mirror of
https://github.com/samba-team/samba.git
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c25460ee1f
This fixes a regression that came in via 00db3aba6c
.
Found by Vivek Das <vdas@redhat.com> (Red Hat QE).
In order to demonstrate simply run:
smbclient //server/share -U user%password -mNT1 -c quit \
--option="client ntlmv2 auth"=no \
--option="client use spnego"=no
against a server that uses "ntlm auth = ntlmv2-only" (our default
setting).
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13360
CVE-2018-1139: Weak authentication protocol allowed.
Guenther
Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
605 lines
20 KiB
C
605 lines
20 KiB
C
/*
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Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
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Password and authentication handling
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Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2001-2004
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Copyright (C) Gerald Carter 2003
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Copyright (C) Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton 1996-2000
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This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
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(at your option) any later version.
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This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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GNU General Public License for more details.
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You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
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*/
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#include "includes.h"
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#include "../lib/crypto/crypto.h"
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#include "librpc/gen_ndr/netlogon.h"
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#include "libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
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/****************************************************************************
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Core of smb password checking routine.
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****************************************************************************/
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static bool smb_pwd_check_ntlmv1(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
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const DATA_BLOB *nt_response,
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const uint8_t *part_passwd,
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const DATA_BLOB *sec_blob,
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DATA_BLOB *user_sess_key)
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{
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/* Finish the encryption of part_passwd. */
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uint8_t p24[24];
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if (part_passwd == NULL) {
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DEBUG(10,("No password set - DISALLOWING access\n"));
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/* No password set - always false ! */
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return false;
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}
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if (sec_blob->length != 8) {
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DEBUG(0, ("smb_pwd_check_ntlmv1: incorrect challenge size (%lu)\n",
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(unsigned long)sec_blob->length));
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return false;
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}
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if (nt_response->length != 24) {
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DEBUG(0, ("smb_pwd_check_ntlmv1: incorrect password length (%lu)\n",
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(unsigned long)nt_response->length));
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return false;
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}
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SMBOWFencrypt(part_passwd, sec_blob->data, p24);
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#if DEBUG_PASSWORD
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DEBUG(100,("Part password (P16) was |\n"));
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dump_data(100, part_passwd, 16);
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DEBUGADD(100,("Password from client was |\n"));
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dump_data(100, nt_response->data, nt_response->length);
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DEBUGADD(100,("Given challenge was |\n"));
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dump_data(100, sec_blob->data, sec_blob->length);
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DEBUGADD(100,("Value from encryption was |\n"));
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dump_data(100, p24, 24);
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#endif
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if (memcmp(p24, nt_response->data, 24) == 0) {
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if (user_sess_key != NULL) {
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*user_sess_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 16);
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SMBsesskeygen_ntv1(part_passwd, user_sess_key->data);
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}
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return true;
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}
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return false;
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}
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/****************************************************************************
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Core of smb password checking routine. (NTLMv2, LMv2)
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Note: The same code works with both NTLMv2 and LMv2.
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****************************************************************************/
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static bool smb_pwd_check_ntlmv2(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
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const DATA_BLOB *ntv2_response,
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const uint8_t *part_passwd,
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const DATA_BLOB *sec_blob,
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const char *user, const char *domain,
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DATA_BLOB *user_sess_key)
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{
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/* Finish the encryption of part_passwd. */
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uint8_t kr[16];
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uint8_t value_from_encryption[16];
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DATA_BLOB client_key_data;
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if (part_passwd == NULL) {
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DEBUG(10,("No password set - DISALLOWING access\n"));
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/* No password set - always false */
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return false;
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}
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if (sec_blob->length != 8) {
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DEBUG(0, ("smb_pwd_check_ntlmv2: incorrect challenge size (%lu)\n",
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(unsigned long)sec_blob->length));
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return false;
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}
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if (ntv2_response->length < 24) {
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/* We MUST have more than 16 bytes, or the stuff below will go
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crazy. No known implementation sends less than the 24 bytes
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for LMv2, let alone NTLMv2. */
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DEBUG(0, ("smb_pwd_check_ntlmv2: incorrect password length (%lu)\n",
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(unsigned long)ntv2_response->length));
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return false;
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}
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client_key_data = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, ntv2_response->data+16, ntv2_response->length-16);
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/*
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todo: should we be checking this for anything? We can't for LMv2,
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but for NTLMv2 it is meant to contain the current time etc.
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*/
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if (!ntv2_owf_gen(part_passwd, user, domain, kr)) {
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return false;
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}
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SMBOWFencrypt_ntv2(kr, sec_blob, &client_key_data, value_from_encryption);
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#if DEBUG_PASSWORD
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DEBUG(100,("Part password (P16) was |\n"));
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dump_data(100, part_passwd, 16);
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DEBUGADD(100,("Password from client was |\n"));
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dump_data(100, ntv2_response->data, ntv2_response->length);
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DEBUGADD(100,("Variable data from client was |\n"));
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dump_data(100, client_key_data.data, client_key_data.length);
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DEBUGADD(100,("Given challenge was |\n"));
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dump_data(100, sec_blob->data, sec_blob->length);
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DEBUGADD(100,("Value from encryption was |\n"));
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dump_data(100, value_from_encryption, 16);
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#endif
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data_blob_clear_free(&client_key_data);
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if (memcmp(value_from_encryption, ntv2_response->data, 16) == 0) {
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if (user_sess_key != NULL) {
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*user_sess_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 16);
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SMBsesskeygen_ntv2(kr, value_from_encryption, user_sess_key->data);
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}
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return true;
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}
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return false;
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}
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/****************************************************************************
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Core of smb password checking routine. (NTLMv2, LMv2)
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Note: The same code works with both NTLMv2 and LMv2.
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****************************************************************************/
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static bool smb_sess_key_ntlmv2(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
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const DATA_BLOB *ntv2_response,
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const uint8_t *part_passwd,
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const DATA_BLOB *sec_blob,
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const char *user, const char *domain,
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DATA_BLOB *user_sess_key)
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{
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/* Finish the encryption of part_passwd. */
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uint8_t kr[16];
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uint8_t value_from_encryption[16];
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DATA_BLOB client_key_data;
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if (part_passwd == NULL) {
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DEBUG(10,("No password set - DISALLOWING access\n"));
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/* No password set - always false */
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return false;
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}
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if (sec_blob->length != 8) {
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DEBUG(0, ("smb_sess_key_ntlmv2: incorrect challenge size (%lu)\n",
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(unsigned long)sec_blob->length));
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return false;
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}
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if (ntv2_response->length < 24) {
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/* We MUST have more than 16 bytes, or the stuff below will go
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crazy. No known implementation sends less than the 24 bytes
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for LMv2, let alone NTLMv2. */
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DEBUG(0, ("smb_sess_key_ntlmv2: incorrect password length (%lu)\n",
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(unsigned long)ntv2_response->length));
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return false;
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}
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client_key_data = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, ntv2_response->data+16, ntv2_response->length-16);
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if (!ntv2_owf_gen(part_passwd, user, domain, kr)) {
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return false;
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}
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SMBOWFencrypt_ntv2(kr, sec_blob, &client_key_data, value_from_encryption);
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*user_sess_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 16);
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SMBsesskeygen_ntv2(kr, value_from_encryption, user_sess_key->data);
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return true;
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}
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/**
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* Compare password hashes against those from the SAM
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*
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* @param mem_ctx talloc context
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* @param client_lanman LANMAN password hash, as supplied by the client
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* @param client_nt NT (MD4) password hash, as supplied by the client
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* @param username internal Samba username, for log messages
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* @param client_username username the client used
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* @param client_domain domain name the client used (may be mapped)
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* @param stored_lanman LANMAN password hash, as stored on the SAM
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* @param stored_nt NT (MD4) password hash, as stored on the SAM
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* @param user_sess_key User session key
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* @param lm_sess_key LM session key (first 8 bytes of the LM hash)
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*/
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NTSTATUS hash_password_check(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
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bool lanman_auth,
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const struct samr_Password *client_lanman,
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const struct samr_Password *client_nt,
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const char *username,
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const struct samr_Password *stored_lanman,
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const struct samr_Password *stored_nt)
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{
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if (stored_nt == NULL) {
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DEBUG(3,("hash_password_check: NO NT password stored for user %s.\n",
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username));
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}
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if (client_nt && stored_nt) {
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if (memcmp(client_nt->hash, stored_nt->hash, sizeof(stored_nt->hash)) == 0) {
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return NT_STATUS_OK;
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} else {
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DEBUG(3,("hash_password_check: Interactive logon: NT password check failed for user %s\n",
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username));
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return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
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}
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} else if (client_lanman && stored_lanman) {
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if (!lanman_auth) {
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DEBUG(3,("hash_password_check: Interactive logon: only LANMAN password supplied for user %s, and LM passwords are disabled!\n",
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username));
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return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
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}
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if (strchr_m(username, '@')) {
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return NT_STATUS_NOT_FOUND;
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}
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if (memcmp(client_lanman->hash, stored_lanman->hash, sizeof(stored_lanman->hash)) == 0) {
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return NT_STATUS_OK;
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} else {
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DEBUG(3,("hash_password_check: Interactive logon: LANMAN password check failed for user %s\n",
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username));
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return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
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}
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}
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if (strchr_m(username, '@')) {
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return NT_STATUS_NOT_FOUND;
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}
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return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
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}
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/**
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* Check a challenge-response password against the value of the NT or
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* LM password hash.
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*
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* @param mem_ctx talloc context
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* @param challenge 8-byte challenge. If all zero, forces plaintext comparison
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* @param nt_response 'unicode' NT response to the challenge, or unicode password
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* @param lm_response ASCII or LANMAN response to the challenge, or password in DOS code page
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* @param username internal Samba username, for log messages
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* @param client_username username the client used
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* @param client_domain domain name the client used (may be mapped)
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* @param stored_lanman LANMAN ASCII password from our passdb or similar
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* @param stored_nt MD4 unicode password from our passdb or similar
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* @param user_sess_key User session key
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* @param lm_sess_key LM session key (first 8 bytes of the LM hash)
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*/
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NTSTATUS ntlm_password_check(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
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bool lanman_auth,
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enum ntlm_auth_level ntlm_auth,
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uint32_t logon_parameters,
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const DATA_BLOB *challenge,
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const DATA_BLOB *lm_response,
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const DATA_BLOB *nt_response,
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const char *username,
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const char *client_username,
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const char *client_domain,
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const struct samr_Password *stored_lanman,
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const struct samr_Password *stored_nt,
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DATA_BLOB *user_sess_key,
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DATA_BLOB *lm_sess_key)
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{
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DATA_BLOB tmp_sess_key;
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const char *upper_client_domain = NULL;
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if (ntlm_auth == NTLM_AUTH_DISABLED) {
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DBG_WARNING("ntlm_password_check: NTLM authentication not "
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"permitted by configuration.\n");
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return NT_STATUS_NTLM_BLOCKED;
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}
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if (client_domain != NULL) {
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upper_client_domain = talloc_strdup_upper(mem_ctx, client_domain);
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if (upper_client_domain == NULL) {
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return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
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}
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}
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if (stored_nt == NULL) {
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DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: NO NT password stored for user %s.\n",
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username));
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}
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*lm_sess_key = data_blob(NULL, 0);
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*user_sess_key = data_blob(NULL, 0);
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/* Check for cleartext netlogon. Used by Exchange 5.5. */
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if ((logon_parameters & MSV1_0_CLEARTEXT_PASSWORD_ALLOWED)
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&& challenge->length == 8
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&& (all_zero(challenge->data, challenge->length))) {
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struct samr_Password client_nt;
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struct samr_Password client_lm;
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char *unix_pw = NULL;
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bool lm_ok;
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size_t converted_size = 0;
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DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: checking plaintext passwords for user %s\n",
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username));
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mdfour(client_nt.hash, nt_response->data, nt_response->length);
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if (lm_response->length &&
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(convert_string_talloc(mem_ctx, CH_DOS, CH_UNIX,
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lm_response->data, lm_response->length,
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(void *)&unix_pw, &converted_size))) {
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if (E_deshash(unix_pw, client_lm.hash)) {
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lm_ok = true;
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} else {
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lm_ok = false;
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}
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} else {
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lm_ok = false;
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}
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return hash_password_check(mem_ctx,
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lanman_auth,
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lm_ok ? &client_lm : NULL,
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nt_response->length ? &client_nt : NULL,
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username,
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stored_lanman, stored_nt);
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}
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if (nt_response->length != 0 && nt_response->length < 24) {
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DEBUG(2,("ntlm_password_check: invalid NT password length (%lu) for user %s\n",
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(unsigned long)nt_response->length, username));
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}
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if (nt_response->length > 24 && stored_nt) {
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/* We have the NT MD4 hash challenge available - see if we can
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use it
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*/
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DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: Checking NTLMv2 password with domain [%s]\n",
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client_domain ? client_domain : "<NULL>"));
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if (smb_pwd_check_ntlmv2(mem_ctx,
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nt_response,
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stored_nt->hash, challenge,
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client_username,
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client_domain,
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user_sess_key)) {
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if (user_sess_key->length) {
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*lm_sess_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, user_sess_key->data, MIN(8, user_sess_key->length));
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}
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return NT_STATUS_OK;
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}
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DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: Checking NTLMv2 password with uppercased version of domain [%s]\n",
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upper_client_domain ? upper_client_domain : "<NULL>"));
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if (smb_pwd_check_ntlmv2(mem_ctx,
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nt_response,
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stored_nt->hash, challenge,
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client_username,
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upper_client_domain,
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user_sess_key)) {
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if (user_sess_key->length) {
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*lm_sess_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, user_sess_key->data, MIN(8, user_sess_key->length));
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}
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return NT_STATUS_OK;
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}
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DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: Checking NTLMv2 password without a domain\n"));
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if (smb_pwd_check_ntlmv2(mem_ctx,
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nt_response,
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stored_nt->hash, challenge,
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client_username,
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"",
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user_sess_key)) {
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if (user_sess_key->length) {
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*lm_sess_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, user_sess_key->data, MIN(8, user_sess_key->length));
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}
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return NT_STATUS_OK;
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} else {
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DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: NTLMv2 password check failed\n"));
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}
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} else if (nt_response->length == 24 && stored_nt) {
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if (ntlm_auth == NTLM_AUTH_ON
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|| (ntlm_auth == NTLM_AUTH_MSCHAPv2_NTLMV2_ONLY && (logon_parameters & MSV1_0_ALLOW_MSVCHAPV2))) {
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/* We have the NT MD4 hash challenge available - see if we can
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use it (ie. does it exist in the smbpasswd file).
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*/
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DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: Checking NT MD4 password\n"));
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if (smb_pwd_check_ntlmv1(mem_ctx,
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nt_response,
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stored_nt->hash, challenge,
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user_sess_key)) {
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/* The LM session key for this response is not very secure,
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so use it only if we otherwise allow LM authentication */
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if (lanman_auth && stored_lanman) {
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*lm_sess_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, stored_lanman->hash, MIN(8, user_sess_key->length));
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}
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return NT_STATUS_OK;
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} else {
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DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: NT MD4 password check failed for user %s\n",
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username));
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return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
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}
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} else {
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DEBUG(2,("ntlm_password_check: NTLMv1 passwords NOT PERMITTED for user %s\n",
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username));
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/* no return, because we might pick up LMv2 in the LM field */
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}
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}
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if (lm_response->length == 0) {
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DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: NEITHER LanMan nor NT password supplied for user %s\n",
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username));
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return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
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}
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if (lm_response->length < 24) {
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DEBUG(2,("ntlm_password_check: invalid LanMan password length (%lu) for user %s\n",
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(unsigned long)nt_response->length, username));
|
|
return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!lanman_auth) {
|
|
DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: Lanman passwords NOT PERMITTED for user %s\n",
|
|
username));
|
|
} else if (!stored_lanman) {
|
|
DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: NO LanMan password set for user %s (and no NT password supplied)\n",
|
|
username));
|
|
} else if (strchr_m(username, '@')) {
|
|
DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: NO LanMan password allowed for username@realm logins (user: %s)\n",
|
|
username));
|
|
} else {
|
|
DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: Checking LM password\n"));
|
|
if (smb_pwd_check_ntlmv1(mem_ctx,
|
|
lm_response,
|
|
stored_lanman->hash, challenge,
|
|
NULL)) {
|
|
/* The session key for this response is still very odd.
|
|
It not very secure, so use it only if we otherwise
|
|
allow LM authentication */
|
|
|
|
if (lanman_auth && stored_lanman) {
|
|
uint8_t first_8_lm_hash[16];
|
|
memcpy(first_8_lm_hash, stored_lanman->hash, 8);
|
|
memset(first_8_lm_hash + 8, '\0', 8);
|
|
*user_sess_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, first_8_lm_hash, 16);
|
|
*lm_sess_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, stored_lanman->hash, 8);
|
|
}
|
|
return NT_STATUS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!stored_nt) {
|
|
DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: LM password check failed for user, no NT password %s\n",username));
|
|
return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* This is for 'LMv2' authentication. almost NTLMv2 but limited to 24 bytes.
|
|
- related to Win9X, legacy NAS pass-though authentication
|
|
*/
|
|
DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: Checking LMv2 password with domain %s\n",
|
|
client_domain ? client_domain : "<NULL>"));
|
|
if (smb_pwd_check_ntlmv2(mem_ctx,
|
|
lm_response,
|
|
stored_nt->hash, challenge,
|
|
client_username,
|
|
client_domain,
|
|
&tmp_sess_key)) {
|
|
if (nt_response->length > 24) {
|
|
/* If NTLMv2 authentication has preceded us
|
|
* (even if it failed), then use the session
|
|
* key from that. See the RPC-SAMLOGON
|
|
* torture test */
|
|
smb_sess_key_ntlmv2(mem_ctx,
|
|
nt_response,
|
|
stored_nt->hash, challenge,
|
|
client_username,
|
|
client_domain,
|
|
user_sess_key);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Otherwise, use the LMv2 session key */
|
|
*user_sess_key = tmp_sess_key;
|
|
}
|
|
if (user_sess_key->length) {
|
|
*lm_sess_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, user_sess_key->data, MIN(8, user_sess_key->length));
|
|
}
|
|
return NT_STATUS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: Checking LMv2 password with upper-cased version of domain %s\n",
|
|
upper_client_domain ? upper_client_domain : "<NULL>"));
|
|
if (smb_pwd_check_ntlmv2(mem_ctx,
|
|
lm_response,
|
|
stored_nt->hash, challenge,
|
|
client_username,
|
|
upper_client_domain,
|
|
&tmp_sess_key)) {
|
|
if (nt_response->length > 24) {
|
|
/* If NTLMv2 authentication has preceded us
|
|
* (even if it failed), then use the session
|
|
* key from that. See the RPC-SAMLOGON
|
|
* torture test */
|
|
smb_sess_key_ntlmv2(mem_ctx,
|
|
nt_response,
|
|
stored_nt->hash, challenge,
|
|
client_username,
|
|
upper_client_domain,
|
|
user_sess_key);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Otherwise, use the LMv2 session key */
|
|
*user_sess_key = tmp_sess_key;
|
|
}
|
|
if (user_sess_key->length) {
|
|
*lm_sess_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, user_sess_key->data, MIN(8, user_sess_key->length));
|
|
}
|
|
return NT_STATUS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: Checking LMv2 password without a domain\n"));
|
|
if (smb_pwd_check_ntlmv2(mem_ctx,
|
|
lm_response,
|
|
stored_nt->hash, challenge,
|
|
client_username,
|
|
"",
|
|
&tmp_sess_key)) {
|
|
if (nt_response->length > 24) {
|
|
/* If NTLMv2 authentication has preceded us
|
|
* (even if it failed), then use the session
|
|
* key from that. See the RPC-SAMLOGON
|
|
* torture test */
|
|
smb_sess_key_ntlmv2(mem_ctx,
|
|
nt_response,
|
|
stored_nt->hash, challenge,
|
|
client_username,
|
|
"",
|
|
user_sess_key);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Otherwise, use the LMv2 session key */
|
|
*user_sess_key = tmp_sess_key;
|
|
}
|
|
if (user_sess_key->length) {
|
|
*lm_sess_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, user_sess_key->data, MIN(8, user_sess_key->length));
|
|
}
|
|
return NT_STATUS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Apparently NT accepts NT responses in the LM field
|
|
- I think this is related to Win9X pass-though authentication
|
|
*/
|
|
DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: Checking NT MD4 password in LM field\n"));
|
|
if (ntlm_auth == NTLM_AUTH_ON) {
|
|
if (smb_pwd_check_ntlmv1(mem_ctx,
|
|
lm_response,
|
|
stored_nt->hash, challenge,
|
|
NULL)) {
|
|
/* The session key for this response is still very odd.
|
|
It not very secure, so use it only if we otherwise
|
|
allow LM authentication */
|
|
|
|
if (lanman_auth && stored_lanman) {
|
|
uint8_t first_8_lm_hash[16];
|
|
memcpy(first_8_lm_hash, stored_lanman->hash, 8);
|
|
memset(first_8_lm_hash + 8, '\0', 8);
|
|
*user_sess_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, first_8_lm_hash, 16);
|
|
*lm_sess_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, stored_lanman->hash, 8);
|
|
}
|
|
return NT_STATUS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: LM password, NT MD4 password in LM field and LMv2 failed for user %s\n",username));
|
|
} else {
|
|
DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: LM password and LMv2 failed for user %s, and NT MD4 password in LM field not permitted\n",username));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Try and match error codes */
|
|
if (strchr_m(username, '@')) {
|
|
return NT_STATUS_NOT_FOUND;
|
|
}
|
|
return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
|
|
}
|
|
|