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samba-mirror/third_party/heimdal/kdc/kerberos5.c
Joseph Sutton a87aae5292 third_party/heimdal: Import lorikeet-heimdal-202303200103 (commit 2ee541b5e963f7cffb1ec4acd1a8cc45426a9f28) 
NOTE: THIS COMMIT WON'T COMPILE/WORK ON ITS OWN!

Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
2023-03-31 01:48:30 +00:00

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/*
* Copyright (c) 1997-2007 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
* (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "kdc_locl.h"
#ifdef TIME_T_SIGNED
#if SIZEOF_TIME_T == 4
#define MAX_TIME ((time_t)INT32_MAX)
#elif SIZEOF_TIME_T == 8
#define MAX_TIME ((time_t)INT64_MAX)
#else
#error "Unexpected sizeof(time_t)"
#endif
#else
#if SIZEOF_TIME_T == 4
#define MAX_TIME ((time_t)UINT32_MAX)
#else
#define MAX_TIME ((time_t)UINT64_MAX)
#endif
#endif
#undef __attribute__
#define __attribute__(X)
void
_kdc_fix_time(time_t **t)
{
if(*t == NULL){
ALLOC(*t);
**t = MAX_TIME;
}
if(**t == 0) **t = MAX_TIME; /* fix for old clients */
}
static int
realloc_method_data(METHOD_DATA *md)
{
PA_DATA *pa;
pa = realloc(md->val, (md->len + 1) * sizeof(*md->val));
if(pa == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
md->val = pa;
md->len++;
return 0;
}
static krb5_error_code
get_pa_etype_info2(krb5_context context,
krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
METHOD_DATA *md, Key *ckey,
krb5_boolean include_salt);
static krb5_error_code
set_salt_padata(krb5_context context,
krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
METHOD_DATA *md, Key *key)
{
if (!key->salt)
return 0;
return get_pa_etype_info2(context, config, md, key, TRUE);
}
const PA_DATA*
_kdc_find_padata(const KDC_REQ *req, int *start, int type)
{
if (req->padata == NULL)
return NULL;
while((size_t)*start < req->padata->len){
(*start)++;
if(req->padata->val[*start - 1].padata_type == (unsigned)type)
return &req->padata->val[*start - 1];
}
return NULL;
}
/*
* This is a hack to allow predefined weak services, like afs to
* still use weak types
*/
krb5_boolean
_kdc_is_weak_exception(krb5_principal principal, krb5_enctype etype)
{
if (principal->name.name_string.len > 0 &&
strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], "afs") == 0 &&
(etype == ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC
|| etype == ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4
|| etype == ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5))
return TRUE;
return FALSE;
}
/*
* Detect if `key' is the using the the precomputed `default_salt'.
*/
static krb5_boolean
is_default_salt_p(const krb5_salt *default_salt, const Key *key)
{
if (key->salt == NULL)
return TRUE;
if (default_salt->salttype != key->salt->type)
return FALSE;
if (krb5_data_cmp(&default_salt->saltvalue, &key->salt->salt) != 0)
return FALSE;
return TRUE;
}
/*
* Detect if `key' is the using the the precomputed `default_salt'
* (for des-cbc-crc) or any salt otherwise.
*
* This is for avoiding Kerberos v4 (yes really) keys in AS-REQ as
* that salt is strange, and a buggy client will try to use the
* principal as the salt and not the returned value.
*/
static krb5_boolean
is_good_salt_p(const krb5_salt *default_salt, const Key *key)
{
if (key->key.keytype == KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC)
return is_default_salt_p(default_salt, key);
return TRUE;
}
krb5_boolean
_kdc_is_anon_request(const KDC_REQ *req)
{
const KDC_REQ_BODY *b = &req->req_body;
/*
* Versions of Heimdal from 0.9rc1 through 1.50 use bit 14 instead
* of 16 for request_anonymous, as indicated in the anonymous draft
* prior to version 11. Bit 14 is assigned to S4U2Proxy, but S4U2Proxy
* requests are only sent to the TGS and, in any case, would have an
* additional ticket present.
*/
return b->kdc_options.request_anonymous ||
(b->kdc_options.cname_in_addl_tkt && !b->additional_tickets);
}
/*
* return the first appropriate key of `princ' in `ret_key'. Look for
* all the etypes in (`etypes', `len'), stopping as soon as we find
* one, but preferring one that has default salt.
*
* XXX This function does way way too much. Split it up!
*
* XXX `etypes' and `len' are always `b->etype.val' and `b->etype.len' -- the
* etype list from the KDC-REQ-BODY, which is available here as
* `r->req->req_body', so we could just stop having it passed in.
*
* XXX Picking an enctype(s) for PA-ETYPE-INFO* is rather different than
* picking an enctype for a ticket's session key. The former is what we do
* here when `(flags & KFE_IS_PREAUTH)', the latter otherwise.
*/
krb5_error_code
_kdc_find_etype(astgs_request_t r, uint32_t flags,
krb5_enctype *etypes, unsigned len,
krb5_enctype *ret_enctype, Key **ret_key,
krb5_boolean *ret_default_salt)
{
krb5_boolean use_strongest_session_key;
krb5_boolean is_preauth = flags & KFE_IS_PREAUTH;
krb5_boolean is_tgs = flags & KFE_IS_TGS;
hdb_entry *princ;
krb5_principal request_princ;
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_salt def_salt;
krb5_enctype enctype = ETYPE_NULL;
const krb5_enctype *p;
Key *key = NULL;
size_t i, k, m;
if (is_preauth && (flags & KFE_USE_CLIENT) &&
r->client->flags.synthetic)
return KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
if ((flags & KFE_USE_CLIENT) && !r->client->flags.synthetic) {
princ = r->client;
request_princ = r->client_princ;
} else {
princ = r->server;
request_princ = r->server->principal;
}
use_strongest_session_key =
is_preauth ? r->config->preauth_use_strongest_session_key
: (is_tgs ? r->config->tgt_use_strongest_session_key :
r->config->svc_use_strongest_session_key);
/* We'll want to avoid keys with v4 salted keys in the pre-auth case... */
ret = krb5_get_pw_salt(r->context, request_princ, &def_salt);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
/*
* Pick an enctype that is in the intersection of:
*
* - permitted_enctypes (local policy)
* - requested enctypes (KDC-REQ-BODY's etype list)
* - the client's long-term keys' enctypes
* OR
* the server's configured etype list
*
* There are two sub-cases:
*
* - use local enctype preference (local policy)
* - use the client's preference list
*/
if (use_strongest_session_key) {
/*
* Pick the strongest key that the KDC, target service, and
* client all support, using the local cryptosystem enctype
* list in strongest-to-weakest order to drive the search.
*
* This is not what RFC4120 says to do, but it encourages
* adoption of stronger enctypes. This doesn't play well with
* clients that have multiple Kerberos client implementations
* with different supported enctype lists sharing the same ccache.
*/
/* drive the search with local supported enctypes list */
p = krb5_kerberos_enctypes(r->context);
for (i = 0;
p[i] != ETYPE_NULL && enctype == ETYPE_NULL;
i++) {
if (krb5_enctype_valid(r->context, p[i]) != 0 &&
!_kdc_is_weak_exception(princ->principal, p[i]))
continue;
/* check that the client supports it too */
for (k = 0; k < len && enctype == ETYPE_NULL; k++) {
if (p[i] != etypes[k])
continue;
if (!is_preauth && (flags & KFE_USE_CLIENT)) {
/*
* It suffices that the client says it supports this
* enctype in its KDC-REQ-BODY's etype list, which is what
* `etypes' is here.
*/
enctype = p[i];
ret = 0;
break;
}
/* check target princ support */
key = NULL;
if (!is_preauth && !(flags & KFE_USE_CLIENT) && princ->etypes) {
/*
* Use the etypes list from the server's HDB entry instead
* of deriving it from its long-term keys. This allows an
* entry to have just one long-term key but record support
* for multiple enctypes.
*/
for (m = 0; m < princ->etypes->len; m++) {
if (p[i] == princ->etypes->val[m]) {
enctype = p[i];
ret = 0;
break;
}
}
} else {
/*
* Use the entry's long-term keys as the source of its
* supported enctypes, either because we're making
* PA-ETYPE-INFO* or because we're selecting a session key
* enctype.
*/
while (hdb_next_enctype2key(r->context, princ, NULL,
p[i], &key) == 0) {
if (key->key.keyvalue.length == 0) {
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_NULL_KEY;
continue;
}
enctype = p[i];
ret = 0;
if (is_preauth && ret_key != NULL &&
!is_good_salt_p(&def_salt, key))
continue;
}
}
}
}
} else {
/*
* Pick the first key from the client's enctype list that is
* supported by the cryptosystem and by the given principal.
*
* RFC4120 says we SHOULD pick the first _strong_ key from the
* client's list... not the first key... If the admin disallows
* weak enctypes in krb5.conf and selects this key selection
* algorithm, then we get exactly what RFC4120 says.
*/
for(i = 0; ret != 0 && i < len; i++) {
if (krb5_enctype_valid(r->context, etypes[i]) != 0 &&
!_kdc_is_weak_exception(princ->principal, etypes[i]))
continue;
key = NULL;
while (ret != 0 &&
hdb_next_enctype2key(r->context, princ, NULL,
etypes[i], &key) == 0) {
if (key->key.keyvalue.length == 0) {
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_NULL_KEY;
continue;
}
enctype = etypes[i];
ret = 0;
if (is_preauth && ret_key != NULL &&
!is_good_salt_p(&def_salt, key))
continue;
}
}
}
if (ret == 0 && enctype == ETYPE_NULL) {
/*
* if the service principal is one for which there is a known 1DES
* exception and no other enctype matches both the client request and
* the service key list, provide a DES-CBC-CRC key.
*/
if (ret_key == NULL &&
_kdc_is_weak_exception(princ->principal, ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC)) {
ret = 0;
enctype = ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC;
} else {
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
}
}
if (ret == 0) {
if (ret_enctype != NULL)
*ret_enctype = enctype;
if (ret_key != NULL)
*ret_key = key;
if (ret_default_salt != NULL)
*ret_default_salt = is_default_salt_p(&def_salt, key);
}
krb5_free_salt (r->context, def_salt);
return ret;
}
/*
* The principal's session_etypes must be sorted in order of strength, with
* preferred etype first.
*/
krb5_error_code
_kdc_find_session_etype(astgs_request_t r,
krb5_enctype *etypes, size_t len,
const hdb_entry *princ,
krb5_enctype *ret_enctype)
{
size_t i;
if (princ->session_etypes == NULL) {
/* The principal must have session etypes available. */
return KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
}
/* Loop over the client's specified etypes. */
for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) {
size_t j;
/* Check that the server also supports the etype. */
for (j = 0; j < princ->session_etypes->len; ++j) {
if (princ->session_etypes->val[j] == etypes[i]) {
*ret_enctype = etypes[i];
return 0;
}
}
}
return KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
}
krb5_error_code
_kdc_make_anonymous_principalname (PrincipalName *pn)
{
pn->name_type = KRB5_NT_WELLKNOWN;
pn->name_string.len = 2;
pn->name_string.val = calloc(2, sizeof(*pn->name_string.val));
if (pn->name_string.val == NULL)
goto failed;
pn->name_string.val[0] = strdup(KRB5_WELLKNOWN_NAME);
if (pn->name_string.val[0] == NULL)
goto failed;
pn->name_string.val[1] = strdup(KRB5_ANON_NAME);
if (pn->name_string.val[1] == NULL)
goto failed;
return 0;
failed:
free_PrincipalName(pn);
pn->name_type = KRB5_NT_UNKNOWN;
pn->name_string.len = 0;
pn->name_string.val = NULL;
return ENOMEM;
}
static void
_kdc_r_log(astgs_request_t r, int level, const char *fmt, ...)
__attribute__ ((__format__ (__printf__, 3, 4)))
{
va_list ap;
char *s;
va_start(ap, fmt);
s = kdc_log_msg_va(r->context, r->config, level, fmt, ap);
if(s) free(s);
va_end(ap);
}
void
_kdc_set_const_e_text(astgs_request_t r, const char *e_text)
{
/* We should never see this */
if (r->e_text) {
kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 1,
"trying to replace e-text \"%s\" with \"%s\"\n",
r->e_text, e_text);
return;
}
r->e_text = e_text;
kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 4, "%s", e_text);
}
void
_kdc_set_e_text(astgs_request_t r, const char *fmt, ...)
__attribute__ ((__format__ (__printf__, 2, 3)))
{
va_list ap;
char *e_text = NULL;
int vasprintf_ret;
va_start(ap, fmt);
vasprintf_ret = vasprintf(&e_text, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
if (vasprintf_ret < 0 || !e_text) {
/* not much else to do... */
kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 1,
"Could not set e_text: %s (out of memory)", fmt);
return;
}
/* We should never see this */
if (r->e_text) {
kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 1, "trying to replace e-text: %s\n",
e_text);
free(e_text);
return;
}
r->e_text = e_text;
r->e_text_buf = e_text;
kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 4, "%s", e_text);
}
void
_kdc_log_timestamp(astgs_request_t r, const char *type,
KerberosTime authtime, KerberosTime *starttime,
KerberosTime endtime, KerberosTime *renew_till)
{
krb5_kdc_configuration *config = r->config;
char authtime_str[100], starttime_str[100],
endtime_str[100], renewtime_str[100];
if (authtime)
kdc_audit_setkv_number((kdc_request_t)r, "auth", authtime);
if (starttime && *starttime)
kdc_audit_setkv_number((kdc_request_t)r, "start", *starttime);
if (endtime)
kdc_audit_setkv_number((kdc_request_t)r, "end", endtime);
if (renew_till && *renew_till)
kdc_audit_setkv_number((kdc_request_t)r, "renew", *renew_till);
krb5_format_time(r->context, authtime,
authtime_str, sizeof(authtime_str), TRUE);
if (starttime)
krb5_format_time(r->context, *starttime,
starttime_str, sizeof(starttime_str), TRUE);
else
strlcpy(starttime_str, "unset", sizeof(starttime_str));
krb5_format_time(r->context, endtime,
endtime_str, sizeof(endtime_str), TRUE);
if (renew_till)
krb5_format_time(r->context, *renew_till,
renewtime_str, sizeof(renewtime_str), TRUE);
else
strlcpy(renewtime_str, "unset", sizeof(renewtime_str));
kdc_log(r->context, config, 4,
"%s authtime: %s starttime: %s endtime: %s renew till: %s",
type, authtime_str, starttime_str, endtime_str, renewtime_str);
}
/*
*
*/
#ifdef PKINIT
static krb5_error_code
pa_pkinit_validate(astgs_request_t r, const PA_DATA *pa)
{
pk_client_params *pkp = NULL;
char *client_cert = NULL;
krb5_error_code ret;
ret = _kdc_pk_rd_padata(r, pa, &pkp);
if (ret || pkp == NULL) {
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
_kdc_r_log(r, 4, "Failed to decode PKINIT PA-DATA -- %s",
r->cname);
goto out;
}
ret = _kdc_pk_check_client(r, pkp, &client_cert);
if (client_cert)
kdc_audit_addkv((kdc_request_t)r, 0, KDC_REQUEST_KV_PKINIT_CLIENT_CERT,
"%s", client_cert);
if (ret) {
_kdc_set_e_text(r, "PKINIT certificate not allowed to "
"impersonate principal");
kdc_audit_setkv_number((kdc_request_t)r, KDC_REQUEST_KV_AUTH_EVENT,
KDC_AUTH_EVENT_CLIENT_NAME_UNAUTHORIZED);
goto out;
}
r->pa_endtime = _kdc_pk_endtime(pkp);
if (!r->client->flags.synthetic)
r->pa_max_life = _kdc_pk_max_life(pkp);
_kdc_r_log(r, 4, "PKINIT pre-authentication succeeded -- %s using %s",
r->cname, client_cert);
ret = _kdc_pk_mk_pa_reply(r, pkp);
if (ret) {
_kdc_set_e_text(r, "Failed to build PK-INIT reply");
goto out;
}
ret = _kdc_add_initial_verified_cas(r->context, r->config,
pkp, &r->et);
kdc_audit_setkv_number((kdc_request_t)r, KDC_REQUEST_KV_AUTH_EVENT,
KDC_AUTH_EVENT_PREAUTH_SUCCEEDED);
out:
if (pkp)
_kdc_pk_free_client_param(r->context, pkp);
free(client_cert);
return ret;
}
#endif /* PKINIT */
static krb5_error_code
pa_gss_validate(astgs_request_t r, const PA_DATA *pa)
{
gss_client_params *gcp = NULL;
char *client_name = NULL;
krb5_error_code ret;
int open = 0;
ret = _kdc_gss_rd_padata(r, pa, &gcp, &open);
if (ret && gcp == NULL)
return ret;
if (open) {
ret = _kdc_gss_check_client(r, gcp, &client_name);
if (client_name)
kdc_audit_addkv((kdc_request_t)r, 0, KDC_REQUEST_KV_GSS_INITIATOR,
"%s", client_name);
if (ret) {
_kdc_set_e_text(r, "GSS-API client not allowed to "
"impersonate principal");
kdc_audit_setkv_number((kdc_request_t)r, KDC_REQUEST_KV_AUTH_EVENT,
KDC_AUTH_EVENT_CLIENT_NAME_UNAUTHORIZED);
goto out;
}
r->pa_endtime = _kdc_gss_endtime(r, gcp);
_kdc_r_log(r, 4, "GSS pre-authentication succeeded -- %s using %s",
r->cname, client_name);
kdc_audit_setkv_number((kdc_request_t)r, KDC_REQUEST_KV_AUTH_EVENT,
KDC_AUTH_EVENT_PREAUTH_SUCCEEDED);
ret = _kdc_gss_mk_composite_name_ad(r, gcp);
if (ret) {
_kdc_set_e_text(r, "Failed to build GSS authorization data");
goto out;
}
}
ret = _kdc_gss_mk_pa_reply(r, gcp);
if (ret) {
if (ret != KRB5_KDC_ERR_MORE_PREAUTH_DATA_REQUIRED)
_kdc_set_e_text(r, "Failed to build GSS pre-authentication reply");
goto out;
}
ret = kdc_request_set_attribute((kdc_request_t)r,
HSTR("org.h5l.pa-gss-client-params"), gcp);
if (ret)
goto out;
out:
kdc_object_release(gcp);
free(client_name);
return ret;
}
static krb5_error_code
pa_gss_finalize_pac(astgs_request_t r)
{
gss_client_params *gcp;
gcp = kdc_request_get_attribute((kdc_request_t)r, HSTR("org.h5l.pa-gss-client-params"));
heim_assert(gcp != NULL, "invalid GSS-API client params");
return _kdc_gss_finalize_pac(r, gcp);
}
static krb5_error_code
pa_enc_chal_validate(astgs_request_t r, const PA_DATA *pa)
{
krb5_data pepper1, pepper2;
int invalidPassword = 0;
EncryptedData enc_data;
krb5_enctype aenctype;
krb5_error_code ret;
struct Key *k;
size_t size;
int i;
heim_assert(r->armor_crypto != NULL, "ENC-CHAL called for non FAST");
if (_kdc_is_anon_request(&r->req)) {
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 4, "ENC-CHALL doesn't support anon");
return ret;
}
if (r->client->flags.locked_out) {
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED;
kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 0,
"Client (%s) is locked out", r->cname);
kdc_audit_setkv_number((kdc_request_t)r, KDC_REQUEST_KV_AUTH_EVENT,
KDC_AUTH_EVENT_CLIENT_LOCKED_OUT);
return ret;
}
ret = decode_EncryptedData(pa->padata_value.data,
pa->padata_value.length,
&enc_data,
&size);
if (ret) {
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
_kdc_r_log(r, 4, "Failed to decode PA-DATA -- %s",
r->cname);
return ret;
}
pepper1.data = "clientchallengearmor";
pepper1.length = strlen(pepper1.data);
pepper2.data = "challengelongterm";
pepper2.length = strlen(pepper2.data);
krb5_crypto_getenctype(r->context, r->armor_crypto, &aenctype);
kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 5, "FAST armor enctype is: %d", (int)aenctype);
for (i = 0; i < r->client->keys.len; i++) {
krb5_crypto challengecrypto, longtermcrypto;
krb5_keyblock challengekey;
k = &r->client->keys.val[i];
ret = krb5_crypto_init(r->context, &k->key, 0, &longtermcrypto);
if (ret)
continue;
ret = krb5_crypto_fx_cf2(r->context, r->armor_crypto, longtermcrypto,
&pepper1, &pepper2, aenctype,
&challengekey);
if (ret) {
krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, longtermcrypto);
continue;
}
ret = krb5_crypto_init(r->context, &challengekey, 0,
&challengecrypto);
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r->context, &challengekey);
if (ret) {
krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, longtermcrypto);
continue;
}
ret = _krb5_validate_pa_enc_challenge(r->context,
challengecrypto,
KRB5_KU_ENC_CHALLENGE_CLIENT,
&enc_data,
r->cname);
krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, challengecrypto);
if (ret) {
const char *msg;
krb5_error_code ret2;
char *str = NULL;
krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, longtermcrypto);
invalidPassword = (ret == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY);
if (!invalidPassword) {
goto out;
}
ret2 = krb5_enctype_to_string(r->context, k->key.keytype, &str);
if (ret2)
str = NULL;
msg = krb5_get_error_message(r->context, ret);
_kdc_r_log(r, 2, "Failed to decrypt ENC-CHAL -- %s "
"(enctype %s) error %s",
r->cname, str ? str : "unknown enctype", msg);
krb5_free_error_message(r->context, msg);
free(str);
continue;
}
/*
* Found a key that the client used, lets pick that as the reply key
*/
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r->context, &r->reply_key);
ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(r->context, &k->key, &r->reply_key);
if (ret) {
krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, longtermcrypto);
goto out;
}
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r->context, &challengekey);
/*
* Provide KDC authentication to the client, uses a different
* challenge key (different pepper).
*/
pepper1.data = "kdcchallengearmor";
pepper1.length = strlen(pepper1.data);
ret = krb5_crypto_fx_cf2(r->context, r->armor_crypto, longtermcrypto,
&pepper1, &pepper2, aenctype,
&challengekey);
krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, longtermcrypto);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = krb5_crypto_init(r->context, &challengekey, 0, &challengecrypto);
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r->context, &challengekey);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = _krb5_make_pa_enc_challenge(r->context, challengecrypto,
KRB5_KU_ENC_CHALLENGE_KDC,
r->rep.padata);
krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, challengecrypto);
if (ret)
goto out;
if (ret == 0)
ret = set_salt_padata(r->context, r->config,
r->rep.padata, k);
/*
* Success
*/
kdc_audit_setkv_number((kdc_request_t)r, KDC_REQUEST_KV_AUTH_EVENT,
KDC_AUTH_EVENT_VALIDATED_LONG_TERM_KEY);
goto out;
}
if (invalidPassword) {
kdc_audit_setkv_number((kdc_request_t)r, KDC_REQUEST_KV_AUTH_EVENT,
KDC_AUTH_EVENT_WRONG_LONG_TERM_KEY);
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
} else {
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
}
out:
free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
return ret;
}
static krb5_error_code
pa_enc_ts_validate(astgs_request_t r, const PA_DATA *pa)
{
EncryptedData enc_data;
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_crypto crypto;
krb5_data ts_data;
PA_ENC_TS_ENC p;
size_t len;
Key *pa_key;
char *str;
if (r->armor_crypto && !r->config->enable_armored_pa_enc_timestamp) {
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 0,
"Armored encrypted timestamp pre-authentication is disabled");
return ret;
} else if (!r->armor_crypto && !r->config->enable_unarmored_pa_enc_timestamp) {
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 0,
"Unarmored encrypted timestamp pre-authentication is disabled");
return ret;
}
if (r->client->flags.locked_out) {
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED;
kdc_log(r->context, r->config, 0,
"Client (%s) is locked out", r->cname);
kdc_audit_setkv_number((kdc_request_t)r, KDC_REQUEST_KV_AUTH_EVENT,
KDC_AUTH_EVENT_CLIENT_LOCKED_OUT);
return ret;
}
ret = decode_EncryptedData(pa->padata_value.data,
pa->padata_value.length,
&enc_data,
&len);
if (ret) {
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
_kdc_r_log(r, 4, "Failed to decode PA-DATA -- %s",
r->cname);
goto out;
}
ret = hdb_enctype2key(r->context, r->client, NULL,
enc_data.etype, &pa_key);
if(ret){
char *estr;
_kdc_set_e_text(r, "No key matching entype");
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
if(krb5_enctype_to_string(r->context, enc_data.etype, &estr))
estr = NULL;
if(estr == NULL)
_kdc_r_log(r, 4,
"No client key matching pa-data (%d) -- %s",
enc_data.etype, r->cname);
else
_kdc_r_log(r, 4,
"No client key matching pa-data (%s) -- %s",
estr, r->cname);
free(estr);
free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
goto out;
}
try_next_key:
ret = krb5_crypto_init(r->context, &pa_key->key, 0, &crypto);
if (ret) {
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(r->context, ret);
_kdc_r_log(r, 4, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
krb5_free_error_message(r->context, msg);
free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
goto out;
}
ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData (r->context,
crypto,
KRB5_KU_PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP,
&enc_data,
&ts_data);
krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, crypto);
/*
* Since the user might have several keys with the same
* enctype but with diffrent salting, we need to try all
* the keys with the same enctype.
*/
if(ret){
krb5_error_code ret2;
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(r->context, ret);
ret2 = krb5_enctype_to_string(r->context,
pa_key->key.keytype, &str);
if (ret2)
str = NULL;
_kdc_r_log(r, 2, "Failed to decrypt PA-DATA -- %s "
"(enctype %s) error %s",
r->cname, str ? str : "unknown enctype", msg);
krb5_xfree(str);
krb5_free_error_message(r->context, msg);
kdc_audit_setkv_number((kdc_request_t)r, KDC_REQUEST_KV_PA_ETYPE,
pa_key->key.keytype);
kdc_audit_setkv_number((kdc_request_t)r, KDC_REQUEST_KV_AUTH_EVENT,
KDC_AUTH_EVENT_WRONG_LONG_TERM_KEY);
if(hdb_next_enctype2key(r->context, r->client, NULL,
enc_data.etype, &pa_key) == 0)
goto try_next_key;
free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
goto out;
}
free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
ret = decode_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(ts_data.data,
ts_data.length,
&p,
&len);
krb5_data_free(&ts_data);
if(ret){
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
_kdc_r_log(r, 4, "Failed to decode PA-ENC-TS_ENC -- %s",
r->cname);
goto out;
}
if (labs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp) > r->context->max_skew) {
char client_time[100];
krb5_format_time(r->context, p.patimestamp,
client_time, sizeof(client_time), TRUE);
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW;
_kdc_r_log(r, 4, "Too large time skew, "
"client time %s is out by %u > %u seconds -- %s",
client_time,
(unsigned)labs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp),
r->context->max_skew,
r->cname);
kdc_audit_setkv_number((kdc_request_t)r, KDC_REQUEST_KV_AUTH_EVENT,
KDC_AUTH_EVENT_CLIENT_TIME_SKEW);
/*
* The following is needed to make windows clients to
* retry using the timestamp in the error message, if
* there is a e_text, they become unhappy.
*/
r->e_text = NULL;
free_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(&p);
goto out;
}
free_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(&p);
ret = set_salt_padata(r->context, r->config,
r->rep.padata, pa_key);
if (ret == 0)
ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(r->context, &pa_key->key, &r->reply_key);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(r->context, pa_key->key.keytype, &str);
if (ret)
str = NULL;
_kdc_r_log(r, 4, "ENC-TS Pre-authentication succeeded -- %s using %s",
r->cname, str ? str : "unknown enctype");
krb5_xfree(str);
kdc_audit_setkv_number((kdc_request_t)r, KDC_REQUEST_KV_PA_ETYPE,
pa_key->key.keytype);
kdc_audit_setkv_number((kdc_request_t)r, KDC_REQUEST_KV_AUTH_EVENT,
KDC_AUTH_EVENT_VALIDATED_LONG_TERM_KEY);
ret = 0;
out:
return ret;
}
struct kdc_patypes {
int type;
char *name;
unsigned int flags;
#define PA_ANNOUNCE 1
#define PA_REQ_FAST 2 /* only use inside fast */
#define PA_SYNTHETIC_OK 4
#define PA_REPLACE_REPLY_KEY 8 /* PA mech replaces reply key */
#define PA_USES_LONG_TERM_KEY 16 /* PA mech uses client's long-term key */
krb5_error_code (*validate)(astgs_request_t, const PA_DATA *pa);
krb5_error_code (*finalize_pac)(astgs_request_t r);
void (*cleanup)(astgs_request_t r);
};
static const struct kdc_patypes pat[] = {
#ifdef PKINIT
{
KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ, "PK-INIT(ietf)",
PA_ANNOUNCE | PA_SYNTHETIC_OK | PA_REPLACE_REPLY_KEY,
pa_pkinit_validate, NULL, NULL
},
{
KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_WIN, "PK-INIT(win2k)", PA_ANNOUNCE | PA_REPLACE_REPLY_KEY,
pa_pkinit_validate, NULL, NULL
},
{
KRB5_PADATA_PKINIT_KX, "Anonymous PK-INIT", PA_ANNOUNCE,
NULL, NULL, NULL
},
#else
{ KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ, "PK-INIT(ietf)", 0, NULL , NULL, NULL },
{ KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_WIN, "PK-INIT(win2k)", 0, NULL, NULL, NULL },
{ KRB5_PADATA_PKINIT_KX, "Anonymous PK-INIT", 0, NULL, NULL, NULL },
#endif
{ KRB5_PADATA_PA_PK_OCSP_RESPONSE , "OCSP", 0, NULL, NULL, NULL },
{
KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP , "ENC-TS",
PA_ANNOUNCE | PA_USES_LONG_TERM_KEY,
pa_enc_ts_validate, NULL, NULL
},
{
KRB5_PADATA_ENCRYPTED_CHALLENGE , "ENC-CHAL",
PA_ANNOUNCE | PA_USES_LONG_TERM_KEY | PA_REQ_FAST,
pa_enc_chal_validate, NULL, NULL
},
{ KRB5_PADATA_REQ_ENC_PA_REP , "REQ-ENC-PA-REP", 0, NULL, NULL, NULL },
{ KRB5_PADATA_FX_FAST, "FX-FAST", PA_ANNOUNCE, NULL, NULL, NULL },
{ KRB5_PADATA_FX_ERROR, "FX-ERROR", 0, NULL, NULL, NULL },
{ KRB5_PADATA_FX_COOKIE, "FX-COOKIE", 0, NULL, NULL, NULL },
{
KRB5_PADATA_GSS , "GSS",
PA_ANNOUNCE | PA_SYNTHETIC_OK | PA_REPLACE_REPLY_KEY,
pa_gss_validate, pa_gss_finalize_pac, NULL
},
};
static void
log_patypes(astgs_request_t r, METHOD_DATA *padata)
{
krb5_kdc_configuration *config = r->config;
struct rk_strpool *p = NULL;
char *str;
size_t n, m;
for (n = 0; n < padata->len; n++) {
for (m = 0; m < sizeof(pat) / sizeof(pat[0]); m++) {
if (padata->val[n].padata_type == pat[m].type) {
p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "%s", pat[m].name);
break;
}
}
if (m == sizeof(pat) / sizeof(pat[0]))
p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "%d", padata->val[n].padata_type);
if (p && n + 1 < padata->len)
p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", ");
if (p == NULL) {
kdc_log(r->context, config, 1, "out of memory");
return;
}
}
if (p == NULL)
p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "none");
str = rk_strpoolcollect(p);
kdc_log(r->context, config, 4, "Client sent patypes: %s", str);
kdc_audit_addkv((kdc_request_t)r, KDC_AUDIT_EATWHITE,
"client-pa", "%s", str);
free(str);
}
static krb5_boolean
pa_used_flag_isset(astgs_request_t r, unsigned int flag)
{
if (r->pa_used == NULL)
return FALSE;
return (r->pa_used->flags & flag) == flag;
}
/*
*
*/
krb5_error_code
_kdc_encode_reply(krb5_context context,
krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
astgs_request_t r, uint32_t nonce,
krb5_enctype etype,
int skvno, const EncryptionKey *skey,
int ckvno,
int rk_is_subkey,
krb5_data *reply)
{
unsigned char *buf;
size_t buf_size;
size_t len = 0;
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_crypto crypto;
KDC_REP *rep = &r->rep;
EncTicketPart *et = &r->et;
EncKDCRepPart *ek = &r->ek;
heim_assert(rep->padata != NULL, "reply padata uninitialized");
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncTicketPart, buf, buf_size, et, &len, ret);
if(ret) {
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
kdc_log(context, config, 4, "Failed to encode ticket: %s", msg);
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
return ret;
}
if(buf_size != len)
krb5_abortx(context, "Internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, skey, etype, &crypto);
if (ret) {
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
kdc_log(context, config, 4, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
free(buf);
return ret;
}
ret = krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context,
crypto,
KRB5_KU_TICKET,
buf,
len,
skvno,
&rep->ticket.enc_part);
free(buf);
krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
if(ret) {
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
kdc_log(context, config, 4, "Failed to encrypt data: %s", msg);
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
return ret;
}
if (r && r->armor_crypto) {
KrbFastFinished finished;
krb5_data data;
kdc_log(context, config, 4, "FAST armor protection");
memset(&finished, 0, sizeof(finished));
krb5_data_zero(&data);
finished.timestamp = kdc_time;
finished.usec = 0;
finished.crealm = et->crealm;
finished.cname = et->cname;
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(Ticket, data.data, data.length,
&rep->ticket, &len, ret);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (data.length != len)
krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 error");
ret = krb5_create_checksum(context, r->armor_crypto,
KRB5_KU_FAST_FINISHED, 0,
data.data, data.length,
&finished.ticket_checksum);
krb5_data_free(&data);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = _kdc_fast_mk_response(context, r->armor_crypto,
rep->padata, &r->strengthen_key, &finished,
nonce, &data);
free_Checksum(&finished.ticket_checksum);
if (ret)
return ret;
free_METHOD_DATA(r->rep.padata);
ret = krb5_padata_add(context, rep->padata,
KRB5_PADATA_FX_FAST,
data.data, data.length);
if (ret)
return ret;
/*
* Hide client name for privacy reasons
*/
if (r->fast.flags.requested_hidden_names) {
Realm anon_realm = KRB5_ANON_REALM;
free_Realm(&rep->crealm);
ret = copy_Realm(&anon_realm, &rep->crealm);
if (ret == 0) {
free_PrincipalName(&rep->cname);
ret = _kdc_make_anonymous_principalname(&rep->cname);
}
if (ret)
return ret;
}
}
if (rep->padata->len == 0) {
free_METHOD_DATA(rep->padata);
free(rep->padata);
rep->padata = NULL;
}
if(rep->msg_type == krb_as_rep && !config->encode_as_rep_as_tgs_rep)
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncASRepPart, buf, buf_size, ek, &len, ret);
else
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncTGSRepPart, buf, buf_size, ek, &len, ret);
if(ret) {
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
kdc_log(context, config, 4, "Failed to encode KDC-REP: %s", msg);
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
return ret;
}
if(buf_size != len) {
free(buf);
kdc_log(context, config, 4, "Internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
_kdc_set_e_text(r, "KDC internal error");
return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
}
ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, &r->reply_key, 0, &crypto);
if (ret) {
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
free(buf);
kdc_log(context, config, 4, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
return ret;
}
if(rep->msg_type == krb_as_rep) {
ret = krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context,
crypto,
KRB5_KU_AS_REP_ENC_PART,
buf,
len,
ckvno,
&rep->enc_part);
free(buf);
if (ret == 0)
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(AS_REP, buf, buf_size, rep, &len, ret);
} else {
ret = krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context,
crypto,
rk_is_subkey ?
KRB5_KU_TGS_REP_ENC_PART_SUB_KEY :
KRB5_KU_TGS_REP_ENC_PART_SESSION,
buf,
len,
ckvno,
&rep->enc_part);
free(buf);
if (ret == 0)
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(TGS_REP, buf, buf_size, rep, &len, ret);
}
krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
if(ret) {
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
kdc_log(context, config, 4, "Failed to encode KDC-REP: %s", msg);
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
return ret;
}
if(buf_size != len) {
free(buf);
kdc_log(context, config, 4, "Internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
_kdc_set_e_text(r, "KDC internal error");
return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
}
reply->data = buf;
reply->length = buf_size;
return 0;
}
/*
*
*/
static krb5_error_code
get_pa_etype_info(krb5_context context,
krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
METHOD_DATA *md, Key *ckey,
krb5_boolean include_salt)
{
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
ETYPE_INFO_ENTRY eie; /* do not free this one */
ETYPE_INFO ei;
PA_DATA pa;
size_t len;
/*
* Code moved here from what used to be make_etype_info_entry() because
* using the ASN.1 compiler-generated SEQUENCE OF add functions makes that
* old function's body and this one's small and clean.
*
* The following comment blocks were there:
*
* According to `the specs', we can't send a salt if we have AFS3 salted
* key, but that requires that you *know* what cell you are using (e.g by
* assuming that the cell is the same as the realm in lower case)
*
* We shouldn't sent salttype since it is incompatible with the
* specification and it breaks windows clients. The afs salting problem
* is solved by using KRB5-PADATA-AFS3-SALT implemented in Heimdal 0.7 and
* later.
*
* We return no salt type at all, as that should indicate the default salt
* type and make everybody happy. some systems (like w2k) dislike being
* told the salt type here.
*/
pa.padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_ETYPE_INFO;
pa.padata_value.data = NULL;
pa.padata_value.length = 0;
ei.len = 0;
ei.val = NULL;
eie.etype = ckey->key.keytype;
eie.salttype = NULL;
eie.salt = NULL;
if (include_salt && ckey->salt)
eie.salt = &ckey->salt->salt;
ret = add_ETYPE_INFO(&ei, &eie);
if (ret == 0)
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(ETYPE_INFO, pa.padata_value.data, pa.padata_value.length,
&ei, &len, ret);
if (ret == 0)
add_METHOD_DATA(md, &pa);
free_ETYPE_INFO(&ei);
free_PA_DATA(&pa);
return ret;
}
/*
*
*/
extern int _krb5_AES_SHA1_string_to_default_iterator;
extern int _krb5_AES_SHA2_string_to_default_iterator;
static krb5_error_code
make_s2kparams(int value, size_t len, krb5_data **ps2kparams)
{
krb5_data *s2kparams;
krb5_error_code ret;
ALLOC(s2kparams);
if (s2kparams == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
ret = krb5_data_alloc(s2kparams, len);
if (ret) {
free(s2kparams);
return ret;
}
_krb5_put_int(s2kparams->data, value, len);
*ps2kparams = s2kparams;
return 0;
}
static krb5_error_code
make_etype_info2_entry(ETYPE_INFO2_ENTRY *ent,
Key *key,
krb5_boolean include_salt)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
ent->etype = key->key.keytype;
if (key->salt && include_salt) {
ALLOC(ent->salt);
if (ent->salt == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
*ent->salt = malloc(key->salt->salt.length + 1);
if (*ent->salt == NULL) {
free(ent->salt);
ent->salt = NULL;
return ENOMEM;
}
memcpy(*ent->salt, key->salt->salt.data, key->salt->salt.length);
(*ent->salt)[key->salt->salt.length] = '\0';
} else
ent->salt = NULL;
ent->s2kparams = NULL;
switch (key->key.keytype) {
case ETYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
case ETYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
ret = make_s2kparams(_krb5_AES_SHA1_string_to_default_iterator,
4, &ent->s2kparams);
break;
case KRB5_ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA256_128:
case KRB5_ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA384_192:
ret = make_s2kparams(_krb5_AES_SHA2_string_to_default_iterator,
4, &ent->s2kparams);
break;
case ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4:
case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
/* Check if this was a AFS3 salted key */
if(key->salt && key->salt->type == hdb_afs3_salt)
ret = make_s2kparams(1, 1, &ent->s2kparams);
else
ret = 0;
break;
default:
ret = 0;
break;
}
return ret;
}
/*
* Return an ETYPE-INFO2. Enctypes are storted the same way as in the
* database (client supported enctypes first, then the unsupported
* enctypes).
*/
static krb5_error_code
get_pa_etype_info2(krb5_context context,
krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
METHOD_DATA *md, Key *ckey,
krb5_boolean include_salt)
{
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
ETYPE_INFO2 pa;
unsigned char *buf;
size_t len;
pa.len = 1;
pa.val = calloc(1, sizeof(pa.val[0]));
if(pa.val == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
ret = make_etype_info2_entry(&pa.val[0], ckey, include_salt);
if (ret) {
free_ETYPE_INFO2(&pa);
return ret;
}
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(ETYPE_INFO2, buf, len, &pa, &len, ret);
free_ETYPE_INFO2(&pa);
if(ret)
return ret;
ret = realloc_method_data(md);
if(ret) {
free(buf);
return ret;
}
md->val[md->len - 1].padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_ETYPE_INFO2;
md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value.length = len;
md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value.data = buf;
return 0;
}
/*
* Return 0 if the client have only older enctypes, this is for
* determining if the server should send ETYPE_INFO2 or not.
*/
static int
newer_enctype_present(krb5_context context,
struct KDC_REQ_BODY_etype *etype_list)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < etype_list->len; i++) {
if (!krb5_is_enctype_old(context, etype_list->val[i]))
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
static krb5_error_code
get_pa_etype_info_both(krb5_context context,
krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
struct KDC_REQ_BODY_etype *etype_list,
METHOD_DATA *md, Key *ckey,
krb5_boolean include_salt)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
/*
* Windows 2019 (and earlier versions) always sends the salt
* and Samba has testsuites that check this behaviour, so a
* Samba AD DC will set this flag to match the AS-REP packet
* more closely.
*/
if (config->force_include_pa_etype_salt)
include_salt = TRUE;
/*
* RFC4120 requires:
* When the AS server is to include pre-authentication data in a
* KRB-ERROR or in an AS-REP, it MUST use PA-ETYPE-INFO2, not
* PA-ETYPE-INFO, if the etype field of the client's AS-REQ lists
* at least one "newer" encryption type. Otherwise (when the etype
* field of the client's AS-REQ does not list any "newer" encryption
* types), it MUST send both PA-ETYPE-INFO2 and PA-ETYPE-INFO (both
* with an entry for each enctype). A "newer" enctype is any enctype
* first officially specified concurrently with or subsequent to the
* issue of this RFC. The enctypes DES, 3DES, or RC4 and any defined
* in [RFC1510] are not "newer" enctypes.
*
* It goes on to state:
* The preferred ordering of the "hint" pre-authentication data that
* affect client key selection is: ETYPE-INFO2, followed by ETYPE-INFO,
* followed by PW-SALT. As noted in Section 3.1.3, a KDC MUST NOT send
* ETYPE-INFO or PW-SALT when the client's AS-REQ includes at least one
* "newer" etype.
*/
ret = get_pa_etype_info2(context, config, md, ckey, include_salt);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (!newer_enctype_present(context, etype_list))
ret = get_pa_etype_info(context, config, md, ckey, include_salt);
return ret;
}
/*
*
*/
void
_log_astgs_req(astgs_request_t r, krb5_enctype setype)
{
const KDC_REQ_BODY *b = &r->req.req_body;
krb5_enctype cetype = r->reply_key.keytype;
krb5_error_code ret;
struct rk_strpool *p;
struct rk_strpool *s = NULL;
char *str;
char *cet;
char *set;
size_t i;
/*
* we are collecting ``p'' and ``s''. The former is a textual
* representation of the enctypes as strings which will be used
* for debugging. The latter is a terse comma separated list of
* the %d's of the enctypes to emit into our audit trail to
* conserve space in the logs.
*/
p = rk_strpoolprintf(NULL, "%s", "Client supported enctypes: ");
for (i = 0; i < b->etype.len; i++) {
ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(r->context, b->etype.val[i], &str);
if (ret == 0) {
p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "%s", str);
free(str);
} else
p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "%d", b->etype.val[i]);
if (p == NULL) {
rk_strpoolfree(s);
_kdc_r_log(r, 4, "out of memory");
return;
}
s = rk_strpoolprintf(s, "%d", b->etype.val[i]);
if (i + 1 < b->etype.len) {
p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", ");
s = rk_strpoolprintf(s, ",");
}
}
if (p == NULL)
p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "no encryption types");
str = rk_strpoolcollect(s);
if (str)
kdc_audit_addkv((kdc_request_t)r, KDC_AUDIT_EATWHITE, "etypes", "%s",
str);
free(str);
ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(r->context, cetype, &cet);
if(ret == 0) {
ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(r->context, setype, &set);
if (ret == 0) {
p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", using %s/%s", cet, set);
free(set);
}
free(cet);
}
if (ret != 0)
p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", using enctypes %d/%d",
cetype, setype);
str = rk_strpoolcollect(p);
if (str)
_kdc_r_log(r, 4, "%s", str);
free(str);
kdc_audit_addkv((kdc_request_t)r, 0, "etype", "%d/%d", cetype, setype);
{
char fixedstr[128];
int result;
result = unparse_flags(KDCOptions2int(b->kdc_options), asn1_KDCOptions_units(),
fixedstr, sizeof(fixedstr));
if (result > 0) {
_kdc_r_log(r, 4, "Requested flags: %s", fixedstr);
kdc_audit_addkv((kdc_request_t)r, KDC_AUDIT_EATWHITE,
"flags", "%s", fixedstr);
}
}
}
/*
* verify the flags on `client' and `server', returning 0
* if they are OK and generating an error messages and returning
* and error code otherwise.
*/
KDC_LIB_FUNCTION krb5_error_code KDC_LIB_CALL
kdc_check_flags(astgs_request_t r,
krb5_boolean is_as_req,
hdb_entry *client,
hdb_entry *server)
{
if (client != NULL) {
/* check client */
if (client->flags.locked_out) {
kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)r, "Client is locked out");
return KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED;
}
if (client->flags.invalid) {
kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)r,
"Client has invalid bit set");
return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
}
if (!client->flags.client) {
kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)r,
"Principal may not act as client");
return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
}
if (client->valid_start && *client->valid_start > kdc_time) {
char starttime_str[100];
krb5_format_time(r->context, *client->valid_start,
starttime_str, sizeof(starttime_str), TRUE);
kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)r, "Client not yet valid "
"until %s", starttime_str);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET;
}
if (client->valid_end && *client->valid_end < kdc_time) {
char endtime_str[100];
krb5_format_time(r->context, *client->valid_end,
endtime_str, sizeof(endtime_str), TRUE);
kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)r, "Client expired at %s",
endtime_str);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_NAME_EXP;
}
if (client->flags.require_pwchange &&
(server == NULL || !server->flags.change_pw))
return KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED;
if (client->pw_end && *client->pw_end < kdc_time
&& (server == NULL || !server->flags.change_pw)) {
char pwend_str[100];
krb5_format_time(r->context, *client->pw_end,
pwend_str, sizeof(pwend_str), TRUE);
kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)r, "Client's key has expired "
"at %s", pwend_str);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED;
}
}
/* check server */
if (server != NULL) {
if (server->flags.locked_out) {
kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)r, "Server locked out");
return KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVICE_REVOKED;
}
if (server->flags.invalid) {
kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)r,
"Server has invalid flag set");
return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
}
if (!server->flags.server) {
kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)r,
"Principal may not act as server");
return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
}
if (!is_as_req && server->flags.initial) {
kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)r,
"AS-REQ is required for server");
return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
}
if (server->valid_start && *server->valid_start > kdc_time) {
char starttime_str[100];
krb5_format_time(r->context, *server->valid_start,
starttime_str, sizeof(starttime_str), TRUE);
kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)r, "Server not yet valid "
"until %s", starttime_str);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVICE_NOTYET;
}
if (server->valid_end && *server->valid_end < kdc_time) {
char endtime_str[100];
krb5_format_time(r->context, *server->valid_end,
endtime_str, sizeof(endtime_str), TRUE);
kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)r, "Server expired at %s",
endtime_str);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVICE_EXP;
}
if (server->pw_end && *server->pw_end < kdc_time) {
char pwend_str[100];
krb5_format_time(r->context, *server->pw_end,
pwend_str, sizeof(pwend_str), TRUE);
kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)r, "Server's key has expired "
"at %s", pwend_str);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED;
}
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Return TRUE if `from' is part of `addresses' taking into consideration
* the configuration variables that tells us how strict we should be about
* these checks
*/
krb5_boolean
_kdc_check_addresses(astgs_request_t r, HostAddresses *addresses,
const struct sockaddr *from)
{
krb5_kdc_configuration *config = r->config;
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_address addr;
krb5_boolean result;
krb5_boolean only_netbios = TRUE;
size_t i;
if (!config->check_ticket_addresses && !config->warn_ticket_addresses)
return TRUE;
/*
* Fields of HostAddresses type are always OPTIONAL and should be non-
* empty, but we check for empty just in case as our compiler doesn't
* support size constraints on SEQUENCE OF.
*/
if (addresses == NULL || addresses->len == 0)
return config->allow_null_ticket_addresses;
for (i = 0; i < addresses->len; ++i) {
if (addresses->val[i].addr_type != KRB5_ADDRESS_NETBIOS) {
only_netbios = FALSE;
}
}
/* Windows sends it's netbios name, which I can only assume is
* used for the 'allowed workstations' check. This is painful,
* but we still want to check IP addresses if they happen to be
* present.
*/
if(only_netbios)
return config->allow_null_ticket_addresses;
ret = krb5_sockaddr2address (r->context, from, &addr);
if(ret)
return FALSE;
result = krb5_address_search(r->context, &addr, addresses);
krb5_free_address (r->context, &addr);
return result;
}
/*
*
*/
krb5_error_code
_kdc_check_anon_policy(astgs_request_t r)
{
if (!r->config->allow_anonymous) {
kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)r,
"Anonymous tickets denied by local policy");
return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Determine whether the client requested a PAC be included
* or excluded explictly, or whether it doesn't care.
*/
static uint64_t
get_pac_attributes(krb5_context context, KDC_REQ *req)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
PA_PAC_REQUEST pacreq;
const PA_DATA *pa;
int i = 0;
uint32_t pac_attributes;
pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_PA_PAC_REQUEST);
if (pa == NULL)
return KRB5_PAC_WAS_GIVEN_IMPLICITLY;
ret = decode_PA_PAC_REQUEST(pa->padata_value.data,
pa->padata_value.length,
&pacreq,
NULL);
if (ret)
return KRB5_PAC_WAS_GIVEN_IMPLICITLY;
pac_attributes = pacreq.include_pac ? KRB5_PAC_WAS_REQUESTED : 0;
free_PA_PAC_REQUEST(&pacreq);
return pac_attributes;
}
/*
*
*/
static krb5_error_code
generate_pac(astgs_request_t r, const Key *skey, const Key *tkey,
krb5_boolean is_tgs)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_data data;
uint16_t rodc_id;
krb5_principal client;
krb5_const_principal canon_princ = NULL;
r->pac_attributes = get_pac_attributes(r->context, &r->req);
kdc_audit_setkv_number((kdc_request_t)r, "pac_attributes",
r->pac_attributes);
if (!is_tgs && !(r->pac_attributes & (KRB5_PAC_WAS_REQUESTED | KRB5_PAC_WAS_GIVEN_IMPLICITLY)))
return 0;
/*
* When a PA mech does not use the client's long-term key, the PAC
* may include the client's long-term key (encrypted in the reply key)
* for use by other shared secret authentication protocols, e.g. NTLM.
* Validate a PA mech was actually used before doing this.
*/
ret = _kdc_pac_generate(r,
r->client,
r->server,
r->pa_used && !pa_used_flag_isset(r, PA_USES_LONG_TERM_KEY)
? &r->reply_key : NULL,
r->pac_attributes,
&r->pac);
if (ret) {
_kdc_r_log(r, 4, "PAC generation failed for -- %s",
r->cname);
return ret;
}
if (r->pac == NULL)
return 0;
rodc_id = r->server->kvno >> 16;
/* libkrb5 expects ticket and PAC client names to match */
ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(r->context, &client,
r->et.cname, r->et.crealm);
if (ret)
return ret;
/*
* Include the canonical name of the principal in the authorization
* data, if the realms match (if they don't, then the KDC could
* impersonate any realm. Windows always canonicalizes the realm,
* but Heimdal permits aliases between realms.)
*/
if (krb5_realm_compare(r->context, client, r->canon_client_princ)) {
char *cpn = NULL;
canon_princ = r->canon_client_princ;
(void) krb5_unparse_name(r->context, canon_princ, &cpn);
kdc_audit_addkv((kdc_request_t)r, 0, "canon_client_name", "%s",
cpn ? cpn : "<unknown>");
krb5_xfree(cpn);
}
if (r->pa_used && r->pa_used->finalize_pac) {
ret = r->pa_used->finalize_pac(r);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
ret = _krb5_pac_sign(r->context,
r->pac,
r->et.authtime,
client,
&skey->key, /* Server key */
&tkey->key, /* TGS key */
rodc_id,
NULL, /* UPN */
canon_princ,
false, /* add_full_sig */
is_tgs ? &r->pac_attributes : NULL,
&data);
krb5_free_principal(r->context, client);
krb5_pac_free(r->context, r->pac);
r->pac = NULL;
if (ret) {
_kdc_r_log(r, 4, "PAC signing failed for -- %s",
r->cname);
return ret;
}
ret = _kdc_tkt_insert_pac(r->context, &r->et, &data);
krb5_data_free(&data);
return ret;
}
/*
*
*/
krb5_boolean
_kdc_is_anonymous(krb5_context context, krb5_const_principal principal)
{
return krb5_principal_is_anonymous(context, principal, KRB5_ANON_MATCH_ANY);
}
/*
* Returns TRUE if principal is the unauthenticated anonymous identity,
* i.e. WELLKNOWN/ANONYMOUS@WELLKNOWN:ANONYMOUS. Unfortunately due to
* backwards compatibility logic in krb5_principal_is_anonymous() we
* have to use our own implementation.
*/
krb5_boolean
_kdc_is_anonymous_pkinit(krb5_context context, krb5_const_principal principal)
{
return _kdc_is_anonymous(context, principal) &&
strcmp(principal->realm, KRB5_ANON_REALM) == 0;
}
static int
require_preauth_p(astgs_request_t r)
{
return r->config->require_preauth
|| r->client->flags.require_preauth
|| r->server->flags.require_preauth;
}
/*
*
*/
static krb5_error_code
add_enc_pa_rep(astgs_request_t r)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_crypto crypto;
Checksum checksum;
krb5_data cdata;
size_t len;
ret = krb5_crypto_init(r->context, &r->reply_key, 0, &crypto);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = krb5_create_checksum(r->context, crypto,
KRB5_KU_AS_REQ, 0,
r->request.data, r->request.length,
&checksum);
krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, crypto);
if (ret)
return ret;
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(Checksum, cdata.data, cdata.length,
&checksum, &len, ret);
free_Checksum(&checksum);
if (ret)
return ret;
heim_assert(cdata.length == len, "ASN.1 internal error");
if (r->ek.encrypted_pa_data == NULL) {
ALLOC(r->ek.encrypted_pa_data);
if (r->ek.encrypted_pa_data == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
}
ret = krb5_padata_add(r->context, r->ek.encrypted_pa_data,
KRB5_PADATA_REQ_ENC_PA_REP, cdata.data, cdata.length);
if (ret)
return ret;
return krb5_padata_add(r->context, r->ek.encrypted_pa_data,
KRB5_PADATA_FX_FAST, NULL, 0);
}
/*
* Add an authorization data element indicating that a synthetic
* principal was used, so that the TGS does not accidentally
* synthesize a non-synthetic principal that has since been deleted.
*/
static krb5_error_code
add_synthetic_princ_ad(astgs_request_t r)
{
krb5_data data;
krb5_data_zero(&data);
return _kdc_tkt_add_if_relevant_ad(r->context, &r->et,
KRB5_AUTHDATA_SYNTHETIC_PRINC_USED,
&data);
}
static krb5_error_code
get_local_tgs(krb5_context context,
krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
krb5_const_realm realm,
HDB **krbtgtdb,
hdb_entry **krbtgt)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_principal tgs_name;
*krbtgtdb = NULL;
*krbtgt = NULL;
ret = krb5_make_principal(context,
&tgs_name,
realm,
KRB5_TGS_NAME,
realm,
NULL);
if (ret == 0)
ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, tgs_name,
HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT, NULL, krbtgtdb, krbtgt);
krb5_free_principal(context, tgs_name);
return ret;
}
/*
*
*/
krb5_error_code
_kdc_as_rep(astgs_request_t r)
{
krb5_kdc_configuration *config = r->config;
KDC_REQ *req = &r->req;
const char *from = r->from;
KDC_REQ_BODY *b = NULL;
KDC_REP *rep = &r->rep;
KDCOptions f;
krb5_enctype setype;
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
Key *skey;
int found_pa = 0;
int i, flags = HDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ;
const PA_DATA *pa;
krb5_boolean is_tgs;
const char *msg;
Key *krbtgt_key;
memset(rep, 0, sizeof(*rep));
ALLOC(rep->padata);
if (rep->padata == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
krb5_set_error_message(r->context, ret, N_("malloc: out of memory", ""));
goto out;
}
/*
* Look for FAST armor and unwrap
*/
ret = _kdc_fast_unwrap_request(r, NULL, NULL);
if (ret) {
_kdc_r_log(r, 1, "FAST unwrap request from %s failed: %d", from, ret);
goto out;
}
b = &req->req_body;
f = b->kdc_options;
if (f.canonicalize)
flags |= HDB_F_CANON;
if (b->sname == NULL) {
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
_kdc_set_e_text(r, "No server in request");
goto out;
}
ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(r->context, &r->server_princ,
*(b->sname), b->realm);
if (!ret)
ret = krb5_unparse_name(r->context, r->server_princ, &r->sname);
if (ret) {
kdc_log(r->context, config, 2,
"AS_REQ malformed server name from %s", from);
goto out;
}
if (b->cname == NULL) {
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
_kdc_set_e_text(r, "No client in request");
goto out;
}
ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(r->context, &r->client_princ,
*(b->cname), b->realm);
if (!ret)
ret = krb5_unparse_name(r->context, r->client_princ, &r->cname);
if (ret) {
kdc_log(r->context, config, 2,
"AS-REQ malformed client name from %s", from);
goto out;
}
kdc_log(r->context, config, 4, "AS-REQ %s from %s for %s",
r->cname, r->from, r->sname);
is_tgs = krb5_principal_is_krbtgt(r->context, r->server_princ);
if (_kdc_is_anonymous(r->context, r->client_princ) &&
!_kdc_is_anon_request(req)) {
kdc_log(r->context, config, 2, "Anonymous client w/o anonymous flag");
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
goto out;
}
ret = _kdc_db_fetch(r->context, config, r->client_princ,
HDB_F_GET_CLIENT | HDB_F_SYNTHETIC_OK | flags, NULL,
&r->clientdb, &r->client);
switch (ret) {
case 0: /* Success */
break;
case HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE:
kdc_log(r->context, config, 5, "client %s does not have secrets at this KDC, need to proxy",
r->cname);
goto out;
case HDB_ERR_WRONG_REALM: {
char *fixed_client_name = NULL;
ret = krb5_unparse_name(r->context, r->client->principal,
&fixed_client_name);
if (ret) {
goto out;
}
kdc_log(r->context, config, 4, "WRONG_REALM - %s -> %s",
r->cname, fixed_client_name);
free(fixed_client_name);
r->e_text = NULL;
ret = _kdc_fast_mk_error(r, r->rep.padata, r->armor_crypto,
&req->req_body,
r->error_code = KRB5_KDC_ERR_WRONG_REALM,
r->client->principal, r->server_princ,
NULL, NULL, r->reply);
goto out;
}
default:
{
msg = krb5_get_error_message(r->context, ret);
kdc_log(r->context, config, 4, "UNKNOWN -- %s: %s", r->cname, msg);
krb5_free_error_message(r->context, msg);
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
kdc_audit_setkv_number((kdc_request_t)r, KDC_REQUEST_KV_AUTH_EVENT,
KDC_AUTH_EVENT_CLIENT_UNKNOWN);
goto out;
}
}
ret = _kdc_db_fetch(r->context, config, r->server_princ,
HDB_F_GET_SERVER | HDB_F_DELAY_NEW_KEYS |
flags | (is_tgs ? HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT : 0),
NULL, &r->serverdb, &r->server);
switch (ret) {
case 0: /* Success */
break;
case HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE:
kdc_log(r->context, config, 5, "target %s does not have secrets at this KDC, need to proxy",
r->sname);
goto out;
default:
msg = krb5_get_error_message(r->context, ret);
kdc_log(r->context, config, 4, "UNKNOWN -- %s: %s", r->sname, msg);
krb5_free_error_message(r->context, msg);
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto out;
}
/*
* This has to be here (not later), because we need to have r->sessionetype
* set prior to calling pa_pkinit_validate(), which in turn calls
* _kdc_pk_mk_pa_reply(), during padata validation.
*/
/*
* Select an enctype for the to-be-issued ticket's session key using the
* intersection of the client's requested enctypes and the server's (like a
* root krbtgt, but not necessarily) etypes from its HDB entry.
*/
ret = _kdc_find_session_etype(r, b->etype.val, b->etype.len,
r->server, &r->sessionetype);
if (ret) {
kdc_log(r->context, config, 4,
"Client (%s) from %s has no common enctypes with KDC "
"to use for the session key",
r->cname, from);
goto out;
}
/*
* Pre-auth processing
*/
if(req->padata){
unsigned int n;
log_patypes(r, req->padata);
/* Check if preauth matching */
for (n = 0; !found_pa && n < sizeof(pat) / sizeof(pat[0]); n++) {
if (pat[n].validate == NULL)
continue;
if (r->armor_crypto == NULL && (pat[n].flags & PA_REQ_FAST))
continue;
kdc_log(r->context, config, 5,
"Looking for %s pa-data -- %s", pat[n].name, r->cname);
i = 0;
pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, pat[n].type);
if (pa) {
if (r->client->flags.synthetic &&
!(pat[n].flags & PA_SYNTHETIC_OK)) {
kdc_log(r->context, config, 4, "UNKNOWN -- %s", r->cname);
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto out;
}
kdc_audit_addkv((kdc_request_t)r, KDC_AUDIT_VIS, "pa", "%s",
pat[n].name);
ret = pat[n].validate(r, pa);
if (ret != 0) {
krb5_error_code ret2;
Key *ckey = NULL;
krb5_boolean default_salt;
if (ret != KRB5_KDC_ERR_MORE_PREAUTH_DATA_REQUIRED &&
!kdc_audit_getkv((kdc_request_t)r, KDC_REQUEST_KV_AUTH_EVENT))
kdc_audit_setkv_number((kdc_request_t)r, KDC_REQUEST_KV_AUTH_EVENT,
KDC_AUTH_EVENT_PREAUTH_FAILED);
/*
* If there is a client key, send ETYPE_INFO{,2}
*/
ret2 = _kdc_find_etype(r, KFE_IS_PREAUTH|KFE_USE_CLIENT,
b->etype.val, b->etype.len,
NULL, &ckey, &default_salt);
if (ret2 == 0) {
ret2 = get_pa_etype_info_both(r->context, config, &b->etype,
r->rep.padata, ckey, !default_salt);
if (ret2 != 0)
ret = ret2;
}
goto out;
}
if (!kdc_audit_getkv((kdc_request_t)r, KDC_REQUEST_KV_AUTH_EVENT))
kdc_audit_setkv_number((kdc_request_t)r, KDC_REQUEST_KV_AUTH_EVENT,
KDC_AUTH_EVENT_PREAUTH_SUCCEEDED);
kdc_log(r->context, config, 4,
"%s pre-authentication succeeded -- %s",
pat[n].name, r->cname);
found_pa = 1;
r->pa_used = &pat[n];
r->et.flags.pre_authent = 1;
}
}
}
if (found_pa == 0) {
Key *ckey = NULL;
size_t n;
krb5_boolean default_salt;
if (r->client->flags.synthetic) {
kdc_log(r->context, config, 4, "UNKNOWN -- %s", r->cname);
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto out;
}
for (n = 0; n < sizeof(pat) / sizeof(pat[0]); n++) {
if ((pat[n].flags & PA_ANNOUNCE) == 0)
continue;
if (!r->armor_crypto && (pat[n].flags & PA_REQ_FAST))
continue;
if (pat[n].type == KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP) {
if (r->armor_crypto && !r->config->enable_armored_pa_enc_timestamp)
continue;
if (!r->armor_crypto && !r->config->enable_unarmored_pa_enc_timestamp)
continue;
}
ret = krb5_padata_add(r->context, r->rep.padata,
pat[n].type, NULL, 0);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
/*
* If there is a client key, send ETYPE_INFO{,2}
*/
ret = _kdc_find_etype(r, KFE_IS_PREAUTH|KFE_USE_CLIENT,
b->etype.val, b->etype.len,
NULL, &ckey, &default_salt);
if (ret == 0) {
ret = get_pa_etype_info_both(r->context, config, &b->etype,
r->rep.padata, ckey, !default_salt);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
/*
* send requre preauth is its required or anon is requested,
* anon is today only allowed via preauth mechanisms.
*/
if (require_preauth_p(r) || _kdc_is_anon_request(&r->req)) {
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED;
_kdc_set_e_text(r, "Need to use PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP/PA-PK-AS-REQ");
goto out;
}
if (ckey == NULL) {
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET;
_kdc_set_e_text(r, "Doesn't have a client key available");
goto out;
}
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r->context, &r->reply_key);
ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(r->context, &ckey->key, &r->reply_key);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
r->canon_client_princ = r->client->principal;
/*
* Verify flags after the user been required to prove its identity
* with in a preauth mech.
*/
ret = _kdc_check_access(r);
if(ret)
goto out;
if (_kdc_is_anon_request(&r->req)) {
ret = _kdc_check_anon_policy(r);
if (ret) {
_kdc_set_e_text(r, "Anonymous ticket requests are disabled");
goto out;
}
r->et.flags.anonymous = 1;
}
kdc_audit_setkv_number((kdc_request_t)r, KDC_REQUEST_KV_AUTH_EVENT,
KDC_AUTH_EVENT_CLIENT_AUTHORIZED);
/*
* Select the best encryption type for the KDC with out regard to
* the client since the client never needs to read that data.
*/
ret = _kdc_get_preferred_key(r->context, config,
r->server, r->sname,
&setype, &skey);
if(ret)
goto out;
/* If server is not krbtgt, fetch local krbtgt key for signing authdata */
if (is_tgs) {
krbtgt_key = skey;
} else {
ret = get_local_tgs(r->context, config, r->server_princ->realm,
&r->krbtgtdb, &r->krbtgt);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = _kdc_get_preferred_key(r->context, config, r->krbtgt,
r->server_princ->realm,
NULL, &krbtgt_key);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
if(f.renew || f.validate || f.proxy || f.forwarded || f.enc_tkt_in_skey) {
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
_kdc_set_e_text(r, "Bad KDC options");
goto out;
}
/*
* Build reply
*/
rep->pvno = 5;
rep->msg_type = krb_as_rep;
if (!config->historical_anon_realm &&
_kdc_is_anonymous(r->context, r->client_princ)) {
Realm anon_realm = KRB5_ANON_REALM;
ret = copy_Realm(&anon_realm, &rep->crealm);
} else if (f.canonicalize || r->client->flags.force_canonicalize)
ret = copy_Realm(&r->canon_client_princ->realm, &rep->crealm);
else
ret = copy_Realm(&r->client_princ->realm, &rep->crealm);
if (ret)
goto out;
if (r->et.flags.anonymous)
ret = _kdc_make_anonymous_principalname(&rep->cname);
else if (f.canonicalize || r->client->flags.force_canonicalize)
ret = _krb5_principal2principalname(&rep->cname, r->canon_client_princ);
else
ret = _krb5_principal2principalname(&rep->cname, r->client_princ);
if (ret)
goto out;
rep->ticket.tkt_vno = 5;
if (f.canonicalize || r->server->flags.force_canonicalize)
ret = copy_Realm(&r->server->principal->realm, &rep->ticket.realm);
else
ret = copy_Realm(&r->server_princ->realm, &rep->ticket.realm);
if (ret)
goto out;
if (f.canonicalize || r->server->flags.force_canonicalize)
_krb5_principal2principalname(&rep->ticket.sname,
r->server->principal);
else
_krb5_principal2principalname(&rep->ticket.sname,
r->server_princ);
/* java 1.6 expects the name to be the same type, lets allow that
* uncomplicated name-types, when f.canonicalize is not set (to
* match Windows Server 1709). */
#define CNT(sp,t) (((sp)->sname->name_type) == KRB5_NT_##t)
if (!f.canonicalize
&& (CNT(b, UNKNOWN) || CNT(b, PRINCIPAL) || CNT(b, SRV_INST) || CNT(b, SRV_HST) || CNT(b, SRV_XHST))) {
rep->ticket.sname.name_type = b->sname->name_type;
}
#undef CNT
r->et.flags.initial = 1;
if(r->client->flags.forwardable && r->server->flags.forwardable)
r->et.flags.forwardable = f.forwardable;
if(r->client->flags.proxiable && r->server->flags.proxiable)
r->et.flags.proxiable = f.proxiable;
else if (f.proxiable) {
_kdc_set_e_text(r, "Ticket may not be proxiable");
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
goto out;
}
if(r->client->flags.postdate && r->server->flags.postdate)
r->et.flags.may_postdate = f.allow_postdate;
else if (f.allow_postdate){
_kdc_set_e_text(r, "Ticket may not be postdate");
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
goto out;
}
if (b->addresses)
kdc_audit_addaddrs((kdc_request_t)r, b->addresses, "reqaddrs");
/* check for valid set of addresses */
if (!_kdc_check_addresses(r, b->addresses, r->addr)) {
if (r->config->warn_ticket_addresses) {
kdc_audit_setkv_bool((kdc_request_t)r, "wrongaddr", TRUE);
} else {
_kdc_set_e_text(r, "Request from wrong address");
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR;
goto out;
}
}
ret = copy_PrincipalName(&rep->cname, &r->et.cname);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = copy_Realm(&rep->crealm, &r->et.crealm);
if (ret)
goto out;
{
time_t start;
time_t t;
start = r->et.authtime = kdc_time;
if(f.postdated && req->req_body.from){
ALLOC(r->et.starttime);
start = *r->et.starttime = *req->req_body.from;
r->et.flags.invalid = 1;
r->et.flags.postdated = 1; /* XXX ??? */
}
_kdc_fix_time(&b->till);
t = *b->till;
/* be careful not overflowing */
/*
* Pre-auth can override r->client->max_life if configured.
*
* See pre-auth methods, specifically PKINIT, which can get or derive
* this from the client's certificate.
*/
if (r->pa_max_life > 0)
t = rk_time_add(start, min(rk_time_sub(t, start), r->pa_max_life));
else if (r->client->max_life && *r->client->max_life)
t = rk_time_add(start, min(rk_time_sub(t, start),
*r->client->max_life));
if (r->server->max_life && *r->server->max_life)
t = rk_time_add(start, min(rk_time_sub(t, start),
*r->server->max_life));
/* Pre-auth can bound endtime as well */
if (r->pa_endtime > 0)
t = rk_time_add(start, min(rk_time_sub(t, start), r->pa_endtime));
#if 0
t = min(t, rk_time_add(start, realm->max_life));
#endif
r->et.endtime = t;
if(f.renewable_ok && r->et.endtime < *b->till){
f.renewable = 1;
if(b->rtime == NULL){
ALLOC(b->rtime);
*b->rtime = 0;
}
if(*b->rtime < *b->till)
*b->rtime = *b->till;
}
if(f.renewable && b->rtime){
t = *b->rtime;
if(t == 0)
t = MAX_TIME;
if(r->client->max_renew && *r->client->max_renew)
t = rk_time_add(start, min(rk_time_sub(t, start),
*r->client->max_renew));
if(r->server->max_renew && *r->server->max_renew)
t = rk_time_add(start, min(rk_time_sub(t, start),
*r->server->max_renew));
#if 0
t = min(t, rk_time_add(start, realm->max_renew));
#endif
ALLOC(r->et.renew_till);
*r->et.renew_till = t;
r->et.flags.renewable = 1;
}
}
if(b->addresses){
ALLOC(r->et.caddr);
copy_HostAddresses(b->addresses, r->et.caddr);
}
r->et.transited.tr_type = domain_X500_Compress;
krb5_data_zero(&r->et.transited.contents);
/* The MIT ASN.1 library (obviously) doesn't tell lengths encoded
* as 0 and as 0x80 (meaning indefinite length) apart, and is thus
* incapable of correctly decoding SEQUENCE OF's of zero length.
*
* To fix this, always send at least one no-op last_req
*
* If there's a pw_end or valid_end we will use that,
* otherwise just a dummy lr.
*/
r->ek.last_req.val = malloc(2 * sizeof(*r->ek.last_req.val));
if (r->ek.last_req.val == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
r->ek.last_req.len = 0;
if (r->client->pw_end
&& (config->kdc_warn_pwexpire == 0
|| kdc_time + config->kdc_warn_pwexpire >= *r->client->pw_end)) {
r->ek.last_req.val[r->ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_PW_EXPTIME;
r->ek.last_req.val[r->ek.last_req.len].lr_value = *r->client->pw_end;
++r->ek.last_req.len;
}
if (r->client->valid_end) {
r->ek.last_req.val[r->ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_ACCT_EXPTIME;
r->ek.last_req.val[r->ek.last_req.len].lr_value = *r->client->valid_end;
++r->ek.last_req.len;
}
if (r->ek.last_req.len == 0) {
r->ek.last_req.val[r->ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_NONE;
r->ek.last_req.val[r->ek.last_req.len].lr_value = 0;
++r->ek.last_req.len;
}
r->ek.nonce = b->nonce;
if (r->client->valid_end || r->client->pw_end) {
ALLOC(r->ek.key_expiration);
if (r->client->valid_end) {
if (r->client->pw_end)
*r->ek.key_expiration = min(*r->client->valid_end,
*r->client->pw_end);
else
*r->ek.key_expiration = *r->client->valid_end;
} else
*r->ek.key_expiration = *r->client->pw_end;
} else
r->ek.key_expiration = NULL;
r->ek.flags = r->et.flags;
r->ek.authtime = r->et.authtime;
if (r->et.starttime) {
ALLOC(r->ek.starttime);
*r->ek.starttime = *r->et.starttime;
}
r->ek.endtime = r->et.endtime;
if (r->et.renew_till) {
ALLOC(r->ek.renew_till);
*r->ek.renew_till = *r->et.renew_till;
}
ret = copy_Realm(&rep->ticket.realm, &r->ek.srealm);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = copy_PrincipalName(&rep->ticket.sname, &r->ek.sname);
if (ret)
goto out;
if(r->et.caddr){
ALLOC(r->ek.caddr);
copy_HostAddresses(r->et.caddr, r->ek.caddr);
}
/*
* Check and session and reply keys
*/
if (r->session_key.keytype == ETYPE_NULL) {
ret = krb5_generate_random_keyblock(r->context, r->sessionetype, &r->session_key);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
if (r->reply_key.keytype == ETYPE_NULL) {
_kdc_set_e_text(r, "Client have no reply key");
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET;
goto out;
}
ret = copy_EncryptionKey(&r->session_key, &r->et.key);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = copy_EncryptionKey(&r->session_key, &r->ek.key);
if (ret)
goto out;
/* Add the PAC */
if (!r->et.flags.anonymous) {
ret = generate_pac(r, skey, krbtgt_key, is_tgs);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
if (r->client->flags.synthetic) {
ret = add_synthetic_princ_ad(r);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
_kdc_log_timestamp(r, "AS-REQ", r->et.authtime,
r->et.starttime, r->et.endtime,
r->et.renew_till);
_log_astgs_req(r, setype);
/*
* We always say we support FAST/enc-pa-rep
*/
r->et.flags.enc_pa_rep = r->ek.flags.enc_pa_rep = 1;
/*
* update reply-key with strengthen-key
*/
ret = _kdc_fast_strengthen_reply_key(r);
if (ret)
goto out;
/*
* Add REQ_ENC_PA_REP if client supports it
*/
i = 0;
pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_REQ_ENC_PA_REP);
if (pa) {
ret = add_enc_pa_rep(r);
if (ret) {
msg = krb5_get_error_message(r->context, ret);
_kdc_r_log(r, 4, "add_enc_pa_rep failed: %s: %d", msg, ret);
krb5_free_error_message(r->context, msg);
goto out;
}
}
/*
* Last chance for plugins to update reply
*/
ret = _kdc_finalize_reply(r);
if (ret)
goto out;
/*
* Don't send kvno from client entry if the pre-authentication
* mechanism replaced the reply key.
*/
ret = _kdc_encode_reply(r->context, config,
r, req->req_body.nonce, setype,
r->server->kvno, &skey->key,
pa_used_flag_isset(r, PA_REPLACE_REPLY_KEY) ? 0 : r->client->kvno,
0, r->reply);
if (ret)
goto out;
/*
* Check if message too large
*/
if (r->datagram_reply && r->reply->length > config->max_datagram_reply_length) {
krb5_data_free(r->reply);
ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_RESPONSE_TOO_BIG;
_kdc_set_e_text(r, "Reply packet too large");
}
out:
r->error_code = ret;
{
krb5_error_code ret2 = _kdc_audit_request(r);
if (ret2) {
krb5_data_free(r->reply);
ret = ret2;
}
}
/*
* In case of a non proxy error, build an error message.
*/
if (ret != 0 && ret != HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE && r->reply->length == 0) {
kdc_log(r->context, config, 5, "as-req: sending error: %d to client", ret);
ret = _kdc_fast_mk_error(r,
r->rep.padata,
r->armor_crypto,
&req->req_body,
r->error_code,
r->client_princ,
r->server_princ,
NULL, NULL,
r->reply);
}
if (r->pa_used && r->pa_used->cleanup)
r->pa_used->cleanup(r);
free_AS_REP(&r->rep);
free_EncTicketPart(&r->et);
free_EncKDCRepPart(&r->ek);
_kdc_free_fast_state(&r->fast);
if (r->client_princ) {
krb5_free_principal(r->context, r->client_princ);
r->client_princ = NULL;
}
if (r->server_princ){
krb5_free_principal(r->context, r->server_princ);
r->server_princ = NULL;
}
if (r->client)
_kdc_free_ent(r->context, r->clientdb, r->client);
if (r->server)
_kdc_free_ent(r->context, r->serverdb, r->server);
if (r->krbtgt)
_kdc_free_ent(r->context, r->krbtgtdb, r->krbtgt);
if (r->armor_crypto) {
krb5_crypto_destroy(r->context, r->armor_crypto);
r->armor_crypto = NULL;
}
if (r->armor_ticket)
krb5_free_ticket(r->context, r->armor_ticket);
if (r->armor_server)
_kdc_free_ent(r->context, r->armor_serverdb, r->armor_server);
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r->context, &r->reply_key);
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r->context, &r->session_key);
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r->context, &r->strengthen_key);
krb5_pac_free(r->context, r->pac);
return ret;
}
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