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Kerberos Working Group S. Hartman
Internet-Draft Painless Security
Updates: 4120 (if approved) L. Zhu
Intended status: Standards Track Microsoft Corporation
Expires: December 6, 2009 June 4, 2009
A Generalized Framework for Kerberos Pre-Authentication
draft-ietf-krb-wg-preauth-framework-12
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
This Internet-Draft will expire on December 6, 2009.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of
publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document.
Abstract
Kerberos is a protocol for verifying the identity of principals
(e.g., a workstation user or a network server) on an open network.
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The Kerberos protocol provides a mechanism called pre-authentication
for proving the identity of a principal and for better protecting the
long-term secrets of the principal.
This document describes a model for Kerberos pre-authentication
mechanisms. The model describes what state in the Kerberos request a
pre-authentication mechanism is likely to change. It also describes
how multiple pre-authentication mechanisms used in the same request
will interact.
This document also provides common tools needed by multiple pre-
authentication mechanisms. One of these tools is a secure channel
between the client and the KDC with a reply key delivery mechanism;
this secure channel can be used to protect the authentication
exchange thus eliminate offline dictionary attacks. With these
tools, it is relatively straightforward to chain multiple
authentication mechanisms, utilize a different key management system,
or support a new key agreement algorithm.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Conventions and Terminology Used in This Document . . . . . . 6
3. Model for Pre-Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Information Managed by the Pre-authentication Model . . . 7
3.2. Initial Pre-authentication Required Error . . . . . . . . 9
3.3. Client to KDC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.4. KDC to Client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4. Pre-Authentication Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.1. Client-authentication Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.2. Strengthening-reply-key Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.3. Replacing-reply-key Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.4. KDC-authentication Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5. Requirements for Pre-Authentication Mechanisms . . . . . . . . 15
6. Tools for Use in Pre-Authentication Mechanisms . . . . . . . . 16
6.1. Combining Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.2. Protecting Requests/Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6.3. Managing States for the KDC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6.4. Pre-authentication Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
6.5. Definition of Kerberos FAST Padata . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
6.5.1. FAST Armors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
6.5.2. FAST Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
6.5.3. FAST Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
6.5.4. Authenticated Kerberos Error Messages using
Kerberos FAST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6.5.5. Outer and Inner Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
6.5.6. The Encrypted Challenge FAST Factor . . . . . . . . . 34
6.6. Authentication Strength Indication . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
7. Assigned Constants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
7.1. New Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
7.2. Key Usage Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
7.3. Authorization Data Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
7.4. New PA-DATA Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
8.1. Pre-authentication and Typed Data . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
8.2. Fast Armor Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
8.3. FAST Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Appendix A. Test Vectors for KRB-FX-CF2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Appendix B. Change History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
B.1. Changes since 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
B.2. Changes since 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
B.3. Changes since 09 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
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B.4. Changes since 08 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
B.5. Changes since 07 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
B.6. Changes since 06 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Appendix C. ASN.1 module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
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1. Introduction
The core Kerberos specification [RFC4120] treats pre-authentication
data as an opaque typed hole in the messages to the KDC that may
influence the reply key used to encrypt the KDC reply. This
generality has been useful: pre-authentication data is used for a
variety of extensions to the protocol, many outside the expectations
of the initial designers. However, this generality makes designing
more common types of pre-authentication mechanisms difficult. Each
mechanism needs to specify how it interacts with other mechanisms.
Also, problems like combining a key with the long-term secrets or
proving the identity of the user are common to multiple mechanisms.
Where there are generally well-accepted solutions to these problems,
it is desirable to standardize one of these solutions so mechanisms
can avoid duplication of work. In other cases, a modular approach to
these problems is appropriate. The modular approach will allow new
and better solutions to common pre-authentication problems to be used
by existing mechanisms as they are developed.
This document specifies a framework for Kerberos pre-authentication
mechanisms. It defines the common set of functions that pre-
authentication mechanisms perform as well as how these functions
affect the state of the request and reply. In addition several
common tools needed by pre-authentication mechanisms are provided.
Unlike [RFC3961], this framework is not complete--it does not
describe all the inputs and outputs for the pre-authentication
mechanisms. Pre-Authentication mechanism designers should try to be
consistent with this framework because doing so will make their
mechanisms easier to implement. Kerberos implementations are likely
to have plugin architectures for pre-authentication; such
architectures are likely to support mechanisms that follow this
framework plus commonly used extensions. This framework also
facilitates combining multiple pre-authentication mechanisms, each of
which may represent an authentication factor, into a single multi-
factor pre-authentication mechanism.
One of these common tools is the flexible authentication secure
tunneling (FAST) padata type. FAST provides a protected channel
between the client and the KDC, and it can optionally deliver a reply
key within the protected channel. Based on FAST, pre-authentication
mechanisms can extend Kerberos with ease, to support, for example,
password authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocols with zero
knowledge password proof (ZKPP) [EKE] [IEEE1363.2]. Any pre-
authentication mechanism can be encapsulated in the FAST messages as
defined in Section 6.5. A pre-authentication type carried within
FAST is called a FAST factor. Creating a FAST factor is the easiest
path to create a new pre-authentication mechanism. FAST factors are
significantly easier to analyze from a security standpoint than other
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pre-authentication mechanisms.
Mechanism designers should design FAST factors, instead of new pre-
authentication mechanisms outside of FAST.
2. Conventions and Terminology Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
This document should be read only after reading the documents
describing the Kerberos cryptography framework [RFC3961] and the core
Kerberos protocol [RFC4120]. This document may freely use
terminology and notation from these documents without reference or
further explanation.
The word padata is used as a shorthand for pre-authentication data.
A conversation is the set of all authentication messages exchanged
between the client and the client's Authentication Service (AS) in
order to authenticate the client principal. A conversation as
defined here consists of all messages that are necessary to complete
the authentication between the client and the client's AS. In the
Ticket Exchange Service (TGS) exchange, a conversation consists of
the request message and the reply message. The term conversation is
defined here for both AS and TGS for convenience of discussion. See
Section 6.3 for specific rules on the extent of a conversation in the
AS-REQ case. Prior to this framework, implementations needed to use
implementation-specific heuristics to determine the extent of a
conversation.
If the KDC reply in an AS exchange is verified, the KDC is
authenticated by the client. In this document, verification of the
KDC reply is used as a synonym of authentication of the KDC.
3. Model for Pre-Authentication
When a Kerberos client wishes to obtain a ticket using the
authentication server, it sends an initial Authentication Service
(AS) request. If pre-authentication is required but not being used,
then the KDC will respond with a KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED error.
Alternatively, if the client knows what pre-authentication to use, it
MAY optimize away a round-trip and send an initial request with
padata included in the initial request. If the client includes the
padata computed using the wrong pre-authentication mechanism or
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incorrect keys, the KDC MAY return KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED with no
indication of what padata should have been included. In that case,
the client MUST retry with no padata and examine the error data of
the KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED error. If the KDC includes pre-
authentication information in the accompanying error data of
KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED, the client SHOULD process the error data, and
then retry.
The conventional KDC maintains no state between two requests;
subsequent requests may even be processed by a different KDC. On the
other hand, the client treats a series of exchanges with KDCs as a
single conversation. Each exchange accumulates state and hopefully
brings the client closer to a successful authentication.
These models for state management are in apparent conflict. For many
of the simpler pre-authentication scenarios, the client uses one
round trip to find out what mechanisms the KDC supports. Then the
next request contains sufficient pre-authentication for the KDC to be
able to return a successful reply. For these simple scenarios, the
client only sends one request with pre-authentication data and so the
conversation is trivial. For more complex conversations, the KDC
needs to provide the client with a cookie to include in future
requests to capture the current state of the authentication session.
Handling of multiple round-trip mechanisms is discussed in
Section 6.3.
This framework specifies the behavior of Kerberos pre-authentication
mechanisms used to identify users or to modify the reply key used to
encrypt the KDC reply. The PA-DATA typed hole may be used to carry
extensions to Kerberos that have nothing to do with proving the
identity of the user or establishing a reply key. Such extensions
are outside the scope of this framework. However mechanisms that do
accomplish these goals should follow this framework.
This framework specifies the minimum state that a Kerberos
implementation needs to maintain while handling a request in order to
process pre-authentication. It also specifies how Kerberos
implementations process the padata at each step of the AS request
process.
3.1. Information Managed by the Pre-authentication Model
The following information is maintained by the client and KDC as each
request is being processed:
o The reply key used to encrypt the KDC reply
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o How strongly the identity of the client has been authenticated
o Whether the reply key has been used in this conversation
o Whether the reply key has been replaced in this conversation
o Whether the contents of the KDC reply can be verified by the
client principal
Conceptually, the reply key is initially the long-term key of the
principal. However, principals can have multiple long-term keys
because of support for multiple encryption types, salts and
string2key parameters. As described in Section 5.2.7.5 of the
Kerberos protocol [RFC4120], the KDC sends PA-ETYPE-INFO2 to notify
the client what types of keys are available. Thus in full
generality, the reply key in the pre-authentication model is actually
a set of keys. At the beginning of a request, it is initialized to
the set of long-term keys advertised in the PA-ETYPE-INFO2 element on
the KDC. If multiple reply keys are available, the client chooses
which one to use. Thus the client does not need to treat the reply
key as a set. At the beginning of a request, the client picks a key
to use.
KDC implementations MAY choose to offer only one key in the PA-ETYPE-
INFO2 element. Since the KDC already knows the client's list of
supported enctypes from the request, no interoperability problems are
created by choosing a single possible reply key. This way, the KDC
implementation avoids the complexity of treating the reply key as a
set.
When the padata in the request is verified by the KDC, then the
client is known to have that key, therefore the KDC SHOULD pick the
same key as the reply key.
At the beginning of handling a message on both the client and the
KDC, the client's identity is not authenticated. A mechanism may
indicate that it has successfully authenticated the client's
identity. This information is useful to keep track of on the client
in order to know what pre-authentication mechanisms should be used.
The KDC needs to keep track of whether the client is authenticated
because the primary purpose of pre-authentication is to authenticate
the client identity before issuing a ticket. The handling of
authentication strength using various authentication mechanisms is
discussed in Section 6.6.
Initially the reply key has not been used. A pre-authentication
mechanism that uses the reply key to encrypt or checksum some data in
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the generation of new keys MUST indicate that the reply key is used.
This state is maintained by the client and the KDC to enforce the
security requirement stated in Section 4.3 that the reply key SHOULD
NOT be replaced after it is used.
Initially the reply key has not been replaced. If a mechanism
implements the Replace Reply Key facility discussed in Section 4.3,
then the state MUST be updated to indicate that the reply key has
been replaced. Once the reply key has been replaced, knowledge of
the reply key is insufficient to authenticate the client. The reply
key is marked replaced in exactly the same situations as the KDC
reply is marked as not being verified to the client principal.
However, while mechanisms can verify the KDC reply to the client,
once the reply key is replaced, then the reply key remains replaced
for the remainder of the conversation.
Without pre-authentication, the client knows that the KDC reply is
authentic and has not been modified because it is encrypted in a
long-term key of the client. Only the KDC and the client know that
key. So at the start of a conversation, the KDC reply is presumed to
be verified using the client principal's long-term key. It should be
noted that in this document, verifying the KDC reply means
authenticating the KDC, and these phrases are used interchangeably.
Any pre-authentication mechanism that sets a new reply key not based
on the principal's long-term secret MUST either verify the KDC reply
some other way or indicate that the reply is not verified. If a
mechanism indicates that the reply is not verified then the client
implementation MUST return an error unless a subsequent mechanism
verifies the reply. The KDC needs to track this state so it can
avoid generating a reply that is not verified.
The typical Kerberos request does not provide a way for the client
machine to know that it is talking to the correct KDC. Someone who
can inject packets into the network between the client machine and
the KDC and who knows the password that the user will give to the
client machine can generate a KDC reply that will decrypt properly.
So, if the client machine needs to authenticate that the user is in
fact the named principal, then the client machine needs to do a TGS
request for itself as a service. Some pre-authentication mechanisms
may provide a way for the client machine to authenticate the KDC.
Examples of this include signing the reply that can be verified using
a well-known public key or providing a ticket for the client machine
as a service.
3.2. Initial Pre-authentication Required Error
Typically a client starts a conversation by sending an initial
request with no pre-authentication. If the KDC requires pre-
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authentication, then it returns a KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED message.
After the first reply with the KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED error code,
the KDC returns the error code KDC_ERR_MORE_PREAUTH_DATA_NEEDED
(defined in Section 6.3) for pre-authentication configurations that
use multi-round-trip mechanisms; see Section 3.4 for details of that
case.
The KDC needs to choose which mechanisms to offer the client. The
client needs to be able to choose what mechanisms to use from the
first message. For example consider the KDC that will accept
mechanism A followed by mechanism B or alternatively the single
mechanism C. A client that supports A and C needs to know that it
should not bother trying A.
Mechanisms can either be sufficient on their own or can be part of an
authentication set--a group of mechanisms that all need to
successfully complete in order to authenticate a client. Some
mechanisms may only be useful in authentication sets; others may be
useful alone or in authentication sets. For the second group of
mechanisms, KDC policy dictates whether the mechanism will be part of
an authentication set, offered alone, or both. For each mechanism
that is offered alone (even if it is also offered in an
authentication set), the KDC includes the pre-authentication type ID
of the mechanism in the padata sequence returned in the
KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED error. Mechanisms that are only offered as
part of an authentication set are not directly represented in the
padata sequence returned in the KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED error,
although they are represented in the PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET sequence.
The KDC SHOULD NOT send data that is encrypted in the long-term
password-based key of the principal. Doing so has the same security
exposures as the Kerberos protocol without pre-authentication. There
are few situations where the KDC needs to expose cipher text
encrypted in a weak key before the client has proven knowledge of
that key, and pre-authentication is desirable.
3.3. Client to KDC
This description assumes that a client has already received a
KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED from the KDC. If the client performs
optimistic pre-authentication then the client needs to guess values
for the information it would normally receive from that error
response or use cached information obtained in prior interactions
with the KDC.
The client starts by initializing the pre-authentication state as
specified. It then processes the padata in the
KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED.
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When processing the response to the KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED, the
client MAY ignore any padata it chooses unless doing so violates a
specification to which the client conforms. Clients conforming to
this specification MUST NOT ignore the padata defined in Section 6.3.
Clients SHOULD process padata unrelated to this framework or other
means of authenticating the user. Clients SHOULD choose one
authentication set or mechanism that could lead to authenticating the
user and ignore the rest. Since the list of mechanisms offered by
the KDC is in the decreasing preference order, clients typically
choose the first mechanism or authentication set that the client can
usefully perform. If a client chooses to ignore a padata it MUST NOT
process the padata, allow the padata to affect the pre-authentication
state, nor respond to the padata.
For each padata the client chooses to process, the client processes
the padata and modifies the pre-authentication state as required by
that mechanism. Padata are processed in the order received from the
KDC.
After processing the padata in the KDC error, the client generates a
new request. It processes the pre-authentication mechanisms in the
order in which they will appear in the next request, updating the
state as appropriate. The request is sent when it is complete.
3.4. KDC to Client
When a KDC receives an AS request from a client, it needs to
determine whether it will respond with an error or an AS reply.
There are many causes for an error to be generated that have nothing
to do with pre-authentication; they are discussed in the core
Kerberos specification.
From the standpoint of evaluating the pre-authentication, the KDC
first starts by initializing the pre-authentication state. If a PA-
FX-COOKIE pre-authentication data item is present, it is processed
first; see Section 6.3 for a definition. It then processes the
padata in the request. As mentioned in Section 3.3, the KDC MAY
ignore padata that is inappropriate for the configuration and MUST
ignore padata of an unknown type. The KDC MUST NOT ignore padata of
types used in previous messages. For example, if a KDC issues a
KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED error including padata of type x, then the
KDC cannot ignore padata of type x received in an AS-REQ message from
the client.
At this point the KDC decides whether it will issue an error or a
reply. Typically a KDC will issue a reply if the client's identity
has been authenticated to a sufficient degree.
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In the case of a KDC_ERR_MORE_PREAUTH_DATA_NEEDED error, the KDC
first starts by initializing the pre-authentication state. Then it
processes any padata in the client's request in the order provided by
the client. Mechanisms that are not understood by the KDC are
ignored. Next, it generates padata for the error response, modifying
the pre-authentication state appropriately as each mechanism is
processed. The KDC chooses the order in which it will generate
padata (and thus the order of padata in the response), but it needs
to modify the pre-authentication state consistently with the choice
of order. For example, if some mechanism establishes an
authenticated client identity, then the subsequent mechanisms in the
generated response receive this state as input. After the padata is
generated, the error response is sent. Typically the errors with the
code KDC_ERR_MORE_PREAUTH_DATA_NEEDED in a conversation will include
KDC state as discussed in Section 6.3.
To generate a final reply, the KDC generates the padata modifying the
pre-authentication state as necessary. Then it generates the final
response, encrypting it in the current pre-authentication reply key.
4. Pre-Authentication Facilities
Pre-Authentication mechanisms can be thought of as providing various
conceptual facilities. This serves two useful purposes. First,
mechanism authors can choose only to solve one specific small
problem. It is often useful for a mechanism designed to offer key
management not to directly provide client authentication but instead
to allow one or more other mechanisms to handle this need. Secondly,
thinking about the abstract services that a mechanism provides yields
a minimum set of security requirements that all mechanisms providing
that facility must meet. These security requirements are not
complete; mechanisms will have additional security requirements based
on the specific protocol they employ.
A mechanism is not constrained to only offering one of these
facilities. While such mechanisms can be designed and are sometimes
useful, many pre-authentication mechanisms implement several
facilities. By combining multiple facilities in a single mechanism,
it is often easier to construct a secure, simple solution than by
solving the problem in full generality. Even when mechanisms provide
multiple facilities, they need to meet the security requirements for
all the facilities they provide. If the FAST factor approach is
used, it is likely that one or a small number of facilities can be
provided by a single mechanism without complicating the security
analysis.
According to Kerberos extensibility rules (Section 1.5 of the
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Kerberos specification [RFC4120]), an extension MUST NOT change the
semantics of a message unless a recipient is known to understand that
extension. Because a client does not know that the KDC supports a
particular pre-authentication mechanism when it sends an initial
request, a pre-authentication mechanism MUST NOT change the semantics
of the request in a way that will break a KDC that does not
understand that mechanism. Similarly, KDCs MUST NOT send messages to
clients that affect the core semantics unless the client has
indicated support for the message.
The only state in this model that would break the interpretation of a
message is changing the expected reply key. If one mechanism changed
the reply key and a later mechanism used that reply key, then a KDC
that interpreted the second mechanism but not the first would fail to
interpret the request correctly. In order to avoid this problem,
extensions that change core semantics are typically divided into two
parts. The first part proposes a change to the core semantic--for
example proposes a new reply key. The second part acknowledges that
the extension is understood and that the change takes effect.
Section 4.2 discusses how to design mechanisms that modify the reply
key to be split into a proposal and acceptance without requiring
additional round trips to use the new reply key in subsequent pre-
authentication. Other changes in the state described in Section 3.1
can safely be ignored by a KDC that does not understand a mechanism.
Mechanisms that modify the behavior of the request outside the scope
of this framework need to carefully consider the Kerberos
extensibility rules to avoid similar problems.
4.1. Client-authentication Facility
The client authentication facility proves the identity of a user to
the KDC before a ticket is issued. Examples of mechanisms
implementing this facility include the encrypted timestamp facility
defined in Section 5.2.7.2 of the Kerberos specification [RFC4120].
Mechanisms that provide this facility are expected to mark the client
as authenticated.
Mechanisms implementing this facility SHOULD require the client to
prove knowledge of the reply key before transmitting a successful KDC
reply. Otherwise, an attacker can intercept the pre-authentication
exchange and get a reply to attack. One way of proving the client
knows the reply key is to implement the Replace Reply Key facility
along with this facility. The PKINIT mechanism [RFC4556] implements
Client Authentication alongside Replace Reply Key.
If the reply key has been replaced, then mechanisms such as
encrypted-timestamp that rely on knowledge of the reply key to
authenticate the client MUST NOT be used.
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4.2. Strengthening-reply-key Facility
Particularly when dealing with keys based on passwords, it is
desirable to increase the strength of the key by adding additional
secrets to it. Examples of sources of additional secrets include the
results of a Diffie-Hellman key exchange or key bits from the output
of a smart card [KRB-WG.SAM]. Typically these additional secrets can
be first combined with the existing reply key and then converted to a
protocol key using tools defined in Section 6.1.
Typically a mechanism implementing this facility will know that the
other side of the exchange supports the facility before the reply key
is changed. For example, a mechanism might need to learn the
certificate for a KDC before encrypting a new key in the public key
belonging to that certificate. However, if a mechanism implementing
this facility wishes to modify the reply key before knowing that the
other party in the exchange supports the mechanism, it proposes
modifying the reply key. The other party then includes a message
indicating that the proposal is accepted if it is understood and
meets policy. In many cases it is desirable to use the new reply key
for client authentication and for other facilities. Waiting for the
other party to accept the proposal and actually modify the reply key
state would add an additional round trip to the exchange. Instead,
mechanism designers are encouraged to include a typed hole for
additional padata in the message that proposes the reply key change.
The padata included in the typed hole are generated assuming the new
reply key. If the other party accepts the proposal, then these
padata are considered as an inner level. As with the outer level,
one authentication set or mechanism is typically chosen for client
authentication, along with auxiliary mechanisms such as KDC cookies,
and other mechanisms are ignored. When mechanisms include such a
container, the hint provided for use in authentication sets (as
defined in Section 6.4) MUST contain a sequence of inner mechanisms
along with hints for those mechanisms. The party generating the
proposal can determine whether the padata were processed based on
whether the proposal for the reply key is accepted.
The specific formats of the proposal message, including where padata
are included is a matter for the mechanism specification. Similarly,
the format of the message accepting the proposal is mechanism-
specific.
Mechanisms implementing this facility and including a typed hole for
additional padata MUST checksum that padata using a keyed checksum or
encrypt the padata. This requirement protects against modification
of the contents of the typed hole. By modifying these contents an
attacker might be able to choose which mechanism is used to
authenticate the client, or to convince a party to provide text
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encrypted in a key that the attacker had manipulated. It is
important that mechanisms strengthen the reply key enough that using
it to checksum padata is appropriate.
4.3. Replacing-reply-key Facility
The Replace Reply Key facility replaces the key in which a successful
AS reply will be encrypted. This facility can only be used in cases
where knowledge of the reply key is not used to authenticate the
client. The new reply key MUST be communicated to the client and the
KDC in a secure manner. This facility MUST NOT be used if there can
be a man-in-the-middle between the client and the KDC. Mechanisms
implementing this facility MUST mark the reply key as replaced in the
pre-authentication state. Mechanisms implementing this facility MUST
either provide a mechanism to verify the KDC reply to the client or
mark the reply as unverified in the pre-authentication state.
Mechanisms implementing this facility SHOULD NOT be used if a
previous mechanism has used the reply key.
As with the strengthening-reply-key facility, Kerberos extensibility
rules require that the reply key not be changed unless both sides of
the exchange understand the extension. In the case of this facility
it will likely be the case for both sides to know that the facility
is available by the time that the new key is available to be used.
However, mechanism designers can use a container for padata in a
proposal message as discussed in Section 4.2 if appropriate.
4.4. KDC-authentication Facility
This facility verifies that the reply comes from the expected KDC.
In traditional Kerberos, the KDC and the client share a key, so if
the KDC reply can be decrypted then the client knows that a trusted
KDC responded. Note that the client machine cannot trust the client
unless the machine is presented with a service ticket for it
(typically the machine can retrieve this ticket by itself). However,
if the reply key is replaced, some mechanism is required to verify
the KDC. Pre-authentication mechanisms providing this facility allow
a client to determine that the expected KDC has responded even after
the reply key is replaced. They mark the pre-authentication state as
having been verified.
5. Requirements for Pre-Authentication Mechanisms
This section lists requirements for specifications of pre-
authentication mechanisms.
For each message in the pre-authentication mechanism, the
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specification describes the pa-type value to be used and the contents
of the message. The processing of the message by the sender and
recipient is also specified. This specification needs to include all
modifications to the pre-authentication state.
Generally mechanisms have a message that can be sent in the error
data of the KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED error message or in an
authentication set. If the client needs information such as trusted
certificate authorities in order to determine if it can use the
mechanism, then this information should be in that message. In
addition, such mechanisms should also define a pa-hint to be included
in authentication sets. Often, the same information included in the
padata-value is appropriate to include in the pa-hint (as defined in
Section 6.4).
In order to ease security analysis the mechanism specification should
describe what facilities from this document are offered by the
mechanism. For each facility, the security consideration section of
the mechanism specification should show that the security
requirements of that facility are met. This requirement is
applicable to any FAST factor that provides authentication
information.
Significant problems have resulted in the specification of Kerberos
protocols because much of the KDC exchange is not protected against
authentication. The security considerations section should discuss
unauthenticated plaintext attacks. It should either show that
plaintext is protected or discuss what harm an attacker could do by
modifying the plaintext. It is generally acceptable for an attacker
to be able to cause the protocol negotiation to fail by modifying
plaintext. More significant attacks should be evaluated carefully.
As discussed in Section 6.3, there is no guarantee that a client will
use the same KDCs for all messages in a conversation. The mechanism
specification needs to show why the mechanism is secure in this
situation. The hardest problem to deal with, especially for
challenge/response mechanisms is to make sure that the same response
cannot be replayed against two KDCs while allowing the client to talk
to any KDC.
6. Tools for Use in Pre-Authentication Mechanisms
This section describes common tools needed by multiple pre-
authentication mechanisms. By using these tools mechanism designers
can use a modular approach to specify mechanism details and ease
security analysis.
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6.1. Combining Keys
Frequently a weak key needs to be combined with a stronger key before
use. For example, passwords are typically limited in size and
insufficiently random, therefore it is desirable to increase the
strength of the keys based on passwords by adding additional secrets.
Additional source of secrecy may come from hardware tokens.
This section provides standard ways to combine two keys into one.
KRB-FX-CF1() is defined to combine two pass-phrases.
KRB-FX-CF1(UTF-8 string, UTF-8 string) -> (UTF-8 string)
KRB-FX-CF1(x, y) -> x || y
Where || denotes concatenation. The strength of the final key is
roughly the total strength of the individual keys being combined
assuming that the string_to_key() function [RFC3961] uses all its
input evenly.
An example usage of KRB-FX-CF1() is when a device provides random but
short passwords, the password is often combined with a personal
identification number (PIN). The password and the PIN can be
combined using KRB-FX-CF1().
KRB-FX-CF2() combines two protocol keys based on the pseudo-random()
function defined in [RFC3961].
Given two input keys, K1 and K2, where K1 and K2 can be of two
different enctypes, the output key of KRB-FX-CF2(), K3, is derived as
follows:
KRB-FX-CF2(protocol key, protocol key, octet string,
octet string) -> (protocol key)
PRF+(K1, pepper1) -> octet-string-1
PRF+(K2, pepper2) -> octet-string-2
KRB-FX-CF2(K1, K2, pepper1, pepper2) ->
random-to-key(octet-string-1 ^ octet-string-2)
Where ^ denotes the exclusive-OR operation. PRF+() is defined as
follows:
PRF+(protocol key, octet string) -> (octet string)
PRF+(key, shared-info) -> pseudo-random( key, 1 || shared-info ) ||
pseudo-random( key, 2 || shared-info ) ||
pseudo-random( key, 3 || shared-info ) || ...
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Here the counter value 1, 2, 3 and so on are encoded as a one-octet
integer. The pseudo-random() operation is specified by the enctype
of the protocol key. PRF+() uses the counter to generate enough bits
as needed by the random-to-key() [RFC3961] function for the
encryption type specified for the resulting key; unneeded bits are
removed from the tail. Unless otherwise specified, the resulting
enctype of KRB-FX-CF2 is the enctype of k1.
Mechanism designers MUST specify the values for the input parameter
pepper1 and pepper2 when combining two keys using KRB-FX-CF2(). The
pepper1 and pepper2 MUST be distinct so that if the two keys being
combined are the same, the resulting key is not a trivial key.
6.2. Protecting Requests/Responses
Mechanism designers SHOULD protect clear text portions of pre-
authentication data. Various denial of service attacks and downgrade
attacks against Kerberos are possible unless plaintexts are somehow
protected against modification. An early design goal of Kerberos
Version 5 [RFC4120] was to avoid encrypting more of the
authentication exchange that was required. (Version 4 doubly-
encrypted the encrypted part of a ticket in a KDC reply, for
example.) This minimization of encryption reduces the load on the
KDC and busy servers. Also, during the initial design of Version 5,
the existence of legal restrictions on the export of cryptography
made it desirable to minimize of the number of uses of encryption in
the protocol. Unfortunately, performing this minimization created
numerous instances of unauthenticated security-relevant plaintext
fields.
If there is more than one round trip for an authentication exchange,
mechanism designers need to allow either the client or the KDC to
provide a checksum of all the messages exchanged on the wire in the
conversation, and the checksum is then verified by the receiver.
New mechanisms MUST NOT be hard-wired to use a specific algorithm.
Primitives defined in [RFC3961] are RECOMMENDED for integrity
protection and confidentiality. Mechanisms based on these primitives
are crypto-agile as the result of using [RFC3961] along with
[RFC4120]. The advantage afforded by crypto-agility is the ability
to incrementally deploy a fix specific to a particular algorithm thus
avoid a multi-year standardization and deployment cycle, when real
attacks do arise against that algorithm.
Note that data used by FAST factors (defined in Section 6.5) is
encrypted in a protected channel, thus they do not share the un-
authenticated-text issues with mechanisms designed as full-blown pre-
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authentication mechanisms.
6.3. Managing States for the KDC
Kerberos KDCs are stateless in that there is no requirement that
clients will choose the same KDC for the second request in a
conversation. Proxies or other intermediate nodes may also influence
KDC selection. So, each request from a client to a KDC must include
sufficient information that the KDC can regenerate any needed state.
This is accomplished by giving the client a potentially long opaque
cookie in responses to include in future requests in the same
conversation. The KDC MAY respond that a conversation is too old and
needs to restart by responding with a KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_EXPIRED error.
KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_EXPIRED 90
When a client receives this error, the client SHOULD abort the
existing conversation, and restart a new one.
An example, where more than one message from the client is needed, is
when the client is authenticated based on a challenge-response
scheme. In that case, the KDC needs to keep track of the challenge
issued for a client authentication request.
The PA-FX-COOKIE padata type is defined in this section to facilitate
state management in the AS exchange. This padata is sent by the KDC
when the KDC requires state for a future transaction. The client
includes this opaque token in the next message in the conversation.
The token may be relatively large; clients MUST be prepared for
tokens somewhat larger than the size of all messages in a
conversation.
PA-FX-COOKIE 133
-- Stateless cookie that is not tied to a specific KDC.
The corresponding padata-value field [RFC4120] contains an opaque
token that will be echoed by the client in its response to an error
from the KDC.
The cookie token is generated by the KDC and transmitted in a PA-FX-
COOKIE pre-authentication data item of a KRB-ERROR message. The
client MUST copy the exact cookie encapsulated in a PA-FX-COOKIE data
element into the next message of the same conversation. The content
of the cookie field is a local matter of the KDC. As a result, it is
not generally possible to mix KDC implementations from different
vendors in the same realm. However the KDC MUST construct the cookie
token in such a manner that a malicious client cannot subvert the
authentication process by manipulating the token. The KDC
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implementation needs to consider expiration of tokens, key rollover
and other security issues in token design. The content of the cookie
field is likely specific to the pre-authentication mechanisms used to
authenticate the client. If a client authentication response can be
replayed to multiple KDCs via the PA-FX-COOKIE mechanism, an
expiration in the cookie is RECOMMENDED to prevent the response being
presented indefinitely.
If at least one more message for a mechanism or a mechanism set is
expected by the KDC, the KDC returns a
KDC_ERR_MORE_PREAUTH_DATA_NEEDED error with a PA-FX-COOKIE to
identify the conversation with the client according to Section 3.2.
The cookie is not expected to stay constant for a conversation: the
KDC is expected to generate a new cookie for each message.
KDC_ERR_MORE_PREAUTH_DATA_NEEDED 91
A client MAY throw away the state associated with a conversation and
begin a new conversation by discarding its state and not including a
cooking in the first message of a conversation. KDCs that comply
with this specification MUST include a cookie in a response when the
client can continue the conversation. In particular, a KDC MUST
include a cookie in a KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED or
KDC_ERR_MORE_PREAUTH_DATA_NEEDED. KDCs SHOULD include a cookie in
errors containing additional information allowing a client to retry.
One reasonable strategy for meeting these requirements is to always
include a cookie in KDC errors.
A KDC MAY indicate that it is terminating a conversation by not
including a cookie in a response. When FAST is used, clients can
assume that the absence of a cookie means that the KDC is ending the
conversation. Clients also need to deal with KDCs prior to this
specification that do not include cookies; if cookies nor FAST are
used in a conversation, the absence of a cookie is not a strong
indication that the KDC is terminating the conversation.
6.4. Pre-authentication Set
If all mechanisms in a group need to successfully complete in order
to authenticate a client, the client and the KDC SHOULD use the PA-
AUTHENTICATION-SET padata element.
PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET 134
A PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET padata element contains the ASN.1 DER
encoding of the PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET structure:
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PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET ::= SEQUENCE OF PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET-ELEM
PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET-ELEM ::= SEQUENCE {
pa-type [0] Int32,
-- same as padata-type.
pa-hint [1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
pa-value [2] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
...
}
The pa-type field of the PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET-ELEM structure
contains the corresponding value of padata-type in PA-DATA [RFC4120].
Associated with the pa-type is a pa-hint, which is an octet-string
specified by the pre-authentication mechanism. This hint may provide
information for the client which helps it determine whether the
mechanism can be used. For example a public-key mechanism might
include the certificate authorities it trusts in the hint info. Most
mechanisms today do not specify hint info; if a mechanism does not
specify hint info the KDC MUST NOT send a hint for that mechanism.
To allow future revisions of mechanism specifications to add hint
info, clients MUST ignore hint info received for mechanisms that the
client believes do not support hint info. The pa-value element of
the PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET-ELEM sequence is included to carry the
first padata-value from the KDC to the client. If the client chooses
this authentication set then the client MUST process this pa-value.
The pa-value element MUST be absent for all but the first entry in
the authentication set. Clients MUST ignore pa-value for the second
and following entries in the authentication set.
If the client chooses an authentication set, then its first AS-REQ
message MUST contain a PA-AUTH-SET-SELECTED padata element. This
element contains the encoding of the PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET sequence
received from the KDC corresponding to the authentication set that is
chosen. The client MUST use the same octet values received from the
KDC; it cannot re-encode the sequence. This allows KDCs to use bit-
wise comparison to identify the selected authentication set. The PA-
AUTH-SET-SELECTED padata element MUST come before any padata elements
from the authentication set in the padata sequence in the AS-REQ
message. The client MAY cache authentication sets from prior
messages and use them to construct an optimistic initial AS-REQ. If
the KDC receives a PA-AUTH-SET-SELECTED padata element that does not
correspond to an authentication set that it would offer, then the KDC
returns the KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_BAD_AUTHENTICATION_SET error. The e-data
in this error contains a sequence of padata just as for the
KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED error.
PA-AUTH-SET-SELECTED 135
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KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_BAD_AUTHENTICATION_SET 92
The PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET appears only in the first message from the
KDC to the client. In particular, the client MAY fail if the
authentication mechanism sets change as the conversation progresses.
Clients MAY assume that the hints provided in the authentication set
contain enough information that the client knows what user interface
elements need to be displayed during the entire authentication
conversation. Exceptional circumstances such as expired passwords or
expired accounts may require that additional user interface be
displayed. Mechanism designers needs to carefully consider the
design of their hints so that the client has this information. This
way, clients can construct necessary dialogue boxes or wizards based
on the authentication set and can present a coherent user interface.
Current standards for user interface do not provide an acceptable
experience when the client has to ask additional questions later in
the conversation.
When indicating which sets of pre-authentication mechanisms are
supported, the KDC includes a PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET padata element
for each pre-authentication mechanism set.
The client sends the padata-value for the first mechanism it picks in
the pre-authentication set, when the first mechanism completes, the
client and the KDC will proceed with the second mechanism, and so on
until all mechanisms complete successfully. The PA-FX-COOKIE as
defined in Section 6.3 MUST be sent by the KDC. One reason for this
requirement is so that the conversation can continue if the
conversation involves multiple KDCs. KDCs MUST support clients that
do not include a cookie because they optimistically choose an
authentication set, although they MAY always return
KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_BAD_AUTHENTICATION_SET and include a cookie in that
message. Clients that support PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET MUST support PA-
FX-COOKIE.
Before the authentication succeeds and a ticket is returned, the
message that the client sends is an AS_REQ and the message that the
KDC sends is a KRB-ERROR message. The error code in the KRB-ERROR
message from the KDC is KDC_ERR_MORE_PREAUTH_DATA_NEEDED as defined
in Section 6.3 and the accompanying e-data contains the DER encoding
of ASN.1 type METHOD-DATA. The KDC includes the padata elements in
the METHOD-DATA. If there is no padata, the e-data field is absent
in the KRB-ERROR message.
If the client sends the last message for a given mechanism, then the
KDC sends the first message for the next mechanism. If the next
mechanism does not start with a KDC-side challenge, then the KDC
includes a padata item with the appropriate pa-type and an empty pa-
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data.
If the KDC sends the last message for a particular mechanism, the KDC
also includes the first padata for the next mechanism.
6.5. Definition of Kerberos FAST Padata
As described in [RFC4120], Kerberos is vulnerable to offline
dictionary attacks. An attacker can request an AS-REP and try
various passwords to see if they can decrypt the resulting ticket.
RFC 4120 provides the encrypted timestamp pre-authentication method
that ameliorates the situation somewhat by requiring that an attacker
observe a successful authentication. However stronger security is
desired in many environments. The Kerberos FAST pre-authentication
padata defined in this section provides a tool to significantly
reduce vulnerability to offline dictionary attack. When combined
with encrypted challenge, FAST requires an attacker to mount a
successful man-in-the-middle attack to observe ciphertext. When
combined with host keys, FAST can even protect against active
attacks. FAST also provides solutions to common problems for pre-
authentication mechanisms such as binding of the request and the
reply, freshness guarantee of the authentication. FAST itself,
however, does not authenticate the client or the KDC, instead, it
provides a typed hole to allow pre-authentication data be tunneled.
A pre-authentication data element used within FAST is called a FAST
factor. A FAST factor captures the minimal work required for
extending Kerberos to support a new pre-authentication scheme.
A FAST factor MUST NOT be used outside of FAST unless its
specification explicitly allows so. The typed holes in FAST messages
can also be used as generic holes for other padata that are not
intended to prove the client's identity, or establish the reply key.
New pre-authentication mechanisms SHOULD be designed as FAST factors,
instead of full-blown pre-authentication mechanisms.
FAST factors that are pre-authentication mechanisms MUST meet the
requirements in Section 5.
FAST employs an armoring scheme. The armor can be a Ticket Granting
Ticket (TGT) obtained by the client's machine using the host keys to
pre-authenticate with the KDC, or an anonymous TGT obtained based on
anonymous PKINIT [KRB-ANON] [RFC4556].
The rest of this section describes the types of armors and the syntax
of the messages used by FAST. Conforming implementations MUST
support Kerberos FAST padata.
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Any FAST armor scheme MUST provide a fresh armor key for each
conversation. Clients and KDCs can assume that if a message is
encrypted and integrity protected with a given armor key then it is
part of the conversation using that armor key.
All KDCs in a realm MUST support FAST if FAST is offered by any KDC
as a pre-authentication mechanism.
6.5.1. FAST Armors
An armor key is used to encrypt pre-authentication data in the FAST
request and the response. The KrbFastArmor structure is defined to
identify the armor key. This structure contains the following two
fields: the armor-type identifies the type of armors, and the armor-
value is an OCTET STRING that contains the description of the armor
scheme and the armor key.
KrbFastArmor ::= SEQUENCE {
armor-type [0] Int32,
-- Type of the armor.
armor-value [1] OCTET STRING,
-- Value of the armor.
...
}
The value of the armor key is a matter of the armor type
specification. Only one armor type is defined in this document.
FX_FAST_ARMOR_AP_REQUEST 1
The FX_FAST_ARMOR_AP_REQUEST armor is based on Kerberos tickets.
Conforming implementations MUST implement the
FX_FAST_ARMOR_AP_REQUEST armor type.
FAST implementations MUST maintain state about whether the armor
mechanism authenticates the KDC. If it does not, then a fast factor
that authenticates the KDC MUST be used if the reply key is replaced.
6.5.1.1. Ticket-based Armors
This is a ticket-based armoring scheme. The armor-type is
FX_FAST_ARMOR_AP_REQUEST, the armor-value contains an ASN.1 DER
encoded AP-REQ. The ticket in the AP-REQ is called an armor ticket
or an armor TGT. The subkey field in the AP-REQ MUST be present.
The armor key is defined by the following function:
armor_key = KRB-FX-CF2( subkey, ticket_session_key,
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"subkeyarmor", "ticketarmor" )
The `ticket_session_key' is the session key from the ticket in the
ap-req. The `subkey' is the ap-req subkey. This construction
guarantees that both the KDC (through the session key) and the client
(through the subkey) contribute to the armor key.
The server name field of the armor ticket MUST identify the TGS of
the target realm. Here are three common ways in the decreasing
preference order how an armor TGT SHOULD be obtained:
1. If the client is authenticating from a host machine whose
Kerberos realm has an authentication path to the client's realm,
the host machine obtains a TGT by using the host keys. If the
client's realm is different than the realm of the local host, the
machine then obtains a cross-realm TGT to the client's realm as
the armor ticket. Otherwise, the host's primary TGT is the armor
ticket.
2. If the client's host machine cannot obtain a host ticket strictly
based on RFC4120, but the KDC has an asymmetric signing key whose
binding with the expected KDC can be verified by the client, the
client can use anonymous PKINIT [KRB-ANON] [RFC4556] to
authenticate the KDC and obtain an anonymous TGT as the armor
ticket. The armor ticket can also be a cross-realm TGT obtained
based on the initial primary TGT obtained using anonymous PKINIT
with KDC authentication.
3. Otherwise, the client uses anonymous PKINIT to get an anonymous
TGT without KDC authentication and that TGT is the armor ticket.
Note that this mode of operation is vulnerable to man-in-the-
middle attacks at the time of obtaining the initial anonymous
armor TGT.
If anonymous PKINIT is used to obtain the armor ticket, the KDC
cannot know whether its signing key can be verified by the client,
hence the KDC MUST be marked as unverified from the KDC's point of
view while the client could be able to authenticate the KDC by
verifying the KDC's signing key is bound with the expected KDC. The
client needs to carefully consider the risk and benefit tradeoffs
associated with active attacks before exposing cipher text encrypted
using the user's long-term secrets when the armor does not
authenticate the KDC.
The TGS MUST reject a request if there is an AD-fx-fast-armor (TBD)
element in the authenticator of the pa-tgs-req padata or if the
ticket in the authenticator of a pa-tgs-req contains the AD-fx-fast-
armor authorization data element. These tickets and authenticators
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MAY be used as FAST armor tickets but not to obtain a ticket via the
TGS. This authorization data is used in a system where the
encryption of the user's pre-authentication data is performed in an
unprivileged user process. A privileged process can provide to the
user process a host ticket, an authenticator for use with that
ticket, and the sub session key contained in the authenticator. In
order for the host process to ensure that the host ticket is not
accidentally or intentionally misused, (i.e. the user process might
use the host ticket to authenticate as the host), it MUST include a
critical authorization data element of the type AD-fx-fast-armor when
providing the authenticator or in the enc-authorization-data field of
the TGS request used to obtain the TGT. The corresponding ad-data
field of the AD-fx-fast-armor element is empty.
As discussed previously, the server of an armor ticket MUST be the
TGS of the realm from whom service is requested. As a result, if
this armor type is used when a ticket is being validated, proxied, or
in other cases where a ticket other than a TGT is presented to the
TGS, a TGT will be used as an armor ticket, while another ticket will
be used in the pa-tgs-req authenticator.
6.5.2. FAST Request
A padata type PA-FX-FAST is defined for the Kerberos FAST pre-
authentication padata. The corresponding padata-value field
[RFC4120] contains the DER encoding of the ASN.1 type PA-FX-FAST-
REQUEST. As with all pre-authentication types, the KDC SHOULD
advertise PA-FX-FAST in a PREAUTH_REQUIRED error. KDCs MUST send the
advertisement of pa-fx-fast with an empty pa-value. Clients MUST
ignore the pa-value of PA-FX-FAST in an initial PREAUTH_REQUIRED
error. FAST is not expected to be used in an authentication set:
clients will typically use FAST padata if available and this decision
should not depend on what other pre-authentication methods are
available. As such, no pa-hint is defined for FAST at this time.
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PA-FX-FAST 136
-- Padata type for Kerberos FAST
PA-FX-FAST-REQUEST ::= CHOICE {
armored-data [0] KrbFastArmoredReq,
...
}
KrbFastArmoredReq ::= SEQUENCE {
armor [0] KrbFastArmor OPTIONAL,
-- Contains the armor that identifies the armor key.
-- MUST be present in AS-REQ.
req-checksum [1] Checksum,
-- For AS, contains the checksum performed over the type
-- KDC-REQ-BODY for the req-body field of the KDC-REQ
-- structure;
-- For TGS, contains the checksum performed over the type
-- AP-REQ in the PA-TGS-REQ padata.
-- The checksum key is the armor key, the checksum
-- type is the required checksum type for the enctype of
-- the armor key, and the key usage number is
-- KEY_USAGE_FAST_REQ_CHKSUM.
enc-fast-req [2] EncryptedData, -- KrbFastReq --
-- The encryption key is the armor key, and the key usage
-- number is KEY_USAGE_FAST_ENC.
...
}
KEY_USAGE_FAST_REQ_CHKSUM 50
KEY_USAGE_FAST_ENC 51
The PA-FX-FAST-REQUEST structure contains a KrbFastArmoredReq type.
The KrbFastArmoredReq encapsulates the encrypted padata.
The enc-fast-req field contains an encrypted KrbFastReq structure.
The armor key is used to encrypt the KrbFastReq structure, and the
key usage number for that encryption is KEY_USAGE_FAST_ENC.
The armor key is selected as follows:
o In an AS request, the armor field in the KrbFastArmoredReq
structure MUST be present and the armor key is identified
according to the specification of the armor type.
o There are two possibilities for armor for a TGS request. If the
ticket presented in the PA-TGS-REQ authenticator is a TGT, then
the client SHOULD not include the armor field in the Krbfastreq
and a subkey MUST be included in the PA-TGS-REQ authenticator. In
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this case, the armor key is the same armor key that would be
computed if the TGS-REQ authenticator was used in a
FX_FAST_ARMOR_AP_REQUEST armor. If a ticket other than a TGT is
being presented to the TGS, a client SHOULD use some form of FAST
armor such as a ticket-based armor with a TGT as an armor ticket.
Clients MAY present a non-TGT in the PA-TGS-REQ authenticator and
omit the armor field, in which case the armor key is the same that
would be computed if the authenticator were used in a
FX_FAST_ARMOR_AP_REQUEST armor. This is the only case where a
ticket other than a TGT can be used to establish an armor key;
even though the armor key is computed the same as a
FX_FAST_ARMOR_AP_REQUEST, a non-TGT cannot be used as an armor
ticket in FX_FAST_ARMOR_AP_REQUEST.
The req-checksum field contains a checksum computed differently for
AS and TGS. For an AS-REQ, it is performed over the type KDC-REQ-
BODY for the req-body field of the KDC-REQ structure of the
containing message; for an TGS-REQ, it is performed over the type AP-
REQ in the PA-TGS-REQ padata of the TGS request. The checksum key is
the armor key, and the checksum type is the required checksum type
for the enctype of the armor key per [RFC3961]. This checksum MUST
be a keyed checksume and it is included in order to bind the FAST
padata to the outer request. A KDC that implements FAST will ignore
the outer request, but including a checksum is relatively cheap and
may prevent confusing behavior.
The KrbFastReq structure contains the following information:
KrbFastReq ::= SEQUENCE {
fast-options [0] FastOptions,
-- Additional options.
padata [1] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA,
-- padata typed holes.
req-body [2] KDC-REQ-BODY,
-- Contains the KDC request body as defined in Section
-- 5.4.1 of [RFC4120].
-- This req-body field is preferred over the outer field
-- in the KDC request.
...
}
The fast-options field indicates various options that are to modify
the behavior of the KDC. The following options are defined:
FastOptions ::= KerberosFlags
-- reserved(0),
-- hide-client-names(1),
-- kdc-follow-referrals(16)
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Bits Name Description
-----------------------------------------------------------------
0 RESERVED Reserved for future expansion of this
field.
1 hide-client-names Requesting the KDC to hide client
names in the KDC response, as
described next in this section.
16 kdc-follow-referrals Requesting the KDC to follow referrals.
Bits 1 through 15 inclusive (with bit 1 and bit 15 included) are
critical options. If the KDC does not support a critical option, it
MUST fail the request with KDC_ERR_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL_FAST_OPTIONS, and
there is no accompanying e-data defined in this document for this
error code. Bit 16 and onward (with bit 16 included) are non-
critical options. KDCs conforming to this specification ignore
unknown non-critical options.
KDC_ERR_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL_FAST_OPTIONS 93
The hide-client-names Option
The Kerberos response defined in [RFC4120] contains the client
identity in clear text, This makes traffic analysis
straightforward. The hide-client-names option is designed to
complicate traffic analysis. If the hide-client-names option is
set, the KDC implementing PA-FX-FAST MUST identify the client as
the anonymous principal [KRB-ANON] in the KDC reply and the error
response. Hence this option is set by the client if it wishes to
conceal the client identity in the KDC response. A conforming KDC
ignores the client principal name in the outer KDC-REQ-BODY field,
and identifies the client using the cname and crealm fields in the
req-body field of the KrbFastReq structure.
The kdc-follow-referrals Option
The Kerberos client described in [RFC4120] has to request referral
TGTs along the authentication path in order to get a service
ticket for the target service. The Kerberos client described in
the [REFERRALS] needs to contact the AS specified in the error
response in order to complete client referrals. The kdc-follow-
referrals option is designed to minimize the number of messages
that need to be processed by the client. This option is useful
when, for example, the client may contact the KDC via a satellite
link that has high network latency, or the client has limited
computational capabilities. If the kdc-follow-referrals option is
set, the KDC MAY act as the client to follow TGS referrals
[REFERRALS], and return the service ticket to the named server
principal in the client request using the reply key expected by
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the client. That is, rather than returning a referral, the KDC
follows that referral by contacting a remote KDC and processing
the referral. The kdc-referrals option can be implemented when
the KDC knows the reply key. The KDC can ignore kdc-referrals
option when it does not understand it or it does not allow this
option based on local policy. The client SHOULD be capable of
processing the KDC responses when this option is not honored by
the KDC. Clients SHOULD use TCP to contact a KDC if this option
is going to be used to avoid problems when the client's UDP
retransmit algorithm has timeouts insufficient to allow the KDC to
interact with remote KDCs.
The padata field contains a list of PA-DATA structures as described
in Section 5.2.7 of [RFC4120]. These PA-DATA structures can contain
FAST factors. They can also be used as generic typed-holes to
contain data not intended for proving the client's identity or
establishing a reply key, but for protocol extensibility. If the KDC
supports the PA-FX-FAST-REQUEST padata, unless otherwise specified,
the client MUST place any padata that is otherwise in the outer KDC
request body into this field. In a TGS request, PA-TGS-REQ padata is
not included in this field and it is present in the outer KDC request
body.
The KDC-REQ-BODY in the FAST structure is used in preference to the
KDC-REQ-BODY outside of the FAST pre-authentication. The outer KDC-
REQ-BODY structure SHOULD be filled in for backwards compatibility
with KDCs that do not support FAST. A conforming KDC ignores the
outer KDC-REQ-BODY field in the KDC request. Pre-authentication data
methods such as [RFC4556] that include a checksum of the KDC-REQ-BODY
should checksum the KDC-REQ-BODY.
In a TGS request, a client MAY include the AD-fx-fast-used authdata
either in the pa-tgs-req authenticator or in the authorization data
in the pa-tgs-req ticket. If the KDC receives this authorization
data but does not find a FAST padata then it MUST return
KRB_APP_ERR_MODIFIED.
6.5.3. FAST Response
The KDC that supports the PA-FX-FAST padata MUST include a PA-FX-FAST
padata element in the KDC reply. In the case of an error, the PA-FX-
FAST padata is included in the KDC responses according to
Section 6.5.4.
The corresponding padata-value field [RFC4120] for the PA-FX-FAST in
the KDC response contains the DER encoding of the ASN.1 type PA-FX-
FAST-REPLY.
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PA-FX-FAST-REPLY ::= CHOICE {
armored-data [0] KrbFastArmoredRep,
...
}
KrbFastArmoredRep ::= SEQUENCE {
enc-fast-rep [0] EncryptedData, -- KrbFastResponse --
-- The encryption key is the armor key in the request, and
-- the key usage number is KEY_USAGE_FAST_REP.
...
}
KEY_USAGE_FAST_REP 52
The PA-FX-FAST-REPLY structure contains a KrbFastArmoredRep
structure. The KrbFastArmoredRep structure encapsulates the padata
in the KDC reply in the encrypted form. The KrbFastResponse is
encrypted with the armor key used in the corresponding request, and
the key usage number is KEY_USAGE_FAST_REP.
The Kerberos client who does not receive a PA-FX-FAST-REPLY in the
KDC response MUST support a local policy that rejects the response.
Clients MAY also support policies that fall back to other mechanisms
or that do not use pre-authentication when FAST is unavailable. It
is important to consider the potential downgrade attacks when
deploying such a policy.
The KrbFastResponse structure contains the following information:
KrbFastResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
padata [0] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA,
-- padata typed holes.
strengthen-key [1] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL,
-- This, if present, strengthens the reply key for AS and
-- TGS.
-- MUST be absent in KRB-ERROR.
finished [2] KrbFastFinished OPTIONAL,
-- Present in AS or TGS reply; absent otherwise.
nonce [3] UInt32,
-- Nonce from the client request.
...
}
The padata field in the KrbFastResponse structure contains a list of
PA-DATA structures as described in Section 5.2.7 of [RFC4120]. These
PA-DATA structures are used to carry data advancing the exchange
specific for the FAST factors. They can also be used as generic
typed-holes for protocol extensibility. Unless otherwise specified,
the KDC MUST include any padata that is otherwise in the outer KDC-
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REP structure into this field. The padata field in the KDC reply
structure outside of the PA-FX-FAST-REPLY structure typically
includes only the PA-FX- FAST-REPLY padata.
The strengthen-key field provides a mechanism for the KDC to
strengthen the reply key. If set, the reply key is strengthened
after all padata items are processed. Let padata-reply-key be the
reply key after padata processing.
reply-key = KRB-FX-CF2(strengthen-key, padata-reply-key,
"strengthenkey", "replykey")
The strengthen-key field MAY be set in an AS or TGS reply; it must be
absent in an error reply.
The finished field contains a KrbFastFinished structure. It is
filled by the KDC in the final message in the conversation. This
field is present in an AS-REP or a TGS-REP when a ticket is returned,
and it is not present in an error reply.
The KrbFastFinished structure contains the following information:
KrbFastFinished ::= SEQUENCE {
timestamp [0] KerberosTime,
usec [1] Microseconds,
-- timestamp and usec represent the time on the KDC when
-- the reply was generated.
crealm [2] Realm,
cname [3] PrincipalName,
-- Contains the client realm and the client name.
ticket-checksum [4] Checksum,
-- checksum of the ticket in the KDC-REP using the armor
-- and the key usage is KEY_USAGE_FAST_FINISH.
-- The checksum type is the required checksum type
-- of the armor key.
...
}
KEY_USAGE_FAST_FINISHED 53
The timestamp and usec fields represent the time on the KDC when the
reply ticket was generated, these fields have the same semantics as
the corresponding-identically-named fields in Section 5.6.1 of
[RFC4120]. The client MUST use the KDC's time in these fields
thereafter when using the returned ticket. Note that the KDC's time
in AS-REP may not match the authtime in the reply ticket if the kdc-
follow-referrals option is requested and honored by the KDC. The
client need not confirm that the timestamp returned is within
allowable clock skew: the armor key guarantees that the reply is
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fresh. The client MAY trust the time stamp returned.
The cname and crealm fields identify the authenticated client. If
facilities described in [REFERRALS] are used, the authenticated
client may differ from the client in the FAST request.
The ticket-checksum is a checksum of the issued ticket. The checksum
key is the armor key, and the checksum type is the required checksum
type of the enctype of that key, and the key usage number is
KEY_USAGE_FAST_FINISHED.
When FAST padata is included, the PA-FX-COOKIE padata as defined in
Section 6.3 MUST be included in the padata sequence in the
KrbFastResponse sequence if the KDC expects at least one more message
from the client in order to complete the authentication.
The nonce field in the KrbFastResponse contains the value of the
nonce field in the KDC-REQ of the corresponding client request and it
binds the KDC response with the client request. The client MUST
verify that this nonce value in the reply matches with that of the
request and reject the KDC reply otherwise. To prevent the response
from one message in a conversation from being replayed to a request
in another message, clients SHOULD use a new nonce for each message
in a conversation.
6.5.4. Authenticated Kerberos Error Messages using Kerberos FAST
If the Kerberos FAST padata was included in the request, unless
otherwise specified, the e-data field of the KRB-ERROR message
[RFC4120] contains the ASN.1 DER encoding of the type METHOD-DATA
[RFC4120] and a PA-FX-FAST is included in the METHOD-DATA. The KDC
MUST include all the padata elements such as PA-ETYPE-INFO2 and
padata elements that indicate acceptable pre-authentication
mechanisms [RFC4120] in the KrbFastResponse structure.
The KDC MUST also include a PA-FX-ERROR padata item in the
KRBFastResponse structure. The padata-value element of this sequence
is the ASN.1 DER encoding of the type KRB-ERROR. The e-data field
MUST be absent in the PA-FX-ERROR padata. All other fields should be
the same as the outer KRB-ERROR. The client ignores the outer error
and uses the combination of the padata in the KRBFastResponse and the
error information in the PA-FX-ERROR.
PA-FX-ERROR 137
If the Kerberos FAST padata is included in the request but not
included in the error reply, it is a matter of the local policy on
the client to accept the information in the error message without
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integrity protection. The client SHOULD however process the KDC
errors as the result of the KDC's inability to accept the AP_REQ
armor and potentially retry another request with a different armor
when applicable. The Kerberos client MAY process an error message
without a PA-FX-FAST-REPLY, if that is only intended to return better
error information to the application, typically for trouble-shooting
purposes.
In the cases where the e-data field of the KRB-ERROR message is
expected to carry a TYPED-DATA [RFC4120] element, then that
information should be transmitted in a pa-data element within the
KRBFastResponse structure. The padata-type is the same as the data-
type would be in the typed data element and the padata-value is the
same as the data-value. As discussed in Section 8, data-types and
padata-types are drawn from the same namespace. For example, the
TD_TRUSTED_CERTIFIERS structure is expected to be in the KRB-ERROR
message when the error code is KDC_ERR_CANT_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE
[RFC4556].
6.5.5. Outer and Inner Requests
Typically, a client will know that FAST is being used before a
request containing PA-FX-FAST is sent. So, the outer AS request
typically only includes one pa-data item: PA-FX-FAST. The client MAY
include additional pa-data, but the KDC MUST ignore the outer request
body and any padata besides PA-FX-FAST if and only if PA-FX-FAST is
processed. In the case of the TGS request, the outer request should
include PA-FX-FAST and PA-TGS-REQ.
When an AS generates a response, all padata besides PA-FX-FAST should
be included in PA-FX-FAST. The client MUST ignore other padata
outside of PA-FX-FAST.
6.5.6. The Encrypted Challenge FAST Factor
The encrypted challenge FAST factor authenticates a client using the
client's long-term key. This factor works similarly to the encrypted
time stamp pre-authentication option described in [RFC4120]. The
client encrypts a structure containing a timestamp in the challenge
key. The challenge key used by the client to send a message to the
KDC is KRB-FX-CF2(armor_key,long_term_key, "clientchallengearmor",
"challengelongterm"). The challenge key used by the KDC encrypting
to the client is KRB-FX-CF2(armor_key, long_term_key,
"kdcchallengearmor", "challengelongterm"). Because the armor key is
fresh and random, the challenge key is fresh and random. The only
purpose of the timestamp is to limit the validity of the
authentication so that a request cannot be replayed. A client MAY
base the timestamp on the KDC time in a KDC error and need not
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maintain accurate time synchronization itself. If a client bases its
time on an untrusted source, an attacker may trick the client into
producing an authentication request that is valid at some future
time. The attacker may be able to use this authentication request to
make it appear that a client has authenticated at that future time.
If ticket-based armor is used, then the lifetime of the ticket will
limit the window in which an attacker can make the client appear to
have authenticated. For many situations, the ability of an attacker
to cause a client to appear to have authenticated is not a
significant concern; the ability to avoid requiring time
synchronization on clients is more valuable.
The client sends a padata of type PA-ENCRYPTED-CHALLENGE the
corresponding padata-value contains the DER encoding of ASN.1 type
EncryptedChallenge.
EncryptedChallenge ::= EncryptedData
-- Encrypted PA-ENC-TS-ENC, encrypted in the challenge key
-- using key usage KEY_USAGE_ENC_CHALLENGE_CLIENT for the
-- client and KEY_USAGE_ENC_CHALLENGE_KDC for the KDC.
PA-ENCRYPTED-CHALLENGE 138
KEY_USAGE_ENC_CHALLENGE_CLIENT 54
KEY_USAGE_ENC_CHALLENGE_KDC 55
The client includes some time stamp reasonably close to the KDC's
current time and encrypts it in the challenge key. Clients MAY use
the current time; doing so prevents the exposure where an attacker
can cause a client to appear to authenticate in the future. The
client sends the request including this factor.
On receiving an AS-REQ containing the PA-ENCRYPTED-CHALLENGE fast
factor, the KDC decrypts the timestamp. If the decryption fails the
KDC SHOULD return KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED, including PA-ETYPE-INFO2 in
the KRBFastResponse in the error. The KDC confirms that the
timestamp falls within its current clock skew returning
KRB_APP_ERR_SKEW if not. The KDC then SHOULD check to see if the
encrypted challenge is a replay. The KDC MUST NOT consider two
encrypted challenges replays simply because the time stamps are the
same; to be a replay, the ciphertext MUST be identical. Allowing
clients to re-use time stamps avoids requiring that clients maintain
state about which time stamps have been used.
If the KDC accepts the encrypted challenge, it MUST include a padata
element of type PA-ENCRYPTED-CHALLENGE. The KDC encrypts its current
time in the challenge key. The KDC MUST strengthen the reply key
before issuing a ticket. The client MUST check that the timestamp
decrypts properly. The client MAY check that the timestamp is
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winthin the window of acceptable clock skew for the client. The
client MUST NOT require that the timestamp be identical to the
timestamp in the issued credentials or the returned message.
The encrypted challenge FAST factor provides the following
facilities: client-authentication and KDC authentication. This FAST
factor also takes advantage of the FAST facility to strengthen the
reply key. It does not provide the replacing-reply-key facility.
The security considerations section of this document provides an
explanation why the security requirements are met.
The encrypted challenge FAST factor can be useful in an
authentication set. No pa-hint is defined because the only
information needed by this mechanism is information contained in the
PA-ETYPE-INFO2 pre-authentication data. KDCs are already required to
send PA-ETYPE-INFO2. If KDCs were not required to send PA-ETYPE-
INFO2 then that information would need to be part of a hint for
encrypted challenge.
Conforming implementations MUST support the encrypted challenge FAST
factor.
6.6. Authentication Strength Indication
Implementations that have pre-authentication mechanisms offering
significantly different strengths of client authentication MAY choose
to keep track of the strength of the authentication used as an input
into policy decisions. For example, some principals might require
strong pre-authentication, while less sensitive principals can use
relatively weak forms of pre-authentication like encrypted timestamp.
An AuthorizationData data type AD-Authentication-Strength is defined
for this purpose.
AD-authentication-strength 70
The corresponding ad-data field contains the DER encoding of the pre-
authentication data set as defined in Section 6.4. This set contains
all the pre-authentication mechanisms that were used to authenticate
the client. If only one pre-authentication mechanism was used to
authenticate the client, the pre-authentication set contains one
element.
The AD-authentication-strength element MUST be included in the AD-IF-
RELEVANT, thus it can be ignored if it is unknown to the receiver.
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7. Assigned Constants
The pre-authentication framework and FAST involve using a number of
Kerberos protocol constants. This section lists protocol constants
first introduced in this specification drawn from registries not
managed by IANA. Many of these registries would best be managed by
IANA; that is a known issue that is out of scope for this document.
The constants described in this section have been accounted for and
will appear in the next revision of the Kerberos core specification
or in a document creating IANA registries.
Section 8 creates IANA registries for a different set of constants
used by the extensions described in this document.
7.1. New Errors
KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_EXPIRED 90
KDC_ERR_MORE_PREAUTH_DATA_NEEDED 91
KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_BAD_AUTHENTICATION_SET 92
KDC_ERR_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL_FAST_OPTIONS 93
7.2. Key Usage Numbers
KEY_USAGE_FAST_REQ_CHKSUM 50
KEY_USAGE_FAST_ENC 51
KEY_USAGE_FAST_REP 52
KEY_USAGE_FAST_FINISHED 53
KEY_USAGE_ENC_CHALLENGE_CLIENT 54
KEY_USAGE_ENC_CHALLENGE_KDC 55
7.3. Authorization Data Elements
AD-authentication-strength 70
AD-fx-fast-armor 71
AD-fx-fast-used 72
7.4. New PA-DATA Types
PA-FX-COOKIE 133
PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET 134
PA-AUTH-SET-SELECTED 135
PA-FX-FAST 136
PA-FX-ERROR 137
PA-ENCRYPTED-CHALLENGE 138
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8. IANA Considerations
This document creates a number of IANA registries. These registries
should all be located under
http://www.iana.org/assignments/kerberos-parameters.
8.1. Pre-authentication and Typed Data
RFC 4120 defines pre-authentication data, which can be included in a
KDC request or response in order to authenticate the client or extend
the protocol. In addition, it defines Typed-Data which is an
extension mechanism for errors. Both pre-authentication data and
typed data are carried as a 32-bit signed integer along with an octet
string. The encoding of typed data and pre-authentication data is
slightly different. However the types for pre-authentication data
and typed-data are drawn from the same namespace. By convention,
registrations starting with TD- are typed data and registration
starting with PA- are pre-authentication data. It is important that
these data types be drawn from the same namespace, because some
errors where it would be desirable to include typed data require the
e-data field to be formatted as pre-authentication data.
When Kerberos FAST is used, pre-authentication data encoding is
always used.
There is one apparently conflicting registration between typed data
and pre-authentication data. PA-GET-FROM-TYPED-DATA and TD-PADATA
are both assigned the value 22. However this registration is simply
a mechanism to include an element of the other encoding. The use of
both should be deprecated.
This document creates a registry for pre-authentication and typed
data. The registration procedures are as follows. Expert review for
pre-authentication mechanisms designed to authenticate users, KDCs,
or establish the reply key. The expert first determines that the
purpose of the method is to authenticate clients, KDCs, or to
establish the reply key. If so, expert review is appropriate. The
expert evaluates the security and interoperability of the
specification.
IETF review is required if the expert believes that the pre-
authentication method is broader than these three areas. Pre-
authentication methods that change the Kerberos state machine or
otherwise make significant changes to the Kerberos protocol should be
standards track RFCs. A concern that a particular method needs to be
a standards track RFC may be raised as an objection during IETF
review.
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Type Value Reference
----------------------------------------------------------------------
PA-TGS-REQ 1 RFC 4120
PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP 2 RFC 4120
PA-PW-SALT 3 RFC 4120
[reserved] 4
PA-ENC-UNIX-TIME 5 (deprecated)
PA-SANDIA-SECUREID 6
PA-SESAME 7
PA-OSF-DCE 8
PA-CYBERSAFE-SECUREID 9
PA-AFS3-SALT 10
PA-ETYPE-INFO 11 RFC 4120
PA-SAM-CHALLENGE 12 (sam/otp)
PA-SAM-RESPONSE 13 (sam/otp)
PA-PK-AS-REQ_OLD 14 draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-init-09
PA-PK-AS-REP_OLD 15 draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-init-09
PA-PK-AS-REQ 16 RFC 4556
PA-PK-AS-REP 17 RFC 4556
PA-PK-OCSP-RESPONSE 18 RFC 4557
PA-ETYPE-INFO2 19 RFC 4120
PA-USE-SPECIFIED-KVNO 20
PA-SVR-REFERRAL-INFO 20 (referrals)
PA-SAM-REDIRECT 21 (sam/otp)
PA-GET-FROM-TYPED-DATA 22 (embedded in typed data)
TD-PADATA 22 (embeds padata)
PA-SAM-ETYPE-INFO 23 (sam/otp)
PA-ALT-PRINC 24 (crawdad@fnal.gov)
PA-SERVER-REFERRAL 25 (referrals)
PA-SAM-CHALLENGE2 30 (kenh@pobox.com)
PA-SAM-RESPONSE2 31 (kenh@pobox.com)
PA-EXTRA-TGT 41 Reserved extra TGT
TD-PKINIT-CMS-CERTIFICATES 101 CertificateSet from CMS
TD-KRB-PRINCIPAL 102 PrincipalName
TD-KRB-REALM 103 Realm
TD-TRUSTED-CERTIFIERS 104 PKINIT
TD-CERTIFICATE-INDEX 105 PKINIT
TD-APP-DEFINED-ERROR 106 Application specific
TD-REQ-NONCE 107 INTEGER
TD-REQ-SEQ 108 INTEGER
PA-PAC-REQUEST 128 MS-KILE
PA-FOR_USER 129 MS-KILE
PA-FOR-X509-USER 130 MS-KILE
PA-FOR-CHECK_DUPS 131 MS-KILE
PA-AS-CHECKSUM 132 MS-KILE
PA-FX-COOKIE 133 draft-ietf-krb-wg-preauth-framework
PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET 134 draft-ietf-krb-wg-preauth-framework
PA-AUTH-SET-SELECTED 135 draft-ietf-krb-wg-preauth-framework
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PA-FX-FAST 136 draft-ietf-krb-wg-preauth-framework
PA-FX-ERROR 137 draft-ietf-krb-wg-preauth-framework
PA-ENCRYPTED-CHALLENGE 138 draft-ietf-krb-wg-preauth-framework
PA-OTP-CHALLENGE 141 (gareth.richards@rsa.com)
PA-OTP-REQUEST 142 (gareth.richards@rsa.com)
PA-OTP-CONFIRM 143 (gareth.richards@rsa.com)
PA-OTP-PIN-CHANGE 144 (gareth.richards@rsa.com)
PA-EPAK-AS-REQ 145 (sshock@gmail.com)
PA-EPAK-AS-REP 146 (sshock@gmail.com>)
PA_PKINIT_KX 147 draft-ietf-krb-wg-anon
PA_PKU2U_NAME 148 draft-zhu-pku2u
PA-SUPPORTED-ETYPES 165 MS-KILE
PA-EXTENDED_ERROR 166 MS-KILE
8.2. Fast Armor Types
FAST armor types are defined in Section 6.5.1. A FAST armor type is
a signed 32-bit integer. FAST armor types are assigned by standards
action.
Type Name Description
------------------------------------------------------------
0 Reserved.
1 FX_FAST_ARMOR_AP_REQUEST Ticket armor using an ap-req.
8.3. FAST Options
A FAST request includes a set of bit flags to indicate additional
options. Bits 0-15 are critical; other bits are non-critical.
Assigning bits greater than 31 may require special support in
implementations. Assignment of FAST options requires standards
action.
Type Name Description
-------------------------------------------------------------------
0 RESERVED Reserved for future expansion of this
field.
1 hide-client-names Requesting the KDC to hide client
names in the KDC response
16 kdc-follow-referrals Requesting the KDC to follow
referrals
9. Security Considerations
The kdc-referrals option in the Kerberos FAST padata requests the KDC
to act as the client to follow referrals. This can overload the KDC.
To limit the damages of denial of service using this option, KDCs MAY
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restrict the number of simultaneous active requests with this option
for any given client principal.
With regarding to the facilities provided by the Encrypted Challenge
FAST factor, the challenge key is derived from the client secrets and
because the client secrets are known only to the client and the KDC,
the verification of the EncryptedChallenge structure proves the
client's identity, the verification of the EncryptedChallenge
structure in the KDC reply proves that the expected KDC responded.
Therefore, the Encrypted Challenge FAST factor as a pre-
authentication mechanism offers the following facilities: client-
authentication and KDC-authentication. There is no un-authenticated
clear text introduced by the Encrypted Challenge FAST factor.
FAST provides an encrypted tunnel over which pre-authentication
conversations can take place. In addition, FAST optionally
authenticates the KDC to the client. It is the responsibility of
FAST factors to authenticate the client to the KDC. Care MUST be
taken to design FAST factors such that they are bound to the
conversation. If this is not done, a man-in-the-middle may be able
to cut&paste a fast factor from one conversation to another. The
easiest way to do this is to bind each fast factor to the armor key
which is guaranteed to be unique for each conversation.
The anonymous pkinit mode for obtaining an armor ticket does not
always authenticate the KDC to the client before the conversation
begins. Tracking the KDC verified state guarantees that by the end
of the conversation, the client has authenticated the KDC. However
fast factor designers need to consider the implications of using
their factor when the KDC has not yet been authenticated. If this
proves problematic in an environment, then the particular fast factor
should not be used with anonymous PKINIT.
Existing pre-authentication mechanisms are believed to be at least as
secure when used with FAST as they are when used outside of FAST.
One part of this security is making sure that when pre-authentication
methods checksum the request, they checksum the inner request rather
than the outer request. If the mechanism checksummed the outer
request, a man-in-the-middle could observe it outside a FAST tunnel
and then cut&paste it into a FAST exchange where the inner rather
than outer request would be used to select attributes of the issued
ticket. Such attacks would typically invalidate auditing information
or create a situation where the client and KDC disagree about what
ticket is issued. However, such attacks are unlikely to allow an
attacker who would not be able to authenticate as a principal to do
so. Even so, FAST is believed to defend against these attacks in
existing legacy mechanism. However since there is no standard for
how legacy mechanisms bind the request to the pre-authentication or
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provide integrity protection, security analysis can be difficult. In
some cases FAST may significantly improve the integrity protection of
legacy mechanisms.
10. Acknowledgements
Sam Hartman would like to thank the MIT Kerberos Consortium for its
funding of his time on this project.
Several suggestions from Jeffrey Hutzelman based on early revisions
of this documents led to significant improvements of this document.
The proposal to ask one KDC to chase down the referrals and return
the final ticket is based on requirements in [ID.CROSS].
Joel Webber had a proposal for a mechanism similar to FAST that
created a protected tunnel for Kerberos pre-authentication.
Srinivas Cheruku and Greg Hudson provided valuable review comments.
11. References
11.1. Normative References
[KRB-ANON]
Zhu, L. and P. Leach, "Kerberos Anonymity Support",
draft-ietf-krb-wg-anon-04.txt (work in progress), 2007.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3961] Raeburn, K., "Encryption and Checksum Specifications for
Kerberos 5", RFC 3961, February 2005.
[RFC4120] Neuman, C., Yu, T., Hartman, S., and K. Raeburn, "The
Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 4120,
July 2005.
[RFC4556] Zhu, L. and B. Tung, "Public Key Cryptography for Initial
Authentication in Kerberos (PKINIT)", RFC 4556, June 2006.
11.2. Informative References
[ID.CROSS]
Sakane, S., Zrelli, S., and M. Ishiyama , "Problem
Statement on the Operation of Kerberos in a Specific
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System", draft-sakane-krb-cross-problem-statement-02.txt
(work in progress), April 2007.
[KRB-WG.SAM]
Hornstein, K., Renard, K., Neuman, C., and G. Zorn,
"Integrating Single-use Authentication Mechanisms with
Kerberos", draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-sam-02.txt (work in
progress), October 2003.
[REFERRALS]
Raeburn, K. and L. Zhu, "Generating KDC Referrals to
Locate Kerberos Realms",
draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-referrals-10.txt (work in
progress), 2007.
Appendix A. Test Vectors for KRB-FX-CF2
This informative appendix presents test vectors for the KRB-FX-CF2
function. Test vectors are presented for several encryption types.
In all cases the first key (k1) is the result of string-to-
key("key1", "key1", default_parameters) and the second key (k2) is
the result of string-to-key("key2", "key2", default_parameters).
Both keys are of the same enctype. The presented test vector is the
hexadecimal encoding of the key produced by KRB-FX-CF2(k1, k2, "a",
"b"). The peppers are one-octet ASCII strings.
In performing interoperability testing, there was significant
ambiguity surrounding [RFC3961] pseudo-random operations. These test
vectors assume that the AES pseudo-random operation is aes-
ecb(trunc128(sha-1(input))) where trunc128 truncates its input to
128-bits. The 3DES pseudo-random operation is assumed to be des3-
cbc(trunc128(sha-1(input))). The DES pseudo-random operation is
assumed to be des-cbc(md5(input). As specified in RFC 4757, the RC4
pseudo-random operation is hmac-sha1(input).
These test vectors were produced with revision 22359 of the MIT
Kerberos sources. The AES 256 and AES 128 test vectors have been
confirmed by another implementer. The RC4 implementation of KRB-FX-
CF2 from that revision of MIT Kerberos worked against another
implementation during an interoperability event, although these
specific test vectors have not been confirmed. The DES and triple
DES test vectors have not been confirmed.
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aes 128 (enctype 17): 97df97e4b798b29eb31ed7280287a92a
AES256 (enctype 18): 4d6ca4e629785c1f01baf55e2e548566
b9617ae3a96868c337cb93b5e72b1c7b
DES (enctype 1): 43bae3738c9467e6
3DES (enctype 16): e58f9eb643862c13ad38e529313462a7f73e62834fe54a01
RC4 (enctype 23): 24d7f6b6bae4e5c00d2082c5ebab3672
Appendix B. Change History
RFC editor, please remove this section before publication.
B.1. Changes since 11
Checksum the inner request body in methods like PKINIT, not the
outer request body. Per mailing list discussion, this change
addresses a potential security weakness.
Add additional security considerations text
B.2. Changes since 10
The checksum member of the KrbFastFinished sequence has been
removed. A nonce field has been added to KrbFastResponse.
The cookie no longer needs to be outside of FAST. In fact, some
security guarantees depend on the cookie being inside FAST now
that the finish checksum has been removed. Affected that change.
Replace the rep-key field in KrbFastResponse with the strengthen-
key field. Per mailing list discussion, there are security
advantages to strengthening the reply key.
Clarify handling of authentication sets.
Include the AD-fx-fast-used authorization data type.
Include note about random nonces.
B.3. Changes since 09
Clarify conversations by defining for TGS and by describing how
cookies form conversation boundaries.
Simplify text surrounding when finish is included: always for AS
and TGS reply, never for error.
Fill in IANA and constants
B.4. Changes since 08
Fix a number of typos
Rename anonymous flag to hide-client-name; rename kdc-referals to
kdc-follow-referrals
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Clarify how anonymous pkinit interacts with KDC verified.
Introduce AD-fx-fast-armor authorization data to deal with
unprivileged processes constructing KDC requests. Note that a TGT
is always used for armor tickets if the armor field is present; if
you proxy or validate you'll end up with a TGT armor ticket and
another ticket in the pa-tgs-req. Alternatively you can simply
use the other ticket in the PA-TGS-REQ; weak consensus within WG.
All KDCs in a realm MUST support FAST if it is to be offered.
The cookie message is always generated by the KDC.
Note that the client can trust and need not verify the time stamp
in the finish message. This can seed the client's idea of KDC
time.
Note that the client name in the finish message may differ from
the name in the request if referrals are used.
Note that KDCs should advertize fast in preauth_required errors.
Armor key is constructed using KRB-FX-CF2. This is true even in
the TGS case; there is no security reason to do this. Using the
subkey as done in draft 08 would be fine, but the current text
uses the same procedure both in the TGS and AS case.
Use a different challenge key in each direction in the encrypted
challenge option.
Note that the KDC should process PA-FX-COOKIE before other padata.
KRB-FX-CF2 uses k1's enctype for the result; change around calling
order so we pass in subkeys and armor keys as k1 in preference to
long-term keys or ticket session keys.
Clarify the relationship between authentication sets and cookies.
A cookie may not be needed in the first message. Clarify how this
interacts with optimistic clients.
Remove text raising a concern that RFC 3961 may permit ciphertext
transformations that do not change plaintext: discussion on the
list came to the conclusion that RFC 3961 does not permit this.
Remove binding key concept; use the armor key instead. The cookie
becomes just an octet string.
Include PA-FX-ERROR to protect the error information per Dublin.
Returning preauth_failed in the failed to decrypt encrypted
challenge seems fine; remove the issue marker
Add a section describing what goes in the inner and outer request.
I believe it is redundant but found it useful while putting
together an implementation proposal.
Use hyphen rather than underscore in the constants for pre-
authentication data to be consistent with RFC 4120.
Add a ticket-checksum to the finished message
Remove redundant KEY_USAGE_FAST_ARMOR.
Add protocol constants section for non-IANA registrations and
flesh out IANA section.
Clarify that kdc-req-body checksums should always use the outer
body even for mechanisms like PKINIT that include their own (now
redundant) checksum.
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Remove mechanism for encapsulating typed data in padata; just
reflect the value.
B.5. Changes since 07
Propose replacement of authenticated timestamp with encrypted
challenge. The desire to avoid clients needing time
synchronization and to simply the factor.
Add a requirement that any FAST armor scheme must provide a fresh
key for each conversation. This allows us to assume that anything
encrypted/integrity protected in the right key is fresh and not
subject to cross-conversation cut and paste.
Removed heartbeat padata. The KDC will double up messages if it
needs to; the client simply sends its message and waits for the
next response.
Define PA-AUTH-SET-SELECTED
Clarify a KDC cannot ignore padata is has claimed to support
B.6. Changes since 06
Note that even for replace reply key it is likely that the side
using the mechanism will know that the other side supports it.
Since it is reasonably unlikely we'll need a container mechanism
other than FAST itself, we don't need to optimize for that case.
So, we want to optimize for implementation simplicity. Thus if
you do have such a container mechanism interacting with
authentication sets we'll assume that the hint need to describe
hints for all contained mechanisms. This closes out a long-
standing issue.
Write up what Sam believes is the consensus on UI and prompts in
the authentication set: clients MAY assume that they have all the
UI information they need.
Appendix C. ASN.1 module
KerberosPreauthFramework {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) kerberosV5(2) modules(4) preauth-framework(3)
} DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN
IMPORTS
KerberosTime, PrincipalName, Realm, EncryptionKey, Checksum,
Int32, EncryptedData, PA-ENC-TS-ENC, PA-DATA, KDC-REQ-BODY,
Microseconds, KerberosFlags
FROM KerberosV5Spec2 { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) kerberosV5(2)
modules(4) krb5spec2(2) };
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-- as defined in RFC 4120.
PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET ::= SEQUENCE OF PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET-ELEM
PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET-ELEM ::= SEQUENCE {
pa-type [0] Int32,
-- same as padata-type.
pa-hint [1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
pa-value [2] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
...
}
KrbFastArmor ::= SEQUENCE {
armor-type [0] Int32,
-- Type of the armor.
armor-value [1] OCTET STRING,
-- Value of the armor.
...
}
PA-FX-FAST-REQUEST ::= CHOICE {
armored-data [0] KrbFastArmoredReq,
...
}
KrbFastArmoredReq ::= SEQUENCE {
armor [0] KrbFastArmor OPTIONAL,
-- Contains the armor that identifies the armor key.
-- MUST be present in AS-REQ.
req-checksum [1] Checksum,
-- For AS, contains the checksum performed over the type
-- KDC-REQ-BODY for the req-body field of the KDC-REQ
-- structure;
-- For TGS, contains the checksum performed over the type
-- AP-REQ in the PA-TGS-REQ padata.
-- The checksum key is the armor key, the checksum
-- type is the required checksum type for the enctype of
-- the armor key, and the key usage number is
-- KEY_USAGE_FAST_REQ_CHKSUM.
enc-fast-req [2] EncryptedData, -- KrbFastReq --
-- The encryption key is the armor key, and the key usage
-- number is KEY_USAGE_FAST_ENC.
...
}
KrbFastReq ::= SEQUENCE {
fast-options [0] FastOptions,
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-- Additional options.
padata [1] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA,
-- padata typed holes.
req-body [2] KDC-REQ-BODY,
-- Contains the KDC request body as defined in Section
-- 5.4.1 of [RFC4120].
-- This req-body field is preferred over the outer field
-- in the KDC request.
...
}
FastOptions ::= KerberosFlags
-- reserved(0),
-- hide-client-names(1),
-- kdc-follow-referrals(16)
PA-FX-FAST-REPLY ::= CHOICE {
armored-data [0] KrbFastArmoredRep,
...
}
KrbFastArmoredRep ::= SEQUENCE {
enc-fast-rep [0] EncryptedData, -- KrbFastResponse --
-- The encryption key is the armor key in the request, and
-- the key usage number is KEY_USAGE_FAST_REP.
...
}
KrbFastResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
padata [0] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA,
-- padata typed holes.
strengthen-key [1] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL,
-- This, if present, strengthens the reply key for AS and
-- TGS.
-- MUST be absent in KRB-ERROR.
finished [2] KrbFastFinished OPTIONAL,
-- Present in AS or TGS reply; absent otherwise.
nonce [3] UInt32,
-- Nonce from the client request.
...
}
KrbFastFinished ::= SEQUENCE {
timestamp [0] KerberosTime,
usec [1] Microseconds,
-- timestamp and usec represent the time on the KDC when
-- the reply was generated.
crealm [2] Realm,
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cname [3] PrincipalName,
-- Contains the client realm and the client name.
ticket-checksum [4] Checksum,
-- checksum of the ticket in the KDC-REP using the armor
-- and the key usage is KEY_USAGE_FAST_FINISH.
-- The checksum type is the required checksum type
-- of the armor key.
...
}
EncryptedChallenge ::= EncryptedData
-- Encrypted PA-ENC-TS-ENC, encrypted in the challenge key
-- using key usage KEY_USAGE_ENC_CHALLENGE_CLIENT for the
-- client and KEY_USAGE_ENC_CHALLENGE_KDC for the KDC.
END
Authors' Addresses
Sam hartman
Painless Security
Email: hartmans-ietf@mit.edu
Larry Zhu
Microsoft Corporation
One Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052
US
Email: lzhu@microsoft.com
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