License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 17:07:57 +03:00
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
2007-07-09 22:56:42 +04:00
#
# Generic algorithms support
#
config XOR_BLOCKS
tristate
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
#
async_tx: add the async_tx api
The async_tx api provides methods for describing a chain of asynchronous
bulk memory transfers/transforms with support for inter-transactional
dependencies. It is implemented as a dmaengine client that smooths over
the details of different hardware offload engine implementations. Code
that is written to the api can optimize for asynchronous operation and the
api will fit the chain of operations to the available offload resources.
I imagine that any piece of ADMA hardware would register with the
'async_*' subsystem, and a call to async_X would be routed as
appropriate, or be run in-line. - Neil Brown
async_tx exploits the capabilities of struct dma_async_tx_descriptor to
provide an api of the following general format:
struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *
async_<operation>(..., struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *depend_tx,
dma_async_tx_callback cb_fn, void *cb_param)
{
struct dma_chan *chan = async_tx_find_channel(depend_tx, <operation>);
struct dma_device *device = chan ? chan->device : NULL;
int int_en = cb_fn ? 1 : 0;
struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *tx = device ?
device->device_prep_dma_<operation>(chan, len, int_en) : NULL;
if (tx) { /* run <operation> asynchronously */
...
tx->tx_set_dest(addr, tx, index);
...
tx->tx_set_src(addr, tx, index);
...
async_tx_submit(chan, tx, flags, depend_tx, cb_fn, cb_param);
} else { /* run <operation> synchronously */
...
<operation>
...
async_tx_sync_epilog(flags, depend_tx, cb_fn, cb_param);
}
return tx;
}
async_tx_find_channel() returns a capable channel from its pool. The
channel pool is organized as a per-cpu array of channel pointers. The
async_tx_rebalance() routine is tasked with managing these arrays. In the
uniprocessor case async_tx_rebalance() tries to spread responsibility
evenly over channels of similar capabilities. For example if there are two
copy+xor channels, one will handle copy operations and the other will
handle xor. In the SMP case async_tx_rebalance() attempts to spread the
operations evenly over the cpus, e.g. cpu0 gets copy channel0 and xor
channel0 while cpu1 gets copy channel 1 and xor channel 1. When a
dependency is specified async_tx_find_channel defaults to keeping the
operation on the same channel. A xor->copy->xor chain will stay on one
channel if it supports both operation types, otherwise the transaction will
transition between a copy and a xor resource.
Currently the raid5 implementation in the MD raid456 driver has been
converted to the async_tx api. A driver for the offload engines on the
Intel Xscale series of I/O processors, iop-adma, is provided in a later
commit. With the iop-adma driver and async_tx, raid456 is able to offload
copy, xor, and xor-zero-sum operations to hardware engines.
On iop342 tiobench showed higher throughput for sequential writes (20 - 30%
improvement) and sequential reads to a degraded array (40 - 55%
improvement). For the other cases performance was roughly equal, +/- a few
percentage points. On a x86-smp platform the performance of the async_tx
implementation (in synchronous mode) was also +/- a few percentage points
of the original implementation. According to 'top' on iop342 CPU
utilization drops from ~50% to ~15% during a 'resync' while the speed
according to /proc/mdstat doubles from ~25 MB/s to ~50 MB/s.
The tiobench command line used for testing was: tiobench --size 2048
--block 4096 --block 131072 --dir /mnt/raid --numruns 5
* iop342 had 1GB of memory available
Details:
* if CONFIG_DMA_ENGINE=n the asynchronous path is compiled away by making
async_tx_find_channel a static inline routine that always returns NULL
* when a callback is specified for a given transaction an interrupt will
fire at operation completion time and the callback will occur in a
tasklet. if the the channel does not support interrupts then a live
polling wait will be performed
* the api is written as a dmaengine client that requests all available
channels
* In support of dependencies the api implicitly schedules channel-switch
interrupts. The interrupt triggers the cleanup tasklet which causes
pending operations to be scheduled on the next channel
* Xor engines treat an xor destination address differently than a software
xor routine. To the software routine the destination address is an implied
source, whereas engines treat it as a write-only destination. This patch
modifies the xor_blocks routine to take a an explicit destination address
to mirror the hardware.
Changelog:
* fixed a leftover debug print
* don't allow callbacks in async_interrupt_cond
* fixed xor_block changes
* fixed usage of ASYNC_TX_XOR_DROP_DEST
* drop dma mapping methods, suggested by Chris Leech
* printk warning fixups from Andrew Morton
* don't use inline in C files, Adrian Bunk
* select the API when MD is enabled
* BUG_ON xor source counts <= 1
* implicitly handle hardware concerns like channel switching and
interrupts, Neil Brown
* remove the per operation type list, and distribute operation capabilities
evenly amongst the available channels
* simplify async_tx_find_channel to optimize the fast path
* introduce the channel_table_initialized flag to prevent early calls to
the api
* reorganize the code to mimic crypto
* include mm.h as not all archs include it in dma-mapping.h
* make the Kconfig options non-user visible, Adrian Bunk
* move async_tx under crypto since it is meant as 'core' functionality, and
the two may share algorithms in the future
* move large inline functions into c files
* checkpatch.pl fixes
* gpl v2 only correction
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Acked-By: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
2007-01-02 21:10:44 +03:00
# async_tx api: hardware offloaded memory transfer/transform support
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
#
async_tx: add the async_tx api
The async_tx api provides methods for describing a chain of asynchronous
bulk memory transfers/transforms with support for inter-transactional
dependencies. It is implemented as a dmaengine client that smooths over
the details of different hardware offload engine implementations. Code
that is written to the api can optimize for asynchronous operation and the
api will fit the chain of operations to the available offload resources.
I imagine that any piece of ADMA hardware would register with the
'async_*' subsystem, and a call to async_X would be routed as
appropriate, or be run in-line. - Neil Brown
async_tx exploits the capabilities of struct dma_async_tx_descriptor to
provide an api of the following general format:
struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *
async_<operation>(..., struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *depend_tx,
dma_async_tx_callback cb_fn, void *cb_param)
{
struct dma_chan *chan = async_tx_find_channel(depend_tx, <operation>);
struct dma_device *device = chan ? chan->device : NULL;
int int_en = cb_fn ? 1 : 0;
struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *tx = device ?
device->device_prep_dma_<operation>(chan, len, int_en) : NULL;
if (tx) { /* run <operation> asynchronously */
...
tx->tx_set_dest(addr, tx, index);
...
tx->tx_set_src(addr, tx, index);
...
async_tx_submit(chan, tx, flags, depend_tx, cb_fn, cb_param);
} else { /* run <operation> synchronously */
...
<operation>
...
async_tx_sync_epilog(flags, depend_tx, cb_fn, cb_param);
}
return tx;
}
async_tx_find_channel() returns a capable channel from its pool. The
channel pool is organized as a per-cpu array of channel pointers. The
async_tx_rebalance() routine is tasked with managing these arrays. In the
uniprocessor case async_tx_rebalance() tries to spread responsibility
evenly over channels of similar capabilities. For example if there are two
copy+xor channels, one will handle copy operations and the other will
handle xor. In the SMP case async_tx_rebalance() attempts to spread the
operations evenly over the cpus, e.g. cpu0 gets copy channel0 and xor
channel0 while cpu1 gets copy channel 1 and xor channel 1. When a
dependency is specified async_tx_find_channel defaults to keeping the
operation on the same channel. A xor->copy->xor chain will stay on one
channel if it supports both operation types, otherwise the transaction will
transition between a copy and a xor resource.
Currently the raid5 implementation in the MD raid456 driver has been
converted to the async_tx api. A driver for the offload engines on the
Intel Xscale series of I/O processors, iop-adma, is provided in a later
commit. With the iop-adma driver and async_tx, raid456 is able to offload
copy, xor, and xor-zero-sum operations to hardware engines.
On iop342 tiobench showed higher throughput for sequential writes (20 - 30%
improvement) and sequential reads to a degraded array (40 - 55%
improvement). For the other cases performance was roughly equal, +/- a few
percentage points. On a x86-smp platform the performance of the async_tx
implementation (in synchronous mode) was also +/- a few percentage points
of the original implementation. According to 'top' on iop342 CPU
utilization drops from ~50% to ~15% during a 'resync' while the speed
according to /proc/mdstat doubles from ~25 MB/s to ~50 MB/s.
The tiobench command line used for testing was: tiobench --size 2048
--block 4096 --block 131072 --dir /mnt/raid --numruns 5
* iop342 had 1GB of memory available
Details:
* if CONFIG_DMA_ENGINE=n the asynchronous path is compiled away by making
async_tx_find_channel a static inline routine that always returns NULL
* when a callback is specified for a given transaction an interrupt will
fire at operation completion time and the callback will occur in a
tasklet. if the the channel does not support interrupts then a live
polling wait will be performed
* the api is written as a dmaengine client that requests all available
channels
* In support of dependencies the api implicitly schedules channel-switch
interrupts. The interrupt triggers the cleanup tasklet which causes
pending operations to be scheduled on the next channel
* Xor engines treat an xor destination address differently than a software
xor routine. To the software routine the destination address is an implied
source, whereas engines treat it as a write-only destination. This patch
modifies the xor_blocks routine to take a an explicit destination address
to mirror the hardware.
Changelog:
* fixed a leftover debug print
* don't allow callbacks in async_interrupt_cond
* fixed xor_block changes
* fixed usage of ASYNC_TX_XOR_DROP_DEST
* drop dma mapping methods, suggested by Chris Leech
* printk warning fixups from Andrew Morton
* don't use inline in C files, Adrian Bunk
* select the API when MD is enabled
* BUG_ON xor source counts <= 1
* implicitly handle hardware concerns like channel switching and
interrupts, Neil Brown
* remove the per operation type list, and distribute operation capabilities
evenly amongst the available channels
* simplify async_tx_find_channel to optimize the fast path
* introduce the channel_table_initialized flag to prevent early calls to
the api
* reorganize the code to mimic crypto
* include mm.h as not all archs include it in dma-mapping.h
* make the Kconfig options non-user visible, Adrian Bunk
* move async_tx under crypto since it is meant as 'core' functionality, and
the two may share algorithms in the future
* move large inline functions into c files
* checkpatch.pl fixes
* gpl v2 only correction
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Acked-By: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
2007-01-02 21:10:44 +03:00
source "crypto/async_tx/Kconfig"
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
async_tx: add the async_tx api
The async_tx api provides methods for describing a chain of asynchronous
bulk memory transfers/transforms with support for inter-transactional
dependencies. It is implemented as a dmaengine client that smooths over
the details of different hardware offload engine implementations. Code
that is written to the api can optimize for asynchronous operation and the
api will fit the chain of operations to the available offload resources.
I imagine that any piece of ADMA hardware would register with the
'async_*' subsystem, and a call to async_X would be routed as
appropriate, or be run in-line. - Neil Brown
async_tx exploits the capabilities of struct dma_async_tx_descriptor to
provide an api of the following general format:
struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *
async_<operation>(..., struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *depend_tx,
dma_async_tx_callback cb_fn, void *cb_param)
{
struct dma_chan *chan = async_tx_find_channel(depend_tx, <operation>);
struct dma_device *device = chan ? chan->device : NULL;
int int_en = cb_fn ? 1 : 0;
struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *tx = device ?
device->device_prep_dma_<operation>(chan, len, int_en) : NULL;
if (tx) { /* run <operation> asynchronously */
...
tx->tx_set_dest(addr, tx, index);
...
tx->tx_set_src(addr, tx, index);
...
async_tx_submit(chan, tx, flags, depend_tx, cb_fn, cb_param);
} else { /* run <operation> synchronously */
...
<operation>
...
async_tx_sync_epilog(flags, depend_tx, cb_fn, cb_param);
}
return tx;
}
async_tx_find_channel() returns a capable channel from its pool. The
channel pool is organized as a per-cpu array of channel pointers. The
async_tx_rebalance() routine is tasked with managing these arrays. In the
uniprocessor case async_tx_rebalance() tries to spread responsibility
evenly over channels of similar capabilities. For example if there are two
copy+xor channels, one will handle copy operations and the other will
handle xor. In the SMP case async_tx_rebalance() attempts to spread the
operations evenly over the cpus, e.g. cpu0 gets copy channel0 and xor
channel0 while cpu1 gets copy channel 1 and xor channel 1. When a
dependency is specified async_tx_find_channel defaults to keeping the
operation on the same channel. A xor->copy->xor chain will stay on one
channel if it supports both operation types, otherwise the transaction will
transition between a copy and a xor resource.
Currently the raid5 implementation in the MD raid456 driver has been
converted to the async_tx api. A driver for the offload engines on the
Intel Xscale series of I/O processors, iop-adma, is provided in a later
commit. With the iop-adma driver and async_tx, raid456 is able to offload
copy, xor, and xor-zero-sum operations to hardware engines.
On iop342 tiobench showed higher throughput for sequential writes (20 - 30%
improvement) and sequential reads to a degraded array (40 - 55%
improvement). For the other cases performance was roughly equal, +/- a few
percentage points. On a x86-smp platform the performance of the async_tx
implementation (in synchronous mode) was also +/- a few percentage points
of the original implementation. According to 'top' on iop342 CPU
utilization drops from ~50% to ~15% during a 'resync' while the speed
according to /proc/mdstat doubles from ~25 MB/s to ~50 MB/s.
The tiobench command line used for testing was: tiobench --size 2048
--block 4096 --block 131072 --dir /mnt/raid --numruns 5
* iop342 had 1GB of memory available
Details:
* if CONFIG_DMA_ENGINE=n the asynchronous path is compiled away by making
async_tx_find_channel a static inline routine that always returns NULL
* when a callback is specified for a given transaction an interrupt will
fire at operation completion time and the callback will occur in a
tasklet. if the the channel does not support interrupts then a live
polling wait will be performed
* the api is written as a dmaengine client that requests all available
channels
* In support of dependencies the api implicitly schedules channel-switch
interrupts. The interrupt triggers the cleanup tasklet which causes
pending operations to be scheduled on the next channel
* Xor engines treat an xor destination address differently than a software
xor routine. To the software routine the destination address is an implied
source, whereas engines treat it as a write-only destination. This patch
modifies the xor_blocks routine to take a an explicit destination address
to mirror the hardware.
Changelog:
* fixed a leftover debug print
* don't allow callbacks in async_interrupt_cond
* fixed xor_block changes
* fixed usage of ASYNC_TX_XOR_DROP_DEST
* drop dma mapping methods, suggested by Chris Leech
* printk warning fixups from Andrew Morton
* don't use inline in C files, Adrian Bunk
* select the API when MD is enabled
* BUG_ON xor source counts <= 1
* implicitly handle hardware concerns like channel switching and
interrupts, Neil Brown
* remove the per operation type list, and distribute operation capabilities
evenly amongst the available channels
* simplify async_tx_find_channel to optimize the fast path
* introduce the channel_table_initialized flag to prevent early calls to
the api
* reorganize the code to mimic crypto
* include mm.h as not all archs include it in dma-mapping.h
* make the Kconfig options non-user visible, Adrian Bunk
* move async_tx under crypto since it is meant as 'core' functionality, and
the two may share algorithms in the future
* move large inline functions into c files
* checkpatch.pl fixes
* gpl v2 only correction
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Acked-By: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
2007-01-02 21:10:44 +03:00
#
# Cryptographic API Configuration
#
2007-05-18 09:11:01 +04:00
menuconfig CRYPTO
2008-03-30 12:36:09 +04:00
tristate "Cryptographic API"
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
help
This option provides the core Cryptographic API.
2006-08-21 15:08:13 +04:00
if CRYPTO
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
comment "Crypto core or helper"
2008-08-05 10:13:08 +04:00
config CRYPTO_FIPS
bool "FIPS 200 compliance"
2014-07-04 18:15:08 +04:00
depends on (CRYPTO_ANSI_CPRNG || CRYPTO_DRBG) && !CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS
2016-10-05 01:34:30 +03:00
depends on (MODULE_SIG || !MODULES)
2008-08-05 10:13:08 +04:00
help
2019-03-20 13:41:03 +03:00
This option enables the fips boot option which is
required if you want the system to operate in a FIPS 200
2008-08-05 10:13:08 +04:00
certification. You should say no unless you know what
2010-09-03 15:17:49 +04:00
this is.
2008-08-05 10:13:08 +04:00
2006-08-21 15:08:13 +04:00
config CRYPTO_ALGAPI
tristate
2008-12-10 15:29:44 +03:00
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI2
2006-08-21 15:08:13 +04:00
help
This option provides the API for cryptographic algorithms.
2008-12-10 15:29:44 +03:00
config CRYPTO_ALGAPI2
tristate
2007-08-30 11:36:14 +04:00
config CRYPTO_AEAD
tristate
2008-12-10 15:29:44 +03:00
select CRYPTO_AEAD2
2007-08-30 11:36:14 +04:00
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
2008-12-10 15:29:44 +03:00
config CRYPTO_AEAD2
tristate
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI2
2015-08-13 12:28:58 +03:00
select CRYPTO_NULL2
select CRYPTO_RNG2
2008-12-10 15:29:44 +03:00
2006-08-21 18:07:53 +04:00
config CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
tristate
2008-12-10 15:29:44 +03:00
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER2
2006-08-21 18:07:53 +04:00
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
2008-12-10 15:29:44 +03:00
config CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER2
tristate
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI2
select CRYPTO_RNG2
2006-08-21 18:07:53 +04:00
2006-08-19 16:24:23 +04:00
config CRYPTO_HASH
tristate
2008-12-10 15:29:44 +03:00
select CRYPTO_HASH2
2006-08-19 16:24:23 +04:00
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
2008-12-10 15:29:44 +03:00
config CRYPTO_HASH2
tristate
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI2
2008-08-14 16:15:52 +04:00
config CRYPTO_RNG
tristate
2008-12-10 15:29:44 +03:00
select CRYPTO_RNG2
2008-08-14 16:15:52 +04:00
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
2008-12-10 15:29:44 +03:00
config CRYPTO_RNG2
tristate
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI2
2015-06-03 09:49:31 +03:00
config CRYPTO_RNG_DEFAULT
tristate
select CRYPTO_DRBG_MENU
2015-06-16 20:30:55 +03:00
config CRYPTO_AKCIPHER2
tristate
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI2
config CRYPTO_AKCIPHER
tristate
select CRYPTO_AKCIPHER2
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
2016-06-22 19:49:13 +03:00
config CRYPTO_KPP2
tristate
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI2
config CRYPTO_KPP
tristate
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
select CRYPTO_KPP2
2016-10-21 15:19:47 +03:00
config CRYPTO_ACOMP2
tristate
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI2
2018-01-05 19:26:47 +03:00
select SGL_ALLOC
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config CRYPTO_ACOMP
tristate
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
select CRYPTO_ACOMP2
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config CRYPTO_MANAGER
tristate "Cryptographic algorithm manager"
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select CRYPTO_MANAGER2
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help
Create default cryptographic template instantiations such as
cbc(aes).
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config CRYPTO_MANAGER2
def_tristate CRYPTO_MANAGER || (CRYPTO_MANAGER!=n && CRYPTO_ALGAPI=y)
select CRYPTO_AEAD2
select CRYPTO_HASH2
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER2
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select CRYPTO_AKCIPHER2
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select CRYPTO_KPP2
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select CRYPTO_ACOMP2
2008-12-10 15:29:44 +03:00
2011-09-27 09:23:50 +04:00
config CRYPTO_USER
tristate "Userspace cryptographic algorithm configuration"
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depends on NET
2011-09-27 09:23:50 +04:00
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
help
2011-11-09 10:29:20 +04:00
Userspace configuration for cryptographic instantiations such as
2011-09-27 09:23:50 +04:00
cbc(aes).
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if CRYPTO_MANAGER2
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config CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS
bool "Disable run-time self tests"
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default y
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help
2010-08-06 05:40:28 +04:00
Disable run-time self tests that normally take place at
algorithm registration.
2010-06-03 14:53:43 +04:00
2019-02-01 10:51:44 +03:00
config CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS
bool "Enable extra run-time crypto self tests"
depends on DEBUG_KERNEL && !CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS
help
Enable extra run-time self tests of registered crypto algorithms,
including randomized fuzz tests.
This is intended for developer use only, as these tests take much
longer to run than the normal self tests.
2019-05-20 19:48:29 +03:00
endif # if CRYPTO_MANAGER2
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config CRYPTO_GF128MUL
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tristate
2006-10-28 07:15:24 +04:00
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
config CRYPTO_NULL
tristate "Null algorithms"
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select CRYPTO_NULL2
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help
These are 'Null' algorithms, used by IPsec, which do nothing.
2015-08-13 12:28:58 +03:00
config CRYPTO_NULL2
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tristate
2015-08-13 12:28:58 +03:00
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI2
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER2
select CRYPTO_HASH2
2010-01-07 07:57:19 +03:00
config CRYPTO_PCRYPT
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tristate "Parallel crypto engine"
depends on SMP
2010-01-07 07:57:19 +03:00
select PADATA
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
select CRYPTO_AEAD
help
This converts an arbitrary crypto algorithm into a parallel
algorithm that executes in kernel threads.
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config CRYPTO_CRYPTD
tristate "Software async crypto daemon"
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
2008-05-14 17:23:00 +04:00
select CRYPTO_HASH
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select CRYPTO_MANAGER
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
help
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
This is a generic software asynchronous crypto daemon that
converts an arbitrary synchronous software crypto algorithm
into an asynchronous algorithm that executes in a kernel thread.
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
config CRYPTO_AUTHENC
tristate "Authenc support"
select CRYPTO_AEAD
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
select CRYPTO_HASH
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select CRYPTO_NULL
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help
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
Authenc: Combined mode wrapper for IPsec.
This is required for IPSec.
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
config CRYPTO_TEST
tristate "Testing module"
depends on m
2008-07-31 13:08:25 +04:00
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
help
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
Quick & dirty crypto test module.
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
2016-11-22 15:08:25 +03:00
config CRYPTO_SIMD
tristate
2012-06-18 15:06:58 +04:00
select CRYPTO_CRYPTD
2012-06-18 15:07:19 +04:00
config CRYPTO_GLUE_HELPER_X86
tristate
depends on X86
2016-11-22 15:08:29 +03:00
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
2012-06-18 15:07:19 +04:00
2016-01-26 15:25:39 +03:00
config CRYPTO_ENGINE
tristate
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comment "Public-key cryptography"
config CRYPTO_RSA
tristate "RSA algorithm"
select CRYPTO_AKCIPHER
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
select MPILIB
select ASN1
help
Generic implementation of the RSA public key algorithm.
config CRYPTO_DH
tristate "Diffie-Hellman algorithm"
select CRYPTO_KPP
select MPILIB
help
Generic implementation of the Diffie-Hellman algorithm.
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config CRYPTO_ECC
tristate
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config CRYPTO_ECDH
tristate "ECDH algorithm"
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select CRYPTO_ECC
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select CRYPTO_KPP
select CRYPTO_RNG_DEFAULT
help
Generic implementation of the ECDH algorithm
crypto: ecrdsa - add EC-RDSA (GOST 34.10) algorithm
Add Elliptic Curve Russian Digital Signature Algorithm (GOST R
34.10-2012, RFC 7091, ISO/IEC 14888-3) is one of the Russian (and since
2018 the CIS countries) cryptographic standard algorithms (called GOST
algorithms). Only signature verification is supported, with intent to be
used in the IMA.
Summary of the changes:
* crypto/Kconfig:
- EC-RDSA is added into Public-key cryptography section.
* crypto/Makefile:
- ecrdsa objects are added.
* crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:
- Recognize EC-RDSA and Streebog OIDs.
* include/linux/oid_registry.h:
- EC-RDSA OIDs are added to the enum. Also, a two currently not
implemented curve OIDs are added for possible extension later (to
not change numbering and grouping).
* crypto/ecc.c:
- Kenneth MacKay copyright date is updated to 2014, because
vli_mmod_slow, ecc_point_add, ecc_point_mult_shamir are based on his
code from micro-ecc.
- Functions needed for ecrdsa are EXPORT_SYMBOL'ed.
- New functions:
vli_is_negative - helper to determine sign of vli;
vli_from_be64 - unpack big-endian array into vli (used for
a signature);
vli_from_le64 - unpack little-endian array into vli (used for
a public key);
vli_uadd, vli_usub - add/sub u64 value to/from vli (used for
increment/decrement);
mul_64_64 - optimized to use __int128 where appropriate, this speeds
up point multiplication (and as a consequence signature
verification) by the factor of 1.5-2;
vli_umult - multiply vli by a small value (speeds up point
multiplication by another factor of 1.5-2, depending on vli sizes);
vli_mmod_special - module reduction for some form of Pseudo-Mersenne
primes (used for the curves A);
vli_mmod_special2 - module reduction for another form of
Pseudo-Mersenne primes (used for the curves B);
vli_mmod_barrett - module reduction using pre-computed value (used
for the curve C);
vli_mmod_slow - more general module reduction which is much slower
(used when the modulus is subgroup order);
vli_mod_mult_slow - modular multiplication;
ecc_point_add - add two points;
ecc_point_mult_shamir - add two points multiplied by scalars in one
combined multiplication (this gives speed up by another factor 2 in
compare to two separate multiplications).
ecc_is_pubkey_valid_partial - additional samity check is added.
- Updated vli_mmod_fast with non-strict heuristic to call optimal
module reduction function depending on the prime value;
- All computations for the previously defined (two NIST) curves should
not unaffected.
* crypto/ecc.h:
- Newly exported functions are documented.
* crypto/ecrdsa_defs.h
- Five curves are defined.
* crypto/ecrdsa.c:
- Signature verification is implemented.
* crypto/ecrdsa_params.asn1, crypto/ecrdsa_pub_key.asn1:
- Templates for BER decoder for EC-RDSA parameters and public key.
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-04-11 18:51:20 +03:00
config CRYPTO_ECRDSA
tristate "EC-RDSA (GOST 34.10) algorithm"
select CRYPTO_ECC
select CRYPTO_AKCIPHER
select CRYPTO_STREEBOG
2019-04-24 04:32:40 +03:00
select OID_REGISTRY
select ASN1
crypto: ecrdsa - add EC-RDSA (GOST 34.10) algorithm
Add Elliptic Curve Russian Digital Signature Algorithm (GOST R
34.10-2012, RFC 7091, ISO/IEC 14888-3) is one of the Russian (and since
2018 the CIS countries) cryptographic standard algorithms (called GOST
algorithms). Only signature verification is supported, with intent to be
used in the IMA.
Summary of the changes:
* crypto/Kconfig:
- EC-RDSA is added into Public-key cryptography section.
* crypto/Makefile:
- ecrdsa objects are added.
* crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:
- Recognize EC-RDSA and Streebog OIDs.
* include/linux/oid_registry.h:
- EC-RDSA OIDs are added to the enum. Also, a two currently not
implemented curve OIDs are added for possible extension later (to
not change numbering and grouping).
* crypto/ecc.c:
- Kenneth MacKay copyright date is updated to 2014, because
vli_mmod_slow, ecc_point_add, ecc_point_mult_shamir are based on his
code from micro-ecc.
- Functions needed for ecrdsa are EXPORT_SYMBOL'ed.
- New functions:
vli_is_negative - helper to determine sign of vli;
vli_from_be64 - unpack big-endian array into vli (used for
a signature);
vli_from_le64 - unpack little-endian array into vli (used for
a public key);
vli_uadd, vli_usub - add/sub u64 value to/from vli (used for
increment/decrement);
mul_64_64 - optimized to use __int128 where appropriate, this speeds
up point multiplication (and as a consequence signature
verification) by the factor of 1.5-2;
vli_umult - multiply vli by a small value (speeds up point
multiplication by another factor of 1.5-2, depending on vli sizes);
vli_mmod_special - module reduction for some form of Pseudo-Mersenne
primes (used for the curves A);
vli_mmod_special2 - module reduction for another form of
Pseudo-Mersenne primes (used for the curves B);
vli_mmod_barrett - module reduction using pre-computed value (used
for the curve C);
vli_mmod_slow - more general module reduction which is much slower
(used when the modulus is subgroup order);
vli_mod_mult_slow - modular multiplication;
ecc_point_add - add two points;
ecc_point_mult_shamir - add two points multiplied by scalars in one
combined multiplication (this gives speed up by another factor 2 in
compare to two separate multiplications).
ecc_is_pubkey_valid_partial - additional samity check is added.
- Updated vli_mmod_fast with non-strict heuristic to call optimal
module reduction function depending on the prime value;
- All computations for the previously defined (two NIST) curves should
not unaffected.
* crypto/ecc.h:
- Newly exported functions are documented.
* crypto/ecrdsa_defs.h
- Five curves are defined.
* crypto/ecrdsa.c:
- Signature verification is implemented.
* crypto/ecrdsa_params.asn1, crypto/ecrdsa_pub_key.asn1:
- Templates for BER decoder for EC-RDSA parameters and public key.
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-04-11 18:51:20 +03:00
help
Elliptic Curve Russian Digital Signature Algorithm (GOST R 34.10-2012,
RFC 7091, ISO/IEC 14888-3:2018) is one of the Russian cryptographic
standard algorithms (called GOST algorithms). Only signature verification
is implemented.
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
comment "Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data"
2007-11-10 15:08:25 +03:00
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
config CRYPTO_CCM
tristate "CCM support"
select CRYPTO_CTR
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select CRYPTO_HASH
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select CRYPTO_AEAD
2019-05-20 19:49:46 +03:00
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
help
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
Support for Counter with CBC MAC. Required for IPsec.
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
config CRYPTO_GCM
tristate "GCM/GMAC support"
select CRYPTO_CTR
select CRYPTO_AEAD
2009-08-06 09:34:26 +04:00
select CRYPTO_GHASH
2013-04-07 17:43:41 +04:00
select CRYPTO_NULL
2019-05-20 19:49:46 +03:00
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
help
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
Support for Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and Galois Message
Authentication Code (GMAC). Required for IPSec.
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
2015-06-01 14:44:00 +03:00
config CRYPTO_CHACHA20POLY1305
tristate "ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD support"
select CRYPTO_CHACHA20
select CRYPTO_POLY1305
select CRYPTO_AEAD
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select CRYPTO_MANAGER
2015-06-01 14:44:00 +03:00
help
ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD support, RFC7539.
Support for the AEAD wrapper using the ChaCha20 stream cipher combined
with the Poly1305 authenticator. It is defined in RFC7539 for use in
IETF protocols.
2018-05-11 15:12:49 +03:00
config CRYPTO_AEGIS128
tristate "AEGIS-128 AEAD algorithm"
select CRYPTO_AEAD
select CRYPTO_AES # for AES S-box tables
help
Support for the AEGIS-128 dedicated AEAD algorithm.
2018-05-11 15:12:51 +03:00
config CRYPTO_AEGIS128_AESNI_SSE2
tristate "AEGIS-128 AEAD algorithm (x86_64 AESNI+SSE2 implementation)"
depends on X86 && 64BIT
select CRYPTO_AEAD
2019-03-10 22:00:53 +03:00
select CRYPTO_SIMD
2018-05-11 15:12:51 +03:00
help
2019-03-15 10:47:25 +03:00
AESNI+SSE2 implementation of the AEGIS-128 dedicated AEAD algorithm.
2018-05-11 15:12:51 +03:00
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
config CRYPTO_SEQIV
tristate "Sequence Number IV Generator"
select CRYPTO_AEAD
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
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select CRYPTO_NULL
2015-06-03 09:49:31 +03:00
select CRYPTO_RNG_DEFAULT
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select CRYPTO_MANAGER
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
help
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
This IV generator generates an IV based on a sequence number by
xoring it with a salt. This algorithm is mainly useful for CTR
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
2015-05-21 10:11:15 +03:00
config CRYPTO_ECHAINIV
tristate "Encrypted Chain IV Generator"
select CRYPTO_AEAD
select CRYPTO_NULL
2015-06-03 09:49:31 +03:00
select CRYPTO_RNG_DEFAULT
2019-05-20 19:49:46 +03:00
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
2015-05-21 10:11:15 +03:00
help
This IV generator generates an IV based on the encryption of
a sequence number xored with a salt. This is the default
algorithm for CBC.
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comment "Block modes"
2006-11-29 10:59:44 +03:00
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
config CRYPTO_CBC
tristate "CBC support"
2006-09-21 05:44:08 +04:00
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
2006-10-16 15:28:58 +04:00
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
2006-09-21 05:44:08 +04:00
help
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
CBC: Cipher Block Chaining mode
This block cipher algorithm is required for IPSec.
2006-09-21 05:44:08 +04:00
2018-03-02 01:36:17 +03:00
config CRYPTO_CFB
tristate "CFB support"
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
help
CFB: Cipher FeedBack mode
This block cipher algorithm is required for TPM2 Cryptography.
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
config CRYPTO_CTR
tristate "CTR support"
2006-09-21 05:44:08 +04:00
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
select CRYPTO_SEQIV
2006-10-16 15:28:58 +04:00
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
2006-09-21 05:44:08 +04:00
help
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
CTR: Counter mode
2006-09-21 05:44:08 +04:00
This block cipher algorithm is required for IPSec.
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
config CRYPTO_CTS
tristate "CTS support"
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
2019-05-20 19:49:46 +03:00
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
help
CTS: Cipher Text Stealing
This is the Cipher Text Stealing mode as described by
2018-11-05 15:05:01 +03:00
Section 8 of rfc2040 and referenced by rfc3962
(rfc3962 includes errata information in its Appendix A) or
CBC-CS3 as defined by NIST in Sp800-38A addendum from Oct 2010.
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
This mode is required for Kerberos gss mechanism support
for AES encryption.
2018-11-05 15:05:01 +03:00
See: https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-38a/addendum/final
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
config CRYPTO_ECB
tristate "ECB support"
2006-12-16 04:09:02 +03:00
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
help
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
ECB: Electronic CodeBook mode
This is the simplest block cipher algorithm. It simply encrypts
the input block by block.
2006-12-16 04:09:02 +03:00
2006-11-26 01:43:10 +03:00
config CRYPTO_LRW
2011-12-13 14:52:51 +04:00
tristate "LRW support"
2006-11-26 01:43:10 +03:00
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
select CRYPTO_GF128MUL
help
LRW: Liskov Rivest Wagner, a tweakable, non malleable, non movable
narrow block cipher mode for dm-crypt. Use it with cipher
specification string aes-lrw-benbi, the key must be 256, 320 or 384.
The first 128, 192 or 256 bits in the key are used for AES and the
rest is used to tie each cipher block to its logical position.
2018-09-20 16:18:39 +03:00
config CRYPTO_OFB
tristate "OFB support"
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
help
OFB: the Output Feedback mode makes a block cipher into a synchronous
stream cipher. It generates keystream blocks, which are then XORed
with the plaintext blocks to get the ciphertext. Flipping a bit in the
ciphertext produces a flipped bit in the plaintext at the same
location. This property allows many error correcting codes to function
normally even when applied before encryption.
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
config CRYPTO_PCBC
tristate "PCBC support"
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
help
PCBC: Propagating Cipher Block Chaining mode
This block cipher algorithm is required for RxRPC.
2007-09-19 16:23:13 +04:00
config CRYPTO_XTS
2011-12-13 14:52:56 +04:00
tristate "XTS support"
2007-09-19 16:23:13 +04:00
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
2017-02-23 10:38:26 +03:00
select CRYPTO_ECB
2007-09-19 16:23:13 +04:00
help
XTS: IEEE1619/D16 narrow block cipher use with aes-xts-plain,
key size 256, 384 or 512 bits. This implementation currently
can't handle a sectorsize which is not a multiple of 16 bytes.
2015-09-21 21:58:56 +03:00
config CRYPTO_KEYWRAP
tristate "Key wrapping support"
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
2019-05-20 19:49:46 +03:00
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
2015-09-21 21:58:56 +03:00
help
Support for key wrapping (NIST SP800-38F / RFC3394) without
padding.
2018-11-17 04:26:29 +03:00
config CRYPTO_NHPOLY1305
tristate
select CRYPTO_HASH
select CRYPTO_POLY1305
2018-12-05 09:20:00 +03:00
config CRYPTO_NHPOLY1305_SSE2
tristate "NHPoly1305 hash function (x86_64 SSE2 implementation)"
depends on X86 && 64BIT
select CRYPTO_NHPOLY1305
help
SSE2 optimized implementation of the hash function used by the
Adiantum encryption mode.
2018-12-05 09:20:01 +03:00
config CRYPTO_NHPOLY1305_AVX2
tristate "NHPoly1305 hash function (x86_64 AVX2 implementation)"
depends on X86 && 64BIT
select CRYPTO_NHPOLY1305
help
AVX2 optimized implementation of the hash function used by the
Adiantum encryption mode.
crypto: adiantum - add Adiantum support
Add support for the Adiantum encryption mode. Adiantum was designed by
Paul Crowley and is specified by our paper:
Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors
(https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf)
See our paper for full details; this patch only provides an overview.
Adiantum is a tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode designed for
fast and secure disk encryption, especially on CPUs without dedicated
crypto instructions. Adiantum encrypts each sector using the XChaCha12
stream cipher, two passes of an ε-almost-∆-universal (εA∆U) hash
function, and an invocation of the AES-256 block cipher on a single
16-byte block. On CPUs without AES instructions, Adiantum is much
faster than AES-XTS; for example, on ARM Cortex-A7, on 4096-byte sectors
Adiantum encryption is about 4 times faster than AES-256-XTS encryption,
and decryption about 5 times faster.
Adiantum is a specialization of the more general HBSH construction. Our
earlier proposal, HPolyC, was also a HBSH specialization, but it used a
different εA∆U hash function, one based on Poly1305 only. Adiantum's
εA∆U hash function, which is based primarily on the "NH" hash function
like that used in UMAC (RFC4418), is about twice as fast as HPolyC's;
consequently, Adiantum is about 20% faster than HPolyC.
This speed comes with no loss of security: Adiantum is provably just as
secure as HPolyC, in fact slightly *more* secure. Like HPolyC,
Adiantum's security is reducible to that of XChaCha12 and AES-256,
subject to a security bound. XChaCha12 itself has a security reduction
to ChaCha12. Therefore, one need not "trust" Adiantum; one need only
trust ChaCha12 and AES-256. Note that the εA∆U hash function is only
used for its proven combinatorical properties so cannot be "broken".
Adiantum is also a true wide-block encryption mode, so flipping any
plaintext bit in the sector scrambles the entire ciphertext, and vice
versa. No other such mode is available in the kernel currently; doing
the same with XTS scrambles only 16 bytes. Adiantum also supports
arbitrary-length tweaks and naturally supports any length input >= 16
bytes without needing "ciphertext stealing".
For the stream cipher, Adiantum uses XChaCha12 rather than XChaCha20 in
order to make encryption feasible on the widest range of devices.
Although the 20-round variant is quite popular, the best known attacks
on ChaCha are on only 7 rounds, so ChaCha12 still has a substantial
security margin; in fact, larger than AES-256's. 12-round Salsa20 is
also the eSTREAM recommendation. For the block cipher, Adiantum uses
AES-256, despite it having a lower security margin than XChaCha12 and
needing table lookups, due to AES's extensive adoption and analysis
making it the obvious first choice. Nevertheless, for flexibility this
patch also permits the "adiantum" template to be instantiated with
XChaCha20 and/or with an alternate block cipher.
We need Adiantum support in the kernel for use in dm-crypt and fscrypt,
where currently the only other suitable options are block cipher modes
such as AES-XTS. A big problem with this is that many low-end mobile
devices (e.g. Android Go phones sold primarily in developing countries,
as well as some smartwatches) still have CPUs that lack AES
instructions, e.g. ARM Cortex-A7. Sadly, AES-XTS encryption is much too
slow to be viable on these devices. We did find that some "lightweight"
block ciphers are fast enough, but these suffer from problems such as
not having much cryptanalysis or being too controversial.
The ChaCha stream cipher has excellent performance but is insecure to
use directly for disk encryption, since each sector's IV is reused each
time it is overwritten. Even restricting the threat model to offline
attacks only isn't enough, since modern flash storage devices don't
guarantee that "overwrites" are really overwrites, due to wear-leveling.
Adiantum avoids this problem by constructing a
"tweakable super-pseudorandom permutation"; this is the strongest
possible security model for length-preserving encryption.
Of course, storing random nonces along with the ciphertext would be the
ideal solution. But doing that with existing hardware and filesystems
runs into major practical problems; in most cases it would require data
journaling (like dm-integrity) which severely degrades performance.
Thus, for now length-preserving encryption is still needed.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-11-17 04:26:31 +03:00
config CRYPTO_ADIANTUM
tristate "Adiantum support"
select CRYPTO_CHACHA20
select CRYPTO_POLY1305
select CRYPTO_NHPOLY1305
2019-05-20 19:49:46 +03:00
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
crypto: adiantum - add Adiantum support
Add support for the Adiantum encryption mode. Adiantum was designed by
Paul Crowley and is specified by our paper:
Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors
(https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf)
See our paper for full details; this patch only provides an overview.
Adiantum is a tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode designed for
fast and secure disk encryption, especially on CPUs without dedicated
crypto instructions. Adiantum encrypts each sector using the XChaCha12
stream cipher, two passes of an ε-almost-∆-universal (εA∆U) hash
function, and an invocation of the AES-256 block cipher on a single
16-byte block. On CPUs without AES instructions, Adiantum is much
faster than AES-XTS; for example, on ARM Cortex-A7, on 4096-byte sectors
Adiantum encryption is about 4 times faster than AES-256-XTS encryption,
and decryption about 5 times faster.
Adiantum is a specialization of the more general HBSH construction. Our
earlier proposal, HPolyC, was also a HBSH specialization, but it used a
different εA∆U hash function, one based on Poly1305 only. Adiantum's
εA∆U hash function, which is based primarily on the "NH" hash function
like that used in UMAC (RFC4418), is about twice as fast as HPolyC's;
consequently, Adiantum is about 20% faster than HPolyC.
This speed comes with no loss of security: Adiantum is provably just as
secure as HPolyC, in fact slightly *more* secure. Like HPolyC,
Adiantum's security is reducible to that of XChaCha12 and AES-256,
subject to a security bound. XChaCha12 itself has a security reduction
to ChaCha12. Therefore, one need not "trust" Adiantum; one need only
trust ChaCha12 and AES-256. Note that the εA∆U hash function is only
used for its proven combinatorical properties so cannot be "broken".
Adiantum is also a true wide-block encryption mode, so flipping any
plaintext bit in the sector scrambles the entire ciphertext, and vice
versa. No other such mode is available in the kernel currently; doing
the same with XTS scrambles only 16 bytes. Adiantum also supports
arbitrary-length tweaks and naturally supports any length input >= 16
bytes without needing "ciphertext stealing".
For the stream cipher, Adiantum uses XChaCha12 rather than XChaCha20 in
order to make encryption feasible on the widest range of devices.
Although the 20-round variant is quite popular, the best known attacks
on ChaCha are on only 7 rounds, so ChaCha12 still has a substantial
security margin; in fact, larger than AES-256's. 12-round Salsa20 is
also the eSTREAM recommendation. For the block cipher, Adiantum uses
AES-256, despite it having a lower security margin than XChaCha12 and
needing table lookups, due to AES's extensive adoption and analysis
making it the obvious first choice. Nevertheless, for flexibility this
patch also permits the "adiantum" template to be instantiated with
XChaCha20 and/or with an alternate block cipher.
We need Adiantum support in the kernel for use in dm-crypt and fscrypt,
where currently the only other suitable options are block cipher modes
such as AES-XTS. A big problem with this is that many low-end mobile
devices (e.g. Android Go phones sold primarily in developing countries,
as well as some smartwatches) still have CPUs that lack AES
instructions, e.g. ARM Cortex-A7. Sadly, AES-XTS encryption is much too
slow to be viable on these devices. We did find that some "lightweight"
block ciphers are fast enough, but these suffer from problems such as
not having much cryptanalysis or being too controversial.
The ChaCha stream cipher has excellent performance but is insecure to
use directly for disk encryption, since each sector's IV is reused each
time it is overwritten. Even restricting the threat model to offline
attacks only isn't enough, since modern flash storage devices don't
guarantee that "overwrites" are really overwrites, due to wear-leveling.
Adiantum avoids this problem by constructing a
"tweakable super-pseudorandom permutation"; this is the strongest
possible security model for length-preserving encryption.
Of course, storing random nonces along with the ciphertext would be the
ideal solution. But doing that with existing hardware and filesystems
runs into major practical problems; in most cases it would require data
journaling (like dm-integrity) which severely degrades performance.
Thus, for now length-preserving encryption is still needed.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-11-17 04:26:31 +03:00
help
Adiantum is a tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode
designed for fast and secure disk encryption, especially on
CPUs without dedicated crypto instructions. It encrypts
each sector using the XChaCha12 stream cipher, two passes of
an ε-almost-∆-universal hash function, and an invocation of
the AES-256 block cipher on a single 16-byte block. On CPUs
without AES instructions, Adiantum is much faster than
AES-XTS.
Adiantum's security is provably reducible to that of its
underlying stream and block ciphers, subject to a security
bound. Unlike XTS, Adiantum is a true wide-block encryption
mode, so it actually provides an even stronger notion of
security than XTS, subject to the security bound.
If unsure, say N.
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
comment "Hash modes"
2013-04-08 11:48:44 +04:00
config CRYPTO_CMAC
tristate "CMAC support"
select CRYPTO_HASH
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
help
Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC) specified by
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4493
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38B/SP_800-38B.pdf
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
config CRYPTO_HMAC
tristate "HMAC support"
select CRYPTO_HASH
[CRYPTO] ctr: Add CTR (Counter) block cipher mode
This patch implements CTR mode for IPsec.
It is based off of RFC 3686.
Please note:
1. CTR turns a block cipher into a stream cipher.
Encryption is done in blocks, however the last block
may be a partial block.
A "counter block" is encrypted, creating a keystream
that is xor'ed with the plaintext. The counter portion
of the counter block is incremented after each block
of plaintext is encrypted.
Decryption is performed in same manner.
2. The CTR counterblock is composed of,
nonce + IV + counter
The size of the counterblock is equivalent to the
blocksize of the cipher.
sizeof(nonce) + sizeof(IV) + sizeof(counter) = blocksize
The CTR template requires the name of the cipher
algorithm, the sizeof the nonce, and the sizeof the iv.
ctr(cipher,sizeof_nonce,sizeof_iv)
So for example,
ctr(aes,4,8)
specifies the counterblock will be composed of 4 bytes
from a nonce, 8 bytes from the iv, and 4 bytes for counter
since aes has a blocksize of 16 bytes.
3. The counter portion of the counter block is stored
in big endian for conformance to rfc 3686.
Signed-off-by: Joy Latten <latten@austin.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2007-10-23 04:50:32 +04:00
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
help
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication (RFC2104).
This is required for IPSec.
[CRYPTO] ctr: Add CTR (Counter) block cipher mode
This patch implements CTR mode for IPsec.
It is based off of RFC 3686.
Please note:
1. CTR turns a block cipher into a stream cipher.
Encryption is done in blocks, however the last block
may be a partial block.
A "counter block" is encrypted, creating a keystream
that is xor'ed with the plaintext. The counter portion
of the counter block is incremented after each block
of plaintext is encrypted.
Decryption is performed in same manner.
2. The CTR counterblock is composed of,
nonce + IV + counter
The size of the counterblock is equivalent to the
blocksize of the cipher.
sizeof(nonce) + sizeof(IV) + sizeof(counter) = blocksize
The CTR template requires the name of the cipher
algorithm, the sizeof the nonce, and the sizeof the iv.
ctr(cipher,sizeof_nonce,sizeof_iv)
So for example,
ctr(aes,4,8)
specifies the counterblock will be composed of 4 bytes
from a nonce, 8 bytes from the iv, and 4 bytes for counter
since aes has a blocksize of 16 bytes.
3. The counter portion of the counter block is stored
in big endian for conformance to rfc 3686.
Signed-off-by: Joy Latten <latten@austin.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2007-10-23 04:50:32 +04:00
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
config CRYPTO_XCBC
tristate "XCBC support"
select CRYPTO_HASH
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
2008-03-24 16:26:16 +03:00
help
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
XCBC: Keyed-Hashing with encryption algorithm
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3566.txt
http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/modes/proposedmodes/
xcbc-mac/xcbc-mac-spec.pdf
2008-03-24 16:26:16 +03:00
2009-09-02 14:05:22 +04:00
config CRYPTO_VMAC
tristate "VMAC support"
select CRYPTO_HASH
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
help
VMAC is a message authentication algorithm designed for
very high speed on 64-bit architectures.
See also:
<http://fastcrypto.org/vmac>
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
comment "Digest"
2007-11-26 17:24:11 +03:00
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
config CRYPTO_CRC32C
tristate "CRC32c CRC algorithm"
2008-07-08 16:54:28 +04:00
select CRYPTO_HASH
2012-03-24 02:02:25 +04:00
select CRC32
2007-12-12 15:25:13 +03:00
help
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
Castagnoli, et al Cyclic Redundancy-Check Algorithm. Used
by iSCSI for header and data digests and by others.
2008-11-07 10:11:47 +03:00
See Castagnoli93. Module will be crc32c.
2007-12-12 15:25:13 +03:00
2008-08-07 05:57:03 +04:00
config CRYPTO_CRC32C_INTEL
tristate "CRC32c INTEL hardware acceleration"
depends on X86
select CRYPTO_HASH
help
In Intel processor with SSE4.2 supported, the processor will
support CRC32C implementation using hardware accelerated CRC32
instruction. This option will create 'crc32c-intel' module,
which will enable any routine to use the CRC32 instruction to
gain performance compared with software implementation.
Module will be crc32c-intel.
2016-11-22 12:32:44 +03:00
config CRYPTO_CRC32C_VPMSUM
2016-07-01 01:19:45 +03:00
tristate "CRC32c CRC algorithm (powerpc64)"
2016-08-09 01:46:15 +03:00
depends on PPC64 && ALTIVEC
2016-07-01 01:19:45 +03:00
select CRYPTO_HASH
select CRC32
help
CRC32c algorithm implemented using vector polynomial multiply-sum
(vpmsum) instructions, introduced in POWER8. Enable on POWER8
and newer processors for improved performance.
2012-08-23 07:47:36 +04:00
config CRYPTO_CRC32C_SPARC64
tristate "CRC32c CRC algorithm (SPARC64)"
depends on SPARC64
select CRYPTO_HASH
select CRC32
help
CRC32c CRC algorithm implemented using sparc64 crypto instructions,
when available.
2013-01-10 18:54:59 +04:00
config CRYPTO_CRC32
tristate "CRC32 CRC algorithm"
select CRYPTO_HASH
select CRC32
help
CRC-32-IEEE 802.3 cyclic redundancy-check algorithm.
Shash crypto api wrappers to crc32_le function.
config CRYPTO_CRC32_PCLMUL
tristate "CRC32 PCLMULQDQ hardware acceleration"
depends on X86
select CRYPTO_HASH
select CRC32
help
From Intel Westmere and AMD Bulldozer processor with SSE4.2
and PCLMULQDQ supported, the processor will support
CRC32 PCLMULQDQ implementation using hardware accelerated PCLMULQDQ
2018-12-28 13:09:40 +03:00
instruction. This option will create 'crc32-pclmul' module,
2013-01-10 18:54:59 +04:00
which will enable any routine to use the CRC-32-IEEE 802.3 checksum
and gain better performance as compared with the table implementation.
2018-02-10 01:11:06 +03:00
config CRYPTO_CRC32_MIPS
tristate "CRC32c and CRC32 CRC algorithm (MIPS)"
depends on MIPS_CRC_SUPPORT
select CRYPTO_HASH
help
CRC32c and CRC32 CRC algorithms implemented using mips crypto
instructions, when available.
2019-05-30 09:52:57 +03:00
config CRYPTO_XXHASH
tristate "xxHash hash algorithm"
select CRYPTO_HASH
select XXHASH
help
xxHash non-cryptographic hash algorithm. Extremely fast, working at
speeds close to RAM limits.
2013-09-07 06:56:26 +04:00
config CRYPTO_CRCT10DIF
tristate "CRCT10DIF algorithm"
select CRYPTO_HASH
help
CRC T10 Data Integrity Field computation is being cast as
a crypto transform. This allows for faster crc t10 diff
transforms to be used if they are available.
config CRYPTO_CRCT10DIF_PCLMUL
tristate "CRCT10DIF PCLMULQDQ hardware acceleration"
depends on X86 && 64BIT && CRC_T10DIF
select CRYPTO_HASH
help
For x86_64 processors with SSE4.2 and PCLMULQDQ supported,
CRC T10 DIF PCLMULQDQ computation can be hardware
accelerated PCLMULQDQ instruction. This option will create
2018-12-28 13:09:40 +03:00
'crct10dif-pclmul' module, which is faster when computing the
2013-09-07 06:56:26 +04:00
crct10dif checksum as compared with the generic table implementation.
2017-03-15 15:37:36 +03:00
config CRYPTO_CRCT10DIF_VPMSUM
tristate "CRC32T10DIF powerpc64 hardware acceleration"
depends on PPC64 && ALTIVEC && CRC_T10DIF
select CRYPTO_HASH
help
CRC10T10DIF algorithm implemented using vector polynomial
multiply-sum (vpmsum) instructions, introduced in POWER8. Enable on
POWER8 and newer processors for improved performance.
2017-03-15 15:37:37 +03:00
config CRYPTO_VPMSUM_TESTER
tristate "Powerpc64 vpmsum hardware acceleration tester"
depends on CRYPTO_CRCT10DIF_VPMSUM && CRYPTO_CRC32C_VPMSUM
help
Stress test for CRC32c and CRC-T10DIF algorithms implemented with
POWER8 vpmsum instructions.
Unless you are testing these algorithms, you don't need this.
2009-08-06 09:32:38 +04:00
config CRYPTO_GHASH
2019-07-20 09:09:18 +03:00
tristate "GHASH hash function"
2009-08-06 09:32:38 +04:00
select CRYPTO_GF128MUL
2016-01-25 19:51:21 +03:00
select CRYPTO_HASH
2009-08-06 09:32:38 +04:00
help
2019-07-20 09:09:18 +03:00
GHASH is the hash function used in GCM (Galois/Counter Mode).
It is not a general-purpose cryptographic hash function.
2009-08-06 09:32:38 +04:00
2015-06-01 14:43:58 +03:00
config CRYPTO_POLY1305
tristate "Poly1305 authenticator algorithm"
2016-01-25 19:51:21 +03:00
select CRYPTO_HASH
2015-06-01 14:43:58 +03:00
help
Poly1305 authenticator algorithm, RFC7539.
Poly1305 is an authenticator algorithm designed by Daniel J. Bernstein.
It is used for the ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD, specified in RFC7539 for use
in IETF protocols. This is the portable C implementation of Poly1305.
crypto: poly1305 - Add a SSE2 SIMD variant for x86_64
Implements an x86_64 assembler driver for the Poly1305 authenticator. This
single block variant holds the 130-bit integer in 5 32-bit words, but uses
SSE to do two multiplications/additions in parallel.
When calling updates with small blocks, the overhead for kernel_fpu_begin/
kernel_fpu_end() negates the perfmance gain. We therefore use the
poly1305-generic fallback for small updates.
For large messages, throughput increases by ~5-10% compared to
poly1305-generic:
testing speed of poly1305 (poly1305-generic)
test 0 ( 96 byte blocks, 16 bytes per update, 6 updates): 4080026 opers/sec, 391682496 bytes/sec
test 1 ( 96 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 3 updates): 6221094 opers/sec, 597225024 bytes/sec
test 2 ( 96 byte blocks, 96 bytes per update, 1 updates): 9609750 opers/sec, 922536057 bytes/sec
test 3 ( 288 byte blocks, 16 bytes per update, 18 updates): 1459379 opers/sec, 420301267 bytes/sec
test 4 ( 288 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 9 updates): 2115179 opers/sec, 609171609 bytes/sec
test 5 ( 288 byte blocks, 288 bytes per update, 1 updates): 3729874 opers/sec, 1074203856 bytes/sec
test 6 ( 1056 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 33 updates): 593000 opers/sec, 626208000 bytes/sec
test 7 ( 1056 byte blocks, 1056 bytes per update, 1 updates): 1081536 opers/sec, 1142102332 bytes/sec
test 8 ( 2080 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 65 updates): 302077 opers/sec, 628320576 bytes/sec
test 9 ( 2080 byte blocks, 2080 bytes per update, 1 updates): 554384 opers/sec, 1153120176 bytes/sec
test 10 ( 4128 byte blocks, 4128 bytes per update, 1 updates): 278715 opers/sec, 1150536345 bytes/sec
test 11 ( 8224 byte blocks, 8224 bytes per update, 1 updates): 140202 opers/sec, 1153022070 bytes/sec
testing speed of poly1305 (poly1305-simd)
test 0 ( 96 byte blocks, 16 bytes per update, 6 updates): 3790063 opers/sec, 363846076 bytes/sec
test 1 ( 96 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 3 updates): 5913378 opers/sec, 567684355 bytes/sec
test 2 ( 96 byte blocks, 96 bytes per update, 1 updates): 9352574 opers/sec, 897847104 bytes/sec
test 3 ( 288 byte blocks, 16 bytes per update, 18 updates): 1362145 opers/sec, 392297990 bytes/sec
test 4 ( 288 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 9 updates): 2007075 opers/sec, 578037628 bytes/sec
test 5 ( 288 byte blocks, 288 bytes per update, 1 updates): 3709811 opers/sec, 1068425798 bytes/sec
test 6 ( 1056 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 33 updates): 566272 opers/sec, 597984182 bytes/sec
test 7 ( 1056 byte blocks, 1056 bytes per update, 1 updates): 1111657 opers/sec, 1173910108 bytes/sec
test 8 ( 2080 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 65 updates): 288857 opers/sec, 600823808 bytes/sec
test 9 ( 2080 byte blocks, 2080 bytes per update, 1 updates): 590746 opers/sec, 1228751888 bytes/sec
test 10 ( 4128 byte blocks, 4128 bytes per update, 1 updates): 301825 opers/sec, 1245936902 bytes/sec
test 11 ( 8224 byte blocks, 8224 bytes per update, 1 updates): 153075 opers/sec, 1258896201 bytes/sec
Benchmark results from a Core i5-4670T.
Signed-off-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2015-07-16 20:14:06 +03:00
config CRYPTO_POLY1305_X86_64
crypto: poly1305 - Add a four block AVX2 variant for x86_64
Extends the x86_64 Poly1305 authenticator by a function processing four
consecutive Poly1305 blocks in parallel using AVX2 instructions.
For large messages, throughput increases by ~15-45% compared to two
block SSE2:
testing speed of poly1305 (poly1305-simd)
test 0 ( 96 byte blocks, 16 bytes per update, 6 updates): 3809514 opers/sec, 365713411 bytes/sec
test 1 ( 96 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 3 updates): 5973423 opers/sec, 573448627 bytes/sec
test 2 ( 96 byte blocks, 96 bytes per update, 1 updates): 9446779 opers/sec, 906890803 bytes/sec
test 3 ( 288 byte blocks, 16 bytes per update, 18 updates): 1364814 opers/sec, 393066691 bytes/sec
test 4 ( 288 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 9 updates): 2045780 opers/sec, 589184697 bytes/sec
test 5 ( 288 byte blocks, 288 bytes per update, 1 updates): 3711946 opers/sec, 1069040592 bytes/sec
test 6 ( 1056 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 33 updates): 573686 opers/sec, 605812732 bytes/sec
test 7 ( 1056 byte blocks, 1056 bytes per update, 1 updates): 1647802 opers/sec, 1740079440 bytes/sec
test 8 ( 2080 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 65 updates): 292970 opers/sec, 609378224 bytes/sec
test 9 ( 2080 byte blocks, 2080 bytes per update, 1 updates): 943229 opers/sec, 1961916528 bytes/sec
test 10 ( 4128 byte blocks, 4128 bytes per update, 1 updates): 494623 opers/sec, 2041804569 bytes/sec
test 11 ( 8224 byte blocks, 8224 bytes per update, 1 updates): 254045 opers/sec, 2089271014 bytes/sec
testing speed of poly1305 (poly1305-simd)
test 0 ( 96 byte blocks, 16 bytes per update, 6 updates): 3826224 opers/sec, 367317552 bytes/sec
test 1 ( 96 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 3 updates): 5948638 opers/sec, 571069267 bytes/sec
test 2 ( 96 byte blocks, 96 bytes per update, 1 updates): 9439110 opers/sec, 906154627 bytes/sec
test 3 ( 288 byte blocks, 16 bytes per update, 18 updates): 1367756 opers/sec, 393913872 bytes/sec
test 4 ( 288 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 9 updates): 2056881 opers/sec, 592381958 bytes/sec
test 5 ( 288 byte blocks, 288 bytes per update, 1 updates): 3711153 opers/sec, 1068812179 bytes/sec
test 6 ( 1056 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 33 updates): 574940 opers/sec, 607136745 bytes/sec
test 7 ( 1056 byte blocks, 1056 bytes per update, 1 updates): 1948830 opers/sec, 2057964585 bytes/sec
test 8 ( 2080 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 65 updates): 293308 opers/sec, 610082096 bytes/sec
test 9 ( 2080 byte blocks, 2080 bytes per update, 1 updates): 1235224 opers/sec, 2569267792 bytes/sec
test 10 ( 4128 byte blocks, 4128 bytes per update, 1 updates): 684405 opers/sec, 2825226316 bytes/sec
test 11 ( 8224 byte blocks, 8224 bytes per update, 1 updates): 367101 opers/sec, 3019039446 bytes/sec
Benchmark results from a Core i5-4670T.
Signed-off-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2015-07-16 20:14:08 +03:00
tristate "Poly1305 authenticator algorithm (x86_64/SSE2/AVX2)"
crypto: poly1305 - Add a SSE2 SIMD variant for x86_64
Implements an x86_64 assembler driver for the Poly1305 authenticator. This
single block variant holds the 130-bit integer in 5 32-bit words, but uses
SSE to do two multiplications/additions in parallel.
When calling updates with small blocks, the overhead for kernel_fpu_begin/
kernel_fpu_end() negates the perfmance gain. We therefore use the
poly1305-generic fallback for small updates.
For large messages, throughput increases by ~5-10% compared to
poly1305-generic:
testing speed of poly1305 (poly1305-generic)
test 0 ( 96 byte blocks, 16 bytes per update, 6 updates): 4080026 opers/sec, 391682496 bytes/sec
test 1 ( 96 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 3 updates): 6221094 opers/sec, 597225024 bytes/sec
test 2 ( 96 byte blocks, 96 bytes per update, 1 updates): 9609750 opers/sec, 922536057 bytes/sec
test 3 ( 288 byte blocks, 16 bytes per update, 18 updates): 1459379 opers/sec, 420301267 bytes/sec
test 4 ( 288 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 9 updates): 2115179 opers/sec, 609171609 bytes/sec
test 5 ( 288 byte blocks, 288 bytes per update, 1 updates): 3729874 opers/sec, 1074203856 bytes/sec
test 6 ( 1056 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 33 updates): 593000 opers/sec, 626208000 bytes/sec
test 7 ( 1056 byte blocks, 1056 bytes per update, 1 updates): 1081536 opers/sec, 1142102332 bytes/sec
test 8 ( 2080 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 65 updates): 302077 opers/sec, 628320576 bytes/sec
test 9 ( 2080 byte blocks, 2080 bytes per update, 1 updates): 554384 opers/sec, 1153120176 bytes/sec
test 10 ( 4128 byte blocks, 4128 bytes per update, 1 updates): 278715 opers/sec, 1150536345 bytes/sec
test 11 ( 8224 byte blocks, 8224 bytes per update, 1 updates): 140202 opers/sec, 1153022070 bytes/sec
testing speed of poly1305 (poly1305-simd)
test 0 ( 96 byte blocks, 16 bytes per update, 6 updates): 3790063 opers/sec, 363846076 bytes/sec
test 1 ( 96 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 3 updates): 5913378 opers/sec, 567684355 bytes/sec
test 2 ( 96 byte blocks, 96 bytes per update, 1 updates): 9352574 opers/sec, 897847104 bytes/sec
test 3 ( 288 byte blocks, 16 bytes per update, 18 updates): 1362145 opers/sec, 392297990 bytes/sec
test 4 ( 288 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 9 updates): 2007075 opers/sec, 578037628 bytes/sec
test 5 ( 288 byte blocks, 288 bytes per update, 1 updates): 3709811 opers/sec, 1068425798 bytes/sec
test 6 ( 1056 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 33 updates): 566272 opers/sec, 597984182 bytes/sec
test 7 ( 1056 byte blocks, 1056 bytes per update, 1 updates): 1111657 opers/sec, 1173910108 bytes/sec
test 8 ( 2080 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 65 updates): 288857 opers/sec, 600823808 bytes/sec
test 9 ( 2080 byte blocks, 2080 bytes per update, 1 updates): 590746 opers/sec, 1228751888 bytes/sec
test 10 ( 4128 byte blocks, 4128 bytes per update, 1 updates): 301825 opers/sec, 1245936902 bytes/sec
test 11 ( 8224 byte blocks, 8224 bytes per update, 1 updates): 153075 opers/sec, 1258896201 bytes/sec
Benchmark results from a Core i5-4670T.
Signed-off-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2015-07-16 20:14:06 +03:00
depends on X86 && 64BIT
select CRYPTO_POLY1305
help
Poly1305 authenticator algorithm, RFC7539.
Poly1305 is an authenticator algorithm designed by Daniel J. Bernstein.
It is used for the ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD, specified in RFC7539 for use
in IETF protocols. This is the x86_64 assembler implementation using SIMD
instructions.
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
config CRYPTO_MD4
tristate "MD4 digest algorithm"
2008-12-03 14:55:27 +03:00
select CRYPTO_HASH
2007-04-16 14:49:20 +04:00
help
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
MD4 message digest algorithm (RFC1320).
2007-04-16 14:49:20 +04:00
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
config CRYPTO_MD5
tristate "MD5 digest algorithm"
2008-12-03 14:57:12 +03:00
select CRYPTO_HASH
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
help
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
MD5 message digest algorithm (RFC1321).
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
2014-12-21 23:54:02 +03:00
config CRYPTO_MD5_OCTEON
tristate "MD5 digest algorithm (OCTEON)"
depends on CPU_CAVIUM_OCTEON
select CRYPTO_MD5
select CRYPTO_HASH
help
MD5 message digest algorithm (RFC1321) implemented
using OCTEON crypto instructions, when available.
2015-03-01 21:30:46 +03:00
config CRYPTO_MD5_PPC
tristate "MD5 digest algorithm (PPC)"
depends on PPC
select CRYPTO_HASH
help
MD5 message digest algorithm (RFC1321) implemented
in PPC assembler.
2012-08-20 08:51:26 +04:00
config CRYPTO_MD5_SPARC64
tristate "MD5 digest algorithm (SPARC64)"
depends on SPARC64
select CRYPTO_MD5
select CRYPTO_HASH
help
MD5 message digest algorithm (RFC1321) implemented
using sparc64 crypto instructions, when available.
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
config CRYPTO_MICHAEL_MIC
tristate "Michael MIC keyed digest algorithm"
2008-12-07 14:35:38 +03:00
select CRYPTO_HASH
2006-12-16 04:13:14 +03:00
help
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
Michael MIC is used for message integrity protection in TKIP
(IEEE 802.11i). This algorithm is required for TKIP, but it
should not be used for other purposes because of the weakness
of the algorithm.
2006-12-16 04:13:14 +03:00
2008-05-07 18:17:37 +04:00
config CRYPTO_RMD128
2008-07-16 15:28:00 +04:00
tristate "RIPEMD-128 digest algorithm"
2008-11-08 04:10:40 +03:00
select CRYPTO_HASH
2008-07-16 15:28:00 +04:00
help
RIPEMD-128 (ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004).
2008-05-07 18:17:37 +04:00
2008-07-16 15:28:00 +04:00
RIPEMD-128 is a 128-bit cryptographic hash function. It should only
2011-07-09 08:02:31 +04:00
be used as a secure replacement for RIPEMD. For other use cases,
2008-07-16 15:28:00 +04:00
RIPEMD-160 should be used.
2008-05-07 18:17:37 +04:00
2008-07-16 15:28:00 +04:00
Developed by Hans Dobbertin, Antoon Bosselaers and Bart Preneel.
2010-09-12 06:42:47 +04:00
See <http://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/~bosselae/ripemd160.html>
2008-05-07 18:17:37 +04:00
config CRYPTO_RMD160
2008-07-16 15:28:00 +04:00
tristate "RIPEMD-160 digest algorithm"
2008-11-08 04:18:51 +03:00
select CRYPTO_HASH
2008-07-16 15:28:00 +04:00
help
RIPEMD-160 (ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004).
2008-05-07 18:17:37 +04:00
2008-07-16 15:28:00 +04:00
RIPEMD-160 is a 160-bit cryptographic hash function. It is intended
to be used as a secure replacement for the 128-bit hash functions
MD4, MD5 and it's predecessor RIPEMD
(not to be confused with RIPEMD-128).
2008-05-07 18:17:37 +04:00
2008-07-16 15:28:00 +04:00
It's speed is comparable to SHA1 and there are no known attacks
against RIPEMD-160.
2008-05-09 17:30:27 +04:00
2008-07-16 15:28:00 +04:00
Developed by Hans Dobbertin, Antoon Bosselaers and Bart Preneel.
2010-09-12 06:42:47 +04:00
See <http://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/~bosselae/ripemd160.html>
2008-05-09 17:30:27 +04:00
config CRYPTO_RMD256
2008-07-16 15:28:00 +04:00
tristate "RIPEMD-256 digest algorithm"
2008-11-08 04:58:10 +03:00
select CRYPTO_HASH
2008-07-16 15:28:00 +04:00
help
RIPEMD-256 is an optional extension of RIPEMD-128 with a
256 bit hash. It is intended for applications that require
longer hash-results, without needing a larger security level
(than RIPEMD-128).
2008-05-09 17:30:27 +04:00
2008-07-16 15:28:00 +04:00
Developed by Hans Dobbertin, Antoon Bosselaers and Bart Preneel.
2010-09-12 06:42:47 +04:00
See <http://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/~bosselae/ripemd160.html>
2008-05-09 17:30:27 +04:00
config CRYPTO_RMD320
2008-07-16 15:28:00 +04:00
tristate "RIPEMD-320 digest algorithm"
2008-11-08 05:11:09 +03:00
select CRYPTO_HASH
2008-07-16 15:28:00 +04:00
help
RIPEMD-320 is an optional extension of RIPEMD-160 with a
320 bit hash. It is intended for applications that require
longer hash-results, without needing a larger security level
(than RIPEMD-160).
2008-05-09 17:30:27 +04:00
2008-07-16 15:28:00 +04:00
Developed by Hans Dobbertin, Antoon Bosselaers and Bart Preneel.
2010-09-12 06:42:47 +04:00
See <http://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/~bosselae/ripemd160.html>
2008-05-07 18:17:37 +04:00
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
config CRYPTO_SHA1
tristate "SHA1 digest algorithm"
2008-12-02 16:08:20 +03:00
select CRYPTO_HASH
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
help
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
SHA-1 secure hash standard (FIPS 180-1/DFIPS 180-2).
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
2011-08-04 22:19:25 +04:00
config CRYPTO_SHA1_SSSE3
2015-09-11 01:27:26 +03:00
tristate "SHA1 digest algorithm (SSSE3/AVX/AVX2/SHA-NI)"
2011-08-04 22:19:25 +04:00
depends on X86 && 64BIT
select CRYPTO_SHA1
select CRYPTO_HASH
help
SHA-1 secure hash standard (FIPS 180-1/DFIPS 180-2) implemented
using Supplemental SSE3 (SSSE3) instructions or Advanced Vector
2015-09-11 01:27:26 +03:00
Extensions (AVX/AVX2) or SHA-NI(SHA Extensions New Instructions),
when available.
2011-08-04 22:19:25 +04:00
2013-03-27 00:59:17 +04:00
config CRYPTO_SHA256_SSSE3
2015-09-11 01:27:26 +03:00
tristate "SHA256 digest algorithm (SSSE3/AVX/AVX2/SHA-NI)"
2013-03-27 00:59:17 +04:00
depends on X86 && 64BIT
select CRYPTO_SHA256
select CRYPTO_HASH
help
SHA-256 secure hash standard (DFIPS 180-2) implemented
using Supplemental SSE3 (SSSE3) instructions, or Advanced Vector
Extensions version 1 (AVX1), or Advanced Vector Extensions
2015-09-11 01:27:26 +03:00
version 2 (AVX2) instructions, or SHA-NI (SHA Extensions New
Instructions) when available.
2013-03-27 01:00:02 +04:00
config CRYPTO_SHA512_SSSE3
tristate "SHA512 digest algorithm (SSSE3/AVX/AVX2)"
depends on X86 && 64BIT
select CRYPTO_SHA512
select CRYPTO_HASH
help
SHA-512 secure hash standard (DFIPS 180-2) implemented
using Supplemental SSE3 (SSSE3) instructions, or Advanced Vector
Extensions version 1 (AVX1), or Advanced Vector Extensions
2013-03-27 00:59:17 +04:00
version 2 (AVX2) instructions, when available.
2015-03-08 23:07:47 +03:00
config CRYPTO_SHA1_OCTEON
tristate "SHA1 digest algorithm (OCTEON)"
depends on CPU_CAVIUM_OCTEON
select CRYPTO_SHA1
select CRYPTO_HASH
help
SHA-1 secure hash standard (FIPS 180-1/DFIPS 180-2) implemented
using OCTEON crypto instructions, when available.
2012-08-20 02:41:53 +04:00
config CRYPTO_SHA1_SPARC64
tristate "SHA1 digest algorithm (SPARC64)"
depends on SPARC64
select CRYPTO_SHA1
select CRYPTO_HASH
help
SHA-1 secure hash standard (FIPS 180-1/DFIPS 180-2) implemented
using sparc64 crypto instructions, when available.
2012-09-14 03:00:49 +04:00
config CRYPTO_SHA1_PPC
tristate "SHA1 digest algorithm (powerpc)"
depends on PPC
help
This is the powerpc hardware accelerated implementation of the
SHA-1 secure hash standard (FIPS 180-1/DFIPS 180-2).
2015-02-24 22:36:50 +03:00
config CRYPTO_SHA1_PPC_SPE
tristate "SHA1 digest algorithm (PPC SPE)"
depends on PPC && SPE
help
SHA-1 secure hash standard (DFIPS 180-4) implemented
using powerpc SPE SIMD instruction set.
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
config CRYPTO_SHA256
tristate "SHA224 and SHA256 digest algorithm"
2008-12-03 14:57:49 +03:00
select CRYPTO_HASH
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
help
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
SHA256 secure hash standard (DFIPS 180-2).
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
This version of SHA implements a 256 bit hash with 128 bits of
security against collision attacks.
2006-06-20 14:37:23 +04:00
2008-07-16 15:28:00 +04:00
This code also includes SHA-224, a 224 bit hash with 112 bits
of security against collision attacks.
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
2015-01-30 17:39:34 +03:00
config CRYPTO_SHA256_PPC_SPE
tristate "SHA224 and SHA256 digest algorithm (PPC SPE)"
depends on PPC && SPE
select CRYPTO_SHA256
select CRYPTO_HASH
help
SHA224 and SHA256 secure hash standard (DFIPS 180-2)
implemented using powerpc SPE SIMD instruction set.
2015-03-08 23:07:47 +03:00
config CRYPTO_SHA256_OCTEON
tristate "SHA224 and SHA256 digest algorithm (OCTEON)"
depends on CPU_CAVIUM_OCTEON
select CRYPTO_SHA256
select CRYPTO_HASH
help
SHA-256 secure hash standard (DFIPS 180-2) implemented
using OCTEON crypto instructions, when available.
2012-08-20 04:11:37 +04:00
config CRYPTO_SHA256_SPARC64
tristate "SHA224 and SHA256 digest algorithm (SPARC64)"
depends on SPARC64
select CRYPTO_SHA256
select CRYPTO_HASH
help
SHA-256 secure hash standard (DFIPS 180-2) implemented
using sparc64 crypto instructions, when available.
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
config CRYPTO_SHA512
tristate "SHA384 and SHA512 digest algorithms"
2008-12-17 08:49:02 +03:00
select CRYPTO_HASH
2006-06-20 14:59:16 +04:00
help
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
SHA512 secure hash standard (DFIPS 180-2).
2006-06-20 14:59:16 +04:00
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
This version of SHA implements a 512 bit hash with 256 bits of
security against collision attacks.
2006-06-20 14:59:16 +04:00
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
This code also includes SHA-384, a 384 bit hash with 192 bits
of security against collision attacks.
2006-06-20 14:59:16 +04:00
2015-03-08 23:07:47 +03:00
config CRYPTO_SHA512_OCTEON
tristate "SHA384 and SHA512 digest algorithms (OCTEON)"
depends on CPU_CAVIUM_OCTEON
select CRYPTO_SHA512
select CRYPTO_HASH
help
SHA-512 secure hash standard (DFIPS 180-2) implemented
using OCTEON crypto instructions, when available.
2012-08-20 04:37:56 +04:00
config CRYPTO_SHA512_SPARC64
tristate "SHA384 and SHA512 digest algorithm (SPARC64)"
depends on SPARC64
select CRYPTO_SHA512
select CRYPTO_HASH
help
SHA-512 secure hash standard (DFIPS 180-2) implemented
using sparc64 crypto instructions, when available.
2016-06-17 08:00:35 +03:00
config CRYPTO_SHA3
tristate "SHA3 digest algorithm"
select CRYPTO_HASH
help
SHA-3 secure hash standard (DFIPS 202). It's based on
cryptographic sponge function family called Keccak.
References:
http://keccak.noekeon.org/
2017-08-21 13:51:28 +03:00
config CRYPTO_SM3
tristate "SM3 digest algorithm"
select CRYPTO_HASH
help
SM3 secure hash function as defined by OSCCA GM/T 0004-2012 SM3).
It is part of the Chinese Commercial Cryptography suite.
References:
http://www.oscca.gov.cn/UpFile/20101222141857786.pdf
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-shen-sm3-hash
2018-11-07 00:00:01 +03:00
config CRYPTO_STREEBOG
tristate "Streebog Hash Function"
select CRYPTO_HASH
help
Streebog Hash Function (GOST R 34.11-2012, RFC 6986) is one of the Russian
cryptographic standard algorithms (called GOST algorithms).
This setting enables two hash algorithms with 256 and 512 bits output.
References:
https://tc26.ru/upload/iblock/fed/feddbb4d26b685903faa2ba11aea43f6.pdf
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6986
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
config CRYPTO_TGR192
tristate "Tiger digest algorithms"
2008-12-03 14:58:32 +03:00
select CRYPTO_HASH
2006-06-20 15:12:02 +04:00
help
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
Tiger hash algorithm 192, 160 and 128-bit hashes
2006-06-20 15:12:02 +04:00
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
Tiger is a hash function optimized for 64-bit processors while
still having decent performance on 32-bit processors.
Tiger was developed by Ross Anderson and Eli Biham.
2006-06-20 15:12:02 +04:00
See also:
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
<http://www.cs.technion.ac.il/~biham/Reports/Tiger/>.
2006-06-20 15:12:02 +04:00
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
config CRYPTO_WP512
tristate "Whirlpool digest algorithms"
2008-12-07 14:34:37 +03:00
select CRYPTO_HASH
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
help
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
Whirlpool hash algorithm 512, 384 and 256-bit hashes
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
Whirlpool-512 is part of the NESSIE cryptographic primitives.
Whirlpool will be part of the ISO/IEC 10118-3:2003(E) standard
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
See also:
2010-09-12 06:42:47 +04:00
<http://www.larc.usp.br/~pbarreto/WhirlpoolPage.html>
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
2009-10-19 06:53:06 +04:00
config CRYPTO_GHASH_CLMUL_NI_INTEL
2019-07-20 09:09:18 +03:00
tristate "GHASH hash function (CLMUL-NI accelerated)"
2011-06-08 16:56:29 +04:00
depends on X86 && 64BIT
2009-10-19 06:53:06 +04:00
select CRYPTO_CRYPTD
help
2019-07-20 09:09:18 +03:00
This is the x86_64 CLMUL-NI accelerated implementation of
GHASH, the hash function used in GCM (Galois/Counter mode).
2009-10-19 06:53:06 +04:00
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
comment "Ciphers"
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
2019-07-02 22:41:22 +03:00
config CRYPTO_LIB_AES
tristate
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
config CRYPTO_AES
tristate "AES cipher algorithms"
2006-08-21 15:08:13 +04:00
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
2019-07-02 22:41:33 +03:00
select CRYPTO_LIB_AES
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
help
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
AES cipher algorithms (FIPS-197). AES uses the Rijndael
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
algorithm.
Rijndael appears to be consistently a very good performer in
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
both hardware and software across a wide range of computing
environments regardless of its use in feedback or non-feedback
modes. Its key setup time is excellent, and its key agility is
good. Rijndael's very low memory requirements make it very well
suited for restricted-space environments, in which it also
demonstrates excellent performance. Rijndael's operations are
among the easiest to defend against power and timing attacks.
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
The AES specifies three key sizes: 128, 192 and 256 bits
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
See <http://csrc.nist.gov/CryptoToolkit/aes/> for more information.
crypto: aes - add generic time invariant AES cipher
Lookup table based AES is sensitive to timing attacks, which is due to
the fact that such table lookups are data dependent, and the fact that
8 KB worth of tables covers a significant number of cachelines on any
architecture, resulting in an exploitable correlation between the key
and the processing time for known plaintexts.
For network facing algorithms such as CTR, CCM or GCM, this presents a
security risk, which is why arch specific AES ports are typically time
invariant, either through the use of special instructions, or by using
SIMD algorithms that don't rely on table lookups.
For generic code, this is difficult to achieve without losing too much
performance, but we can improve the situation significantly by switching
to an implementation that only needs 256 bytes of table data (the actual
S-box itself), which can be prefetched at the start of each block to
eliminate data dependent latencies.
This code encrypts at ~25 cycles per byte on ARM Cortex-A57 (while the
ordinary generic AES driver manages 18 cycles per byte on this
hardware). Decryption is substantially slower.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-02-02 19:37:40 +03:00
config CRYPTO_AES_TI
tristate "Fixed time AES cipher"
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
2019-07-02 22:41:22 +03:00
select CRYPTO_LIB_AES
crypto: aes - add generic time invariant AES cipher
Lookup table based AES is sensitive to timing attacks, which is due to
the fact that such table lookups are data dependent, and the fact that
8 KB worth of tables covers a significant number of cachelines on any
architecture, resulting in an exploitable correlation between the key
and the processing time for known plaintexts.
For network facing algorithms such as CTR, CCM or GCM, this presents a
security risk, which is why arch specific AES ports are typically time
invariant, either through the use of special instructions, or by using
SIMD algorithms that don't rely on table lookups.
For generic code, this is difficult to achieve without losing too much
performance, but we can improve the situation significantly by switching
to an implementation that only needs 256 bytes of table data (the actual
S-box itself), which can be prefetched at the start of each block to
eliminate data dependent latencies.
This code encrypts at ~25 cycles per byte on ARM Cortex-A57 (while the
ordinary generic AES driver manages 18 cycles per byte on this
hardware). Decryption is substantially slower.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-02-02 19:37:40 +03:00
help
This is a generic implementation of AES that attempts to eliminate
data dependent latencies as much as possible without affecting
performance too much. It is intended for use by the generic CCM
and GCM drivers, and other CTR or CMAC/XCBC based modes that rely
solely on encryption (although decryption is supported as well, but
with a more dramatic performance hit)
Instead of using 16 lookup tables of 1 KB each, (8 for encryption and
8 for decryption), this implementation only uses just two S-boxes of
256 bytes each, and attempts to eliminate data dependent latencies by
prefetching the entire table into the cache at the start of each
2018-10-18 07:37:58 +03:00
block. Interrupts are also disabled to avoid races where cachelines
are evicted when the CPU is interrupted to do something else.
crypto: aes - add generic time invariant AES cipher
Lookup table based AES is sensitive to timing attacks, which is due to
the fact that such table lookups are data dependent, and the fact that
8 KB worth of tables covers a significant number of cachelines on any
architecture, resulting in an exploitable correlation between the key
and the processing time for known plaintexts.
For network facing algorithms such as CTR, CCM or GCM, this presents a
security risk, which is why arch specific AES ports are typically time
invariant, either through the use of special instructions, or by using
SIMD algorithms that don't rely on table lookups.
For generic code, this is difficult to achieve without losing too much
performance, but we can improve the situation significantly by switching
to an implementation that only needs 256 bytes of table data (the actual
S-box itself), which can be prefetched at the start of each block to
eliminate data dependent latencies.
This code encrypts at ~25 cycles per byte on ARM Cortex-A57 (while the
ordinary generic AES driver manages 18 cycles per byte on this
hardware). Decryption is substantially slower.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-02-02 19:37:40 +03:00
2009-01-18 08:28:34 +03:00
config CRYPTO_AES_NI_INTEL
tristate "AES cipher algorithms (AES-NI)"
2011-06-08 16:56:29 +04:00
depends on X86
2016-11-22 15:08:33 +03:00
select CRYPTO_AEAD
2019-07-02 22:41:23 +03:00
select CRYPTO_LIB_AES
2009-01-18 08:28:34 +03:00
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
2016-11-22 15:08:33 +03:00
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
2013-04-10 19:39:20 +04:00
select CRYPTO_GLUE_HELPER_X86 if 64BIT
2016-11-22 15:08:33 +03:00
select CRYPTO_SIMD
2009-01-18 08:28:34 +03:00
help
Use Intel AES-NI instructions for AES algorithm.
AES cipher algorithms (FIPS-197). AES uses the Rijndael
algorithm.
Rijndael appears to be consistently a very good performer in
both hardware and software across a wide range of computing
environments regardless of its use in feedback or non-feedback
modes. Its key setup time is excellent, and its key agility is
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
good. Rijndael's very low memory requirements make it very well
suited for restricted-space environments, in which it also
demonstrates excellent performance. Rijndael's operations are
among the easiest to defend against power and timing attacks.
2005-07-07 00:55:00 +04:00
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
The AES specifies three key sizes: 128, 192 and 256 bits
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
See <http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/aes/> for more information.
crypto: aesni-intel - Ported implementation to x86-32
The AES-NI instructions are also available in legacy mode so the 32-bit
architecture may profit from those, too.
To illustrate the performance gain here's a short summary of a dm-crypt
speed test on a Core i7 M620 running at 2.67GHz comparing both assembler
implementations:
x86: i568 aes-ni delta
ECB, 256 bit: 93.8 MB/s 123.3 MB/s +31.4%
CBC, 256 bit: 84.8 MB/s 262.3 MB/s +209.3%
LRW, 256 bit: 108.6 MB/s 222.1 MB/s +104.5%
XTS, 256 bit: 105.0 MB/s 205.5 MB/s +95.7%
Additionally, due to some minor optimizations, the 64-bit version also
got a minor performance gain as seen below:
x86-64: old impl. new impl. delta
ECB, 256 bit: 121.1 MB/s 123.0 MB/s +1.5%
CBC, 256 bit: 285.3 MB/s 290.8 MB/s +1.9%
LRW, 256 bit: 263.7 MB/s 265.3 MB/s +0.6%
XTS, 256 bit: 251.1 MB/s 255.3 MB/s +1.7%
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Reviewed-by: Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2010-11-27 11:34:46 +03:00
In addition to AES cipher algorithm support, the acceleration
for some popular block cipher mode is supported too, including
2018-09-24 15:48:16 +03:00
ECB, CBC, LRW, XTS. The 64 bit version has additional
crypto: aesni-intel - Ported implementation to x86-32
The AES-NI instructions are also available in legacy mode so the 32-bit
architecture may profit from those, too.
To illustrate the performance gain here's a short summary of a dm-crypt
speed test on a Core i7 M620 running at 2.67GHz comparing both assembler
implementations:
x86: i568 aes-ni delta
ECB, 256 bit: 93.8 MB/s 123.3 MB/s +31.4%
CBC, 256 bit: 84.8 MB/s 262.3 MB/s +209.3%
LRW, 256 bit: 108.6 MB/s 222.1 MB/s +104.5%
XTS, 256 bit: 105.0 MB/s 205.5 MB/s +95.7%
Additionally, due to some minor optimizations, the 64-bit version also
got a minor performance gain as seen below:
x86-64: old impl. new impl. delta
ECB, 256 bit: 121.1 MB/s 123.0 MB/s +1.5%
CBC, 256 bit: 285.3 MB/s 290.8 MB/s +1.9%
LRW, 256 bit: 263.7 MB/s 265.3 MB/s +0.6%
XTS, 256 bit: 251.1 MB/s 255.3 MB/s +1.7%
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Reviewed-by: Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2010-11-27 11:34:46 +03:00
acceleration for CTR.
2009-03-29 11:41:20 +04:00
2012-08-21 14:58:13 +04:00
config CRYPTO_AES_SPARC64
tristate "AES cipher algorithms (SPARC64)"
depends on SPARC64
select CRYPTO_CRYPTD
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
help
Use SPARC64 crypto opcodes for AES algorithm.
AES cipher algorithms (FIPS-197). AES uses the Rijndael
algorithm.
Rijndael appears to be consistently a very good performer in
both hardware and software across a wide range of computing
environments regardless of its use in feedback or non-feedback
modes. Its key setup time is excellent, and its key agility is
good. Rijndael's very low memory requirements make it very well
suited for restricted-space environments, in which it also
demonstrates excellent performance. Rijndael's operations are
among the easiest to defend against power and timing attacks.
The AES specifies three key sizes: 128, 192 and 256 bits
See <http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/aes/> for more information.
In addition to AES cipher algorithm support, the acceleration
for some popular block cipher mode is supported too, including
ECB and CBC.
2015-02-22 12:00:10 +03:00
config CRYPTO_AES_PPC_SPE
tristate "AES cipher algorithms (PPC SPE)"
depends on PPC && SPE
help
AES cipher algorithms (FIPS-197). Additionally the acceleration
for popular block cipher modes ECB, CBC, CTR and XTS is supported.
This module should only be used for low power (router) devices
without hardware AES acceleration (e.g. caam crypto). It reduces the
size of the AES tables from 16KB to 8KB + 256 bytes and mitigates
timining attacks. Nevertheless it might be not as secure as other
architecture specific assembler implementations that work on 1KB
tables or 256 bytes S-boxes.
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
config CRYPTO_ANUBIS
tristate "Anubis cipher algorithm"
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
help
Anubis cipher algorithm.
Anubis is a variable key length cipher which can use keys from
128 bits to 320 bits in length. It was evaluated as a entrant
in the NESSIE competition.
See also:
2010-09-12 06:42:47 +04:00
<https://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/nessie/reports/>
<http://www.larc.usp.br/~pbarreto/AnubisPage.html>
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
2019-06-12 19:19:53 +03:00
config CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4
tristate
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
config CRYPTO_ARC4
tristate "ARC4 cipher algorithm"
2012-06-26 20:13:46 +04:00
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
2019-06-12 19:19:53 +03:00
select CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
help
ARC4 cipher algorithm.
ARC4 is a stream cipher using keys ranging from 8 bits to 2048
bits in length. This algorithm is required for driver-based
WEP, but it should not be for other purposes because of the
weakness of the algorithm.
config CRYPTO_BLOWFISH
tristate "Blowfish cipher algorithm"
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
2011-09-02 02:45:07 +04:00
select CRYPTO_BLOWFISH_COMMON
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
help
Blowfish cipher algorithm, by Bruce Schneier.
This is a variable key length cipher which can use keys from 32
bits to 448 bits in length. It's fast, simple and specifically
designed for use on "large microprocessors".
See also:
<http://www.schneier.com/blowfish.html>
2011-09-02 02:45:07 +04:00
config CRYPTO_BLOWFISH_COMMON
tristate
help
Common parts of the Blowfish cipher algorithm shared by the
generic c and the assembler implementations.
See also:
<http://www.schneier.com/blowfish.html>
2011-09-02 02:45:22 +04:00
config CRYPTO_BLOWFISH_X86_64
tristate "Blowfish cipher algorithm (x86_64)"
2012-04-09 04:31:22 +04:00
depends on X86 && 64BIT
2018-02-20 10:48:16 +03:00
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
2011-09-02 02:45:22 +04:00
select CRYPTO_BLOWFISH_COMMON
help
Blowfish cipher algorithm (x86_64), by Bruce Schneier.
This is a variable key length cipher which can use keys from 32
bits to 448 bits in length. It's fast, simple and specifically
designed for use on "large microprocessors".
See also:
<http://www.schneier.com/blowfish.html>
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
config CRYPTO_CAMELLIA
tristate "Camellia cipher algorithms"
depends on CRYPTO
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
help
Camellia cipher algorithms module.
Camellia is a symmetric key block cipher developed jointly
at NTT and Mitsubishi Electric Corporation.
The Camellia specifies three key sizes: 128, 192 and 256 bits.
See also:
<https://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/camellia/index_s.html>
2012-03-05 22:26:47 +04:00
config CRYPTO_CAMELLIA_X86_64
tristate "Camellia cipher algorithm (x86_64)"
2012-04-09 04:31:22 +04:00
depends on X86 && 64BIT
2012-03-05 22:26:47 +04:00
depends on CRYPTO
2018-02-20 10:48:22 +03:00
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
2012-06-18 15:07:29 +04:00
select CRYPTO_GLUE_HELPER_X86
2012-03-05 22:26:47 +04:00
help
Camellia cipher algorithm module (x86_64).
Camellia is a symmetric key block cipher developed jointly
at NTT and Mitsubishi Electric Corporation.
The Camellia specifies three key sizes: 128, 192 and 256 bits.
See also:
2012-10-26 15:49:01 +04:00
<https://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/camellia/index_s.html>
config CRYPTO_CAMELLIA_AESNI_AVX_X86_64
tristate "Camellia cipher algorithm (x86_64/AES-NI/AVX)"
depends on X86 && 64BIT
depends on CRYPTO
2018-02-20 10:48:23 +03:00
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
2012-10-26 15:49:01 +04:00
select CRYPTO_CAMELLIA_X86_64
2018-02-20 10:48:23 +03:00
select CRYPTO_GLUE_HELPER_X86
select CRYPTO_SIMD
2012-10-26 15:49:01 +04:00
select CRYPTO_XTS
help
Camellia cipher algorithm module (x86_64/AES-NI/AVX).
Camellia is a symmetric key block cipher developed jointly
at NTT and Mitsubishi Electric Corporation.
The Camellia specifies three key sizes: 128, 192 and 256 bits.
See also:
2012-03-05 22:26:47 +04:00
<https://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/camellia/index_s.html>
2013-04-13 14:47:00 +04:00
config CRYPTO_CAMELLIA_AESNI_AVX2_X86_64
tristate "Camellia cipher algorithm (x86_64/AES-NI/AVX2)"
depends on X86 && 64BIT
depends on CRYPTO
select CRYPTO_CAMELLIA_AESNI_AVX_X86_64
help
Camellia cipher algorithm module (x86_64/AES-NI/AVX2).
Camellia is a symmetric key block cipher developed jointly
at NTT and Mitsubishi Electric Corporation.
The Camellia specifies three key sizes: 128, 192 and 256 bits.
See also:
<https://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/camellia/index_s.html>
2012-08-28 23:05:54 +04:00
config CRYPTO_CAMELLIA_SPARC64
tristate "Camellia cipher algorithm (SPARC64)"
depends on SPARC64
depends on CRYPTO
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
help
Camellia cipher algorithm module (SPARC64).
Camellia is a symmetric key block cipher developed jointly
at NTT and Mitsubishi Electric Corporation.
The Camellia specifies three key sizes: 128, 192 and 256 bits.
See also:
<https://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/camellia/index_s.html>
2012-11-13 13:43:14 +04:00
config CRYPTO_CAST_COMMON
tristate
help
Common parts of the CAST cipher algorithms shared by the
generic c and the assembler implementations.
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
config CRYPTO_CAST5
tristate "CAST5 (CAST-128) cipher algorithm"
2006-08-21 15:08:13 +04:00
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
2012-11-13 13:43:14 +04:00
select CRYPTO_CAST_COMMON
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
help
The CAST5 encryption algorithm (synonymous with CAST-128) is
described in RFC2144.
2012-07-11 21:37:37 +04:00
config CRYPTO_CAST5_AVX_X86_64
tristate "CAST5 (CAST-128) cipher algorithm (x86_64/AVX)"
depends on X86 && 64BIT
2018-02-20 10:48:13 +03:00
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
2012-07-11 21:37:37 +04:00
select CRYPTO_CAST5
2018-02-20 10:48:13 +03:00
select CRYPTO_CAST_COMMON
select CRYPTO_SIMD
2012-07-11 21:37:37 +04:00
help
The CAST5 encryption algorithm (synonymous with CAST-128) is
described in RFC2144.
This module provides the Cast5 cipher algorithm that processes
sixteen blocks parallel using the AVX instruction set.
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
config CRYPTO_CAST6
tristate "CAST6 (CAST-256) cipher algorithm"
2006-08-21 15:08:13 +04:00
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
2012-11-13 13:43:14 +04:00
select CRYPTO_CAST_COMMON
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
help
The CAST6 encryption algorithm (synonymous with CAST-256) is
described in RFC2612.
2012-07-11 21:38:57 +04:00
config CRYPTO_CAST6_AVX_X86_64
tristate "CAST6 (CAST-256) cipher algorithm (x86_64/AVX)"
depends on X86 && 64BIT
2018-02-20 10:48:15 +03:00
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
2012-07-11 21:38:57 +04:00
select CRYPTO_CAST6
2018-02-20 10:48:15 +03:00
select CRYPTO_CAST_COMMON
select CRYPTO_GLUE_HELPER_X86
select CRYPTO_SIMD
2012-07-11 21:38:57 +04:00
select CRYPTO_XTS
help
The CAST6 encryption algorithm (synonymous with CAST-256) is
described in RFC2612.
This module provides the Cast6 cipher algorithm that processes
eight blocks parallel using the AVX instruction set.
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
config CRYPTO_DES
tristate "DES and Triple DES EDE cipher algorithms"
2006-08-21 15:08:13 +04:00
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
help
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
DES cipher algorithm (FIPS 46-2), and Triple DES EDE (FIPS 46-3).
2005-09-02 04:42:46 +04:00
2012-08-26 09:37:23 +04:00
config CRYPTO_DES_SPARC64
tristate "DES and Triple DES EDE cipher algorithms (SPARC64)"
2012-10-03 01:13:20 +04:00
depends on SPARC64
2012-08-26 09:37:23 +04:00
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
select CRYPTO_DES
help
DES cipher algorithm (FIPS 46-2), and Triple DES EDE (FIPS 46-3),
optimized using SPARC64 crypto opcodes.
2014-06-09 21:59:54 +04:00
config CRYPTO_DES3_EDE_X86_64
tristate "Triple DES EDE cipher algorithm (x86-64)"
depends on X86 && 64BIT
2018-02-20 10:48:17 +03:00
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
2014-06-09 21:59:54 +04:00
select CRYPTO_DES
help
Triple DES EDE (FIPS 46-3) algorithm.
This module provides implementation of the Triple DES EDE cipher
algorithm that is optimized for x86-64 processors. Two versions of
algorithm are provided; regular processing one input block and
one that processes three blocks parallel.
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
config CRYPTO_FCRYPT
tristate "FCrypt cipher algorithm"
2006-08-21 15:08:13 +04:00
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
help
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
FCrypt algorithm used by RxRPC.
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
config CRYPTO_KHAZAD
tristate "Khazad cipher algorithm"
2006-08-21 15:08:13 +04:00
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
help
Khazad cipher algorithm.
Khazad was a finalist in the initial NESSIE competition. It is
an algorithm optimized for 64-bit processors with good performance
on 32-bit processors. Khazad uses an 128 bit key size.
See also:
2010-09-12 06:42:47 +04:00
<http://www.larc.usp.br/~pbarreto/KhazadPage.html>
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
2007-11-23 14:45:00 +03:00
config CRYPTO_SALSA20
2012-10-02 22:16:49 +04:00
tristate "Salsa20 stream cipher algorithm"
2007-11-23 14:45:00 +03:00
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
help
Salsa20 stream cipher algorithm.
Salsa20 is a stream cipher submitted to eSTREAM, the ECRYPT
Stream Cipher Project. See <http://www.ecrypt.eu.org/stream/>
2007-12-10 10:52:56 +03:00
The Salsa20 stream cipher algorithm is designed by Daniel J.
Bernstein <djb@cr.yp.to>. See <http://cr.yp.to/snuffle.html>
2015-06-01 14:43:56 +03:00
config CRYPTO_CHACHA20
crypto: chacha - add XChaCha12 support
Now that the generic implementation of ChaCha20 has been refactored to
allow varying the number of rounds, add support for XChaCha12, which is
the XSalsa construction applied to ChaCha12. ChaCha12 is one of the
three ciphers specified by the original ChaCha paper
(https://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf: "ChaCha, a variant of
Salsa20"), alongside ChaCha8 and ChaCha20. ChaCha12 is faster than
ChaCha20 but has a lower, but still large, security margin.
We need XChaCha12 support so that it can be used in the Adiantum
encryption mode, which enables disk/file encryption on low-end mobile
devices where AES-XTS is too slow as the CPUs lack AES instructions.
We'd prefer XChaCha20 (the more popular variant), but it's too slow on
some of our target devices, so at least in some cases we do need the
XChaCha12-based version. In more detail, the problem is that Adiantum
is still much slower than we're happy with, and encryption still has a
quite noticeable effect on the feel of low-end devices. Users and
vendors push back hard against encryption that degrades the user
experience, which always risks encryption being disabled entirely. So
we need to choose the fastest option that gives us a solid margin of
security, and here that's XChaCha12. The best known attack on ChaCha
breaks only 7 rounds and has 2^235 time complexity, so ChaCha12's
security margin is still better than AES-256's. Much has been learned
about cryptanalysis of ARX ciphers since Salsa20 was originally designed
in 2005, and it now seems we can be comfortable with a smaller number of
rounds. The eSTREAM project also suggests the 12-round version of
Salsa20 as providing the best balance among the different variants:
combining very good performance with a "comfortable margin of security".
Note that it would be trivial to add vanilla ChaCha12 in addition to
XChaCha12. However, it's unneeded for now and therefore is omitted.
As discussed in the patch that introduced XChaCha20 support, I
considered splitting the code into separate chacha-common, chacha20,
xchacha20, and xchacha12 modules, so that these algorithms could be
enabled/disabled independently. However, since nearly all the code is
shared anyway, I ultimately decided there would have been little benefit
to the added complexity.
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-11-17 04:26:22 +03:00
tristate "ChaCha stream cipher algorithms"
2015-06-01 14:43:56 +03:00
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
help
crypto: chacha - add XChaCha12 support
Now that the generic implementation of ChaCha20 has been refactored to
allow varying the number of rounds, add support for XChaCha12, which is
the XSalsa construction applied to ChaCha12. ChaCha12 is one of the
three ciphers specified by the original ChaCha paper
(https://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf: "ChaCha, a variant of
Salsa20"), alongside ChaCha8 and ChaCha20. ChaCha12 is faster than
ChaCha20 but has a lower, but still large, security margin.
We need XChaCha12 support so that it can be used in the Adiantum
encryption mode, which enables disk/file encryption on low-end mobile
devices where AES-XTS is too slow as the CPUs lack AES instructions.
We'd prefer XChaCha20 (the more popular variant), but it's too slow on
some of our target devices, so at least in some cases we do need the
XChaCha12-based version. In more detail, the problem is that Adiantum
is still much slower than we're happy with, and encryption still has a
quite noticeable effect on the feel of low-end devices. Users and
vendors push back hard against encryption that degrades the user
experience, which always risks encryption being disabled entirely. So
we need to choose the fastest option that gives us a solid margin of
security, and here that's XChaCha12. The best known attack on ChaCha
breaks only 7 rounds and has 2^235 time complexity, so ChaCha12's
security margin is still better than AES-256's. Much has been learned
about cryptanalysis of ARX ciphers since Salsa20 was originally designed
in 2005, and it now seems we can be comfortable with a smaller number of
rounds. The eSTREAM project also suggests the 12-round version of
Salsa20 as providing the best balance among the different variants:
combining very good performance with a "comfortable margin of security".
Note that it would be trivial to add vanilla ChaCha12 in addition to
XChaCha12. However, it's unneeded for now and therefore is omitted.
As discussed in the patch that introduced XChaCha20 support, I
considered splitting the code into separate chacha-common, chacha20,
xchacha20, and xchacha12 modules, so that these algorithms could be
enabled/disabled independently. However, since nearly all the code is
shared anyway, I ultimately decided there would have been little benefit
to the added complexity.
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-11-17 04:26:22 +03:00
The ChaCha20, XChaCha20, and XChaCha12 stream cipher algorithms.
2015-06-01 14:43:56 +03:00
ChaCha20 is a 256-bit high-speed stream cipher designed by Daniel J.
Bernstein and further specified in RFC7539 for use in IETF protocols.
crypto: chacha20-generic - add XChaCha20 support
Add support for the XChaCha20 stream cipher. XChaCha20 is the
application of the XSalsa20 construction
(https://cr.yp.to/snuffle/xsalsa-20081128.pdf) to ChaCha20 rather than
to Salsa20. XChaCha20 extends ChaCha20's nonce length from 64 bits (or
96 bits, depending on convention) to 192 bits, while provably retaining
ChaCha20's security. XChaCha20 uses the ChaCha20 permutation to map the
key and first 128 nonce bits to a 256-bit subkey. Then, it does the
ChaCha20 stream cipher with the subkey and remaining 64 bits of nonce.
We need XChaCha support in order to add support for the Adiantum
encryption mode. Note that to meet our performance requirements, we
actually plan to primarily use the variant XChaCha12. But we believe
it's wise to first add XChaCha20 as a baseline with a higher security
margin, in case there are any situations where it can be used.
Supporting both variants is straightforward.
Since XChaCha20's subkey differs for each request, XChaCha20 can't be a
template that wraps ChaCha20; that would require re-keying the
underlying ChaCha20 for every request, which wouldn't be thread-safe.
Instead, we make XChaCha20 its own top-level algorithm which calls the
ChaCha20 streaming implementation internally.
Similar to the existing ChaCha20 implementation, we define the IV to be
the nonce and stream position concatenated together. This allows users
to seek to any position in the stream.
I considered splitting the code into separate chacha20-common, chacha20,
and xchacha20 modules, so that chacha20 and xchacha20 could be
enabled/disabled independently. However, since nearly all the code is
shared anyway, I ultimately decided there would have been little benefit
to the added complexity of separate modules.
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-11-17 04:26:20 +03:00
This is the portable C implementation of ChaCha20. See also:
2015-06-01 14:43:56 +03:00
<http://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf>
crypto: chacha20-generic - add XChaCha20 support
Add support for the XChaCha20 stream cipher. XChaCha20 is the
application of the XSalsa20 construction
(https://cr.yp.to/snuffle/xsalsa-20081128.pdf) to ChaCha20 rather than
to Salsa20. XChaCha20 extends ChaCha20's nonce length from 64 bits (or
96 bits, depending on convention) to 192 bits, while provably retaining
ChaCha20's security. XChaCha20 uses the ChaCha20 permutation to map the
key and first 128 nonce bits to a 256-bit subkey. Then, it does the
ChaCha20 stream cipher with the subkey and remaining 64 bits of nonce.
We need XChaCha support in order to add support for the Adiantum
encryption mode. Note that to meet our performance requirements, we
actually plan to primarily use the variant XChaCha12. But we believe
it's wise to first add XChaCha20 as a baseline with a higher security
margin, in case there are any situations where it can be used.
Supporting both variants is straightforward.
Since XChaCha20's subkey differs for each request, XChaCha20 can't be a
template that wraps ChaCha20; that would require re-keying the
underlying ChaCha20 for every request, which wouldn't be thread-safe.
Instead, we make XChaCha20 its own top-level algorithm which calls the
ChaCha20 streaming implementation internally.
Similar to the existing ChaCha20 implementation, we define the IV to be
the nonce and stream position concatenated together. This allows users
to seek to any position in the stream.
I considered splitting the code into separate chacha20-common, chacha20,
and xchacha20 modules, so that chacha20 and xchacha20 could be
enabled/disabled independently. However, since nearly all the code is
shared anyway, I ultimately decided there would have been little benefit
to the added complexity of separate modules.
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-11-17 04:26:20 +03:00
XChaCha20 is the application of the XSalsa20 construction to ChaCha20
rather than to Salsa20. XChaCha20 extends ChaCha20's nonce length
from 64 bits (or 96 bits using the RFC7539 convention) to 192 bits,
while provably retaining ChaCha20's security. See also:
<https://cr.yp.to/snuffle/xsalsa-20081128.pdf>
crypto: chacha - add XChaCha12 support
Now that the generic implementation of ChaCha20 has been refactored to
allow varying the number of rounds, add support for XChaCha12, which is
the XSalsa construction applied to ChaCha12. ChaCha12 is one of the
three ciphers specified by the original ChaCha paper
(https://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf: "ChaCha, a variant of
Salsa20"), alongside ChaCha8 and ChaCha20. ChaCha12 is faster than
ChaCha20 but has a lower, but still large, security margin.
We need XChaCha12 support so that it can be used in the Adiantum
encryption mode, which enables disk/file encryption on low-end mobile
devices where AES-XTS is too slow as the CPUs lack AES instructions.
We'd prefer XChaCha20 (the more popular variant), but it's too slow on
some of our target devices, so at least in some cases we do need the
XChaCha12-based version. In more detail, the problem is that Adiantum
is still much slower than we're happy with, and encryption still has a
quite noticeable effect on the feel of low-end devices. Users and
vendors push back hard against encryption that degrades the user
experience, which always risks encryption being disabled entirely. So
we need to choose the fastest option that gives us a solid margin of
security, and here that's XChaCha12. The best known attack on ChaCha
breaks only 7 rounds and has 2^235 time complexity, so ChaCha12's
security margin is still better than AES-256's. Much has been learned
about cryptanalysis of ARX ciphers since Salsa20 was originally designed
in 2005, and it now seems we can be comfortable with a smaller number of
rounds. The eSTREAM project also suggests the 12-round version of
Salsa20 as providing the best balance among the different variants:
combining very good performance with a "comfortable margin of security".
Note that it would be trivial to add vanilla ChaCha12 in addition to
XChaCha12. However, it's unneeded for now and therefore is omitted.
As discussed in the patch that introduced XChaCha20 support, I
considered splitting the code into separate chacha-common, chacha20,
xchacha20, and xchacha12 modules, so that these algorithms could be
enabled/disabled independently. However, since nearly all the code is
shared anyway, I ultimately decided there would have been little benefit
to the added complexity.
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-11-17 04:26:22 +03:00
XChaCha12 is XChaCha20 reduced to 12 rounds, with correspondingly
reduced security margin but increased performance. It can be needed
in some performance-sensitive scenarios.
crypto: chacha20 - Add a SSSE3 SIMD variant for x86_64
Implements an x86_64 assembler driver for the ChaCha20 stream cipher. This
single block variant works on a single state matrix using SSE instructions.
It requires SSSE3 due the use of pshufb for efficient 8/16-bit rotate
operations.
For large messages, throughput increases by ~65% compared to
chacha20-generic:
testing speed of chacha20 (chacha20-generic) encryption
test 0 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 45089207 operations in 10 seconds (721427312 bytes)
test 1 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 43839521 operations in 10 seconds (2805729344 bytes)
test 2 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 12702056 operations in 10 seconds (3251726336 bytes)
test 3 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 3371173 operations in 10 seconds (3452081152 bytes)
test 4 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 422468 operations in 10 seconds (3460857856 bytes)
testing speed of chacha20 (chacha20-simd) encryption
test 0 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 43141886 operations in 10 seconds (690270176 bytes)
test 1 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 46845874 operations in 10 seconds (2998135936 bytes)
test 2 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 18458512 operations in 10 seconds (4725379072 bytes)
test 3 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 5360533 operations in 10 seconds (5489185792 bytes)
test 4 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 692846 operations in 10 seconds (5675794432 bytes)
Benchmark results from a Core i5-4670T.
Signed-off-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2015-07-16 20:14:01 +03:00
config CRYPTO_CHACHA20_X86_64
2018-12-05 09:20:02 +03:00
tristate "ChaCha stream cipher algorithms (x86_64/SSSE3/AVX2/AVX-512VL)"
crypto: chacha20 - Add a SSSE3 SIMD variant for x86_64
Implements an x86_64 assembler driver for the ChaCha20 stream cipher. This
single block variant works on a single state matrix using SSE instructions.
It requires SSSE3 due the use of pshufb for efficient 8/16-bit rotate
operations.
For large messages, throughput increases by ~65% compared to
chacha20-generic:
testing speed of chacha20 (chacha20-generic) encryption
test 0 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 45089207 operations in 10 seconds (721427312 bytes)
test 1 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 43839521 operations in 10 seconds (2805729344 bytes)
test 2 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 12702056 operations in 10 seconds (3251726336 bytes)
test 3 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 3371173 operations in 10 seconds (3452081152 bytes)
test 4 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 422468 operations in 10 seconds (3460857856 bytes)
testing speed of chacha20 (chacha20-simd) encryption
test 0 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 43141886 operations in 10 seconds (690270176 bytes)
test 1 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 46845874 operations in 10 seconds (2998135936 bytes)
test 2 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 18458512 operations in 10 seconds (4725379072 bytes)
test 3 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 5360533 operations in 10 seconds (5489185792 bytes)
test 4 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 692846 operations in 10 seconds (5675794432 bytes)
Benchmark results from a Core i5-4670T.
Signed-off-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2015-07-16 20:14:01 +03:00
depends on X86 && 64BIT
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
select CRYPTO_CHACHA20
help
2018-12-05 09:20:04 +03:00
SSSE3, AVX2, and AVX-512VL optimized implementations of the ChaCha20,
XChaCha20, and XChaCha12 stream ciphers.
crypto: chacha20 - Add a SSSE3 SIMD variant for x86_64
Implements an x86_64 assembler driver for the ChaCha20 stream cipher. This
single block variant works on a single state matrix using SSE instructions.
It requires SSSE3 due the use of pshufb for efficient 8/16-bit rotate
operations.
For large messages, throughput increases by ~65% compared to
chacha20-generic:
testing speed of chacha20 (chacha20-generic) encryption
test 0 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 45089207 operations in 10 seconds (721427312 bytes)
test 1 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 43839521 operations in 10 seconds (2805729344 bytes)
test 2 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 12702056 operations in 10 seconds (3251726336 bytes)
test 3 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 3371173 operations in 10 seconds (3452081152 bytes)
test 4 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 422468 operations in 10 seconds (3460857856 bytes)
testing speed of chacha20 (chacha20-simd) encryption
test 0 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 43141886 operations in 10 seconds (690270176 bytes)
test 1 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 46845874 operations in 10 seconds (2998135936 bytes)
test 2 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 18458512 operations in 10 seconds (4725379072 bytes)
test 3 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 5360533 operations in 10 seconds (5489185792 bytes)
test 4 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 692846 operations in 10 seconds (5675794432 bytes)
Benchmark results from a Core i5-4670T.
Signed-off-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2015-07-16 20:14:01 +03:00
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
config CRYPTO_SEED
tristate "SEED cipher algorithm"
2006-08-21 15:08:13 +04:00
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
help
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
SEED cipher algorithm (RFC4269).
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
SEED is a 128-bit symmetric key block cipher that has been
developed by KISA (Korea Information Security Agency) as a
national standard encryption algorithm of the Republic of Korea.
It is a 16 round block cipher with the key size of 128 bit.
See also:
<http://www.kisa.or.kr/kisa/seed/jsp/seed_eng.jsp>
config CRYPTO_SERPENT
tristate "Serpent cipher algorithm"
2006-08-21 15:08:13 +04:00
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
help
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
Serpent cipher algorithm, by Anderson, Biham & Knudsen.
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
Keys are allowed to be from 0 to 256 bits in length, in steps
of 8 bits. Also includes the 'Tnepres' algorithm, a reversed
variant of Serpent for compatibility with old kerneli.org code.
See also:
<http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/serpent.html>
2011-11-09 18:26:25 +04:00
config CRYPTO_SERPENT_SSE2_X86_64
tristate "Serpent cipher algorithm (x86_64/SSE2)"
depends on X86 && 64BIT
2018-02-20 10:48:03 +03:00
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
2012-06-18 15:07:19 +04:00
select CRYPTO_GLUE_HELPER_X86
2011-11-09 18:26:25 +04:00
select CRYPTO_SERPENT
2018-02-20 10:48:03 +03:00
select CRYPTO_SIMD
2011-11-09 18:26:25 +04:00
help
Serpent cipher algorithm, by Anderson, Biham & Knudsen.
Keys are allowed to be from 0 to 256 bits in length, in steps
of 8 bits.
2015-04-03 18:20:30 +03:00
This module provides Serpent cipher algorithm that processes eight
2011-11-09 18:26:25 +04:00
blocks parallel using SSE2 instruction set.
See also:
<http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/serpent.html>
2011-11-09 18:26:31 +04:00
config CRYPTO_SERPENT_SSE2_586
tristate "Serpent cipher algorithm (i586/SSE2)"
depends on X86 && !64BIT
2018-02-20 10:48:03 +03:00
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
2012-06-18 15:07:19 +04:00
select CRYPTO_GLUE_HELPER_X86
2011-11-09 18:26:31 +04:00
select CRYPTO_SERPENT
2018-02-20 10:48:03 +03:00
select CRYPTO_SIMD
2011-11-09 18:26:31 +04:00
help
Serpent cipher algorithm, by Anderson, Biham & Knudsen.
Keys are allowed to be from 0 to 256 bits in length, in steps
of 8 bits.
This module provides Serpent cipher algorithm that processes four
blocks parallel using SSE2 instruction set.
See also:
<http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/serpent.html>
2012-06-12 12:47:43 +04:00
config CRYPTO_SERPENT_AVX_X86_64
tristate "Serpent cipher algorithm (x86_64/AVX)"
depends on X86 && 64BIT
2018-02-20 10:48:06 +03:00
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
2012-06-18 15:07:24 +04:00
select CRYPTO_GLUE_HELPER_X86
2012-06-12 12:47:43 +04:00
select CRYPTO_SERPENT
2018-02-20 10:48:06 +03:00
select CRYPTO_SIMD
2012-06-12 12:47:43 +04:00
select CRYPTO_XTS
help
Serpent cipher algorithm, by Anderson, Biham & Knudsen.
Keys are allowed to be from 0 to 256 bits in length, in steps
of 8 bits.
This module provides the Serpent cipher algorithm that processes
eight blocks parallel using the AVX instruction set.
See also:
<http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/serpent.html>
2011-11-09 18:26:31 +04:00
2013-04-13 14:46:55 +04:00
config CRYPTO_SERPENT_AVX2_X86_64
tristate "Serpent cipher algorithm (x86_64/AVX2)"
depends on X86 && 64BIT
select CRYPTO_SERPENT_AVX_X86_64
help
Serpent cipher algorithm, by Anderson, Biham & Knudsen.
Keys are allowed to be from 0 to 256 bits in length, in steps
of 8 bits.
This module provides Serpent cipher algorithm that processes 16
blocks parallel using AVX2 instruction set.
See also:
<http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/serpent.html>
2018-03-06 12:44:42 +03:00
config CRYPTO_SM4
tristate "SM4 cipher algorithm"
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
help
SM4 cipher algorithms (OSCCA GB/T 32907-2016).
SM4 (GBT.32907-2016) is a cryptographic standard issued by the
Organization of State Commercial Administration of China (OSCCA)
as an authorized cryptographic algorithms for the use within China.
SMS4 was originally created for use in protecting wireless
networks, and is mandated in the Chinese National Standard for
Wireless LAN WAPI (Wired Authentication and Privacy Infrastructure)
(GB.15629.11-2003).
The latest SM4 standard (GBT.32907-2016) was proposed by OSCCA and
standardized through TC 260 of the Standardization Administration
of the People's Republic of China (SAC).
The input, output, and key of SMS4 are each 128 bits.
See also: <https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/329.pdf>
If unsure, say N.
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
config CRYPTO_TEA
tristate "TEA, XTEA and XETA cipher algorithms"
2006-08-21 15:08:13 +04:00
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
help
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
TEA cipher algorithm.
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
Tiny Encryption Algorithm is a simple cipher that uses
many rounds for security. It is very fast and uses
little memory.
Xtendend Tiny Encryption Algorithm is a modification to
the TEA algorithm to address a potential key weakness
in the TEA algorithm.
Xtendend Encryption Tiny Algorithm is a mis-implementation
of the XTEA algorithm for compatibility purposes.
config CRYPTO_TWOFISH
tristate "Twofish cipher algorithm"
2006-10-22 08:49:17 +04:00
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
select CRYPTO_TWOFISH_COMMON
2006-10-22 08:49:17 +04:00
help
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
Twofish cipher algorithm.
2006-10-22 08:49:17 +04:00
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
Twofish was submitted as an AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)
candidate cipher by researchers at CounterPane Systems. It is a
16 round block cipher supporting key sizes of 128, 192, and 256
bits.
2006-10-22 08:49:17 +04:00
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
See also:
<http://www.schneier.com/twofish.html>
config CRYPTO_TWOFISH_COMMON
tristate
help
Common parts of the Twofish cipher algorithm shared by the
generic c and the assembler implementations.
config CRYPTO_TWOFISH_586
tristate "Twofish cipher algorithms (i586)"
depends on (X86 || UML_X86) && !64BIT
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
select CRYPTO_TWOFISH_COMMON
help
Twofish cipher algorithm.
Twofish was submitted as an AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)
candidate cipher by researchers at CounterPane Systems. It is a
16 round block cipher supporting key sizes of 128, 192, and 256
bits.
2006-10-22 08:49:17 +04:00
See also:
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
<http://www.schneier.com/twofish.html>
2006-10-22 08:49:17 +04:00
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
config CRYPTO_TWOFISH_X86_64
tristate "Twofish cipher algorithm (x86_64)"
depends on (X86 || UML_X86) && 64BIT
2006-08-21 15:08:13 +04:00
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
select CRYPTO_TWOFISH_COMMON
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
help
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
Twofish cipher algorithm (x86_64).
2005-04-17 02:20:36 +04:00
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
Twofish was submitted as an AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)
candidate cipher by researchers at CounterPane Systems. It is a
16 round block cipher supporting key sizes of 128, 192, and 256
bits.
See also:
<http://www.schneier.com/twofish.html>
2011-09-26 17:47:25 +04:00
config CRYPTO_TWOFISH_X86_64_3WAY
tristate "Twofish cipher algorithm (x86_64, 3-way parallel)"
2012-04-09 04:31:22 +04:00
depends on X86 && 64BIT
2018-02-20 10:48:09 +03:00
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
2011-09-26 17:47:25 +04:00
select CRYPTO_TWOFISH_COMMON
select CRYPTO_TWOFISH_X86_64
2012-06-18 15:07:34 +04:00
select CRYPTO_GLUE_HELPER_X86
2011-09-26 17:47:25 +04:00
help
Twofish cipher algorithm (x86_64, 3-way parallel).
Twofish was submitted as an AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)
candidate cipher by researchers at CounterPane Systems. It is a
16 round block cipher supporting key sizes of 128, 192, and 256
bits.
This module provides Twofish cipher algorithm that processes three
blocks parallel, utilizing resources of out-of-order CPUs better.
See also:
<http://www.schneier.com/twofish.html>
2012-05-28 17:54:24 +04:00
config CRYPTO_TWOFISH_AVX_X86_64
tristate "Twofish cipher algorithm (x86_64/AVX)"
depends on X86 && 64BIT
2018-02-20 10:48:11 +03:00
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
2012-06-18 15:07:39 +04:00
select CRYPTO_GLUE_HELPER_X86
2018-02-20 10:48:11 +03:00
select CRYPTO_SIMD
2012-05-28 17:54:24 +04:00
select CRYPTO_TWOFISH_COMMON
select CRYPTO_TWOFISH_X86_64
select CRYPTO_TWOFISH_X86_64_3WAY
help
Twofish cipher algorithm (x86_64/AVX).
Twofish was submitted as an AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)
candidate cipher by researchers at CounterPane Systems. It is a
16 round block cipher supporting key sizes of 128, 192, and 256
bits.
This module provides the Twofish cipher algorithm that processes
eight blocks parallel using the AVX Instruction Set.
See also:
<http://www.schneier.com/twofish.html>
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
comment "Compression"
config CRYPTO_DEFLATE
tristate "Deflate compression algorithm"
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
2016-10-21 15:19:53 +03:00
select CRYPTO_ACOMP2
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
select ZLIB_INFLATE
select ZLIB_DEFLATE
[CRYPTO] aead: Add authenc
This patch adds the authenc algorithm which constructs an AEAD algorithm
from an asynchronous block cipher and a hash. The construction is done
by concatenating the encrypted result from the cipher with the output
from the hash, as is used by the IPsec ESP protocol.
The authenc algorithm exists as a template with four parameters:
authenc(auth, authsize, enc, enckeylen).
The authentication algorithm, the authentication size (i.e., truncating
the output of the authentication algorithm), the encryption algorithm,
and the encryption key length. Both the size field and the key length
field are in bytes. For example, AES-128 with SHA1-HMAC would be
represented by
authenc(hmac(sha1), 12, cbc(aes), 16)
The key for the authenc algorithm is the concatenation of the keys for
the authentication algorithm with the encryption algorithm. For the
above example, if a key of length 36 bytes is given, then hmac(sha1)
would receive the first 20 bytes while the last 16 would be given to
cbc(aes).
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2007-08-30 12:24:15 +04:00
help
2008-04-05 17:04:48 +04:00
This is the Deflate algorithm (RFC1951), specified for use in
IPSec with the IPCOMP protocol (RFC3173, RFC2394).
You will most probably want this if using IPSec.
[CRYPTO] aead: Add authenc
This patch adds the authenc algorithm which constructs an AEAD algorithm
from an asynchronous block cipher and a hash. The construction is done
by concatenating the encrypted result from the cipher with the output
from the hash, as is used by the IPsec ESP protocol.
The authenc algorithm exists as a template with four parameters:
authenc(auth, authsize, enc, enckeylen).
The authentication algorithm, the authentication size (i.e., truncating
the output of the authentication algorithm), the encryption algorithm,
and the encryption key length. Both the size field and the key length
field are in bytes. For example, AES-128 with SHA1-HMAC would be
represented by
authenc(hmac(sha1), 12, cbc(aes), 16)
The key for the authenc algorithm is the concatenation of the keys for
the authentication algorithm with the encryption algorithm. For the
above example, if a key of length 36 bytes is given, then hmac(sha1)
would receive the first 20 bytes while the last 16 would be given to
cbc(aes).
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2007-08-30 12:24:15 +04:00
2007-12-07 11:53:23 +03:00
config CRYPTO_LZO
tristate "LZO compression algorithm"
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
2016-10-21 15:19:49 +03:00
select CRYPTO_ACOMP2
2007-12-07 11:53:23 +03:00
select LZO_COMPRESS
select LZO_DECOMPRESS
help
This is the LZO algorithm.
2012-07-19 18:42:41 +04:00
config CRYPTO_842
tristate "842 compression algorithm"
2015-05-07 20:49:15 +03:00
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
2016-10-21 15:19:52 +03:00
select CRYPTO_ACOMP2
2015-05-07 20:49:15 +03:00
select 842_COMPRESS
select 842_DECOMPRESS
2012-07-19 18:42:41 +04:00
help
This is the 842 algorithm.
2013-07-09 03:01:51 +04:00
config CRYPTO_LZ4
tristate "LZ4 compression algorithm"
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
2016-10-21 15:19:50 +03:00
select CRYPTO_ACOMP2
2013-07-09 03:01:51 +04:00
select LZ4_COMPRESS
select LZ4_DECOMPRESS
help
This is the LZ4 algorithm.
config CRYPTO_LZ4HC
tristate "LZ4HC compression algorithm"
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
2016-10-21 15:19:51 +03:00
select CRYPTO_ACOMP2
2013-07-09 03:01:51 +04:00
select LZ4HC_COMPRESS
select LZ4_DECOMPRESS
help
This is the LZ4 high compression mode algorithm.
2012-07-19 18:42:41 +04:00
2018-03-30 22:14:53 +03:00
config CRYPTO_ZSTD
tristate "Zstd compression algorithm"
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
select CRYPTO_ACOMP2
select ZSTD_COMPRESS
select ZSTD_DECOMPRESS
help
This is the zstd algorithm.
2008-08-14 16:15:52 +04:00
comment "Random Number Generation"
config CRYPTO_ANSI_CPRNG
tristate "Pseudo Random Number Generation for Cryptographic modules"
select CRYPTO_AES
select CRYPTO_RNG
help
This option enables the generic pseudo random number generator
for cryptographic modules. Uses the Algorithm specified in
2010-01-27 03:00:10 +03:00
ANSI X9.31 A.2.4. Note that this option must be enabled if
CRYPTO_FIPS is selected
2008-08-14 16:15:52 +04:00
2014-07-04 18:15:08 +04:00
menuconfig CRYPTO_DRBG_MENU
2014-05-31 19:22:31 +04:00
tristate "NIST SP800-90A DRBG"
help
NIST SP800-90A compliant DRBG. In the following submenu, one or
more of the DRBG types must be selected.
2014-07-04 18:15:08 +04:00
if CRYPTO_DRBG_MENU
2014-05-31 19:22:31 +04:00
config CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC
2015-06-03 09:49:31 +03:00
bool
2014-05-31 19:22:31 +04:00
default y
select CRYPTO_HMAC
2015-06-11 03:55:10 +03:00
select CRYPTO_SHA256
2014-05-31 19:22:31 +04:00
config CRYPTO_DRBG_HASH
bool "Enable Hash DRBG"
2015-06-11 03:55:10 +03:00
select CRYPTO_SHA256
2014-05-31 19:22:31 +04:00
help
Enable the Hash DRBG variant as defined in NIST SP800-90A.
config CRYPTO_DRBG_CTR
bool "Enable CTR DRBG"
select CRYPTO_AES
2016-06-14 08:34:13 +03:00
depends on CRYPTO_CTR
2014-05-31 19:22:31 +04:00
help
Enable the CTR DRBG variant as defined in NIST SP800-90A.
2014-07-04 18:15:08 +04:00
config CRYPTO_DRBG
tristate
2015-06-03 09:49:31 +03:00
default CRYPTO_DRBG_MENU
2014-07-04 18:15:08 +04:00
select CRYPTO_RNG
2015-05-25 16:10:20 +03:00
select CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY
2014-07-04 18:15:08 +04:00
endif # if CRYPTO_DRBG_MENU
2014-05-31 19:22:31 +04:00
2015-05-25 16:10:20 +03:00
config CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY
tristate "Jitterentropy Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator"
2016-01-26 16:47:10 +03:00
select CRYPTO_RNG
2015-05-25 16:10:20 +03:00
help
The Jitterentropy RNG is a noise that is intended
to provide seed to another RNG. The RNG does not
perform any cryptographic whitening of the generated
random numbers. This Jitterentropy RNG registers with
the kernel crypto API and can be used by any caller.
2010-10-19 17:12:39 +04:00
config CRYPTO_USER_API
tristate
2010-10-19 17:23:00 +04:00
config CRYPTO_USER_API_HASH
tristate "User-space interface for hash algorithms"
2010-11-29 17:56:03 +03:00
depends on NET
2010-10-19 17:23:00 +04:00
select CRYPTO_HASH
select CRYPTO_USER_API
help
This option enables the user-spaces interface for hash
algorithms.
2010-10-19 17:31:55 +04:00
config CRYPTO_USER_API_SKCIPHER
tristate "User-space interface for symmetric key cipher algorithms"
2010-11-29 17:56:03 +03:00
depends on NET
2010-10-19 17:31:55 +04:00
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
select CRYPTO_USER_API
help
This option enables the user-spaces interface for symmetric
key cipher algorithms.
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config CRYPTO_USER_API_RNG
tristate "User-space interface for random number generator algorithms"
depends on NET
select CRYPTO_RNG
select CRYPTO_USER_API
help
This option enables the user-spaces interface for random
number generator algorithms.
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config CRYPTO_USER_API_AEAD
tristate "User-space interface for AEAD cipher algorithms"
depends on NET
select CRYPTO_AEAD
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select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
select CRYPTO_NULL
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select CRYPTO_USER_API
help
This option enables the user-spaces interface for AEAD
cipher algorithms.
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config CRYPTO_STATS
bool "Crypto usage statistics for User-space"
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depends on CRYPTO_USER
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help
This option enables the gathering of crypto stats.
This will collect:
- encrypt/decrypt size and numbers of symmeric operations
- compress/decompress size and numbers of compress operations
- size and numbers of hash operations
- encrypt/decrypt/sign/verify numbers for asymmetric operations
- generate/seed numbers for rng operations
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config CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
bool
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source "drivers/crypto/Kconfig"
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source "crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig"
source "certs/Kconfig"
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endif # if CRYPTO
