sequoia-sq/tests/sq-key-subkey.rs
Justus Winter dc24306af1
Emit partial TPKs as revocation certificates.
- When emitting revocation certificates, emit the revocation
    signature with enough context so that it is a well-formed TPK,
    i.e. include the primary key, the component to be revoked (if
    revoking a user ID or subkey), and the revocation signature.

  - Having a partial TPK instead of a bare revocation makes handling
    it much easier, as it can be stored and transported like any
    cert.  It also gives the recipient of the certificate more
    context, and simplifies merging it into a database of certs.

  - Previously, there was a bug in sq where we would emit secret key
    material when emitting revocation certificates.  The reason for
    that was that the certificate was first converted to a packet
    stream, and then each packet serialized.  In contrast, if a
    Cert is serialized, no secrets are emitted unless the
    programmer opts in.  In a way, this is the more comprehensive fix
    for the problem, as it leverages sequoia-openpgp's mechanisms to
    protect secret key material.

  - See #160.
2023-12-11 15:48:06 +01:00

517 lines
16 KiB
Rust

use assert_cmd::Command;
use chrono::Duration;
use openpgp::packet::Key;
use openpgp::parse::Parse;
use openpgp::types::ReasonForRevocation;
use openpgp::types::RevocationStatus;
use openpgp::types::SignatureType;
use openpgp::Cert;
use openpgp::Result;
use sequoia_openpgp as openpgp;
mod common;
use common::compare_notations;
use common::sq_key_generate;
use common::STANDARD_POLICY;
#[test]
fn sq_key_subkey_generate_authentication_subkey() -> Result<()> {
let (tmpdir, path, _) = sq_key_generate(None).unwrap();
let output = path.parent().unwrap().join("new_key.pgp");
let mut cmd = Command::cargo_bin("sq")?;
cmd.args([
"--no-cert-store",
"key",
"subkey",
"add",
"--output",
&output.to_string_lossy(),
"--can-authenticate",
&path.to_string_lossy(),
]);
cmd.assert().success();
let cert = Cert::from_file(&output)?;
let valid_cert = cert.with_policy(STANDARD_POLICY, None)?;
assert_eq!(
valid_cert.keys().filter(|x| x.for_authentication()).count(),
2
);
tmpdir.close()?;
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn sq_key_subkey_generate_encryption_subkey() -> Result<()> {
let (tmpdir, path, _) = sq_key_generate(None).unwrap();
let output = path.parent().unwrap().join("new_key.pgp");
let mut cmd = Command::cargo_bin("sq")?;
cmd.args([
"--no-cert-store",
"key",
"subkey",
"add",
"--output",
&output.to_string_lossy(),
"--can-encrypt=universal",
&path.to_string_lossy(),
]);
cmd.assert().success();
let cert = Cert::from_file(&output)?;
let valid_cert = cert.with_policy(STANDARD_POLICY, None)?;
assert_eq!(
valid_cert
.keys()
.filter(|x| x.for_storage_encryption())
.count(),
2
);
assert_eq!(
valid_cert
.keys()
.filter(|x| x.for_transport_encryption())
.count(),
2
);
tmpdir.close()?;
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn sq_key_subkey_generate_signing_subkey() -> Result<()> {
let (tmpdir, path, _) = sq_key_generate(None).unwrap();
let output = path.parent().unwrap().join("new_key.pgp");
let mut cmd = Command::cargo_bin("sq")?;
cmd.args([
"--no-cert-store",
"key",
"subkey",
"add",
"--output",
&output.to_string_lossy(),
"--can-sign",
&path.to_string_lossy(),
]);
cmd.assert().success();
let cert = Cert::from_file(&output)?;
let valid_cert = cert.with_policy(STANDARD_POLICY, None)?;
assert_eq!(valid_cert.keys().filter(|x| x.for_signing()).count(), 2);
tmpdir.close()?;
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn sq_key_subkey_revoke() -> Result<()> {
let (tmpdir, path, time) = sq_key_generate(None)?;
let cert = Cert::from_file(&path)?;
let valid_cert = cert.with_policy(STANDARD_POLICY, Some(time.into()))?;
let fingerprint = valid_cert.clone().fingerprint();
let subkey: Key<_, _> = valid_cert
.with_policy(STANDARD_POLICY, Some(time.into()))
.unwrap()
.keys()
.subkeys()
.nth(0)
.unwrap()
.key()
.clone();
let subkey_fingerprint = subkey.fingerprint();
let message = "message";
// revoke for various reasons, with or without notations added, or with
// a revocation whose reference time is one hour after the creation of the
// certificate
for (reason, reason_str, notations, revocation_time) in [
(
ReasonForRevocation::KeyCompromised,
"compromised",
None,
None,
),
(
ReasonForRevocation::KeyCompromised,
"compromised",
None,
Some(time + Duration::hours(1)),
),
(
ReasonForRevocation::KeyCompromised,
"compromised",
Some(&[("foo", "bar"), ("hallo@sequoia-pgp.org", "VALUE")]),
None,
),
(ReasonForRevocation::KeyRetired, "retired", None, None),
(
ReasonForRevocation::KeyRetired,
"retired",
None,
Some(time + Duration::hours(1)),
),
(
ReasonForRevocation::KeyRetired,
"retired",
Some(&[("foo", "bar"), ("hallo@sequoia-pgp.org", "VALUE")]),
None,
),
(ReasonForRevocation::KeySuperseded, "superseded", None, None),
(
ReasonForRevocation::KeySuperseded,
"superseded",
None,
Some(time + Duration::hours(1)),
),
(
ReasonForRevocation::KeySuperseded,
"superseded",
Some(&[("foo", "bar"), ("hallo@sequoia-pgp.org", "VALUE")]),
None,
),
(ReasonForRevocation::Unspecified, "unspecified", None, None),
(
ReasonForRevocation::Unspecified,
"unspecified",
None,
Some(time + Duration::hours(1)),
),
(
ReasonForRevocation::Unspecified,
"unspecified",
Some(&[("foo", "bar"), ("hallo@sequoia-pgp.org", "VALUE")]),
None,
),
] {
let revocation = &path.parent().unwrap().join(format!(
"revocation_{}_{}_{}.rev",
reason_str,
if notations.is_some() {
"notations"
} else {
"no_notations"
},
if revocation_time.is_some() {
"time"
} else {
"no_time"
}
));
let mut cmd = Command::cargo_bin("sq")?;
cmd.args([
"--no-cert-store",
"key",
"subkey",
"revoke",
"--output",
&revocation.to_string_lossy(),
"--certificate-file",
&path.to_string_lossy(),
&subkey_fingerprint.to_string(),
reason_str,
message,
]);
if let Some(notations) = notations {
for (k, v) in notations {
cmd.args(["--notation", k, v]);
}
}
if let Some(time) = revocation_time {
cmd.args([
"--time",
&time.format("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ").to_string(),
]);
}
let output = cmd.output()?;
if !output.status.success() {
panic!("sq exited with non-zero status code: {:?}", output.stderr);
}
// whether we found a revocation signature
let mut found_revoked = false;
// read revocation cert
let rev = Cert::from_file(&revocation)?;
assert!(! rev.is_tsk());
// and merge it into the certificate.
let cert = cert.clone().merge_public(rev)?;
let valid_cert =
cert.with_policy(STANDARD_POLICY, revocation_time.map(Into::into))?;
valid_cert
.with_policy(STANDARD_POLICY, revocation_time.map(Into::into))
.unwrap()
.keys()
.subkeys()
.for_each(|x| {
if x.fingerprint() == subkey_fingerprint {
let status = x.revocation_status(
STANDARD_POLICY,
revocation_time.map(Into::into),
);
// the subkey is revoked
assert!(matches!(status, RevocationStatus::Revoked(_)));
if let RevocationStatus::Revoked(sigs) = status {
// there is only one signature packet
assert_eq!(sigs.len(), 1);
let sig = sigs.into_iter().next().unwrap();
// it is a subkey revocation
assert_eq!(sig.typ(), SignatureType::SubkeyRevocation);
// the issuer is the certificate owner
assert_eq!(
sig.get_issuers().into_iter().next().as_ref(),
Some(&fingerprint.clone().into())
);
// our reason for revocation and message matches
assert_eq!(
sig.reason_for_revocation(),
Some((reason, message.as_bytes()))
);
// the notations of the revocation match the ones
// we passed in
assert!(compare_notations(sig, notations).is_ok());
found_revoked = true;
}
}
});
if !found_revoked {
panic!("the revoked subkey is not found in the revocation cert");
}
}
tmpdir.close()?;
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn sq_key_subkey_revoke_thirdparty() -> Result<()> {
let (tmpdir, path, time) = sq_key_generate(None)?;
let (thirdparty_tmpdir, thirdparty_path, thirdparty_time) =
sq_key_generate(Some(&["bob <bob@example.org"]))?;
let cert = Cert::from_file(&path)?;
let valid_cert = cert.with_policy(STANDARD_POLICY, Some(time.into()))?;
let subkey: Key<_, _> = valid_cert
.with_policy(STANDARD_POLICY, Some(time.into()))
.unwrap()
.keys()
.subkeys()
.nth(0)
.unwrap()
.key()
.clone();
let subkey_fingerprint = subkey.fingerprint();
let thirdparty_cert = Cert::from_file(&thirdparty_path)?;
let thirdparty_valid_cert = thirdparty_cert
.with_policy(STANDARD_POLICY, Some(thirdparty_time.into()))?;
let thirdparty_fingerprint = thirdparty_valid_cert.clone().fingerprint();
let message = "message";
// revoke for various reasons, with or without notations added, or with
// a revocation whose reference time is one hour after the creation of the
// certificate
for (reason, reason_str, notations, revocation_time) in [
(
ReasonForRevocation::KeyCompromised,
"compromised",
None,
None,
),
(
ReasonForRevocation::KeyCompromised,
"compromised",
None,
Some(thirdparty_time + Duration::hours(1)),
),
(
ReasonForRevocation::KeyCompromised,
"compromised",
Some(&[("foo", "bar"), ("hallo@sequoia-pgp.org", "VALUE")]),
None,
),
(ReasonForRevocation::KeyRetired, "retired", None, None),
(
ReasonForRevocation::KeyRetired,
"retired",
None,
Some(thirdparty_time + Duration::hours(1)),
),
(
ReasonForRevocation::KeyRetired,
"retired",
Some(&[("foo", "bar"), ("hallo@sequoia-pgp.org", "VALUE")]),
None,
),
(ReasonForRevocation::KeySuperseded, "superseded", None, None),
(
ReasonForRevocation::KeySuperseded,
"superseded",
None,
Some(thirdparty_time + Duration::hours(1)),
),
(
ReasonForRevocation::KeySuperseded,
"superseded",
Some(&[("foo", "bar"), ("hallo@sequoia-pgp.org", "VALUE")]),
None,
),
(ReasonForRevocation::Unspecified, "unspecified", None, None),
(
ReasonForRevocation::Unspecified,
"unspecified",
None,
Some(thirdparty_time + Duration::hours(1)),
),
(
ReasonForRevocation::Unspecified,
"unspecified",
Some(&[("foo", "bar"), ("hallo@sequoia-pgp.org", "VALUE")]),
None,
),
] {
let revocation = &path.parent().unwrap().join(format!(
"revocation_{}_{}_{}.rev",
reason_str,
if notations.is_some() {
"notations"
} else {
"no_notations"
},
if revocation_time.is_some() {
"time"
} else {
"no_time"
}
));
let mut cmd = Command::cargo_bin("sq")?;
cmd.args([
"--no-cert-store",
"key",
"subkey",
"revoke",
"--output",
&revocation.to_string_lossy(),
"--certificate-file",
&path.to_string_lossy(),
"--revocation-file",
&thirdparty_path.to_string_lossy(),
&subkey_fingerprint.to_string(),
reason_str,
message,
]);
if let Some(notations) = notations {
for (k, v) in notations {
cmd.args(["--notation", k, v]);
}
}
if let Some(time) = revocation_time {
cmd.args([
"--time",
&time.format("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ").to_string(),
]);
}
let output = cmd.output()?;
if !output.status.success() {
panic!("sq exited with non-zero status code: {:?}", output.stderr);
}
// whether we found a revocation signature
let mut found_revoked = false;
// read revocation cert
let rev = Cert::from_file(&revocation)?;
assert!(! rev.is_tsk());
// and merge it into the certificate.
let cert = cert.clone().merge_public(rev)?;
let valid_cert =
cert.with_policy(STANDARD_POLICY, revocation_time.map(Into::into))?;
assert_eq!(valid_cert.userids().count(), 1);
valid_cert
.with_policy(STANDARD_POLICY, revocation_time.map(Into::into))
.unwrap()
.keys()
.subkeys()
.for_each(|x| {
if x.fingerprint() == subkey_fingerprint {
if let RevocationStatus::CouldBe(sigs) = x
.revocation_status(
STANDARD_POLICY,
revocation_time.map(Into::into),
)
{
// there is only one signature packet
assert_eq!(sigs.len(), 1);
let sig = sigs.into_iter().next().unwrap();
// it is a subkey revocation
assert_eq!(sig.typ(), SignatureType::SubkeyRevocation);
// the issuer is a thirdparty revoker
assert_eq!(
sig.get_issuers().into_iter().next().as_ref(),
Some(&thirdparty_fingerprint.clone().into())
);
// the revocation can be verified
if sig
.clone()
.verify_subkey_revocation(
&thirdparty_cert.primary_key(),
&cert.primary_key(),
&subkey,
)
.is_err()
{
panic!("revocation is not valid")
}
// our reason for revocation and message matches
assert_eq!(
sig.reason_for_revocation(),
Some((reason, message.as_bytes()))
);
// the notations of the revocation match the ones
// we passed in
assert!(compare_notations(sig, notations).is_ok());
found_revoked = true;
} else {
panic!("there are no signatures in {:?}", x);
}
}
});
if !found_revoked {
panic!("the revoked subkey is not found in the revocation cert");
}
}
tmpdir.close()?;
thirdparty_tmpdir.close()?;
Ok(())
}