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mirror of https://github.com/samba-team/samba.git synced 2024-12-23 17:34:34 +03:00
samba-mirror/source4/ntp_signd/ntp-dev-4.2.5p125.diff
2008-12-03 17:42:21 +01:00

580 lines
16 KiB
Diff

Only in ntp-samba: autom4te.cache
Only in ntp-samba: config.h
Only in ntp-samba: config.log
Only in ntp-samba: config.status
Only in ntp-samba/ElectricFence: .deps
Only in ntp-samba/ElectricFence: Makefile
Only in ntp-samba: .gcc-warning
Only in ntp-samba/include/isc: Makefile
Only in ntp-samba/include: Makefile
diff -ur ntp-dev-4.2.5p125/include/ntp_config.h ntp-samba/include/ntp_config.h
--- ntp-dev-4.2.5p125/include/ntp_config.h 2008-07-17 07:20:58.000000000 +1000
+++ ntp-samba/include/ntp_config.h 2008-08-28 21:59:06.000000000 +1000
@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@
int requested_key;
int revoke;
queue *trusted_key_list;
+ char *ntp_signd_socket;
};
struct filegen_node {
diff -ur ntp-dev-4.2.5p125/include/ntpd.h ntp-samba/include/ntpd.h
--- ntp-dev-4.2.5p125/include/ntpd.h 2008-05-18 21:11:28.000000000 +1000
+++ ntp-samba/include/ntpd.h 2008-08-28 21:59:06.000000000 +1000
@@ -259,6 +259,8 @@
extern int config_priority;
#endif
+extern char const *ntp_signd_socket;
+
/* ntp_control.c */
extern int num_ctl_traps;
extern keyid_t ctl_auth_keyid; /* keyid used for authenticating write requests */
@@ -471,3 +473,15 @@
extern struct refclock *refclock_conf[]; /* refclock configuration table */
extern u_char num_refclock_conf;
#endif
+
+/* ntp_signd.c */
+#ifdef HAVE_NTP_SIGND
+extern void
+send_via_ntp_signd(
+ struct recvbuf *rbufp, /* receive packet pointer */
+ int xmode,
+ keyid_t xkeyid,
+ int flags,
+ struct pkt *xpkt
+ );
+#endif
diff -ur ntp-dev-4.2.5p125/include/ntp.h ntp-samba/include/ntp.h
--- ntp-dev-4.2.5p125/include/ntp.h 2008-08-10 22:37:56.000000000 +1000
+++ ntp-samba/include/ntp.h 2008-08-28 21:59:06.000000000 +1000
@@ -447,6 +447,7 @@
#ifdef OPENSSL
#define FLAG_ASSOC 0x4000 /* autokey request */
#endif /* OPENSSL */
+#define FLAG_ADKEY 0x00010000 /* Authenticated (or wants reply to be authenticated) using AD authentication */
/*
* Definitions for the clear() routine. We use memset() to clear
Only in ntp-samba/include: ntp.h.orig
Only in ntp-samba: libtool
Only in ntp-samba: Makefile
diff -ur ntp-dev-4.2.5p125/ntpd/Makefile.am ntp-samba/ntpd/Makefile.am
--- ntp-dev-4.2.5p125/ntpd/Makefile.am 2008-05-18 21:11:29.000000000 +1000
+++ ntp-samba/ntpd/Makefile.am 2008-08-28 21:59:06.000000000 +1000
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@
ntp_crypto.c ntp_filegen.c \
ntp_intres.c ntp_loopfilter.c ntp_monitor.c ntp_peer.c \
ntp_proto.c ntp_refclock.c ntp_request.c \
- ntp_restrict.c ntp_timer.c ntp_util.c \
+ ntp_restrict.c ntp_timer.c ntp_util.c ntp_signd.c \
ppsapi_timepps.h \
refclock_acts.c refclock_arbiter.c refclock_arc.c refclock_as2201.c \
refclock_atom.c refclock_bancomm.c refclock_chronolog.c \
diff -ur ntp-dev-4.2.5p125/ntpd/ntp_config.c ntp-samba/ntpd/ntp_config.c
--- ntp-dev-4.2.5p125/ntpd/ntp_config.c 2008-08-10 22:37:54.000000000 +1000
+++ ntp-samba/ntpd/ntp_config.c 2008-08-28 22:03:52.000000000 +1000
@@ -148,6 +148,7 @@
#endif
const char *config_file;
+const char *ntp_signd_socket;
#ifdef HAVE_NETINFO
struct netinfo_config_state *config_netinfo = NULL;
int check_netinfo = 1;
@@ -276,6 +277,11 @@
my_config.auth.crypto_cmd_list = NULL;
my_config.auth.keys = NULL;
my_config.auth.keysdir = NULL;
+#ifdef NTP_SIGND_PATH
+ my_config.auth.ntp_signd_socket = NTP_SIGND_PATH;
+#else
+ my_config.auth.ntp_signd_socket = NULL;
+#endif
my_config.auth.requested_key = 0;
my_config.auth.revoke = 0;
my_config.auth.trusted_key_list = NULL;
@@ -795,6 +801,7 @@
{ "crypto", T_Crypto, NO_ARG },
{ "keys", T_Keys, SINGLE_ARG },
{ "keysdir", T_Keysdir, SINGLE_ARG },
+ { "ntpsigndsocket", T_NtpSignDsocket, SINGLE_ARG },
{ "requestkey", T_Requestkey, NO_ARG },
{ "revoke", T_Revoke, NO_ARG },
{ "trustedkey", T_Trustedkey, NO_ARG },
@@ -1000,6 +1007,10 @@
if (my_config.auth.keysdir)
keysdir = my_config.auth.keysdir;
+ /* ntp_signd_socket Command */
+ if (my_config.auth.ntp_signd_socket)
+ ntp_signd_socket = my_config.auth.ntp_signd_socket;
+
#ifdef OPENSSL
if (cryptosw) {
crypto_setup();
Only in ntp-samba/ntpd: ntp_config.c~
Only in ntp-samba/ntpd: ntp_config.c.orig
diff -ur ntp-dev-4.2.5p125/ntpd/ntp_parser.y ntp-samba/ntpd/ntp_parser.y
--- ntp-dev-4.2.5p125/ntpd/ntp_parser.y 2008-07-17 07:21:06.000000000 +1000
+++ ntp-samba/ntpd/ntp_parser.y 2008-08-28 21:59:06.000000000 +1000
@@ -155,6 +155,7 @@
%token T_Novolley
%token T_Ntp
%token T_Ntpport
+%token T_NtpSignDsocket
%token T_Orphan
%token T_Panic
%token T_Peer
@@ -432,6 +433,8 @@
{ my_config.auth.requested_key = $2; }
| T_Trustedkey integer_list
{ my_config.auth.trusted_key_list = $2; }
+ | T_NtpSignDsocket T_String
+ { my_config.auth.ntp_signd_socket = $2; }
;
crypto_command_line
diff -ur ntp-dev-4.2.5p125/ntpd/ntp_proto.c ntp-samba/ntpd/ntp_proto.c
--- ntp-dev-4.2.5p125/ntpd/ntp_proto.c 2008-07-17 07:21:02.000000000 +1000
+++ ntp-samba/ntpd/ntp_proto.c 2008-08-28 21:59:06.000000000 +1000
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@
static void clock_combine (struct peer **, int);
static void peer_xmit (struct peer *);
static void fast_xmit (struct recvbuf *, int, keyid_t,
- char *);
+ char *, int);
static void clock_update (struct peer *);
static int default_get_precision (void);
static int peer_unfit (struct peer *);
@@ -311,6 +311,7 @@
int authlen; /* offset of MAC field */
int is_authentic = 0; /* cryptosum ok */
int retcode = AM_NOMATCH; /* match code */
+ int flags = 0; /* flags with details about the authentication */
keyid_t skeyid = 0; /* key IDs */
u_int32 opcode = 0; /* extension field opcode */
struct sockaddr_storage *dstadr_sin; /* active runway */
@@ -324,6 +325,8 @@
keyid_t pkeyid = 0, tkeyid = 0; /* key IDs */
#endif /* OPENSSL */
+ static unsigned char zero_key[16];
+
/*
* Monitor the packet and get restrictions. Note that the packet
* length for control and private mode packets must be checked
@@ -480,9 +483,9 @@
return; /* rate exceeded */
if (hismode == MODE_CLIENT)
- fast_xmit(rbufp, MODE_SERVER, skeyid, "RATE");
+ fast_xmit(rbufp, MODE_SERVER, skeyid, "RATE", 0);
else
- fast_xmit(rbufp, MODE_ACTIVE, skeyid, "RATE");
+ fast_xmit(rbufp, MODE_ACTIVE, skeyid, "RATE", 0);
return; /* rate exceeded */
}
@@ -535,6 +538,7 @@
* is zero, acceptable outcomes of y are NONE and OK. If x is
* one, the only acceptable outcome of y is OK.
*/
+
if (has_mac == 0) {
is_authentic = AUTH_NONE; /* not required */
#ifdef DEBUG
@@ -555,6 +559,25 @@
stoa(&rbufp->recv_srcadr), hismode, skeyid,
authlen + has_mac, is_authentic);
#endif
+
+ /* If the signature is 20 bytes long, the last 16 of
+ * which are zero, then this is a Microsoft client
+ * wanting AD-style authentication of the server's
+ * reply.
+ *
+ * This is described in Microsoft's WSPP docs, in MS-SNTP:
+ * http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc212930.aspx
+ */
+ } else if (has_mac == MAX_MAC_LEN
+ && (retcode == AM_FXMIT || retcode == AM_NEWPASS)
+ && (memcmp(zero_key, (char *)pkt + authlen + 4, MAX_MAC_LEN - 4) == 0)) {
+
+ /* Don't try to verify the zeros, just set a
+ * flag and otherwise pretend we never saw the signature */
+ is_authentic = AUTH_NONE;
+
+ flags = FLAG_ADKEY;
+
} else {
#ifdef OPENSSL
/*
@@ -696,9 +719,9 @@
if (AUTH(restrict_mask & RES_DONTTRUST,
is_authentic)) {
fast_xmit(rbufp, MODE_SERVER, skeyid,
- NULL);
+ NULL, flags);
} else if (is_authentic == AUTH_ERROR) {
- fast_xmit(rbufp, MODE_SERVER, 0, NULL);
+ fast_xmit(rbufp, MODE_SERVER, 0, NULL, 0);
sys_badauth++;
} else {
sys_restricted++;
@@ -733,7 +756,7 @@
* crypto-NAK, as that would not be useful.
*/
if (AUTH(restrict_mask & RES_DONTTRUST, is_authentic))
- fast_xmit(rbufp, MODE_SERVER, skeyid, NULL);
+ fast_xmit(rbufp, MODE_SERVER, skeyid, NULL, 0);
return; /* hooray */
/*
@@ -888,7 +911,7 @@
is_authentic)) {
#ifdef OPENSSL
if (crypto_flags && skeyid > NTP_MAXKEY)
- fast_xmit(rbufp, MODE_ACTIVE, 0, NULL);
+ fast_xmit(rbufp, MODE_ACTIVE, 0, NULL, 0);
#endif /* OPENSSL */
sys_restricted++;
return; /* access denied */
@@ -904,7 +927,7 @@
* This is for drat broken Windows clients. See
* Microsoft KB 875424 for preferred workaround.
*/
- fast_xmit(rbufp, MODE_PASSIVE, skeyid, NULL);
+ fast_xmit(rbufp, MODE_PASSIVE, skeyid, NULL, flags);
#else /* WINTIME */
sys_restricted++;
#endif /* WINTIME */
@@ -938,6 +961,7 @@
}
break;
+
/*
* Process regular packet. Nothing special.
*/
@@ -1090,7 +1114,7 @@
peer->flash |= TEST5; /* bad auth */
peer->badauth++;
if (hismode == MODE_ACTIVE || hismode == MODE_PASSIVE)
- fast_xmit(rbufp, MODE_ACTIVE, 0, NULL);
+ fast_xmit(rbufp, MODE_ACTIVE, 0, NULL, 0);
if (peer->flags & FLAG_PREEMPT) {
unpeer(peer);
return;
@@ -3159,7 +3183,8 @@
struct recvbuf *rbufp, /* receive packet pointer */
int xmode, /* receive mode */
keyid_t xkeyid, /* transmit key ID */
- char *mask /* kiss code */
+ char *mask, /* kiss code */
+ int flags /* Flags to indicate signing behaviour */
)
{
struct pkt xpkt; /* transmit packet structure */
@@ -3220,6 +3245,19 @@
HTONL_FP(&rbufp->recv_time, &xpkt.rec);
}
+ if (flags & FLAG_ADKEY) {
+#ifdef HAVE_NTP_SIGND
+ get_systime(&xmt_tx);
+ if (mask == NULL) {
+ HTONL_FP(&xmt_tx, &xpkt.xmt);
+ }
+ send_via_ntp_signd(rbufp, xmode, xkeyid, flags, &xpkt);
+#endif
+ /* If we don't have the support, drop the packet on the floor.
+ An all zero sig is compleatly bogus anyway */
+ return;
+ }
+
/*
* If the received packet contains a MAC, the transmitted packet
* is authenticated and contains a MAC. If not, the transmitted
@@ -3252,7 +3290,7 @@
* source-destination-key ID combination.
*/
#ifdef OPENSSL
- if (xkeyid > NTP_MAXKEY) {
+ if (!(flags & FLAG_ADKEY) && (xkeyid > NTP_MAXKEY)) {
keyid_t cookie;
/*
@@ -3284,8 +3322,10 @@
if (mask == NULL) {
HTONL_FP(&xmt_tx, &xpkt.xmt);
}
+
authlen = authencrypt(xkeyid, (u_int32 *)&xpkt, sendlen);
sendlen += authlen;
+
#ifdef OPENSSL
if (xkeyid > NTP_MAXKEY)
authtrust(xkeyid, 0);
Only in ntp-samba/ntpd: ntp_signd.c
Only in ntp-dev-4.2.5p125/ntpdc: nl.pl
Only in ntp-samba/scripts: calc_tickadj
Only in ntp-samba/scripts: checktime
Only in ntp-samba/scripts: freq_adj
Only in ntp-samba/scripts: html2man
Only in ntp-samba/scripts: Makefile
Only in ntp-samba/scripts: mkver
Only in ntp-samba/scripts: ntpsweep
Only in ntp-samba/scripts: ntptrace
Only in ntp-samba/scripts: ntpver
Only in ntp-samba/scripts: ntp-wait
Only in ntp-samba/scripts: plot_summary
Only in ntp-samba/scripts: summary
Only in ntp-samba: stamp-h1
--- /dev/null 2008-08-25 07:28:22.036002925 +1000
+++ ntp-samba/ntpd/ntp_signd.c 2008-08-28 21:59:06.000000000 +1000
@@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
+/* Copyright 2008, Red Hat, Inc.
+ Copyright 2008, Andrew Tridgell.
+ Licenced under the same terms as NTP itself.
+ */
+#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
+#include <config.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_NTP_SIGND
+
+#include "ntpd.h"
+#include "ntp_io.h"
+#include "ntp_stdlib.h"
+#include "ntp_unixtime.h"
+#include "ntp_control.h"
+#include "ntp_string.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBSCF_H
+#include <libscf.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#endif /* HAVE_LIBSCF_H */
+
+#include <sys/un.h>
+
+/* socket routines by tridge - from junkcode.samba.org */
+
+/*
+ connect to a unix domain socket
+*/
+static int
+ux_socket_connect(const char *name)
+{
+ int fd;
+ struct sockaddr_un addr;
+ if (!name) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
+ addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+ strncpy(addr.sun_path, name, sizeof(addr.sun_path));
+
+ fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+ if (fd == -1) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (connect(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == -1) {
+ close(fd);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return fd;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ keep writing until its all sent
+*/
+static int
+write_all(int fd, const void *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ size_t total = 0;
+ while (len) {
+ int n = write(fd, buf, len);
+ if (n <= 0) return total;
+ buf = n + (char *)buf;
+ len -= n;
+ total += n;
+ }
+ return total;
+}
+
+/*
+ keep reading until its all read
+*/
+static int
+read_all(int fd, void *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ size_t total = 0;
+ while (len) {
+ int n = read(fd, buf, len);
+ if (n <= 0) return total;
+ buf = n + (char *)buf;
+ len -= n;
+ total += n;
+ }
+ return total;
+}
+
+/*
+ send a packet in length prefix format
+*/
+static int
+send_packet(int fd, const char *buf, uint32_t len)
+{
+ uint32_t net_len = htonl(len);
+ if (write_all(fd, &net_len, sizeof(net_len)) != sizeof(net_len)) return -1;
+ if (write_all(fd, buf, len) != len) return -1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ receive a packet in length prefix format
+*/
+static int
+recv_packet(int fd, char **buf, uint32_t *len)
+{
+ if (read_all(fd, len, sizeof(*len)) != sizeof(*len)) return -1;
+ *len = ntohl(*len);
+ (*buf) = malloc(*len);
+ if (!*buf) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (read_all(fd, *buf, *len) != *len) {
+ free(*buf);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+send_via_ntp_signd(
+ struct recvbuf *rbufp, /* receive packet pointer */
+ int xmode,
+ keyid_t xkeyid,
+ int flags,
+ struct pkt *xpkt
+ )
+{
+
+ /* We are here because it was detected that the client
+ * sent an all-zero signature, and we therefore know
+ * it's windows trying to talk to an AD server
+ *
+ * Because we don't want to dive into Samba's secrets
+ * database just to find the long-term kerberos key
+ * that is re-used as the NTP key, we instead hand the
+ * packet over to Samba to sign, and return to us.
+ *
+ * The signing method Samba will use is described by
+ * Microsoft in MS-SNTP, found here:
+ * http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc212930.aspx
+ */
+
+ int fd, sendlen;
+ struct samba_key_in {
+ uint32_t version;
+ uint32_t op;
+ uint32_t packet_id;
+ uint32_t key_id_le;
+ struct pkt pkt;
+ } samba_pkt;
+
+ struct samba_key_out {
+ uint32_t version;
+ uint32_t op;
+ uint32_t packet_id;
+ struct pkt pkt;
+ } samba_reply;
+
+ char full_socket[256];
+
+ char *reply = NULL;
+ uint32_t reply_len;
+
+ memset(&samba_pkt, 0, sizeof(samba_pkt));
+ samba_pkt.op = 0; /* Sign message */
+ /* This will be echoed into the reply - a different
+ * impelementation might want multiple packets
+ * awaiting signing */
+
+ samba_pkt.packet_id = 1;
+
+ /* Swap the byte order back - it's actually little
+ * endian on the wire, but it was read above as
+ * network byte order */
+ samba_pkt.key_id_le = htonl(xkeyid);
+ samba_pkt.pkt = *xpkt;
+
+ snprintf(full_socket, sizeof(full_socket), "%s/socket", ntp_signd_socket);
+
+ fd = ux_socket_connect(full_socket);
+ /* Only continue with this if we can talk to Samba */
+ if (fd != -1) {
+ /* Send old packet to Samba, expect response */
+ /* Packet to Samba is quite simple:
+ All values BIG endian except key ID as noted
+ [packet size as BE] - 4 bytes
+ [protocol version (0)] - 4 bytes
+ [packet ID] - 4 bytes
+ [operation (sign message=0)] - 4 bytes
+ [key id] - LITTLE endian (as on wire) - 4 bytes
+ [message to sign] - as marshalled, without signature
+ */
+
+ if (send_packet(fd, (char *)&samba_pkt, offsetof(struct samba_key_in, pkt) + LEN_PKT_NOMAC) != 0) {
+ /* Huh? could not talk to Samba... */
+ close(fd);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (recv_packet(fd, &reply, &reply_len) != 0) {
+ if (reply) {
+ free(reply);
+ }
+ close(fd);
+ return;
+ }
+ /* Return packet is also simple:
+ [packet size] - network byte order - 4 bytes
+ [protocol version (0)] network byte order - - 4 bytes
+ [operation (signed success=3, failure=4)] network byte order - - 4 byte
+ (optional) [signed message] - as provided before, with signature appended
+ */
+
+ if (reply_len <= sizeof(samba_reply)) {
+ memcpy(&samba_reply, reply, reply_len);
+ if (ntohl(samba_reply.op) == 3 && reply_len > offsetof(struct samba_key_out, pkt)) {
+ sendlen = reply_len - offsetof(struct samba_key_out, pkt);
+ xpkt = &samba_reply.pkt;
+ sendpkt(&rbufp->recv_srcadr, rbufp->dstadr, 0, xpkt, sendlen);
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ if (debug)
+ printf(
+ "transmit ntp_signd packet: at %ld %s->%s mode %d keyid %08x len %d\n",
+ current_time, ntoa(&rbufp->dstadr->sin),
+ ntoa(&rbufp->recv_srcadr), xmode, xkeyid, sendlen);
+#endif
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (reply) {
+ free(reply);
+ }
+ close(fd);
+
+ }
+}
+#endif