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samba-mirror/third_party/heimdal/kdc/kx509.c
Joseph Sutton 51569b3152 third_party/heimdal: import lorikeet-heimdal-202203010107 (commit 0e7a12404c388e831fe6933fcc3c86e7eb334825)
NOTE: THIS COMMIT WON'T COMPILE/WORK ON ITS OWN!

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14995

Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
2022-03-01 22:34:34 +00:00

1081 lines
35 KiB
C

/*
* Copyright (c) 2006 - 2019 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
* (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "kdc_locl.h"
#include <hex.h>
#include <rfc2459_asn1.h>
#include <hx509.h>
#include <hx509_err.h>
#include <kx509_err.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
/*
* This file implements the kx509 service.
*
* The protocol, its shortcomings, and its future are described in
* lib/krb5/hx509.c. See also lib/asn1/kx509.asn1.
*
* The service handles requests, decides whether to issue a certificate, and
* does so by populating a "template" to generate a TBSCertificate and signing
* it with a configured CA issuer certificate and private key. See ca.c for
* details.
*
* A "template" is a Certificate that has ${variable} references in its
* subjectName, and may have EKUs.
*
* Some SANs may be included in issued certificates. See below.
*
* Besides future protocol improvements described in lib/krb5/hx509.c, here is
* a list of KDC functionality we'd like to add:
*
* - support templates as strings (rather than filenames) in configuration?
* - lookup an hx509 template for the client principal in its HDB entry?
* - lookup subjectName, SANs for a principal in its HDB entry
* - lookup a host-based client principal's HDB entry and add its canonical
* name / aliases as dNSName SANs
* (this would have to be if requested by the client, perhaps; see
* commentary about the protocol in lib/krb5/kx509.c)
* - add code to build a template on the fly
*
* (just SANs, with empty subjectName?
* or
* CN=component0,CN=component1,..,CN=componentN,DC=<from-REALM>
* and set KU and EKUs)
*
* Processing begins in _kdc_do_kx509().
*
* The sequence of events in _kdc_do_kx509() is:
*
* - parse outer request
* - authenticate request
* - extract CSR and AP-REQ Authenticator authz-data elements
* - characterize request as one of
* - default client cert req (no cert exts requested, client user princ)
* - default server cert req (no cert exts requested, client service princ)
* - client cert req (cert exts requested denoting client use)
* - server cert req (cert exts requested denoting server use)
* - mixed cert req (cert exts requested denoting client and server use)
* - authorize request based only on the request's details
* - there is a default authorizer, and a plugin authorizer
* - get configuration sub-tree corresponding to the request as characterized
* - missing configuration sub-tree -> reject (we have multiple ways to
* express "no")
* - get common config params from that sub-tree
* - set TBS template and details from CSR and such
* - issue certificate by signing TBS
*/
#ifdef KX509
static const unsigned char version_2_0[4] = {0 , 0, 2, 0};
/*
* Taste the request to see if it's a kx509 request.
*/
krb5_error_code
_kdc_try_kx509_request(kx509_req_context r)
{
const unsigned char *p = (const void *)(uintptr_t)r->request.data;
size_t len = r->request.length;
size_t sz;
if (len < sizeof(version_2_0))
return -1;
if (memcmp(version_2_0, p, sizeof(version_2_0)) != 0)
return -1;
p += sizeof(version_2_0);
len -= sizeof(version_2_0);
if (len == 0)
return -1;
memset(&r->req, 0, sizeof(r->req));
return decode_Kx509Request(p, len, &r->req, &sz);
}
static krb5_boolean
get_bool_param(krb5_context context,
krb5_boolean def,
const char *crealm,
const char *name)
{
krb5_boolean global_default;
global_default = krb5_config_get_bool_default(context, NULL, def, "kdc",
name, NULL);
if (!crealm)
return global_default;
return krb5_config_get_bool_default(context, NULL, global_default,
"kdc", "realms", crealm, name, NULL);
}
/*
* Verify the HMAC in the request.
*/
static krb5_error_code
verify_req_hash(krb5_context context,
const Kx509Request *req,
krb5_keyblock *key)
{
unsigned char digest[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
HMAC_CTX ctx;
if (req->pk_hash.length != sizeof(digest)) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED,
"pk-hash has wrong length: %lu",
(unsigned long)req->pk_hash.length);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
}
HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx);
if (HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, key->keyvalue.data, key->keyvalue.length,
EVP_sha1(), NULL) == 0) {
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return krb5_enomem(context);
}
if (sizeof(digest) != HMAC_size(&ctx))
krb5_abortx(context, "runtime error, hmac buffer wrong size in kx509");
HMAC_Update(&ctx, version_2_0, sizeof(version_2_0));
if (req->pk_key.length)
HMAC_Update(&ctx, req->pk_key.data, req->pk_key.length);
else
HMAC_Update(&ctx, req->authenticator.data, req->authenticator.length);
HMAC_Final(&ctx, digest, 0);
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
if (ct_memcmp(req->pk_hash.data, digest, sizeof(digest)) != 0) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED,
"kx509 request MAC mismatch");
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Set the HMAC in the response.
*/
static krb5_error_code
calculate_reply_hash(krb5_context context,
krb5_keyblock *key,
Kx509Response *rep)
{
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
HMAC_CTX ctx;
HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx);
if (HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, key->keyvalue.data, key->keyvalue.length,
EVP_sha1(), NULL) == 0)
ret = krb5_enomem(context);
if (ret == 0)
ret = krb5_data_alloc(rep->hash, HMAC_size(&ctx));
if (ret) {
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return krb5_enomem(context);
}
HMAC_Update(&ctx, version_2_0, sizeof(version_2_0));
{
int32_t t = rep->error_code;
unsigned char encint[sizeof(t) + 1];
size_t k;
/*
* RFC6717 says this about how the error-code is included in the HMAC:
*
* o DER representation of the error-code exclusive of the tag and
* length, if it is present.
*
* So we use der_put_integer(), which encodes from the right.
*
* RFC6717 does not constrain the error-code's range. We assume it to
* be a 32-bit, signed integer, for which we'll need no more than 5
* bytes.
*/
ret = der_put_integer(&encint[sizeof(encint) - 1],
sizeof(encint), &t, &k);
if (ret == 0)
HMAC_Update(&ctx, &encint[sizeof(encint)] - k, k);
}
if (rep->certificate)
HMAC_Update(&ctx, rep->certificate->data, rep->certificate->length);
if (rep->e_text)
HMAC_Update(&ctx, (unsigned char *)*rep->e_text, strlen(*rep->e_text));
HMAC_Final(&ctx, rep->hash->data, 0);
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return 0;
}
static void
frees(char **s)
{
free(*s);
*s = NULL;
}
/* Check that a krbtgt's second component is a local realm */
static krb5_error_code
is_local_realm(krb5_context context,
kx509_req_context reqctx,
const char *realm)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_principal tgs;
HDB *db;
hdb_entry *ent = NULL;
ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &tgs, realm, KRB5_TGS_NAME, realm,
NULL);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (ret == 0)
ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, reqctx->config, tgs, HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT,
NULL, &db, &ent);
if (ent)
_kdc_free_ent(context, db, ent);
krb5_free_principal(context, tgs);
if (ret == HDB_ERR_NOENTRY || ret == HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE)
return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US;
return ret;
}
/*
* Since we're using the HDB as a keytab we have to check that the client used
* an acceptable name for the kx509 service.
*
* We accept two names: kca_service/hostname and krbtgt/REALM.
*
* We allow cross-realm requests.
*
* Maybe x-realm support should be configurable. Requiring INITIAL tickets
* does NOT preclude x-realm support! (Cross-realm TGTs can be INITIAL.)
*
* Support for specific client realms is configurable by configuring issuer
* credentials and TBS templates on a per-realm basis and configuring no
* default. But maybe we should have an explicit configuration parameter
* to enable support for clients from different realms than the service.
*/
static krb5_error_code
kdc_kx509_verify_service_principal(krb5_context context,
kx509_req_context reqctx,
krb5_principal sprincipal)
{
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
krb5_principal principal = NULL;
char *expected = NULL;
char localhost[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
if (krb5_principal_get_num_comp(context, sprincipal) != 2)
goto err;
/* Check if sprincipal is a krbtgt/REALM name */
if (strcmp(krb5_principal_get_comp_string(context, sprincipal, 0),
KRB5_TGS_NAME) == 0) {
const char *r = krb5_principal_get_comp_string(context, sprincipal, 1);
if ((ret = is_local_realm(context, reqctx, r)))
kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)reqctx,
"Client used wrong krbtgt for kx509");
goto out;
}
/* Must be hostbased kca_service name then */
ret = gethostname(localhost, sizeof(localhost) - 1);
if (ret != 0) {
ret = errno;
kdc_log(context, reqctx->config, 0, "Failed to get local hostname");
kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)reqctx,
"Failed to get local hostname");
return ret;
}
localhost[sizeof(localhost) - 1] = '\0';
ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &principal, "", "kca_service",
localhost, NULL);
if (ret)
goto out;
if (krb5_principal_compare_any_realm(context, sprincipal, principal))
goto out; /* found a match */
err:
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, sprincipal, &expected);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH;
kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)reqctx, "Client used wrong kx509 "
"service principal (expected %s)", expected);
out:
krb5_xfree(expected);
krb5_free_principal(context, principal);
return ret;
}
static krb5_error_code
encode_reply(krb5_context context,
kx509_req_context reqctx,
Kx509Response *r)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_data data;
size_t size;
reqctx->reply->data = NULL;
reqctx->reply->length = 0;
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(Kx509Response, data.data, data.length, r, &size, ret);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (size != data.length)
krb5_abortx(context, "ASN1 internal error");
ret = krb5_data_alloc(reqctx->reply, data.length + sizeof(version_2_0));
if (ret == 0) {
memcpy(reqctx->reply->data, version_2_0, sizeof(version_2_0));
memcpy(((unsigned char *)reqctx->reply->data) + sizeof(version_2_0),
data.data, data.length);
}
free(data.data);
return ret;
}
/* Make an error response, and log the error message as well */
static krb5_error_code
mk_error_response(krb5_context context,
kx509_req_context reqctx,
int level,
int32_t code,
const char *fmt,
...)
{
krb5_error_code ret = code;
krb5_error_code ret2;
Kx509Response rep;
const char *msg;
char *freeme0 = NULL;
char *freeme1 = NULL;
va_list ap;
if (code != 0) {
/* Log errors where _kdc_audit_trail() is not enough */
if (code == ENOMEM)
level = 0;
if (level < 3) {
va_start(ap, fmt);
kdc_vlog(context, reqctx->config, level, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
}
va_start(ap, fmt);
kdc_audit_vaddreason((kdc_request_t)reqctx, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
}
if (!reqctx->config->enable_kx509)
code = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
/* Make sure we only send RFC4120 and friends wire protocol error codes */
if (code) {
if (code == KX509_ERR_NONE) {
code = 0;
} else if (code > KX509_ERR_NONE && code <= KX509_ERR_SRV_OVERLOADED) {
code -= KX509_ERR_NONE;
} else {
if (code < KRB5KDC_ERR_NONE || code >= KRB5_ERR_RCSID)
code = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
code -= KRB5KDC_ERR_NONE;
code += kx509_krb5_error_base;
}
}
va_start(ap, fmt);
if (vasprintf(&freeme0, fmt, ap) == -1 || freeme0 == NULL)
msg = "Could not format error message (out of memory)";
else
msg = freeme0;
va_end(ap);
if (!reqctx->config->enable_kx509 &&
asprintf(&freeme1, "kx509 service is disabled (%s)", msg) > -1 &&
freeme1 != NULL) {
msg = freeme1;
}
rep.hash = NULL;
rep.certificate = NULL;
rep.error_code = code;
if (ALLOC(rep.e_text))
*rep.e_text = (void *)(uintptr_t)msg;
if (reqctx->key) {
if (ALLOC(rep.hash) != NULL &&
calculate_reply_hash(context, reqctx->key, &rep)) {
free(rep.hash);
rep.hash = NULL;
}
}
if ((ret2 = encode_reply(context, reqctx, &rep)))
ret = ret2;
if (rep.hash)
krb5_data_free(rep.hash);
free(rep.e_text);
free(rep.hash);
free(freeme0);
free(freeme1);
return ret;
}
/* Wrap a bare public (RSA) key with a CSR (not signed it, since we can't) */
static krb5_error_code
make_csr(krb5_context context, kx509_req_context reqctx, krb5_data *key)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
SubjectPublicKeyInfo spki;
heim_any any;
ret = hx509_request_init(context->hx509ctx, &reqctx->csr);
if (ret)
return ret;
memset(&spki, 0, sizeof(spki));
spki.subjectPublicKey.data = key->data;
spki.subjectPublicKey.length = key->length * 8;
ret = der_copy_oid(&asn1_oid_id_pkcs1_rsaEncryption,
&spki.algorithm.algorithm);
any.data = "\x05\x00";
any.length = 2;
spki.algorithm.parameters = &any;
if (ret == 0)
ret = hx509_request_set_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(context->hx509ctx,
reqctx->csr, &spki);
der_free_oid(&spki.algorithm.algorithm);
if (ret)
hx509_request_free(&reqctx->csr);
/*
* TODO: Move a lot of the templating stuff here so we can let clients
* leave out extensions they don't want.
*/
return ret;
}
/* Update a CSR with desired Certificate Extensions */
static krb5_error_code
update_csr(krb5_context context, kx509_req_context reqctx, Extensions *exts)
{
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
size_t i, k;
if (exts == NULL)
return 0;
for (i = 0; ret == 0 && i < exts->len; i++) {
Extension *e = &exts->val[i];
if (der_heim_oid_cmp(&e->extnID, &asn1_oid_id_x509_ce_keyUsage) == 0) {
KeyUsage ku;
ret = decode_KeyUsage(e->extnValue.data, e->extnValue.length, &ku,
NULL);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = hx509_request_set_ku(context->hx509ctx, reqctx->csr, ku);
} else if (der_heim_oid_cmp(&e->extnID,
&asn1_oid_id_x509_ce_extKeyUsage) == 0) {
ExtKeyUsage eku;
ret = decode_ExtKeyUsage(e->extnValue.data, e->extnValue.length,
&eku, NULL);
for (k = 0; ret == 0 && k < eku.len; k++) {
ret = hx509_request_add_eku(context->hx509ctx, reqctx->csr,
&eku.val[k]);
}
free_ExtKeyUsage(&eku);
} else if (der_heim_oid_cmp(&e->extnID,
&asn1_oid_id_x509_ce_subjectAltName) == 0) {
GeneralNames san;
ret = decode_GeneralNames(e->extnValue.data, e->extnValue.length,
&san, NULL);
for (k = 0; ret == 0 && k < san.len; k++) {
ret = hx509_request_add_GeneralName(context->hx509ctx,
reqctx->csr, &san.val[k]);
}
free_GeneralNames(&san);
}
}
if (ret) {
const char *emsg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
kdc_log(context, reqctx->config, 1,
"Error handling requested extensions: %s", emsg);
kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)reqctx,
"Error handling requested extensions: %s",
emsg);
krb5_free_error_message(context, emsg);
}
return ret;
}
/*
* Parse the `pk_key' from the request as a CSR or raw public key, and if the
* latter, wrap it in a non-signed CSR.
*/
static krb5_error_code
get_csr(krb5_context context, kx509_req_context reqctx)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
RSAPublicKey rsapkey;
heim_octet_string pk_key = reqctx->req.pk_key;
size_t size;
ret = decode_Kx509CSRPlus(pk_key.data, pk_key.length, &reqctx->csr_plus,
&size);
if (ret == 0) {
reqctx->have_csr = 1;
reqctx->send_chain = 1;
/* Parse CSR */
ret = hx509_request_parse_der(context->hx509ctx, &reqctx->csr_plus.csr,
&reqctx->csr);
/*
* Handle any additional Certificate Extensions requested out of band
* of the CSR.
*/
if (ret == 0)
return update_csr(context, reqctx, reqctx->csr_plus.exts);
kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)reqctx, "Invalid CSR");
return ret;
}
reqctx->send_chain = 0;
reqctx->have_csr = 0;
/* Check if proof of possession is required by configuration */
if (!get_bool_param(context, FALSE, reqctx->realm, "require_csr")) {
kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)reqctx,
"CSRs required but client did not send one");
krb5_set_error_message(context, KX509_STATUS_CLIENT_USE_CSR,
"CSRs required but kx509 client did not send "
"one");
return KX509_STATUS_CLIENT_USE_CSR;
}
/* Attempt to decode pk_key as RSAPublicKey */
ret = decode_RSAPublicKey(reqctx->req.pk_key.data,
reqctx->req.pk_key.length,
&rsapkey, &size);
free_RSAPublicKey(&rsapkey);
if (ret == 0 && size == reqctx->req.pk_key.length)
return make_csr(context, reqctx, &pk_key); /* Make pretend CSR */
/* Not an RSAPublicKey or garbage follows it */
if (ret == 0) {
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_NULL_KEY;
kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)reqctx,
"Request has garbage after key");
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "Request has garbage after key");
return ret;
}
kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)reqctx,
"Could not decode CSR or RSA subject public key");
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
"Could not decode CSR or RSA subject public key");
return ret;
}
/*
* Host-based principal _clients_ might ask for a cert for their host -- but
* which services are permitted to do that? This function answers that
* question.
*/
static int
check_authz_svc_ok(krb5_context context, const char *svc)
{
const char *def[] = { "host", "HTTP", 0 };
const char * const *svcs;
char **strs;
strs = krb5_config_get_strings(context, NULL, "kdc",
"kx509_permitted_hostbased_services", NULL);
for (svcs = strs ? (const char * const *)strs : def; svcs[0]; svcs++) {
if (strcmp(svcs[0], svc) == 0) {
krb5_config_free_strings(strs);
return 1;
}
}
krb5_config_free_strings(strs);
return 0;
}
static krb5_error_code
check_authz(krb5_context context,
kx509_req_context reqctx,
krb5_principal cprincipal)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
const char *comp0 = krb5_principal_get_comp_string(context, cprincipal, 0);
const char *comp1 = krb5_principal_get_comp_string(context, cprincipal, 1);
unsigned int ncomp = krb5_principal_get_num_comp(context, cprincipal);
hx509_san_type san_type;
KeyUsage ku, ku_allowed;
size_t i;
const heim_oid *eku_whitelist[] = {
&asn1_oid_id_pkix_kp_serverAuth,
&asn1_oid_id_pkix_kp_clientAuth,
&asn1_oid_id_pkekuoid,
&asn1_oid_id_pkinit_ms_eku
};
char *cprinc = NULL;
char *s = NULL;
/*
* In the no-CSR case we'll derive cert contents from client name and its
* HDB entry -- authorization is implied.
*/
if (!reqctx->have_csr)
return 0;
ret = kdc_authorize_csr(context, reqctx->config->app, reqctx->csr,
cprincipal);
if (ret == 0) {
kdc_audit_setkv_bool((kdc_request_t)reqctx, "authorized", TRUE);
ret = hx509_request_get_san(reqctx->csr, 0, &san_type, &s);
if (ret == 0) {
const char *san_type_s;
/* This should be an hx509 function... */
switch (san_type) {
case HX509_SAN_TYPE_EMAIL: san_type_s = "rfc822Name"; break;
case HX509_SAN_TYPE_DNSNAME: san_type_s = "dNSName"; break;
case HX509_SAN_TYPE_DN: san_type_s = "DN"; break;
case HX509_SAN_TYPE_REGISTERED_ID: san_type_s = "registeredID"; break;
case HX509_SAN_TYPE_XMPP: san_type_s = "xMPPName"; break;
case HX509_SAN_TYPE_PKINIT: san_type_s = "krb5PrincipalName"; break;
case HX509_SAN_TYPE_MS_UPN: san_type_s = "ms-UPN"; break;
default: san_type_s = "unknown"; break;
}
kdc_audit_addkv((kdc_request_t)reqctx, 0, "san0_type", "%s",
san_type_s);
kdc_audit_addkv((kdc_request_t)reqctx, 0, "san0", "%s", s);
}
frees(&s);
ret = hx509_request_get_eku(reqctx->csr, 0, &s);
if (ret == 0)
kdc_audit_addkv((kdc_request_t)reqctx, 0, "eku0", "%s", s);
free(s);
return 0;
}
if (ret != KRB5_PLUGIN_NO_HANDLE) {
kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)reqctx,
"Requested extensions rejected by plugin");
return ret;
}
/* Default authz */
if ((ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, cprincipal, &cprinc)))
return ret;
for (i = 0; ret == 0; i++) {
frees(&s);
ret = hx509_request_get_san(reqctx->csr, i, &san_type, &s);
if (ret)
break;
switch (san_type) {
case HX509_SAN_TYPE_DNSNAME:
if (ncomp != 2 || strcasecmp(comp1, s) != 0 ||
strchr(s, '.') == NULL ||
!check_authz_svc_ok(context, comp0)) {
kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)reqctx,
"Requested extensions rejected by "
"default policy (dNSName SAN "
"does not match client)");
goto eacces;
}
break;
case HX509_SAN_TYPE_PKINIT:
if (strcmp(cprinc, s) != 0) {
kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)reqctx,
"Requested extensions rejected by "
"default policy (PKINIT SAN "
"does not match client)");
goto eacces;
}
break;
default:
kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)reqctx,
"Requested extensions rejected by "
"default policy (non-default SAN "
"requested)");
goto eacces;
}
}
frees(&s);
if (ret == HX509_NO_ITEM)
ret = 0;
if (ret)
goto out;
for (i = 0; ret == 0; i++) {
heim_oid oid;
size_t k;
frees(&s);
ret = hx509_request_get_eku(reqctx->csr, i, &s);
if (ret)
break;
if ((ret = der_parse_heim_oid(s, ".", &oid))) {
goto out;
}
for (k = 0; k < sizeof(eku_whitelist)/sizeof(eku_whitelist[0]); k++) {
if (der_heim_oid_cmp(eku_whitelist[k], &oid) == 0)
break;
}
der_free_oid(&oid);
if (k == sizeof(eku_whitelist)/sizeof(eku_whitelist[0])) {
kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)reqctx,
"Requested EKU rejected by default policy");
goto eacces;
}
}
if (ret == HX509_NO_ITEM)
ret = 0;
if (ret)
goto out;
memset(&ku_allowed, 0, sizeof(ku_allowed));
ku_allowed.digitalSignature = 1;
ku_allowed.nonRepudiation = 1;
ret = hx509_request_get_ku(context->hx509ctx, reqctx->csr, &ku);
if (ret)
goto out;
if (KeyUsage2int(ku) != (KeyUsage2int(ku) & KeyUsage2int(ku_allowed)))
goto eacces;
kdc_audit_setkv_bool((kdc_request_t)reqctx, "authorized", TRUE);
free(cprinc);
return 0;
eacces:
ret = EACCES;
goto out2;
out:
/* XXX Display error code */
kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)reqctx,
"Error handling requested extensions");
out2:
free(cprinc);
free(s);
return ret;
}
static int
chain_add1_func(hx509_context context, void *d, hx509_cert c)
{
heim_octet_string os;
Certificates *cs = d;
Certificate c2;
int ret;
ret = hx509_cert_binary(context, c, &os);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = decode_Certificate(os.data, os.length, &c2, NULL);
der_free_octet_string(&os);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = add_Certificates(cs, &c2);
free_Certificate(&c2);
return ret;
}
static krb5_error_code
encode_cert_and_chain(hx509_context hx509ctx,
hx509_certs certs,
krb5_data *out)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
Certificates cs;
size_t len;
cs.len = 0;
cs.val = 0;
ret = hx509_certs_iter_f(hx509ctx, certs, chain_add1_func, &cs);
if (ret == 0)
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(Certificates, out->data, out->length,
&cs, &len, ret);
free_Certificates(&cs);
return ret;
}
/*
* Process a request, produce a reply.
*/
krb5_error_code
_kdc_do_kx509(kx509_req_context r)
{
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
krb5_ticket *ticket = NULL;
krb5_flags ap_req_options;
krb5_principal cprincipal = NULL;
krb5_principal sprincipal = NULL;
krb5_keytab id = NULL;
Kx509Response rep;
hx509_certs certs = NULL;
int is_probe = 0;
r->csr_plus.csr.data = NULL;
r->csr_plus.exts = NULL;
r->sname = NULL;
r->cname = NULL;
r->realm = NULL;
r->key = NULL;
r->csr = NULL;
r->ac = NULL;
/*
* In order to support authenticated error messages we defer checking
* whether the kx509 service is enabled until after accepting the AP-REQ.
*/
krb5_data_zero(r->reply);
memset(&rep, 0, sizeof(rep));
if (r->req.authenticator.length == 0) {
/*
* Unauthenticated kx509 service availability probe.
*
* mk_error_response() will check whether the service is enabled and
* possibly change the error code and message.
*/
is_probe = 1;
kdc_audit_addkv((kdc_request_t)r, 0, "probe", "unauthenticated");
ret = mk_error_response(r->context, r, 4, 0,
"kx509 service is available");
goto out;
}
/* Authenticate the request (consume the AP-REQ) */
ret = krb5_kt_resolve(r->context, "HDBGET:", &id);
if (ret) {
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(r->context, ret);
ret = mk_error_response(r->context, r, 1,
KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN,
"Can't open HDB/keytab for kx509: %s",
msg);
krb5_free_error_message(r->context, msg);
goto out;
}
ret = krb5_rd_req(r->context,
&r->ac,
&r->req.authenticator,
NULL,
id,
&ap_req_options,
&ticket);
if (ret == 0)
ret = krb5_auth_con_getkey(r->context, r->ac, &r->key);
if (ret == 0 && r->key == NULL)
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_NULL_KEY;
/*
* Provided we got the session key, errors past this point will be
* authenticated.
*/
if (ret == 0)
ret = krb5_ticket_get_client(r->context, ticket, &cprincipal);
/* Optional: check if Ticket is INITIAL */
if (ret == 0 &&
!ticket->ticket.flags.initial &&
!get_bool_param(r->context, TRUE,
krb5_principal_get_realm(r->context, cprincipal),
"require_initial_kca_tickets")) {
ret = mk_error_response(r->context, r, 4, KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY,
"Client used non-INITIAL tickets, but kx509 "
"service is configured to require INITIAL "
"tickets");
goto out;
}
if (ret == 0)
ret = krb5_unparse_name(r->context, cprincipal, &r->cname);
/* Check that the service name is a valid kx509 service name */
if (ret == 0)
ret = krb5_ticket_get_server(r->context, ticket, &sprincipal);
if (ret == 0)
r->realm = krb5_principal_get_realm(r->context, sprincipal);
if (ret == 0)
ret = krb5_unparse_name(r->context, sprincipal, &r->sname);
if (ret == 0)
ret = kdc_kx509_verify_service_principal(r->context, r, sprincipal);
if (ret) {
ret = mk_error_response(r->context, r, 4, ret,
"kx509 client used incorrect service name");
goto out;
}
/* Authenticate the rest of the request */
ret = verify_req_hash(r->context, &r->req, r->key);
if (ret) {
ret = mk_error_response(r->context, r, 4, ret,
"Incorrect request HMAC on kx509 request");
goto out;
}
if (r->req.pk_key.length == 0) {
/*
* The request is an authenticated kx509 service availability probe.
*
* mk_error_response() will check whether the service is enabled and
* possibly change the error code and message.
*/
is_probe = 1;
kdc_audit_addkv((kdc_request_t)r, 0, "probe", "authenticated");
ret = mk_error_response(r->context, r, 4, 0,
"kx509 authenticated probe request");
goto out;
}
/* Extract and parse CSR or a DER-encoded RSA public key */
ret = get_csr(r->context, r);
if (ret) {
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(r->context, ret);
ret = mk_error_response(r->context, r, 3, ret,
"Failed to parse CSR: %s", msg);
krb5_free_error_message(r->context, msg);
goto out;
}
/* Authorize the request */
ret = check_authz(r->context, r, cprincipal);
if (ret) {
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(r->context, ret);
ret = mk_error_response(r->context, r, 3, ret,
"Rejected by policy: %s", msg);
krb5_free_error_message(r->context, msg);
goto out;
}
/* Issue the certificate */
ALLOC(rep.hash);
ALLOC(rep.certificate);
if (rep.certificate == NULL || rep.hash == NULL) {
ret = mk_error_response(r->context, r, 0, ENOMEM,
"Could allocate memory for response");
goto out;
}
krb5_data_zero(rep.hash);
krb5_data_zero(rep.certificate);
krb5_ticket_get_times(r->context, ticket, &r->ticket_times);
ret = kdc_issue_certificate(r->context, r->config->app, r->logf, r->csr,
cprincipal, &r->ticket_times, 0 /*req_life*/,
r->send_chain, &certs);
if (ret) {
int level = 1;
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(r->context, ret);
if (ret == KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY)
level = 4; /* _kdc_audit_trail() logs at level 3 */
ret = mk_error_response(r->context, r, level, ret,
"Certificate isuance failed: %s", msg);
krb5_free_error_message(r->context, msg);
goto out;
}
ret = encode_cert_and_chain(r->context->hx509ctx, certs, rep.certificate);
if (ret) {
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(r->context, ret);
ret = mk_error_response(r->context, r, 1, ret,
"Could not encode certificate and chain: %s",
msg);
krb5_free_error_message(r->context, msg);
goto out;
}
/* Authenticate the response */
ret = calculate_reply_hash(r->context, r->key, &rep);
if (ret) {
ret = mk_error_response(r->context, r, 1, ret,
"Failed to compute response HMAC");
goto out;
}
/* Encode and output reply */
ret = encode_reply(r->context, r, &rep);
if (ret)
/* Can't send an error message either in this case, surely */
kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)r, "Could not encode response");
out:
hx509_certs_free(&certs);
if (ret == 0 && !is_probe)
kdc_audit_setkv_bool((kdc_request_t)r, "cert_issued", TRUE);
else
kdc_audit_setkv_bool((kdc_request_t)r, "cert_issued", FALSE);
if (r->ac)
krb5_auth_con_free(r->context, r->ac);
if (ticket)
krb5_free_ticket(r->context, ticket);
if (id)
krb5_kt_close(r->context, id);
if (sprincipal)
krb5_free_principal(r->context, sprincipal);
if (cprincipal)
krb5_free_principal(r->context, cprincipal);
if (r->key)
krb5_free_keyblock (r->context, r->key);
hx509_request_free(&r->csr);
free_Kx509CSRPlus(&r->csr_plus);
free_Kx509Response(&rep);
free_Kx509Request(&r->req);
return ret;
}
#endif /* KX509 */