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samba-mirror/source3/passdb/secrets.c
Michael Adam 2ade25279c Fix logic and prevent segfaults in secrets trustdom tdb pack code.
New size calculation logic in tdb_trusted_dom_pass_pack()
and tdb_sid_pack() used accumulated sizes as successive offsets
to buffer pointer.

Michael
(This used to be commit 9c24713b40)
2007-12-12 09:47:41 -08:00

1322 lines
32 KiB
C

/*
Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-2001
Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2002
Copyright (C) Rafal Szczesniak 2002
Copyright (C) Tim Potter 2001
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
/* the Samba secrets database stores any generated, private information
such as the local SID and machine trust password */
#include "includes.h"
#undef DBGC_CLASS
#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_PASSDB
static TDB_CONTEXT *tdb;
/* Urrrg. global.... */
bool global_machine_password_needs_changing;
/**
* Use a TDB to store an incrementing random seed.
*
* Initialised to the current pid, the very first time Samba starts,
* and incremented by one each time it is needed.
*
* @note Not called by systems with a working /dev/urandom.
*/
static void get_rand_seed(int *new_seed)
{
*new_seed = sys_getpid();
if (tdb) {
tdb_change_int32_atomic(tdb, "INFO/random_seed", new_seed, 1);
}
}
/* open up the secrets database */
bool secrets_init(void)
{
TALLOC_CTX *ctx;
char *fname = NULL;
unsigned char dummy;
if (tdb)
return True;
ctx = talloc_init("secrets_init");
if (!ctx) {
return false;
}
fname = talloc_asprintf(ctx,
"%s/secrets.tdb",
lp_private_dir());
if (!fname) {
TALLOC_FREE(ctx);
return false;
}
tdb = tdb_open_log(fname, 0, TDB_DEFAULT, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0600);
if (!tdb) {
DEBUG(0,("Failed to open %s\n", fname));
TALLOC_FREE(ctx);
return False;
}
TALLOC_FREE(ctx);
/**
* Set a reseed function for the crypto random generator
*
* This avoids a problem where systems without /dev/urandom
* could send the same challenge to multiple clients
*/
set_rand_reseed_callback(get_rand_seed);
/* Ensure that the reseed is done now, while we are root, etc */
generate_random_buffer(&dummy, sizeof(dummy));
return True;
}
/* read a entry from the secrets database - the caller must free the result
if size is non-null then the size of the entry is put in there
*/
void *secrets_fetch(const char *key, size_t *size)
{
TDB_DATA dbuf;
secrets_init();
if (!tdb)
return NULL;
dbuf = tdb_fetch(tdb, string_tdb_data(key));
if (size)
*size = dbuf.dsize;
return dbuf.dptr;
}
/* store a secrets entry
*/
bool secrets_store(const char *key, const void *data, size_t size)
{
secrets_init();
if (!tdb)
return False;
return tdb_trans_store(tdb, string_tdb_data(key),
make_tdb_data((const uint8 *)data, size),
TDB_REPLACE) == 0;
}
/* delete a secets database entry
*/
bool secrets_delete(const char *key)
{
secrets_init();
if (!tdb)
return False;
return tdb_trans_delete(tdb, string_tdb_data(key)) == 0;
}
bool secrets_store_domain_sid(const char *domain, const DOM_SID *sid)
{
fstring key;
bool ret;
slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_SID, domain);
strupper_m(key);
ret = secrets_store(key, sid, sizeof(DOM_SID));
/* Force a re-query, in case we modified our domain */
if (ret)
reset_global_sam_sid();
return ret;
}
bool secrets_fetch_domain_sid(const char *domain, DOM_SID *sid)
{
DOM_SID *dyn_sid;
fstring key;
size_t size = 0;
slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_SID, domain);
strupper_m(key);
dyn_sid = (DOM_SID *)secrets_fetch(key, &size);
if (dyn_sid == NULL)
return False;
if (size != sizeof(DOM_SID)) {
SAFE_FREE(dyn_sid);
return False;
}
*sid = *dyn_sid;
SAFE_FREE(dyn_sid);
return True;
}
bool secrets_store_domain_guid(const char *domain, struct GUID *guid)
{
fstring key;
slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_GUID, domain);
strupper_m(key);
return secrets_store(key, guid, sizeof(struct GUID));
}
bool secrets_fetch_domain_guid(const char *domain, struct GUID *guid)
{
struct GUID *dyn_guid;
fstring key;
size_t size = 0;
struct GUID new_guid;
slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_GUID, domain);
strupper_m(key);
dyn_guid = (struct GUID *)secrets_fetch(key, &size);
if (!dyn_guid) {
if (lp_server_role() == ROLE_DOMAIN_PDC) {
smb_uuid_generate_random(&new_guid);
if (!secrets_store_domain_guid(domain, &new_guid))
return False;
dyn_guid = (struct GUID *)secrets_fetch(key, &size);
}
if (dyn_guid == NULL) {
return False;
}
}
if (size != sizeof(struct GUID)) {
DEBUG(1,("UUID size %d is wrong!\n", (int)size));
SAFE_FREE(dyn_guid);
return False;
}
*guid = *dyn_guid;
SAFE_FREE(dyn_guid);
return True;
}
/**
* Form a key for fetching the machine trust account password
*
* @param domain domain name
*
* @return stored password's key
**/
static const char *trust_keystr(const char *domain)
{
char *keystr;
keystr = talloc_asprintf(talloc_tos(), "%s/%s",
SECRETS_MACHINE_ACCT_PASS, domain);
SMB_ASSERT(keystr != NULL);
strupper_m(keystr);
return keystr;
}
/**
* Form a key for fetching a trusted domain password
*
* @param domain trusted domain name
*
* @return stored password's key
**/
static char *trustdom_keystr(const char *domain)
{
char *keystr;
keystr = talloc_asprintf(talloc_tos(), "%s/%s",
SECRETS_DOMTRUST_ACCT_PASS, domain);
SMB_ASSERT(keystr != NULL);
strupper_m(keystr);
return keystr;
}
/************************************************************************
Lock the trust password entry.
************************************************************************/
bool secrets_lock_trust_account_password(const char *domain, bool dolock)
{
if (!tdb)
return False;
if (dolock)
return (tdb_lock_bystring(tdb, trust_keystr(domain)) == 0);
else
tdb_unlock_bystring(tdb, trust_keystr(domain));
return True;
}
/************************************************************************
Routine to get the default secure channel type for trust accounts
************************************************************************/
uint32 get_default_sec_channel(void)
{
if (lp_server_role() == ROLE_DOMAIN_BDC ||
lp_server_role() == ROLE_DOMAIN_PDC) {
return SEC_CHAN_BDC;
} else {
return SEC_CHAN_WKSTA;
}
}
/************************************************************************
Routine to get the trust account password for a domain.
The user of this function must have locked the trust password file using
the above secrets_lock_trust_account_password().
************************************************************************/
bool secrets_fetch_trust_account_password(const char *domain, uint8 ret_pwd[16],
time_t *pass_last_set_time,
uint32 *channel)
{
struct machine_acct_pass *pass;
char *plaintext;
size_t size = 0;
plaintext = secrets_fetch_machine_password(domain, pass_last_set_time,
channel);
if (plaintext) {
DEBUG(4,("Using cleartext machine password\n"));
E_md4hash(plaintext, ret_pwd);
SAFE_FREE(plaintext);
return True;
}
if (!(pass = (struct machine_acct_pass *)secrets_fetch(
trust_keystr(domain), &size))) {
DEBUG(5, ("secrets_fetch failed!\n"));
return False;
}
if (size != sizeof(*pass)) {
DEBUG(0, ("secrets were of incorrect size!\n"));
return False;
}
if (pass_last_set_time) {
*pass_last_set_time = pass->mod_time;
}
memcpy(ret_pwd, pass->hash, 16);
if (channel) {
*channel = get_default_sec_channel();
}
/* Test if machine password has expired and needs to be changed */
if (lp_machine_password_timeout()) {
if (pass->mod_time > 0 && time(NULL) > (pass->mod_time +
(time_t)lp_machine_password_timeout())) {
global_machine_password_needs_changing = True;
}
}
SAFE_FREE(pass);
return True;
}
/**
* Pack SID passed by pointer
*
* @param pack_buf pointer to buffer which is to be filled with packed data
* @param bufsize size of packing buffer
* @param sid pointer to sid to be packed
*
* @return length of the packed representation of the whole structure
**/
static size_t tdb_sid_pack(uint8 *pack_buf, int bufsize, DOM_SID* sid)
{
int idx;
size_t len = 0;
uint8 *p = pack_buf;
int remaining_space = pack_buf ? bufsize : 0;
if (!sid) {
return -1;
}
len += tdb_pack(p, remaining_space, "bb", sid->sid_rev_num,
sid->num_auths);
if (pack_buf) {
p = pack_buf + len;
remaining_space = bufsize - len;
}
for (idx = 0; idx < 6; idx++) {
len += tdb_pack(p, remaining_space, "b",
sid->id_auth[idx]);
if (pack_buf) {
p = pack_buf + len;
remaining_space = bufsize - len;
}
}
for (idx = 0; idx < MAXSUBAUTHS; idx++) {
len += tdb_pack(p, remaining_space, "d",
sid->sub_auths[idx]);
if (pack_buf) {
p = pack_buf + len;
remaining_space = bufsize - len;
}
}
return len;
}
/**
* Unpack SID into a pointer
*
* @param pack_buf pointer to buffer with packed representation
* @param bufsize size of the buffer
* @param sid pointer to sid structure to be filled with unpacked data
*
* @return size of structure unpacked from buffer
**/
static size_t tdb_sid_unpack(uint8 *pack_buf, int bufsize, DOM_SID* sid)
{
int idx, len = 0;
if (!sid || !pack_buf) return -1;
len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "bb",
&sid->sid_rev_num, &sid->num_auths);
for (idx = 0; idx < 6; idx++) {
len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "b",
&sid->id_auth[idx]);
}
for (idx = 0; idx < MAXSUBAUTHS; idx++) {
len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "d",
&sid->sub_auths[idx]);
}
return len;
}
/**
* Pack TRUSTED_DOM_PASS passed by pointer
*
* @param pack_buf pointer to buffer which is to be filled with packed data
* @param bufsize size of the buffer
* @param pass pointer to trusted domain password to be packed
*
* @return length of the packed representation of the whole structure
**/
static size_t tdb_trusted_dom_pass_pack(uint8 *pack_buf, int bufsize,
TRUSTED_DOM_PASS* pass)
{
int idx, len = 0;
uint8 *p = pack_buf;
int remaining_space = pack_buf ? bufsize : 0;
if (!pass) {
return -1;
}
/* packing unicode domain name and password */
len += tdb_pack(p, remaining_space, "d",
pass->uni_name_len);
if (pack_buf) {
p = pack_buf + len;
remaining_space = bufsize - len;
}
for (idx = 0; idx < 32; idx++) {
len += tdb_pack(p, remaining_space, "w",
pass->uni_name[idx]);
if (pack_buf) {
p = pack_buf + len;
remaining_space = bufsize - len;
}
}
len += tdb_pack(p, remaining_space, "dPd", pass->pass_len,
pass->pass, pass->mod_time);
if (pack_buf) {
p = pack_buf + len;
remaining_space = bufsize - len;
}
/* packing SID structure */
len += tdb_sid_pack(p, remaining_space, &pass->domain_sid);
if (pack_buf) {
p = pack_buf + len;
remaining_space = bufsize - len;
}
return len;
}
/**
* Unpack TRUSTED_DOM_PASS passed by pointer
*
* @param pack_buf pointer to buffer with packed representation
* @param bufsize size of the buffer
* @param pass pointer to trusted domain password to be filled with unpacked data
*
* @return size of structure unpacked from buffer
**/
static size_t tdb_trusted_dom_pass_unpack(uint8 *pack_buf, int bufsize,
TRUSTED_DOM_PASS* pass)
{
int idx, len = 0;
char *passp = NULL;
if (!pack_buf || !pass) return -1;
/* unpack unicode domain name and plaintext password */
len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf, bufsize - len, "d", &pass->uni_name_len);
for (idx = 0; idx < 32; idx++)
len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "w",
&pass->uni_name[idx]);
len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "dPd",
&pass->pass_len, &passp, &pass->mod_time);
if (passp) {
fstrcpy(pass->pass, passp);
}
SAFE_FREE(passp);
/* unpack domain sid */
len += tdb_sid_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len,
&pass->domain_sid);
return len;
}
/************************************************************************
Routine to get account password to trusted domain
************************************************************************/
bool secrets_fetch_trusted_domain_password(const char *domain, char** pwd,
DOM_SID *sid, time_t *pass_last_set_time)
{
struct trusted_dom_pass pass;
size_t size = 0;
/* unpacking structures */
uint8 *pass_buf;
int pass_len = 0;
ZERO_STRUCT(pass);
/* fetching trusted domain password structure */
if (!(pass_buf = (uint8 *)secrets_fetch(trustdom_keystr(domain),
&size))) {
DEBUG(5, ("secrets_fetch failed!\n"));
return False;
}
/* unpack trusted domain password */
pass_len = tdb_trusted_dom_pass_unpack(pass_buf, size, &pass);
SAFE_FREE(pass_buf);
if (pass_len != size) {
DEBUG(5, ("Invalid secrets size. Unpacked data doesn't match trusted_dom_pass structure.\n"));
return False;
}
/* the trust's password */
if (pwd) {
*pwd = SMB_STRDUP(pass.pass);
if (!*pwd) {
return False;
}
}
/* last change time */
if (pass_last_set_time) *pass_last_set_time = pass.mod_time;
/* domain sid */
if (sid != NULL) sid_copy(sid, &pass.domain_sid);
return True;
}
/************************************************************************
Routine to set the trust account password for a domain.
************************************************************************/
bool secrets_store_trust_account_password(const char *domain, uint8 new_pwd[16])
{
struct machine_acct_pass pass;
pass.mod_time = time(NULL);
memcpy(pass.hash, new_pwd, 16);
return secrets_store(trust_keystr(domain), (void *)&pass, sizeof(pass));
}
/**
* Routine to store the password for trusted domain
*
* @param domain remote domain name
* @param pwd plain text password of trust relationship
* @param sid remote domain sid
*
* @return true if succeeded
**/
bool secrets_store_trusted_domain_password(const char* domain, const char* pwd,
const DOM_SID *sid)
{
smb_ucs2_t *uni_dom_name;
bool ret;
/* packing structures */
uint8 *pass_buf = NULL;
int pass_len = 0;
struct trusted_dom_pass pass;
ZERO_STRUCT(pass);
if (push_ucs2_allocate(&uni_dom_name, domain) == (size_t)-1) {
DEBUG(0, ("Could not convert domain name %s to unicode\n",
domain));
return False;
}
strncpy_w(pass.uni_name, uni_dom_name, sizeof(pass.uni_name) - 1);
pass.uni_name_len = strlen_w(uni_dom_name)+1;
SAFE_FREE(uni_dom_name);
/* last change time */
pass.mod_time = time(NULL);
/* password of the trust */
pass.pass_len = strlen(pwd);
fstrcpy(pass.pass, pwd);
/* domain sid */
sid_copy(&pass.domain_sid, sid);
/* Calculate the length. */
pass_len = tdb_trusted_dom_pass_pack(NULL, 0, &pass);
pass_buf = SMB_MALLOC_ARRAY(uint8, pass_len);
if (!pass_buf) {
return false;
}
pass_len = tdb_trusted_dom_pass_pack(pass_buf, pass_len, &pass);
ret = secrets_store(trustdom_keystr(domain), (void *)pass_buf,
pass_len);
SAFE_FREE(pass_buf);
return ret;
}
/************************************************************************
Routine to set the plaintext machine account password for a realm
the password is assumed to be a null terminated ascii string
************************************************************************/
bool secrets_store_machine_password(const char *pass, const char *domain, uint32 sec_channel)
{
char *key = NULL;
bool ret;
uint32 last_change_time;
uint32 sec_channel_type;
asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_PASSWORD, domain);
if (!key)
return False;
strupper_m(key);
ret = secrets_store(key, pass, strlen(pass)+1);
SAFE_FREE(key);
if (!ret)
return ret;
asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_LAST_CHANGE_TIME, domain);
if (!key)
return False;
strupper_m(key);
SIVAL(&last_change_time, 0, time(NULL));
ret = secrets_store(key, &last_change_time, sizeof(last_change_time));
SAFE_FREE(key);
asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_SEC_CHANNEL_TYPE, domain);
if (!key)
return False;
strupper_m(key);
SIVAL(&sec_channel_type, 0, sec_channel);
ret = secrets_store(key, &sec_channel_type, sizeof(sec_channel_type));
SAFE_FREE(key);
return ret;
}
/************************************************************************
Routine to fetch the plaintext machine account password for a realm
the password is assumed to be a null terminated ascii string.
************************************************************************/
char *secrets_fetch_machine_password(const char *domain,
time_t *pass_last_set_time,
uint32 *channel)
{
char *key = NULL;
char *ret;
asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_PASSWORD, domain);
strupper_m(key);
ret = (char *)secrets_fetch(key, NULL);
SAFE_FREE(key);
if (pass_last_set_time) {
size_t size;
uint32 *last_set_time;
asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_LAST_CHANGE_TIME, domain);
strupper_m(key);
last_set_time = (unsigned int *)secrets_fetch(key, &size);
if (last_set_time) {
*pass_last_set_time = IVAL(last_set_time,0);
SAFE_FREE(last_set_time);
} else {
*pass_last_set_time = 0;
}
SAFE_FREE(key);
}
if (channel) {
size_t size;
uint32 *channel_type;
asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_SEC_CHANNEL_TYPE, domain);
strupper_m(key);
channel_type = (unsigned int *)secrets_fetch(key, &size);
if (channel_type) {
*channel = IVAL(channel_type,0);
SAFE_FREE(channel_type);
} else {
*channel = get_default_sec_channel();
}
SAFE_FREE(key);
}
return ret;
}
/************************************************************************
Routine to delete the machine trust account password file for a domain.
************************************************************************/
bool trust_password_delete(const char *domain)
{
return secrets_delete(trust_keystr(domain));
}
/************************************************************************
Routine to delete the password for trusted domain
************************************************************************/
bool trusted_domain_password_delete(const char *domain)
{
return secrets_delete(trustdom_keystr(domain));
}
bool secrets_store_ldap_pw(const char* dn, char* pw)
{
char *key = NULL;
bool ret;
if (asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_LDAP_BIND_PW, dn) < 0) {
DEBUG(0, ("secrets_store_ldap_pw: asprintf failed!\n"));
return False;
}
ret = secrets_store(key, pw, strlen(pw)+1);
SAFE_FREE(key);
return ret;
}
/*******************************************************************
Find the ldap password.
******************************************************************/
bool fetch_ldap_pw(char **dn, char** pw)
{
char *key = NULL;
size_t size = 0;
*dn = smb_xstrdup(lp_ldap_admin_dn());
if (asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_LDAP_BIND_PW, *dn) < 0) {
SAFE_FREE(*dn);
DEBUG(0, ("fetch_ldap_pw: asprintf failed!\n"));
}
*pw=(char *)secrets_fetch(key, &size);
SAFE_FREE(key);
if (!size) {
/* Upgrade 2.2 style entry */
char *p;
char* old_style_key = SMB_STRDUP(*dn);
char *data;
fstring old_style_pw;
if (!old_style_key) {
DEBUG(0, ("fetch_ldap_pw: strdup failed!\n"));
return False;
}
for (p=old_style_key; *p; p++)
if (*p == ',') *p = '/';
data=(char *)secrets_fetch(old_style_key, &size);
if (!size && size < sizeof(old_style_pw)) {
DEBUG(0,("fetch_ldap_pw: neither ldap secret retrieved!\n"));
SAFE_FREE(old_style_key);
SAFE_FREE(*dn);
return False;
}
size = MIN(size, sizeof(fstring)-1);
strncpy(old_style_pw, data, size);
old_style_pw[size] = 0;
SAFE_FREE(data);
if (!secrets_store_ldap_pw(*dn, old_style_pw)) {
DEBUG(0,("fetch_ldap_pw: ldap secret could not be upgraded!\n"));
SAFE_FREE(old_style_key);
SAFE_FREE(*dn);
return False;
}
if (!secrets_delete(old_style_key)) {
DEBUG(0,("fetch_ldap_pw: old ldap secret could not be deleted!\n"));
}
SAFE_FREE(old_style_key);
*pw = smb_xstrdup(old_style_pw);
}
return True;
}
/**
* Get trusted domains info from secrets.tdb.
**/
NTSTATUS secrets_trusted_domains(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, uint32 *num_domains,
struct trustdom_info ***domains)
{
TDB_LIST_NODE *keys, *k;
char *pattern;
TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx;
if (!(tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx))) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
if (!secrets_init()) return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
/* generate searching pattern */
pattern = talloc_asprintf(tmp_ctx, "%s/*", SECRETS_DOMTRUST_ACCT_PASS);
if (pattern == NULL) {
DEBUG(0, ("secrets_trusted_domains: talloc_asprintf() "
"failed!\n"));
TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
*num_domains = 0;
/*
* Make sure that a talloc context for the trustdom_info structs
* exists
*/
if (!(*domains = TALLOC_ARRAY(mem_ctx, struct trustdom_info *, 1))) {
TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
/* fetching trusted domains' data and collecting them in a list */
keys = tdb_search_keys(tdb, pattern);
/* searching for keys in secrets db -- way to go ... */
for (k = keys; k; k = k->next) {
uint8 *packed_pass;
size_t size = 0, packed_size = 0;
struct trusted_dom_pass pass;
char *secrets_key;
struct trustdom_info *dom_info;
/* important: ensure null-termination of the key string */
secrets_key = talloc_strndup(tmp_ctx,
(const char *)k->node_key.dptr,
k->node_key.dsize);
if (!secrets_key) {
DEBUG(0, ("strndup failed!\n"));
tdb_search_list_free(keys);
TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
packed_pass = (uint8 *)secrets_fetch(secrets_key, &size);
packed_size = tdb_trusted_dom_pass_unpack(packed_pass, size,
&pass);
/* packed representation isn't needed anymore */
SAFE_FREE(packed_pass);
if (size != packed_size) {
DEBUG(2, ("Secrets record %s is invalid!\n",
secrets_key));
continue;
}
if (pass.domain_sid.num_auths != 4) {
DEBUG(0, ("SID %s is not a domain sid, has %d "
"auths instead of 4\n",
sid_string_static(&pass.domain_sid),
pass.domain_sid.num_auths));
continue;
}
if (!(dom_info = TALLOC_P(*domains, struct trustdom_info))) {
DEBUG(0, ("talloc failed\n"));
tdb_search_list_free(keys);
TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
if (pull_ucs2_talloc(dom_info, &dom_info->name,
pass.uni_name) == (size_t)-1) {
DEBUG(2, ("pull_ucs2_talloc failed\n"));
tdb_search_list_free(keys);
TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
sid_copy(&dom_info->sid, &pass.domain_sid);
ADD_TO_ARRAY(*domains, struct trustdom_info *, dom_info,
domains, num_domains);
if (*domains == NULL) {
tdb_search_list_free(keys);
TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
}
DEBUG(5, ("secrets_get_trusted_domains: got %d domains\n",
*num_domains));
/* free the results of searching the keys */
tdb_search_list_free(keys);
TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
/*******************************************************************************
Lock the secrets tdb based on a string - this is used as a primitive form of mutex
between smbd instances.
*******************************************************************************/
bool secrets_named_mutex(const char *name, unsigned int timeout)
{
int ret = 0;
if (!secrets_init())
return False;
ret = tdb_lock_bystring_with_timeout(tdb, name, timeout);
if (ret == 0)
DEBUG(10,("secrets_named_mutex: got mutex for %s\n", name ));
return (ret == 0);
}
/*******************************************************************************
Unlock a named mutex.
*******************************************************************************/
void secrets_named_mutex_release(const char *name)
{
tdb_unlock_bystring(tdb, name);
DEBUG(10,("secrets_named_mutex: released mutex for %s\n", name ));
}
/*******************************************************************************
Store a complete AFS keyfile into secrets.tdb.
*******************************************************************************/
bool secrets_store_afs_keyfile(const char *cell, const struct afs_keyfile *keyfile)
{
fstring key;
if ((cell == NULL) || (keyfile == NULL))
return False;
if (ntohl(keyfile->nkeys) > SECRETS_AFS_MAXKEYS)
return False;
slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_AFS_KEYFILE, cell);
return secrets_store(key, keyfile, sizeof(struct afs_keyfile));
}
/*******************************************************************************
Fetch the current (highest) AFS key from secrets.tdb
*******************************************************************************/
bool secrets_fetch_afs_key(const char *cell, struct afs_key *result)
{
fstring key;
struct afs_keyfile *keyfile;
size_t size = 0;
uint32 i;
slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_AFS_KEYFILE, cell);
keyfile = (struct afs_keyfile *)secrets_fetch(key, &size);
if (keyfile == NULL)
return False;
if (size != sizeof(struct afs_keyfile)) {
SAFE_FREE(keyfile);
return False;
}
i = ntohl(keyfile->nkeys);
if (i > SECRETS_AFS_MAXKEYS) {
SAFE_FREE(keyfile);
return False;
}
*result = keyfile->entry[i-1];
result->kvno = ntohl(result->kvno);
return True;
}
/******************************************************************************
When kerberos is not available, choose between anonymous or
authenticated connections.
We need to use an authenticated connection if DCs have the
RestrictAnonymous registry entry set > 0, or the "Additional
restrictions for anonymous connections" set in the win2k Local
Security Policy.
Caller to free() result in domain, username, password
*******************************************************************************/
void secrets_fetch_ipc_userpass(char **username, char **domain, char **password)
{
*username = (char *)secrets_fetch(SECRETS_AUTH_USER, NULL);
*domain = (char *)secrets_fetch(SECRETS_AUTH_DOMAIN, NULL);
*password = (char *)secrets_fetch(SECRETS_AUTH_PASSWORD, NULL);
if (*username && **username) {
if (!*domain || !**domain)
*domain = smb_xstrdup(lp_workgroup());
if (!*password || !**password)
*password = smb_xstrdup("");
DEBUG(3, ("IPC$ connections done by user %s\\%s\n",
*domain, *username));
} else {
DEBUG(3, ("IPC$ connections done anonymously\n"));
*username = smb_xstrdup("");
*domain = smb_xstrdup("");
*password = smb_xstrdup("");
}
}
/******************************************************************************
Open or create the schannel session store tdb.
*******************************************************************************/
static TDB_CONTEXT *open_schannel_session_store(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx)
{
TDB_DATA vers;
uint32 ver;
TDB_CONTEXT *tdb_sc = NULL;
char *fname = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "%s/schannel_store.tdb", lp_private_dir());
if (!fname) {
return NULL;
}
tdb_sc = tdb_open_log(fname, 0, TDB_DEFAULT, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0600);
if (!tdb_sc) {
DEBUG(0,("open_schannel_session_store: Failed to open %s\n", fname));
TALLOC_FREE(fname);
return NULL;
}
vers = tdb_fetch_bystring(tdb_sc, "SCHANNEL_STORE_VERSION");
if (vers.dptr == NULL) {
/* First opener, no version. */
SIVAL(&ver,0,1);
vers.dptr = (uint8 *)&ver;
vers.dsize = 4;
tdb_store_bystring(tdb_sc, "SCHANNEL_STORE_VERSION", vers, TDB_REPLACE);
vers.dptr = NULL;
} else if (vers.dsize == 4) {
ver = IVAL(vers.dptr,0);
if (ver != 1) {
tdb_close(tdb_sc);
tdb_sc = NULL;
DEBUG(0,("open_schannel_session_store: wrong version number %d in %s\n",
(int)ver, fname ));
}
} else {
tdb_close(tdb_sc);
tdb_sc = NULL;
DEBUG(0,("open_schannel_session_store: wrong version number size %d in %s\n",
(int)vers.dsize, fname ));
}
SAFE_FREE(vers.dptr);
TALLOC_FREE(fname);
return tdb_sc;
}
/******************************************************************************
Store the schannel state after an AUTH2 call.
Note we must be root here.
*******************************************************************************/
bool secrets_store_schannel_session_info(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
const char *remote_machine,
const struct dcinfo *pdc)
{
TDB_CONTEXT *tdb_sc = NULL;
TDB_DATA value;
bool ret;
char *keystr = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "%s/%s", SECRETS_SCHANNEL_STATE,
remote_machine);
if (!keystr) {
return False;
}
strupper_m(keystr);
/* Work out how large the record is. */
value.dsize = tdb_pack(NULL, 0, "dBBBBBfff",
pdc->sequence,
8, pdc->seed_chal.data,
8, pdc->clnt_chal.data,
8, pdc->srv_chal.data,
16, pdc->sess_key,
16, pdc->mach_pw,
pdc->mach_acct,
pdc->remote_machine,
pdc->domain);
value.dptr = TALLOC_ARRAY(mem_ctx, uint8, value.dsize);
if (!value.dptr) {
TALLOC_FREE(keystr);
return False;
}
value.dsize = tdb_pack(value.dptr, value.dsize, "dBBBBBfff",
pdc->sequence,
8, pdc->seed_chal.data,
8, pdc->clnt_chal.data,
8, pdc->srv_chal.data,
16, pdc->sess_key,
16, pdc->mach_pw,
pdc->mach_acct,
pdc->remote_machine,
pdc->domain);
tdb_sc = open_schannel_session_store(mem_ctx);
if (!tdb_sc) {
TALLOC_FREE(keystr);
TALLOC_FREE(value.dptr);
return False;
}
ret = (tdb_store_bystring(tdb_sc, keystr, value, TDB_REPLACE) == 0 ? True : False);
DEBUG(3,("secrets_store_schannel_session_info: stored schannel info with key %s\n",
keystr ));
tdb_close(tdb_sc);
TALLOC_FREE(keystr);
TALLOC_FREE(value.dptr);
return ret;
}
/******************************************************************************
Restore the schannel state on a client reconnect.
Note we must be root here.
*******************************************************************************/
bool secrets_restore_schannel_session_info(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
const char *remote_machine,
struct dcinfo **ppdc)
{
TDB_CONTEXT *tdb_sc = NULL;
TDB_DATA value;
unsigned char *pseed_chal = NULL;
unsigned char *pclnt_chal = NULL;
unsigned char *psrv_chal = NULL;
unsigned char *psess_key = NULL;
unsigned char *pmach_pw = NULL;
uint32 l1, l2, l3, l4, l5;
int ret;
struct dcinfo *pdc = NULL;
char *keystr = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "%s/%s", SECRETS_SCHANNEL_STATE,
remote_machine);
*ppdc = NULL;
if (!keystr) {
return False;
}
strupper_m(keystr);
tdb_sc = open_schannel_session_store(mem_ctx);
if (!tdb_sc) {
TALLOC_FREE(keystr);
return False;
}
value = tdb_fetch_bystring(tdb_sc, keystr);
if (!value.dptr) {
DEBUG(0,("secrets_restore_schannel_session_info: Failed to find entry with key %s\n",
keystr ));
tdb_close(tdb_sc);
return False;
}
pdc = TALLOC_ZERO_P(mem_ctx, struct dcinfo);
/* Retrieve the record. */
ret = tdb_unpack(value.dptr, value.dsize, "dBBBBBfff",
&pdc->sequence,
&l1, &pseed_chal,
&l2, &pclnt_chal,
&l3, &psrv_chal,
&l4, &psess_key,
&l5, &pmach_pw,
&pdc->mach_acct,
&pdc->remote_machine,
&pdc->domain);
if (ret == -1 || l1 != 8 || l2 != 8 || l3 != 8 || l4 != 16 || l5 != 16) {
/* Bad record - delete it. */
tdb_delete_bystring(tdb_sc, keystr);
tdb_close(tdb_sc);
TALLOC_FREE(keystr);
TALLOC_FREE(pdc);
SAFE_FREE(pseed_chal);
SAFE_FREE(pclnt_chal);
SAFE_FREE(psrv_chal);
SAFE_FREE(psess_key);
SAFE_FREE(pmach_pw);
SAFE_FREE(value.dptr);
return False;
}
tdb_close(tdb_sc);
memcpy(pdc->seed_chal.data, pseed_chal, 8);
memcpy(pdc->clnt_chal.data, pclnt_chal, 8);
memcpy(pdc->srv_chal.data, psrv_chal, 8);
memcpy(pdc->sess_key, psess_key, 16);
memcpy(pdc->mach_pw, pmach_pw, 16);
/* We know these are true so didn't bother to store them. */
pdc->challenge_sent = True;
pdc->authenticated = True;
DEBUG(3,("secrets_restore_schannel_session_info: restored schannel info key %s\n",
keystr ));
SAFE_FREE(pseed_chal);
SAFE_FREE(pclnt_chal);
SAFE_FREE(psrv_chal);
SAFE_FREE(psess_key);
SAFE_FREE(pmach_pw);
TALLOC_FREE(keystr);
SAFE_FREE(value.dptr);
*ppdc = pdc;
return True;
}
bool secrets_store_generic(const char *owner, const char *key, const char *secret)
{
char *tdbkey = NULL;
bool ret;
if (asprintf(&tdbkey, "SECRETS/GENERIC/%s/%s", owner, key) < 0) {
DEBUG(0, ("asprintf failed!\n"));
return False;
}
ret = secrets_store(tdbkey, secret, strlen(secret)+1);
SAFE_FREE(tdbkey);
return ret;
}
/*******************************************************************
Find the ldap password.
******************************************************************/
char *secrets_fetch_generic(const char *owner, const char *key)
{
char *secret = NULL;
char *tdbkey = NULL;
if (( ! owner) || ( ! key)) {
DEBUG(1, ("Invalid Paramters"));
return NULL;
}
if (asprintf(&tdbkey, "SECRETS/GENERIC/%s/%s", owner, key) < 0) {
DEBUG(0, ("Out of memory!\n"));
return NULL;
}
secret = (char *)secrets_fetch(tdbkey, NULL);
SAFE_FREE(tdbkey);
return secret;
}