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samba-mirror/source3/smbd/sesssetup.c

1726 lines
46 KiB
C

/*
Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
handle SMBsessionsetup
Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1998-2001
Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2001
Copyright (C) Jim McDonough <jmcd@us.ibm.com> 2002
Copyright (C) Luke Howard 2003
Copyright (C) Volker Lendecke 2007
Copyright (C) Jeremy Allison 2007
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include "smbd/globals.h"
#include "../libcli/auth/spnego.h"
#include "../libcli/auth/ntlmssp.h"
#include "ntlmssp_wrap.h"
#include "librpc/gen_ndr/messaging.h"
#include "../librpc/gen_ndr/krb5pac.h"
#include "libads/kerberos_proto.h"
/* For split krb5 SPNEGO blobs. */
struct pending_auth_data {
struct pending_auth_data *prev, *next;
uint16 vuid; /* Tag for this entry. */
uint16 smbpid; /* Alternate tag for this entry. */
size_t needed_len;
DATA_BLOB partial_data;
};
/*
on a logon error possibly map the error to success if "map to guest"
is set approriately
*/
NTSTATUS do_map_to_guest(NTSTATUS status,
struct auth_serversupplied_info **server_info,
const char *user, const char *domain)
{
user = user ? user : "";
domain = domain ? domain : "";
if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER)) {
if ((lp_map_to_guest() == MAP_TO_GUEST_ON_BAD_USER) ||
(lp_map_to_guest() == MAP_TO_GUEST_ON_BAD_PASSWORD)) {
DEBUG(3,("No such user %s [%s] - using guest account\n",
user, domain));
status = make_server_info_guest(NULL, server_info);
}
}
if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD)) {
if (lp_map_to_guest() == MAP_TO_GUEST_ON_BAD_PASSWORD) {
DEBUG(3,("Registered username %s for guest access\n",
user));
status = make_server_info_guest(NULL, server_info);
}
}
return status;
}
/****************************************************************************
Add the standard 'Samba' signature to the end of the session setup.
****************************************************************************/
static int push_signature(uint8 **outbuf)
{
char *lanman;
int result, tmp;
result = 0;
tmp = message_push_string(outbuf, "Unix", STR_TERMINATE);
if (tmp == -1) return -1;
result += tmp;
if (asprintf(&lanman, "Samba %s", samba_version_string()) != -1) {
tmp = message_push_string(outbuf, lanman, STR_TERMINATE);
SAFE_FREE(lanman);
}
else {
tmp = message_push_string(outbuf, "Samba", STR_TERMINATE);
}
if (tmp == -1) return -1;
result += tmp;
tmp = message_push_string(outbuf, lp_workgroup(), STR_TERMINATE);
if (tmp == -1) return -1;
result += tmp;
return result;
}
/****************************************************************************
Send a security blob via a session setup reply.
****************************************************************************/
static void reply_sesssetup_blob(struct smb_request *req,
DATA_BLOB blob,
NTSTATUS nt_status)
{
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status) &&
!NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED)) {
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(nt_status));
return;
}
nt_status = nt_status_squash(nt_status);
SIVAL(req->outbuf, smb_rcls, NT_STATUS_V(nt_status));
SSVAL(req->outbuf, smb_vwv0, 0xFF); /* no chaining possible */
SSVAL(req->outbuf, smb_vwv3, blob.length);
if ((message_push_blob(&req->outbuf, blob) == -1)
|| (push_signature(&req->outbuf) == -1)) {
reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY);
}
}
/****************************************************************************
Do a 'guest' logon, getting back the
****************************************************************************/
static NTSTATUS check_guest_password(struct auth_serversupplied_info **server_info)
{
struct auth_context *auth_context;
struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info = NULL;
NTSTATUS nt_status;
static unsigned char chal[8] = { 0, };
DEBUG(3,("Got anonymous request\n"));
nt_status = make_auth_context_fixed(talloc_tos(), &auth_context, chal);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
return nt_status;
}
if (!make_user_info_guest(&user_info)) {
TALLOC_FREE(auth_context);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
nt_status = auth_context->check_ntlm_password(auth_context,
user_info,
server_info);
TALLOC_FREE(auth_context);
free_user_info(&user_info);
return nt_status;
}
#ifdef HAVE_KRB5
#if 0
/* Experiment that failed. See "only happens with a KDC" comment below. */
/****************************************************************************
Cerate a clock skew error blob for a Windows client.
****************************************************************************/
static bool make_krb5_skew_error(DATA_BLOB *pblob_out)
{
krb5_context context = NULL;
krb5_error_code kerr = 0;
krb5_data reply;
krb5_principal host_princ = NULL;
char *host_princ_s = NULL;
bool ret = False;
*pblob_out = data_blob_null;
initialize_krb5_error_table();
kerr = krb5_init_context(&context);
if (kerr) {
return False;
}
/* Create server principal. */
asprintf(&host_princ_s, "%s$@%s", global_myname(), lp_realm());
if (!host_princ_s) {
goto out;
}
strlower_m(host_princ_s);
kerr = smb_krb5_parse_name(context, host_princ_s, &host_princ);
if (kerr) {
DEBUG(10,("make_krb5_skew_error: smb_krb5_parse_name failed "
"for name %s: Error %s\n",
host_princ_s, error_message(kerr) ));
goto out;
}
kerr = smb_krb5_mk_error(context, KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW,
host_princ, &reply);
if (kerr) {
DEBUG(10,("make_krb5_skew_error: smb_krb5_mk_error "
"failed: Error %s\n",
error_message(kerr) ));
goto out;
}
*pblob_out = data_blob(reply.data, reply.length);
kerberos_free_data_contents(context,&reply);
ret = True;
out:
if (host_princ_s) {
SAFE_FREE(host_princ_s);
}
if (host_princ) {
krb5_free_principal(context, host_princ);
}
krb5_free_context(context);
return ret;
}
#endif
/****************************************************************************
Reply to a session setup spnego negotiate packet for kerberos.
****************************************************************************/
static void reply_spnego_kerberos(struct smb_request *req,
DATA_BLOB *secblob,
const char *mechOID,
uint16 vuid,
bool *p_invalidate_vuid)
{
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
DATA_BLOB ticket;
struct passwd *pw;
int sess_vuid = req->vuid;
NTSTATUS ret = NT_STATUS_OK;
DATA_BLOB ap_rep, ap_rep_wrapped, response;
struct auth_serversupplied_info *server_info = NULL;
DATA_BLOB session_key = data_blob_null;
uint8 tok_id[2];
DATA_BLOB nullblob = data_blob_null;
bool map_domainuser_to_guest = False;
bool username_was_mapped;
struct PAC_LOGON_INFO *logon_info = NULL;
struct smbd_server_connection *sconn = req->sconn;
char *principal;
char *user;
char *domain;
char *real_username;
ZERO_STRUCT(ticket);
ZERO_STRUCT(ap_rep);
ZERO_STRUCT(ap_rep_wrapped);
ZERO_STRUCT(response);
/* Normally we will always invalidate the intermediate vuid. */
*p_invalidate_vuid = True;
mem_ctx = talloc_init("reply_spnego_kerberos");
if (mem_ctx == NULL) {
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY));
return;
}
if (!spnego_parse_krb5_wrap(mem_ctx, *secblob, &ticket, tok_id)) {
talloc_destroy(mem_ctx);
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE));
return;
}
ret = ads_verify_ticket(mem_ctx, lp_realm(), 0, &ticket,
&principal, &logon_info, &ap_rep,
&session_key, True);
data_blob_free(&ticket);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) {
#if 0
/* Experiment that failed.
* See "only happens with a KDC" comment below. */
if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(ret, NT_STATUS_TIME_DIFFERENCE_AT_DC)) {
/*
* Windows in this case returns
* NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED
* with a negTokenTarg blob containing an krb5_error
* struct ASN1 encoded containing KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW.
* The client then fixes its clock and continues rather
* than giving an error. JRA.
* -- Looks like this only happens with a KDC. JRA.
*/
bool ok = make_krb5_skew_error(&ap_rep);
if (!ok) {
talloc_destroy(mem_ctx);
return ERROR_NT(nt_status_squash(
NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE));
}
ap_rep_wrapped = spnego_gen_krb5_wrap(ap_rep,
TOK_ID_KRB_ERROR);
response = spnego_gen_auth_response(&ap_rep_wrapped,
ret, OID_KERBEROS5_OLD);
reply_sesssetup_blob(conn, inbuf, outbuf, response,
NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED);
/*
* In this one case we don't invalidate the
* intermediate vuid as we're expecting the client
* to re-use it for the next sessionsetupX packet. JRA.
*/
*p_invalidate_vuid = False;
data_blob_free(&ap_rep);
data_blob_free(&ap_rep_wrapped);
data_blob_free(&response);
talloc_destroy(mem_ctx);
return -1; /* already replied */
}
#else
if (!NT_STATUS_EQUAL(ret, NT_STATUS_TIME_DIFFERENCE_AT_DC)) {
ret = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
}
#endif
DEBUG(1,("Failed to verify incoming ticket with error %s!\n",
nt_errstr(ret)));
talloc_destroy(mem_ctx);
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(ret));
return;
}
ret = get_user_from_kerberos_info(talloc_tos(),
sconn->client_id.name,
principal, logon_info,
&username_was_mapped,
&map_domainuser_to_guest,
&user, &domain,
&real_username, &pw);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) {
data_blob_free(&ap_rep);
data_blob_free(&session_key);
talloc_destroy(mem_ctx);
reply_nterror(req,nt_status_squash(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE));
return;
}
/* save the PAC data if we have it */
if (logon_info) {
netsamlogon_cache_store(user, &logon_info->info3);
}
/* setup the string used by %U */
sub_set_smb_name(real_username);
/* reload services so that the new %U is taken into account */
reload_services(sconn->msg_ctx, sconn->sock, True);
ret = make_server_info_krb5(mem_ctx,
user, domain, real_username, pw,
logon_info, map_domainuser_to_guest,
&server_info);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) {
DEBUG(1, ("make_server_info_krb5 failed!\n"));
data_blob_free(&ap_rep);
data_blob_free(&session_key);
TALLOC_FREE(mem_ctx);
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(ret));
return;
}
server_info->nss_token |= username_was_mapped;
/* we need to build the token for the user. make_server_info_guest()
already does this */
if ( !server_info->ptok ) {
ret = create_local_token( server_info );
if ( !NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret) ) {
DEBUG(10,("failed to create local token: %s\n",
nt_errstr(ret)));
data_blob_free(&ap_rep);
data_blob_free(&session_key);
TALLOC_FREE( mem_ctx );
TALLOC_FREE( server_info );
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(ret));
return;
}
}
if (!is_partial_auth_vuid(sconn, sess_vuid)) {
sess_vuid = register_initial_vuid(sconn);
}
data_blob_free(&server_info->user_session_key);
/* Set the kerberos-derived session key onto the server_info */
server_info->user_session_key = session_key;
talloc_steal(server_info, session_key.data);
session_key = data_blob_null;
/* register_existing_vuid keeps the server info */
/* register_existing_vuid takes ownership of session_key on success,
* no need to free after this on success. A better interface would copy
* it.... */
sess_vuid = register_existing_vuid(sconn, sess_vuid,
server_info, nullblob, user);
reply_outbuf(req, 4, 0);
SSVAL(req->outbuf,smb_uid,sess_vuid);
if (sess_vuid == UID_FIELD_INVALID ) {
ret = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
} else {
/* current_user_info is changed on new vuid */
reload_services(sconn->msg_ctx, sconn->sock, True);
SSVAL(req->outbuf, smb_vwv3, 0);
if (server_info->guest) {
SSVAL(req->outbuf,smb_vwv2,1);
}
SSVAL(req->outbuf, smb_uid, sess_vuid);
/* Successful logon. Keep this vuid. */
*p_invalidate_vuid = False;
}
/* wrap that up in a nice GSS-API wrapping */
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) {
ap_rep_wrapped = spnego_gen_krb5_wrap(talloc_tos(), ap_rep,
TOK_ID_KRB_AP_REP);
} else {
ap_rep_wrapped = data_blob_null;
}
response = spnego_gen_auth_response(talloc_tos(), &ap_rep_wrapped, ret,
mechOID);
reply_sesssetup_blob(req, response, ret);
data_blob_free(&ap_rep);
data_blob_free(&ap_rep_wrapped);
data_blob_free(&response);
TALLOC_FREE(mem_ctx);
}
#endif
/****************************************************************************
Send a session setup reply, wrapped in SPNEGO.
Get vuid and check first.
End the NTLMSSP exchange context if we are OK/complete fail
This should be split into two functions, one to handle each
leg of the NTLM auth steps.
***************************************************************************/
static void reply_spnego_ntlmssp(struct smb_request *req,
uint16 vuid,
struct auth_ntlmssp_state **auth_ntlmssp_state,
DATA_BLOB *ntlmssp_blob, NTSTATUS nt_status,
const char *OID,
bool wrap)
{
bool do_invalidate = true;
DATA_BLOB response;
struct auth_serversupplied_info *server_info = NULL;
struct smbd_server_connection *sconn = req->sconn;
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
nt_status = auth_ntlmssp_steal_server_info(talloc_tos(),
(*auth_ntlmssp_state), &server_info);
} else {
/* Note that this server_info won't have a session
* key. But for map to guest, that's exactly the right
* thing - we can't reasonably guess the key the
* client wants, as the password was wrong */
nt_status = do_map_to_guest(nt_status,
&server_info,
auth_ntlmssp_get_username(*auth_ntlmssp_state),
auth_ntlmssp_get_domain(*auth_ntlmssp_state));
}
reply_outbuf(req, 4, 0);
SSVAL(req->outbuf, smb_uid, vuid);
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
DATA_BLOB nullblob = data_blob_null;
if (!is_partial_auth_vuid(sconn, vuid)) {
nt_status = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
goto out;
}
/* register_existing_vuid keeps the server info */
if (register_existing_vuid(sconn, vuid,
server_info, nullblob,
auth_ntlmssp_get_username(*auth_ntlmssp_state)) !=
vuid) {
/* The problem is, *auth_ntlmssp_state points
* into the vuser this will have
* talloc_free()'ed in
* register_existing_vuid() */
do_invalidate = false;
nt_status = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
goto out;
}
/* current_user_info is changed on new vuid */
reload_services(sconn->msg_ctx, sconn->sock, True);
SSVAL(req->outbuf, smb_vwv3, 0);
if (server_info->guest) {
SSVAL(req->outbuf,smb_vwv2,1);
}
}
out:
if (wrap) {
response = spnego_gen_auth_response(talloc_tos(),
ntlmssp_blob,
nt_status, OID);
} else {
response = *ntlmssp_blob;
}
reply_sesssetup_blob(req, response, nt_status);
if (wrap) {
data_blob_free(&response);
}
/* NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED from our NTLMSSP code tells us,
and the other end, that we are not finished yet. */
if (!NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED)) {
/* NB. This is *NOT* an error case. JRA */
if (do_invalidate) {
TALLOC_FREE(*auth_ntlmssp_state);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
/* Kill the intermediate vuid */
invalidate_vuid(sconn, vuid);
}
}
}
}
/****************************************************************************
Is this a krb5 mechanism ?
****************************************************************************/
NTSTATUS parse_spnego_mechanisms(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
DATA_BLOB blob_in,
DATA_BLOB *pblob_out,
char **kerb_mechOID)
{
char *OIDs[ASN1_MAX_OIDS];
int i;
NTSTATUS ret = NT_STATUS_OK;
*kerb_mechOID = NULL;
/* parse out the OIDs and the first sec blob */
if (!spnego_parse_negTokenInit(ctx, blob_in, OIDs, NULL, pblob_out) ||
(OIDs[0] == NULL)) {
return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
}
/* only look at the first OID for determining the mechToken --
according to RFC2478, we should choose the one we want
and renegotiate, but i smell a client bug here..
Problem observed when connecting to a member (samba box)
of an AD domain as a user in a Samba domain. Samba member
server sent back krb5/mskrb5/ntlmssp as mechtypes, but the
client (2ksp3) replied with ntlmssp/mskrb5/krb5 and an
NTLMSSP mechtoken. --jerry */
#ifdef HAVE_KRB5
if (strcmp(OID_KERBEROS5, OIDs[0]) == 0 ||
strcmp(OID_KERBEROS5_OLD, OIDs[0]) == 0) {
*kerb_mechOID = talloc_strdup(ctx, OIDs[0]);
if (*kerb_mechOID == NULL) {
ret = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
}
#endif
for (i=0;OIDs[i];i++) {
DEBUG(5,("parse_spnego_mechanisms: Got OID %s\n", OIDs[i]));
talloc_free(OIDs[i]);
}
return ret;
}
/****************************************************************************
Fall back from krb5 to NTLMSSP.
****************************************************************************/
static void reply_spnego_downgrade_to_ntlmssp(struct smb_request *req,
uint16 vuid)
{
DATA_BLOB response;
reply_outbuf(req, 4, 0);
SSVAL(req->outbuf,smb_uid,vuid);
DEBUG(3,("reply_spnego_downgrade_to_ntlmssp: Got krb5 ticket in SPNEGO "
"but set to downgrade to NTLMSSP\n"));
response = spnego_gen_auth_response(talloc_tos(), NULL,
NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED,
OID_NTLMSSP);
reply_sesssetup_blob(req, response, NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED);
data_blob_free(&response);
}
/****************************************************************************
Reply to a session setup spnego negotiate packet.
****************************************************************************/
static void reply_spnego_negotiate(struct smb_request *req,
uint16 vuid,
DATA_BLOB blob1,
struct auth_ntlmssp_state **auth_ntlmssp_state)
{
DATA_BLOB secblob;
DATA_BLOB chal;
char *kerb_mech = NULL;
NTSTATUS status;
struct smbd_server_connection *sconn = req->sconn;
status = parse_spnego_mechanisms(talloc_tos(),
blob1, &secblob, &kerb_mech);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
/* Kill the intermediate vuid */
invalidate_vuid(sconn, vuid);
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(status));
return;
}
DEBUG(3,("reply_spnego_negotiate: Got secblob of size %lu\n",
(unsigned long)secblob.length));
#ifdef HAVE_KRB5
if (kerb_mech && ((lp_security()==SEC_ADS) ||
USE_KERBEROS_KEYTAB) ) {
bool destroy_vuid = True;
reply_spnego_kerberos(req, &secblob, kerb_mech,
vuid, &destroy_vuid);
data_blob_free(&secblob);
if (destroy_vuid) {
/* Kill the intermediate vuid */
invalidate_vuid(sconn, vuid);
}
TALLOC_FREE(kerb_mech);
return;
}
#endif
if (*auth_ntlmssp_state) {
TALLOC_FREE(*auth_ntlmssp_state);
}
if (kerb_mech) {
data_blob_free(&secblob);
/* The mechtoken is a krb5 ticket, but
* we need to fall back to NTLM. */
reply_spnego_downgrade_to_ntlmssp(req, vuid);
TALLOC_FREE(kerb_mech);
return;
}
status = auth_ntlmssp_start(auth_ntlmssp_state);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
/* Kill the intermediate vuid */
invalidate_vuid(sconn, vuid);
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(status));
return;
}
status = auth_ntlmssp_update(*auth_ntlmssp_state,
secblob, &chal);
data_blob_free(&secblob);
reply_spnego_ntlmssp(req, vuid, auth_ntlmssp_state,
&chal, status, OID_NTLMSSP, true);
data_blob_free(&chal);
/* already replied */
return;
}
/****************************************************************************
Reply to a session setup spnego auth packet.
****************************************************************************/
static void reply_spnego_auth(struct smb_request *req,
uint16 vuid,
DATA_BLOB blob1,
struct auth_ntlmssp_state **auth_ntlmssp_state)
{
DATA_BLOB auth = data_blob_null;
DATA_BLOB auth_reply = data_blob_null;
DATA_BLOB secblob = data_blob_null;
NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
struct smbd_server_connection *sconn = req->sconn;
if (!spnego_parse_auth(talloc_tos(), blob1, &auth)) {
#if 0
file_save("auth.dat", blob1.data, blob1.length);
#endif
/* Kill the intermediate vuid */
invalidate_vuid(sconn, vuid);
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(
NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE));
return;
}
if (auth.data[0] == ASN1_APPLICATION(0)) {
/* Might be a second negTokenTarg packet */
char *kerb_mech = NULL;
status = parse_spnego_mechanisms(talloc_tos(),
auth, &secblob, &kerb_mech);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
/* Kill the intermediate vuid */
invalidate_vuid(sconn, vuid);
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(status));
return;
}
DEBUG(3,("reply_spnego_auth: Got secblob of size %lu\n",
(unsigned long)secblob.length));
#ifdef HAVE_KRB5
if (kerb_mech && ((lp_security()==SEC_ADS) ||
USE_KERBEROS_KEYTAB)) {
bool destroy_vuid = True;
reply_spnego_kerberos(req, &secblob, kerb_mech,
vuid, &destroy_vuid);
data_blob_free(&secblob);
data_blob_free(&auth);
if (destroy_vuid) {
/* Kill the intermediate vuid */
invalidate_vuid(sconn, vuid);
}
TALLOC_FREE(kerb_mech);
return;
}
#endif
/* Can't blunder into NTLMSSP auth if we have
* a krb5 ticket. */
if (kerb_mech) {
/* Kill the intermediate vuid */
invalidate_vuid(sconn, vuid);
DEBUG(3,("reply_spnego_auth: network "
"misconfiguration, client sent us a "
"krb5 ticket and kerberos security "
"not enabled\n"));
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(
NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE));
TALLOC_FREE(kerb_mech);
}
}
/* If we get here it wasn't a negTokenTarg auth packet. */
data_blob_free(&secblob);
if (!*auth_ntlmssp_state) {
status = auth_ntlmssp_start(auth_ntlmssp_state);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
/* Kill the intermediate vuid */
invalidate_vuid(sconn, vuid);
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(status));
return;
}
}
status = auth_ntlmssp_update(*auth_ntlmssp_state,
auth, &auth_reply);
data_blob_free(&auth);
/* Don't send the mechid as we've already sent this (RFC4178). */
reply_spnego_ntlmssp(req, vuid,
auth_ntlmssp_state,
&auth_reply, status, NULL, true);
data_blob_free(&auth_reply);
/* and tell smbd that we have already replied to this packet */
return;
}
/****************************************************************************
Delete an entry on the list.
****************************************************************************/
static void delete_partial_auth(struct smbd_server_connection *sconn,
struct pending_auth_data *pad)
{
if (!pad) {
return;
}
DLIST_REMOVE(sconn->smb1.pd_list, pad);
data_blob_free(&pad->partial_data);
SAFE_FREE(pad);
}
/****************************************************************************
Search for a partial SPNEGO auth fragment matching an smbpid.
****************************************************************************/
static struct pending_auth_data *get_pending_auth_data(
struct smbd_server_connection *sconn,
uint16_t smbpid)
{
struct pending_auth_data *pad;
/*
* NOTE: using the smbpid here is completely wrong...
* see [MS-SMB]
* 3.3.5.3 Receiving an SMB_COM_SESSION_SETUP_ANDX Request
*/
for (pad = sconn->smb1.pd_list; pad; pad = pad->next) {
if (pad->smbpid == smbpid) {
break;
}
}
return pad;
}
/****************************************************************************
Check the size of an SPNEGO blob. If we need more return
NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED, else return NT_STATUS_OK. Don't allow
the blob to be more than 64k.
****************************************************************************/
static NTSTATUS check_spnego_blob_complete(struct smbd_server_connection *sconn,
uint16 smbpid, uint16 vuid,
DATA_BLOB *pblob)
{
struct pending_auth_data *pad = NULL;
ASN1_DATA *data;
size_t needed_len = 0;
pad = get_pending_auth_data(sconn, smbpid);
/* Ensure we have some data. */
if (pblob->length == 0) {
/* Caller can cope. */
DEBUG(2,("check_spnego_blob_complete: zero blob length !\n"));
delete_partial_auth(sconn, pad);
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
/* Were we waiting for more data ? */
if (pad) {
DATA_BLOB tmp_blob;
size_t copy_len = MIN(65536, pblob->length);
/* Integer wrap paranoia.... */
if (pad->partial_data.length + copy_len <
pad->partial_data.length ||
pad->partial_data.length + copy_len < copy_len) {
DEBUG(2,("check_spnego_blob_complete: integer wrap "
"pad->partial_data.length = %u, "
"copy_len = %u\n",
(unsigned int)pad->partial_data.length,
(unsigned int)copy_len ));
delete_partial_auth(sconn, pad);
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
DEBUG(10,("check_spnego_blob_complete: "
"pad->partial_data.length = %u, "
"pad->needed_len = %u, "
"copy_len = %u, "
"pblob->length = %u,\n",
(unsigned int)pad->partial_data.length,
(unsigned int)pad->needed_len,
(unsigned int)copy_len,
(unsigned int)pblob->length ));
tmp_blob = data_blob(NULL,
pad->partial_data.length + copy_len);
/* Concatenate the two (up to copy_len) bytes. */
memcpy(tmp_blob.data,
pad->partial_data.data,
pad->partial_data.length);
memcpy(tmp_blob.data + pad->partial_data.length,
pblob->data,
copy_len);
/* Replace the partial data. */
data_blob_free(&pad->partial_data);
pad->partial_data = tmp_blob;
ZERO_STRUCT(tmp_blob);
/* Are we done ? */
if (pblob->length >= pad->needed_len) {
/* Yes, replace pblob. */
data_blob_free(pblob);
*pblob = pad->partial_data;
ZERO_STRUCT(pad->partial_data);
delete_partial_auth(sconn, pad);
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
/* Still need more data. */
pad->needed_len -= copy_len;
return NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED;
}
if ((pblob->data[0] != ASN1_APPLICATION(0)) &&
(pblob->data[0] != ASN1_CONTEXT(1))) {
/* Not something we can determine the
* length of.
*/
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
/* This is a new SPNEGO sessionsetup - see if
* the data given in this blob is enough.
*/
data = asn1_init(NULL);
if (data == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
asn1_load(data, *pblob);
asn1_start_tag(data, pblob->data[0]);
if (data->has_error || data->nesting == NULL) {
asn1_free(data);
/* Let caller catch. */
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
/* Integer wrap paranoia.... */
if (data->nesting->taglen + data->nesting->start < data->nesting->taglen ||
data->nesting->taglen + data->nesting->start < data->nesting->start) {
DEBUG(2,("check_spnego_blob_complete: integer wrap "
"data.nesting->taglen = %u, "
"data.nesting->start = %u\n",
(unsigned int)data->nesting->taglen,
(unsigned int)data->nesting->start ));
asn1_free(data);
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
/* Total length of the needed asn1 is the tag length
* plus the current offset. */
needed_len = data->nesting->taglen + data->nesting->start;
asn1_free(data);
DEBUG(10,("check_spnego_blob_complete: needed_len = %u, "
"pblob->length = %u\n",
(unsigned int)needed_len,
(unsigned int)pblob->length ));
if (needed_len <= pblob->length) {
/* Nothing to do - blob is complete. */
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
/* Refuse the blob if it's bigger than 64k. */
if (needed_len > 65536) {
DEBUG(2,("check_spnego_blob_complete: needed_len "
"too large (%u)\n",
(unsigned int)needed_len ));
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
/* We must store this blob until complete. */
if (!(pad = SMB_MALLOC_P(struct pending_auth_data))) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
pad->needed_len = needed_len - pblob->length;
pad->partial_data = data_blob(pblob->data, pblob->length);
if (pad->partial_data.data == NULL) {
SAFE_FREE(pad);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
pad->smbpid = smbpid;
pad->vuid = vuid;
DLIST_ADD(sconn->smb1.pd_list, pad);
return NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED;
}
/****************************************************************************
Reply to a session setup command.
conn POINTER CAN BE NULL HERE !
****************************************************************************/
static void reply_sesssetup_and_X_spnego(struct smb_request *req)
{
const uint8 *p;
DATA_BLOB blob1;
size_t bufrem;
char *tmp;
const char *native_os;
const char *native_lanman;
const char *primary_domain;
const char *p2;
uint16 data_blob_len = SVAL(req->vwv+7, 0);
enum remote_arch_types ra_type = get_remote_arch();
int vuid = req->vuid;
user_struct *vuser = NULL;
NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_OK;
uint16 smbpid = req->smbpid;
struct smbd_server_connection *sconn = req->sconn;
DEBUG(3,("Doing spnego session setup\n"));
if (global_client_caps == 0) {
global_client_caps = IVAL(req->vwv+10, 0);
if (!(global_client_caps & CAP_STATUS32)) {
remove_from_common_flags2(FLAGS2_32_BIT_ERROR_CODES);
}
}
p = req->buf;
if (data_blob_len == 0) {
/* an invalid request */
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE));
return;
}
bufrem = smbreq_bufrem(req, p);
/* pull the spnego blob */
blob1 = data_blob(p, MIN(bufrem, data_blob_len));
#if 0
file_save("negotiate.dat", blob1.data, blob1.length);
#endif
p2 = (char *)req->buf + blob1.length;
p2 += srvstr_pull_req_talloc(talloc_tos(), req, &tmp, p2,
STR_TERMINATE);
native_os = tmp ? tmp : "";
p2 += srvstr_pull_req_talloc(talloc_tos(), req, &tmp, p2,
STR_TERMINATE);
native_lanman = tmp ? tmp : "";
p2 += srvstr_pull_req_talloc(talloc_tos(), req, &tmp, p2,
STR_TERMINATE);
primary_domain = tmp ? tmp : "";
DEBUG(3,("NativeOS=[%s] NativeLanMan=[%s] PrimaryDomain=[%s]\n",
native_os, native_lanman, primary_domain));
if ( ra_type == RA_WIN2K ) {
/* Vista sets neither the OS or lanman strings */
if ( !strlen(native_os) && !strlen(native_lanman) )
set_remote_arch(RA_VISTA);
/* Windows 2003 doesn't set the native lanman string,
but does set primary domain which is a bug I think */
if ( !strlen(native_lanman) ) {
ra_lanman_string( primary_domain );
} else {
ra_lanman_string( native_lanman );
}
}
/* Did we get a valid vuid ? */
if (!is_partial_auth_vuid(sconn, vuid)) {
/* No, then try and see if this is an intermediate sessionsetup
* for a large SPNEGO packet. */
struct pending_auth_data *pad;
pad = get_pending_auth_data(sconn, smbpid);
if (pad) {
DEBUG(10,("reply_sesssetup_and_X_spnego: found "
"pending vuid %u\n",
(unsigned int)pad->vuid ));
vuid = pad->vuid;
}
}
/* Do we have a valid vuid now ? */
if (!is_partial_auth_vuid(sconn, vuid)) {
/* No, start a new authentication setup. */
vuid = register_initial_vuid(sconn);
if (vuid == UID_FIELD_INVALID) {
data_blob_free(&blob1);
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(
NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER));
return;
}
}
vuser = get_partial_auth_user_struct(sconn, vuid);
/* This MUST be valid. */
if (!vuser) {
smb_panic("reply_sesssetup_and_X_spnego: invalid vuid.");
}
/* Large (greater than 4k) SPNEGO blobs are split into multiple
* sessionsetup requests as the Windows limit on the security blob
* field is 4k. Bug #4400. JRA.
*/
status = check_spnego_blob_complete(sconn, smbpid, vuid, &blob1);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
if (!NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status,
NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED)) {
/* Real error - kill the intermediate vuid */
invalidate_vuid(sconn, vuid);
}
data_blob_free(&blob1);
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(status));
return;
}
if (blob1.data[0] == ASN1_APPLICATION(0)) {
/* its a negTokenTarg packet */
reply_spnego_negotiate(req, vuid, blob1,
&vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state);
data_blob_free(&blob1);
return;
}
if (blob1.data[0] == ASN1_CONTEXT(1)) {
/* its a auth packet */
reply_spnego_auth(req, vuid, blob1,
&vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state);
data_blob_free(&blob1);
return;
}
if (strncmp((char *)(blob1.data), "NTLMSSP", 7) == 0) {
DATA_BLOB chal;
if (!vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state) {
status = auth_ntlmssp_start(&vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
/* Kill the intermediate vuid */
invalidate_vuid(sconn, vuid);
data_blob_free(&blob1);
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(status));
return;
}
}
status = auth_ntlmssp_update(vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state,
blob1, &chal);
data_blob_free(&blob1);
reply_spnego_ntlmssp(req, vuid,
&vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state,
&chal, status, OID_NTLMSSP, false);
data_blob_free(&chal);
return;
}
/* what sort of packet is this? */
DEBUG(1,("Unknown packet in reply_sesssetup_and_X_spnego\n"));
data_blob_free(&blob1);
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE));
}
/****************************************************************************
On new VC == 0, shutdown *all* old connections and users.
It seems that only NT4.x does this. At W2K and above (XP etc.).
a new session setup with VC==0 is ignored.
****************************************************************************/
struct shutdown_state {
const char *ip;
struct messaging_context *msg_ctx;
};
static int shutdown_other_smbds(const struct connections_key *key,
const struct connections_data *crec,
void *private_data)
{
struct shutdown_state *state = (struct shutdown_state *)private_data;
DEBUG(10, ("shutdown_other_smbds: %s, %s\n",
procid_str(talloc_tos(), &crec->pid), crec->addr));
if (!process_exists(crec->pid)) {
DEBUG(10, ("process does not exist\n"));
return 0;
}
if (procid_is_me(&crec->pid)) {
DEBUG(10, ("It's me\n"));
return 0;
}
if (strcmp(state->ip, crec->addr) != 0) {
DEBUG(10, ("%s does not match %s\n", state->ip, crec->addr));
return 0;
}
DEBUG(1, ("shutdown_other_smbds: shutting down pid %u "
"(IP %s)\n", (unsigned int)procid_to_pid(&crec->pid),
state->ip));
messaging_send(state->msg_ctx, crec->pid, MSG_SHUTDOWN,
&data_blob_null);
return 0;
}
static void setup_new_vc_session(struct smbd_server_connection *sconn)
{
DEBUG(2,("setup_new_vc_session: New VC == 0, if NT4.x "
"compatible we would close all old resources.\n"));
#if 0
conn_close_all();
invalidate_all_vuids();
#endif
if (lp_reset_on_zero_vc()) {
char *addr;
struct shutdown_state state;
addr = tsocket_address_inet_addr_string(
sconn->remote_address, talloc_tos());
if (addr == NULL) {
return;
}
state.ip = addr;
state.msg_ctx = sconn->msg_ctx;
connections_forall_read(shutdown_other_smbds, &state);
TALLOC_FREE(addr);
}
}
/****************************************************************************
Reply to a session setup command.
****************************************************************************/
void reply_sesssetup_and_X(struct smb_request *req)
{
int sess_vuid;
int smb_bufsize;
DATA_BLOB lm_resp;
DATA_BLOB nt_resp;
DATA_BLOB plaintext_password;
char *tmp;
const char *user;
fstring sub_user; /* Sanitised username for substituion */
const char *domain;
const char *native_os;
const char *native_lanman;
const char *primary_domain;
struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info = NULL;
struct auth_serversupplied_info *server_info = NULL;
uint16 smb_flag2 = req->flags2;
NTSTATUS nt_status;
struct smbd_server_connection *sconn = req->sconn;
bool doencrypt = sconn->smb1.negprot.encrypted_passwords;
START_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
ZERO_STRUCT(lm_resp);
ZERO_STRUCT(nt_resp);
ZERO_STRUCT(plaintext_password);
DEBUG(3,("wct=%d flg2=0x%x\n", req->wct, req->flags2));
/* a SPNEGO session setup has 12 command words, whereas a normal
NT1 session setup has 13. See the cifs spec. */
if (req->wct == 12 &&
(req->flags2 & FLAGS2_EXTENDED_SECURITY)) {
if (!sconn->smb1.negprot.spnego) {
DEBUG(0,("reply_sesssetup_and_X: Rejecting attempt "
"at SPNEGO session setup when it was not "
"negotiated.\n"));
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(
NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE));
END_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
return;
}
if (SVAL(req->vwv+4, 0) == 0) {
setup_new_vc_session(req->sconn);
}
reply_sesssetup_and_X_spnego(req);
END_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
return;
}
smb_bufsize = SVAL(req->vwv+2, 0);
if (get_Protocol() < PROTOCOL_NT1) {
uint16 passlen1 = SVAL(req->vwv+7, 0);
/* Never do NT status codes with protocols before NT1 as we
* don't get client caps. */
remove_from_common_flags2(FLAGS2_32_BIT_ERROR_CODES);
if ((passlen1 > MAX_PASS_LEN) || (passlen1 > req->buflen)) {
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(
NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER));
END_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
return;
}
if (doencrypt) {
lm_resp = data_blob(req->buf, passlen1);
} else {
plaintext_password = data_blob(req->buf, passlen1+1);
/* Ensure null termination */
plaintext_password.data[passlen1] = 0;
}
srvstr_pull_req_talloc(talloc_tos(), req, &tmp,
req->buf + passlen1, STR_TERMINATE);
user = tmp ? tmp : "";
domain = "";
} else {
uint16 passlen1 = SVAL(req->vwv+7, 0);
uint16 passlen2 = SVAL(req->vwv+8, 0);
enum remote_arch_types ra_type = get_remote_arch();
const uint8_t *p = req->buf;
const uint8_t *save_p = req->buf;
uint16 byte_count;
if(global_client_caps == 0) {
global_client_caps = IVAL(req->vwv+11, 0);
if (!(global_client_caps & CAP_STATUS32)) {
remove_from_common_flags2(
FLAGS2_32_BIT_ERROR_CODES);
}
/* client_caps is used as final determination if
* client is NT or Win95. This is needed to return
* the correct error codes in some circumstances.
*/
if(ra_type == RA_WINNT || ra_type == RA_WIN2K ||
ra_type == RA_WIN95) {
if(!(global_client_caps & (CAP_NT_SMBS|
CAP_STATUS32))) {
set_remote_arch( RA_WIN95);
}
}
}
if (!doencrypt) {
/* both Win95 and WinNT stuff up the password
* lengths for non-encrypting systems. Uggh.
if passlen1==24 its a win95 system, and its setting
the password length incorrectly. Luckily it still
works with the default code because Win95 will null
terminate the password anyway
if passlen1>0 and passlen2>0 then maybe its a NT box
and its setting passlen2 to some random value which
really stuffs things up. we need to fix that one. */
if (passlen1 > 0 && passlen2 > 0 && passlen2 != 24 &&
passlen2 != 1) {
passlen2 = 0;
}
}
/* check for nasty tricks */
if (passlen1 > MAX_PASS_LEN
|| passlen1 > smbreq_bufrem(req, p)) {
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(
NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER));
END_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
return;
}
if (passlen2 > MAX_PASS_LEN
|| passlen2 > smbreq_bufrem(req, p+passlen1)) {
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(
NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER));
END_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
return;
}
/* Save the lanman2 password and the NT md4 password. */
if ((doencrypt) && (passlen1 != 0) && (passlen1 != 24)) {
doencrypt = False;
}
if (doencrypt) {
lm_resp = data_blob(p, passlen1);
nt_resp = data_blob(p+passlen1, passlen2);
} else if (lp_security() != SEC_SHARE) {
/*
* In share level we should ignore any passwords, so
* only read them if we're not.
*/
char *pass = NULL;
bool unic= smb_flag2 & FLAGS2_UNICODE_STRINGS;
if (unic && (passlen2 == 0) && passlen1) {
/* Only a ascii plaintext password was sent. */
(void)srvstr_pull_talloc(talloc_tos(),
req->inbuf,
req->flags2,
&pass,
req->buf,
passlen1,
STR_TERMINATE|STR_ASCII);
} else {
(void)srvstr_pull_talloc(talloc_tos(),
req->inbuf,
req->flags2,
&pass,
req->buf,
unic ? passlen2 : passlen1,
STR_TERMINATE);
}
if (!pass) {
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(
NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER));
END_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
return;
}
plaintext_password = data_blob(pass, strlen(pass)+1);
}
p += passlen1 + passlen2;
p += srvstr_pull_req_talloc(talloc_tos(), req, &tmp, p,
STR_TERMINATE);
user = tmp ? tmp : "";
p += srvstr_pull_req_talloc(talloc_tos(), req, &tmp, p,
STR_TERMINATE);
domain = tmp ? tmp : "";
p += srvstr_pull_req_talloc(talloc_tos(), req, &tmp, p,
STR_TERMINATE);
native_os = tmp ? tmp : "";
p += srvstr_pull_req_talloc(talloc_tos(), req, &tmp, p,
STR_TERMINATE);
native_lanman = tmp ? tmp : "";
/* not documented or decoded by Ethereal but there is one more
* string in the extra bytes which is the same as the
* PrimaryDomain when using extended security. Windows NT 4
* and 2003 use this string to store the native lanman string.
* Windows 9x does not include a string here at all so we have
* to check if we have any extra bytes left */
byte_count = SVAL(req->vwv+13, 0);
if ( PTR_DIFF(p, save_p) < byte_count) {
p += srvstr_pull_req_talloc(talloc_tos(), req, &tmp, p,
STR_TERMINATE);
primary_domain = tmp ? tmp : "";
} else {
primary_domain = talloc_strdup(talloc_tos(), "null");
}
DEBUG(3,("Domain=[%s] NativeOS=[%s] NativeLanMan=[%s] "
"PrimaryDomain=[%s]\n",
domain, native_os, native_lanman, primary_domain));
if ( ra_type == RA_WIN2K ) {
if ( strlen(native_lanman) == 0 )
ra_lanman_string( primary_domain );
else
ra_lanman_string( native_lanman );
}
}
if (SVAL(req->vwv+4, 0) == 0) {
setup_new_vc_session(req->sconn);
}
DEBUG(3,("sesssetupX:name=[%s]\\[%s]@[%s]\n",
domain, user, get_remote_machine_name()));
if (*user) {
if (sconn->smb1.negprot.spnego) {
/* This has to be here, because this is a perfectly
* valid behaviour for guest logons :-( */
DEBUG(0,("reply_sesssetup_and_X: Rejecting attempt "
"at 'normal' session setup after "
"negotiating spnego.\n"));
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(
NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE));
END_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
return;
}
fstrcpy(sub_user, user);
} else {
fstrcpy(sub_user, lp_guestaccount());
}
sub_set_smb_name(sub_user);
reload_services(sconn->msg_ctx, sconn->sock, True);
if (lp_security() == SEC_SHARE) {
char *sub_user_mapped = NULL;
/* In share level we should ignore any passwords */
data_blob_free(&lm_resp);
data_blob_free(&nt_resp);
data_blob_clear_free(&plaintext_password);
(void)map_username(talloc_tos(), sub_user, &sub_user_mapped);
if (!sub_user_mapped) {
reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY);
END_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
return;
}
fstrcpy(sub_user, sub_user_mapped);
add_session_user(sconn, sub_user);
add_session_workgroup(sconn, domain);
/* Then force it to null for the benfit of the code below */
user = "";
}
if (!*user) {
nt_status = check_guest_password(&server_info);
} else if (doencrypt) {
struct auth_context *negprot_auth_context = NULL;
negprot_auth_context = sconn->smb1.negprot.auth_context;
if (!negprot_auth_context) {
DEBUG(0, ("reply_sesssetup_and_X: Attempted encrypted "
"session setup without negprot denied!\n"));
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(
NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE));
END_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
return;
}
nt_status = make_user_info_for_reply_enc(&user_info, user,
domain,
lm_resp, nt_resp);
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
nt_status = negprot_auth_context->check_ntlm_password(
negprot_auth_context,
user_info,
&server_info);
}
} else {
struct auth_context *plaintext_auth_context = NULL;
nt_status = make_auth_context_subsystem(
talloc_tos(), &plaintext_auth_context);
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
uint8_t chal[8];
plaintext_auth_context->get_ntlm_challenge(
plaintext_auth_context, chal);
if (!make_user_info_for_reply(&user_info,
user, domain, chal,
plaintext_password)) {
nt_status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
nt_status = plaintext_auth_context->check_ntlm_password(
plaintext_auth_context,
user_info,
&server_info);
TALLOC_FREE(plaintext_auth_context);
}
}
}
free_user_info(&user_info);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
nt_status = do_map_to_guest(nt_status, &server_info,
user, domain);
}
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
data_blob_free(&nt_resp);
data_blob_free(&lm_resp);
data_blob_clear_free(&plaintext_password);
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(nt_status));
END_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
return;
}
/* Ensure we can't possible take a code path leading to a
* null defref. */
if (!server_info) {
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE));
END_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
return;
}
if (!server_info->ptok) {
nt_status = create_local_token(server_info);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
DEBUG(10, ("create_local_token failed: %s\n",
nt_errstr(nt_status)));
data_blob_free(&nt_resp);
data_blob_free(&lm_resp);
data_blob_clear_free(&plaintext_password);
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(nt_status));
END_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
return;
}
}
data_blob_clear_free(&plaintext_password);
/* it's ok - setup a reply */
reply_outbuf(req, 3, 0);
if (get_Protocol() >= PROTOCOL_NT1) {
push_signature(&req->outbuf);
/* perhaps grab OS version here?? */
}
if (server_info->guest) {
SSVAL(req->outbuf,smb_vwv2,1);
}
/* register the name and uid as being validated, so further connections
to a uid can get through without a password, on the same VC */
if (lp_security() == SEC_SHARE) {
sess_vuid = UID_FIELD_INVALID;
TALLOC_FREE(server_info);
} else {
/* Ignore the initial vuid. */
sess_vuid = register_initial_vuid(sconn);
if (sess_vuid == UID_FIELD_INVALID) {
data_blob_free(&nt_resp);
data_blob_free(&lm_resp);
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(
NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE));
END_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
return;
}
/* register_existing_vuid keeps the server info */
sess_vuid = register_existing_vuid(sconn, sess_vuid,
server_info,
nt_resp.data ? nt_resp : lm_resp,
sub_user);
if (sess_vuid == UID_FIELD_INVALID) {
data_blob_free(&nt_resp);
data_blob_free(&lm_resp);
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(
NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE));
END_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
return;
}
/* current_user_info is changed on new vuid */
reload_services(sconn->msg_ctx, sconn->sock, True);
}
data_blob_free(&nt_resp);
data_blob_free(&lm_resp);
SSVAL(req->outbuf,smb_uid,sess_vuid);
SSVAL(req->inbuf,smb_uid,sess_vuid);
req->vuid = sess_vuid;
if (!sconn->smb1.sessions.done_sesssetup) {
sconn->smb1.sessions.max_send =
MIN(sconn->smb1.sessions.max_send,smb_bufsize);
}
sconn->smb1.sessions.done_sesssetup = true;
END_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
chain_reply(req);
return;
}