
|
|
|
if passlen1==24 its a win95 system, and its setting the
|
|
password length incorrectly. Luckily it still works with the
|
|
default code because Win95 will null terminate the password
|
|
anyway
|
|
|
|
if passlen1>0 and passlen2>0 then maybe its a NT box and its
|
|
setting passlen2 to some random value which really stuffs
|
|
things up. we need to fix that one. */
|
|
|
|
if (passlen1 > 0 && passlen2 > 0 && passlen2 != 24 && passlen2 != 1)
|
|
passlen2 = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* check for nasty tricks */
|
|
if (passlen1 > MAX_PASS_LEN || passlen1 > smb_bufrem(inbuf, p)) {
|
|
return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (passlen2 > MAX_PASS_LEN || passlen2 > smb_bufrem(inbuf, p+passlen1)) {
|
|
return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Save the lanman2 password and the NT md4 password. */
|
|
|
|
if ((doencrypt) && (passlen1 != 0) && (passlen1 != 24)) {
|
|
doencrypt = False;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (doencrypt) {
|
|
lm_resp = data_blob(p, passlen1);
|
|
nt_resp = data_blob(p+passlen1, passlen2);
|
|
} else {
|
|
pstring pass;
|
|
BOOL unic=SVAL(inbuf, smb_flg2) & FLAGS2_UNICODE_STRINGS;
|
|
|
|
#if 0
|
|
/* This was the previous fix. Not sure if it's still valid. JRA. */
|
|
if ((ra_type == RA_WINNT) && (passlen2 == 0) && unic && passlen1) {
|
|
/* NT4.0 stuffs up plaintext unicode password lengths... */
|
|
srvstr_pull(inbuf, pass, smb_buf(inbuf) + 1,
|
|
sizeof(pass), passlen1, STR_TERMINATE);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (unic && (passlen2 == 0) && passlen1) {
|
|
/* Only a ascii plaintext password was sent. */
|
|
srvstr_pull(inbuf, pass, smb_buf(inbuf), sizeof(pass),
|
|
passlen1, STR_TERMINATE|STR_ASCII);
|
|
} else {
|
|
srvstr_pull(inbuf, pass, smb_buf(inbuf),
|
|
sizeof(pass), unic ? passlen2 : passlen1,
|
|
STR_TERMINATE);
|
|
}
|
|
plaintext_password = data_blob(pass, strlen(pass)+1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p += passlen1 + passlen2;
|
|
p += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, user, p, sizeof(user), STR_TERMINATE);
|
|
p += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, domain, p, sizeof(domain), STR_TERMINATE);
|
|
p += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, native_os, p, sizeof(native_os), STR_TERMINATE);
|
|
p += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, native_lanman, p, sizeof(native_lanman), STR_TERMINATE);
|
|
|
|
/* not documented or decoded by Ethereal but there is one more string
|
|
in the extra bytes which is the same as the PrimaryDomain when using
|
|
extended security. Windows NT 4 and 2003 use this string to store
|
|
the native lanman string. Windows 9x does not include a string here
|
|
at all so we have to check if we have any extra bytes left */
|
|
|
|
byte_count = SVAL(inbuf, smb_vwv13);
|
|
if ( PTR_DIFF(p, save_p) < byte_count)
|
|
p += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, primary_domain, p, sizeof(primary_domain), STR_TERMINATE);
|
|
else
|
|
fstrcpy( primary_domain, "null" );
|
|
|
|
DEBUG(3,("Domain=[%s] NativeOS=[%s] NativeLanMan=[%s] PrimaryDomain=[%s]\n",
|
|
domain, native_os, native_lanman, primary_domain));
|
|
|
|
if ( ra_type == RA_WIN2K ) {
|
|
if ( strlen(native_lanman) == 0 )
|
|
ra_lanman_string( primary_domain );
|
|
else
|
|
ra_lanman_string( native_lanman );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv4) == 0) {
|
|
setup_new_vc_session();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DEBUG(3,("sesssetupX:name=[%s]\\[%s]@[%s]\n", domain, user, get_remote_machine_name()));
|
|
|
|
if (*user) {
|
|
if (global_spnego_negotiated) {
|
|
|
|
/* This has to be here, because this is a perfectly valid behaviour for guest logons :-( */
|
|
|
|
DEBUG(0,("reply_sesssetup_and_X: Rejecting attempt at 'normal' session setup after negotiating spnego.\n"));
|
|
return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
|
|
}
|
|
fstrcpy(sub_user, user);
|
|
} else {
|
|
fstrcpy(sub_user, lp_guestaccount());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sub_set_smb_name(sub_user);
|
|
|
|
reload_services(True);
|
|
|
|
if (lp_security() == SEC_SHARE) {
|
|
/* in share level we should ignore any passwords */
|
|
|
|
data_blob_free(&lm_resp);
|
|
data_blob_free(&nt_resp);
|
|
data_blob_clear_free(&plaintext_password);
|
|
|
|
map_username(sub_user);
|
|
add_session_user(sub_user);
|
|
/* Then force it to null for the benfit of the code below */
|
|
*user = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!*user) {
|
|
|
|
nt_status = check_guest_password(&server_info);
|
|
|
|
} else if (doencrypt) {
|
|
if (!negprot_global_auth_context) {
|
|
DEBUG(0, ("reply_sesssetup_and_X: Attempted encrypted session setup without negprot denied!\n"));
|
|
return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
|
|
}
|
|
nt_status = make_user_info_for_reply_enc(&user_info, user, domain,
|
|
lm_resp, nt_resp);
|
|
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
|
|
nt_status = negprot_global_auth_context->check_ntlm_password(negprot_global_auth_context,
|
|
user_info,
|
|
&server_info);
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
struct auth_context *plaintext_auth_context = NULL;
|
|
const uint8 *chal;
|
|
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status = make_auth_context_subsystem(&plaintext_auth_context))) {
|
|
chal = plaintext_auth_context->get_ntlm_challenge(plaintext_auth_context);
|
|
|
|
if (!make_user_info_for_reply(&user_info,
|
|
user, domain, chal,
|
|
plaintext_password)) {
|
|
nt_status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
|
|
nt_status = plaintext_auth_context->check_ntlm_password(plaintext_auth_context,
|
|
user_info,
|
|
&server_info);
|
|
|
|
(plaintext_auth_context->free)(&plaintext_auth_context);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
free_user_info(&user_info);
|
|
|
|
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
|
|
nt_status = do_map_to_guest(nt_status, &server_info, user, domain);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
|
|
data_blob_free(&nt_resp);
|
|
data_blob_free(&lm_resp);
|
|
data_blob_clear_free(&plaintext_password);
|
|
return ERROR_NT(nt_status_squash(nt_status));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nt_status = create_local_token(server_info);
|
|
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
|
|
DEBUG(10, ("create_local_token failed: %s\n",
|
|
nt_errstr(nt_status)));
|
|
data_blob_free(&nt_resp);
|
|
data_blob_free(&lm_resp);
|
|
data_blob_clear_free(&plaintext_password);
|
|
return ERROR_NT(nt_status_squash(nt_status));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (server_info->user_session_key.data) {
|
|
session_key = data_blob(server_info->user_session_key.data, server_info->user_session_key.length);
|
|
} else {
|
|
session_key = data_blob(NULL, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
data_blob_clear_free(&plaintext_password);
|
|
|
|
/* it's ok - setup a reply */
|
|
set_message(outbuf,3,0,True);
|
|
if (Protocol >= PROTOCOL_NT1) {
|
|
char *p = smb_buf( outbuf );
|
|
p += add_signature( outbuf, p );
|
|
set_message_end( outbuf, p );
|
|
/* perhaps grab OS version here?? */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (server_info->guest) {
|
|
SSVAL(outbuf,smb_vwv2,1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* register the name and uid as being validated, so further connections
|
|
to a uid can get through without a password, on the same VC */
|
|
|
|
/* register_vuid keeps the server info */
|
|
sess_vuid = register_vuid(server_info, session_key, nt_resp.data ? nt_resp : lm_resp, sub_user);
|
|
data_blob_free(&nt_resp);
|
|
data_blob_free(&lm_resp);
|
|
|
|
if (sess_vuid == -1) {
|
|
return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* current_user_info is changed on new vuid */
|
|
reload_services( True );
|
|
|
|
sessionsetup_start_signing_engine(server_info, inbuf);
|
|
|
|
SSVAL(outbuf,smb_uid,sess_vuid);
|
|
SSVAL(inbuf,smb_uid,sess_vuid);
|
|
|
|
if (!done_sesssetup)
|
|
max_send = MIN(max_send,smb_bufsize);
|
|
|
|
done_sesssetup = True;
|
|
|
|
END_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
|
|
return chain_reply(inbuf,outbuf,length,bufsize);
|
|
}
|