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samba-mirror/python/samba/tests/gkdi.py
Jo Sutton 1381581334 tests/gkdi: Change ‘current_gkid’ parameter to ‘current_time’
Signed-off-by: Jo Sutton <josutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
2024-04-16 03:58:31 +00:00

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#
# Helper classes for testing the Group Key Distribution Service.
#
# Copyright (C) Catalyst.Net Ltd 2023
#
# This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
# the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
# (at your option) any later version.
#
# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
# GNU General Public License for more details.
#
# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
# along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
#
import sys
import os
sys.path.insert(0, "bin/python")
os.environ["PYTHONUNBUFFERED"] = "1"
import datetime
import secrets
from typing import NewType, Optional, Tuple, Union
import ldb
from cryptography.hazmat.backends import default_backend
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.kbkdf import CounterLocation, KBKDFHMAC, Mode
from samba import (
ntstatus,
NTSTATUSError,
werror,
)
from samba.credentials import Credentials
from samba.dcerpc import gkdi, misc
from samba.gkdi import (
Algorithm,
Gkid,
GkidType,
GroupKey,
KEY_CYCLE_DURATION,
KEY_LEN_BYTES,
MAX_CLOCK_SKEW,
SeedKeyPair,
)
from samba.hresult import (
HRES_E_INVALIDARG,
HRES_NTE_BAD_KEY,
HRES_NTE_NO_KEY,
)
from samba.ndr import ndr_pack, ndr_unpack
from samba.nt_time import (
datetime_from_nt_time,
nt_time_from_datetime,
NtTime,
NtTimeDelta,
timedelta_from_nt_time_delta,
)
from samba.param import LoadParm
from samba.samdb import SamDB
from samba.tests import delete_force, TestCase
HResult = NewType("HResult", int)
RootKey = NewType("RootKey", ldb.Message)
ROOT_KEY_START_TIME = NtTime(KEY_CYCLE_DURATION + MAX_CLOCK_SKEW)
DSDB_GMSA_TIME_OPAQUE = "dsdb_gmsa_time_opaque"
class GetKeyError(Exception):
def __init__(self, status: HResult, message: str):
super().__init__(status, message)
class GkdiBaseTest(TestCase):
# This is the NDRencoded security descriptor O:SYD:(A;;FRFW;;;S-1-5-9).
gmsa_sd = (
b"\x01\x00\x04\x800\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
b"\x14\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x1c\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x14\x00"
b"\x9f\x01\x12\x00\x01\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x05\t\x00\x00\x00"
b"\x01\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x05\x12\x00\x00\x00"
)
def set_db_time(self, samdb: SamDB, time: Optional[NtTime]) -> None:
samdb.set_opaque(DSDB_GMSA_TIME_OPAQUE, time)
def get_db_time(self, samdb: SamDB) -> Optional[NtTime]:
return samdb.get_opaque(DSDB_GMSA_TIME_OPAQUE)
def current_time(
self, samdb: SamDB, *, offset: Optional[datetime.timedelta] = None
) -> datetime.datetime:
now = self.get_db_time(samdb)
if now is None:
current_time = datetime.datetime.now(tz=datetime.timezone.utc)
else:
current_time = datetime_from_nt_time(now)
if offset is not None:
current_time += offset
return current_time
def current_nt_time(
self, samdb: SamDB, *, offset: Optional[datetime.timedelta] = None
) -> NtTime:
return nt_time_from_datetime(self.current_time(samdb, offset=offset))
def current_gkid(
self, samdb: SamDB, *, offset: Optional[datetime.timedelta] = None
) -> Gkid:
return Gkid.from_nt_time(self.current_nt_time(samdb, offset=offset))
def gkdi_connect(
self, host: str, lp: LoadParm, server_creds: Credentials
) -> gkdi.gkdi:
try:
return gkdi.gkdi(f"ncacn_ip_tcp:{host}[seal]", lp, server_creds)
except NTSTATUSError as err:
if err.args[0] == ntstatus.NT_STATUS_PORT_UNREACHABLE:
self.fail(
"Try starting the Microsoft Key Distribution Service (KdsSvc).\n"
"In PowerShell, run:\n\tStart-Service -Name KdsSvc"
)
raise
def rpc_get_key(
self,
conn: gkdi.gkdi,
target_sd: bytes,
root_key_id: Optional[misc.GUID],
gkid: Gkid,
) -> SeedKeyPair:
out_len, out, result = conn.GetKey(
list(target_sd), root_key_id, gkid.l0_idx, gkid.l1_idx, gkid.l2_idx
)
result_code, result_string = result
if (
root_key_id is None
and result_code & 0xFFFF == werror.WERR_TOO_MANY_OPEN_FILES
):
self.fail(
"The server has given up selecting a root key because there are too"
" many keys (more than 1000) in the Master Root Keys container. Delete"
" some root keys and try again."
)
if result != (0, None):
raise GetKeyError(result_code, result_string)
self.assertEqual(len(out), out_len, "output len mismatch")
envelope = ndr_unpack(gkdi.GroupKeyEnvelope, bytes(out))
gkid = Gkid(envelope.l0_index, envelope.l1_index, envelope.l2_index)
l1_key = bytes(envelope.l1_key) if envelope.l1_key else None
l2_key = bytes(envelope.l2_key) if envelope.l2_key else None
hash_algorithm = Algorithm.from_kdf_parameters(bytes(envelope.kdf_parameters))
root_key_id = envelope.root_key_id
return SeedKeyPair(l1_key, l2_key, gkid, hash_algorithm, root_key_id)
def get_root_key_object(
self, samdb: SamDB, root_key_id: Optional[misc.GUID], gkid: Gkid
) -> Tuple[RootKey, misc.GUID]:
"""Return a root key object and its corresponding GUID.
*root_key_id* specifies the GUID of the root key object to return. It
can be ``None`` to indicate that the selected key should be the most
recently created key starting not after the time indicated by *gkid*.
Bear in mind as that the Microsoft Key Distribution Service caches root
keys, the most recently created key might not be the one that Windows
chooses."""
root_key_attrs = [
"cn",
"msKds-CreateTime",
"msKds-KDFAlgorithmID",
"msKds-KDFParam",
"msKds-RootKeyData",
"msKds-UseStartTime",
"msKds-Version",
]
gkid_start_nt_time = gkid.start_nt_time()
exact_key_specified = root_key_id is not None
if exact_key_specified:
root_key_dn = self.get_root_key_container_dn(samdb)
root_key_dn.add_child(f"CN={root_key_id}")
try:
root_key_res = samdb.search(
root_key_dn, scope=ldb.SCOPE_BASE, attrs=root_key_attrs
)
except ldb.LdbError as err:
if err.args[0] == ldb.ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT:
raise GetKeyError(HRES_NTE_NO_KEY, "no such root key exists")
raise
root_key_object = root_key_res[0]
else:
root_keys = samdb.search(
self.get_root_key_container_dn(samdb),
scope=ldb.SCOPE_SUBTREE,
expression=f"(msKds-UseStartTime<={gkid_start_nt_time})",
attrs=root_key_attrs,
)
if not root_keys:
raise GetKeyError(
HRES_NTE_NO_KEY, "no root keys exist at specified time"
)
def root_key_create_time(key: RootKey) -> NtTime:
create_time = key.get("msKds-CreateTime", idx=0)
if create_time is None:
return NtTime(0)
return NtTime(int(create_time))
root_key_object = max(root_keys, key=root_key_create_time)
root_key_cn = root_key_object.get("cn", idx=0)
self.assertIsNotNone(root_key_cn)
root_key_id = misc.GUID(root_key_cn)
data = root_key_object.get("msKds-RootKeyData", idx=0)
self.assertIsNotNone(data)
if len(data) != KEY_LEN_BYTES:
raise GetKeyError(
HRES_NTE_BAD_KEY, f"root key data must be {KEY_LEN_BYTES} bytes"
)
use_start_nt_time = NtTime(
int(root_key_object.get("msKds-UseStartTime", idx=0))
)
if use_start_nt_time == 0:
raise GetKeyError(HRES_NTE_BAD_KEY, "root key effective time is 0")
use_start_nt_time = NtTime(
use_start_nt_time - NtTimeDelta(KEY_CYCLE_DURATION + MAX_CLOCK_SKEW)
)
if exact_key_specified and not (0 <= use_start_nt_time <= gkid_start_nt_time):
raise GetKeyError(HRES_E_INVALIDARG, "root key is not yet valid")
return root_key_object, root_key_id
def validate_get_key_request(
self, gkid: Gkid, current_time: NtTime, root_key_specified: bool
) -> None:
# The key being requested must not be from the future. That said, we
# allow for a little bit of clock skew so that we can compute the next
# managed password prior to the expiration of the current one.
current_gkid = Gkid.from_nt_time(NtTime(current_time + MAX_CLOCK_SKEW))
if gkid > current_gkid:
raise GetKeyError(
HRES_E_INVALIDARG,
f"invalid request for a key from the future: {gkid} > {current_gkid}",
)
gkid_type = gkid.gkid_type()
if gkid_type is GkidType.DEFAULT:
derived_from = (
" derived from the specified root key" if root_key_specified else ""
)
raise NotImplementedError(
f"The latest group key{derived_from} is being requested."
)
if gkid_type is not GkidType.L2_SEED_KEY:
raise GetKeyError(
HRES_E_INVALIDARG, f"invalid request for {gkid_type.description()}"
)
def get_key(
self,
samdb: SamDB,
target_sd: bytes, # An NDRencoded valid security descriptor in selfrelative format.
root_key_id: Optional[misc.GUID],
gkid: Gkid,
*,
root_key_id_hint: Optional[misc.GUID] = None,
current_time: Optional[NtTime] = None,
) -> SeedKeyPair:
"""Emulate the ISDKey.GetKey() RPC method.
When passed a NULL root key ID, GetKey() may use a cached root key
rather than picking the most recently created applicable key as the
documentation implies. If its important to arrive at the same result as
Windows, pass a GUID in the *root_key_id_hint* parameter to specify a
particular root key to use."""
if current_time is None:
current_time = self.current_nt_time(samdb)
root_key_specified = root_key_id is not None
if root_key_specified:
self.assertIsNone(
root_key_id_hint, "dont provide both root key ID parameters"
)
self.validate_get_key_request(gkid, current_time, root_key_specified)
root_key_object, root_key_id = self.get_root_key_object(
samdb, root_key_id if root_key_specified else root_key_id_hint, gkid
)
if root_key_specified:
current_gkid = Gkid.from_nt_time(current_time)
if gkid.l0_idx < current_gkid.l0_idx:
# All of the seed keys with an L0 index less than the current L0
# index are from the past and thus are safe to return. If the
# caller has requested a specific seed key with a past L0 index,
# return the L1 seed key (L0, 31, 1), from which any L1 or L2
# seed key having that L0 index can be derived.
l1_gkid = Gkid(gkid.l0_idx, 31, -1)
seed_key = self.compute_seed_key(
target_sd, root_key_id, root_key_object, l1_gkid
)
return SeedKeyPair(
seed_key.key,
None,
Gkid(gkid.l0_idx, 31, 31),
seed_key.hash_algorithm,
root_key_id,
)
# All of the previous seed keys with an L0 index equal to the
# current L0 index can be derived from the current seed key or from
# the next older L1 seed key.
gkid = current_gkid
if gkid.l2_idx == 31:
# The current seed key, and all previous seed keys with that same L0
# index, can be derived from the L1 seed key (L0, L1, 31).
l1_gkid = Gkid(gkid.l0_idx, gkid.l1_idx, -1)
seed_key = self.compute_seed_key(
target_sd, root_key_id, root_key_object, l1_gkid
)
return SeedKeyPair(
seed_key.key, None, gkid, seed_key.hash_algorithm, root_key_id
)
# Compute the L2 seed key to return.
seed_key = self.compute_seed_key(target_sd, root_key_id, root_key_object, gkid)
next_older_seed_key = None
if gkid.l1_idx != 0:
# From the current seed key can be derived only those seed keys that
# share its L1 and L2 indices. To be able to derive previous seed
# keys with older L1 indices, the caller must be given the next
# older L1 seed key as well.
next_older_l1_gkid = Gkid(gkid.l0_idx, gkid.l1_idx - 1, -1)
next_older_seed_key = self.compute_seed_key(
target_sd, root_key_id, root_key_object, next_older_l1_gkid
).key
return SeedKeyPair(
next_older_seed_key,
seed_key.key,
gkid,
seed_key.hash_algorithm,
root_key_id,
)
def get_key_exact(
self,
samdb: SamDB,
target_sd: bytes, # An NDRencoded valid security descriptor in selfrelative format.
root_key_id: Optional[misc.GUID],
gkid: Gkid,
current_time: Optional[NtTime] = None,
) -> GroupKey:
if current_time is None:
current_time = self.current_nt_time(samdb)
root_key_specified = root_key_id is not None
self.validate_get_key_request(gkid, current_time, root_key_specified)
root_key_object, root_key_id = self.get_root_key_object(
samdb, root_key_id, gkid
)
return self.compute_seed_key(target_sd, root_key_id, root_key_object, gkid)
def get_root_key_data(self, root_key: RootKey) -> Tuple[bytes, Algorithm]:
version = root_key.get("msKds-Version", idx=0)
self.assertEqual(b"1", version)
algorithm_id = root_key.get("msKds-KDFAlgorithmID", idx=0)
self.assertEqual(b"SP800_108_CTR_HMAC", algorithm_id)
hash_algorithm = Algorithm.from_kdf_parameters(
root_key.get("msKds-KDFParam", idx=0)
)
root_key_data = root_key.get("msKds-RootKeyData", idx=0)
self.assertIsInstance(root_key_data, bytes)
return root_key_data, hash_algorithm
def compute_seed_key(
self,
target_sd: bytes,
root_key_id: misc.GUID,
root_key: RootKey,
target_gkid: Gkid,
) -> GroupKey:
target_gkid_type = target_gkid.gkid_type()
self.assertIn(
target_gkid_type,
(GkidType.L1_SEED_KEY, GkidType.L2_SEED_KEY),
f"unexpected attempt to compute {target_gkid_type.description()}",
)
root_key_data, algorithm = self.get_root_key_data(root_key)
root_key_id_bytes = ndr_pack(root_key_id)
hash_algorithm = algorithm.algorithm()
# Derive the L0 seed key.
gkid = Gkid.l0_seed_key(target_gkid.l0_idx)
key = self.derive_key(root_key_data, root_key_id_bytes, hash_algorithm, gkid)
# Derive the L1 seed key.
gkid = gkid.derive_l1_seed_key()
key = self.derive_key(
key, root_key_id_bytes, hash_algorithm, gkid, target_sd=target_sd
)
while gkid.l1_idx != target_gkid.l1_idx:
gkid = gkid.derive_l1_seed_key()
key = self.derive_key(key, root_key_id_bytes, hash_algorithm, gkid)
# Derive the L2 seed key.
while gkid != target_gkid:
gkid = gkid.derive_l2_seed_key()
key = self.derive_key(key, root_key_id_bytes, hash_algorithm, gkid)
return GroupKey(key, gkid, algorithm, root_key_id)
def derive_key(
self,
key: bytes,
root_key_id_bytes: bytes,
hash_algorithm: hashes.HashAlgorithm,
gkid: Gkid,
*,
target_sd: Optional[bytes] = None,
) -> bytes:
def u32_bytes(n: int) -> bytes:
return (n & 0xFFFF_FFFF).to_bytes(length=4, byteorder="little")
context = (
root_key_id_bytes
+ u32_bytes(gkid.l0_idx)
+ u32_bytes(gkid.l1_idx)
+ u32_bytes(gkid.l2_idx)
)
if target_sd is not None:
context += target_sd
return self.kdf(hash_algorithm, key, context)
def kdf(
self,
hash_algorithm: hashes.HashAlgorithm,
key: bytes,
context: bytes,
*,
label="KDS service",
len_in_bytes=KEY_LEN_BYTES,
) -> bytes:
label = label.encode("utf-16-le") + b"\x00\x00"
kdf = KBKDFHMAC(
algorithm=hash_algorithm,
mode=Mode.CounterMode,
length=len_in_bytes,
rlen=4,
llen=4,
location=CounterLocation.BeforeFixed,
label=label,
context=context,
fixed=None,
backend=default_backend(),
)
return kdf.derive(key)
def get_config_dn(self, samdb: SamDB, dn: str) -> ldb.Dn:
config_dn = samdb.get_config_basedn()
config_dn.add_child(dn)
return config_dn
def get_server_config_dn(self, samdb: SamDB) -> ldb.Dn:
# [MS-GKDI] has “CN=Sid Key Service” for “CN=Group Key Distribution
# Service”, and “CN=SID Key Server Configuration” for “CN=Group Key
# Distribution Service Server Configuration”.
return self.get_config_dn(
samdb,
"CN=Group Key Distribution Service Server Configuration,"
"CN=Server Configuration,"
"CN=Group Key Distribution Service,"
"CN=Services",
)
def get_root_key_container_dn(self, samdb: SamDB) -> ldb.Dn:
# [MS-GKDI] has “CN=Sid Key Service” for “CN=Group Key Distribution Service”.
return self.get_config_dn(
samdb,
"CN=Master Root Keys,CN=Group Key Distribution Service,CN=Services",
)
def create_root_key(
self,
samdb: SamDB,
domain_dn: ldb.Dn,
*,
use_start_time: Optional[Union[datetime.datetime, NtTime]] = None,
hash_algorithm: Optional[Algorithm] = Algorithm.SHA512,
guid: Optional[misc.GUID] = None,
data: Optional[bytes] = None,
) -> misc.GUID:
# we defer the actual work to the create_root_key() function,
# which exists so that the samba-tool tests can borrow that
# function.
root_key_guid, root_key_dn = create_root_key(
samdb,
domain_dn,
current_nt_time=self.current_nt_time(
samdb,
# Allow for clock skew.
offset=timedelta_from_nt_time_delta(MAX_CLOCK_SKEW),
),
use_start_time=use_start_time,
hash_algorithm=hash_algorithm,
guid=guid,
data=data,
)
if guid is not None:
# A test may request that a root key have a specific GUID so that
# results may be reproducible. Ensure these keys are cleaned up
# afterwards.
self.addCleanup(delete_force, samdb, root_key_dn)
self.assertEqual(guid, root_key_guid)
return root_key_guid
def create_root_key(
samdb: SamDB,
domain_dn: ldb.Dn,
*,
current_nt_time: NtTime,
use_start_time: Optional[Union[datetime.datetime, NtTime]] = None,
hash_algorithm: Optional[Algorithm] = Algorithm.SHA512,
guid: Optional[misc.GUID] = None,
data: Optional[bytes] = None,
) -> Tuple[misc.GUID, ldb.Dn]:
# [MS-GKDI] 3.1.4.1.1, “Creating a New Root Key”, states that if the
# server receives a GetKey request and the root keys container in Active
# Directory is empty, the the server must create a new root key object
# based on the default Server Configuration object. Additional root keys
# are to be created based on either the default Server Configuration
# object or an updated one specifying optional configuration values.
if guid is None:
guid = misc.GUID(secrets.token_bytes(16))
if data is None:
data = secrets.token_bytes(KEY_LEN_BYTES)
create_time = current_nt_time
if use_start_time is None:
# Root keys created by Windows without the -EffectiveImmediately
# parameter have an effective time of exactly ten days in the
# future, presumably to allow time for replication.
#
# Microsofts documentation on creating a KDS root key, located at
# https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/security/group-managed-service-accounts/create-the-key-distribution-services-kds-root-key,
# claims to the contrary that domain controllers will only wait up
# to ten hours before allowing Group Managed Service Accounts to be
# created.
#
# The same page includes instructions for creating a root key with
# an effective time of ten hours in the past (for testing purposes),
# but Im not sure why — the KDS will consider a key valid for use
# immediately after its start time has passed, without bothering to
# wait ten hours first. In fact, it will consider a key to be valid
# a full ten hours (plus clock skew) *before* its declared start
# time — intentional, or (conceivably) the result of an accidental
# negation?
current_interval_start_nt_time = Gkid.from_nt_time(
current_nt_time
).start_nt_time()
use_start_time = NtTime(
current_interval_start_nt_time + KEY_CYCLE_DURATION + MAX_CLOCK_SKEW
)
if isinstance(use_start_time, datetime.datetime):
use_start_nt_time = nt_time_from_datetime(use_start_time)
elif isinstance(use_start_time, int):
use_start_nt_time = use_start_time
else:
raise ValueError("use_start_time should be a datetime or int")
kdf_parameters = None
if hash_algorithm is not None:
kdf_parameters = gkdi.KdfParameters()
kdf_parameters.hash_algorithm = hash_algorithm.value
kdf_parameters = ndr_pack(kdf_parameters)
# These are the encoded p and g values, respectively, of the “2048bit
# MODP Group with 256bit Prime Order Subgroup” from RFC 5114 section
# 2.3.
field_order = (
b"\x87\xa8\xe6\x1d\xb4\xb6f<\xff\xbb\xd1\x9ce\x19Y\x99\x8c\xee\xf6\x08"
b"f\r\xd0\xf2],\xee\xd4C^;\x00\xe0\r\xf8\xf1\xd6\x19W\xd4\xfa\xf7\xdfE"
b"a\xb2\xaa0\x16\xc3\xd9\x114\to\xaa;\xf4)m\x83\x0e\x9a|"
b" \x9e\x0cd\x97Qz\xbd"
b'Z\x8a\x9d0k\xcfg\xed\x91\xf9\xe6r[GX\xc0"\xe0\xb1\xefBu\xbf{l[\xfc\x11'
b"\xd4_\x90\x88\xb9A\xf5N\xb1\xe5\x9b\xb8\xbc9\xa0\xbf\x120\x7f\\O\xdbp\xc5"
b"\x81\xb2?v\xb6:\xca\xe1\xca\xa6\xb7\x90-RRg5H\x8a\x0e\xf1<m\x9aQ\xbf\xa4\xab"
b":\xd84w\x96RM\x8e\xf6\xa1g\xb5\xa4\x18%\xd9g\xe1D\xe5\x14\x05d%"
b"\x1c\xca\xcb\x83\xe6\xb4\x86\xf6\xb3\xca?yqP`&\xc0\xb8W\xf6\x89\x96(V"
b"\xde\xd4\x01\n\xbd\x0b\xe6!\xc3\xa3\x96\nT\xe7\x10\xc3u\xf2cu\xd7\x01A\x03"
b"\xa4\xb5C0\xc1\x98\xaf\x12a\x16\xd2'n\x11q_i8w\xfa\xd7\xef\t\xca\xdb\tJ\xe9"
b"\x1e\x1a\x15\x97"
)
generator = (
b"?\xb3,\x9bs\x13M\x0b.wPf`\xed\xbdHL\xa7\xb1\x8f!\xef T\x07\xf4y:"
b"\x1a\x0b\xa1%\x10\xdb\xc1Pw\xbeF?\xffO\xedJ\xac\x0b\xb5U\xbe:l\x1b\x0ckG\xb1"
b"\xbc7s\xbf~\x8cob\x90\x12(\xf8\xc2\x8c\xbb\x18\xa5Z\xe3\x13A\x00\ne"
b"\x01\x96\xf91\xc7zW\xf2\xdd\xf4c\xe5\xe9\xec\x14Kw}\xe6*\xaa\xb8\xa8b"
b"\x8a\xc3v\xd2\x82\xd6\xed8d\xe6y\x82B\x8e\xbc\x83\x1d\x144\x8fo/\x91\x93"
b"\xb5\x04Z\xf2vqd\xe1\xdf\xc9g\xc1\xfb?.U\xa4\xbd\x1b\xff\xe8;\x9c\x80"
b"\xd0R\xb9\x85\xd1\x82\xea\n\xdb*;s\x13\xd3\xfe\x14\xc8HK\x1e\x05%\x88\xb9"
b"\xb7\xd2\xbb\xd2\xdf\x01a\x99\xec\xd0n\x15W\xcd\t\x15\xb35;\xbbd\xe0\xec7"
b"\x7f\xd0(7\r\xf9+R\xc7\x89\x14(\xcd\xc6~\xb6\x18KR=\x1d\xb2F\xc3/c\x07\x84"
b"\x90\xf0\x0e\xf8\xd6G\xd1H\xd4yTQ^#'\xcf\xef\x98\xc5\x82fKL\x0fl\xc4\x16Y"
)
assert len(field_order) == len(generator)
key_length = len(field_order)
ffc_dh_parameters = gkdi.FfcDhParameters()
ffc_dh_parameters.field_order = list(field_order)
ffc_dh_parameters.generator = list(generator)
ffc_dh_parameters.key_length = key_length
ffc_dh_parameters = ndr_pack(ffc_dh_parameters)
root_key_dn = samdb.get_config_basedn()
root_key_dn.add_child(
"CN=Master Root Keys,CN=Group Key Distribution Service,CN=Services"
)
root_key_dn.add_child(f"CN={guid}")
# Avoid deleting root key objects without subsequently restarting the
# Microsoft Key Distribution Service. This service will keep its root
# key cached even after the corresponding AD object has been deleted,
# breaking later tests that try to look up the root key object.
details = {
"dn": root_key_dn,
"objectClass": "msKds-ProvRootKey",
"msKds-RootKeyData": data,
"msKds-CreateTime": str(create_time),
"msKds-UseStartTime": str(use_start_nt_time),
"msKds-DomainID": str(domain_dn),
"msKds-Version": "1", # comes from Server Configuration object.
"msKds-KDFAlgorithmID": (
"SP800_108_CTR_HMAC"
), # comes from Server Configuration.
"msKds-SecretAgreementAlgorithmID": "DH", # comes from Server Configuration.
"msKds-SecretAgreementParam": (
ffc_dh_parameters
), # comes from Server Configuration.
"msKds-PublicKeyLength": "2048", # comes from Server Configuration.
"msKds-PrivateKeyLength": (
"512"
), # comes from Server Configuration. [MS-GKDI] claims this defaults to 256.
}
if kdf_parameters is not None:
details["msKds-KDFParam"] = kdf_parameters # comes from Server Configuration.
samdb.add(details)
return (guid, root_key_dn)