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749 lines
24 KiB
C
749 lines
24 KiB
C
/*
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ldb database module
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Copyright (C) Simo Sorce 2004
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Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2005
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Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 2004
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This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
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(at your option) any later version.
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This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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GNU General Public License for more details.
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You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
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Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
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*/
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/*
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* Name: ldb
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*
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* Component: ldb password_hash module
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*
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* Description: correctly update hash values based on changes to sambaPassword and friends
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*
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* Author: Andrew Bartlett
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*/
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#include "includes.h"
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#include "libcli/ldap/ldap.h"
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#include "ldb/include/ldb_errors.h"
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#include "ldb/include/ldb_private.h"
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#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_misc.h"
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#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_samr.h"
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#include "libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
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#include "system/kerberos.h"
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#include "auth/kerberos/kerberos.h"
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#include "system/time.h"
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#include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h"
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#include "ads.h"
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#include "hdb.h"
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/* If we have decided there is reason to work on this request, then
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* setup all the password hash types correctly.
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*
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* If the administrator doesn't want the sambaPassword stored (set in the
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* domain and per-account policies) then we must strip that out before
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* we do the first operation.
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*
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* Once this is done (which could update anything at all), we
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* calculate the password hashes.
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*
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* This function must not only update the ntPwdHash, lmPwdHash and
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* krb5Key fields, it must also atomicly increment the
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* msDS-KeyVersionNumber. We should be in a transaction, so all this
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* should be quite safe...
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*
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* Finally, if the administrator has requested that a password history
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* be maintained, then this should also be written out.
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*
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*/
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static int password_hash_handle(struct ldb_module *module, struct ldb_request *req,
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const struct ldb_message *msg)
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{
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int ret, old_ret = -1;
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uint_t pwdProperties, pwdHistoryLength;
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uint_t userAccountControl;
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const char *dnsDomain, *realm;
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const char *sambaPassword = NULL;
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struct samr_Password *sambaLMPwdHistory, *sambaNTPwdHistory;
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struct samr_Password *lmPwdHash, *ntPwdHash;
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struct samr_Password *lmOldHash = NULL, *ntOldHash = NULL;
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struct samr_Password *new_sambaLMPwdHistory, *new_sambaNTPwdHistory;
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struct samr_Password local_lmNewHash, local_ntNewHash;
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int sambaLMPwdHistory_len, sambaNTPwdHistory_len;
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uint_t kvno;
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struct dom_sid *domain_sid;
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time_t now = time(NULL);
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NTTIME now_nt;
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int i;
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krb5_error_code krb5_ret;
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struct smb_krb5_context *smb_krb5_context;
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struct ldb_message_element *attribute;
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struct ldb_dn *dn = msg->dn;
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struct ldb_message *msg2;
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struct ldb_request *search_request = NULL;
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struct ldb_request *modify_request;
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struct ldb_request *modified_orig_request;
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struct ldb_result *res, *dom_res, *old_res;
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struct ldb_message_element *objectclasses;
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struct ldb_val computer_val;
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struct ldb_val person_val;
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BOOL is_computer;
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struct ldb_message *modify_msg;
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const char *domain_expression;
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const char *old_user_attrs[] = { "lmPwdHash", "ntPwdHash", NULL };
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const char *user_attrs[] = { "userAccountControl", "sambaLMPwdHistory",
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"sambaNTPwdHistory",
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"ntPwdHash",
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"objectSid", "msDS-KeyVersionNumber",
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"objectClass", "userPrincipalName",
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"samAccountName",
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NULL };
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const char * const domain_attrs[] = { "pwdProperties", "pwdHistoryLength",
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"dnsDomain", NULL };
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TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
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/* Do the original action */
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/* If no part of this touches the sambaPassword, then we don't
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* need to make any changes. For password changes/set there should
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* be a 'delete' or a 'modify' on this attribute. */
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if ((attribute = ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "sambaPassword")) == NULL ) {
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return ldb_next_request(module, req);
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}
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mem_ctx = talloc_new(module);
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if (!mem_ctx) {
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return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
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}
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if (req->operation == LDB_REQ_MODIFY) {
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search_request = talloc(mem_ctx, struct ldb_request);
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if (!search_request) {
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talloc_free(mem_ctx);
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return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
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}
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/* Look up the old ntPwdHash and lmPwdHash values, so
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* we can later place these into the password
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* history */
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search_request->operation = LDB_REQ_SEARCH;
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search_request->op.search.base = dn;
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search_request->op.search.scope = LDB_SCOPE_BASE;
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search_request->op.search.tree = ldb_parse_tree(module->ldb, NULL);
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search_request->op.search.attrs = old_user_attrs;
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search_request->controls = NULL;
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old_ret = ldb_next_request(module, search_request);
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}
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/* we can't change things untill we copy it */
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msg2 = ldb_msg_copy_shallow(mem_ctx, msg);
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/* look again, this time at the copied attribute */
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if (!msg2 || (attribute = ldb_msg_find_element(msg2, "sambaPassword")) == NULL ) {
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talloc_free(mem_ctx);
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/* Gah? where did it go? Oh well... */
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return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
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}
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/* Wipe out the sambaPassword attribute set, we will handle it in
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* the second modify. We might not want it written to disk */
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if (req->operation == LDB_REQ_ADD) {
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if (attribute->num_values > 1) {
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ldb_set_errstring(module->ldb,
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talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "sambaPassword_handle: "
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"attempted set of multiple sambaPassword attributes on %s rejected",
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ldb_dn_linearize(mem_ctx, dn)));
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talloc_free(mem_ctx);
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return LDB_ERR_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION;
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}
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if (attribute->num_values == 1) {
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sambaPassword = (const char *)attribute->values[0].data;
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ldb_msg_remove_attr(msg2, "sambaPassword");
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}
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} else if (((attribute->flags & LDB_FLAG_MOD_MASK) == LDB_FLAG_MOD_ADD)
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|| ((attribute->flags & LDB_FLAG_MOD_MASK) == LDB_FLAG_MOD_REPLACE)) {
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if (attribute->num_values > 1) {
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ldb_set_errstring(module->ldb,
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talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "sambaPassword_handle: "
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"attempted set of multiple sambaPassword attributes on %s rejected",
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ldb_dn_linearize(mem_ctx, dn)));
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talloc_free(mem_ctx);
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return LDB_ERR_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION;
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}
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if (attribute->num_values == 1) {
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sambaPassword = (const char *)attribute->values[0].data;
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ldb_msg_remove_attr(msg2, "sambaPassword");
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}
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}
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modified_orig_request = talloc(mem_ctx, struct ldb_request);
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if (!modified_orig_request) {
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talloc_free(mem_ctx);
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return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
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}
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*modified_orig_request = *req;
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switch (modified_orig_request->operation) {
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case LDB_REQ_ADD:
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modified_orig_request->op.add.message = msg2;
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break;
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case LDB_REQ_MODIFY:
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modified_orig_request->op.mod.message = msg2;
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break;
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}
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/* Send the (modified) request of the original caller down to the database */
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ret = ldb_next_request(module, modified_orig_request);
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if (ret) {
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talloc_free(mem_ctx);
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return ret;
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}
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/* While we do the search first (for the old password hashes),
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* we don't want to override any error that the modify may
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* have returned. Now check the error */
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if (req->operation == LDB_REQ_MODIFY) {
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if (old_ret) {
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talloc_free(mem_ctx);
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return old_ret;
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}
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/* Find out the old passwords details of the user */
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old_res = search_request->op.search.res;
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talloc_steal(mem_ctx, old_res);
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talloc_free(search_request);
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if (old_res->count != 1) {
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ldb_set_errstring(module->ldb,
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talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "password_hash_handle: "
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"(pre) search for %s found %d != 1 objects, for entry we just modified",
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ldb_dn_linearize(mem_ctx, dn),
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old_res->count));
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/* What happend? The above add/modify worked... */
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talloc_free(mem_ctx);
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return LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT;
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}
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lmOldHash = samdb_result_hash(mem_ctx, old_res->msgs[0], "lmPwdHash");
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ntOldHash = samdb_result_hash(mem_ctx, old_res->msgs[0], "ntPwdHash");
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}
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/* Start finding out details we need for the second modify.
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* We do this after the first add/modify because other modules
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* will have filled in the templates, and we may have had
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* things like the username (affecting the salt) changed along
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* with the password. */
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/* Now find out what is on the entry after the above add/modify */
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search_request = talloc(mem_ctx, struct ldb_request);
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if (!search_request) {
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talloc_free(mem_ctx);
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return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
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}
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search_request->operation = LDB_REQ_SEARCH;
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search_request->op.search.base = dn;
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search_request->op.search.scope = LDB_SCOPE_BASE;
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search_request->op.search.tree = ldb_parse_tree(module->ldb, NULL);
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search_request->op.search.attrs = user_attrs;
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search_request->controls = NULL;
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ret = ldb_next_request(module, search_request);
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if (ret) {
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talloc_free(mem_ctx);
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return ret;
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}
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/* Find out the full details of the user */
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res = search_request->op.search.res;
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talloc_steal(mem_ctx, res);
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talloc_free(search_request);
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if (res->count != 1) {
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ldb_set_errstring(module->ldb,
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talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "password_hash_handle: "
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"search for %s found %d != 1 objects, for entry we just added/modified",
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ldb_dn_linearize(mem_ctx, dn),
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res->count));
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/* What happend? The above add/modify worked... */
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talloc_free(mem_ctx);
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return LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT;
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}
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userAccountControl = samdb_result_uint(res->msgs[0], "userAccountControl", 0);
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sambaLMPwdHistory_len = samdb_result_hashes(mem_ctx, res->msgs[0],
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"sambaLMPwdHistory", &sambaLMPwdHistory);
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sambaNTPwdHistory_len = samdb_result_hashes(mem_ctx, res->msgs[0],
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"sambaNTPwdHistory", &sambaNTPwdHistory);
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ntPwdHash = samdb_result_hash(mem_ctx, res->msgs[0], "ntPwdHash");
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kvno = samdb_result_uint(res->msgs[0], "msDS-KeyVersionNumber", 0);
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domain_sid = samdb_result_sid_prefix(mem_ctx, res->msgs[0], "objectSid");
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objectclasses = ldb_msg_find_element(res->msgs[0], "objectClass");
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person_val = data_blob_string_const("person");
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if (!objectclasses || !ldb_msg_find_val(objectclasses, &person_val)) {
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/* Not a 'person', so the rest of this doesn't make
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* sense. How we got a sambaPassword this far I don't
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* know... */
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ldb_set_errstring(module->ldb,
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talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "password_hash_handle: "
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"attempted set of sambaPassword on non-'person' object %s rejected",
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ldb_dn_linearize(mem_ctx, dn)));
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talloc_free(mem_ctx);
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return LDB_ERR_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION;
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}
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computer_val = data_blob_string_const("computer");
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if (ldb_msg_find_val(objectclasses, &computer_val)) {
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is_computer = True;
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} else {
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is_computer = False;
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}
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domain_expression = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "(&(objectSid=%s)(objectClass=domain))",
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ldap_encode_ndr_dom_sid(mem_ctx, domain_sid));
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/* Find the user's domain, then find out the domain password
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* properties */
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ret = ldb_search(module->ldb, NULL, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, domain_expression,
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domain_attrs, &dom_res);
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if (ret) {
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talloc_free(mem_ctx);
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return ret;
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}
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if (dom_res->count != 1) {
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/* What happend? The user we are modifying must be odd... */
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ldb_set_errstring(module->ldb,
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talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "password_hash_handle: "
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"search for domain %s found %d != 1 objects",
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dom_sid_string(mem_ctx, domain_sid),
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dom_res->count));
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talloc_free(mem_ctx);
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return LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT;
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}
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pwdProperties = samdb_result_uint(dom_res->msgs[0], "pwdProperties", 0);
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pwdHistoryLength = samdb_result_uint(dom_res->msgs[0], "pwdHistoryLength", 0);
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dnsDomain = ldb_msg_find_string(dom_res->msgs[0], "dnsDomain", NULL);
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realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, dnsDomain);
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/* Some operations below require kerberos contexts */
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if (smb_krb5_init_context(mem_ctx, &smb_krb5_context) != 0) {
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talloc_free(mem_ctx);
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return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
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}
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/* Prepare the modifications to set all the hash/key types */
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modify_msg = ldb_msg_new(req);
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modify_msg->dn = talloc_reference(modify_msg, dn);
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#define CHECK_RET(x) \
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do { \
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int check_ret = x; \
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if (check_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) { \
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talloc_free(mem_ctx); \
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return check_ret; \
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} \
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} while(0)
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/* Setup krb5Key (we want to either delete an existing value,
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* or replace with a new one). Both the unicode and NT hash
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* only branches append keys to this multivalued entry. */
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CHECK_RET(ldb_msg_add_empty(modify_msg, "krb5Key", LDB_FLAG_MOD_REPLACE));
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/* Yay, we can compute new password hashes from the unicode
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* password */
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if (sambaPassword) {
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Principal *salt_principal;
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const char *user_principal_name = ldb_msg_find_string(res->msgs[0], "userPrincipalName", NULL);
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Key *keys;
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size_t num_keys;
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/* compute the new nt and lm hashes */
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if (E_deshash(sambaPassword, local_lmNewHash.hash)) {
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lmPwdHash = &local_lmNewHash;
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} else {
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lmPwdHash = NULL;
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}
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E_md4hash(sambaPassword, local_ntNewHash.hash);
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ntPwdHash = &local_ntNewHash;
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CHECK_RET(ldb_msg_add_empty(modify_msg, "ntPwdHash",
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LDB_FLAG_MOD_REPLACE));
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CHECK_RET(samdb_msg_add_hash(module->ldb, req,
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modify_msg, "ntPwdHash",
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ntPwdHash));
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CHECK_RET(ldb_msg_add_empty(modify_msg, "lmPwdHash",
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LDB_FLAG_MOD_REPLACE));
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if (lmPwdHash) {
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CHECK_RET(samdb_msg_add_hash(module->ldb, req,
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modify_msg, "lmPwdHash",
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lmPwdHash));
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}
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/* Many, many thanks to lukeh@padl.com for this
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* algorithm, described in his Nov 10 2004 mail to
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* samba-technical@samba.org */
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if (is_computer) {
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/* Determine a salting principal */
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char *samAccountName = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, ldb_msg_find_string(res->msgs[0], "samAccountName", NULL));
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char *saltbody;
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if (!samAccountName) {
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ldb_set_errstring(module->ldb,
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talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "password_hash_handle: "
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"generation of new kerberos keys failed: %s is a computer without a samAccountName",
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ldb_dn_linearize(mem_ctx, dn)));
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talloc_free(mem_ctx);
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return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
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}
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if (samAccountName[strlen(samAccountName)-1] == '$') {
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samAccountName[strlen(samAccountName)-1] = '\0';
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}
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saltbody = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "%s.%s", samAccountName, dnsDomain);
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krb5_ret = krb5_make_principal(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, &salt_principal, realm, "host", saltbody, NULL);
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} else if (user_principal_name) {
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char *p;
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user_principal_name = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, user_principal_name);
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if (!user_principal_name) {
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talloc_free(mem_ctx);
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return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
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} else {
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p = strchr(user_principal_name, '@');
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if (p) {
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p[0] = '\0';
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}
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krb5_ret = krb5_make_principal(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, &salt_principal, realm, user_principal_name, NULL);
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}
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} else {
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const char *samAccountName = ldb_msg_find_string(res->msgs[0], "samAccountName", NULL);
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if (!samAccountName) {
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ldb_set_errstring(module->ldb,
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talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "password_hash_handle: "
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"generation of new kerberos keys failed: %s has no samAccountName",
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|
ldb_dn_linearize(mem_ctx, dn)));
|
|
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
|
|
return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
krb5_ret = krb5_make_principal(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, &salt_principal, realm, samAccountName, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (krb5_ret) {
|
|
ldb_set_errstring(module->ldb,
|
|
talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "password_hash_handle: "
|
|
"generation of a saltking principal failed: %s",
|
|
smb_get_krb5_error_message(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
|
|
krb5_ret, mem_ctx)));
|
|
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
|
|
return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* TODO: We may wish to control the encryption types chosen in future */
|
|
krb5_ret = hdb_generate_key_set_password(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
|
|
salt_principal, sambaPassword, &keys, &num_keys);
|
|
krb5_free_principal(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, salt_principal);
|
|
|
|
if (krb5_ret) {
|
|
ldb_set_errstring(module->ldb,
|
|
talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "password_hash_handle: "
|
|
"generation of new kerberos keys failed: %s",
|
|
smb_get_krb5_error_message(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
|
|
krb5_ret, mem_ctx)));
|
|
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
|
|
return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Walking all the key types generated, transform each
|
|
* key into an ASN.1 blob
|
|
*/
|
|
for (i=0; i < num_keys; i++) {
|
|
unsigned char *buf;
|
|
size_t buf_size;
|
|
size_t len;
|
|
struct ldb_val val;
|
|
|
|
if (keys[i].key.keytype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
|
|
/* We might end up doing this below:
|
|
* This ensures we get the unicode
|
|
* conversion right. This should also
|
|
* be fixed in the Heimdal libs */
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(Key, buf, buf_size, &keys[i], &len, krb5_ret);
|
|
if (krb5_ret) {
|
|
return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
val.data = talloc_memdup(req, buf, len);
|
|
val.length = len;
|
|
free(buf);
|
|
if (!val.data || krb5_ret) {
|
|
hdb_free_keys (smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, num_keys, keys);
|
|
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
|
|
return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
ret = ldb_msg_add_value(modify_msg, "krb5Key", &val);
|
|
if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
|
|
hdb_free_keys (smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, num_keys, keys);
|
|
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hdb_free_keys (smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, num_keys, keys);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Possibly kill off the cleartext or store it */
|
|
CHECK_RET(ldb_msg_add_empty(modify_msg, "sambaPassword", LDB_FLAG_MOD_REPLACE));
|
|
|
|
if (sambaPassword && (pwdProperties & DOMAIN_PASSWORD_STORE_CLEARTEXT) &&
|
|
(userAccountControl & UF_ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PASSWORD_ALLOWED)) {
|
|
CHECK_RET(ldb_msg_add_string(modify_msg, "sambaPassword", sambaPassword));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Even if we didn't get a sambaPassword, we can still setup
|
|
* krb5Key from the NT hash.
|
|
*
|
|
* This is an append, so it works with the 'continue' in the
|
|
* unicode loop above, to use Samba's NT hash function, which
|
|
* is more correct than Heimdal's
|
|
*/
|
|
if (ntPwdHash) {
|
|
unsigned char *buf;
|
|
size_t buf_size;
|
|
size_t len;
|
|
struct ldb_val val;
|
|
Key key;
|
|
|
|
key.mkvno = 0;
|
|
key.salt = NULL; /* No salt for this enc type */
|
|
|
|
krb5_ret = krb5_keyblock_init(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
|
|
ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
|
|
ntPwdHash->hash, sizeof(ntPwdHash->hash),
|
|
&key.key);
|
|
if (krb5_ret) {
|
|
return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(Key, buf, buf_size, &key, &len, krb5_ret);
|
|
if (krb5_ret) {
|
|
return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
|
|
&key.key);
|
|
|
|
val.data = talloc_memdup(req, buf, len);
|
|
val.length = len;
|
|
free(buf);
|
|
if (!val.data || ret) {
|
|
return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
CHECK_RET(ldb_msg_add_value(modify_msg, "krb5Key", &val));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If the original caller did anything with pwdLastSet then skip this. It could be an incoming samsync */
|
|
attribute = ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "pwdLastSet");
|
|
if (attribute == NULL) {
|
|
/* Update the password last set time */
|
|
unix_to_nt_time(&now_nt, now);
|
|
CHECK_RET(ldb_msg_add_empty(modify_msg, "pwdLastSet", LDB_FLAG_MOD_REPLACE));
|
|
CHECK_RET(samdb_msg_add_uint64(module->ldb, mem_ctx, modify_msg, "pwdLastSet", now_nt));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If the original caller did anything with "msDS-KeyVersionNumber" then skip this. It could be an incoming samsync */
|
|
attribute = ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber");
|
|
if (attribute == NULL) {
|
|
if (kvno == 0) {
|
|
CHECK_RET(ldb_msg_add_empty(modify_msg, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber",
|
|
LDB_FLAG_MOD_REPLACE));
|
|
CHECK_RET(samdb_msg_add_uint(module->ldb, mem_ctx, modify_msg, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber", kvno + 1));
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* While we should be in a transaction, go one extra
|
|
* step in the dance for an 'atomic' increment. This
|
|
* may be of value against remote LDAP servers. (Note
|
|
* however that Mulitmaster replication stil offers no
|
|
* such guarantee) */
|
|
|
|
struct ldb_val old_kvno, new_kvno;
|
|
old_kvno.data = (uint8_t *)talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "%u", kvno);
|
|
if (!old_kvno.data) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
old_kvno.length = strlen((char *)old_kvno.data);
|
|
|
|
new_kvno.data = (uint8_t *)talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "%u", kvno + 1);
|
|
if (!new_kvno.data) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
new_kvno.length = strlen((char *)new_kvno.data);
|
|
|
|
CHECK_RET(ldb_msg_add_empty(modify_msg, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber",
|
|
LDB_FLAG_MOD_DELETE));
|
|
CHECK_RET(ldb_msg_add_empty(modify_msg, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber",
|
|
LDB_FLAG_MOD_ADD));
|
|
modify_msg->elements[modify_msg->num_elements - 2].num_values = 1;
|
|
modify_msg->elements[modify_msg->num_elements - 2].values = &old_kvno;
|
|
modify_msg->elements[modify_msg->num_elements - 1].num_values = 1;
|
|
modify_msg->elements[modify_msg->num_elements - 1].values = &new_kvno;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CHECK_RET(ldb_msg_add_empty(modify_msg, "sambaLMPwdHistory",
|
|
LDB_FLAG_MOD_REPLACE));
|
|
CHECK_RET(ldb_msg_add_empty(modify_msg, "sambaNTPwdHistory",
|
|
LDB_FLAG_MOD_REPLACE));
|
|
|
|
/* If we have something to put into the history, or an old
|
|
* history element to expire, update the history */
|
|
if (pwdHistoryLength > 0 &&
|
|
((sambaNTPwdHistory_len > 0) || (sambaLMPwdHistory_len > 0)
|
|
|| lmOldHash || ntOldHash)) {
|
|
/* store the password history */
|
|
new_sambaLMPwdHistory = talloc_array(mem_ctx, struct samr_Password,
|
|
pwdHistoryLength);
|
|
if (!new_sambaLMPwdHistory) {
|
|
return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
new_sambaNTPwdHistory = talloc_array(mem_ctx, struct samr_Password,
|
|
pwdHistoryLength);
|
|
if (!new_sambaNTPwdHistory) {
|
|
return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
for (i=0;i<MIN(pwdHistoryLength-1, sambaLMPwdHistory_len);i++) {
|
|
new_sambaLMPwdHistory[i+1] = sambaLMPwdHistory[i];
|
|
}
|
|
for (i=0;i<MIN(pwdHistoryLength-1, sambaNTPwdHistory_len);i++) {
|
|
new_sambaNTPwdHistory[i+1] = sambaNTPwdHistory[i];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Don't store 'long' passwords in the LM history,
|
|
but make sure to 'expire' one password off the other end */
|
|
if (lmOldHash) {
|
|
new_sambaLMPwdHistory[0] = *lmOldHash;
|
|
} else {
|
|
ZERO_STRUCT(new_sambaLMPwdHistory[0]);
|
|
}
|
|
sambaLMPwdHistory_len = MIN(sambaLMPwdHistory_len + 1, pwdHistoryLength);
|
|
|
|
/* Likewise, we might not have an old NT password (lm
|
|
* only password change function on previous change) */
|
|
if (ntOldHash) {
|
|
new_sambaNTPwdHistory[0] = *ntOldHash;
|
|
} else {
|
|
ZERO_STRUCT(new_sambaNTPwdHistory[0]);
|
|
}
|
|
sambaNTPwdHistory_len = MIN(sambaNTPwdHistory_len + 1, pwdHistoryLength);
|
|
|
|
CHECK_RET(samdb_msg_add_hashes(module->ldb, mem_ctx, modify_msg,
|
|
"sambaLMPwdHistory",
|
|
new_sambaLMPwdHistory,
|
|
sambaLMPwdHistory_len));
|
|
|
|
CHECK_RET(samdb_msg_add_hashes(module->ldb, mem_ctx, modify_msg,
|
|
"sambaNTPwdHistory",
|
|
new_sambaNTPwdHistory,
|
|
sambaNTPwdHistory_len));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Too much code above, we should check we got it close to reasonable */
|
|
CHECK_RET(ldb_msg_sanity_check(modify_msg));
|
|
|
|
modify_request = talloc(mem_ctx, struct ldb_request);
|
|
if (!modify_request) {
|
|
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
|
|
return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
modify_request->operation = LDB_REQ_MODIFY;
|
|
modify_request->op.mod.message = modify_msg;
|
|
modify_request->controls = NULL;
|
|
|
|
ret = ldb_next_request(module, modify_request);
|
|
|
|
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* add_record: do things with the sambaPassword attribute */
|
|
static int password_hash_add(struct ldb_module *module, struct ldb_request *req)
|
|
{
|
|
const struct ldb_message *msg = req->op.add.message;
|
|
|
|
ldb_debug(module->ldb, LDB_DEBUG_TRACE, "password_hash_add_record\n");
|
|
|
|
if (ldb_dn_is_special(msg->dn)) { /* do not manipulate our control entries */
|
|
return ldb_next_request(module, req);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return password_hash_handle(module, req, msg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* modify_record: do things with the sambaPassword attribute */
|
|
static int password_hash_modify(struct ldb_module *module, struct ldb_request *req)
|
|
{
|
|
const struct ldb_message *msg = req->op.mod.message;
|
|
|
|
ldb_debug(module->ldb, LDB_DEBUG_TRACE, "password_hash_modify_record\n");
|
|
|
|
if (ldb_dn_is_special(msg->dn)) { /* do not manipulate our control entries */
|
|
return ldb_next_request(module, req);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return password_hash_handle(module, req, msg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int password_hash_request(struct ldb_module *module, struct ldb_request *req)
|
|
{
|
|
switch (req->operation) {
|
|
|
|
case LDB_REQ_ADD:
|
|
return password_hash_add(module, req);
|
|
|
|
case LDB_REQ_MODIFY:
|
|
return password_hash_modify(module, req);
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
return ldb_next_request(module, req);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static const struct ldb_module_ops password_hash_ops = {
|
|
.name = "password_hash",
|
|
.request = password_hash_request
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
int password_hash_module_init(void)
|
|
{
|
|
return ldb_register_module(&password_hash_ops);
|
|
}
|