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ac1cdffe7c
samba-mirror/source4/kdc/db-glue.c
Stefan Metzmacher ac1cdffe7c s4:kdc: samba_kdc_fetch_server() only needs sdb_entry 
sdb_entry_ex will be removed shortly.

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
2022-03-24 09:19:33 +00:00

3212 lines
86 KiB
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/*
Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
Database Glue between Samba and the KDC
Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2005-2009
Copyright (C) Simo Sorce <idra@samba.org> 2010
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include "libcli/security/security.h"
#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_security.h"
#include "auth/auth.h"
#include "auth/auth_sam.h"
#include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h"
#include "dsdb/common/util.h"
#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_drsblobs.h"
#include "param/param.h"
#include "param/secrets.h"
#include "../lib/crypto/md4.h"
#include "system/kerberos.h"
#include "auth/kerberos/kerberos.h"
#include "kdc/sdb.h"
#include "kdc/samba_kdc.h"
#include "kdc/db-glue.h"
#include "kdc/pac-glue.h"
#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_irpc_c.h"
#include "lib/messaging/irpc.h"
#undef strcasecmp
#undef strncasecmp
#define SAMBA_KVNO_GET_KRBTGT(kvno) \
((uint16_t)(((uint32_t)kvno) >> 16))
#define SAMBA_KVNO_GET_VALUE(kvno) \
((uint16_t)(((uint32_t)kvno) & 0xFFFF))
#define SAMBA_KVNO_AND_KRBTGT(kvno, krbtgt) \
((krb5_kvno)((((uint32_t)kvno) & 0xFFFF) | \
((((uint32_t)krbtgt) << 16) & 0xFFFF0000)))
enum samba_kdc_ent_type
{ SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_TRUST, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY };
enum trust_direction {
UNKNOWN = 0,
INBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_INBOUND,
OUTBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND
};
static const char *trust_attrs[] = {
"securityIdentifier",
"flatName",
"trustPartner",
"trustAttributes",
"trustDirection",
"trustType",
"msDS-TrustForestTrustInfo",
"trustAuthIncoming",
"trustAuthOutgoing",
"whenCreated",
"msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
NULL
};
/*
send a message to the drepl server telling it to initiate a
REPL_SECRET getncchanges extended op to fetch the users secrets
*/
static void auth_sam_trigger_repl_secret(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct imessaging_context *msg_ctx,
struct tevent_context *event_ctx,
struct ldb_dn *user_dn)
{
struct dcerpc_binding_handle *irpc_handle;
struct drepl_trigger_repl_secret r;
struct tevent_req *req;
TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx;
tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx);
if (tmp_ctx == NULL) {
return;
}
irpc_handle = irpc_binding_handle_by_name(tmp_ctx, msg_ctx,
"dreplsrv",
&ndr_table_irpc);
if (irpc_handle == NULL) {
DEBUG(1,(__location__ ": Unable to get binding handle for dreplsrv\n"));
TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
return;
}
r.in.user_dn = ldb_dn_get_linearized(user_dn);
/*
* This seem to rely on the current IRPC implementation,
* which delivers the message in the _send function.
*
* TODO: we need a ONE_WAY IRPC handle and register
* a callback and wait for it to be triggered!
*/
req = dcerpc_drepl_trigger_repl_secret_r_send(tmp_ctx,
event_ctx,
irpc_handle,
&r);
/* we aren't interested in a reply */
talloc_free(req);
TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
}
static time_t ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(struct ldb_message *msg, const char *attr, time_t default_val)
{
const char *tmp;
const char *gentime;
struct tm tm;
gentime = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, attr, NULL);
if (!gentime)
return default_val;
tmp = strptime(gentime, "%Y%m%d%H%M%SZ", &tm);
if (tmp == NULL) {
return default_val;
}
return timegm(&tm);
}
static struct SDBFlags uf2SDBFlags(krb5_context context, uint32_t userAccountControl, enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type)
{
struct SDBFlags flags = int2SDBFlags(0);
/* we don't allow kadmin deletes */
flags.immutable = 1;
/* mark the principal as invalid to start with */
flags.invalid = 1;
flags.renewable = 1;
/* All accounts are servers, but this may be disabled again in the caller */
flags.server = 1;
/* Account types - clear the invalid bit if it turns out to be valid */
if (userAccountControl & UF_NORMAL_ACCOUNT) {
if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
flags.client = 1;
}
flags.invalid = 0;
}
if (userAccountControl & UF_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
flags.client = 1;
}
flags.invalid = 0;
}
if (userAccountControl & UF_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
flags.client = 1;
}
flags.invalid = 0;
}
if (userAccountControl & UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
flags.client = 1;
}
flags.invalid = 0;
}
/* Not permitted to act as a client if disabled */
if (userAccountControl & UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE) {
flags.client = 0;
}
if (userAccountControl & UF_LOCKOUT) {
flags.locked_out = 1;
}
/*
if (userAccountControl & UF_PASSWORD_NOTREQD) {
flags.invalid = 1;
}
*/
/*
UF_PASSWORD_CANT_CHANGE and UF_ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PASSWORD_ALLOWED are irrelevent
*/
if (userAccountControl & UF_TEMP_DUPLICATE_ACCOUNT) {
flags.invalid = 1;
}
/* UF_DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD and UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY handled in samba_kdc_message2entry() */
/*
if (userAccountControl & UF_MNS_LOGON_ACCOUNT) {
flags.invalid = 1;
}
*/
if (userAccountControl & UF_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED) {
flags.require_hwauth = 1;
}
if (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION) {
flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
}
if (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_TO_AUTHENTICATE_FOR_DELEGATION) {
/*
* this is confusing...
*
* UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION
* => ok_as_delegate
*
* and
*
* UF_TRUSTED_TO_AUTHENTICATE_FOR_DELEGATION
* => trusted_for_delegation
*/
flags.trusted_for_delegation = 1;
}
if (!(userAccountControl & UF_NOT_DELEGATED)) {
flags.forwardable = 1;
flags.proxiable = 1;
}
if (userAccountControl & UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH) {
flags.require_preauth = 0;
} else {
flags.require_preauth = 1;
}
if (userAccountControl & UF_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED) {
flags.no_auth_data_reqd = 1;
}
return flags;
}
static int samba_kdc_entry_destructor(struct samba_kdc_entry *p)
{
if (p->db_entry != NULL) {
/*
* A sdb_entry still has a reference
*/
return -1;
}
if (p->kdc_entry != NULL) {
/*
* hdb_entry or krb5_db_entry still
* have a reference...
*/
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Sort keys in descending order of strength.
*
* Explanaton from Greg Hudson:
*
* To encrypt tickets only the first returned key is used by the MIT KDC. The
* other keys just communicate support for session key enctypes, and aren't
* really used. The encryption key for the ticket enc part doesn't have
* to be of a type requested by the client. The session key enctype is chosen
* based on the client preference order, limited by the set of enctypes present
* in the server keys (unless the string attribute is set on the server
* principal overriding that set).
*/
static int sdb_key_strength_priority(krb5_enctype etype)
{
static const krb5_enctype etype_list[] = {
ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1,
ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5,
ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD4,
ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC,
ENCTYPE_NULL
};
int i;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(etype_list); i++) {
if (etype == etype_list[i]) {
break;
}
}
return ARRAY_SIZE(etype_list) - i;
}
static int sdb_key_strength_cmp(const struct sdb_key *k1, const struct sdb_key *k2)
{
int p1 = sdb_key_strength_priority(KRB5_KEY_TYPE(&k1->key));
int p2 = sdb_key_strength_priority(KRB5_KEY_TYPE(&k2->key));
if (p1 == p2) {
return 0;
}
if (p1 > p2) {
/*
* Higher priority comes first
*/
return -1;
} else {
return 1;
}
}
static void samba_kdc_sort_keys(struct sdb_keys *keys)
{
if (keys == NULL) {
return;
}
TYPESAFE_QSORT(keys->val, keys->len, sdb_key_strength_cmp);
}
int samba_kdc_set_fixed_keys(krb5_context context,
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
const struct ldb_val *secretbuffer,
bool is_protected,
struct sdb_keys *keys)
{
uint32_t supported_enctypes = ENC_ALL_TYPES;
uint16_t allocated_keys = 0;
int ret;
allocated_keys = 3;
keys->len = 0;
keys->val = calloc(allocated_keys, sizeof(struct sdb_key));
if (keys->val == NULL) {
memset(secretbuffer->data, 0, secretbuffer->length);
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
if (is_protected) {
supported_enctypes &= ~ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5;
}
if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256) {
struct sdb_key key = {};
ret = smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context,
ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
secretbuffer->data,
MIN(secretbuffer->length, 32),
&key.key);
if (ret) {
memset(secretbuffer->data, 0, secretbuffer->length);
goto out;
}
keys->val[keys->len] = key;
keys->len++;
}
if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128) {
struct sdb_key key = {};
ret = smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context,
ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
secretbuffer->data,
MIN(secretbuffer->length, 16),
&key.key);
if (ret) {
memset(secretbuffer->data, 0, secretbuffer->length);
goto out;
}
keys->val[keys->len] = key;
keys->len++;
}
if (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5) {
struct sdb_key key = {};
ret = smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context,
ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
secretbuffer->data,
MIN(secretbuffer->length, 16),
&key.key);
if (ret) {
memset(secretbuffer->data, 0, secretbuffer->length);
goto out;
}
keys->val[keys->len] = key;
keys->len++;
}
ret = 0;
out:
return ret;
}
static int samba_kdc_set_random_keys(krb5_context context,
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
struct sdb_keys *keys,
bool is_protected)
{
struct ldb_val secret_val;
uint8_t secretbuffer[32];
/*
* Fake keys until we have a better way to reject
* non-pkinit requests.
*
* We just need to indicate which encryption types are
* supported.
*/
generate_secret_buffer(secretbuffer, sizeof(secretbuffer));
secret_val = data_blob_const(secretbuffer,
sizeof(secretbuffer));
return samba_kdc_set_fixed_keys(context, kdc_db_ctx,
&secret_val,
is_protected,
keys);
}
struct samba_kdc_user_keys {
struct sdb_keys *skeys;
uint32_t kvno;
uint32_t *returned_kvno;
uint32_t supported_enctypes;
uint32_t *available_enctypes;
const struct samr_Password *nthash;
const char *salt_string;
uint16_t num_pkeys;
const struct package_PrimaryKerberosKey4 *pkeys;
};
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fill_user_keys(krb5_context context,
struct samba_kdc_user_keys *p)
{
/*
* Make sure we'll never reveal DES keys
*/
uint32_t supported_enctypes = p->supported_enctypes & ENC_ALL_TYPES;
uint32_t _available_enctypes = 0;
uint32_t *available_enctypes = p->available_enctypes;
uint32_t _returned_kvno = 0;
uint32_t *returned_kvno = p->returned_kvno;
uint32_t num_pkeys = p->num_pkeys;
uint32_t allocated_keys = num_pkeys;
uint32_t i;
int ret;
if (available_enctypes == NULL) {
available_enctypes = &_available_enctypes;
}
*available_enctypes = 0;
if (returned_kvno == NULL) {
returned_kvno = &_returned_kvno;
}
*returned_kvno = p->kvno;
if (p->nthash != NULL) {
allocated_keys += 1;
}
allocated_keys = MAX(1, allocated_keys);
/* allocate space to decode into */
p->skeys->len = 0;
p->skeys->val = calloc(allocated_keys, sizeof(struct sdb_key));
if (p->skeys->val == NULL) {
return ENOMEM;
}
for (i=0; i < num_pkeys; i++) {
struct sdb_key key = {};
uint32_t enctype_bit;
if (p->pkeys[i].value == NULL) {
continue;
}
enctype_bit = kerberos_enctype_to_bitmap(p->pkeys[i].keytype);
if (!(enctype_bit & supported_enctypes)) {
continue;
}
if (p->salt_string != NULL) {
DATA_BLOB salt;
salt = data_blob_string_const(p->salt_string);
key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
if (key.salt == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto fail;
}
key.salt->type = KRB5_PW_SALT;
ret = smb_krb5_copy_data_contents(&key.salt->salt,
salt.data,
salt.length);
if (ret) {
ZERO_STRUCTP(key.salt);
sdb_key_free(&key);
goto fail;
}
}
ret = smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context,
p->pkeys[i].keytype,
p->pkeys[i].value->data,
p->pkeys[i].value->length,
&key.key);
if (ret == 0) {
p->skeys->val[p->skeys->len++] = key;
*available_enctypes |= enctype_bit;
continue;
}
ZERO_STRUCT(key.key);
sdb_key_free(&key);
if (ret == KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP) {
DEBUG(2,("Unsupported keytype ignored - type %u\n",
p->pkeys[i].keytype));
ret = 0;
continue;
}
goto fail;
}
if (p->nthash != NULL && (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5)) {
struct sdb_key key = {};
ret = smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context,
ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
p->nthash->hash,
sizeof(p->nthash->hash),
&key.key);
if (ret == 0) {
p->skeys->val[p->skeys->len++] = key;
*available_enctypes |= ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5;
} else if (ret == KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP) {
DEBUG(2,("Unsupported keytype ignored - type %u\n",
ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC));
ret = 0;
}
if (ret != 0) {
goto fail;
}
}
samba_kdc_sort_keys(p->skeys);
return 0;
fail:
sdb_keys_free(p->skeys);
return ret;
}
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(krb5_context context,
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct ldb_message *msg,
uint32_t rid,
bool is_rodc,
uint32_t userAccountControl,
enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type,
struct sdb_entry *entry,
bool is_protected,
uint32_t *supported_enctypes_out)
{
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
struct samr_Password *hash;
const struct ldb_val *sc_val;
struct supplementalCredentialsBlob scb;
struct supplementalCredentialsPackage *scpk = NULL;
struct package_PrimaryKerberosBlob _pkb;
struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr4 *pkb4 = NULL;
bool is_krbtgt = false;
int krbtgt_number = 0;
uint32_t current_kvno;
uint32_t returned_kvno = 0;
uint16_t i;
struct samba_kdc_user_keys keys = { .num_pkeys = 0, };
uint32_t available_enctypes = 0;
uint32_t supported_enctypes
= ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg,
"msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
0);
*supported_enctypes_out = 0;
if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT || is_rodc) {
bool enable_fast;
/* KDCs (and KDCs on RODCs) use AES */
supported_enctypes |= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128 | ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256;
is_krbtgt = true;
enable_fast = lpcfg_kdc_enable_fast(kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx);
if (enable_fast) {
supported_enctypes |= ENC_FAST_SUPPORTED;
}
} else if (userAccountControl & (UF_PARTIAL_SECRETS_ACCOUNT|UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT)) {
/* DCs and RODCs comptuer accounts use AES */
supported_enctypes |= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128 | ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256;
} else if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT ||
(ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY)) {
/* for AS-REQ the client chooses the enc types it
* supports, and this will vary between computers a
* user logs in from.
*
* likewise for 'any' return as much as is supported,
* to export into a keytab */
supported_enctypes = ENC_ALL_TYPES;
}
/* If UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY has been set, then don't allow use of the newer enc types */
if (userAccountControl & UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY) {
supported_enctypes = 0;
} else {
/* Otherwise, add in the default enc types */
supported_enctypes |= ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5;
}
if (is_protected) {
supported_enctypes &= ~ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5;
}
/* Is this the krbtgt or a RODC krbtgt */
if (is_rodc) {
krbtgt_number = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1);
if (krbtgt_number == -1) {
return EINVAL;
}
if (krbtgt_number == 0) {
return EINVAL;
}
}
if ((ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT)
&& (userAccountControl & UF_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED)) {
ret = samba_kdc_set_random_keys(context,
kdc_db_ctx,
&entry->keys,
is_protected);
*supported_enctypes_out = supported_enctypes;
goto out;
}
current_kvno = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber", 0);
if (is_krbtgt) {
/*
* Even for the main krbtgt account
* we have to strictly split the kvno into
* two 16-bit parts and the upper 16-bit
* need to be all zero, even if
* the msDS-KeyVersionNumber has a value
* larger than 65535.
*
* See https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14951
*/
current_kvno = SAMBA_KVNO_GET_VALUE(current_kvno);
}
/* Get keys from the db */
hash = samdb_result_hash(mem_ctx, msg, "unicodePwd");
sc_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "supplementalCredentials");
/* supplementalCredentials if present */
if (sc_val) {
ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob_all(sc_val, mem_ctx, &scb,
(ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_supplementalCredentialsBlob);
if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
dump_data(0, sc_val->data, sc_val->length);
ret = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (scb.sub.signature != SUPPLEMENTAL_CREDENTIALS_SIGNATURE) {
if (scb.sub.num_packages != 0) {
NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(supplementalCredentialsBlob, &scb);
ret = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
}
for (i=0; i < scb.sub.num_packages; i++) {
if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) {
scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i];
if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) {
scpk = NULL;
continue;
}
break;
}
}
}
/*
* Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys element
* of supplementalCredentials
*
* The legacy Primary:Kerberos only contains
* single DES keys, which are completely ignored
* now.
*/
if (scpk) {
DATA_BLOB blob;
blob = strhex_to_data_blob(mem_ctx, scpk->data);
if (!blob.data) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
/* we cannot use ndr_pull_struct_blob_all() here, as w2k and w2k3 add padding bytes */
ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob, mem_ctx, &_pkb,
(ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_package_PrimaryKerberosBlob);
if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
ret = EINVAL;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
goto out;
}
if (_pkb.version != 4) {
ret = EINVAL;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
goto out;
}
pkb4 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr4;
}
keys = (struct samba_kdc_user_keys) {
.kvno = current_kvno,
.supported_enctypes = supported_enctypes,
.nthash = hash,
.salt_string = pkb4 != NULL ? pkb4->salt.string : NULL,
.num_pkeys = pkb4 != NULL ? pkb4->num_keys : 0,
.pkeys = pkb4 != NULL ? pkb4->keys : NULL,
.skeys = &entry->keys,
.available_enctypes = &available_enctypes,
.returned_kvno = &returned_kvno,
};
if (keys.skeys != NULL) {
ret = samba_kdc_fill_user_keys(context, &keys);
if (ret != 0) {
goto out;
}
}
*supported_enctypes_out |= available_enctypes;
/* Set FAST support bits */
*supported_enctypes_out |= supported_enctypes & (ENC_FAST_SUPPORTED |
ENC_COMPOUND_IDENTITY_SUPPORTED |
ENC_CLAIMS_SUPPORTED);
if (is_krbtgt) {
/*
* Even for the main krbtgt account
* we have to strictly split the kvno into
* two 16-bit parts and the upper 16-bit
* need to be all zero, even if
* the msDS-KeyVersionNumber has a value
* larger than 65535.
*
* See https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14951
*/
returned_kvno = SAMBA_KVNO_AND_KRBTGT(returned_kvno, krbtgt_number);
}
entry->kvno = returned_kvno;
if (entry->keys.len == 0) {
if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
/* We are on an RODC, but don't have keys for this account. Signal this to the caller */
auth_sam_trigger_repl_secret(kdc_db_ctx, kdc_db_ctx->msg_ctx,
kdc_db_ctx->ev_ctx, msg->dn);
return SDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE;
}
/*
* oh, no password. Apparently (comment in
* hdb-ldap.c) this violates the ASN.1, but this
* allows an entry with no keys (yet).
*/
}
out:
return ret;
}
static int principal_comp_strcmp_int(krb5_context context,
krb5_const_principal principal,
unsigned int component,
const char *string,
bool do_strcasecmp)
{
const char *p;
size_t len;
#if defined(HAVE_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_GET_COMP_STRING)
p = krb5_principal_get_comp_string(context, principal, component);
if (p == NULL) {
return -1;
}
len = strlen(p);
#else
krb5_data *d;
if (component >= krb5_princ_size(context, principal)) {
return -1;
}
d = krb5_princ_component(context, principal, component);
if (d == NULL) {
return -1;
}
p = d->data;
len = d->length;
#endif
if (do_strcasecmp) {
return strncasecmp(p, string, len);
} else {
return strncmp(p, string, len);
}
}
static int principal_comp_strcasecmp(krb5_context context,
krb5_const_principal principal,
unsigned int component,
const char *string)
{
return principal_comp_strcmp_int(context, principal,
component, string, true);
}
static int principal_comp_strcmp(krb5_context context,
krb5_const_principal principal,
unsigned int component,
const char *string)
{
return principal_comp_strcmp_int(context, principal,
component, string, false);
}
/*
* Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
*/
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry(krb5_context context,
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
krb5_const_principal principal,
enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type,
unsigned flags,
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
struct ldb_message *msg,
struct sdb_entry *entry)
{
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
uint32_t userAccountControl;
uint32_t msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed;
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
krb5_boolean is_computer = FALSE;
struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
uint32_t supported_enctypes = 0;
NTTIME acct_expiry;
NTSTATUS status;
bool protected_user = false;
uint32_t rid;
bool is_rodc = false;
struct ldb_message_element *objectclasses;
struct ldb_val computer_val = data_blob_string_const("computer");
const char *samAccountName = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "samAccountName", NULL);
ZERO_STRUCTP(entry);
if (ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber")) {
is_rodc = true;
}
if (!samAccountName) {
ret = ENOENT;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry: no samAccountName present");
goto out;
}
objectclasses = ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "objectClass");
if (objectclasses && ldb_msg_find_val(objectclasses, &computer_val)) {
is_computer = TRUE;
}
p = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
if (!p) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
p->is_rodc = is_rodc;
p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx;
p->realm_dn = talloc_reference(p, realm_dn);
if (!p->realm_dn) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor);
entry->skdc_entry = p;
userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg, "userAccountControl", 0);
msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed
= ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg,
"msDS-User-Account-Control-Computed",
UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE);
/*
* This brings in the lockout flag, block the account if not
* found. We need the weird UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE check because
* we do not want to fail open if the value is not returned,
* but 0 is a valid value (all OK)
*/
if (msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed == UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE) {
ret = EINVAL;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry: "
"no msDS-User-Account-Control-Computed present");
goto out;
} else {
userAccountControl |= msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed;
}
/*
* If we are set to canonicalize, we get back the fixed UPPER
* case realm, and the real username (ie matching LDAP
* samAccountName)
*
* Otherwise, if we are set to enterprise, we
* get back the whole principal as-sent
*
* Finally, if we are not set to canonicalize, we get back the
* fixed UPPER case realm, but the as-sent username
*/
if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT) {
p->is_krbtgt = true;
if (flags & (SDB_F_CANON|SDB_F_FORCE_CANON)) {
/*
* When requested to do so, ensure that the
* both realm values in the principal are set
* to the upper case, canonical realm
*/
ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context, &entry->principal,
lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "krbtgt",
lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), NULL);
if (ret) {
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
goto out;
}
smb_krb5_principal_set_type(context, entry->principal, KRB5_NT_SRV_INST);
} else {
ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, principal, &entry->principal);
if (ret) {
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
goto out;
}
/*
* this appears to be required regardless of
* the canonicalize flag from the client
*/
ret = smb_krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry->principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
if (ret) {
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
goto out;
}
}
} else if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY && principal == NULL) {
ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context, &entry->principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), samAccountName, NULL);
if (ret) {
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
goto out;
}
} else if ((flags & SDB_F_FORCE_CANON) ||
((flags & SDB_F_CANON) && (flags & SDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ))) {
/*
* SDB_F_CANON maps from the canonicalize flag in the
* packet, and has a different meaning between AS-REQ
* and TGS-REQ. We only change the principal in the AS-REQ case
*
* The SDB_F_FORCE_CANON if for new MIT KDC code that wants
* the canonical name in all lookups, and takes care to
* canonicalize only when appropriate.
*/
ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context, &entry->principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), samAccountName, NULL);
if (ret) {
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
goto out;
}
} else {
ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, principal, &entry->principal);
if (ret) {
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
goto out;
}
/* While we have copied the client principal, tests
* show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
* the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
* replace the client principal's realm with the one
* we determine from our records */
/* this has to be with malloc() */
ret = smb_krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry->principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
if (ret) {
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
goto out;
}
}
/* First try and figure out the flags based on the userAccountControl */
entry->flags = uf2SDBFlags(context, userAccountControl, ent_type);
/*
* Take control of the returned principal here, rather than
* allowing the Heimdal code to do it as we have specific
* behaviour around the forced realm to honour
*/
entry->flags.force_canonicalize = true;
/* Windows 2008 seems to enforce this (very sensible) rule by
* default - don't allow offline attacks on a user's password
* by asking for a ticket to them as a service (encrypted with
* their probably patheticly insecure password) */
if (entry->flags.server
&& lpcfg_parm_bool(lp_ctx, NULL, "kdc", "require spn for service", true)) {
if (!is_computer && !ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "servicePrincipalName", NULL)) {
entry->flags.server = 0;
}
}
/*
* We restrict a 3-part SPN ending in my domain/realm to full
* domain controllers.
*
* This avoids any cases where (eg) a demoted DC still has
* these more restricted SPNs.
*/
if (krb5_princ_size(context, principal) > 2) {
char *third_part
= smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(mem_ctx,
context,
principal,
2);
bool is_our_realm =
lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx,
third_part);
bool is_dc = userAccountControl &
(UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT | UF_PARTIAL_SECRETS_ACCOUNT);
if (is_our_realm && !is_dc) {
entry->flags.server = 0;
}
}
/*
* To give the correct type of error to the client, we must
* not just return the entry without .server set, we must
* pretend the principal does not exist. Otherwise we may
* return ERR_POLICY instead of
* KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN
*/
if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER && entry->flags.server == 0) {
ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry: no servicePrincipalName present for this server, refusing with no-such-entry");
goto out;
}
if (flags & SDB_F_ADMIN_DATA) {
/* These (created_by, modified_by) parts of the entry are not relevant for Samba4's use
* of the Heimdal KDC. They are stored in a the traditional
* DB for audit purposes, and still form part of the structure
* we must return */
/* use 'whenCreated' */
entry->created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
/* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context,
&entry->created_by.principal,
lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "kadmin", NULL);
if (ret) {
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
goto out;
}
entry->modified_by = (struct sdb_event *) malloc(sizeof(struct sdb_event));
if (entry->modified_by == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "malloc: out of memory");
goto out;
}
/* use 'whenChanged' */
entry->modified_by->time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenChanged", 0);
/* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context,
&entry->modified_by->principal,
lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "kadmin", NULL);
if (ret) {
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
goto out;
}
}
/* The lack of password controls etc applies to krbtgt by
* virtue of being that particular RID */
status = dom_sid_split_rid(NULL, samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid"), NULL, &rid);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
ret = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT) {
char *realm = NULL;
entry->valid_end = NULL;
entry->pw_end = NULL;
entry->flags.invalid = 0;
entry->flags.server = 1;
realm = smb_krb5_principal_get_realm(
mem_ctx, context, principal);
if (realm == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
/* Don't mark all requests for the krbtgt/realm as
* 'change password', as otherwise we could get into
* trouble, and not enforce the password expirty.
* Instead, only do it when request is for the kpasswd service */
if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER
&& krb5_princ_size(context, principal) == 2
&& (principal_comp_strcmp(context, principal, 0, "kadmin") == 0)
&& (principal_comp_strcmp(context, principal, 1, "changepw") == 0)
&& lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, realm)) {
entry->flags.change_pw = 1;
}
TALLOC_FREE(realm);
entry->flags.client = 0;
entry->flags.forwardable = 1;
entry->flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
} else if (is_rodc) {
/* The RODC krbtgt account is like the main krbtgt,
* but it does not have a changepw or kadmin
* service */
entry->valid_end = NULL;
entry->pw_end = NULL;
/* Also don't allow the RODC krbtgt to be a client (it should not be needed) */
entry->flags.client = 0;
entry->flags.invalid = 0;
entry->flags.server = 1;
entry->flags.client = 0;
entry->flags.forwardable = 1;
entry->flags.ok_as_delegate = 0;
} else if (entry->flags.server && ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) {
/* The account/password expiry only applies when the account is used as a
* client (ie password login), not when used as a server */
/* Make very well sure we don't use this for a client,
* it could bypass the password restrictions */
entry->flags.client = 0;
entry->valid_end = NULL;
entry->pw_end = NULL;
} else {
NTTIME must_change_time
= samdb_result_nttime(msg,
"msDS-UserPasswordExpiryTimeComputed",
0);
if (must_change_time == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
entry->pw_end = NULL;
} else {
entry->pw_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry->pw_end));
if (entry->pw_end == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
*entry->pw_end = nt_time_to_unix(must_change_time);
}
acct_expiry = samdb_result_account_expires(msg);
if (acct_expiry == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
entry->valid_end = NULL;
} else {
entry->valid_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry->valid_end));
if (entry->valid_end == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
*entry->valid_end = nt_time_to_unix(acct_expiry);
}
}
entry->valid_start = NULL;
entry->max_life = malloc(sizeof(*entry->max_life));
if (entry->max_life == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) {
*entry->max_life = kdc_db_ctx->policy.svc_tkt_lifetime;
} else if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT) {
*entry->max_life = kdc_db_ctx->policy.usr_tkt_lifetime;
} else {
*entry->max_life = MIN(kdc_db_ctx->policy.svc_tkt_lifetime,
kdc_db_ctx->policy.usr_tkt_lifetime);
}
entry->max_renew = malloc(sizeof(*entry->max_renew));
if (entry->max_renew == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
*entry->max_renew = kdc_db_ctx->policy.renewal_lifetime;
if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT && (flags & SDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ)) {
int result;
struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc = NULL;
/*
* These protections only apply to clients, so servers in the
* Protected Users group may still have service tickets to them
* encrypted with RC4. For accounts looked up as servers, note
* that 'msg' does not contain the 'memberOf' attribute for
* determining whether the account is a member of Protected
* Users.
*
* Additionally, Microsoft advises that accounts for services
* and computers should never be members of Protected Users, or
* they may fail to authenticate.
*/
status = samba_kdc_get_user_info_from_db(p, msg, &user_info_dc);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
ret = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
result = dsdb_is_protected_user(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
user_info_dc->sids,
user_info_dc->num_sids);
if (result == -1) {
ret = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
protected_user = result;
if (protected_user) {
*entry->max_life = MIN(*entry->max_life, 4 * 60 * 60);
*entry->max_renew = MIN(*entry->max_renew, 4 * 60 * 60);
entry->flags.forwardable = 0;
entry->flags.proxiable = 0;
}
}
/* Get keys from the db */
ret = samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(context, kdc_db_ctx, p, msg,
rid, is_rodc, userAccountControl,
ent_type, entry,
protected_user, &supported_enctypes);
if (ret) {
/* Could be bogus data in the entry, or out of memory */
goto out;
}
p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
p->supported_enctypes = supported_enctypes;
out:
if (ret != 0) {
/* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
sdb_entry_free(entry);
} else {
talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, p);
}
return ret;
}
/*
* Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
* The kvno is what the remote client asked for
*/
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(krb5_context context,
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
enum trust_direction direction,
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
unsigned flags,
uint32_t kvno,
struct ldb_message *msg,
struct sdb_entry *entry)
{
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
const char *our_realm = lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx);
char *partner_realm = NULL;
const char *realm = NULL;
const char *krbtgt_realm = NULL;
DATA_BLOB password_utf16 = data_blob_null;
DATA_BLOB password_utf8 = data_blob_null;
struct samr_Password _password_hash;
const struct samr_Password *password_hash = NULL;
const struct ldb_val *password_val;
struct trustAuthInOutBlob password_blob;
struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
bool use_previous = false;
uint32_t current_kvno;
uint32_t previous_kvno;
uint32_t num_keys = 0;
enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
int ret;
unsigned int i;
struct AuthenticationInformationArray *auth_array;
struct timeval tv;
NTTIME an_hour_ago;
uint32_t *auth_kvno;
bool preferr_current = false;
uint32_t supported_enctypes = ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5;
struct lsa_TrustDomainInfoInfoEx *tdo = NULL;
NTSTATUS status;
ZERO_STRUCTP(entry);
if (dsdb_functional_level(kdc_db_ctx->samdb) >= DS_DOMAIN_FUNCTION_2008) {
supported_enctypes = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg,
"msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
supported_enctypes);
}
status = dsdb_trust_parse_tdo_info(mem_ctx, msg, &tdo);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
if (!(tdo->trust_direction & direction)) {
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
goto out;
}
if (tdo->trust_type != LSA_TRUST_TYPE_UPLEVEL) {
/*
* Only UPLEVEL domains support kerberos here,
* as we don't support LSA_TRUST_TYPE_MIT.
*/
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
goto out;
}
if (tdo->trust_attributes & LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_CROSS_ORGANIZATION) {
/*
* We don't support selective authentication yet.
*/
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
goto out;
}
if (tdo->domain_name.string == NULL) {
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
goto out;
}
partner_realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, tdo->domain_name.string);
if (partner_realm == NULL) {
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
if (direction == INBOUND) {
realm = our_realm;
krbtgt_realm = partner_realm;
password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthIncoming");
} else { /* OUTBOUND */
realm = partner_realm;
krbtgt_realm = our_realm;
password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthOutgoing");
}
if (password_val == NULL) {
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
goto out;
}
ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(password_val, mem_ctx, &password_blob,
(ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_trustAuthInOutBlob);
if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
ret = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
p = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
if (!p) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
p->is_trust = true;
p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx;
p->realm_dn = realm_dn;
p->supported_enctypes = supported_enctypes;
talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor);
entry->skdc_entry = p;
/* use 'whenCreated' */
entry->created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
/* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context,
&entry->created_by.principal,
realm, "kadmin", NULL);
if (ret) {
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
goto out;
}
/*
* We always need to generate the canonicalized principal
* with the values of our database.
*/
ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context, &entry->principal, realm,
"krbtgt", krbtgt_realm, NULL);
if (ret) {
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
goto out;
}
smb_krb5_principal_set_type(context, entry->principal,
KRB5_NT_SRV_INST);
entry->valid_start = NULL;
/* we need to work out if we are going to use the current or
* the previous password hash.
* We base this on the kvno the client passes in. If the kvno
* passed in is equal to the current kvno in our database then
* we use the current structure. If it is the current kvno-1,
* then we use the previous substrucure.
*/
/*
* Windows preferrs the previous key for one hour.
*/
tv = timeval_current();
if (tv.tv_sec > 3600) {
tv.tv_sec -= 3600;
}
an_hour_ago = timeval_to_nttime(&tv);
/* first work out the current kvno */
current_kvno = 0;
for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) {
struct AuthenticationInformation *a =
&password_blob.current.array[i];
if (a->LastUpdateTime <= an_hour_ago) {
preferr_current = true;
}
if (a->AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_VERSION) {
current_kvno = a->AuthInfo.version.version;
}
}
if (current_kvno == 0) {
previous_kvno = 255;
} else {
previous_kvno = current_kvno - 1;
}
for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) {
struct AuthenticationInformation *a =
&password_blob.previous.array[i];
if (a->AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_VERSION) {
previous_kvno = a->AuthInfo.version.version;
}
}
/* work out whether we will use the previous or current
password */
if (password_blob.previous.count == 0) {
/* there is no previous password */
use_previous = false;
} else if (!(flags & SDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED)) {
/*
* If not specified we use the lowest kvno
* for the first hour after an update.
*/
if (preferr_current) {
use_previous = false;
} else if (previous_kvno < current_kvno) {
use_previous = true;
} else {
use_previous = false;
}
} else if (kvno == current_kvno) {
/*
* Exact match ...
*/
use_previous = false;
} else if (kvno == previous_kvno) {
/*
* Exact match ...
*/
use_previous = true;
} else {
/*
* Fallback to the current one for anything else
*/
use_previous = false;
}
if (use_previous) {
auth_array = &password_blob.previous;
auth_kvno = &previous_kvno;
} else {
auth_array = &password_blob.current;
auth_kvno = &current_kvno;
}
/* use the kvno the client specified, if available */
if (flags & SDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) {
entry->kvno = kvno;
} else {
entry->kvno = *auth_kvno;
}
for (i=0; i < auth_array->count; i++) {
if (auth_array->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_CLEAR) {
bool ok;
password_utf16 = data_blob_const(auth_array->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.password,
auth_array->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.size);
if (password_utf16.length == 0) {
break;
}
if (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5) {
mdfour(_password_hash.hash, password_utf16.data, password_utf16.length);
if (password_hash == NULL) {
num_keys += 1;
}
password_hash = &_password_hash;
}
if (!(supported_enctypes & (ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128|ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256))) {
break;
}
ok = convert_string_talloc(mem_ctx,
CH_UTF16MUNGED, CH_UTF8,
password_utf16.data,
password_utf16.length,
(void *)&password_utf8.data,
&password_utf8.length);
if (!ok) {
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128) {
num_keys += 1;
}
if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256) {
num_keys += 1;
}
break;
} else if (auth_array->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_NT4OWF) {
if (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5) {
password_hash = &auth_array->array[i].AuthInfo.nt4owf.password;
num_keys += 1;
}
}
}
/* Must have found a cleartext or MD4 password */
if (num_keys == 0) {
DEBUG(1,(__location__ ": no usable key found\n"));
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
goto out;
}
entry->keys.val = calloc(num_keys, sizeof(struct sdb_key));
if (entry->keys.val == NULL) {
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
if (password_utf8.length != 0) {
struct sdb_key key = {};
krb5_const_principal salt_principal = entry->principal;
krb5_data salt;
krb5_data cleartext_data;
cleartext_data.data = discard_const_p(char, password_utf8.data);
cleartext_data.length = password_utf8.length;
ret = smb_krb5_get_pw_salt(context,
salt_principal,
&salt);
if (ret != 0) {
goto out;
}
if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256) {
ret = smb_krb5_create_key_from_string(context,
salt_principal,
&salt,
&cleartext_data,
ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
&key.key);
if (ret != 0) {
smb_krb5_free_data_contents(context, &salt);
goto out;
}
entry->keys.val[entry->keys.len] = key;
entry->keys.len++;
}
if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128) {
ret = smb_krb5_create_key_from_string(context,
salt_principal,
&salt,
&cleartext_data,
ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
&key.key);
if (ret != 0) {
smb_krb5_free_data_contents(context, &salt);
goto out;
}
entry->keys.val[entry->keys.len] = key;
entry->keys.len++;
}
smb_krb5_free_data_contents(context, &salt);
}
if (password_hash != NULL) {
struct sdb_key key = {};
ret = smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context,
ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
password_hash->hash,
sizeof(password_hash->hash),
&key.key);
if (ret != 0) {
goto out;
}
entry->keys.val[entry->keys.len] = key;
entry->keys.len++;
}
entry->flags = int2SDBFlags(0);
entry->flags.immutable = 1;
entry->flags.invalid = 0;
entry->flags.server = 1;
entry->flags.require_preauth = 1;
entry->pw_end = NULL;
entry->max_life = NULL;
entry->max_renew = NULL;
/* Match Windows behavior and allow forwardable flag in cross-realm. */
entry->flags.forwardable = 1;
samba_kdc_sort_keys(&entry->keys);
p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
out:
TALLOC_FREE(partner_realm);
if (ret != 0) {
/* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
sdb_entry_free(entry);
} else {
talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, p);
}
return ret;
}
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_trust(krb5_context context, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
const char *realm,
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
struct ldb_message **pmsg)
{
NTSTATUS status;
const char * const *attrs = trust_attrs;
status = dsdb_trust_search_tdo(ldb_ctx, realm, realm,
attrs, mem_ctx, pmsg);
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
return 0;
} else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND)) {
return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
} else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY)) {
int ret = ENOMEM;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "get_sam_result_trust: out of memory");
return ret;
} else {
int ret = EINVAL;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "get_sam_result_trust: %s", nt_errstr(status));
return ret;
}
}
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_client(krb5_context context,
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
krb5_const_principal principal,
const char **attrs,
struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
struct ldb_message **msg)
{
NTSTATUS nt_status;
char *principal_string = NULL;
if (smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
principal_string = smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(mem_ctx, context,
principal, 0);
if (principal_string == NULL) {
return ENOMEM;
}
} else {
char *principal_string_m = NULL;
krb5_error_code ret;
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, principal, &principal_string_m);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
principal_string = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, principal_string_m);
SAFE_FREE(principal_string_m);
if (principal_string == NULL) {
return ENOMEM;
}
}
nt_status = sam_get_results_principal(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
mem_ctx, principal_string, attrs,
realm_dn, msg);
if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER)) {
krb5_principal fallback_principal = NULL;
unsigned int num_comp;
char *fallback_realm = NULL;
char *fallback_account = NULL;
krb5_error_code ret;
ret = krb5_parse_name(context, principal_string,
&fallback_principal);
TALLOC_FREE(principal_string);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
num_comp = krb5_princ_size(context, fallback_principal);
fallback_realm = smb_krb5_principal_get_realm(
mem_ctx, context, fallback_principal);
if (fallback_realm == NULL) {
krb5_free_principal(context, fallback_principal);
return ENOMEM;
}
if (num_comp == 1) {
size_t len;
fallback_account = smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(mem_ctx,
context, fallback_principal, 0);
if (fallback_account == NULL) {
krb5_free_principal(context, fallback_principal);
TALLOC_FREE(fallback_realm);
return ENOMEM;
}
len = strlen(fallback_account);
if (len >= 2 && fallback_account[len - 1] == '$') {
TALLOC_FREE(fallback_account);
}
}
krb5_free_principal(context, fallback_principal);
fallback_principal = NULL;
if (fallback_account != NULL) {
char *with_dollar;
with_dollar = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "%s$",
fallback_account);
if (with_dollar == NULL) {
TALLOC_FREE(fallback_realm);
return ENOMEM;
}
TALLOC_FREE(fallback_account);
ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context,
&fallback_principal,
fallback_realm,
with_dollar, NULL);
TALLOC_FREE(with_dollar);
if (ret != 0) {
TALLOC_FREE(fallback_realm);
return ret;
}
}
TALLOC_FREE(fallback_realm);
if (fallback_principal != NULL) {
char *fallback_string = NULL;
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context,
fallback_principal,
&fallback_string);
if (ret != 0) {
krb5_free_principal(context, fallback_principal);
return ret;
}
nt_status = sam_get_results_principal(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
mem_ctx,
fallback_string,
attrs,
realm_dn, msg);
SAFE_FREE(fallback_string);
}
krb5_free_principal(context, fallback_principal);
fallback_principal = NULL;
}
TALLOC_FREE(principal_string);
if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER)) {
return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
} else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY)) {
return ENOMEM;
} else if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
return EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_client(krb5_context context,
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
krb5_const_principal principal,
unsigned flags,
struct sdb_entry *entry)
{
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
krb5_error_code ret;
struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
mem_ctx, principal, user_attrs,
&realm_dn, &msg);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT,
flags,
realm_dn, msg, entry);
return ret;
}
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(krb5_context context,
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
krb5_const_principal principal,
unsigned flags,
uint32_t kvno,
struct sdb_entry *entry)
{
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
krb5_error_code ret;
struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
char *realm_from_princ;
char *realm_princ_comp = smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(mem_ctx, context, principal, 1);
realm_from_princ = smb_krb5_principal_get_realm(
mem_ctx, context, principal);
if (realm_from_princ == NULL) {
/* can't happen */
return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
}
if (krb5_princ_size(context, principal) != 2
|| (principal_comp_strcmp(context, principal, 0, KRB5_TGS_NAME) != 0)) {
/* Not a krbtgt */
return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
}
/* krbtgt case. Either us or a trusted realm */
if (lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, realm_from_princ)
&& lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, realm_princ_comp)) {
/* us, or someone quite like us */
/* Cludge, cludge cludge. If the realm part of krbtgt/realm,
* is in our db, then direct the caller at our primary
* krbtgt */
int lret;
unsigned int krbtgt_number;
/* w2k8r2 sometimes gives us a kvno of 255 for inter-domain
trust tickets. We don't yet know what this means, but we do
seem to need to treat it as unspecified */
if (flags & SDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) {
krbtgt_number = SAMBA_KVNO_GET_KRBTGT(kvno);
if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
if (krbtgt_number != kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number) {
return SDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE;
}
}
} else {
krbtgt_number = kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number;
}
if (krbtgt_number == kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number) {
lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
&msg, kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
krbtgt_attrs, DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
"(objectClass=user)");
} else {
/* We need to look up an RODC krbtgt (perhaps
* ours, if we are an RODC, perhaps another
* RODC if we are a read-write DC */
lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
&msg, realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
krbtgt_attrs,
DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN | DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
"(&(objectClass=user)(msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber=%u))", (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
}
if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
(unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
krb5_set_error_message(context, SDB_ERR_NOENTRY,
"samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
(unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
} else if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
(unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
krb5_set_error_message(context, SDB_ERR_NOENTRY,
"samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
(unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
}
ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT,
flags, realm_dn, msg, entry);
if (ret != 0) {
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: self krbtgt message2entry failed");
}
return ret;
} else {
enum trust_direction direction = UNKNOWN;
const char *realm = NULL;
/* Either an inbound or outbound trust */
if (strcasecmp(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), realm_from_princ) == 0) {
/* look for inbound trust */
direction = INBOUND;
realm = realm_princ_comp;
} else if (principal_comp_strcasecmp(context, principal, 1, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx)) == 0) {
/* look for outbound trust */
direction = OUTBOUND;
realm = realm_from_princ;
} else {
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: not our realm for trusts ('%s', '%s')",
realm_from_princ,
realm_princ_comp);
krb5_set_error_message(context, SDB_ERR_NOENTRY, "samba_kdc_fetch: not our realm for trusts ('%s', '%s')",
realm_from_princ,
realm_princ_comp);
return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
}
/* Trusted domains are under CN=system */
ret = samba_kdc_lookup_trust(context, kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
mem_ctx,
realm, realm_dn, &msg);
if (ret != 0) {
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
return ret;
}
ret = samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
direction,
realm_dn, flags, kvno, msg, entry);
if (ret != 0) {
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: trust_message2entry failed for %s",
ldb_dn_get_linearized(msg->dn));
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: "
"trust_message2entry failed for %s",
ldb_dn_get_linearized(msg->dn));
}
return ret;
}
}
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_server(krb5_context context,
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
krb5_const_principal principal,
unsigned flags,
const char **attrs,
struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
struct ldb_message **msg)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
if ((smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) != KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL)
&& krb5_princ_size(context, principal) >= 2) {
/* 'normal server' case */
int ldb_ret;
NTSTATUS nt_status;
struct ldb_dn *user_dn;
char *principal_string;
ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal,
KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM,
&principal_string);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
/* At this point we may find the host is known to be
* in a different realm, so we should generate a
* referral instead */
nt_status = crack_service_principal_name(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
mem_ctx, principal_string,
&user_dn, realm_dn);
free(principal_string);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
}
ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
mem_ctx,
msg, user_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
attrs,
DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN | DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
"(objectClass=*)");
if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
}
return 0;
} else if (!(flags & SDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ)
&& smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
/*
* The behaviour of accepting an
* KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL server principal
* containing a UPN only applies to TGS-REQ packets,
* not AS-REQ packets.
*/
return samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
mem_ctx, principal, attrs,
realm_dn, msg);
} else {
/*
* This case is for:
* - the AS-REQ, where we only accept
* samAccountName based lookups for the server, no
* matter if the name is an
* KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL or not
* - for the TGS-REQ when we are not given an
* KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL, which also must
* only lookup samAccountName based names.
*/
int lret;
char *short_princ;
krb5_principal enterprise_principal = NULL;
krb5_const_principal used_principal = NULL;
char *name1 = NULL;
size_t len1 = 0;
char *filter = NULL;
if (smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
char *str = NULL;
/* Need to reparse the enterprise principal to find the real target */
if (krb5_princ_size(context, principal) != 1) {
ret = KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_lookup_server: request for an "
"enterprise principal with wrong (%d) number of components",
krb5_princ_size(context, principal));
return ret;
}
str = smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(mem_ctx, context, principal, 0);
if (str == NULL) {
return KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED;
}
ret = krb5_parse_name(context, str,
&enterprise_principal);
talloc_free(str);
if (ret) {
return ret;
}
used_principal = enterprise_principal;
} else {
used_principal = principal;
}
/* server as client principal case, but we must not lookup userPrincipalNames */
*realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
/* TODO: Check if it is our realm, otherwise give referral */
ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, used_principal,
KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM |
KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_DISPLAY,
&short_princ);
used_principal = NULL;
krb5_free_principal(context, enterprise_principal);
enterprise_principal = NULL;
if (ret != 0) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
return ret;
}
name1 = ldb_binary_encode_string(mem_ctx, short_princ);
SAFE_FREE(short_princ);
if (name1 == NULL) {
return ENOMEM;
}
len1 = strlen(name1);
if (len1 >= 1 && name1[len1 - 1] != '$') {
filter = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx,
"(&(objectClass=user)(|(samAccountName=%s)(samAccountName=%s$)))",
name1, name1);
if (filter == NULL) {
return ENOMEM;
}
} else {
filter = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx,
"(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=%s))",
name1);
if (filter == NULL) {
return ENOMEM;
}
}
lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx, msg,
*realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
attrs,
DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN | DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
"%s", filter);
if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
DEBUG(10, ("Failed to find an entry for %s filter:%s\n",
name1, filter));
return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
}
if (lret == LDB_ERR_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION) {
DEBUG(10, ("Failed to find unique entry for %s filter:%s\n",
name1, filter));
return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
}
if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
DEBUG(0, ("Failed single search for %s - %s\n",
name1, ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
}
return 0;
}
return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
}
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_server(krb5_context context,
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
krb5_const_principal principal,
unsigned flags,
struct sdb_entry *entry)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
struct ldb_message *msg;
ret = samba_kdc_lookup_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal,
flags, server_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
flags,
realm_dn, msg, entry);
if (ret != 0) {
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: message2entry failed");
}
return ret;
}
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_realm(krb5_context context,
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
krb5_const_principal principal,
unsigned flags,
struct sdb_entry *entry)
{
TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe();
NTSTATUS status;
krb5_error_code ret;
bool check_realm = false;
const char *realm = NULL;
struct dsdb_trust_routing_table *trt = NULL;
const struct lsa_TrustDomainInfoInfoEx *tdo = NULL;
unsigned int num_comp;
bool ok;
char *upper = NULL;
num_comp = krb5_princ_size(context, principal);
if (flags & SDB_F_GET_CLIENT) {
if (flags & SDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ) {
check_realm = true;
}
}
if (flags & SDB_F_GET_SERVER) {
if (flags & SDB_F_FOR_TGS_REQ) {
check_realm = true;
}
}
if (!check_realm) {
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return 0;
}
realm = smb_krb5_principal_get_realm(frame, context, principal);
if (realm == NULL) {
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return ENOMEM;
}
/*
* The requested realm needs to be our own
*/
ok = lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx, realm);
if (!ok) {
/*
* The request is not for us...
*/
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
}
if (smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
char *principal_string = NULL;
krb5_principal enterprise_principal = NULL;
char *enterprise_realm = NULL;
if (num_comp != 1) {
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
}
principal_string = smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(frame, context,
principal, 0);
if (principal_string == NULL) {
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return ENOMEM;
}
ret = krb5_parse_name(context, principal_string,
&enterprise_principal);
TALLOC_FREE(principal_string);
if (ret) {
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return ret;
}
enterprise_realm = smb_krb5_principal_get_realm(
frame, context, enterprise_principal);
krb5_free_principal(context, enterprise_principal);
if (enterprise_realm != NULL) {
realm = enterprise_realm;
}
}
if (flags & SDB_F_GET_SERVER) {
char *service_realm = NULL;
ret = principal_comp_strcmp(context, principal, 0, KRB5_TGS_NAME);
if (ret == 0) {
/*
* we need to search krbtgt/ locally
*/
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return 0;
}
/*
* We need to check the last component against the routing table.
*
* Note this works only with 2 or 3 component principals, e.g:
*
* servicePrincipalName: ldap/W2K8R2-219.bla.base
* servicePrincipalName: ldap/W2K8R2-219.bla.base/bla.base
* servicePrincipalName: ldap/W2K8R2-219.bla.base/ForestDnsZones.bla.base
* servicePrincipalName: ldap/W2K8R2-219.bla.base/DomainDnsZones.bla.base
*/
if (num_comp == 2 || num_comp == 3) {
service_realm = smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(frame,
context,
principal,
num_comp - 1);
}
if (service_realm != NULL) {
realm = service_realm;
}
}
ok = lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx, realm);
if (ok) {
/*
* skip the expensive routing lookup
*/
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return 0;
}
status = dsdb_trust_routing_table_load(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
frame, &trt);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return EINVAL;
}
tdo = dsdb_trust_routing_by_name(trt, realm);
if (tdo == NULL) {
/*
* This principal has to be local
*/
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return 0;
}
if (tdo->trust_attributes & LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_WITHIN_FOREST) {
/*
* TODO: handle the routing within the forest
*
* This should likely be handled in
* samba_kdc_message2entry() in case we're
* a global catalog. We'd need to check
* if realm_dn is our own domain and derive
* the dns domain name from realm_dn and check that
* against the routing table or fallback to
* the tdo we found here.
*
* But for now we don't support multiple domains
* in our forest correctly anyway.
*
* Just search in our local database.
*/
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return 0;
}
ZERO_STRUCTP(entry);
ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, principal,
&entry->principal);
if (ret) {
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return ret;
}
upper = strupper_talloc(frame, tdo->domain_name.string);
if (upper == NULL) {
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return ENOMEM;
}
ret = smb_krb5_principal_set_realm(context,
entry->principal,
upper);
if (ret) {
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return ret;
}
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return SDB_ERR_WRONG_REALM;
}
krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch(krb5_context context,
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
krb5_const_principal principal,
unsigned flags,
krb5_kvno kvno,
struct sdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
{
struct sdb_entry *entry = &entry_ex->entry;
krb5_error_code ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_fetch context");
if (!mem_ctx) {
ret = ENOMEM;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
return ret;
}
ret = samba_kdc_lookup_realm(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
principal, flags, entry);
if (ret != 0) {
goto done;
}
ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
if (flags & SDB_F_GET_CLIENT) {
ret = samba_kdc_fetch_client(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry);
if (ret != SDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
}
if (flags & SDB_F_GET_SERVER) {
/* krbtgt fits into this situation for trusted realms, and for resolving different versions of our own realm name */
ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, kvno, entry);
if (ret != SDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
/* We return 'no entry' if it does not start with krbtgt/, so move to the common case quickly */
ret = samba_kdc_fetch_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry);
if (ret != SDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
}
if (flags & SDB_F_GET_KRBTGT) {
ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, kvno, entry);
if (ret != SDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
}
done:
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret;
}
struct samba_kdc_seq {
unsigned int index;
unsigned int count;
struct ldb_message **msgs;
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
};
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_seq(krb5_context context,
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
struct sdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
{
struct sdb_entry *entry = &entry_ex->entry;
krb5_error_code ret;
struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx;
const char *realm = lpcfg_realm(kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx);
struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
const char *sAMAccountName = NULL;
krb5_principal principal = NULL;
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
if (!priv) {
return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
}
mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_seq context");
if (!mem_ctx) {
ret = ENOMEM;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_seq: talloc_named() failed!");
return ret;
}
while (priv->index < priv->count) {
msg = priv->msgs[priv->index++];
sAMAccountName = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "sAMAccountName", NULL);
if (sAMAccountName != NULL) {
break;
}
}
if (sAMAccountName == NULL) {
ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
goto out;
}
ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context, &principal,
realm, sAMAccountName, NULL);
if (ret != 0) {
goto out;
}
ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY,
SDB_F_ADMIN_DATA|SDB_F_GET_ANY,
priv->realm_dn, msg, entry);
out:
if (principal != NULL) {
krb5_free_principal(context, principal);
}
if (ret != 0) {
TALLOC_FREE(priv);
kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
} else {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
}
return ret;
}
krb5_error_code samba_kdc_firstkey(krb5_context context,
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
struct sdb_entry_ex *entry)
{
struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->samdb;
struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx;
char *realm;
struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
krb5_error_code ret;
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
int lret;
if (priv) {
TALLOC_FREE(priv);
kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
}
priv = (struct samba_kdc_seq *) talloc(kdc_db_ctx, struct samba_kdc_seq);
if (!priv) {
ret = ENOMEM;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc: out of memory");
return ret;
}
priv->index = 0;
priv->msgs = NULL;
priv->realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_ctx);
priv->count = 0;
mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_firstkey context");
if (!mem_ctx) {
ret = ENOMEM;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_firstkey: talloc_named() failed!");
return ret;
}
ret = krb5_get_default_realm(context, &realm);
if (ret != 0) {
TALLOC_FREE(priv);
return ret;
}
krb5_free_default_realm(context, realm);
lret = dsdb_search(ldb_ctx, priv, &res,
priv->realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, user_attrs,
DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
"(objectClass=user)");
if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
TALLOC_FREE(priv);
return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
}
priv->count = res->count;
priv->msgs = talloc_steal(priv, res->msgs);
talloc_free(res);
kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = priv;
ret = samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry);
if (ret != 0) {
TALLOC_FREE(priv);
kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
} else {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
}
return ret;
}
krb5_error_code samba_kdc_nextkey(krb5_context context,
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
struct sdb_entry_ex *entry)
{
return samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry);
}
/* Check if a given entry may delegate or do s4u2self to this target principal
*
* The safest way to determine 'self' is to check the DB record made at
* the time the principal was presented to the KDC.
*/
krb5_error_code
samba_kdc_check_client_matches_target_service(krb5_context context,
struct samba_kdc_entry *skdc_entry_client,
struct samba_kdc_entry *skdc_entry_server_target)
{
struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
struct dom_sid *target_sid;
TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe();
orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(frame,
skdc_entry_client->msg,
"objectSid");
target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(frame,
skdc_entry_server_target->msg,
"objectSid");
/*
* Allow delegation to the same record (representing a
* principal), even if by a different name. The easy and safe
* way to prove this is by SID comparison
*/
if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
talloc_free(frame);
return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH;
}
talloc_free(frame);
return 0;
}
/* Certificates printed by a the Certificate Authority might have a
* slightly different form of the user principal name to that in the
* database. Allow a mismatch where they both refer to the same
* SID */
krb5_error_code
samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match(krb5_context context,
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
struct samba_kdc_entry *skdc_entry,
krb5_const_principal certificate_principal)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
struct ldb_message *msg;
struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
struct dom_sid *target_sid;
const char *ms_upn_check_attrs[] = {
"objectSid", NULL
};
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match");
if (!mem_ctx) {
ret = ENOMEM;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
return ret;
}
ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
mem_ctx, certificate_principal,
ms_upn_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
if (ret != 0) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret;
}
orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, skdc_entry->msg, "objectSid");
target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid");
/* Consider these to be the same principal, even if by a different
* name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID
* comparison */
if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
#if defined(KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH) /* MIT */
return KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH;
#else /* Heimdal (where this is an enum) */
return KRB5_KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH;
#endif
}
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret;
}
/*
* Check if a given entry may delegate to this target principal
* with S4U2Proxy.
*/
krb5_error_code
samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy(krb5_context context,
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
struct samba_kdc_entry *skdc_entry,
krb5_const_principal target_principal)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
char *tmp = NULL;
const char *client_dn = NULL;
const char *target_principal_name = NULL;
struct ldb_message_element *el;
struct ldb_val val;
unsigned int i;
bool found = false;
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy");
if (!mem_ctx) {
ret = ENOMEM;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
"samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
" talloc_named() failed!");
return ret;
}
client_dn = ldb_dn_get_linearized(skdc_entry->msg->dn);
if (!client_dn) {
if (errno == 0) {
errno = ENOMEM;
}
ret = errno;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
"samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
" ldb_dn_get_linearized() failed!");
return ret;
}
el = ldb_msg_find_element(skdc_entry->msg, "msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo");
if (el == NULL) {
ret = ENOENT;
goto bad_option;
}
SMB_ASSERT(el->num_values != 0);
/*
* This is the Microsoft forwardable flag behavior.
*
* If the proxy (target) principal is NULL, and we have any authorized
* delegation target, allow to forward.
*/
if (target_principal == NULL) {
return 0;
}
/*
* The main heimdal code already checked that the target_principal
* belongs to the same realm as the client.
*
* So we just need the principal without the realm,
* as that is what is configured in the "msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo"
* attribute.
*/
ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, target_principal,
KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &tmp);
if (ret) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
"samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
" krb5_unparse_name() failed!");
return ret;
}
DEBUG(10,("samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy: client[%s] for target[%s]\n",
client_dn, tmp));
target_principal_name = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, tmp);
SAFE_FREE(tmp);
if (target_principal_name == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
"samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
" talloc_strdup() failed!");
return ret;
}
val = data_blob_string_const(target_principal_name);
for (i=0; i<el->num_values; i++) {
struct ldb_val *val1 = &val;
struct ldb_val *val2 = &el->values[i];
int cmp;
if (val1->length != val2->length) {
continue;
}
cmp = strncasecmp((const char *)val1->data,
(const char *)val2->data,
val1->length);
if (cmp != 0) {
continue;
}
found = true;
break;
}
if (!found) {
ret = ENOENT;
goto bad_option;
}
DEBUG(10,("samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy: client[%s] allowed target[%s]\n",
client_dn, tmp));
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return 0;
bad_option:
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
"samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy: client[%s] "
"not allowed for delegation to target[%s]",
client_dn,
target_principal_name);
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
}
/*
* This method is called for S4U2Proxy requests and implements the
* resource-based constrained delegation variant, which can support
* cross-realm delegation.
*/
krb5_error_code samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy_rbcd(
krb5_context context,
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
krb5_const_principal client_principal,
krb5_const_principal server_principal,
krb5_pac header_pac,
struct samba_kdc_entry *proxy_skdc_entry)
{
krb5_error_code code;
enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
char *client_name = NULL;
char *server_name = NULL;
const char *proxy_dn = NULL;
const DATA_BLOB *data = NULL;
struct security_descriptor *rbcd_security_descriptor = NULL;
struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc = NULL;
struct auth_session_info *session_info = NULL;
uint32_t session_info_flags = AUTH_SESSION_INFO_SIMPLE_PRIVILEGES;
uint32_t access_desired = SEC_ADS_GENERIC_ALL; /* => 0x000f01ff */
uint32_t access_granted = 0;
NTSTATUS nt_status;
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = NULL;
mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx,
0,
"samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy_rbcd");
if (mem_ctx == NULL) {
errno = ENOMEM;
code = errno;
return code;
}
proxy_dn = ldb_dn_get_linearized(proxy_skdc_entry->msg->dn);
if (proxy_dn == NULL) {
DBG_ERR("ldb_dn_get_linearized failed for proxy_dn!\n");
TALLOC_FREE(mem_ctx);
if (errno == 0) {
errno = ENOMEM;
}
code = errno;
goto out;
}
rbcd_security_descriptor = talloc_zero(mem_ctx,
struct security_descriptor);
if (rbcd_security_descriptor == NULL) {
errno = ENOMEM;
code = errno;
goto out;
}
code = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context,
client_principal,
KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_DISPLAY,
&client_name);
if (code != 0) {
DBG_ERR("Unable to parse client_principal!\n");
goto out;
}
code = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context,
server_principal,
KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_DISPLAY,
&server_name);
if (code != 0) {
DBG_ERR("Unable to parse server_principal!\n");
SAFE_FREE(client_name);
goto out;
}
DBG_INFO("Check delegation from client[%s] to server[%s] via "
"proxy[%s]\n",
client_name,
server_name,
proxy_dn);
code = kerberos_pac_to_user_info_dc(mem_ctx,
header_pac,
context,
&user_info_dc,
NULL,
NULL);
if (code != 0) {
goto out;
}
if (user_info_dc->info->authenticated) {
session_info_flags |= AUTH_SESSION_INFO_AUTHENTICATED;
}
nt_status = auth_generate_session_info(mem_ctx,
kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx,
kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
user_info_dc,
session_info_flags,
&session_info);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
code = map_errno_from_nt_status(nt_status);
goto out;
}
data = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(proxy_skdc_entry->msg,
"msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity");
if (data == NULL) {
DBG_ERR("Could not find security descriptor"
"msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity in "
"proxy[%s]\n",
proxy_dn);
code = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
goto out;
}
ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(
data,
mem_ctx,
rbcd_security_descriptor,
(ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_security_descriptor);
if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
errno = ndr_map_error2errno(ndr_err);
DBG_ERR("Failed to unmarshall "
"msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity "
"security descriptor of proxy[%s]\n",
proxy_dn);
code = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
goto out;
}
if (DEBUGLEVEL >= 10) {
NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(security_token, session_info->security_token);
NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(security_descriptor, rbcd_security_descriptor);
}
nt_status = sec_access_check_ds(rbcd_security_descriptor,
session_info->security_token,
access_desired,
&access_granted,
NULL,
NULL);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
DBG_WARNING("RBCD: sec_access_check_ds(access_desired=%#08x, "
"access_granted:%#08x) failed with: %s\n",
access_desired,
access_granted,
nt_errstr(nt_status));
code = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
goto out;
}
DBG_NOTICE("RBCD: Access granted for client[%s]\n", client_name);
code = 0;
out:
SAFE_FREE(client_name);
SAFE_FREE(server_name);
TALLOC_FREE(mem_ctx);
return code;
}
NTSTATUS samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_base_context *base_ctx,
struct samba_kdc_db_context **kdc_db_ctx_out)
{
int ldb_ret;
struct ldb_message *msg;
struct auth_session_info *session_info;
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx;
/* The idea here is very simple. Using Kerberos to
* authenticate the KDC to the LDAP server is higly likely to
* be circular.
*
* In future we may set this up to use EXERNAL and SSL
* certificates, for now it will almost certainly be NTLMSSP_SET_USERNAME
*/
kdc_db_ctx = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_db_context);
if (kdc_db_ctx == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
kdc_db_ctx->ev_ctx = base_ctx->ev_ctx;
kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx = base_ctx->lp_ctx;
kdc_db_ctx->msg_ctx = base_ctx->msg_ctx;
/* get default kdc policy */
lpcfg_default_kdc_policy(mem_ctx,
base_ctx->lp_ctx,
&kdc_db_ctx->policy.svc_tkt_lifetime,
&kdc_db_ctx->policy.usr_tkt_lifetime,
&kdc_db_ctx->policy.renewal_lifetime);
session_info = system_session(kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx);
if (session_info == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
/* Setup the link to secrets.ldb */
kdc_db_ctx->secrets_db = secrets_db_connect(kdc_db_ctx,
base_ctx->lp_ctx);
if (kdc_db_ctx->secrets_db == NULL) {
DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: "
"Cannot open secrets.ldb for KDC backend!"));
talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
}
kdc_db_ctx->fx_cookie_dn = ldb_dn_new(kdc_db_ctx,
kdc_db_ctx->secrets_db,
"CN=FX Cookie");
/* Setup the link to LDB */
kdc_db_ctx->samdb = samdb_connect(kdc_db_ctx,
base_ctx->ev_ctx,
base_ctx->lp_ctx,
session_info,
NULL,
0);
if (kdc_db_ctx->samdb == NULL) {
DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot open samdb for KDC backend!"));
talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
}
/* Find out our own krbtgt kvno */
ldb_ret = samdb_rodc(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, &kdc_db_ctx->rodc);
if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot determine if we are an RODC in KDC backend: %s\n",
ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
}
if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
int my_krbtgt_number;
const char *secondary_keytab[] = { "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", NULL };
struct ldb_dn *account_dn;
struct ldb_dn *server_dn = samdb_server_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx);
if (!server_dn) {
DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot determine server DN in KDC backend: %s\n",
ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
}
ldb_ret = samdb_reference_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx, server_dn,
"serverReference", &account_dn);
if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot determine server account in KDC backend: %s\n",
ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
}
ldb_ret = samdb_reference_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx, account_dn,
"msDS-KrbTgtLink", &kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn);
talloc_free(account_dn);
if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot determine RODC krbtgt account in KDC backend: %s\n",
ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
}
ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx,
&msg, kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
secondary_keytab,
DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
"(&(objectClass=user)(msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber=*))");
if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot read krbtgt account %s in KDC backend to get msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber: %s: %s\n",
ldb_dn_get_linearized(kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn),
ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb),
ldb_strerror(ldb_ret)));
talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
}
my_krbtgt_number = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1);
if (my_krbtgt_number == -1) {
DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot read msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber from krbtgt account %s in KDC backend: got %d\n",
ldb_dn_get_linearized(kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn),
my_krbtgt_number));
talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
}
kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = my_krbtgt_number;
} else {
kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = 0;
ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx,
&msg,
ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb),
LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
krbtgt_attrs,
DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
"(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=krbtgt))");
if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_fetch: could not find own KRBTGT in DB: %s\n", ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
}
kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn = talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, msg->dn);
kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = 0;
talloc_free(msg);
}
*kdc_db_ctx_out = kdc_db_ctx;
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
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