datastore: drop bogus chunk size check, can cause trouble
other sizes can happen in legitimate and illegitimate ways: - illegitimate: encryped chunks and bad actor client - legitimate: same chunk but newer zstd version (or compression level) can compress it better (or worse) so the Ideally we could take the actual smaller chunk so that improved zstd tech gets leveraged, but we could only allow to do that for un-encrypted ones. Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
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@ -452,10 +452,12 @@ impl ChunkStore {
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} else if old_size == 0 {
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log::warn!("found empty chunk '{digest_str}' in store {name}, overwriting");
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} else {
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bail!(
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"found chunk size mismatch for '{digest_str}': old {old_size} - new \
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{encoded_size}"
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);
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// other sizes can happen in legitimate and illegitimate ways:
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// - illegitimate: encryped chunks and bad actor client
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// - legitimate: same chunk but newer zstd version (or compression level) can
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// compress it better (or worse) so the
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// Ideally we could take the actual smaller chunk so that improved zstd tech gets
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// leveraged, but we could only allow to do that for un-encrypted ones.
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}
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}
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