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samba-mirror/source4/kdc/db-glue.c

1967 lines
56 KiB
C

/*
Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
Database Glue between Samba and the KDC
Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2005-2009
Copyright (C) Simo Sorce <idra@samba.org> 2010
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include "libcli/security/security.h"
#include "auth/auth.h"
#include "auth/auth_sam.h"
#include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h"
#include "dsdb/common/util.h"
#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_drsblobs.h"
#include "param/param.h"
#include "../lib/crypto/md4.h"
#include "system/kerberos.h"
#include "auth/kerberos/kerberos.h"
#include <hdb.h>
#include "kdc/samba_kdc.h"
#include "kdc/kdc-glue.h"
#include "kdc/db-glue.h"
#define SAMBA_KVNO_GET_KRBTGT(kvno) \
((uint16_t)(((uint32_t)kvno) >> 16))
#define SAMBA_KVNO_AND_KRBTGT(kvno, krbtgt) \
((krb5_kvno)((((uint32_t)kvno) & 0xFFFF) | \
((((uint32_t)krbtgt) << 16) & 0xFFFF0000)))
enum samba_kdc_ent_type
{ SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_TRUST, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY };
enum trust_direction {
UNKNOWN = 0,
INBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_INBOUND,
OUTBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND
};
static const char *trust_attrs[] = {
"trustPartner",
"trustAuthIncoming",
"trustAuthOutgoing",
"whenCreated",
"msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
"trustAttributes",
"trustDirection",
"trustType",
NULL
};
static KerberosTime ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(struct ldb_message *msg, const char *attr, KerberosTime default_val)
{
const char *tmp;
const char *gentime;
struct tm tm;
gentime = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, attr, NULL);
if (!gentime)
return default_val;
tmp = strptime(gentime, "%Y%m%d%H%M%SZ", &tm);
if (tmp == NULL) {
return default_val;
}
return timegm(&tm);
}
static HDBFlags uf2HDBFlags(krb5_context context, uint32_t userAccountControl, enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type)
{
HDBFlags flags = int2HDBFlags(0);
/* we don't allow kadmin deletes */
flags.immutable = 1;
/* mark the principal as invalid to start with */
flags.invalid = 1;
flags.renewable = 1;
/* All accounts are servers, but this may be disabled again in the caller */
flags.server = 1;
/* Account types - clear the invalid bit if it turns out to be valid */
if (userAccountControl & UF_NORMAL_ACCOUNT) {
if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
flags.client = 1;
}
flags.invalid = 0;
}
if (userAccountControl & UF_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
flags.client = 1;
}
flags.invalid = 0;
}
if (userAccountControl & UF_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
flags.client = 1;
}
flags.invalid = 0;
}
if (userAccountControl & UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
flags.client = 1;
}
flags.invalid = 0;
}
/* Not permitted to act as a client if disabled */
if (userAccountControl & UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE) {
flags.client = 0;
}
if (userAccountControl & UF_LOCKOUT) {
flags.invalid = 1;
}
/*
if (userAccountControl & UF_PASSWORD_NOTREQD) {
flags.invalid = 1;
}
*/
/*
UF_PASSWORD_CANT_CHANGE and UF_ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PASSWORD_ALLOWED are irrelevent
*/
if (userAccountControl & UF_TEMP_DUPLICATE_ACCOUNT) {
flags.invalid = 1;
}
/* UF_DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD and UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY handled in samba_kdc_message2entry() */
/*
if (userAccountControl & UF_MNS_LOGON_ACCOUNT) {
flags.invalid = 1;
}
*/
if (userAccountControl & UF_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED) {
flags.require_hwauth = 1;
}
if (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION) {
flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
}
if (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_TO_AUTHENTICATE_FOR_DELEGATION) {
/*
* this is confusing...
*
* UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION
* => ok_as_delegate
*
* and
*
* UF_TRUSTED_TO_AUTHENTICATE_FOR_DELEGATION
* => trusted_for_delegation
*/
flags.trusted_for_delegation = 1;
}
if (!(userAccountControl & UF_NOT_DELEGATED)) {
flags.forwardable = 1;
flags.proxiable = 1;
}
if (userAccountControl & UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH) {
flags.require_preauth = 0;
} else {
flags.require_preauth = 1;
}
return flags;
}
static int samba_kdc_entry_destructor(struct samba_kdc_entry *p)
{
hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex = p->entry_ex;
free_hdb_entry(&entry_ex->entry);
return 0;
}
static void samba_kdc_free_entry(krb5_context context, hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
{
/* this function is called only from hdb_free_entry().
* Make sure we neutralize the destructor or we will
* get a double free later when hdb_free_entry() will
* try to call free_hdb_entry() */
talloc_set_destructor(entry_ex->ctx, NULL);
/* now proceed to free the talloc part */
talloc_free(entry_ex->ctx);
}
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(krb5_context context,
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct ldb_message *msg,
uint32_t rid,
bool is_rodc,
uint32_t userAccountControl,
enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type,
hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
{
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
struct samr_Password *hash;
const struct ldb_val *sc_val;
struct supplementalCredentialsBlob scb;
struct supplementalCredentialsPackage *scpk = NULL;
bool newer_keys = false;
struct package_PrimaryKerberosBlob _pkb;
struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr3 *pkb3 = NULL;
struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr4 *pkb4 = NULL;
uint16_t i;
uint16_t allocated_keys = 0;
int rodc_krbtgt_number = 0;
int kvno = 0;
uint32_t supported_enctypes
= ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg,
"msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
0);
if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT || is_rodc) {
/* KDCs (and KDCs on RODCs) use AES */
supported_enctypes |= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128 | ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256;
} else if (userAccountControl & (UF_PARTIAL_SECRETS_ACCOUNT|UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT)) {
/* DCs and RODCs comptuer accounts use AES */
supported_enctypes |= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128 | ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256;
} else if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT ||
(ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY)) {
/* for AS-REQ the client chooses the enc types it
* supports, and this will vary between computers a
* user logs in from.
*
* likewise for 'any' return as much as is supported,
* to export into a keytab */
supported_enctypes = ENC_ALL_TYPES;
}
/* If UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY has been set, then don't allow use of the newer enc types */
if (userAccountControl & UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY) {
supported_enctypes = ENC_CRC32|ENC_RSA_MD5;
} else {
/* Otherwise, add in the default enc types */
supported_enctypes |= ENC_CRC32 | ENC_RSA_MD5 | ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5;
}
/* Is this the krbtgt or a RODC krbtgt */
if (is_rodc) {
rodc_krbtgt_number = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1);
if (rodc_krbtgt_number == -1) {
return EINVAL;
}
}
entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
kvno = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber", 0);
if (is_rodc) {
kvno = SAMBA_KVNO_AND_KRBTGT(kvno, rodc_krbtgt_number);
}
entry_ex->entry.kvno = kvno;
/* Get keys from the db */
hash = samdb_result_hash(mem_ctx, msg, "unicodePwd");
sc_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "supplementalCredentials");
/* unicodePwd for enctype 0x17 (23) if present */
if (hash) {
allocated_keys++;
}
/* supplementalCredentials if present */
if (sc_val) {
ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob_all(sc_val, mem_ctx, &scb,
(ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_supplementalCredentialsBlob);
if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
dump_data(0, sc_val->data, sc_val->length);
ret = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (scb.sub.signature != SUPPLEMENTAL_CREDENTIALS_SIGNATURE) {
NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(supplementalCredentialsBlob, &scb);
ret = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
for (i=0; i < scb.sub.num_packages; i++) {
if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) {
scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i];
if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) {
scpk = NULL;
continue;
}
newer_keys = true;
break;
} else if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) {
scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i];
if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) {
scpk = NULL;
}
/*
* we don't break here in hope to find
* a Kerberos-Newer-Keys package
*/
}
}
}
/*
* Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys or Primary:Kerberos element
* of supplementalCredentials
*/
if (scpk) {
DATA_BLOB blob;
blob = strhex_to_data_blob(mem_ctx, scpk->data);
if (!blob.data) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
/* we cannot use ndr_pull_struct_blob_all() here, as w2k and w2k3 add padding bytes */
ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob, mem_ctx, &_pkb,
(ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_package_PrimaryKerberosBlob);
if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
ret = EINVAL;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
goto out;
}
if (newer_keys && _pkb.version != 4) {
ret = EINVAL;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
goto out;
}
if (!newer_keys && _pkb.version != 3) {
ret = EINVAL;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse Primary:Kerberos not version 3");
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse Primary:Kerberos not version 3");
goto out;
}
if (_pkb.version == 4) {
pkb4 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr4;
allocated_keys += pkb4->num_keys;
} else if (_pkb.version == 3) {
pkb3 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr3;
allocated_keys += pkb3->num_keys;
}
}
if (allocated_keys == 0) {
if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
/* We are on an RODC, but don't have keys for this account. Signal this to the caller */
return HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE;
}
/* oh, no password. Apparently (comment in
* hdb-ldap.c) this violates the ASN.1, but this
* allows an entry with no keys (yet). */
return 0;
}
/* allocate space to decode into */
entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(allocated_keys, sizeof(Key));
if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
if (hash && (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5)) {
Key key;
key.mkvno = 0;
key.salt = NULL; /* No salt for this enc type */
ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
hash->hash, sizeof(hash->hash),
&key.key);
if (ret) {
goto out;
}
entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
}
if (pkb4) {
for (i=0; i < pkb4->num_keys; i++) {
Key key;
if (!pkb4->keys[i].value) continue;
if (!(kerberos_enctype_to_bitmap(pkb4->keys[i].keytype) & supported_enctypes)) {
continue;
}
key.mkvno = 0;
key.salt = NULL;
if (pkb4->salt.string) {
DATA_BLOB salt;
salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb4->salt.string);
key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
if (key.salt == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
key.salt->type = hdb_pw_salt;
ret = krb5_data_copy(&key.salt->salt, salt.data, salt.length);
if (ret) {
free(key.salt);
key.salt = NULL;
goto out;
}
}
/* TODO: maybe pass the iteration_count somehow... */
ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
pkb4->keys[i].keytype,
pkb4->keys[i].value->data,
pkb4->keys[i].value->length,
&key.key);
if (ret == KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP) {
DEBUG(2,("Unsupported keytype ignored - type %u\n",
pkb4->keys[i].keytype));
ret = 0;
continue;
}
if (ret) {
if (key.salt) {
free_Salt(key.salt);
free(key.salt);
key.salt = NULL;
}
goto out;
}
entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
}
} else if (pkb3) {
for (i=0; i < pkb3->num_keys; i++) {
Key key;
if (!pkb3->keys[i].value) continue;
if (!(kerberos_enctype_to_bitmap(pkb3->keys[i].keytype) & supported_enctypes)) {
continue;
}
key.mkvno = 0;
key.salt = NULL;
if (pkb3->salt.string) {
DATA_BLOB salt;
salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb3->salt.string);
key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
if (key.salt == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
key.salt->type = hdb_pw_salt;
ret = krb5_data_copy(&key.salt->salt, salt.data, salt.length);
if (ret) {
free(key.salt);
key.salt = NULL;
goto out;
}
}
ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
pkb3->keys[i].keytype,
pkb3->keys[i].value->data,
pkb3->keys[i].value->length,
&key.key);
if (ret) {
if (key.salt) {
free_Salt(key.salt);
free(key.salt);
key.salt = NULL;
}
goto out;
}
entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
}
}
out:
if (ret != 0) {
entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
}
if (entry_ex->entry.keys.len == 0 && entry_ex->entry.keys.val) {
free(entry_ex->entry.keys.val);
entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
}
return ret;
}
/*
* Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
*/
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry(krb5_context context,
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type,
unsigned flags,
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
struct ldb_message *msg,
hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
{
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
uint32_t userAccountControl;
unsigned int i;
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
krb5_boolean is_computer = FALSE;
struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
NTTIME acct_expiry;
NTSTATUS status;
uint32_t rid;
bool is_rodc = false;
struct ldb_message_element *objectclasses;
struct ldb_val computer_val;
const char *samAccountName = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "samAccountName", NULL);
computer_val.data = discard_const_p(uint8_t,"computer");
computer_val.length = strlen((const char *)computer_val.data);
if (ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber")) {
is_rodc = true;
}
if (!samAccountName) {
ret = ENOENT;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry: no samAccountName present");
goto out;
}
objectclasses = ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "objectClass");
if (objectclasses && ldb_msg_find_val(objectclasses, &computer_val)) {
is_computer = TRUE;
}
memset(entry_ex, 0, sizeof(*entry_ex));
p = talloc(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
if (!p) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx;
p->entry_ex = entry_ex;
p->realm_dn = talloc_reference(p, realm_dn);
if (!p->realm_dn) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor);
/* make sure we do not have bogus data in there */
memset(&entry_ex->entry, 0, sizeof(hdb_entry));
entry_ex->ctx = p;
entry_ex->free_entry = samba_kdc_free_entry;
userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg, "userAccountControl", 0);
entry_ex->entry.principal = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.principal)));
if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY && principal == NULL) {
krb5_make_principal(context, &entry_ex->entry.principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), samAccountName, NULL);
} else {
ret = copy_Principal(principal, entry_ex->entry.principal);
if (ret) {
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
goto out;
}
/* While we have copied the client principal, tests
* show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
* the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
* replace the client principal's realm with the one
* we determine from our records */
/* this has to be with malloc() */
krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
}
/* First try and figure out the flags based on the userAccountControl */
entry_ex->entry.flags = uf2HDBFlags(context, userAccountControl, ent_type);
/* Windows 2008 seems to enforce this (very sensible) rule by
* default - don't allow offline attacks on a user's password
* by asking for a ticket to them as a service (encrypted with
* their probably patheticly insecure password) */
if (entry_ex->entry.flags.server
&& lpcfg_parm_bool(lp_ctx, NULL, "kdc", "require spn for service", true)) {
if (!is_computer && !ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "servicePrincipalName", NULL)) {
entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 0;
}
}
if (flags & HDB_F_ADMIN_DATA) {
/* These (created_by, modified_by) parts of the entry are not relevant for Samba4's use
* of the Heimdal KDC. They are stored in a the traditional
* DB for audit purposes, and still form part of the structure
* we must return */
/* use 'whenCreated' */
entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
/* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
krb5_make_principal(context,
&entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal,
lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "kadmin", NULL);
entry_ex->entry.modified_by = (Event *) malloc(sizeof(Event));
if (entry_ex->entry.modified_by == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "malloc: out of memory");
goto out;
}
/* use 'whenChanged' */
entry_ex->entry.modified_by->time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenChanged", 0);
/* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
krb5_make_principal(context,
&entry_ex->entry.modified_by->principal,
lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "kadmin", NULL);
}
/* The lack of password controls etc applies to krbtgt by
* virtue of being that particular RID */
status = dom_sid_split_rid(NULL, samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid"), NULL, &rid);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
ret = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT) {
entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
/* Don't mark all requests for the krbtgt/realm as
* 'change password', as otherwise we could get into
* trouble, and not enforce the password expirty.
* Instead, only do it when request is for the kpasswd service */
if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER
&& principal->name.name_string.len == 2
&& (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], "kadmin") == 0)
&& (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[1], "changepw") == 0)
&& lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->realm)) {
entry_ex->entry.flags.change_pw = 1;
}
entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
entry_ex->entry.flags.forwardable = 1;
entry_ex->entry.flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
} else if (is_rodc) {
/* The RODC krbtgt account is like the main krbtgt,
* but it does not have a changepw or kadmin
* service */
entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
/* Also don't allow the RODC krbtgt to be a client (it should not be needed) */
entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
entry_ex->entry.flags.forwardable = 1;
entry_ex->entry.flags.ok_as_delegate = 0;
} else if (entry_ex->entry.flags.server && ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) {
/* The account/password expiry only applies when the account is used as a
* client (ie password login), not when used as a server */
/* Make very well sure we don't use this for a client,
* it could bypass the password restrictions */
entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
} else {
NTTIME must_change_time
= samdb_result_force_password_change(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
realm_dn, msg);
if (must_change_time == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
} else {
entry_ex->entry.pw_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.pw_end));
if (entry_ex->entry.pw_end == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
*entry_ex->entry.pw_end = nt_time_to_unix(must_change_time);
}
acct_expiry = samdb_result_account_expires(msg);
if (acct_expiry == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
} else {
entry_ex->entry.valid_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.valid_end));
if (entry_ex->entry.valid_end == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
*entry_ex->entry.valid_end = nt_time_to_unix(acct_expiry);
}
}
entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
entry_ex->entry.max_life = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.max_life));
if (entry_ex->entry.max_life == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) {
*entry_ex->entry.max_life = kdc_db_ctx->policy.svc_tkt_lifetime;
} else if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT) {
*entry_ex->entry.max_life = kdc_db_ctx->policy.usr_tkt_lifetime;
} else {
*entry_ex->entry.max_life = MIN(kdc_db_ctx->policy.svc_tkt_lifetime,
kdc_db_ctx->policy.usr_tkt_lifetime);
}
entry_ex->entry.max_renew = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.max_life));
if (entry_ex->entry.max_renew == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
*entry_ex->entry.max_renew = kdc_db_ctx->policy.renewal_lifetime;
entry_ex->entry.generation = NULL;
/* Get keys from the db */
ret = samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(context, kdc_db_ctx, p, msg,
rid, is_rodc, userAccountControl,
ent_type, entry_ex);
if (ret) {
/* Could be bougus data in the entry, or out of memory */
goto out;
}
entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes)));
if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) {
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
entry_ex->entry.etypes->len = entry_ex->entry.keys.len;
entry_ex->entry.etypes->val = calloc(entry_ex->entry.etypes->len, sizeof(int));
if (entry_ex->entry.etypes->val == NULL) {
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
for (i=0; i < entry_ex->entry.etypes->len; i++) {
entry_ex->entry.etypes->val[i] = entry_ex->entry.keys.val[i].key.keytype;
}
p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
out:
if (ret != 0) {
/* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
hdb_free_entry(context, entry_ex);
} else {
talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, entry_ex->ctx);
}
return ret;
}
/*
* Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
* The kvno is what the remote client asked for
*/
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(krb5_context context,
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
enum trust_direction direction,
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
unsigned flags,
uint32_t kvno,
struct ldb_message *msg,
hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
{
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
const char *dnsdomain;
const char *realm = lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx);
DATA_BLOB password_utf16;
struct samr_Password password_hash;
const struct ldb_val *password_val;
struct trustAuthInOutBlob password_blob;
struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
bool use_previous;
uint32_t current_kvno;
enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
int ret, trust_direction_flags;
unsigned int i;
struct AuthenticationInformationArray *auth_array;
p = talloc(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
if (!p) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx;
p->entry_ex = entry_ex;
p->realm_dn = realm_dn;
talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor);
/* make sure we do not have bogus data in there */
memset(&entry_ex->entry, 0, sizeof(hdb_entry));
entry_ex->ctx = p;
entry_ex->free_entry = samba_kdc_free_entry;
/* use 'whenCreated' */
entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
/* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
krb5_make_principal(context,
&entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal,
realm, "kadmin", NULL);
entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
trust_direction_flags = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "trustDirection", 0);
if (direction == INBOUND) {
password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthIncoming");
} else { /* OUTBOUND */
dnsdomain = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "trustPartner", NULL);
/* replace realm */
realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, dnsdomain);
password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthOutgoing");
}
if (!password_val || !(trust_direction_flags & direction)) {
ret = ENOENT;
goto out;
}
ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(password_val, mem_ctx, &password_blob,
(ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_trustAuthInOutBlob);
if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
ret = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
/* we need to work out if we are going to use the current or
* the previous password hash.
* We base this on the kvno the client passes in. If the kvno
* passed in is equal to the current kvno in our database then
* we use the current structure. If it is the current kvno-1,
* then we use the previous substrucure.
*/
/* first work out the current kvno */
current_kvno = 0;
for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) {
if (password_blob.current.array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_VERSION) {
current_kvno = password_blob.current.array[i].AuthInfo.version.version;
}
}
/* work out whether we will use the previous or current
password */
if (password_blob.previous.count == 0) {
/* there is no previous password */
use_previous = false;
} else if (!(flags & HDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) ||
kvno == current_kvno) {
use_previous = false;
} else if ((kvno+1 == current_kvno) ||
(kvno == 255 && current_kvno == 0)) {
use_previous = true;
} else {
DEBUG(1,(__location__ ": Request for unknown kvno %u - current kvno is %u\n",
kvno, current_kvno));
ret = ENOENT;
goto out;
}
if (use_previous) {
auth_array = &password_blob.previous;
} else {
auth_array = &password_blob.current;
}
/* use the kvno the client specified, if available */
if (flags & HDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) {
entry_ex->entry.kvno = kvno;
} else {
entry_ex->entry.kvno = current_kvno;
}
for (i=0; i < auth_array->count; i++) {
if (auth_array->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_CLEAR) {
password_utf16 = data_blob_const(auth_array->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.password,
auth_array->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.size);
/* In the future, generate all sorts of
* hashes, but for now we can't safely convert
* the random strings windows uses into
* utf8 */
/* but as it is utf16 already, we can get the NT password/arcfour-hmac-md5 key */
mdfour(password_hash.hash, password_utf16.data, password_utf16.length);
break;
} else if (auth_array->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_NT4OWF) {
password_hash = auth_array->array[i].AuthInfo.nt4owf.password;
break;
}
}
if (i < auth_array->count) {
Key key;
/* Must have found a cleartext or MD4 password */
entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(1, sizeof(Key));
key.mkvno = 0;
key.salt = NULL; /* No salt for this enc type */
if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
password_hash.hash, sizeof(password_hash.hash),
&key.key);
if (ret != 0) {
goto out;
}
entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
}
entry_ex->entry.principal = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.principal)));
ret = copy_Principal(principal, entry_ex->entry.principal);
if (ret) {
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
goto out;
}
/* While we have copied the client principal, tests
* show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
* the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
* replace the client principal's realm with the one
* we determine from our records */
krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, realm);
entry_ex->entry.flags = int2HDBFlags(0);
entry_ex->entry.flags.immutable = 1;
entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
entry_ex->entry.flags.require_preauth = 1;
entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
entry_ex->entry.max_life = NULL;
entry_ex->entry.max_renew = NULL;
entry_ex->entry.generation = NULL;
entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes)));
if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) {
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
entry_ex->entry.etypes->len = entry_ex->entry.keys.len;
entry_ex->entry.etypes->val = calloc(entry_ex->entry.etypes->len, sizeof(int));
if (entry_ex->entry.etypes->val == NULL) {
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
for (i=0; i < entry_ex->entry.etypes->len; i++) {
entry_ex->entry.etypes->val[i] = entry_ex->entry.keys.val[i].key.keytype;
}
p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
out:
if (ret != 0) {
/* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
hdb_free_entry(context, entry_ex);
} else {
talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, entry_ex->ctx);
}
return ret;
}
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_trust(krb5_context context, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
const char *realm,
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
struct ldb_message **pmsg)
{
int lret;
krb5_error_code ret;
char *filter = NULL;
const char * const *attrs = trust_attrs;
struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
char *realm_encoded = ldb_binary_encode_string(mem_ctx, realm);
if (!realm_encoded) {
if (!filter) {
ret = ENOMEM;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc_asprintf: out of memory");
return ret;
}
}
filter = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "(&(objectClass=trustedDomain)(|(flatname=%s)(trustPartner=%s)))",
realm_encoded, realm_encoded);
if (!filter) {
talloc_free(realm_encoded);
ret = ENOMEM;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc_asprintf: out of memory");
return ret;
}
lret = dsdb_search(ldb_ctx, mem_ctx, &res,
ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_ctx),
LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, attrs,
DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
"%s", filter);
if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
DEBUG(3, ("Failed to search for %s: %s\n", filter, ldb_errstring(ldb_ctx)));
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
} else if (res->count == 0 || res->count > 1) {
DEBUG(3, ("Failed find a single entry for %s: got %d\n", filter, res->count));
talloc_free(res);
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
}
talloc_steal(mem_ctx, res->msgs);
*pmsg = res->msgs[0];
talloc_free(res);
return 0;
}
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_client(krb5_context context,
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
krb5_const_principal principal,
const char **attrs,
struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
struct ldb_message **msg) {
NTSTATUS nt_status;
char *principal_string;
krb5_error_code ret;
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, principal, &principal_string);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
nt_status = sam_get_results_principal(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
mem_ctx, principal_string, attrs,
realm_dn, msg);
free(principal_string);
if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER)) {
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
} else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY)) {
return ENOMEM;
} else if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
return EINVAL;
}
return ret;
}
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_client(krb5_context context,
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
krb5_const_principal principal,
unsigned flags,
hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex) {
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
krb5_error_code ret;
struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
mem_ctx, principal, user_attrs,
&realm_dn, &msg);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT,
flags,
realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
return ret;
}
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(krb5_context context,
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
krb5_const_principal principal,
unsigned flags,
uint32_t kvno,
hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
{
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
krb5_error_code ret;
struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
krb5_principal alloc_principal = NULL;
if (principal->name.name_string.len != 2
|| (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], KRB5_TGS_NAME) != 0)) {
/* Not a krbtgt */
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
}
/* krbtgt case. Either us or a trusted realm */
if (lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->realm)
&& lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->name.name_string.val[1])) {
/* us, or someone quite like us */
/* Cludge, cludge cludge. If the realm part of krbtgt/realm,
* is in our db, then direct the caller at our primary
* krbtgt */
int lret;
unsigned int krbtgt_number;
/* w2k8r2 sometimes gives us a kvno of 255 for inter-domain
trust tickets. We don't yet know what this means, but we do
seem to need to treat it as unspecified */
if (flags & HDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) {
krbtgt_number = SAMBA_KVNO_GET_KRBTGT(kvno);
if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
if (krbtgt_number != kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number) {
return HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE;
}
}
} else {
krbtgt_number = kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number;
}
if (krbtgt_number == kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number) {
lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
&msg, kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
krbtgt_attrs, DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
"(objectClass=user)");
} else {
/* We need to look up an RODC krbtgt (perhaps
* ours, if we are an RODC, perhaps another
* RODC if we are a read-write DC */
lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
&msg, realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
krbtgt_attrs,
DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN | DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
"(&(objectClass=user)(msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber=%u))", (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
}
if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
(unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY,
"samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
(unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
} else if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
(unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY,
"samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
(unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
}
/*
* Windows seems to canonicalize the principal
* in a TGS REP even if the client did not specify
* the canonicalize flag.
*/
if (flags & (HDB_F_CANON|HDB_F_FOR_TGS_REQ)) {
ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, principal, &alloc_principal);
if (ret) {
return ret;
}
/* When requested to do so, ensure that the
* both realm values in the principal are set
* to the upper case, canonical realm */
free(alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1]);
alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1] = strdup(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
if (!alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1]) {
ret = ENOMEM;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: strdup() failed!");
return ret;
}
principal = alloc_principal;
}
ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT,
flags, realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
if (alloc_principal) {
/* This is again copied in the message2entry call */
krb5_free_principal(context, alloc_principal);
}
if (ret != 0) {
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: self krbtgt message2entry failed");
}
return ret;
} else {
enum trust_direction direction = UNKNOWN;
const char *realm = NULL;
/* Either an inbound or outbound trust */
if (strcasecmp(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), principal->realm) == 0) {
/* look for inbound trust */
direction = INBOUND;
realm = principal->name.name_string.val[1];
} else if (strcasecmp(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), principal->name.name_string.val[1]) == 0) {
/* look for outbound trust */
direction = OUTBOUND;
realm = principal->realm;
} else {
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: not our realm for trusts ('%s', '%s')",
principal->realm, principal->name.name_string.val[1]);
krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY, "samba_kdc_fetch: not our realm for trusts ('%s', '%s')",
principal->realm, principal->name.name_string.val[1]);
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
}
/* Trusted domains are under CN=system */
ret = samba_kdc_lookup_trust(context, kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
mem_ctx,
realm, realm_dn, &msg);
if (ret != 0) {
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
return ret;
}
ret = samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
principal, direction,
realm_dn, flags, kvno, msg, entry_ex);
if (ret != 0) {
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: trust_message2entry failed");
}
return ret;
}
}
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_server(krb5_context context,
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
krb5_const_principal principal,
const char **attrs,
struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
struct ldb_message **msg)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
if (principal->name.name_string.len >= 2) {
/* 'normal server' case */
int ldb_ret;
NTSTATUS nt_status;
struct ldb_dn *user_dn;
char *principal_string;
ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal,
KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM,
&principal_string);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
/* At this point we may find the host is known to be
* in a different realm, so we should generate a
* referral instead */
nt_status = crack_service_principal_name(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
mem_ctx, principal_string,
&user_dn, realm_dn);
free(principal_string);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
}
ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
mem_ctx,
msg, user_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
attrs,
DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN | DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
"(objectClass=*)");
if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
}
} else {
int lret;
char *short_princ;
const char *realm;
/* server as client principal case, but we must not lookup userPrincipalNames */
*realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
realm = krb5_principal_get_realm(context, principal);
/* TODO: Check if it is our realm, otherwise give referral */
ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal, KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &short_princ);
if (ret != 0) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
return ret;
}
lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx, msg,
*realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
attrs,
DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN | DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
"(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=%s))",
ldb_binary_encode_string(mem_ctx, short_princ));
if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
DEBUG(3, ("Failed to find an entry for %s\n", short_princ));
free(short_princ);
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
}
if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
DEBUG(3, ("Failed single search for %s - %s\n",
short_princ, ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
free(short_princ);
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
}
free(short_princ);
}
return 0;
}
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_server(krb5_context context,
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
krb5_const_principal principal,
unsigned flags,
hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
struct ldb_message *msg;
ret = samba_kdc_lookup_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal,
server_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
flags,
realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
if (ret != 0) {
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: message2entry failed");
}
return ret;
}
krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch(krb5_context context,
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
krb5_const_principal principal,
unsigned flags,
krb5_kvno kvno,
hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
{
krb5_error_code ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_fetch context");
if (!mem_ctx) {
ret = ENOMEM;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
return ret;
}
if (flags & HDB_F_GET_CLIENT) {
ret = samba_kdc_fetch_client(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
}
if (flags & HDB_F_GET_SERVER) {
/* krbtgt fits into this situation for trusted realms, and for resolving different versions of our own realm name */
ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, kvno, entry_ex);
if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
/* We return 'no entry' if it does not start with krbtgt/, so move to the common case quickly */
ret = samba_kdc_fetch_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
}
if (flags & HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT) {
ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, kvno, entry_ex);
if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
}
done:
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret;
}
struct samba_kdc_seq {
unsigned int index;
unsigned int count;
struct ldb_message **msgs;
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
};
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_seq(krb5_context context,
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
hdb_entry_ex *entry)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx;
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
hdb_entry_ex entry_ex;
memset(&entry_ex, '\0', sizeof(entry_ex));
if (!priv) {
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
}
mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_seq context");
if (!mem_ctx) {
ret = ENOMEM;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_seq: talloc_named() failed!");
return ret;
}
if (priv->index < priv->count) {
ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
NULL, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY,
HDB_F_ADMIN_DATA|HDB_F_GET_ANY,
priv->realm_dn, priv->msgs[priv->index++], entry);
} else {
ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
}
if (ret != 0) {
TALLOC_FREE(priv);
kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
} else {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
}
return ret;
}
krb5_error_code samba_kdc_firstkey(krb5_context context,
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
hdb_entry_ex *entry)
{
struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->samdb;
struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx;
char *realm;
struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
krb5_error_code ret;
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
int lret;
if (priv) {
TALLOC_FREE(priv);
kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
}
priv = (struct samba_kdc_seq *) talloc(kdc_db_ctx, struct samba_kdc_seq);
if (!priv) {
ret = ENOMEM;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc: out of memory");
return ret;
}
priv->index = 0;
priv->msgs = NULL;
priv->realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_ctx);
priv->count = 0;
mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_firstkey context");
if (!mem_ctx) {
ret = ENOMEM;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_firstkey: talloc_named() failed!");
return ret;
}
ret = krb5_get_default_realm(context, &realm);
if (ret != 0) {
TALLOC_FREE(priv);
return ret;
}
lret = dsdb_search(ldb_ctx, priv, &res,
priv->realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, user_attrs,
DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
"(objectClass=user)");
if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
TALLOC_FREE(priv);
return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
}
priv->count = res->count;
priv->msgs = talloc_steal(priv, res->msgs);
talloc_free(res);
kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = priv;
ret = samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry);
if (ret != 0) {
TALLOC_FREE(priv);
kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
} else {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
}
return ret;
}
krb5_error_code samba_kdc_nextkey(krb5_context context,
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
hdb_entry_ex *entry)
{
return samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry);
}
/* Check if a given entry may delegate or do s4u2self to this target principal
*
* This is currently a very nasty hack - allowing only delegation to itself.
*/
krb5_error_code
samba_kdc_check_s4u2self(krb5_context context,
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
hdb_entry_ex *entry,
krb5_const_principal target_principal)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_principal enterprise_prinicpal = NULL;
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
struct ldb_message *msg;
struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
struct dom_sid *target_sid;
struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
const char *delegation_check_attrs[] = {
"objectSid", NULL
};
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2self");
if (!mem_ctx) {
ret = ENOMEM;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2self: talloc_named() failed!");
return ret;
}
if (target_principal->name.name_type == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
/* Need to reparse the enterprise principal to find the real target */
if (target_principal->name.name_string.len != 1) {
ret = KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2self: request for delegation to enterprise principal with wrong (%d) number of components",
target_principal->name.name_string.len);
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret;
}
ret = krb5_parse_name(context, target_principal->name.name_string.val[0],
&enterprise_prinicpal);
if (ret) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret;
}
target_principal = enterprise_prinicpal;
}
ret = samba_kdc_lookup_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, target_principal,
delegation_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
krb5_free_principal(context, enterprise_prinicpal);
if (ret != 0) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret;
}
orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, p->msg, "objectSid");
target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid");
/* Allow delegation to the same principal, even if by a different
* name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID
* comparison */
if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
}
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret;
}
/* Certificates printed by a the Certificate Authority might have a
* slightly different form of the user principal name to that in the
* database. Allow a mismatch where they both refer to the same
* SID */
krb5_error_code
samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match(krb5_context context,
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
hdb_entry_ex *entry,
krb5_const_principal certificate_principal)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
struct ldb_message *msg;
struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
struct dom_sid *target_sid;
struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
const char *ms_upn_check_attrs[] = {
"objectSid", NULL
};
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match");
if (!mem_ctx) {
ret = ENOMEM;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
return ret;
}
ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
mem_ctx, certificate_principal,
ms_upn_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
if (ret != 0) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret;
}
orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, p->msg, "objectSid");
target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid");
/* Consider these to be the same principal, even if by a different
* name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID
* comparison */
if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return KRB5_KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH;
}
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret;
}
/*
* Check if a given entry may delegate to this target principal
* with S4U2Proxy.
*/
krb5_error_code
samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy(krb5_context context,
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
hdb_entry_ex *entry,
krb5_const_principal target_principal)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
char *tmp = NULL;
const char *client_dn = NULL;
const char *target_principal_name = NULL;
struct ldb_message_element *el;
struct ldb_val val;
unsigned int i;
bool found = false;
struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy");
if (!mem_ctx) {
ret = ENOMEM;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
"samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
" talloc_named() failed!");
return ret;
}
client_dn = ldb_dn_get_linearized(p->msg->dn);
if (!client_dn) {
if (errno == 0) {
errno = ENOMEM;
}
ret = errno;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
"samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
" ldb_dn_get_linearized() failed!");
return ret;
}
/*
* The main heimdal code already checked that the target_principal
* belongs to the same realm as the client.
*
* So we just need the principal without the realm,
* as that is what is configured in the "msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo"
* attribute.
*/
ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, target_principal,
KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &tmp);
if (ret) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
"samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
" krb5_unparse_name() failed!");
return ret;
}
DEBUG(10,("samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy: client[%s] for target[%s]\n",
client_dn, tmp));
target_principal_name = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, tmp);
SAFE_FREE(tmp);
if (target_principal_name == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
"samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
" talloc_strdup() failed!");
return ret;
}
el = ldb_msg_find_element(p->msg, "msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo");
if (el == NULL) {
goto bad_option;
}
val = data_blob_string_const(target_principal_name);
for (i=0; i<el->num_values; i++) {
struct ldb_val *val1 = &val;
struct ldb_val *val2 = &el->values[i];
int cmp;
if (val1->length != val2->length) {
continue;
}
cmp = strncasecmp((const char *)val1->data,
(const char *)val2->data,
val1->length);
if (cmp != 0) {
continue;
}
found = true;
break;
}
if (!found) {
goto bad_option;
}
DEBUG(10,("samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy: client[%s] allowed target[%s]\n",
client_dn, tmp));
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return 0;
bad_option:
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
"samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy: client[%s] "
"not allowed for delegation to target[%s]",
client_dn,
target_principal_name);
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
}
NTSTATUS samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_base_context *base_ctx,
struct samba_kdc_db_context **kdc_db_ctx_out)
{
int ldb_ret;
struct ldb_message *msg;
struct auth_session_info *session_info;
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx;
/* The idea here is very simple. Using Kerberos to
* authenticate the KDC to the LDAP server is higly likely to
* be circular.
*
* In future we may set this up to use EXERNAL and SSL
* certificates, for now it will almost certainly be NTLMSSP_SET_USERNAME
*/
kdc_db_ctx = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_db_context);
if (kdc_db_ctx == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
kdc_db_ctx->ev_ctx = base_ctx->ev_ctx;
kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx = base_ctx->lp_ctx;
/* get default kdc policy */
lpcfg_default_kdc_policy(base_ctx->lp_ctx,
&kdc_db_ctx->policy.svc_tkt_lifetime,
&kdc_db_ctx->policy.usr_tkt_lifetime,
&kdc_db_ctx->policy.renewal_lifetime);
session_info = system_session(kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx);
if (session_info == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
/* Setup the link to LDB */
kdc_db_ctx->samdb = samdb_connect(kdc_db_ctx, base_ctx->ev_ctx,
base_ctx->lp_ctx, session_info, 0);
if (kdc_db_ctx->samdb == NULL) {
DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot open samdb for KDC backend!"));
talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
}
/* Find out our own krbtgt kvno */
ldb_ret = samdb_rodc(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, &kdc_db_ctx->rodc);
if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot determine if we are an RODC in KDC backend: %s\n",
ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
}
if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
int my_krbtgt_number;
const char *secondary_keytab[] = { "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", NULL };
struct ldb_dn *account_dn;
struct ldb_dn *server_dn = samdb_server_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx);
if (!server_dn) {
DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot determine server DN in KDC backend: %s\n",
ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
}
ldb_ret = samdb_reference_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx, server_dn,
"serverReference", &account_dn);
if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot determine server account in KDC backend: %s\n",
ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
}
ldb_ret = samdb_reference_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx, account_dn,
"msDS-KrbTgtLink", &kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn);
talloc_free(account_dn);
if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot determine RODC krbtgt account in KDC backend: %s\n",
ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
}
ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx,
&msg, kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
secondary_keytab,
DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
"(&(objectClass=user)(msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber=*))");
if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot read krbtgt account %s in KDC backend to get msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber: %s: %s\n",
ldb_dn_get_linearized(kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn),
ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb),
ldb_strerror(ldb_ret)));
talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
}
my_krbtgt_number = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1);
if (my_krbtgt_number == -1) {
DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot read msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber from krbtgt account %s in KDC backend: got %d\n",
ldb_dn_get_linearized(kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn),
my_krbtgt_number));
talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
}
kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = my_krbtgt_number;
} else {
kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = 0;
ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx,
&msg,
ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb),
LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
krbtgt_attrs,
DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
"(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=krbtgt))");
if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_fetch: could not find own KRBTGT in DB: %s\n", ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
}
kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn = talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, msg->dn);
kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = 0;
talloc_free(msg);
}
*kdc_db_ctx_out = kdc_db_ctx;
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}