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Change sq key subkey {password,delete} to work with weak bindings.

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- Currently, it is not possible to delete secret key material that
    is only associated with a certificate that is not valid under the
    current policy.  The same goes for changing the password protecting
    the secret key material.

  - Users shouldn't have to first update a key's binding signature to
    delete it, or change its password.

  - Change `sq key subkey delete` and `sq key subkey password` to use
    the null policy.  This is not a security concern, because even if
    the binding signature is weak, both the certificate and the key
    are explicitly named.

  - See #375
This commit is contained in:
Neal H. Walfield 2024-11-21 10:49:41 +01:00
parent c37bfe5e7b
commit 4a5ce6603c
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: 6863C9AD5B4D22D3
10 changed files with 590 additions and 220 deletions
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22
src/commands/key/delete.rs
View File

@ -1,14 +1,30 @@
//! Changes key expiration.
//! Deletes all of a certificate's secret key material.
use anyhow::Context;
use sequoia_openpgp as openpgp;
use openpgp::Cert;
use crate::Result;
use crate::Sq;
use crate::cli::types::KeyDesignators;
use crate::cli;
use crate::common::key::delete;
pub fn dispatch(sq: Sq, command: cli::key::delete::Command)
-> Result<()>
{
delete::delete(sq, command.cert, KeyDesignators::none(),
let (cert, cert_source)
= sq.resolve_cert(&command.cert, sequoia_wot::FULLY_TRUSTED)?;
let vc = Cert::with_policy(&cert, sq.policy, sq.time)
.with_context(|| {
format!("The certificate {} is not valid under the \
current policy.",
cert.fingerprint())
})?;
let kas = vc.keys().collect::<Vec<_>>();
delete::delete(sq, &cert, cert_source, &kas,
command.output, false)
}

20
src/commands/key/password.rs
View File

@ -1,15 +1,31 @@
//! Changes a key's password.
use anyhow::Context;
use sequoia_openpgp as openpgp;
use openpgp::Cert;
use crate::Result;
use crate::Sq;
use crate::cli::types::KeyDesignators;
use crate::cli;
use crate::common::key::password;
pub fn dispatch(sq: Sq, command: cli::key::password::Command)
-> Result<()>
{
password::password(sq, command.cert, KeyDesignators::none(),
let (cert, cert_source)
= sq.resolve_cert(&command.cert, sequoia_wot::FULLY_TRUSTED)?;
let vc = Cert::with_policy(&cert, sq.policy, sq.time)
.with_context(|| {
format!("The certificate {} is not valid under the \
current policy.",
cert.fingerprint())
})?;
let kas = vc.keys().collect::<Vec<_>>();
password::password(sq, &cert, cert_source, &kas,
command.clear_password,
command.new_password_file.as_deref(),
command.output, false)

24
src/commands/key/subkey/delete.rs
View File

@ -1,12 +1,32 @@
//! Deletes one or more key's secret key material.
use anyhow::Context;
use sequoia_openpgp as openpgp;
use openpgp::Cert;
use crate::Result;
use crate::Sq;
use crate::common::key::delete;
use crate::common::NULL_POLICY;
pub fn dispatch(sq: Sq, command: crate::cli::key::subkey::delete::Command)
-> Result<()>
{
assert!(! command.keys.is_empty());
delete(sq, command.cert, Some(command.keys),
command.output, false)
let (cert, cert_source)
= sq.resolve_cert(&command.cert, sequoia_wot::FULLY_TRUSTED)?;
let vc = Cert::with_policy(&cert, NULL_POLICY, sq.time)
.with_context(|| {
format!("The certificate {} is not valid under the \
null policy.",
cert.fingerprint())
})?;
let kas = sq.resolve_keys(&vc, &cert_source, &command.keys, true)?;
delete::delete(sq, &cert, cert_source, &kas,
command.output, false)
}

23
src/commands/key/subkey/password.rs
View File

@ -1,13 +1,34 @@
//! Changes the password protecting one or more keys.
use anyhow::Context;
use sequoia_openpgp as openpgp;
use openpgp::Cert;
use crate::Result;
use crate::Sq;
use crate::common::key::password;
use crate::common::NULL_POLICY;
pub fn dispatch(sq: Sq, command: crate::cli::key::subkey::password::Command)
-> Result<()>
{
assert!(! command.keys.is_empty());
password(sq, command.cert, Some(command.keys),
let (cert, cert_source)
= sq.resolve_cert(&command.cert, sequoia_wot::FULLY_TRUSTED)?;
let vc = Cert::with_policy(&cert, NULL_POLICY, sq.time)
.with_context(|| {
format!("The certificate {} is not valid under the \
null policy.",
cert.fingerprint())
})?;
let kas = sq.resolve_keys(&vc, &cert_source, &command.keys, true)?;
password(sq, &cert, cert_source, &kas,
command.clear_password, command.new_password_file.as_deref(),
command.output, false)
}

69
src/common/key.rs
View File

@ -1,19 +1,15 @@
use anyhow::Context;
use sequoia_openpgp as openpgp;
use openpgp::Cert;
use openpgp::Result;
use openpgp::cert::amalgamation::key::PrimaryKey;
use openpgp::packet::key;
use openpgp::cert::amalgamation::key::ValidErasedKeyAmalgamation;
use openpgp::packet::Key;
use openpgp::packet::key::KeyParts;
use openpgp::packet::key;
use sequoia_keystore as keystore;
use crate::Sq;
use crate::cli::types::CertDesignators;
use crate::cli::types::FileStdinOrKeyHandle;
use crate::cli::types::KeyDesignators;
use crate::cli::types::cert_designator;
mod expire;
@ -37,52 +33,23 @@ pub use password::password;
/// secret key material.
///
/// The returned keys are not unlocked.
pub fn get_keys<CA, CP, CO, CD, KO, KD>(
pub fn get_keys<'a, P>(
sq: &Sq,
cert: &CertDesignators<CA, CP, CO, CD>,
keys: Option<&KeyDesignators<KO, KD>>)
-> Result<(Cert,
FileStdinOrKeyHandle,
Vec<(Key<key::PublicParts, key::UnspecifiedRole>,
bool,
Option<Vec<keystore::Key>>)>)>
where CP: cert_designator::ArgumentPrefix,
KO: typenum::Unsigned,
cert_source: &FileStdinOrKeyHandle,
kas: &[ValidErasedKeyAmalgamation<'a, P>])
-> Result<Vec<(Key<key::PublicParts, key::UnspecifiedRole>,
bool,
Option<Vec<keystore::Key>>)>>
where
P: 'a + KeyParts,
{
assert_eq!(cert.len(), 1);
if let Some(keys) = keys {
assert!(keys.len() > 0);
}
let (cert, cert_source)
= sq.resolve_cert(&cert, sequoia_wot::FULLY_TRUSTED)?;
let vc = Cert::with_policy(&cert, sq.policy, sq.time)
.with_context(|| {
format!("The certificate {} is not valid under the \
current policy.",
cert.fingerprint())
})?;
let kas = if let Some(keys) = keys {
sq.resolve_keys(&vc, &cert_source, &keys, true)?
} else {
vc.keys().collect::<Vec<_>>()
};
let mut list: Vec<(Key<_, _>, bool, Option<_>)> = Vec::new();
let mut no_secret_key_material_count = 0;
match cert_source {
FileStdinOrKeyHandle::FileOrStdin(ref file) => {
FileStdinOrKeyHandle::FileOrStdin(ref _file) => {
// If it is not a TSK, there is nothing to do.
if ! cert.is_tsk() {
return Err(anyhow::anyhow!(
"{} (read from {}) does not contain any secret \
key material.",
cert.fingerprint(), file));
}
for ka in kas.into_iter() {
let no_secret_key_material = ! ka.has_secret();
if no_secret_key_material {
@ -92,7 +59,10 @@ where CP: cert_designator::ArgumentPrefix,
continue;
}
list.push((ka.key().clone(), ka.primary(), None));
list.push((
ka.key().clone().parts_into_public(),
ka.primary(),
None));
}
}
FileStdinOrKeyHandle::KeyHandle(ref _kh) => {
@ -110,7 +80,10 @@ where CP: cert_designator::ArgumentPrefix,
continue;
}
list.push((ka.key().clone(), ka.primary(), Some(remote_keys)));
list.push((
ka.key().clone().parts_into_public(),
ka.primary(),
Some(remote_keys)));
}
}
}
@ -129,5 +102,5 @@ where CP: cert_designator::ArgumentPrefix,
assert!(! list.is_empty());
Ok((cert, cert_source, list))
Ok(list)
}

24
src/common/key/delete.rs
View File

@ -2,31 +2,31 @@
use anyhow::Context;
use sequoia_openpgp as openpgp;
use openpgp::Result;
use openpgp::Cert;
use openpgp::Packet;
use openpgp::Result;
use openpgp::cert::amalgamation::key::ValidErasedKeyAmalgamation;
use openpgp::packet::key::KeyParts;
use openpgp::serialize::Serialize;
use crate::Sq;
use crate::cli::types::CertDesignators;
use crate::cli::types::FileOrStdout;
use crate::cli::types::FileStdinOrKeyHandle;
use crate::cli::types::KeyDesignators;
use crate::cli::types::cert_designator;
use super::get_keys;
pub fn delete<CA, CP, CO, CD, KO, KD>(
pub fn delete<'a, P>(
sq: Sq,
cert: CertDesignators<CA, CP, CO, CD>,
keys: Option<KeyDesignators<KO, KD>>,
cert: &Cert,
cert_source: FileStdinOrKeyHandle,
kas: &[ValidErasedKeyAmalgamation<'a, P>],
output: Option<FileOrStdout>,
binary: bool)
-> Result<()>
where CP: cert_designator::ArgumentPrefix,
KO: typenum::Unsigned,
where
P: 'a + KeyParts,
{
let (cert, cert_source, to_delete)
= get_keys(&sq, &cert, keys.as_ref())?;
let to_delete = get_keys(&sq, &cert_source, kas)?;
let ks = matches!(cert_source, FileStdinOrKeyHandle::KeyHandle(_));
if ks {
@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ where CP: cert_designator::ArgumentPrefix,
}
}
let cert = cert.insert_packets(
let cert = cert.clone().insert_packets(
stripped.into_iter().map(|stripped| Packet::from(stripped)))?;
let output = output.unwrap_or_else(|| FileOrStdout::new(None));

26
src/common/key/password.rs
View File

@ -3,34 +3,35 @@ use std::path::Path;
use anyhow::Context;
use sequoia_openpgp as openpgp;
use openpgp::crypto::Password;
use openpgp::serialize::Serialize;
use openpgp::Cert;
use openpgp::Packet;
use openpgp::Result;
use openpgp::cert::amalgamation::key::ValidErasedKeyAmalgamation;
use openpgp::crypto::Password;
use openpgp::packet::key::KeyParts;
use openpgp::serialize::Serialize;
use sequoia_keystore as keystore;
use keystore::Protection;
use crate::common;
use crate::Sq;
use crate::cli::types::CertDesignators;
use crate::cli::types::FileOrStdout;
use crate::cli::types::FileStdinOrKeyHandle;
use crate::cli::types::KeyDesignators;
use crate::cli::types::cert_designator;
use crate::common::password;
pub fn password<CA, CP, CO, CD, KO, KD>(
pub fn password<'a, P>(
sq: Sq,
cert: CertDesignators<CA, CP, CO, CD>,
keys: Option<KeyDesignators<KO, KD>>,
cert: &Cert,
cert_source: FileStdinOrKeyHandle,
kas: &[ValidErasedKeyAmalgamation<'a, P>],
clear_password: bool,
new_password_file: Option<&Path>,
output: Option<FileOrStdout>,
binary: bool)
-> Result<()>
where CP: cert_designator::ArgumentPrefix,
KO: typenum::Unsigned,
where
P: 'a + KeyParts,
{
let mut new_password_ = None;
// Some(password) => new password
@ -49,8 +50,7 @@ where CP: cert_designator::ArgumentPrefix,
Ok(new_password_.clone().unwrap())
};
let (cert, cert_source, mut list)
= super::get_keys(&sq, &cert, keys.as_ref())?;
let mut list = super::get_keys(&sq, &cert_source, kas)?;
let uid = sq.best_userid(&cert, true);
let ks = matches!(cert_source, FileStdinOrKeyHandle::KeyHandle(_));
@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ where CP: cert_designator::ArgumentPrefix,
}
}
let cert = cert.insert_packets(packets)?;
let cert = cert.clone().insert_packets(packets)?;
let output = output.unwrap_or_else(|| FileOrStdout::new(None));
let mut output = output.for_secrets().create_safe(&sq)?;

92
tests/integration/common.rs
View File

@ -1233,12 +1233,12 @@ impl Sq {
.expect("can parse certificate")
}
/// Delete the specified key.
pub fn key_subkey_delete<'a, H, Q>(&self,
cert_handle: H,
key_handles: &[KeyHandle],
output_file: Q)
-> Cert
/// Delete the specified keys.
pub fn try_key_subkey_delete<'a, H, Q>(&self,
cert_handle: H,
key_handles: &[KeyHandle],
output_file: Q)
-> Result<Cert>
where H: Into<FileOrKeyHandle>,
Q: Into<Option<&'a Path>>,
{
@ -1251,10 +1251,17 @@ impl Sq {
match &cert_handle {
FileOrKeyHandle::FileOrStdin(path) => {
cmd.arg("--cert-file").arg(path);
assert!(output_file.is_some());
if let Some(output_file) = output_file {
cmd.arg("--output").arg(output_file);
} else {
cmd.arg("--output").arg("-");
}
}
FileOrKeyHandle::KeyHandle((_kh, s)) => {
cmd.arg("--cert").arg(&s);
if let Some(output_file) = output_file {
cmd.arg("--output").arg(output_file);
}
}
};
@ -1262,25 +1269,32 @@ impl Sq {
cmd.arg("--key").arg(kh.to_string());
}
if let Some(output_file) = output_file {
cmd.arg("--output").arg(output_file);
}
let output = self.run(cmd, Some(true));
assert!(output.status.success());
let output = self.run(cmd, None);
self.handle_cert_output(output, cert_handle, output_file, None)
.expect("can parse certificate")
}
/// Delete the specified keys.
pub fn key_subkey_delete<'a, H, Q>(&self,
cert_handle: H,
key_handles: &[KeyHandle],
output_file: Q)
-> Cert
where H: Into<FileOrKeyHandle>,
Q: Into<Option<&'a Path>>,
{
self.try_key_subkey_delete(cert_handle, key_handles, output_file)
.expect("success")
}
/// Change the key's password.
pub fn key_subkey_password<'a, H, Q>(&self,
cert_handle: H,
keys: &[KeyHandle],
old_password_file: Option<&'a Path>,
new_password_file: Option<&'a Path>,
output_file: Q,
success: bool)
-> Result<Cert>
pub fn try_key_subkey_password<'a, H, Q>(
&self,
cert_handle: H,
keys: &[KeyHandle],
old_password_file: Option<&'a Path>,
new_password_file: Option<&'a Path>,
output_file: Q)
-> Result<Cert>
where
H: Into<FileOrKeyHandle>,
Q: Into<Option<&'a Path>>,
@ -1293,9 +1307,16 @@ impl Sq {
if cert_handle.is_file() {
cmd.arg("--cert-file").arg(&cert_handle);
assert!(output_file.is_some());
if let Some(output_file) = output_file {
cmd.arg("--output").arg(output_file);
} else {
cmd.arg("--output").arg("-");
}
} else {
cmd.arg("--cert").arg(&cert_handle);
if let Some(output_file) = output_file {
cmd.arg("--output").arg(output_file);
}
};
for key in keys.iter() {
@ -1312,14 +1333,29 @@ impl Sq {
cmd.arg("--clear-password");
}
if let Some(output_file) = output_file {
cmd.arg("--output").arg(output_file);
}
let output = self.run(cmd, Some(success));
let output = self.run(cmd, None);
self.handle_cert_output(output, cert_handle, output_file, None)
}
/// Change the key's password.
pub fn key_subkey_password<'a, H, Q>(&self,
cert_handle: H,
keys: &[KeyHandle],
old_password_file: Option<&'a Path>,
new_password_file: Option<&'a Path>,
output_file: Q)
-> Cert
where
H: Into<FileOrKeyHandle>,
Q: Into<Option<&'a Path>>,
{
self.try_key_subkey_password(
cert_handle, keys,
old_password_file, new_password_file,
output_file)
.expect("success")
}
/// Change the key's expiration.
pub fn key_subkey_expire<'a, H, Q>(&self,
cert_handle: H,

237
tests/integration/sq_key_subkey_delete.rs
View File

@ -1,11 +1,80 @@
use sequoia_openpgp as openpgp;
use openpgp::Cert;
use openpgp::KeyHandle;
use openpgp::KeyID;
use openpgp::Result;
use openpgp::cert::amalgamation::ValidAmalgamation;
use openpgp::packet::Key;
use openpgp::parse::Parse;
use openpgp::types::RevocationStatus;
use super::common::FileOrKeyHandle;
use super::common::power_set;
use super::common::Sq;
use super::common::STANDARD_POLICY;
fn check<'a, H>(
sq: &Sq,
cert_handle: H,
to_delete: &[KeyHandle],
success: bool)
where H: Into<FileOrKeyHandle>,
{
let cert_handle = cert_handle.into();
eprintln!("Deleting keys from {:?}:", cert_handle);
for k in to_delete.iter() {
eprintln!(" - {}", k);
}
// Delete the selection.
let result = sq.try_key_subkey_delete(&cert_handle, to_delete, None);
let got = match (success, result) {
(true, Ok(cert)) => cert,
(true, Err(err)) => {
panic!("Failed, but should have succeeded: {}", err)
}
(false, Ok(_)) => {
panic!("Succeded, but should have failed")
}
(false, Err(_)) => return,
};
// Make sure we got exactly what we asked for; no
// more, no less.
eprintln!("Result:");
let mut deletions = 0;
for got in got.keys() {
eprintln!(" {} {} secret key material",
got.fingerprint(),
if got.has_secret() {
"has"
} else {
"doesn't have"
});
let should_have_deleted
= to_delete.iter().find(|kh| kh.aliases(got.key_handle())).is_some();
if should_have_deleted {
assert!(
! got.has_secret(),
"got secret key material \
for a key we should have deleted ({})",
got.fingerprint());
deletions += 1;
} else {
assert!(
got.has_secret(),
"didn't get secret key material \
for a key we didn't delete ({})",
got.fingerprint());
}
}
assert_eq!(deletions, to_delete.len());
}
#[test]
fn sq_key_subkey_delete() -> Result<()>
@ -44,12 +113,8 @@ fn sq_key_subkey_delete() -> Result<()>
} else {
cert_file.display().to_string()
});
eprintln!(" Deleting:");
for k in to_delete.iter() {
eprintln!(" {}", k);
}
let to_delete_kh: Vec<KeyHandle> = if by_fpr {
let to_delete: Vec<KeyHandle> = if by_fpr {
to_delete.iter()
.map(|fpr| KeyHandle::from(fpr))
.collect()
@ -59,54 +124,130 @@ fn sq_key_subkey_delete() -> Result<()>
.collect()
};
// Delete the selection.
let got = if keystore {
if keystore {
// Import it into the key store.
sq.key_import(&cert_file);
sq.key_subkey_delete(
cert.key_handle(), &to_delete_kh, None)
check(&sq, cert.key_handle(), &to_delete, true);
} else {
sq.key_subkey_delete(
&cert_file, &to_delete_kh,
std::path::PathBuf::from("-").as_path())
};
// Make sure we got exactly what we asked for; no
// more, no less.
eprintln!(" Got:");
let mut deletions = 0;
for got in got.keys() {
eprintln!(" {} {} secret key material",
got.fingerprint(),
if got.has_secret() {
"has"
} else {
"doesn't have"
});
let should_have_deleted
= to_delete.contains(&got.fingerprint());
if should_have_deleted {
assert!(
! got.has_secret(),
"got secret key material \
for a key we deleted ({})",
got.fingerprint());
deletions += 1;
} else {
assert!(
got.has_secret(),
"didn't get secret key material \
for a key we didn't delete ({})",
got.fingerprint());
}
check(&sq, &cert_file, &to_delete, true);
}
assert_eq!(deletions, to_delete.len());
}
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn unbound_subkey() {
// Make sure we can't delete an unbound subkey.
let sq = Sq::new();
let cert_path = sq.test_data()
.join("keys")
.join("unbound-subkey.pgp");
let cert = Cert::from_file(&cert_path).expect("can read");
let vc = cert.with_policy(STANDARD_POLICY, sq.now())
.expect("valid cert");
// One subkey should be considered invalid.
assert!(vc.keys().count() < cert.keys().count());
let unbound = "E992BF8BA7A27BB4FBB71D973857E47B14874045"
.parse::<KeyHandle>().expect("valid");
check(&sq, &cert_path, &[ unbound ], false);
}
#[test]
fn soft_revoked_subkey() {
// Make sure we can delete a soft revoked subkey.
let sq = Sq::new();
let cert_path = sq.test_data()
.join("keys")
.join("soft-revoked-subkey.pgp");
let cert = Cert::from_file(&cert_path).expect("can read");
let vc = cert.with_policy(STANDARD_POLICY, sq.now())
.expect("valid cert");
// Make sure the revoked key is there and is really revoked.
let mut revoked = None;
for k in vc.keys().subkeys() {
if let RevocationStatus::Revoked(_) = k.revocation_status() {
assert!(revoked.is_none(),
"Only expected a single revoked subkey");
revoked = Some(k.key_handle());
}
}
let revoked = if let Some(revoked) = revoked {
revoked
} else {
panic!("Expected a revoked subkey, but didn't fine one");
};
check(&sq, &cert_path, &[ revoked ], true);
}
#[test]
fn hard_revoked_subkey() {
// Make sure we can delete a hard revoked subkey.
let sq = Sq::new();
let cert_path = sq.test_data()
.join("keys")
.join("hard-revoked-subkey.pgp");
let cert = Cert::from_file(&cert_path).expect("can read");
let vc = cert.with_policy(STANDARD_POLICY, sq.now())
.expect("valid cert");
// Make sure the revoked key is there and is really revoked.
let mut revoked = None;
for k in vc.keys().subkeys() {
if let RevocationStatus::Revoked(_) = k.revocation_status() {
assert!(revoked.is_none(),
"Only expected a single revoked subkey");
revoked = Some(k.key_handle());
}
}
let revoked = if let Some(revoked) = revoked {
revoked
} else {
panic!("Expected a revoked subkey, but didn't fine one");
};
check(&sq, &cert_path, &[ revoked ], true);
}
#[test]
fn sha1_subkey() {
// Make sure we can delete a subkey that is bound using SHA-1.
let sq = Sq::new();
let cert_path = sq.test_data()
.join("keys")
.join("sha1-subkey-priv.pgp");
let cert = Cert::from_file(&cert_path).expect("can read");
let vc = cert.with_policy(STANDARD_POLICY, sq.now())
.expect("valid cert");
// Make sure the subkey key is there and really uses SHA-1.
let valid_subkeys: Vec<_> = vc.keys().subkeys()
.map(|ka| ka.fingerprint())
.collect();
let all_subkeys: Vec<_> = cert.keys().subkeys()
.map(|ka| ka.fingerprint())
.collect();
assert_eq!(valid_subkeys.len(), 0);
assert_eq!(all_subkeys.len(), 1);
let subkey = all_subkeys[0].clone();
check(&sq, &cert_path, &[ KeyHandle::from(subkey) ], true);
}

273
tests/integration/sq_key_subkey_password.rs
View File

@ -1,11 +1,101 @@
use std::path::Path;
use sequoia_openpgp as openpgp;
use openpgp::Cert;
use openpgp::KeyHandle;
use openpgp::KeyID;
use openpgp::Result;
use openpgp::cert::amalgamation::ValidAmalgamation;
use openpgp::packet::Key;
use openpgp::parse::Parse;
use openpgp::types::RevocationStatus;
use super::common::power_set;
use super::common::Sq;
use super::common::STANDARD_POLICY;
fn check(
sq: &Sq,
cert_file: &Path,
to_change: &[KeyHandle],
success: bool)
{
let cert = Cert::from_file(&cert_file).expect("can read");
eprintln!("Changing password for {:?}:", cert_file);
for k in to_change.iter() {
eprintln!(" - {}", k);
}
let password = sq.scratch_file("password");
std::fs::write(&password, "this is a super secret password")
.expect("can write");
for keystore in [false, true] {
// Change the password for the selection.
let result = if keystore {
// Import it into the key store.
sq.key_import(&cert_file);
sq.try_key_subkey_password(
cert.key_handle(), &to_change,
None, Some(&password),
None)
} else {
sq.try_key_subkey_password(
cert_file, &to_change,
None, Some(&password),
None)
};
let got = match (success, result) {
(true, Ok(cert)) => cert,
(true, Err(err)) => {
panic!("Failed, but should have succeeded: {}", err)
}
(false, Ok(_)) => {
panic!("Succeded, but should have failed")
}
(false, Err(_)) => return,
};
// Make sure we got exactly what we asked for; no
// more, no less.
eprintln!(" Got:");
let mut changes = 0;
for got in got.keys() {
eprintln!(" {} {} encrypted secret key material",
got.fingerprint(),
if got.has_unencrypted_secret() {
"doesn't have"
} else {
"has"
});
let should_have_changed = to_change.iter()
.find(|kh| kh.aliases(got.key_handle()))
.is_some();
if should_have_changed {
assert!(
! got.has_unencrypted_secret(),
"got unencrypted secret key material \
for a key whose password we changed ({})",
got.fingerprint());
changes += 1;
} else {
assert!(
got.has_unencrypted_secret(),
"didn't get encrypted secret key material \
for a key whose password we changed ({})",
got.fingerprint());
}
}
assert_eq!(changes, to_change.len());
}
}
#[test]
fn sq_key_subkey_password_0() -> Result<()> {
@ -31,9 +121,6 @@ fn sq_key_subkey_password_mod(modulus: usize) -> Result<()>
{
let sq = Sq::new();
let password_txt = sq.scratch_file("password_txt");
std::fs::write(&password_txt, "a new password 1234").expect("can write");
// Generate a key in a file.
let (cert, cert_file, _rev_file) = sq.key_generate(&[], &["alice"]);
assert!(cert.is_tsk());
@ -53,26 +140,21 @@ fn sq_key_subkey_password_mod(modulus: usize) -> Result<()>
let key_ids = keys.iter().map(|k| k.fingerprint()).collect::<Vec<_>>();
for (((i, to_change), keystore), by_fpr) in power_set(&key_ids).into_iter()
for ((i, to_change), by_fpr) in power_set(&key_ids).into_iter()
.enumerate()
.filter(|(i, _)| i % 4 == modulus)
.flat_map(|x| [(x.clone(), false), (x.clone(), true)])
.flat_map(|x| [(x.clone(), false), (x.clone(), true)])
{
eprintln!("Test #{}, by {}, from {}:",
i + 1,
if by_fpr { "fingerprint" } else { "key ID" },
if keystore {
"the key store".to_string()
} else {
cert_file.display().to_string()
});
cert_file.display().to_string());
eprintln!(" Changing the password for:");
for k in to_change.iter() {
eprintln!(" {}", k);
}
let to_change_kh: Vec<KeyHandle> = if by_fpr {
let to_change: Vec<KeyHandle> = if by_fpr {
to_change.iter()
.map(|fpr| KeyHandle::from(fpr))
.collect()
@ -82,59 +164,124 @@ fn sq_key_subkey_password_mod(modulus: usize) -> Result<()>
.collect()
};
// Change the password for the selection.
let got = if keystore {
// Import it into the key store.
sq.key_import(&cert_file);
sq.key_subkey_password(
cert.key_handle(), &to_change_kh,
None, Some(&password_txt),
None, true)
.expect("can change password")
} else {
sq.key_subkey_password(
&cert_file, &to_change_kh,
None, Some(&password_txt),
std::path::PathBuf::from("-").as_path(), true)
.expect("can change password")
};
// Make sure we got exactly what we asked for; no
// more, no less.
eprintln!(" Got:");
let mut changes = 0;
for got in got.keys() {
eprintln!(" {} {} encrypted secret key material",
got.fingerprint(),
if got.has_unencrypted_secret() {
"doesn't have"
} else {
"has"
});
let should_have_changed
= to_change.contains(&got.fingerprint());
if should_have_changed {
assert!(
! got.has_unencrypted_secret(),
"got unencrypted secret key material \
for a key whose password we changed ({})",
got.fingerprint());
changes += 1;
} else {
assert!(
got.has_unencrypted_secret(),
"didn't get encrypted secret key material \
for a key whose password we changed ({})",
got.fingerprint());
}
}
assert_eq!(changes, to_change.len());
check(&sq, &cert_file, &to_change, true);
}
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn unbound_subkey() {
// Make sure we can't delete an unbound subkey.
let sq = Sq::new();
let cert_path = sq.test_data()
.join("keys")
.join("unbound-subkey.pgp");
let cert = Cert::from_file(&cert_path).expect("can read");
let vc = cert.with_policy(STANDARD_POLICY, sq.now())
.expect("valid cert");
// One subkey should be considered invalid.
assert!(vc.keys().count() < cert.keys().count());
let unbound = "E992BF8BA7A27BB4FBB71D973857E47B14874045"
.parse::<KeyHandle>().expect("valid");
check(&sq, &cert_path, &[ unbound ], false);
}
#[test]
fn soft_revoked_subkey() {
// Make sure we can delete a soft revoked subkey.
let sq = Sq::new();
let cert_path = sq.test_data()
.join("keys")
.join("soft-revoked-subkey.pgp");
let cert = Cert::from_file(&cert_path).expect("can read");
let vc = cert.with_policy(STANDARD_POLICY, sq.now())
.expect("valid cert");
// Make sure the revoked key is there and is really revoked.
let mut revoked = None;
for k in vc.keys().subkeys() {
if let RevocationStatus::Revoked(_) = k.revocation_status() {
assert!(revoked.is_none(),
"Only expected a single revoked subkey");
revoked = Some(k.key_handle());
}
}
let revoked = if let Some(revoked) = revoked {
revoked
} else {
panic!("Expected a revoked subkey, but didn't fine one");
};
check(&sq, &cert_path, &[ revoked ], true);
}
#[test]
fn hard_revoked_subkey() {
// Make sure we can delete a hard revoked subkey.
let sq = Sq::new();
let cert_path = sq.test_data()
.join("keys")
.join("hard-revoked-subkey.pgp");
let cert = Cert::from_file(&cert_path).expect("can read");
let vc = cert.with_policy(STANDARD_POLICY, sq.now())
.expect("valid cert");
// Make sure the revoked key is there and is really revoked.
let mut revoked = None;
for k in vc.keys().subkeys() {
if let RevocationStatus::Revoked(_) = k.revocation_status() {
assert!(revoked.is_none(),
"Only expected a single revoked subkey");
revoked = Some(k.key_handle());
}
}
let revoked = if let Some(revoked) = revoked {
revoked
} else {
panic!("Expected a revoked subkey, but didn't fine one");
};
check(&sq, &cert_path, &[ revoked ], true);
}
#[test]
fn sha1_subkey() {
// Make sure we can delete a subkey that is bound using SHA-1.
let sq = Sq::new();
let cert_path = sq.test_data()
.join("keys")
.join("sha1-subkey-priv.pgp");
let cert = Cert::from_file(&cert_path).expect("can read");
let vc = cert.with_policy(STANDARD_POLICY, sq.now())
.expect("valid cert");
// Make sure the subkey key is there and really uses SHA-1.
let valid_subkeys: Vec<_> = vc.keys().subkeys()
.map(|ka| ka.fingerprint())
.collect();
let all_subkeys: Vec<_> = cert.keys().subkeys()
.map(|ka| ka.fingerprint())
.collect();
assert_eq!(valid_subkeys.len(), 0);
assert_eq!(all_subkeys.len(), 1);
let subkey = all_subkeys[0].clone();
check(&sq, &cert_path, &[ KeyHandle::from(subkey) ], true);
}