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samba-mirror/source4/kdc/wdc-samba4.c
Joseph Sutton ffb599050a CVE-2022-2031 s4:kdc: Reject tickets during the last two minutes of their life
For Heimdal, this now matches the behaviour of Windows. The object of
this requirement is to ensure we don't allow kpasswd tickets, not having
a lifetime of more than two minutes, to be passed off as TGTs.

An existing requirement for TGTs to contain a REQUESTER_SID PAC buffer
suffices to prevent kpasswd ticket misuse, so this is just an additional
precaution on top.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15047

Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
2022-07-27 10:52:36 +00:00

643 lines
16 KiB
C

/*
Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
PAC Glue between Samba and the KDC
Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2005-2009
Copyright (C) Simo Sorce <idra@samba.org> 2010
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include "kdc/kdc-glue.h"
#include "kdc/db-glue.h"
#include "kdc/pac-glue.h"
#include "sdb.h"
#include "sdb_hdb.h"
#include "librpc/gen_ndr/auth.h"
#include <krb5_locl.h>
static bool samba_wdc_is_s4u2self_req(astgs_request_t r)
{
krb5_kdc_configuration *config = kdc_request_get_config((kdc_request_t)r);
const KDC_REQ *req = kdc_request_get_req(r);
const PA_DATA *pa_for_user = NULL;
if (req->msg_type != krb_tgs_req) {
return false;
}
if (config->enable_fast && req->padata != NULL) {
const PA_DATA *pa_fx_fast = NULL;
int idx = 0;
pa_fx_fast = krb5_find_padata(req->padata->val,
req->padata->len,
KRB5_PADATA_FX_FAST,
&idx);
if (pa_fx_fast != NULL) {
/*
* We're in the outer request
* with KRB5_PADATA_FX_FAST
* if fast is enabled we'll
* process the s4u2self
* request only in the
* inner request.
*/
return false;
}
}
if (req->padata != NULL) {
int idx = 0;
pa_for_user = krb5_find_padata(req->padata->val,
req->padata->len,
KRB5_PADATA_FOR_USER,
&idx);
}
if (pa_for_user != NULL) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
/*
* Given the right private pointer from hdb_samba4,
* get a PAC from the attached ldb messages.
*
* For PKINIT we also get pk_reply_key and can add PAC_CREDENTIAL_INFO.
*/
static krb5_error_code samba_wdc_get_pac(void *priv,
astgs_request_t r,
hdb_entry *client,
hdb_entry *server,
const krb5_keyblock *pk_reply_key,
uint64_t pac_attributes,
krb5_pac *pac)
{
krb5_context context = kdc_request_get_context((kdc_request_t)r);
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
DATA_BLOB *logon_blob = NULL;
DATA_BLOB *cred_ndr = NULL;
DATA_BLOB **cred_ndr_ptr = NULL;
DATA_BLOB _cred_blob = data_blob_null;
DATA_BLOB *cred_blob = NULL;
DATA_BLOB *upn_blob = NULL;
DATA_BLOB *pac_attrs_blob = NULL;
DATA_BLOB *requester_sid_blob = NULL;
krb5_error_code ret;
NTSTATUS nt_status;
struct samba_kdc_entry *skdc_entry =
talloc_get_type_abort(client->context,
struct samba_kdc_entry);
bool is_krbtgt;
bool is_s4u2self = samba_wdc_is_s4u2self_req(r);
enum samba_asserted_identity asserted_identity =
(is_s4u2self) ?
SAMBA_ASSERTED_IDENTITY_SERVICE :
SAMBA_ASSERTED_IDENTITY_AUTHENTICATION_AUTHORITY;
mem_ctx = talloc_named(client->context, 0, "samba_get_pac context");
if (!mem_ctx) {
return ENOMEM;
}
if (pk_reply_key != NULL) {
cred_ndr_ptr = &cred_ndr;
}
is_krbtgt = krb5_principal_is_krbtgt(context, server->principal);
nt_status = samba_kdc_get_pac_blobs(mem_ctx, skdc_entry,
asserted_identity,
&logon_blob,
cred_ndr_ptr,
&upn_blob,
is_krbtgt ? &pac_attrs_blob : NULL,
pac_attributes,
is_krbtgt ? &requester_sid_blob : NULL);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return EINVAL;
}
if (pk_reply_key != NULL && cred_ndr != NULL) {
ret = samba_kdc_encrypt_pac_credentials(context,
pk_reply_key,
cred_ndr,
mem_ctx,
&_cred_blob);
if (ret != 0) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret;
}
cred_blob = &_cred_blob;
}
ret = krb5_pac_init(context, pac);
if (ret != 0) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret;
}
ret = samba_make_krb5_pac(context, logon_blob, cred_blob,
upn_blob, pac_attrs_blob,
requester_sid_blob, NULL, *pac);
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret;
}
static krb5_error_code samba_wdc_reget_pac2(astgs_request_t r,
const krb5_principal delegated_proxy_principal,
hdb_entry *client,
hdb_entry *server,
hdb_entry *krbtgt,
krb5_pac *pac,
krb5_cksumtype ctype)
{
krb5_context context = kdc_request_get_context((kdc_request_t)r);
struct samba_kdc_entry *client_skdc_entry = NULL;
struct samba_kdc_entry *server_skdc_entry =
talloc_get_type_abort(server->context, struct samba_kdc_entry);
struct samba_kdc_entry *krbtgt_skdc_entry =
talloc_get_type_abort(krbtgt->context, struct samba_kdc_entry);
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = NULL;
krb5_pac new_pac = NULL;
krb5_error_code ret;
bool is_s4u2self = samba_wdc_is_s4u2self_req(r);
bool is_in_db = false;
bool is_untrusted = false;
uint32_t flags = 0;
mem_ctx = talloc_named(NULL, 0, "samba_kdc_reget_pac2 context");
if (mem_ctx == NULL) {
return ENOMEM;
}
if (client != NULL) {
client_skdc_entry = talloc_get_type_abort(client->context,
struct samba_kdc_entry);
}
/*
* If the krbtgt was generated by an RODC, and we are not that
* RODC, then we need to regenerate the PAC - we can't trust
* it, and confirm that the RODC was permitted to print this ticket
*
* Becasue of the samba_kdc_validate_pac_blob() step we can be
* sure that the record in 'client' matches the SID in the
* original PAC.
*/
ret = samba_krbtgt_is_in_db(krbtgt_skdc_entry, &is_in_db, &is_untrusted);
if (ret != 0) {
goto out;
}
if (is_s4u2self) {
flags |= SAMBA_KDC_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION;
}
if (delegated_proxy_principal != NULL) {
krb5_enctype etype;
Key *key = NULL;
if (!is_in_db) {
/*
* The RODC-issued PAC was signed by a KDC entry that we
* don't have a key for. The server signature is not
* trustworthy, since it could have been created by the
* server we got the ticket from. We must not proceed as
* otherwise the ticket signature is unchecked.
*/
ret = HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE;
goto out;
}
/* Fetch the correct key depending on the checksum type. */
if (ctype == CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_MD5) {
etype = ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC;
} else {
ret = krb5_cksumtype_to_enctype(context,
ctype,
&etype);
if (ret != 0) {
goto out;
}
}
ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, krbtgt, NULL, etype, &key);
if (ret != 0) {
goto out;
}
/* Check the KDC and ticket signatures. */
ret = krb5_pac_verify(context,
*pac,
0,
NULL,
NULL,
&key->key);
if (ret != 0) {
DEBUG(1, ("PAC KDC signature failed to verify\n"));
goto out;
}
flags |= SAMBA_KDC_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION;
}
if (is_untrusted) {
flags |= SAMBA_KDC_FLAG_KRBTGT_IS_UNTRUSTED;
}
if (is_in_db) {
flags |= SAMBA_KDC_FLAG_KRBTGT_IN_DB;
}
ret = krb5_pac_init(context, &new_pac);
if (ret != 0) {
new_pac = NULL;
goto out;
}
ret = samba_kdc_update_pac(mem_ctx,
context,
krbtgt_skdc_entry->kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
flags,
client_skdc_entry,
server->principal,
server_skdc_entry,
krbtgt_skdc_entry,
delegated_proxy_principal,
*pac,
new_pac);
if (ret != 0) {
krb5_pac_free(context, new_pac);
if (ret == ENODATA) {
krb5_pac_free(context, *pac);
*pac = NULL;
ret = 0;
}
goto out;
}
/* Replace the pac */
krb5_pac_free(context, *pac);
*pac = new_pac;
out:
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret;
}
/* Resign (and reform, including possibly new groups) a PAC */
static krb5_error_code samba_wdc_reget_pac(void *priv, astgs_request_t r,
const krb5_principal client_principal,
const krb5_principal delegated_proxy_principal,
hdb_entry *client,
hdb_entry *server,
hdb_entry *krbtgt,
krb5_pac *pac)
{
krb5_context context = kdc_request_get_context((kdc_request_t)r);
krb5_kdc_configuration *config = kdc_request_get_config((kdc_request_t)r);
struct samba_kdc_entry *krbtgt_skdc_entry =
talloc_get_type_abort(krbtgt->context,
struct samba_kdc_entry);
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_cksumtype ctype = CKSUMTYPE_NONE;
hdb_entry signing_krbtgt_hdb;
if (delegated_proxy_principal) {
uint16_t rodc_id;
unsigned int my_krbtgt_number;
/*
* We're using delegated_proxy_principal for the moment to
* indicate cases where the ticket was encrypted with the server
* key, and not a krbtgt key. This cannot be trusted, so we need
* to find a krbtgt key that signs the PAC in order to trust the
* ticket.
*
* The krbtgt passed in to this function refers to the krbtgt
* used to decrypt the ticket of the server requesting
* S4U2Proxy.
*
* When we implement service ticket renewal, we need to check
* the PAC, and this will need to be updated.
*/
ret = krb5_pac_get_kdc_checksum_info(context,
*pac,
&ctype,
&rodc_id);
if (ret != 0) {
DEBUG(1, ("Failed to get PAC checksum info\n"));
return ret;
}
/*
* We need to check the KDC and ticket signatures, fetching the
* correct key based on the enctype.
*/
my_krbtgt_number = krbtgt_skdc_entry->kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number;
if (my_krbtgt_number != 0) {
/*
* If we are an RODC, and we are not the KDC that signed
* the evidence ticket, then we need to proxy the
* request.
*/
if (rodc_id != my_krbtgt_number) {
return HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE;
}
} else {
/*
* If we are a DC, the ticket may have been signed by a
* different KDC than the one that issued the header
* ticket.
*/
if (rodc_id != krbtgt->kvno >> 16) {
struct sdb_entry signing_krbtgt_sdb;
/*
* If we didn't sign the ticket, then return an
* error.
*/
if (rodc_id != 0) {
return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
}
/*
* Fetch our key from the database. To support
* key rollover, we're going to need to try
* multiple keys by trial and error. For now,
* krbtgt keys aren't assumed to change.
*/
ret = samba_kdc_fetch(context,
krbtgt_skdc_entry->kdc_db_ctx,
krbtgt->principal,
SDB_F_GET_KRBTGT | SDB_F_CANON,
0,
&signing_krbtgt_sdb);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
ret = sdb_entry_to_hdb_entry(context,
&signing_krbtgt_sdb,
&signing_krbtgt_hdb);
sdb_entry_free(&signing_krbtgt_sdb);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
/*
* Replace the krbtgt entry with our own entry
* for further processing.
*/
krbtgt = &signing_krbtgt_hdb;
}
}
} else if (!krbtgt_skdc_entry->is_trust) {
/*
* We expect to have received a TGT, so check that we haven't
* been given a kpasswd ticket instead. We don't need to do this
* check for an incoming trust, as they use a different secret
* and can't be confused with a normal TGT.
*/
krb5_ticket *tgt = kdc_request_get_ticket(r);
struct timeval now = krb5_kdc_get_time();
/*
* Check if the ticket is in the last two minutes of its
* life.
*/
KerberosTime lifetime = rk_time_sub(tgt->ticket.endtime, now.tv_sec);
if (lifetime <= CHANGEPW_LIFETIME) {
/*
* This ticket has at most two minutes left to live. It
* may be a kpasswd ticket rather than a TGT, so don't
* accept it.
*/
kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)r,
"Ticket is not a ticket-granting ticket");
return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED;
}
}
ret = samba_wdc_reget_pac2(r,
delegated_proxy_principal,
client,
server,
krbtgt,
pac,
ctype);
if (krbtgt == &signing_krbtgt_hdb) {
hdb_free_entry(context, config->db[0], &signing_krbtgt_hdb);
}
return ret;
}
static char *get_netbios_name(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, HostAddresses *addrs)
{
char *nb_name = NULL;
size_t len;
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; addrs && i < addrs->len; i++) {
if (addrs->val[i].addr_type != KRB5_ADDRESS_NETBIOS) {
continue;
}
len = MIN(addrs->val[i].address.length, 15);
nb_name = talloc_strndup(mem_ctx,
addrs->val[i].address.data, len);
if (nb_name) {
break;
}
}
if ((nb_name == NULL) || (nb_name[0] == '\0')) {
return NULL;
}
/* Strip space padding */
for (len = strlen(nb_name) - 1;
(len > 0) && (nb_name[len] == ' ');
--len) {
nb_name[len] = '\0';
}
return nb_name;
}
/* this function allocates 'data' using malloc.
* The caller is responsible for freeing it */
static void samba_kdc_build_edata_reply(NTSTATUS nt_status, krb5_data *e_data)
{
e_data->data = malloc(12);
if (e_data->data == NULL) {
e_data->length = 0;
e_data->data = NULL;
return;
}
e_data->length = 12;
SIVAL(e_data->data, 0, NT_STATUS_V(nt_status));
SIVAL(e_data->data, 4, 0);
SIVAL(e_data->data, 8, 1);
return;
}
static krb5_error_code samba_wdc_check_client_access(void *priv,
astgs_request_t r)
{
struct samba_kdc_entry *kdc_entry;
bool password_change;
char *workstation;
NTSTATUS nt_status;
kdc_entry = talloc_get_type(kdc_request_get_client(r)->context, struct samba_kdc_entry);
password_change = (kdc_request_get_server(r) && kdc_request_get_server(r)->flags.change_pw);
workstation = get_netbios_name((TALLOC_CTX *)kdc_request_get_client(r)->context,
kdc_request_get_req(r)->req_body.addresses);
nt_status = samba_kdc_check_client_access(kdc_entry,
kdc_request_get_cname((kdc_request_t)r),
workstation,
password_change);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY)) {
return ENOMEM;
}
if (kdc_request_get_rep(r)->padata) {
int ret;
krb5_data kd;
samba_kdc_build_edata_reply(nt_status, &kd);
ret = krb5_padata_add(kdc_request_get_context((kdc_request_t)r), kdc_request_get_rep(r)->padata,
KRB5_PADATA_PW_SALT,
kd.data, kd.length);
if (ret != 0) {
/*
* So we do not leak the allocated
* memory on kd in the error case
*/
krb5_data_free(&kd);
}
}
return samba_kdc_map_policy_err(nt_status);
}
/* Now do the standard Heimdal check */
return KRB5_PLUGIN_NO_HANDLE;
}
/* this function allocates 'data' using malloc.
* The caller is responsible for freeing it */
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_build_supported_etypes(uint32_t supported_etypes,
krb5_data *e_data)
{
e_data->data = malloc(4);
if (e_data->data == NULL) {
return ENOMEM;
}
e_data->length = 4;
PUSH_LE_U32(e_data->data, 0, supported_etypes);
return 0;
}
static krb5_error_code samba_wdc_finalize_reply(void *priv,
astgs_request_t r)
{
struct samba_kdc_entry *server_kdc_entry;
uint32_t supported_enctypes;
server_kdc_entry = talloc_get_type(kdc_request_get_server(r)->context, struct samba_kdc_entry);
/*
* If the canonicalize flag is set, add PA-SUPPORTED-ENCTYPES padata
* type to indicate what encryption types the server supports.
*/
supported_enctypes = server_kdc_entry->supported_enctypes;
if (kdc_request_get_req(r)->req_body.kdc_options.canonicalize && supported_enctypes != 0) {
krb5_error_code ret;
PA_DATA md;
ret = samba_kdc_build_supported_etypes(supported_enctypes, &md.padata_value);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
md.padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_SUPPORTED_ETYPES;
ret = kdc_request_add_encrypted_padata(r, &md);
if (ret != 0) {
/*
* So we do not leak the allocated
* memory on kd in the error case
*/
krb5_data_free(&md.padata_value);
}
}
return 0;
}
static krb5_error_code samba_wdc_plugin_init(krb5_context context, void **ptr)
{
*ptr = NULL;
return 0;
}
static void samba_wdc_plugin_fini(void *ptr)
{
return;
}
static krb5_error_code samba_wdc_referral_policy(void *priv,
astgs_request_t r)
{
return kdc_request_get_error_code((kdc_request_t)r);
}
struct krb5plugin_kdc_ftable kdc_plugin_table = {
.minor_version = KRB5_PLUGIN_KDC_VERSION_10,
.init = samba_wdc_plugin_init,
.fini = samba_wdc_plugin_fini,
.pac_verify = samba_wdc_reget_pac,
.client_access = samba_wdc_check_client_access,
.finalize_reply = samba_wdc_finalize_reply,
.pac_generate = samba_wdc_get_pac,
.referral_policy = samba_wdc_referral_policy,
};