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https://github.com/samba-team/samba.git
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a25f549e9a
NOTE: THIS COMMIT WON’T COMPILE/WORK ON ITS OWN! Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
364 lines
10 KiB
C
364 lines
10 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
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* (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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*
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* 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors
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* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
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* without specific prior written permission.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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#include "kdc_locl.h"
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static int
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name_type_ok(krb5_context context,
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krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
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krb5_const_principal principal)
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{
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int nt = krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal);
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if (!krb5_principal_is_krbtgt(context, principal))
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return 1;
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if (nt == KRB5_NT_SRV_INST || nt == KRB5_NT_UNKNOWN)
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return 1;
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if (config->strict_nametypes == 0)
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return 1;
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return 0;
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}
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struct timeval _kdc_now;
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static krb5_error_code
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synthesize_hdb_close(krb5_context context, struct HDB *db)
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{
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(void) context;
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(void) db;
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Synthesize an HDB entry suitable for PKINIT and GSS preauth.
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*/
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static krb5_error_code
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synthesize_client(krb5_context context,
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krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
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krb5_const_principal princ,
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HDB **db,
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hdb_entry **h)
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{
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static HDB null_db;
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krb5_error_code ret;
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hdb_entry *e;
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/* Hope this works! */
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null_db.hdb_destroy = synthesize_hdb_close;
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null_db.hdb_close = synthesize_hdb_close;
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if (db)
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*db = &null_db;
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ret = (e = calloc(1, sizeof(*e))) ? 0 : krb5_enomem(context);
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if (ret == 0) {
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e->flags.client = 1;
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e->flags.immutable = 1;
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e->flags.virtual = 1;
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e->flags.synthetic = 1;
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e->flags.do_not_store = 1;
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e->kvno = 1;
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e->keys.len = 0;
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e->keys.val = NULL;
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e->created_by.time = time(NULL);
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e->modified_by = NULL;
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e->valid_start = NULL;
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e->valid_end = NULL;
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e->pw_end = NULL;
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e->etypes = NULL;
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e->generation = NULL;
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e->extensions = NULL;
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}
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if (ret == 0)
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ret = (e->max_renew = calloc(1, sizeof(*e->max_renew))) ?
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0 : krb5_enomem(context);
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if (ret == 0)
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ret = (e->max_life = calloc(1, sizeof(*e->max_life))) ?
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0 : krb5_enomem(context);
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if (ret == 0)
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ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, princ, &e->principal);
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if (ret == 0)
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ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, princ, &e->created_by.principal);
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if (ret == 0) {
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/*
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* We can't check OCSP in the TGS path, so we can't let tickets for
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* synthetic principals live very long.
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*/
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*(e->max_renew) = config->synthetic_clients_max_renew;
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*(e->max_life) = config->synthetic_clients_max_life;
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*h = e;
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} else if (e) {
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hdb_free_entry(context, &null_db, e);
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}
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return ret;
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}
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KDC_LIB_FUNCTION krb5_error_code KDC_LIB_CALL
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_kdc_db_fetch(krb5_context context,
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krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
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krb5_const_principal principal,
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unsigned flags,
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krb5uint32 *kvno_ptr,
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HDB **db,
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hdb_entry **h)
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{
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hdb_entry *ent = NULL;
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krb5_error_code ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
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int i;
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unsigned kvno = 0;
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krb5_principal enterprise_principal = NULL;
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krb5_const_principal princ;
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*h = NULL;
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if (db)
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*db = NULL;
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if (!name_type_ok(context, config, principal))
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return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
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flags |= HDB_F_DECRYPT;
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if (kvno_ptr != NULL && *kvno_ptr != 0) {
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kvno = *kvno_ptr;
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flags |= HDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED;
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} else {
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flags |= HDB_F_ALL_KVNOS;
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}
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ent = calloc(1, sizeof (*ent));
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if (ent == NULL)
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return krb5_enomem(context);
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if (principal->name.name_type == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
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if (principal->name.name_string.len != 1) {
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ret = KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED;
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krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
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"malformed request: "
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"enterprise name with %d name components",
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principal->name.name_string.len);
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goto out;
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}
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ret = krb5_parse_name(context, principal->name.name_string.val[0],
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&enterprise_principal);
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if (ret)
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goto out;
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}
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for (i = 0; i < config->num_db; i++) {
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HDB *curdb = config->db[i];
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if (db)
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*db = curdb;
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ret = curdb->hdb_open(context, curdb, O_RDONLY, 0);
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if (ret) {
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const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
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kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to open database: %s", msg);
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krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
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continue;
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}
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princ = principal;
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if (!(curdb->hdb_capability_flags & HDB_CAP_F_HANDLE_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) && enterprise_principal)
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princ = enterprise_principal;
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ret = hdb_fetch_kvno(context, curdb, princ, flags, 0, 0, kvno, ent);
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curdb->hdb_close(context, curdb);
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if (ret == HDB_ERR_NOENTRY)
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continue; /* Check the other databases */
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/*
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* This is really important, because errors like
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* HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE (used to indicate to Samba that
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* the RODC on which this code is running does not have
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* the key we need, and so a proxy to the KDC is required)
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* have specific meaning, and need to be propogated up.
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*/
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break;
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}
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switch (ret) {
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case HDB_ERR_WRONG_REALM:
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case 0:
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/*
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* the ent->entry.principal just contains hints for the client
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* to retry. This is important for enterprise principal routing
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* between trusts.
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*/
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*h = ent;
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ent = NULL;
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break;
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case HDB_ERR_NOENTRY:
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if (db)
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*db = NULL;
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if ((flags & HDB_F_GET_CLIENT) && (flags & HDB_F_SYNTHETIC_OK) &&
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config->synthetic_clients) {
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ret = synthesize_client(context, config, principal, db, h);
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if (ret) {
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krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "could not synthesize "
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"HDB client principal entry");
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ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
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krb5_prepend_error_message(context, ret, "no such entry found in hdb");
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}
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} else {
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krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "no such entry found in hdb");
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}
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break;
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default:
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if (db)
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*db = NULL;
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break;
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}
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out:
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krb5_free_principal(context, enterprise_principal);
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free(ent);
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return ret;
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}
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KDC_LIB_FUNCTION void KDC_LIB_CALL
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_kdc_free_ent(krb5_context context, HDB *db, hdb_entry *ent)
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{
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hdb_free_entry (context, db, ent);
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free (ent);
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}
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/*
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* Use the order list of preferred encryption types and sort the
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* available keys and return the most preferred key.
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*/
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krb5_error_code
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_kdc_get_preferred_key(krb5_context context,
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krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
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hdb_entry *h,
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const char *name,
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krb5_enctype *enctype,
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Key **key)
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{
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krb5_error_code ret;
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int i;
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if (config->use_strongest_server_key) {
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const krb5_enctype *p = krb5_kerberos_enctypes(context);
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for (i = 0; p[i] != ETYPE_NULL; i++) {
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if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, p[i]) != 0 &&
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!_kdc_is_weak_exception(h->principal, p[i]))
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continue;
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ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, h, NULL, p[i], key);
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if (ret != 0)
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continue;
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if (enctype != NULL)
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*enctype = p[i];
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return 0;
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}
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} else {
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*key = NULL;
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for (i = 0; i < h->keys.len; i++) {
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if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, h->keys.val[i].key.keytype) != 0 &&
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!_kdc_is_weak_exception(h->principal, h->keys.val[i].key.keytype))
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continue;
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ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, h, NULL,
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h->keys.val[i].key.keytype, key);
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if (ret != 0)
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continue;
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if (enctype != NULL)
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*enctype = (*key)->key.keytype;
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return 0;
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}
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}
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krb5_set_error_message(context, ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP,
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"No valid kerberos key found for %s", name);
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return ret;
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}
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krb5_error_code
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_kdc_verify_checksum(krb5_context context,
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krb5_crypto crypto,
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krb5_key_usage usage,
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const krb5_data *data,
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Checksum *cksum)
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{
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krb5_error_code ret;
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ret = krb5_verify_checksum(context, crypto, usage,
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data->data, data->length,
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cksum);
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if (ret == KRB5_PROG_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP)
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ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP;
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return ret;
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}
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/*
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* Returns TRUE if a PAC should be included in ticket authorization data.
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*
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* Per [MS-KILE] 3.3.5.3, PACs are always included for TGTs; for service
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* tickets, policy is governed by whether the client explicitly requested
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* a PAC be omitted when requesting a TGT, or if the no-auth-data-reqd
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* flag is set on the service principal entry.
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*
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* However, when issuing a cross-realm TGT to an AD realm our PAC might not
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* interoperate correctly. Therefore we honor the no-auth-data-reqd HDB entry
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* flag on cross-realm TGTs.
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*/
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krb5_boolean
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_kdc_include_pac_p(astgs_request_t r)
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{
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return TRUE;
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}
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/*
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* Notify the HDB backend and KDC plugin of the audited event.
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*/
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krb5_error_code
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_kdc_audit_request(astgs_request_t r)
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{
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krb5_error_code ret;
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struct HDB *hdb;
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ret = _kdc_plugin_audit(r);
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if (ret == 0 &&
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(hdb = r->clientdb ? r->clientdb : r->config->db[0]) &&
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hdb->hdb_audit)
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ret = hdb->hdb_audit(r->context, hdb, r->client, (hdb_request_t)r);
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return ret;
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}
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