mirror of
https://github.com/samba-team/samba.git
synced 2024-12-23 17:34:34 +03:00
1528 lines
42 KiB
C
1528 lines
42 KiB
C
/*
|
|
Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
|
|
|
|
Database Glue between Samba and the KDC
|
|
|
|
Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2005-2009
|
|
Copyright (C) Simo Sorce <idra@samba.org> 2010
|
|
|
|
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
|
|
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
|
|
the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
|
|
(at your option) any later version.
|
|
|
|
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
|
|
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
|
|
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
|
|
GNU General Public License for more details.
|
|
|
|
|
|
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
|
|
along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#include "includes.h"
|
|
#include "system/time.h"
|
|
#include "../libds/common/flags.h"
|
|
#include "lib/ldb/include/ldb.h"
|
|
#include "librpc/gen_ndr/netlogon.h"
|
|
#include "libcli/security/security.h"
|
|
#include "auth/auth.h"
|
|
#include "auth/credentials/credentials.h"
|
|
#include "auth/auth_sam.h"
|
|
#include "../lib/util/util_ldb.h"
|
|
#include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h"
|
|
#include "librpc/ndr/libndr.h"
|
|
#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_drsblobs.h"
|
|
#include "librpc/gen_ndr/lsa.h"
|
|
#include "libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
|
|
#include "param/param.h"
|
|
#include "../lib/crypto/md4.h"
|
|
#include "system/kerberos.h"
|
|
#include <hdb.h>
|
|
#include "kdc/samba_kdc.h"
|
|
#include "kdc/db-glue.h"
|
|
|
|
enum samba_kdc_ent_type
|
|
{ SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
|
|
SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_TRUST, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY };
|
|
|
|
enum trust_direction {
|
|
UNKNOWN = 0,
|
|
INBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_INBOUND,
|
|
OUTBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static const char *trust_attrs[] = {
|
|
"trustPartner",
|
|
"trustAuthIncoming",
|
|
"trustAuthOutgoing",
|
|
"whenCreated",
|
|
"msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
|
|
"trustAttributes",
|
|
"trustDirection",
|
|
"trustType",
|
|
NULL
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static KerberosTime ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(struct ldb_message *msg, const char *attr, KerberosTime default_val)
|
|
{
|
|
const char *tmp;
|
|
const char *gentime;
|
|
struct tm tm;
|
|
|
|
gentime = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, attr, NULL);
|
|
if (!gentime)
|
|
return default_val;
|
|
|
|
tmp = strptime(gentime, "%Y%m%d%H%M%SZ", &tm);
|
|
if (tmp == NULL) {
|
|
return default_val;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return timegm(&tm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static HDBFlags uf2HDBFlags(krb5_context context, int userAccountControl, enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type)
|
|
{
|
|
HDBFlags flags = int2HDBFlags(0);
|
|
|
|
/* we don't allow kadmin deletes */
|
|
flags.immutable = 1;
|
|
|
|
/* mark the principal as invalid to start with */
|
|
flags.invalid = 1;
|
|
|
|
flags.renewable = 1;
|
|
|
|
/* All accounts are servers, but this may be disabled again in the caller */
|
|
flags.server = 1;
|
|
|
|
/* Account types - clear the invalid bit if it turns out to be valid */
|
|
if (userAccountControl & UF_NORMAL_ACCOUNT) {
|
|
if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
|
|
flags.client = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
flags.invalid = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (userAccountControl & UF_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
|
|
if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
|
|
flags.client = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
flags.invalid = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (userAccountControl & UF_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
|
|
if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
|
|
flags.client = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
flags.invalid = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (userAccountControl & UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
|
|
if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
|
|
flags.client = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
flags.invalid = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Not permitted to act as a client if disabled */
|
|
if (userAccountControl & UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE) {
|
|
flags.client = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (userAccountControl & UF_LOCKOUT) {
|
|
flags.invalid = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
if (userAccountControl & UF_PASSWORD_NOTREQD) {
|
|
flags.invalid = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
*/
|
|
/*
|
|
UF_PASSWORD_CANT_CHANGE and UF_ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PASSWORD_ALLOWED are irrelevent
|
|
*/
|
|
if (userAccountControl & UF_TEMP_DUPLICATE_ACCOUNT) {
|
|
flags.invalid = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* UF_DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD and UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY handled in samba_kdc_message2entry() */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
if (userAccountControl & UF_MNS_LOGON_ACCOUNT) {
|
|
flags.invalid = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
*/
|
|
if (userAccountControl & UF_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED) {
|
|
flags.require_hwauth = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION) {
|
|
flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!(userAccountControl & UF_NOT_DELEGATED)) {
|
|
flags.forwardable = 1;
|
|
flags.proxiable = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (userAccountControl & UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH) {
|
|
flags.require_preauth = 0;
|
|
} else {
|
|
flags.require_preauth = 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
return flags;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int samba_kdc_entry_destructor(struct samba_kdc_entry *p)
|
|
{
|
|
hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex = p->entry_ex;
|
|
free_hdb_entry(&entry_ex->entry);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void samba_kdc_free_entry(krb5_context context, hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
|
|
{
|
|
/* this function is called only from hdb_free_entry().
|
|
* Make sure we neutralize the destructor or we will
|
|
* get a double free later when hdb_free_entry() will
|
|
* try to call free_hdb_entry() */
|
|
talloc_set_destructor(entry_ex->ctx, NULL);
|
|
|
|
/* now proceed to free the talloc part */
|
|
talloc_free(entry_ex->ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(krb5_context context,
|
|
struct smb_iconv_convenience *iconv_convenience,
|
|
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
|
|
struct ldb_message *msg,
|
|
unsigned int userAccountControl,
|
|
hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
|
|
{
|
|
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
|
|
enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
|
|
struct samr_Password *hash;
|
|
const struct ldb_val *sc_val;
|
|
struct supplementalCredentialsBlob scb;
|
|
struct supplementalCredentialsPackage *scpk = NULL;
|
|
bool newer_keys = false;
|
|
struct package_PrimaryKerberosBlob _pkb;
|
|
struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr3 *pkb3 = NULL;
|
|
struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr4 *pkb4 = NULL;
|
|
uint32_t i;
|
|
uint32_t allocated_keys = 0;
|
|
|
|
entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
|
|
entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
|
|
|
|
entry_ex->entry.kvno = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber", 0);
|
|
|
|
/* Get keys from the db */
|
|
|
|
hash = samdb_result_hash(mem_ctx, msg, "unicodePwd");
|
|
sc_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "supplementalCredentials");
|
|
|
|
/* unicodePwd for enctype 0x17 (23) if present */
|
|
if (hash) {
|
|
allocated_keys++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* supplementalCredentials if present */
|
|
if (sc_val) {
|
|
ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob_all(sc_val, mem_ctx, iconv_convenience, &scb,
|
|
(ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_supplementalCredentialsBlob);
|
|
if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
|
|
dump_data(0, sc_val->data, sc_val->length);
|
|
ret = EINVAL;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (scb.sub.signature != SUPPLEMENTAL_CREDENTIALS_SIGNATURE) {
|
|
NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(supplementalCredentialsBlob, &scb);
|
|
ret = EINVAL;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i=0; i < scb.sub.num_packages; i++) {
|
|
if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) {
|
|
scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i];
|
|
if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) {
|
|
scpk = NULL;
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
newer_keys = true;
|
|
break;
|
|
} else if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) {
|
|
scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i];
|
|
if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) {
|
|
scpk = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* we don't break here in hope to find
|
|
* a Kerberos-Newer-Keys package
|
|
*/
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys or Primary:Kerberos element
|
|
* of supplementalCredentials
|
|
*/
|
|
if (scpk) {
|
|
DATA_BLOB blob;
|
|
|
|
blob = strhex_to_data_blob(mem_ctx, scpk->data);
|
|
if (!blob.data) {
|
|
ret = ENOMEM;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* we cannot use ndr_pull_struct_blob_all() here, as w2k and w2k3 add padding bytes */
|
|
ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob, mem_ctx, iconv_convenience, &_pkb,
|
|
(ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_package_PrimaryKerberosBlob);
|
|
if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
|
|
ret = EINVAL;
|
|
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
|
|
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (newer_keys && _pkb.version != 4) {
|
|
ret = EINVAL;
|
|
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
|
|
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!newer_keys && _pkb.version != 3) {
|
|
ret = EINVAL;
|
|
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse Primary:Kerberos not version 3");
|
|
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse Primary:Kerberos not version 3");
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (_pkb.version == 4) {
|
|
pkb4 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr4;
|
|
allocated_keys += pkb4->num_keys;
|
|
} else if (_pkb.version == 3) {
|
|
pkb3 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr3;
|
|
allocated_keys += pkb3->num_keys;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (allocated_keys == 0) {
|
|
/* oh, no password. Apparently (comment in
|
|
* hdb-ldap.c) this violates the ASN.1, but this
|
|
* allows an entry with no keys (yet). */
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* allocate space to decode into */
|
|
entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
|
|
entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(allocated_keys, sizeof(Key));
|
|
if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
|
|
ret = ENOMEM;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (hash && !(userAccountControl & UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY)) {
|
|
Key key;
|
|
|
|
key.mkvno = 0;
|
|
key.salt = NULL; /* No salt for this enc type */
|
|
|
|
ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
|
|
ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
|
|
hash->hash, sizeof(hash->hash),
|
|
&key.key);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
|
|
entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (pkb4) {
|
|
for (i=0; i < pkb4->num_keys; i++) {
|
|
bool use = true;
|
|
Key key;
|
|
|
|
if (!pkb4->keys[i].value) continue;
|
|
|
|
if (userAccountControl & UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY) {
|
|
switch (pkb4->keys[i].keytype) {
|
|
case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
|
|
case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
use = false;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!use) continue;
|
|
|
|
key.mkvno = 0;
|
|
key.salt = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (pkb4->salt.string) {
|
|
DATA_BLOB salt;
|
|
|
|
salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb4->salt.string);
|
|
|
|
key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
|
|
if (key.salt == NULL) {
|
|
ret = ENOMEM;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
key.salt->type = hdb_pw_salt;
|
|
|
|
ret = krb5_data_copy(&key.salt->salt, salt.data, salt.length);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
free(key.salt);
|
|
key.salt = NULL;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* TODO: maybe pass the iteration_count somehow... */
|
|
|
|
ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
|
|
pkb4->keys[i].keytype,
|
|
pkb4->keys[i].value->data,
|
|
pkb4->keys[i].value->length,
|
|
&key.key);
|
|
if (ret == KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP) {
|
|
DEBUG(2,("Unsupported keytype ignored - type %u\n",
|
|
pkb4->keys[i].keytype));
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
if (key.salt) {
|
|
free_Salt(key.salt);
|
|
free(key.salt);
|
|
key.salt = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
|
|
entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (pkb3) {
|
|
for (i=0; i < pkb3->num_keys; i++) {
|
|
bool use = true;
|
|
Key key;
|
|
|
|
if (!pkb3->keys[i].value) continue;
|
|
|
|
if (userAccountControl & UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY) {
|
|
switch (pkb3->keys[i].keytype) {
|
|
case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
|
|
case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
use = false;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!use) continue;
|
|
|
|
key.mkvno = 0;
|
|
key.salt = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (pkb3->salt.string) {
|
|
DATA_BLOB salt;
|
|
|
|
salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb3->salt.string);
|
|
|
|
key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
|
|
if (key.salt == NULL) {
|
|
ret = ENOMEM;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
key.salt->type = hdb_pw_salt;
|
|
|
|
ret = krb5_data_copy(&key.salt->salt, salt.data, salt.length);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
free(key.salt);
|
|
key.salt = NULL;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
|
|
pkb3->keys[i].keytype,
|
|
pkb3->keys[i].value->data,
|
|
pkb3->keys[i].value->length,
|
|
&key.key);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
if (key.salt) {
|
|
free_Salt(key.salt);
|
|
free(key.salt);
|
|
key.salt = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
|
|
entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
if (ret != 0) {
|
|
entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (entry_ex->entry.keys.len == 0 && entry_ex->entry.keys.val) {
|
|
free(entry_ex->entry.keys.val);
|
|
entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
|
|
*/
|
|
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry(krb5_context context,
|
|
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
|
|
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
|
|
enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type,
|
|
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
|
|
struct ldb_message *msg,
|
|
hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
|
|
{
|
|
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
|
|
unsigned int userAccountControl;
|
|
int i;
|
|
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
|
|
krb5_boolean is_computer = FALSE;
|
|
char *realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, lp_realm(lp_ctx));
|
|
|
|
struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
|
|
NTTIME acct_expiry;
|
|
NTSTATUS status;
|
|
|
|
uint32_t rid;
|
|
struct ldb_message_element *objectclasses;
|
|
struct ldb_val computer_val;
|
|
const char *samAccountName = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "samAccountName", NULL);
|
|
computer_val.data = discard_const_p(uint8_t,"computer");
|
|
computer_val.length = strlen((const char *)computer_val.data);
|
|
|
|
if (!samAccountName) {
|
|
ret = ENOENT;
|
|
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry: no samAccountName present");
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
objectclasses = ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "objectClass");
|
|
|
|
if (objectclasses && ldb_msg_find_val(objectclasses, &computer_val)) {
|
|
is_computer = TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memset(entry_ex, 0, sizeof(*entry_ex));
|
|
|
|
if (!realm) {
|
|
ret = ENOMEM;
|
|
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc_strdup: out of memory");
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p = talloc(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
|
|
if (!p) {
|
|
ret = ENOMEM;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx;
|
|
p->entry_ex = entry_ex;
|
|
p->realm_dn = talloc_reference(p, realm_dn);
|
|
if (!p->realm_dn) {
|
|
ret = ENOMEM;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor);
|
|
|
|
/* make sure we do not have bogus data in there */
|
|
memset(&entry_ex->entry, 0, sizeof(hdb_entry));
|
|
|
|
entry_ex->ctx = p;
|
|
entry_ex->free_entry = samba_kdc_free_entry;
|
|
|
|
userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg, "userAccountControl", 0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
entry_ex->entry.principal = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.principal)));
|
|
if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY && principal == NULL) {
|
|
krb5_make_principal(context, &entry_ex->entry.principal, realm, samAccountName, NULL);
|
|
} else {
|
|
ret = copy_Principal(principal, entry_ex->entry.principal);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* While we have copied the client principal, tests
|
|
* show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
|
|
* the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
|
|
* replace the client principal's realm with the one
|
|
* we determine from our records */
|
|
|
|
/* this has to be with malloc() */
|
|
krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, realm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* First try and figure out the flags based on the userAccountControl */
|
|
entry_ex->entry.flags = uf2HDBFlags(context, userAccountControl, ent_type);
|
|
|
|
/* Windows 2008 seems to enforce this (very sensible) rule by
|
|
* default - don't allow offline attacks on a user's password
|
|
* by asking for a ticket to them as a service (encrypted with
|
|
* their probably patheticly insecure password) */
|
|
|
|
if (entry_ex->entry.flags.server
|
|
&& lp_parm_bool(lp_ctx, NULL, "kdc", "require spn for service", true)) {
|
|
if (!is_computer && !ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "servicePrincipalName", NULL)) {
|
|
entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
/* These (created_by, modified_by) parts of the entry are not relevant for Samba4's use
|
|
* of the Heimdal KDC. They are stored in a the traditional
|
|
* DB for audit purposes, and still form part of the structure
|
|
* we must return */
|
|
|
|
/* use 'whenCreated' */
|
|
entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
|
|
/* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
|
|
krb5_make_principal(context,
|
|
&entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal,
|
|
realm, "kadmin", NULL);
|
|
|
|
entry_ex->entry.modified_by = (Event *) malloc(sizeof(Event));
|
|
if (entry_ex->entry.modified_by == NULL) {
|
|
ret = ENOMEM;
|
|
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "malloc: out of memory");
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* use 'whenChanged' */
|
|
entry_ex->entry.modified_by->time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenChanged", 0);
|
|
/* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
|
|
krb5_make_principal(context,
|
|
&entry_ex->entry.modified_by->principal,
|
|
realm, "kadmin", NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* The lack of password controls etc applies to krbtgt by
|
|
* virtue of being that particular RID */
|
|
status = dom_sid_split_rid(NULL, samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid"), NULL, &rid);
|
|
|
|
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
|
|
ret = EINVAL;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT) {
|
|
entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
|
|
entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
|
|
|
|
entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
|
|
entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
|
|
|
|
/* Don't mark all requests for the krbtgt/realm as
|
|
* 'change password', as otherwise we could get into
|
|
* trouble, and not enforce the password expirty.
|
|
* Instead, only do it when request is for the kpasswd service */
|
|
if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER
|
|
&& principal->name.name_string.len == 2
|
|
&& (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], "kadmin") == 0)
|
|
&& (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[1], "changepw") == 0)
|
|
&& lp_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->realm)) {
|
|
entry_ex->entry.flags.change_pw = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
|
|
entry_ex->entry.flags.forwardable = 1;
|
|
entry_ex->entry.flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
|
|
} else if (entry_ex->entry.flags.server && ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) {
|
|
/* The account/password expiry only applies when the account is used as a
|
|
* client (ie password login), not when used as a server */
|
|
|
|
/* Make very well sure we don't use this for a client,
|
|
* it could bypass the password restrictions */
|
|
entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
|
|
|
|
entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
|
|
entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
NTTIME must_change_time
|
|
= samdb_result_force_password_change(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
|
|
realm_dn, msg);
|
|
if (must_change_time == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
|
|
entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
|
|
} else {
|
|
entry_ex->entry.pw_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.pw_end));
|
|
if (entry_ex->entry.pw_end == NULL) {
|
|
ret = ENOMEM;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
*entry_ex->entry.pw_end = nt_time_to_unix(must_change_time);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
acct_expiry = samdb_result_account_expires(msg);
|
|
if (acct_expiry == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
|
|
entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
|
|
} else {
|
|
entry_ex->entry.valid_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.valid_end));
|
|
if (entry_ex->entry.valid_end == NULL) {
|
|
ret = ENOMEM;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
*entry_ex->entry.valid_end = nt_time_to_unix(acct_expiry);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
|
|
|
|
entry_ex->entry.max_life = NULL;
|
|
|
|
entry_ex->entry.max_renew = NULL;
|
|
|
|
entry_ex->entry.generation = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* Get keys from the db */
|
|
ret = samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(context, p->kdc_db_ctx->ic_ctx, p,
|
|
msg, userAccountControl, entry_ex);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
/* Could be bougus data in the entry, or out of memory */
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes)));
|
|
if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) {
|
|
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
|
|
ret = ENOMEM;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
entry_ex->entry.etypes->len = entry_ex->entry.keys.len;
|
|
entry_ex->entry.etypes->val = calloc(entry_ex->entry.etypes->len, sizeof(int));
|
|
if (entry_ex->entry.etypes->val == NULL) {
|
|
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
|
|
ret = ENOMEM;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
for (i=0; i < entry_ex->entry.etypes->len; i++) {
|
|
entry_ex->entry.etypes->val[i] = entry_ex->entry.keys.val[i].key.keytype;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
if (ret != 0) {
|
|
/* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
|
|
hdb_free_entry(context, entry_ex);
|
|
} else {
|
|
talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, entry_ex->ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
|
|
*/
|
|
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(krb5_context context,
|
|
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
|
|
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
|
|
enum trust_direction direction,
|
|
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
|
|
struct ldb_message *msg,
|
|
hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
|
|
{
|
|
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
|
|
const char *dnsdomain;
|
|
char *realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, lp_realm(lp_ctx));
|
|
DATA_BLOB password_utf16;
|
|
struct samr_Password password_hash;
|
|
const struct ldb_val *password_val;
|
|
struct trustAuthInOutBlob password_blob;
|
|
struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
|
|
|
|
enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
|
|
int i, ret, trust_direction_flags;
|
|
|
|
p = talloc(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
|
|
if (!p) {
|
|
ret = ENOMEM;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx;
|
|
p->entry_ex = entry_ex;
|
|
p->realm_dn = realm_dn;
|
|
|
|
talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor);
|
|
|
|
/* make sure we do not have bogus data in there */
|
|
memset(&entry_ex->entry, 0, sizeof(hdb_entry));
|
|
|
|
entry_ex->ctx = p;
|
|
entry_ex->free_entry = samba_kdc_free_entry;
|
|
|
|
/* use 'whenCreated' */
|
|
entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
|
|
/* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
|
|
krb5_make_principal(context,
|
|
&entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal,
|
|
realm, "kadmin", NULL);
|
|
|
|
entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
|
|
|
|
trust_direction_flags = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "trustDirection", 0);
|
|
|
|
if (direction == INBOUND) {
|
|
password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthIncoming");
|
|
|
|
} else { /* OUTBOUND */
|
|
dnsdomain = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "trustPartner", NULL);
|
|
/* replace realm */
|
|
talloc_free(realm);
|
|
realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, dnsdomain);
|
|
password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthOutgoing");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!password_val || !(trust_direction_flags & direction)) {
|
|
ret = ENOENT;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(password_val, mem_ctx, p->kdc_db_ctx->ic_ctx, &password_blob,
|
|
(ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_trustAuthInOutBlob);
|
|
if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
|
|
ret = EINVAL;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
entry_ex->entry.kvno = -1;
|
|
for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) {
|
|
if (password_blob.current->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_VERSION) {
|
|
entry_ex->entry.kvno = password_blob.current->array[i].AuthInfo.version.version;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) {
|
|
if (password_blob.current->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_CLEAR) {
|
|
password_utf16 = data_blob_const(password_blob.current->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.password,
|
|
password_blob.current->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.size);
|
|
/* In the future, generate all sorts of
|
|
* hashes, but for now we can't safely convert
|
|
* the random strings windows uses into
|
|
* utf8 */
|
|
|
|
/* but as it is utf16 already, we can get the NT password/arcfour-hmac-md5 key */
|
|
mdfour(password_hash.hash, password_utf16.data, password_utf16.length);
|
|
break;
|
|
} else if (password_blob.current->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_NT4OWF) {
|
|
password_hash = password_blob.current->array[i].AuthInfo.nt4owf.password;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (i < password_blob.count) {
|
|
Key key;
|
|
/* Must have found a cleartext or MD4 password */
|
|
entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(1, sizeof(Key));
|
|
|
|
key.mkvno = 0;
|
|
key.salt = NULL; /* No salt for this enc type */
|
|
|
|
if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
|
|
ret = ENOMEM;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
|
|
ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
|
|
password_hash.hash, sizeof(password_hash.hash),
|
|
&key.key);
|
|
|
|
entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
|
|
entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
entry_ex->entry.principal = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.principal)));
|
|
|
|
ret = copy_Principal(principal, entry_ex->entry.principal);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* While we have copied the client principal, tests
|
|
* show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
|
|
* the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
|
|
* replace the client principal's realm with the one
|
|
* we determine from our records */
|
|
|
|
krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, realm);
|
|
entry_ex->entry.flags = int2HDBFlags(0);
|
|
entry_ex->entry.flags.immutable = 1;
|
|
entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
|
|
entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
|
|
entry_ex->entry.flags.require_preauth = 1;
|
|
|
|
entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
|
|
|
|
entry_ex->entry.max_life = NULL;
|
|
|
|
entry_ex->entry.max_renew = NULL;
|
|
|
|
entry_ex->entry.generation = NULL;
|
|
|
|
entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes)));
|
|
if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) {
|
|
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
|
|
ret = ENOMEM;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
entry_ex->entry.etypes->len = entry_ex->entry.keys.len;
|
|
entry_ex->entry.etypes->val = calloc(entry_ex->entry.etypes->len, sizeof(int));
|
|
if (entry_ex->entry.etypes->val == NULL) {
|
|
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
|
|
ret = ENOMEM;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
for (i=0; i < entry_ex->entry.etypes->len; i++) {
|
|
entry_ex->entry.etypes->val[i] = entry_ex->entry.keys.val[i].key.keytype;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
if (ret != 0) {
|
|
/* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
|
|
hdb_free_entry(context, entry_ex);
|
|
} else {
|
|
talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, entry_ex->ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_trust(krb5_context context, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx,
|
|
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
|
|
const char *realm,
|
|
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
|
|
struct ldb_message **pmsg)
|
|
{
|
|
int lret;
|
|
krb5_error_code ret;
|
|
char *filter = NULL;
|
|
const char * const *attrs = trust_attrs;
|
|
|
|
struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
|
|
filter = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "(&(objectClass=trustedDomain)(|(flatname=%s)(trustPartner=%s)))", realm, realm);
|
|
|
|
if (!filter) {
|
|
ret = ENOMEM;
|
|
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc_asprintf: out of memory");
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
lret = ldb_search(ldb_ctx, mem_ctx, &res,
|
|
ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_ctx),
|
|
LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, attrs, "%s", filter);
|
|
if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
|
|
DEBUG(3, ("Failed to search for %s: %s\n", filter, ldb_errstring(ldb_ctx)));
|
|
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
|
|
} else if (res->count == 0 || res->count > 1) {
|
|
DEBUG(3, ("Failed find a single entry for %s: got %d\n", filter, res->count));
|
|
talloc_free(res);
|
|
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
|
|
}
|
|
talloc_steal(mem_ctx, res->msgs);
|
|
*pmsg = res->msgs[0];
|
|
talloc_free(res);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_client(krb5_context context,
|
|
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
|
|
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
|
|
krb5_const_principal principal,
|
|
const char **attrs,
|
|
struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
|
|
struct ldb_message **msg) {
|
|
NTSTATUS nt_status;
|
|
char *principal_string;
|
|
krb5_error_code ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, principal, &principal_string);
|
|
|
|
if (ret != 0) {
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nt_status = sam_get_results_principal(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
|
|
mem_ctx, principal_string, attrs,
|
|
realm_dn, msg);
|
|
free(principal_string);
|
|
if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER)) {
|
|
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
|
|
} else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY)) {
|
|
return ENOMEM;
|
|
} else if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
|
|
return EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_client(krb5_context context,
|
|
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
|
|
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
|
|
krb5_const_principal principal,
|
|
hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex) {
|
|
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
|
|
krb5_error_code ret;
|
|
struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
|
|
|
|
ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
|
|
mem_ctx, principal, user_attrs,
|
|
&realm_dn, &msg);
|
|
if (ret != 0) {
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
|
|
principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT,
|
|
realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(krb5_context context,
|
|
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
|
|
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
|
|
krb5_const_principal principal,
|
|
hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
|
|
{
|
|
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
|
|
krb5_error_code ret;
|
|
struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
|
|
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
|
|
const char *realm;
|
|
|
|
krb5_principal alloc_principal = NULL;
|
|
if (principal->name.name_string.len != 2
|
|
|| (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], KRB5_TGS_NAME) != 0)) {
|
|
/* Not a krbtgt */
|
|
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* krbtgt case. Either us or a trusted realm */
|
|
|
|
if (lp_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->realm)
|
|
&& lp_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->name.name_string.val[1])) {
|
|
/* us */
|
|
/* Cludge, cludge cludge. If the realm part of krbtgt/realm,
|
|
* is in our db, then direct the caller at our primary
|
|
* krbtgt */
|
|
|
|
int lret;
|
|
char *realm_fixed;
|
|
|
|
lret = gendb_search_single_extended_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
|
|
realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
|
|
&msg, krbtgt_attrs,
|
|
"(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=krbtgt))");
|
|
if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
|
|
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find own KRBTGT in DB!");
|
|
krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find own KRBTGT in DB!");
|
|
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
|
|
} else if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
|
|
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find own KRBTGT in DB: %s", ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb));
|
|
krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find own KRBTGT in DB: %s", ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb));
|
|
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
realm_fixed = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, lp_realm(lp_ctx));
|
|
if (!realm_fixed) {
|
|
ret = ENOMEM;
|
|
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "strupper_talloc: out of memory");
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, principal, &alloc_principal);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
free(alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1]);
|
|
alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1] = strdup(realm_fixed);
|
|
talloc_free(realm_fixed);
|
|
if (!alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1]) {
|
|
ret = ENOMEM;
|
|
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: strdup() failed!");
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
principal = alloc_principal;
|
|
|
|
ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
|
|
principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT,
|
|
realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
|
|
if (ret != 0) {
|
|
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: self krbtgt message2entry failed");
|
|
}
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
enum trust_direction direction = UNKNOWN;
|
|
|
|
/* Either an inbound or outbound trust */
|
|
|
|
if (strcasecmp(lp_realm(lp_ctx), principal->realm) == 0) {
|
|
/* look for inbound trust */
|
|
direction = INBOUND;
|
|
realm = principal->name.name_string.val[1];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (strcasecmp(lp_realm(lp_ctx), principal->name.name_string.val[1]) == 0) {
|
|
/* look for outbound trust */
|
|
direction = OUTBOUND;
|
|
realm = principal->realm;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Trusted domains are under CN=system */
|
|
|
|
ret = samba_kdc_lookup_trust(context, kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
|
|
mem_ctx,
|
|
realm, realm_dn, &msg);
|
|
|
|
if (ret != 0) {
|
|
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
|
|
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
|
|
principal, direction,
|
|
realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
|
|
if (ret != 0) {
|
|
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: trust_message2entry failed");
|
|
}
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* we should lookup trusted domains */
|
|
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_server(krb5_context context,
|
|
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
|
|
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
|
|
krb5_const_principal principal,
|
|
const char **attrs,
|
|
struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
|
|
struct ldb_message **msg)
|
|
{
|
|
krb5_error_code ret;
|
|
const char *realm;
|
|
if (principal->name.name_string.len >= 2) {
|
|
/* 'normal server' case */
|
|
int ldb_ret;
|
|
NTSTATUS nt_status;
|
|
struct ldb_dn *user_dn;
|
|
char *principal_string;
|
|
|
|
ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal,
|
|
KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM,
|
|
&principal_string);
|
|
if (ret != 0) {
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* At this point we may find the host is known to be
|
|
* in a different realm, so we should generate a
|
|
* referral instead */
|
|
nt_status = crack_service_principal_name(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
|
|
mem_ctx, principal_string,
|
|
&user_dn, realm_dn);
|
|
free(principal_string);
|
|
|
|
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
|
|
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ldb_ret = gendb_search_single_extended_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
|
|
mem_ctx,
|
|
user_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
|
|
msg, attrs,
|
|
"(objectClass=*)");
|
|
if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
|
|
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
int lret;
|
|
char *filter = NULL;
|
|
char *short_princ;
|
|
/* server as client principal case, but we must not lookup userPrincipalNames */
|
|
*realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
|
|
realm = krb5_principal_get_realm(context, principal);
|
|
|
|
/* TODO: Check if it is our realm, otherwise give referall */
|
|
|
|
ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal, KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &short_princ);
|
|
|
|
if (ret != 0) {
|
|
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
|
|
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
lret = gendb_search_single_extended_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
|
|
*realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
|
|
msg, attrs, "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=%s))",
|
|
ldb_binary_encode_string(mem_ctx, short_princ));
|
|
free(short_princ);
|
|
if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
|
|
DEBUG(3, ("Failed find a entry for %s\n", filter));
|
|
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
|
|
}
|
|
if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
|
|
DEBUG(3, ("Failed single search for for %s - %s\n",
|
|
filter, ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
|
|
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_server(krb5_context context,
|
|
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
|
|
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
|
|
krb5_const_principal principal,
|
|
hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
|
|
{
|
|
krb5_error_code ret;
|
|
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
|
|
struct ldb_message *msg;
|
|
|
|
ret = samba_kdc_lookup_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal,
|
|
server_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
|
|
if (ret != 0) {
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
|
|
principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
|
|
realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
|
|
if (ret != 0) {
|
|
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: message2entry failed");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch(krb5_context context,
|
|
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
|
|
krb5_const_principal principal,
|
|
unsigned flags,
|
|
hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
|
|
{
|
|
krb5_error_code ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
|
|
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_fetch context");
|
|
|
|
if (!mem_ctx) {
|
|
ret = ENOMEM;
|
|
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (flags & HDB_F_GET_CLIENT) {
|
|
ret = samba_kdc_fetch_client(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, entry_ex);
|
|
if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
if (flags & HDB_F_GET_SERVER) {
|
|
/* krbtgt fits into this situation for trusted realms, and for resolving different versions of our own realm name */
|
|
ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, entry_ex);
|
|
if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
|
|
|
|
/* We return 'no entry' if it does not start with krbtgt/, so move to the common case quickly */
|
|
ret = samba_kdc_fetch_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, entry_ex);
|
|
if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
if (flags & HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT) {
|
|
ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, entry_ex);
|
|
if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
struct samba_kdc_seq {
|
|
int index;
|
|
int count;
|
|
struct ldb_message **msgs;
|
|
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_seq(krb5_context context,
|
|
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
|
|
hdb_entry_ex *entry)
|
|
{
|
|
krb5_error_code ret;
|
|
struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx;
|
|
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
|
|
hdb_entry_ex entry_ex;
|
|
memset(&entry_ex, '\0', sizeof(entry_ex));
|
|
|
|
if (!priv) {
|
|
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_seq context");
|
|
|
|
if (!mem_ctx) {
|
|
ret = ENOMEM;
|
|
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_seq: talloc_named() failed!");
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (priv->index < priv->count) {
|
|
ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
|
|
NULL, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY,
|
|
priv->realm_dn, priv->msgs[priv->index++], entry);
|
|
} else {
|
|
ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ret != 0) {
|
|
talloc_free(priv);
|
|
kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
|
|
} else {
|
|
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
krb5_error_code samba_kdc_firstkey(krb5_context context,
|
|
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
|
|
hdb_entry_ex *entry)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->samdb;
|
|
struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx;
|
|
char *realm;
|
|
struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
|
|
krb5_error_code ret;
|
|
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
|
|
int lret;
|
|
|
|
if (priv) {
|
|
talloc_free(priv);
|
|
kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
priv = (struct samba_kdc_seq *) talloc(kdc_db_ctx, struct samba_kdc_seq);
|
|
if (!priv) {
|
|
ret = ENOMEM;
|
|
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc: out of memory");
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
priv->index = 0;
|
|
priv->msgs = NULL;
|
|
priv->realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_ctx);
|
|
priv->count = 0;
|
|
|
|
mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_firstkey context");
|
|
|
|
if (!mem_ctx) {
|
|
ret = ENOMEM;
|
|
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_firstkey: talloc_named() failed!");
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = krb5_get_default_realm(context, &realm);
|
|
if (ret != 0) {
|
|
talloc_free(priv);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
lret = ldb_search(ldb_ctx, priv, &res,
|
|
priv->realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, user_attrs,
|
|
"(objectClass=user)");
|
|
|
|
if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
|
|
talloc_free(priv);
|
|
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
priv->count = res->count;
|
|
priv->msgs = talloc_steal(priv, res->msgs);
|
|
talloc_free(res);
|
|
|
|
kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = priv;
|
|
|
|
ret = samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry);
|
|
|
|
if (ret != 0) {
|
|
talloc_free(priv);
|
|
kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
|
|
} else {
|
|
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
krb5_error_code samba_kdc_nextkey(krb5_context context,
|
|
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
|
|
hdb_entry_ex *entry)
|
|
{
|
|
return samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check if a given entry may delegate to this target principal
|
|
*
|
|
* This is currently a very nasty hack - allowing only delegation to itself.
|
|
*/
|
|
krb5_error_code
|
|
samba_kdc_check_constrained_delegation(krb5_context context,
|
|
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
|
|
hdb_entry_ex *entry,
|
|
krb5_const_principal target_principal)
|
|
{
|
|
krb5_error_code ret;
|
|
krb5_principal enterprise_prinicpal = NULL;
|
|
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
|
|
struct ldb_message *msg;
|
|
struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
|
|
struct dom_sid *target_sid;
|
|
struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
|
|
const char *delegation_check_attrs[] = {
|
|
"objectSid", NULL
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_constrained_delegation");
|
|
|
|
if (!mem_ctx) {
|
|
ret = ENOMEM;
|
|
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (target_principal->name.name_type == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
|
|
/* Need to reparse the enterprise principal to find the real target */
|
|
if (target_principal->name.name_string.len != 1) {
|
|
ret = KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED;
|
|
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_check_constrained_delegation: request for delegation to enterprise principal with wrong (%d) number of components",
|
|
target_principal->name.name_string.len);
|
|
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
ret = krb5_parse_name(context, target_principal->name.name_string.val[0],
|
|
&enterprise_prinicpal);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
target_principal = enterprise_prinicpal;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = samba_kdc_lookup_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, target_principal,
|
|
delegation_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
|
|
|
|
krb5_free_principal(context, enterprise_prinicpal);
|
|
|
|
if (ret != 0) {
|
|
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, p->msg, "objectSid");
|
|
target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid");
|
|
|
|
/* Allow delegation to the same principal, even if by a different
|
|
* name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID
|
|
* comparison */
|
|
if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
|
|
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
|
|
return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Certificates printed by a the Certificate Authority might have a
|
|
* slightly different form of the user principal name to that in the
|
|
* database. Allow a mismatch where they both refer to the same
|
|
* SID */
|
|
|
|
krb5_error_code
|
|
samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match(krb5_context context,
|
|
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
|
|
hdb_entry_ex *entry,
|
|
krb5_const_principal certificate_principal)
|
|
{
|
|
krb5_error_code ret;
|
|
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
|
|
struct ldb_message *msg;
|
|
struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
|
|
struct dom_sid *target_sid;
|
|
struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
|
|
const char *ms_upn_check_attrs[] = {
|
|
"objectSid", NULL
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match");
|
|
|
|
if (!mem_ctx) {
|
|
ret = ENOMEM;
|
|
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
|
|
mem_ctx, certificate_principal,
|
|
ms_upn_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
|
|
|
|
if (ret != 0) {
|
|
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, p->msg, "objectSid");
|
|
target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid");
|
|
|
|
/* Consider these to be the same principal, even if by a different
|
|
* name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID
|
|
* comparison */
|
|
if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
|
|
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
|
|
return KRB5_KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|