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e42e87d544
Part of a fix for bug #7938. Based on a patch provided by John Bradshaw <john@johnbradshaw.org>. Karolin Autobuild-User: Karolin Seeger <kseeger@samba.org> Autobuild-Date: Tue May 8 13:56:32 CEST 2012 on sn-devel-104
319 lines
11 KiB
XML
319 lines
11 KiB
XML
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="iso-8859-1"?>
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<!DOCTYPE chapter PUBLIC "-//Samba-Team//DTD DocBook V4.2-Based Variant V1.0//EN" "http://www.samba.org/samba/DTD/samba-doc">
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<chapter id="unix-smb">
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<chapterinfo>
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<author>
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<firstname>Andrew</firstname><surname>Tridgell</surname>
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</author>
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<pubdate>April 1995</pubdate>
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</chapterinfo>
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<title>NetBIOS in a Unix World</title>
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<sect1>
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<title>Introduction</title>
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<para>
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This is a short document that describes some of the issues that
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confront a SMB implementation on unix, and how Samba copes with
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them. They may help people who are looking at unix<->PC
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interoperability.
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</para>
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<para>
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It was written to help out a person who was writing a paper on unix to
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PC connectivity.
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</para>
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</sect1>
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<sect1>
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<title>Usernames</title>
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<para>
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The SMB protocol has only a loose username concept. Early SMB
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protocols (such as CORE and COREPLUS) have no username concept at
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all. Even in later protocols clients often attempt operations
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(particularly printer operations) without first validating a username
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on the server.
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</para>
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<para>
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Unix security is based around username/password pairs. A unix box
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should not allow clients to do any substantive operation without some
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sort of validation.
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</para>
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<para>
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The problem mostly manifests itself when the unix server is in "share
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level" security mode. This is the default mode as the alternative
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"user level" security mode usually forces a client to connect to the
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server as the same user for each connected share, which is
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inconvenient in many sites.
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</para>
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<para>
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In "share level" security the client normally gives a username in the
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"session setup" protocol, but does not supply an accompanying
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password. The client then connects to resources using the "tree
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connect" protocol, and supplies a password. The problem is that the
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user on the PC types the username and the password in different
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contexts, unaware that they need to go together to give access to the
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server. The username is normally the one the user typed in when they
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"logged onto" the PC (this assumes Windows for Workgroups). The
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password is the one they chose when connecting to the disk or printer.
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</para>
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<para>
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The user often chooses a totally different username for their login as
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for the drive connection. Often they also want to access different
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drives as different usernames. The unix server needs some way of
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divining the correct username to combine with each password.
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</para>
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<para>
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Samba tries to avoid this problem using several methods. These succeed
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in the vast majority of cases. The methods include username maps, the
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service%user syntax, the saving of session setup usernames for later
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validation and the derivation of the username from the service name
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(either directly or via the user= option).
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</para>
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</sect1>
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<sect1>
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<title>File Ownership</title>
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<para>
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The commonly used SMB protocols have no way of saying "you can't do
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that because you don't own the file". They have, in fact, no concept
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of file ownership at all.
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</para>
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<para>
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This brings up all sorts of interesting problems. For example, when
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you copy a file to a unix drive, and the file is world writeable but
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owned by another user the file will transfer correctly but will
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receive the wrong date. This is because the utime() call under unix
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only succeeds for the owner of the file, or root, even if the file is
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world writeable. For security reasons Samba does all file operations
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as the validated user, not root, so the utime() fails. This can stuff
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up shared development diectories as programs like "make" will not get
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file time comparisons right.
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</para>
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<para>
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There are several possible solutions to this problem, including
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username mapping, and forcing a specific username for particular
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shares.
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</para>
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</sect1>
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<sect1>
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<title>Passwords</title>
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<para>
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Many SMB clients uppercase passwords before sending them. I have no
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idea why they do this. Interestingly WfWg uppercases the password only
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if the server is running a protocol greater than COREPLUS, so
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obviously it isn't just the data entry routines that are to blame.
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</para>
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<para>
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Unix passwords are case sensitive. So if users use mixed case
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passwords they are in trouble.
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</para>
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<para>
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Samba can try to cope with this by either using the "password level"
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option which causes Samba to try the offered password with up to the
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specified number of case changes, or by using the "password server"
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option which allows Samba to do its validation via another machine
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(typically a WinNT server).
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</para>
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<para>
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Samba supports the password encryption method used by SMB
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clients. Note that the use of password encryption in Microsoft
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networking leads to password hashes that are "plain text equivalent".
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This means that it is *VERY* important to ensure that the Samba
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smbpasswd file containing these password hashes is only readable
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by the root user. See the documentation ENCRYPTION.txt for more
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details.
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</para>
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</sect1>
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<sect1>
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<title>Locking</title>
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<para>
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Since samba 2.2, samba supports other types of locking as well. This
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section is outdated.
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</para>
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<para>
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The locking calls available under a DOS/Windows environment are much
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richer than those available in unix. This means a unix server (like
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Samba) choosing to use the standard fcntl() based unix locking calls
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to implement SMB locking has to improvise a bit.
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</para>
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<para>
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One major problem is that dos locks can be in a 32 bit (unsigned)
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range. Unix locking calls are 32 bits, but are signed, giving only a 31
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bit range. Unfortunately OLE2 clients use the top bit to select a
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locking range used for OLE semaphores.
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</para>
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<para>
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To work around this problem Samba compresses the 32 bit range into 31
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bits by appropriate bit shifting. This seems to work but is not
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ideal. In a future version a separate SMB lockd may be added to cope
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with the problem.
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</para>
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<para>
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It also doesn't help that many unix lockd daemons are very buggy and
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crash at the slightest provocation. They normally go mostly unused in
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a unix environment because few unix programs use byte range
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locking. The stress of huge numbers of lock requests from dos/windows
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clients can kill the daemon on some systems.
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</para>
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<para>
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The second major problem is the "opportunistic locking" requested by
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some clients. If a client requests opportunistic locking then it is
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asking the server to notify it if anyone else tries to do something on
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the same file, at which time the client will say if it is willing to
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give up its lock. Unix has no simple way of implementing
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opportunistic locking, and currently Samba has no support for it.
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</para>
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</sect1>
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<sect1>
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<title>Deny Modes</title>
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<para>
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When a SMB client opens a file it asks for a particular "deny mode" to
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be placed on the file. These modes (DENY_NONE, DENY_READ, DENY_WRITE,
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DENY_ALL, DENY_FCB and DENY_DOS) specify what actions should be
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allowed by anyone else who tries to use the file at the same time. If
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DENY_READ is placed on the file, for example, then any attempt to open
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the file for reading should fail.
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</para>
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<para>
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Unix has no equivalent notion. To implement this Samba uses either lock
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files based on the files inode and placed in a separate lock
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directory or a shared memory implementation. The lock file method
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is clumsy and consumes processing and file resources,
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the shared memory implementation is vastly prefered and is turned on
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by default for those systems that support it.
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</para>
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</sect1>
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<sect1>
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<title>Trapdoor UIDs</title>
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<para>
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A SMB session can run with several uids on the one socket. This
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happens when a user connects to two shares with different
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usernames. To cope with this the unix server needs to switch uids
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within the one process. On some unixes (such as SCO) this is not
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possible. This means that on those unixes the client is restricted to
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a single uid.
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</para>
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<para>
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Note that you can also get the "trapdoor uid" message for other
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reasons. Please see the FAQ for details.
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</para>
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</sect1>
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<sect1>
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<title>Port numbers</title>
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<para>
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There is a convention that clients on sockets use high "unprivileged"
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port numbers (>1000) and connect to servers on low "privilegedg" port
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numbers. This is enforced in Unix as non-root users can't open a
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socket for listening on port numbers less than 1000.
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</para>
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<para>
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Most PC based SMB clients (such as WfWg and WinNT) don't follow this
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convention completely. The main culprit is the netbios nameserving on
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udp port 137. Name query requests come from a source port of 137. This
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is a problem when you combine it with the common firewalling technique
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of not allowing incoming packets on low port numbers. This means that
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these clients can't query a netbios nameserver on the other side of a
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low port based firewall.
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</para>
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<para>
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The problem is more severe with netbios node status queries. I've
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found that WfWg, Win95 and WinNT3.5 all respond to netbios node status
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queries on port 137 no matter what the source port was in the
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request. This works between machines that are both using port 137, but
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it means it's not possible for a unix user to do a node status request
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to any of these OSes unless they are running as root. The answer comes
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back, but it goes to port 137 which the unix user can't listen
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on. Interestingly WinNT3.1 got this right - it sends node status
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responses back to the source port in the request.
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</para>
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</sect1>
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<sect1>
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<title>Protocol Complexity</title>
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<para>
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There are many "protocol levels" in the SMB protocol. It seems that
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each time new functionality was added to a Microsoft operating system,
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they added the equivalent functions in a new protocol level of the SMB
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protocol to "externalise" the new capabilities.
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</para>
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<para>
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This means the protocol is very "rich", offering many ways of doing
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each file operation. This means SMB servers need to be complex and
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large. It also means it is very difficult to make them bug free. It is
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not just Samba that suffers from this problem, other servers such as
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WinNT don't support every variation of every call and it has almost
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certainly been a headache for MS developers to support the myriad of
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SMB calls that are available.
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</para>
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<para>
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There are about 65 "top level" operations in the SMB protocol (things
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like SMBread and SMBwrite). Some of these include hundreds of
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sub-functions (SMBtrans has at least 120 sub-functions, like
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DosPrintQAdd and NetSessionEnum). All of them take several options
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that can change the way they work. Many take dozens of possible
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"information levels" that change the structures that need to be
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returned. Samba supports all but 2 of the "top level" functions. It
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supports only 8 (so far) of the SMBtrans sub-functions. Even NT
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doesn't support them all.
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</para>
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<para>
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Samba currently supports up to the "NT LM 0.12" protocol, which is the
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one preferred by Win95 and WinNT3.5. Luckily this protocol level has a
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"capabilities" field which specifies which super-duper new-fangled
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options the server supports. This helps to make the implementation of
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this protocol level much easier.
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</para>
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<para>
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There is also a problem with the SMB specications. SMB is a X/Open
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spec, but the X/Open book is far from ideal, and fails to cover many
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important issues, leaving much to the imagination. Microsoft recently
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renamed the SMB protocol CIFS (Common Internet File System) and have
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published new specifications. These are far superior to the old
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X/Open documents but there are still undocumented calls and features.
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This specification is actively being worked on by a CIFS developers
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mailing list hosted by Microsft.
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</para>
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</sect1>
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</chapter>
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