6688e0a6d7
- This makes it consistent with `sq pki link add` and all the other
commands that add components to certs.
- Fixes #433.
528 lines
17 KiB
Rust
528 lines
17 KiB
Rust
use super::common::NO_USERIDS;
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use super::common::Sq;
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use super::common::UserIDArg;
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#[test]
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fn sq_pki_link_authorize_then_authenticate() {
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let ca_example_org = "<ca@example.org>";
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for userids in &[
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&[UserIDArg::UserID(ca_example_org)][..],
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// Implicitly use all self-signed user IDs.
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NO_USERIDS,
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// Use a non-self signed user ID.
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&[UserIDArg::AddUserID("frank")],
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] {
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let mut sq = Sq::new();
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let (ca, ca_pgp, _ca_rev)
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= sq.key_generate(&[], &[ca_example_org]);
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sq.key_import(&ca_pgp);
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let alice_example_org = "<alice@example.org>";
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let (alice, alice_pgp, _alice_rev)
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= sq.key_generate(&[], &[alice_example_org]);
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sq.key_import(&alice_pgp);
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let bob_example_org = "<bob@example.org>";
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let bob_other_org = "<bob@other.org>";
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let (bob, bob_pgp, _bob_rev)
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= sq.key_generate(&[], &[bob_example_org, bob_other_org]);
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sq.key_import(&bob_pgp);
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sq.tick(1);
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// The ca certifies alice's and bob's certificates for each of
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// their user IDs.
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let certification = sq.scratch_file(None);
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sq.pki_vouch_add(
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&[],
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ca.key_handle(), alice.key_handle(),
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&[ alice_example_org ],
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certification.as_path());
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sq.cert_import(&certification);
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let certification = sq.scratch_file(None);
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sq.pki_vouch_add(
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&[],
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ca.key_handle(), bob.key_handle(),
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&[ bob_example_org, bob_other_org ],
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certification.as_path());
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sq.cert_import(certification);
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// Check whether we can authenticate alice's and bob's
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// certificates for their user ID.
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let check = |sq: &Sq,
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can_authenticate_alice,
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can_authenticate_bob1,
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can_authenticate_bob2|
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{
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for (cert, userid, can_authenticate) in &[
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(&alice, alice_example_org, can_authenticate_alice),
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(&bob, bob_example_org, can_authenticate_bob1),
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(&bob, bob_other_org, can_authenticate_bob2),
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]
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{
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let r = sq.pki_authenticate(
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&[],
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&cert.fingerprint().to_string(),
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userid);
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match (can_authenticate, r.is_ok()) {
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(true, false) => {
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panic!("Expected to authenticated {}, but didn't.",
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userid);
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}
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(false, true) => {
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panic!("Expected to NOT authenticated {}, but did.",
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userid);
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}
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_ => (),
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}
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}
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};
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// No delegation yet.
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println!("CA: not authorized");
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check(
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&sq,
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false, // Alice.
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false, // bob@example.org
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false);// bob@other.org
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// The user completely authorizes the CA.
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sq.tick(1);
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sq.pki_link_authorize(&["--unconstrained"],
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ca.key_handle(),
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userids);
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println!("CA: authorized, and unconstrained");
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check(
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&sq,
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true, // alice@example.org
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true, // bob@example.org
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true);// bob@other.org
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// The user authorizes the CA with the regex contraint "example".
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sq.tick(1);
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sq.pki_link_authorize(&["--regex", "example"],
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ca.key_handle(),
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userids);
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println!("CA: authorized for \"example\"");
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check(
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&sq,
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true, // alice@example.org
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true, // bob@example.org
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false);// bob@other.org
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// The user authorizes the CA with the domain contraint
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// "example.org".
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sq.tick(1);
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sq.pki_link_authorize(&["--domain", "example.org"],
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ca.key_handle(),
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userids);
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println!("CA: authorized for \"example.org\"");
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check(
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&sq,
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true, // alice@example.org
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true, // bob@example.org
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false);// bob@other.org
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// The user authorizes the CA with the regex contraint "other".
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sq.tick(1);
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sq.pki_link_authorize(&["--regex", "other"],
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ca.key_handle(),
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userids);
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println!("CA: authorized for \"other\"");
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check(
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&sq,
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false, // alice@example.org
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false, // bob@example.org
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true); // bob@other.org
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// The user authorizes the CA with the regex contraint "bob".
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sq.tick(1);
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sq.pki_link_authorize(&["--regex", "bob"],
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ca.key_handle(),
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userids);
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println!("CA: authorized for \"bob\"");
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check(
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&sq,
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false, // alice@example.org
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true, // bob@example.org
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true); // bob@other.org
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// The user authorizes the CA with the regex contraint "bob" or
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// "alice".
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sq.tick(1);
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sq.pki_link_authorize(&["--regex", "bob",
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"--regex", "alice"],
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ca.key_handle(),
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userids);
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println!("CA: authorized for \"bob\" or \"alice\"");
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check(
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&sq,
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true, // alice@example.org
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true, // bob@example.org
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true);// bob@other.org
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// The user authorizes the CA for the domains example.org and
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// other.org.
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sq.tick(1);
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sq.pki_link_authorize(&["--domain", "example.org",
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"--domain", "other.org"],
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ca.key_handle(),
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userids);
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println!("CA: authorized for the domains example.org and other.org");
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check(
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&sq,
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true, // alice@example.org
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true, // bob@example.org
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true);// bob@other.org
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// The user authorizes the CA for the domain example.com and the
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// regex alice.
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sq.tick(1);
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sq.pki_link_authorize(&["--domain", "other.org",
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"--regex", "alice"],
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ca.key_handle(),
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userids);
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println!("CA: authorized for the domains example.org and other.org");
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check(
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&sq,
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true, // alice@example.org
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false, // bob@example.org
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true); // bob@other.org
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// The user authorizes the CA with the regex contraint "zoo".
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sq.tick(1);
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sq.pki_link_authorize(&["--regex", "zoo"],
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ca.key_handle(),
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userids);
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println!("CA: authorized for \"zoo\"");
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check(
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&sq,
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false, // alice@example.org
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false, // bob@example.org
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false);// bob@other.org
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// The user authorizes the CA with the domain contraint "example".
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sq.tick(1);
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sq.pki_link_authorize(&["--domain", "example"],
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ca.key_handle(),
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userids);
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println!("CA: authorized for \"zoo\"");
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check(
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&sq,
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false, // alice@example.org
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false, // bob@example.org
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false);// bob@other.org
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}
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}
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#[test]
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fn retract_explicit() {
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// Authorize a CA via multiple user IDs. Retract one
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// authorization at a time. Make sure the CA remains a trusted
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// introducer until all authorizations are retracted.
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let ca_example_org = "<ca@example.org>";
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let ca_example_com = "<ca@example.com>";
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let self_signed_userids = &[ca_example_org, ca_example_com][..];
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// When authorizing the CA we can either authorize implicitly
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// (i.e., all self-signed user IDs) or explicitly. Try both.
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for implicit_all in [true, false] {
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eprintln!("implicit all = {}", implicit_all);
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let mut sq = Sq::new();
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let (ca, ca_pgp, _ca_rev)
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= sq.key_generate(&[], self_signed_userids);
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sq.key_import(&ca_pgp);
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let alice_example_org = "<alice@example.org>";
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let (alice, alice_pgp, _alice_rev)
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= sq.key_generate(&[], &[alice_example_org]);
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sq.key_import(&alice_pgp);
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sq.tick(1);
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// The ca certifies alice's certificate
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let certification = sq.scratch_file(None);
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sq.pki_vouch_add(&[],
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ca.key_handle(), alice.key_handle(),
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&[ alice_example_org ],
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certification.as_path());
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sq.cert_import(&certification);
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let check = |sq: &Sq, can_authenticate: bool| {
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let r = sq.pki_authenticate(
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&[],
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&alice.fingerprint().to_string(),
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alice_example_org);
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match (can_authenticate, r.is_ok()) {
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(true, false) => {
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panic!("Expected to authenticated {}, but didn't.",
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alice_example_org);
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}
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(false, true) => {
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panic!("Expected to NOT authenticated {}, but did.",
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alice_example_org);
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}
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_ => (),
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}
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};
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// The ca is not yet authorized so we shouldn't be able to
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// authenticate alice.
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check(&sq, false);
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// Authorize via all user IDs.
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sq.tick(1);
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let userids = self_signed_userids;
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sq.pki_link_authorize(&["--unconstrained"],
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ca.key_handle(),
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if implicit_all {
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&[]
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} else {
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userids
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});
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check(&sq, true);
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for (i, userid) in userids.iter().enumerate() {
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// Retract the authorization of one user ID. It should
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// still be a trusted introducer.
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sq.tick(1);
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sq.pki_link_retract(&[], ca.key_handle(), &[userid]);
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if i == userids.len() - 1 {
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// We've retracted all authorizations. This should
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// now fail.
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check(&sq, false);
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} else {
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check(&sq, true);
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}
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}
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}
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}
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#[test]
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fn retract_non_self_signed() {
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// Make sure we can retract non-self-signed user IDs.
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let self_signed = "<ca@example.org>";
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let non_self_signed = "<ca@example.com>";
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let mut sq = Sq::new();
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let (ca, ca_pgp, _ca_rev)
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= sq.key_generate(&[], &[self_signed]);
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sq.key_import(&ca_pgp);
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let alice_example_org = "<alice@example.org>";
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let (alice, alice_pgp, _alice_rev)
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= sq.key_generate(&[], &[alice_example_org]);
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sq.key_import(&alice_pgp);
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sq.tick(1);
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// The ca certifies alice's certificate
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let certification = sq.scratch_file(None);
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sq.pki_vouch_add(&[],
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ca.key_handle(), alice.key_handle(),
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&[ alice_example_org ],
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certification.as_path());
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sq.cert_import(&certification);
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let check = |sq: &Sq, can_authenticate: bool| {
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let r = sq.pki_authenticate(
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&[],
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&alice.fingerprint().to_string(),
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alice_example_org);
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match (can_authenticate, r.is_ok()) {
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(true, false) => {
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panic!("Expected to authenticated {}, but didn't.",
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alice_example_org);
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}
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(false, true) => {
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panic!("Expected to NOT authenticated {}, but did.",
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alice_example_org);
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}
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_ => (),
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}
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};
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// The ca is not yet authorized so we shouldn't be able to
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// authenticate alice.
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check(&sq, false);
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// Authorize the CA via a non-self-signed user ID. Now we can
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// authenticate alice.
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sq.tick(1);
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sq.pki_link_authorize(&["--unconstrained"],
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ca.key_handle(),
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&[UserIDArg::AddUserID(non_self_signed)]);
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check(&sq, true);
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// Retract the authorization. It should no longer be considered a
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// trusted introducer.
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sq.tick(1);
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sq.pki_link_retract(&[], ca.key_handle(), &[non_self_signed]);
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check(&sq, false);
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}
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#[test]
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fn retract_all() {
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// Link all self-signed user IDs and a non-self-signed user ID.
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// When we retract all, make sure they are all retracted.
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let self_signed = "<ca@example.org>";
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let non_self_signed = "<ca@example.com>";
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let mut sq = Sq::new();
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let (ca, ca_pgp, _ca_rev)
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= sq.key_generate(&[], &[self_signed]);
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sq.key_import(&ca_pgp);
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let alice_example_org = "<alice@example.org>";
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let (alice, alice_pgp, _alice_rev)
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= sq.key_generate(&[], &[alice_example_org]);
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sq.key_import(&alice_pgp);
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sq.tick(1);
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// The ca certifies alice's certificate
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let certification = sq.scratch_file(None);
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sq.pki_vouch_add(&[],
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ca.key_handle(), alice.key_handle(),
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&[ alice_example_org ],
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certification.as_path());
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sq.cert_import(&certification);
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let check = |sq: &Sq, can_authenticate: bool| {
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let r = sq.pki_authenticate(
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&[],
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&alice.fingerprint().to_string(),
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alice_example_org);
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match (can_authenticate, r.is_ok()) {
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(true, false) => {
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panic!("Expected to authenticated {}, but didn't.",
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alice_example_org);
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}
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(false, true) => {
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panic!("Expected to NOT authenticated {}, but did.",
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alice_example_org);
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}
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_ => (),
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}
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};
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// The ca is not yet authorized so we shouldn't be able to
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// authenticate alice.
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check(&sq, false);
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// Authorize the CA via a non-self-signed user ID. Now we can
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// authenticate alice.
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sq.tick(1);
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sq.pki_link_authorize(&["--unconstrained"],
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ca.key_handle(),
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&[UserIDArg::UserID(self_signed),
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UserIDArg::AddUserID(non_self_signed)]);
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check(&sq, true);
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// Retract all authorizations. It should no longer be considered
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// a trusted introducer.
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sq.tick(1);
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sq.pki_link_retract(&[], ca.key_handle(), NO_USERIDS);
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check(&sq, false);
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}
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#[test]
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fn sq_pki_link_all_revoked() {
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// When we don't provide any user IDs, `sq pki link authorize`
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// certifies all of the self signed user IDs. Make sure this
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// works in the presence of a revoked user ID, which should be
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// ignored.
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let mut sq = Sq::new();
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let ca_example_org = "<ca@example.org>";
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let ca_example_com = "<ca@example.com>";
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let (ca, ca_pgp, _ca_rev)
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= sq.key_generate(&[], &[ca_example_org, ca_example_com]);
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sq.key_import(&ca_pgp);
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// Revoke ca@example.com.
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sq.tick(1);
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let revocation = sq.scratch_file("revocation");
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sq.key_userid_revoke(&[], ca.fingerprint(), ca_example_com,
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"retired", "bye", Some(revocation.as_path()));
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sq.cert_import(&revocation);
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let alice_example_org = "<alice@example.org>";
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let (alice, alice_pgp, _alice_rev)
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= sq.key_generate(&[], &[alice_example_org]);
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sq.key_import(&alice_pgp);
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sq.tick(1);
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// The ca certifies alice's certificate.
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let certification = sq.scratch_file(None);
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sq.pki_vouch_add(
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&[],
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ca.key_handle(), alice.key_handle(),
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&[ alice_example_org ],
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certification.as_path());
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sq.cert_import(&certification);
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// Check whether we can authenticate alice's and bob's
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// certificates for their user ID using otto as the trust root.
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let check = |sq: &Sq, can_authenticate|
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{
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let r = sq.pki_authenticate(
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&[],
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&alice.fingerprint().to_string(),
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alice_example_org);
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match (can_authenticate, r.is_ok()) {
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(true, false) => {
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panic!("Expected to authenticated {}, but didn't.",
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alice_example_org);
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}
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(false, true) => {
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panic!("Expected to NOT authenticated {}, but did.",
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alice_example_org);
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}
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_ => (),
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}
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};
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// No delegation yet.
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println!("CA: not authorized");
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check(&sq, false);
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// The user completely authorizes the CA. Note: we don't specify
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// any user IDs so only valid self-signed user IDs should be used.
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// That means the revoked user ID should be skipped.
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sq.tick(1);
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sq.pki_link_authorize(&["--unconstrained"],
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ca.key_handle(), NO_USERIDS);
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println!("CA: authorized, and unconstrained");
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check(&sq, true);
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}
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