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samba-mirror/source4/kdc/db-glue.c
Andrew Bartlett 89ee9e6518 s4-kdc Handle the case where we may be given a ticket from an RODC in db layer
This includes rewriting the PAC if the original krbtgt isn't to be
trusted, and reading different entries from the DB for the krbtgt
depending on the krbtgt number.

Andrew Bartlett
2010-09-29 04:23:07 +10:00

1734 lines
50 KiB
C

/*
Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
Database Glue between Samba and the KDC
Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2005-2009
Copyright (C) Simo Sorce <idra@samba.org> 2010
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include "system/time.h"
#include "../libds/common/flags.h"
#include "lib/ldb/include/ldb.h"
#include "librpc/gen_ndr/netlogon.h"
#include "libcli/security/security.h"
#include "auth/auth.h"
#include "auth/credentials/credentials.h"
#include "auth/auth_sam.h"
#include "../lib/util/util_ldb.h"
#include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h"
#include "dsdb/common/util.h"
#include "librpc/ndr/libndr.h"
#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_drsblobs.h"
#include "librpc/gen_ndr/lsa.h"
#include "libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
#include "param/param.h"
#include "../lib/crypto/md4.h"
#include "system/kerberos.h"
#include "auth/kerberos/kerberos.h"
#include <hdb.h>
#include "kdc/samba_kdc.h"
#include "kdc/db-glue.h"
enum samba_kdc_ent_type
{ SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_TRUST, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY };
enum trust_direction {
UNKNOWN = 0,
INBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_INBOUND,
OUTBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND
};
static const char *trust_attrs[] = {
"trustPartner",
"trustAuthIncoming",
"trustAuthOutgoing",
"whenCreated",
"msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
"trustAttributes",
"trustDirection",
"trustType",
NULL
};
static KerberosTime ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(struct ldb_message *msg, const char *attr, KerberosTime default_val)
{
const char *tmp;
const char *gentime;
struct tm tm;
gentime = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, attr, NULL);
if (!gentime)
return default_val;
tmp = strptime(gentime, "%Y%m%d%H%M%SZ", &tm);
if (tmp == NULL) {
return default_val;
}
return timegm(&tm);
}
static HDBFlags uf2HDBFlags(krb5_context context, int userAccountControl, enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type)
{
HDBFlags flags = int2HDBFlags(0);
/* we don't allow kadmin deletes */
flags.immutable = 1;
/* mark the principal as invalid to start with */
flags.invalid = 1;
flags.renewable = 1;
/* All accounts are servers, but this may be disabled again in the caller */
flags.server = 1;
/* Account types - clear the invalid bit if it turns out to be valid */
if (userAccountControl & UF_NORMAL_ACCOUNT) {
if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
flags.client = 1;
}
flags.invalid = 0;
}
if (userAccountControl & UF_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
flags.client = 1;
}
flags.invalid = 0;
}
if (userAccountControl & UF_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
flags.client = 1;
}
flags.invalid = 0;
}
if (userAccountControl & UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
flags.client = 1;
}
flags.invalid = 0;
}
/* Not permitted to act as a client if disabled */
if (userAccountControl & UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE) {
flags.client = 0;
}
if (userAccountControl & UF_LOCKOUT) {
flags.invalid = 1;
}
/*
if (userAccountControl & UF_PASSWORD_NOTREQD) {
flags.invalid = 1;
}
*/
/*
UF_PASSWORD_CANT_CHANGE and UF_ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PASSWORD_ALLOWED are irrelevent
*/
if (userAccountControl & UF_TEMP_DUPLICATE_ACCOUNT) {
flags.invalid = 1;
}
/* UF_DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD and UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY handled in samba_kdc_message2entry() */
/*
if (userAccountControl & UF_MNS_LOGON_ACCOUNT) {
flags.invalid = 1;
}
*/
if (userAccountControl & UF_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED) {
flags.require_hwauth = 1;
}
if (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION) {
flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
}
if (!(userAccountControl & UF_NOT_DELEGATED)) {
flags.forwardable = 1;
flags.proxiable = 1;
}
if (userAccountControl & UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH) {
flags.require_preauth = 0;
} else {
flags.require_preauth = 1;
}
return flags;
}
static int samba_kdc_entry_destructor(struct samba_kdc_entry *p)
{
hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex = p->entry_ex;
free_hdb_entry(&entry_ex->entry);
return 0;
}
static void samba_kdc_free_entry(krb5_context context, hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
{
/* this function is called only from hdb_free_entry().
* Make sure we neutralize the destructor or we will
* get a double free later when hdb_free_entry() will
* try to call free_hdb_entry() */
talloc_set_destructor(entry_ex->ctx, NULL);
/* now proceed to free the talloc part */
talloc_free(entry_ex->ctx);
}
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(krb5_context context,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct ldb_message *msg,
uint32_t rid,
unsigned int userAccountControl,
enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type,
hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
{
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
struct samr_Password *hash;
const struct ldb_val *sc_val;
struct supplementalCredentialsBlob scb;
struct supplementalCredentialsPackage *scpk = NULL;
bool newer_keys = false;
struct package_PrimaryKerberosBlob _pkb;
struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr3 *pkb3 = NULL;
struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr4 *pkb4 = NULL;
uint16_t i;
uint16_t allocated_keys = 0;
int rodc_krbtgt_number = 0;
bool is_rodc = false;
/* Supported Enc for this entry */
uint32_t supported_enctypes = ENC_ALL_TYPES; /* by default, we support all enc types */
/* However, if this is a TGS-REQ, then lock it down to a
* reasonable guess as to what the server can decode. The
* krbtgt is special - default to use what is stored for the KDC */
if (rid != DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT && ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) {
/* This is the standard set for a server that has not declared a msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes */
supported_enctypes = ENC_CRC32 | ENC_RSA_MD5 | ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5;
}
supported_enctypes = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg, "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
supported_enctypes);
/* Is this the krbtgt or a RODC */
if (ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber")) {
is_rodc = true;
rodc_krbtgt_number = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1);
if (rodc_krbtgt_number == -1) {
return EINVAL;
}
}
if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT || is_rodc) {
/* Be double-sure never to use DES here */
supported_enctypes &= ~(ENC_CRC32|ENC_RSA_MD5);
}
switch (ent_type) {
case SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT:
case SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_TRUST:
/* Disallow krbtgt and trust tickets to be DES encrypted, it's just too dangerous */
supported_enctypes &= ~(ENC_CRC32|ENC_RSA_MD5);
break;
default:
break;
/* No further restrictions */
}
/* If UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY has been set, then don't allow use of the newer enc types */
if (userAccountControl & UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY) {
/* However, don't allow use of DES, if we were told not to by msDS-SupportedEncTypes */
supported_enctypes &= ENC_CRC32|ENC_RSA_MD5;
}
entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
entry_ex->entry.kvno = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber", 0);
if (is_rodc) {
entry_ex->entry.kvno |= (rodc_krbtgt_number << 16);
}
/* Get keys from the db */
hash = samdb_result_hash(mem_ctx, msg, "unicodePwd");
sc_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "supplementalCredentials");
/* unicodePwd for enctype 0x17 (23) if present */
if (hash) {
allocated_keys++;
}
/* supplementalCredentials if present */
if (sc_val) {
ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob_all(sc_val, mem_ctx, &scb,
(ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_supplementalCredentialsBlob);
if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
dump_data(0, sc_val->data, sc_val->length);
ret = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (scb.sub.signature != SUPPLEMENTAL_CREDENTIALS_SIGNATURE) {
NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(supplementalCredentialsBlob, &scb);
ret = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
for (i=0; i < scb.sub.num_packages; i++) {
if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) {
scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i];
if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) {
scpk = NULL;
continue;
}
newer_keys = true;
break;
} else if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) {
scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i];
if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) {
scpk = NULL;
}
/*
* we don't break here in hope to find
* a Kerberos-Newer-Keys package
*/
}
}
}
/*
* Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys or Primary:Kerberos element
* of supplementalCredentials
*/
if (scpk) {
DATA_BLOB blob;
blob = strhex_to_data_blob(mem_ctx, scpk->data);
if (!blob.data) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
/* we cannot use ndr_pull_struct_blob_all() here, as w2k and w2k3 add padding bytes */
ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob, mem_ctx, &_pkb,
(ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_package_PrimaryKerberosBlob);
if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
ret = EINVAL;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
goto out;
}
if (newer_keys && _pkb.version != 4) {
ret = EINVAL;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
goto out;
}
if (!newer_keys && _pkb.version != 3) {
ret = EINVAL;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse Primary:Kerberos not version 3");
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse Primary:Kerberos not version 3");
goto out;
}
if (_pkb.version == 4) {
pkb4 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr4;
allocated_keys += pkb4->num_keys;
} else if (_pkb.version == 3) {
pkb3 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr3;
allocated_keys += pkb3->num_keys;
}
}
if (allocated_keys == 0) {
/* oh, no password. Apparently (comment in
* hdb-ldap.c) this violates the ASN.1, but this
* allows an entry with no keys (yet). */
return 0;
}
/* allocate space to decode into */
entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(allocated_keys, sizeof(Key));
if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
if (hash && (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5)) {
Key key;
key.mkvno = 0;
key.salt = NULL; /* No salt for this enc type */
ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
hash->hash, sizeof(hash->hash),
&key.key);
if (ret) {
goto out;
}
entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
}
if (pkb4) {
for (i=0; i < pkb4->num_keys; i++) {
Key key;
if (!pkb4->keys[i].value) continue;
if (!(kerberos_enctype_to_bitmap(pkb4->keys[i].keytype) & supported_enctypes)) {
continue;
}
key.mkvno = 0;
key.salt = NULL;
if (pkb4->salt.string) {
DATA_BLOB salt;
salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb4->salt.string);
key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
if (key.salt == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
key.salt->type = hdb_pw_salt;
ret = krb5_data_copy(&key.salt->salt, salt.data, salt.length);
if (ret) {
free(key.salt);
key.salt = NULL;
goto out;
}
}
/* TODO: maybe pass the iteration_count somehow... */
ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
pkb4->keys[i].keytype,
pkb4->keys[i].value->data,
pkb4->keys[i].value->length,
&key.key);
if (ret == KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP) {
DEBUG(2,("Unsupported keytype ignored - type %u\n",
pkb4->keys[i].keytype));
ret = 0;
continue;
}
if (ret) {
if (key.salt) {
free_Salt(key.salt);
free(key.salt);
key.salt = NULL;
}
goto out;
}
entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
}
} else if (pkb3) {
for (i=0; i < pkb3->num_keys; i++) {
Key key;
if (!pkb3->keys[i].value) continue;
if (!(kerberos_enctype_to_bitmap(pkb3->keys[i].keytype) & supported_enctypes)) {
continue;
}
key.mkvno = 0;
key.salt = NULL;
if (pkb3->salt.string) {
DATA_BLOB salt;
salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb3->salt.string);
key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
if (key.salt == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
key.salt->type = hdb_pw_salt;
ret = krb5_data_copy(&key.salt->salt, salt.data, salt.length);
if (ret) {
free(key.salt);
key.salt = NULL;
goto out;
}
}
ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
pkb3->keys[i].keytype,
pkb3->keys[i].value->data,
pkb3->keys[i].value->length,
&key.key);
if (ret) {
if (key.salt) {
free_Salt(key.salt);
free(key.salt);
key.salt = NULL;
}
goto out;
}
entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
}
}
out:
if (ret != 0) {
entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
}
if (entry_ex->entry.keys.len == 0 && entry_ex->entry.keys.val) {
free(entry_ex->entry.keys.val);
entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
}
return ret;
}
/*
* Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
*/
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry(krb5_context context,
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type,
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
struct ldb_message *msg,
hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
{
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
unsigned int userAccountControl;
unsigned int i;
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
krb5_boolean is_computer = FALSE;
char *realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
NTTIME acct_expiry;
NTSTATUS status;
uint32_t rid;
struct ldb_message_element *objectclasses;
struct ldb_val computer_val;
const char *samAccountName = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "samAccountName", NULL);
computer_val.data = discard_const_p(uint8_t,"computer");
computer_val.length = strlen((const char *)computer_val.data);
if (!samAccountName) {
ret = ENOENT;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry: no samAccountName present");
goto out;
}
objectclasses = ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "objectClass");
if (objectclasses && ldb_msg_find_val(objectclasses, &computer_val)) {
is_computer = TRUE;
}
memset(entry_ex, 0, sizeof(*entry_ex));
if (!realm) {
ret = ENOMEM;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc_strdup: out of memory");
goto out;
}
p = talloc(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
if (!p) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx;
p->entry_ex = entry_ex;
p->realm_dn = talloc_reference(p, realm_dn);
if (!p->realm_dn) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor);
/* make sure we do not have bogus data in there */
memset(&entry_ex->entry, 0, sizeof(hdb_entry));
entry_ex->ctx = p;
entry_ex->free_entry = samba_kdc_free_entry;
userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg, "userAccountControl", 0);
entry_ex->entry.principal = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.principal)));
if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY && principal == NULL) {
krb5_make_principal(context, &entry_ex->entry.principal, realm, samAccountName, NULL);
} else {
ret = copy_Principal(principal, entry_ex->entry.principal);
if (ret) {
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
goto out;
}
/* While we have copied the client principal, tests
* show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
* the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
* replace the client principal's realm with the one
* we determine from our records */
/* this has to be with malloc() */
krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, realm);
}
/* First try and figure out the flags based on the userAccountControl */
entry_ex->entry.flags = uf2HDBFlags(context, userAccountControl, ent_type);
/* Windows 2008 seems to enforce this (very sensible) rule by
* default - don't allow offline attacks on a user's password
* by asking for a ticket to them as a service (encrypted with
* their probably patheticly insecure password) */
if (entry_ex->entry.flags.server
&& lpcfg_parm_bool(lp_ctx, NULL, "kdc", "require spn for service", true)) {
if (!is_computer && !ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "servicePrincipalName", NULL)) {
entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 0;
}
}
{
/* These (created_by, modified_by) parts of the entry are not relevant for Samba4's use
* of the Heimdal KDC. They are stored in a the traditional
* DB for audit purposes, and still form part of the structure
* we must return */
/* use 'whenCreated' */
entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
/* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
krb5_make_principal(context,
&entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal,
realm, "kadmin", NULL);
entry_ex->entry.modified_by = (Event *) malloc(sizeof(Event));
if (entry_ex->entry.modified_by == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "malloc: out of memory");
goto out;
}
/* use 'whenChanged' */
entry_ex->entry.modified_by->time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenChanged", 0);
/* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
krb5_make_principal(context,
&entry_ex->entry.modified_by->principal,
realm, "kadmin", NULL);
}
/* The lack of password controls etc applies to krbtgt by
* virtue of being that particular RID */
status = dom_sid_split_rid(NULL, samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid"), NULL, &rid);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
ret = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT) {
entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
/* Don't mark all requests for the krbtgt/realm as
* 'change password', as otherwise we could get into
* trouble, and not enforce the password expirty.
* Instead, only do it when request is for the kpasswd service */
if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER
&& principal->name.name_string.len == 2
&& (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], "kadmin") == 0)
&& (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[1], "changepw") == 0)
&& lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->realm)) {
entry_ex->entry.flags.change_pw = 1;
}
entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
entry_ex->entry.flags.forwardable = 1;
entry_ex->entry.flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
} else if (entry_ex->entry.flags.server && ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) {
/* The account/password expiry only applies when the account is used as a
* client (ie password login), not when used as a server */
/* Make very well sure we don't use this for a client,
* it could bypass the password restrictions */
entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
} else {
NTTIME must_change_time
= samdb_result_force_password_change(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
realm_dn, msg);
if (must_change_time == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
} else {
entry_ex->entry.pw_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.pw_end));
if (entry_ex->entry.pw_end == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
*entry_ex->entry.pw_end = nt_time_to_unix(must_change_time);
}
acct_expiry = samdb_result_account_expires(msg);
if (acct_expiry == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
} else {
entry_ex->entry.valid_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.valid_end));
if (entry_ex->entry.valid_end == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
*entry_ex->entry.valid_end = nt_time_to_unix(acct_expiry);
}
}
entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
entry_ex->entry.max_life = NULL;
entry_ex->entry.max_renew = NULL;
entry_ex->entry.generation = NULL;
/* Get keys from the db */
ret = samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(context, p, msg,
rid, userAccountControl,
ent_type, entry_ex);
if (ret) {
/* Could be bougus data in the entry, or out of memory */
goto out;
}
entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes)));
if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) {
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
entry_ex->entry.etypes->len = entry_ex->entry.keys.len;
entry_ex->entry.etypes->val = calloc(entry_ex->entry.etypes->len, sizeof(int));
if (entry_ex->entry.etypes->val == NULL) {
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
for (i=0; i < entry_ex->entry.etypes->len; i++) {
entry_ex->entry.etypes->val[i] = entry_ex->entry.keys.val[i].key.keytype;
}
p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
out:
if (ret != 0) {
/* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
hdb_free_entry(context, entry_ex);
} else {
talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, entry_ex->ctx);
}
return ret;
}
/*
* Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
*/
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(krb5_context context,
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
enum trust_direction direction,
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
struct ldb_message *msg,
hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
{
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
const char *dnsdomain;
char *realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
DATA_BLOB password_utf16;
struct samr_Password password_hash;
const struct ldb_val *password_val;
struct trustAuthInOutBlob password_blob;
struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
int ret, trust_direction_flags;
unsigned int i;
p = talloc(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
if (!p) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx;
p->entry_ex = entry_ex;
p->realm_dn = realm_dn;
talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor);
/* make sure we do not have bogus data in there */
memset(&entry_ex->entry, 0, sizeof(hdb_entry));
entry_ex->ctx = p;
entry_ex->free_entry = samba_kdc_free_entry;
/* use 'whenCreated' */
entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
/* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
krb5_make_principal(context,
&entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal,
realm, "kadmin", NULL);
entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
trust_direction_flags = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "trustDirection", 0);
if (direction == INBOUND) {
password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthIncoming");
} else { /* OUTBOUND */
dnsdomain = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "trustPartner", NULL);
/* replace realm */
talloc_free(realm);
realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, dnsdomain);
password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthOutgoing");
}
if (!password_val || !(trust_direction_flags & direction)) {
ret = ENOENT;
goto out;
}
ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(password_val, mem_ctx, &password_blob,
(ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_trustAuthInOutBlob);
if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
ret = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
entry_ex->entry.kvno = -1;
for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) {
if (password_blob.current.array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_VERSION) {
entry_ex->entry.kvno = password_blob.current.array[i].AuthInfo.version.version;
}
}
for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) {
if (password_blob.current.array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_CLEAR) {
password_utf16 = data_blob_const(password_blob.current.array[i].AuthInfo.clear.password,
password_blob.current.array[i].AuthInfo.clear.size);
/* In the future, generate all sorts of
* hashes, but for now we can't safely convert
* the random strings windows uses into
* utf8 */
/* but as it is utf16 already, we can get the NT password/arcfour-hmac-md5 key */
mdfour(password_hash.hash, password_utf16.data, password_utf16.length);
break;
} else if (password_blob.current.array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_NT4OWF) {
password_hash = password_blob.current.array[i].AuthInfo.nt4owf.password;
break;
}
}
if (i < password_blob.count) {
Key key;
/* Must have found a cleartext or MD4 password */
entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(1, sizeof(Key));
key.mkvno = 0;
key.salt = NULL; /* No salt for this enc type */
if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
password_hash.hash, sizeof(password_hash.hash),
&key.key);
entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
}
entry_ex->entry.principal = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.principal)));
ret = copy_Principal(principal, entry_ex->entry.principal);
if (ret) {
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
goto out;
}
/* While we have copied the client principal, tests
* show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
* the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
* replace the client principal's realm with the one
* we determine from our records */
krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, realm);
entry_ex->entry.flags = int2HDBFlags(0);
entry_ex->entry.flags.immutable = 1;
entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
entry_ex->entry.flags.require_preauth = 1;
entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
entry_ex->entry.max_life = NULL;
entry_ex->entry.max_renew = NULL;
entry_ex->entry.generation = NULL;
entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes)));
if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) {
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
entry_ex->entry.etypes->len = entry_ex->entry.keys.len;
entry_ex->entry.etypes->val = calloc(entry_ex->entry.etypes->len, sizeof(int));
if (entry_ex->entry.etypes->val == NULL) {
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
for (i=0; i < entry_ex->entry.etypes->len; i++) {
entry_ex->entry.etypes->val[i] = entry_ex->entry.keys.val[i].key.keytype;
}
p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
out:
if (ret != 0) {
/* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
hdb_free_entry(context, entry_ex);
} else {
talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, entry_ex->ctx);
}
return ret;
}
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_trust(krb5_context context, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
const char *realm,
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
struct ldb_message **pmsg)
{
int lret;
krb5_error_code ret;
char *filter = NULL;
const char * const *attrs = trust_attrs;
struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
filter = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "(&(objectClass=trustedDomain)(|(flatname=%s)(trustPartner=%s)))", realm, realm);
if (!filter) {
ret = ENOMEM;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc_asprintf: out of memory");
return ret;
}
lret = ldb_search(ldb_ctx, mem_ctx, &res,
ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_ctx),
LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, attrs, "%s", filter);
if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
DEBUG(3, ("Failed to search for %s: %s\n", filter, ldb_errstring(ldb_ctx)));
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
} else if (res->count == 0 || res->count > 1) {
DEBUG(3, ("Failed find a single entry for %s: got %d\n", filter, res->count));
talloc_free(res);
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
}
talloc_steal(mem_ctx, res->msgs);
*pmsg = res->msgs[0];
talloc_free(res);
return 0;
}
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_client(krb5_context context,
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
krb5_const_principal principal,
const char **attrs,
struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
struct ldb_message **msg) {
NTSTATUS nt_status;
char *principal_string;
krb5_error_code ret;
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, principal, &principal_string);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
nt_status = sam_get_results_principal(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
mem_ctx, principal_string, attrs,
realm_dn, msg);
free(principal_string);
if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER)) {
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
} else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY)) {
return ENOMEM;
} else if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
return EINVAL;
}
return ret;
}
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_client(krb5_context context,
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
krb5_const_principal principal,
hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex) {
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
krb5_error_code ret;
struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
mem_ctx, principal, user_attrs,
&realm_dn, &msg);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT,
realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
return ret;
}
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(krb5_context context,
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
krb5_const_principal principal,
uint32_t krbtgt_number,
hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
{
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
krb5_error_code ret;
struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
krb5_principal alloc_principal = NULL;
if (principal->name.name_string.len != 2
|| (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], KRB5_TGS_NAME) != 0)) {
/* Not a krbtgt */
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
}
/* krbtgt case. Either us or a trusted realm */
if (lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->realm)
&& lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->name.name_string.val[1])) {
/* us, or someone quite like us */
/* Cludge, cludge cludge. If the realm part of krbtgt/realm,
* is in our db, then direct the caller at our primary
* krbtgt */
int lret;
char *realm_fixed;
if (krbtgt_number == kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number) {
lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
&msg, kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
krbtgt_attrs, 0,
"(objectClass=user)");
} else {
/* We need to look up an RODC krbtgt (perhaps
* ours, if we are an RODC, perhaps another
* RODC if we are a read-write DC */
lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
&msg, realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
krbtgt_attrs,
DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN,
"(&(objectClass=user)(msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber=%u))", (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
}
if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
(unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY,
"samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
(unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
} else if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
(unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY,
"samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
(unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
}
realm_fixed = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
if (!realm_fixed) {
ret = ENOMEM;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "strupper_talloc: out of memory");
return ret;
}
ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, principal, &alloc_principal);
if (ret) {
return ret;
}
free(alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1]);
alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1] = strdup(realm_fixed);
talloc_free(realm_fixed);
if (!alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1]) {
ret = ENOMEM;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: strdup() failed!");
return ret;
}
principal = alloc_principal;
ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT,
realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
if (ret != 0) {
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: self krbtgt message2entry failed");
}
return ret;
} else {
enum trust_direction direction = UNKNOWN;
const char *realm = NULL;
/* Either an inbound or outbound trust */
if (strcasecmp(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), principal->realm) == 0) {
/* look for inbound trust */
direction = INBOUND;
realm = principal->name.name_string.val[1];
} else if (strcasecmp(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), principal->name.name_string.val[1]) == 0) {
/* look for outbound trust */
direction = OUTBOUND;
realm = principal->realm;
} else {
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: not our realm for trusts ('%s', '%s')",
principal->realm, principal->name.name_string.val[1]);
krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY, "samba_kdc_fetch: not our realm for trusts ('%s', '%s')",
principal->realm, principal->name.name_string.val[1]);
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
}
/* Trusted domains are under CN=system */
ret = samba_kdc_lookup_trust(context, kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
mem_ctx,
realm, realm_dn, &msg);
if (ret != 0) {
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
return ret;
}
ret = samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
principal, direction,
realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
if (ret != 0) {
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: trust_message2entry failed");
}
return ret;
}
}
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_server(krb5_context context,
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
krb5_const_principal principal,
const char **attrs,
struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
struct ldb_message **msg)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
const char *realm;
if (principal->name.name_string.len >= 2) {
/* 'normal server' case */
int ldb_ret;
NTSTATUS nt_status;
struct ldb_dn *user_dn;
char *principal_string;
ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal,
KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM,
&principal_string);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
/* At this point we may find the host is known to be
* in a different realm, so we should generate a
* referral instead */
nt_status = crack_service_principal_name(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
mem_ctx, principal_string,
&user_dn, realm_dn);
free(principal_string);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
}
ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
mem_ctx,
msg, user_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
attrs, DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN, "(objectClass=*)");
if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
}
} else {
int lret;
char *filter = NULL;
char *short_princ;
/* server as client principal case, but we must not lookup userPrincipalNames */
*realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
realm = krb5_principal_get_realm(context, principal);
/* TODO: Check if it is our realm, otherwise give referall */
ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal, KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &short_princ);
if (ret != 0) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
return ret;
}
lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx, msg,
*realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
attrs,
DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN,
"(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=%s))",
ldb_binary_encode_string(mem_ctx, short_princ));
free(short_princ);
if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
DEBUG(3, ("Failed find a entry for %s\n", filter));
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
}
if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
DEBUG(3, ("Failed single search for for %s - %s\n",
filter, ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
}
}
return 0;
}
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_server(krb5_context context,
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
krb5_const_principal principal,
hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
struct ldb_message *msg;
ret = samba_kdc_lookup_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal,
server_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
if (ret != 0) {
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: message2entry failed");
}
return ret;
}
krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch(krb5_context context,
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
krb5_const_principal principal,
unsigned flags,
unsigned kvno,
hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
{
krb5_error_code ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
unsigned int krbtgt_number;
if (flags & HDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) {
krbtgt_number = kvno >> 16;
if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
if (krbtgt_number != kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number) {
return HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE;
}
}
} else {
krbtgt_number = kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number;
}
mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_fetch context");
if (!mem_ctx) {
ret = ENOMEM;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
return ret;
}
if (flags & HDB_F_GET_CLIENT) {
ret = samba_kdc_fetch_client(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, entry_ex);
if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
}
if (flags & HDB_F_GET_SERVER) {
/* krbtgt fits into this situation for trusted realms, and for resolving different versions of our own realm name */
ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, krbtgt_number, entry_ex);
if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
/* We return 'no entry' if it does not start with krbtgt/, so move to the common case quickly */
ret = samba_kdc_fetch_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, entry_ex);
if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
}
if (flags & HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT) {
ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, krbtgt_number, entry_ex);
if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
}
done:
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret;
}
struct samba_kdc_seq {
unsigned int index;
unsigned int count;
struct ldb_message **msgs;
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
};
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_seq(krb5_context context,
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
hdb_entry_ex *entry)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx;
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
hdb_entry_ex entry_ex;
memset(&entry_ex, '\0', sizeof(entry_ex));
if (!priv) {
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
}
mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_seq context");
if (!mem_ctx) {
ret = ENOMEM;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_seq: talloc_named() failed!");
return ret;
}
if (priv->index < priv->count) {
ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
NULL, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY,
priv->realm_dn, priv->msgs[priv->index++], entry);
} else {
ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
}
if (ret != 0) {
TALLOC_FREE(priv);
kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
} else {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
}
return ret;
}
krb5_error_code samba_kdc_firstkey(krb5_context context,
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
hdb_entry_ex *entry)
{
struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->samdb;
struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx;
char *realm;
struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
krb5_error_code ret;
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
int lret;
if (priv) {
TALLOC_FREE(priv);
kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
}
priv = (struct samba_kdc_seq *) talloc(kdc_db_ctx, struct samba_kdc_seq);
if (!priv) {
ret = ENOMEM;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc: out of memory");
return ret;
}
priv->index = 0;
priv->msgs = NULL;
priv->realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_ctx);
priv->count = 0;
mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_firstkey context");
if (!mem_ctx) {
ret = ENOMEM;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_firstkey: talloc_named() failed!");
return ret;
}
ret = krb5_get_default_realm(context, &realm);
if (ret != 0) {
TALLOC_FREE(priv);
return ret;
}
lret = ldb_search(ldb_ctx, priv, &res,
priv->realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, user_attrs,
"(objectClass=user)");
if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
TALLOC_FREE(priv);
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
}
priv->count = res->count;
priv->msgs = talloc_steal(priv, res->msgs);
talloc_free(res);
kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = priv;
ret = samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry);
if (ret != 0) {
TALLOC_FREE(priv);
kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
} else {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
}
return ret;
}
krb5_error_code samba_kdc_nextkey(krb5_context context,
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
hdb_entry_ex *entry)
{
return samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry);
}
/* Check if a given entry may delegate or do s4u2self to this target principal
*
* This is currently a very nasty hack - allowing only delegation to itself.
*
* This is shared between the constrained delegation and S4U2Self code.
*/
krb5_error_code
samba_kdc_check_identical_client_and_server(krb5_context context,
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
hdb_entry_ex *entry,
krb5_const_principal target_principal)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_principal enterprise_prinicpal = NULL;
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
struct ldb_message *msg;
struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
struct dom_sid *target_sid;
struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
const char *delegation_check_attrs[] = {
"objectSid", NULL
};
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_constrained_delegation");
if (!mem_ctx) {
ret = ENOMEM;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
return ret;
}
if (target_principal->name.name_type == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
/* Need to reparse the enterprise principal to find the real target */
if (target_principal->name.name_string.len != 1) {
ret = KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_check_constrained_delegation: request for delegation to enterprise principal with wrong (%d) number of components",
target_principal->name.name_string.len);
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret;
}
ret = krb5_parse_name(context, target_principal->name.name_string.val[0],
&enterprise_prinicpal);
if (ret) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret;
}
target_principal = enterprise_prinicpal;
}
ret = samba_kdc_lookup_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, target_principal,
delegation_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
krb5_free_principal(context, enterprise_prinicpal);
if (ret != 0) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret;
}
orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, p->msg, "objectSid");
target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid");
/* Allow delegation to the same principal, even if by a different
* name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID
* comparison */
if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
}
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret;
}
/* Certificates printed by a the Certificate Authority might have a
* slightly different form of the user principal name to that in the
* database. Allow a mismatch where they both refer to the same
* SID */
krb5_error_code
samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match(krb5_context context,
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
hdb_entry_ex *entry,
krb5_const_principal certificate_principal)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
struct ldb_message *msg;
struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
struct dom_sid *target_sid;
struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
const char *ms_upn_check_attrs[] = {
"objectSid", NULL
};
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match");
if (!mem_ctx) {
ret = ENOMEM;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
return ret;
}
ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
mem_ctx, certificate_principal,
ms_upn_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
if (ret != 0) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret;
}
orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, p->msg, "objectSid");
target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid");
/* Consider these to be the same principal, even if by a different
* name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID
* comparison */
if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return KRB5_KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH;
}
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret;
}
NTSTATUS samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_base_context *base_ctx,
struct samba_kdc_db_context **kdc_db_ctx_out)
{
NTSTATUS nt_status;
int ldb_ret;
struct ldb_message *msg;
struct auth_session_info *session_info;
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx;
/* The idea here is very simple. Using Kerberos to
* authenticate the KDC to the LDAP server is higly likely to
* be circular.
*
* In future we may set this up to use EXERNAL and SSL
* certificates, for now it will almost certainly be NTLMSSP_SET_USERNAME
*/
kdc_db_ctx = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_db_context);
if (kdc_db_ctx == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
kdc_db_ctx->ev_ctx = base_ctx->ev_ctx;
kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx = base_ctx->lp_ctx;
#if 1
/* we would prefer to use system_session(), as that would
* allow us to share the samdb backend context with other parts of the
* system. For now we can't as we need to override the
* credentials to set CRED_DONT_USE_KERBEROS, which would
* break other users of the system_session */
DEBUG(0,("FIXME: Using new system session for hdb\n"));
nt_status = auth_system_session_info(kdc_db_ctx, base_ctx->lp_ctx, &session_info);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
return nt_status;
}
#else
session_info = system_session(kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx);
if (session_info == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
#endif
cli_credentials_set_kerberos_state(session_info->credentials,
CRED_DONT_USE_KERBEROS);
/* Setup the link to LDB */
kdc_db_ctx->samdb = samdb_connect(kdc_db_ctx, base_ctx->ev_ctx,
base_ctx->lp_ctx, session_info);
if (kdc_db_ctx->samdb == NULL) {
DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot open samdb for KDC backend!"));
talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
}
/* Find out our own krbtgt kvno */
ldb_ret = samdb_rodc(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, &kdc_db_ctx->rodc);
if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot determine if we are an RODC in KDC backend: %s\n",
ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
}
if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
int my_krbtgt_number;
const char *secondary_keytab[] = { "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", NULL };
struct ldb_dn *account_dn;
struct ldb_dn *server_dn = samdb_server_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx);
if (!server_dn) {
DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot determine server DN in KDC backend: %s\n",
ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
}
ldb_ret = samdb_reference_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx, server_dn,
"serverReference", &account_dn);
if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot determine server account in KDC backend: %s\n",
ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
}
ldb_ret = samdb_reference_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx, account_dn,
"msDS-KrbTgtLink", &kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn);
talloc_free(account_dn);
if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot determine RODC krbtgt account in KDC backend: %s\n",
ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
}
ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx,
&msg, kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
secondary_keytab,
0,
"(&(objectClass=user)(msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber=*))");
if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot read krbtgt account %s in KDC backend to get msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber: %s: %s\n",
ldb_dn_get_linearized(kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn),
ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb),
ldb_strerror(ldb_ret)));
talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
}
my_krbtgt_number = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1);
if (my_krbtgt_number == -1) {
DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot read msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber from krbtgt account %s in KDC backend: got %d\n",
ldb_dn_get_linearized(kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn),
my_krbtgt_number));
talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
}
kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = my_krbtgt_number;
} else {
kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = 0;
ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx,
&msg, NULL, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
krbtgt_attrs,
DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN,
"(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=krbtgt))");
if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_fetch: could not find own KRBTGT in DB: %s\n", ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
}
kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn = talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, msg->dn);
kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = 0;
talloc_free(msg);
}
*kdc_db_ctx_out = kdc_db_ctx;
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}