2019-05-29 17:12:37 +03:00
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
/*
* Copyright ( C ) 2008 , 2009 Intel Corporation
* Authors : Andi Kleen , Fengguang Wu
*
* High level machine check handler . Handles pages reported by the
2010-09-28 01:09:51 +04:00
* hardware as being corrupted usually due to a multi - bit ECC memory or cache
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
* failure .
2010-09-28 01:09:51 +04:00
*
* In addition there is a " soft offline " entry point that allows stop using
* not - yet - corrupted - by - suspicious pages without killing anything .
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
*
* Handles page cache pages in various states . The tricky part
2010-09-28 01:09:51 +04:00
* here is that we can access any page asynchronously in respect to
* other VM users , because memory failures could happen anytime and
* anywhere . This could violate some of their assumptions . This is why
* this code has to be extremely careful . Generally it tries to use
* normal locking rules , as in get the standard locks , even if that means
* the error handling takes potentially a long time .
2015-06-25 02:56:02 +03:00
*
* It can be very tempting to add handling for obscure cases here .
* In general any code for handling new cases should only be added iff :
* - You know how to test it .
* - You have a test that can be added to mce - test
* https : //git.kernel.org/cgit/utils/cpu/mce/mce-test.git/
* - The case actually shows up as a frequent ( top 10 ) page state in
* tools / vm / page - types when running a real workload .
2010-09-28 01:09:51 +04:00
*
* There are several operations here with exponential complexity because
* of unsuitable VM data structures . For example the operation to map back
* from RMAP chains to processes has to walk the complete process list and
* has non linear complexity with the number . But since memory corruptions
* are rare we hope to get away with this . This avoids impacting the core
* VM .
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
*/
# include <linux/kernel.h>
# include <linux/mm.h>
# include <linux/page-flags.h>
2009-12-16 14:19:59 +03:00
# include <linux/kernel-page-flags.h>
2017-02-08 20:51:30 +03:00
# include <linux/sched/signal.h>
2017-02-08 20:51:36 +03:00
# include <linux/sched/task.h>
2021-11-05 23:35:30 +03:00
# include <linux/dax.h>
2009-10-13 18:02:11 +04:00
# include <linux/ksm.h>
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
# include <linux/rmap.h>
2011-05-27 00:00:52 +04:00
# include <linux/export.h>
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
# include <linux/pagemap.h>
# include <linux/swap.h>
# include <linux/backing-dev.h>
2009-12-16 14:20:00 +03:00
# include <linux/migrate.h>
# include <linux/suspend.h>
include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h
percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being
included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which
in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files
universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies.
percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for
this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those
headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion
needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is
used as the basis of conversion.
http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py
The script does the followings.
* Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that
only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used,
gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h.
* When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include
blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms
to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains
core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered -
alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there
doesn't seem to be any matching order.
* If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly
because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out
an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the
file.
The conversion was done in the following steps.
1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly
over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h
and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400
files.
2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion,
some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or
embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added
inclusions to around 150 files.
3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits
from #2 to make sure no file was left behind.
4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed.
e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab
APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually.
5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically
editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h
files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h
inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually
wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each
slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as
necessary.
6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h.
7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures
were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my
distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few
more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things
build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq).
* x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config.
* powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig
* sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig
* ia64 SMP allmodconfig
* s390 SMP allmodconfig
* alpha SMP allmodconfig
* um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig
8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as
a separate patch and serve as bisection point.
Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step
6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch.
If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch
headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of
the specific arch.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-24 11:04:11 +03:00
# include <linux/slab.h>
2010-05-31 10:28:19 +04:00
# include <linux/swapops.h>
2010-05-28 04:29:17 +04:00
# include <linux/hugetlb.h>
2010-12-03 01:31:19 +03:00
# include <linux/memory_hotplug.h>
2011-06-16 02:08:48 +04:00
# include <linux/mm_inline.h>
2018-07-14 07:50:21 +03:00
# include <linux/memremap.h>
2011-07-13 09:14:27 +04:00
# include <linux/kfifo.h>
2015-11-06 05:47:26 +03:00
# include <linux/ratelimit.h>
2018-08-24 03:00:42 +03:00
# include <linux/page-isolation.h>
2021-06-29 05:43:14 +03:00
# include <linux/pagewalk.h>
2022-01-15 01:05:19 +03:00
# include <linux/shmem_fs.h>
2022-05-10 04:20:47 +03:00
# include "swap.h"
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
# include "internal.h"
2015-06-25 02:57:36 +03:00
# include "ras/ras_event.h"
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
int sysctl_memory_failure_early_kill __read_mostly = 0 ;
int sysctl_memory_failure_recovery __read_mostly = 1 ;
2013-02-23 04:34:02 +04:00
atomic_long_t num_poisoned_pages __read_mostly = ATOMIC_LONG_INIT ( 0 ) ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
2022-06-15 12:32:09 +03:00
static bool hw_memory_failure __read_mostly = false ;
2021-07-01 04:48:38 +03:00
static bool __page_handle_poison ( struct page * page )
{
2021-09-03 00:58:40 +03:00
int ret ;
2021-07-01 04:48:38 +03:00
zone_pcp_disable ( page_zone ( page ) ) ;
ret = dissolve_free_huge_page ( page ) ;
if ( ! ret )
ret = take_page_off_buddy ( page ) ;
zone_pcp_enable ( page_zone ( page ) ) ;
2021-09-03 00:58:40 +03:00
return ret > 0 ;
2021-07-01 04:48:38 +03:00
}
2020-10-16 06:07:13 +03:00
static bool page_handle_poison ( struct page * page , bool hugepage_or_freepage , bool release )
2020-10-16 06:07:05 +03:00
{
2020-10-16 06:07:13 +03:00
if ( hugepage_or_freepage ) {
/*
* Doing this check for free pages is also fine since dissolve_free_huge_page
* returns 0 for non - hugetlb pages as well .
*/
2021-07-01 04:48:38 +03:00
if ( ! __page_handle_poison ( page ) )
2020-10-16 06:07:13 +03:00
/*
* We could fail to take off the target page from buddy
2021-05-07 04:06:47 +03:00
* for example due to racy page allocation , but that ' s
2020-10-16 06:07:13 +03:00
* acceptable because soft - offlined page is not broken
* and if someone really want to use it , they should
* take it .
*/
return false ;
}
2020-10-16 06:07:05 +03:00
SetPageHWPoison ( page ) ;
mm,hwpoison: rework soft offline for in-use pages
This patch changes the way we set and handle in-use poisoned pages. Until
now, poisoned pages were released to the buddy allocator, trusting that
the checks that take place at allocation time would act as a safe net and
would skip that page.
This has proved to be wrong, as we got some pfn walkers out there, like
compaction, that all they care is the page to be in a buddy freelist.
Although this might not be the only user, having poisoned pages in the
buddy allocator seems a bad idea as we should only have free pages that
are ready and meant to be used as such.
Before explaining the taken approach, let us break down the kind of pages
we can soft offline.
- Anonymous THP (after the split, they end up being 4K pages)
- Hugetlb
- Order-0 pages (that can be either migrated or invalited)
* Normal pages (order-0 and anon-THP)
- If they are clean and unmapped page cache pages, we invalidate
then by means of invalidate_inode_page().
- If they are mapped/dirty, we do the isolate-and-migrate dance.
Either way, do not call put_page directly from those paths. Instead, we
keep the page and send it to page_handle_poison to perform the right
handling.
page_handle_poison sets the HWPoison flag and does the last put_page.
Down the chain, we placed a check for HWPoison page in
free_pages_prepare, that just skips any poisoned page, so those pages
do not end up in any pcplist/freelist.
After that, we set the refcount on the page to 1 and we increment
the poisoned pages counter.
If we see that the check in free_pages_prepare creates trouble, we can
always do what we do for free pages:
- wait until the page hits buddy's freelists
- take it off, and flag it
The downside of the above approach is that we could race with an
allocation, so by the time we want to take the page off the buddy, the
page has been already allocated so we cannot soft offline it.
But the user could always retry it.
* Hugetlb pages
- We isolate-and-migrate them
After the migration has been successful, we call dissolve_free_huge_page,
and we set HWPoison on the page if we succeed.
Hugetlb has a slightly different handling though.
While for non-hugetlb pages we cared about closing the race with an
allocation, doing so for hugetlb pages requires quite some additional
and intrusive code (we would need to hook in free_huge_page and some other
places).
So I decided to not make the code overly complicated and just fail
normally if the page we allocated in the meantime.
We can always build on top of this.
As a bonus, because of the way we handle now in-use pages, we no longer
need the put-as-isolation-migratetype dance, that was guarding for poisoned
pages to end up in pcplists.
Signed-off-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Aristeu Rozanski <aris@ruivo.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Yakunin <zeil@yandex-team.ru>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.com>
Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200922135650.1634-10-osalvador@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-10-16 06:07:09 +03:00
if ( release )
put_page ( page ) ;
2020-10-16 06:07:05 +03:00
page_ref_inc ( page ) ;
num_poisoned_pages_inc ( ) ;
2020-10-16 06:07:13 +03:00
return true ;
2020-10-16 06:07:05 +03:00
}
2009-12-21 21:56:42 +03:00
# if defined(CONFIG_HWPOISON_INJECT) || defined(CONFIG_HWPOISON_INJECT_MODULE)
2009-12-16 14:19:59 +03:00
u32 hwpoison_filter_enable = 0 ;
2009-12-16 14:19:59 +03:00
u32 hwpoison_filter_dev_major = ~ 0U ;
u32 hwpoison_filter_dev_minor = ~ 0U ;
2009-12-16 14:19:59 +03:00
u64 hwpoison_filter_flags_mask ;
u64 hwpoison_filter_flags_value ;
2009-12-16 14:19:59 +03:00
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL ( hwpoison_filter_enable ) ;
2009-12-16 14:19:59 +03:00
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL ( hwpoison_filter_dev_major ) ;
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL ( hwpoison_filter_dev_minor ) ;
2009-12-16 14:19:59 +03:00
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL ( hwpoison_filter_flags_mask ) ;
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL ( hwpoison_filter_flags_value ) ;
2009-12-16 14:19:59 +03:00
static int hwpoison_filter_dev ( struct page * p )
{
struct address_space * mapping ;
dev_t dev ;
if ( hwpoison_filter_dev_major = = ~ 0U & &
hwpoison_filter_dev_minor = = ~ 0U )
return 0 ;
mapping = page_mapping ( p ) ;
if ( mapping = = NULL | | mapping - > host = = NULL )
return - EINVAL ;
dev = mapping - > host - > i_sb - > s_dev ;
if ( hwpoison_filter_dev_major ! = ~ 0U & &
hwpoison_filter_dev_major ! = MAJOR ( dev ) )
return - EINVAL ;
if ( hwpoison_filter_dev_minor ! = ~ 0U & &
hwpoison_filter_dev_minor ! = MINOR ( dev ) )
return - EINVAL ;
return 0 ;
}
2009-12-16 14:19:59 +03:00
static int hwpoison_filter_flags ( struct page * p )
{
if ( ! hwpoison_filter_flags_mask )
return 0 ;
if ( ( stable_page_flags ( p ) & hwpoison_filter_flags_mask ) = =
hwpoison_filter_flags_value )
return 0 ;
else
return - EINVAL ;
}
2009-12-16 14:19:59 +03:00
/*
* This allows stress tests to limit test scope to a collection of tasks
* by putting them under some memcg . This prevents killing unrelated / important
* processes such as / sbin / init . Note that the target task may share clean
* pages with init ( eg . libc text ) , which is harmless . If the target task
* share _dirty_ pages with another task B , the test scheme must make sure B
* is also included in the memcg . At last , due to race conditions this filter
* can only guarantee that the page either belongs to the memcg tasks , or is
* a freed page .
*/
2015-09-10 01:35:31 +03:00
# ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG
2009-12-16 14:19:59 +03:00
u64 hwpoison_filter_memcg ;
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL ( hwpoison_filter_memcg ) ;
static int hwpoison_filter_task ( struct page * p )
{
if ( ! hwpoison_filter_memcg )
return 0 ;
2015-09-10 01:35:31 +03:00
if ( page_cgroup_ino ( p ) ! = hwpoison_filter_memcg )
2009-12-16 14:19:59 +03:00
return - EINVAL ;
return 0 ;
}
# else
static int hwpoison_filter_task ( struct page * p ) { return 0 ; }
# endif
2009-12-16 14:19:59 +03:00
int hwpoison_filter ( struct page * p )
{
2009-12-16 14:19:59 +03:00
if ( ! hwpoison_filter_enable )
return 0 ;
2009-12-16 14:19:59 +03:00
if ( hwpoison_filter_dev ( p ) )
return - EINVAL ;
2009-12-16 14:19:59 +03:00
if ( hwpoison_filter_flags ( p ) )
return - EINVAL ;
2009-12-16 14:19:59 +03:00
if ( hwpoison_filter_task ( p ) )
return - EINVAL ;
2009-12-16 14:19:59 +03:00
return 0 ;
}
2009-12-21 21:56:42 +03:00
# else
int hwpoison_filter ( struct page * p )
{
return 0 ;
}
# endif
2009-12-16 14:19:59 +03:00
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL ( hwpoison_filter ) ;
2018-07-14 07:50:11 +03:00
/*
* Kill all processes that have a poisoned page mapped and then isolate
* the page .
*
* General strategy :
* Find all processes having the page mapped and kill them .
* But we keep a page reference around so that the page is not
* actually freed yet .
* Then stash the page away
*
* There ' s no convenient way to get back to mapped processes
* from the VMAs . So do a brute - force search over all
* running processes .
*
* Remember that machine checks are not common ( or rather
* if they are common you have other problems ) , so this shouldn ' t
* be a performance issue .
*
* Also there are some races possible while we get from the
* error detection to actually handle it .
*/
struct to_kill {
struct list_head nd ;
struct task_struct * tsk ;
unsigned long addr ;
short size_shift ;
} ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
/*
2011-12-13 21:27:58 +04:00
* Send all the processes who have the page mapped a signal .
* ` ` action optional ' ' if they are not immediately affected by the error
* ` ` action required ' ' if error happened in current execution context
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
*/
2018-07-14 07:50:11 +03:00
static int kill_proc ( struct to_kill * tk , unsigned long pfn , int flags )
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
{
2018-07-14 07:50:11 +03:00
struct task_struct * t = tk - > tsk ;
short addr_lsb = tk - > size_shift ;
2020-06-02 07:50:11 +03:00
int ret = 0 ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
2020-06-12 03:34:48 +03:00
pr_err ( " Memory failure: %#lx: Sending SIGBUS to %s:%d due to hardware memory corruption \n " ,
2020-06-02 07:50:11 +03:00
pfn , t - > comm , t - > pid ) ;
2011-12-13 21:27:58 +04:00
2022-03-23 00:44:18 +03:00
if ( ( flags & MF_ACTION_REQUIRED ) & & ( t = = current ) )
ret = force_sig_mceerr ( BUS_MCEERR_AR ,
( void __user * ) tk - > addr , addr_lsb ) ;
else
2011-12-13 21:27:58 +04:00
/*
2022-03-23 00:44:18 +03:00
* Signal other processes sharing the page if they have
* PF_MCE_EARLY set .
2011-12-13 21:27:58 +04:00
* Don ' t use force here , it ' s convenient if the signal
* can be temporarily blocked .
* This could cause a loop when the user sets SIGBUS
* to SIG_IGN , but hopefully no one will do that ?
*/
2018-07-14 07:50:11 +03:00
ret = send_sig_mceerr ( BUS_MCEERR_AO , ( void __user * ) tk - > addr ,
2017-08-02 21:51:22 +03:00
addr_lsb , t ) ; /* synchronous? */
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
if ( ret < 0 )
2016-05-21 02:57:32 +03:00
pr_info ( " Memory failure: Error sending signal to %s:%d: %d \n " ,
2016-03-18 00:19:50 +03:00
t - > comm , t - > pid , ret ) ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
return ret ;
}
2009-12-16 14:19:57 +03:00
/*
2020-12-15 06:11:45 +03:00
* Unknown page type encountered . Try to check whether it can turn PageLRU by
mm: hwpoison: don't drop slab caches for offlining non-LRU page
In the current implementation of soft offline, if non-LRU page is met,
all the slab caches will be dropped to free the page then offline. But
if the page is not slab page all the effort is wasted in vain. Even
though it is a slab page, it is not guaranteed the page could be freed
at all.
However the side effect and cost is quite high. It does not only drop
the slab caches, but also may drop a significant amount of page caches
which are associated with inode caches. It could make the most
workingset gone in order to just offline a page. And the offline is not
guaranteed to succeed at all, actually I really doubt the success rate
for real life workload.
Furthermore the worse consequence is the system may be locked up and
unusable since the page cache release may incur huge amount of works
queued for memcg release.
Actually we ran into such unpleasant case in our production environment.
Firstly, the workqueue of memory_failure_work_func is locked up as
below:
BUG: workqueue lockup - pool cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 stuck for 53s!
Showing busy workqueues and worker pools:
workqueue events: flags=0x0
pwq 2: cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=14/256 refcnt=15
in-flight: 409271:memory_failure_work_func
pending: kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_monitor, kfree_rcu_work, rht_deferred_worker, rht_deferred_worker, rht_deferred_worker, rht_deferred_worker, kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_work, drain_local_stock, kfree_rcu_work
workqueue mm_percpu_wq: flags=0x8
pwq 2: cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=1/256 refcnt=2
pending: vmstat_update
workqueue cgroup_destroy: flags=0x0
pwq 2: cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=1/1 refcnt=12072
pending: css_release_work_fn
There were over 12K css_release_work_fn queued, and this caused a few
lockups due to the contention of worker pool lock with IRQ disabled, for
example:
NMI watchdog: Watchdog detected hard LOCKUP on cpu 1
Modules linked in: amd64_edac_mod edac_mce_amd crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel xt_DSCP iptable_mangle kvm_amd bpfilter vfat fat acpi_ipmi i2c_piix4 usb_storage ipmi_si k10temp i2c_core ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler acpi_cpufreq sch_fq_codel xfs libcrc32c crc32c_intel mlx5_core mlxfw nvme xhci_pci ptp nvme_core pps_core xhci_hcd
CPU: 1 PID: 205500 Comm: kworker/1:0 Tainted: G L 5.10.32-t1.el7.twitter.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: TYAN F5AMT /z /S8026GM2NRE-CGN, BIOS V8.030 03/30/2021
Workqueue: events memory_failure_work_func
RIP: 0010:queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x41/0x1a0
Code: 41 f0 0f ba 2f 08 0f 92 c0 0f b6 c0 c1 e0 08 89 c2 8b 07 30 e4 09 d0 a9 00 01 ff ff 75 1b 85 c0 74 0e 8b 07 84 c0 74 08 f3 90 <8b> 07 84 c0 75 f8 b8 01 00 00 00 66 89 07 c3 f6 c4 01 75 04 c6 47
RSP: 0018:ffff9b2ac278f900 EFLAGS: 00000002
RAX: 0000000000480101 RBX: ffff8ce98ce71800 RCX: 0000000000000084
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8ce98ce6a140
RBP: 00000000000284c8 R08: ffffd7248dcb6808 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffff9b2ac278f9b0 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: ffff8cb44dab9c00 R14: ffffffffbd1ce6a0 R15: ffff8cacaa37f068
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8ce98ce40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fcf6e8cb000 CR3: 0000000a0c60a000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0
Call Trace:
__queue_work+0xd6/0x3c0
queue_work_on+0x1c/0x30
uncharge_batch+0x10e/0x110
mem_cgroup_uncharge_list+0x6d/0x80
release_pages+0x37f/0x3f0
__pagevec_release+0x1c/0x50
__invalidate_mapping_pages+0x348/0x380
inode_lru_isolate+0x10a/0x160
__list_lru_walk_one+0x7b/0x170
list_lru_walk_one+0x4a/0x60
prune_icache_sb+0x37/0x50
super_cache_scan+0x123/0x1a0
do_shrink_slab+0x10c/0x2c0
shrink_slab+0x1f1/0x290
drop_slab_node+0x4d/0x70
soft_offline_page+0x1ac/0x5b0
memory_failure_work_func+0x6a/0x90
process_one_work+0x19e/0x340
worker_thread+0x30/0x360
kthread+0x116/0x130
The lockup made the machine is quite unusable. And it also made the
most workingset gone, the reclaimabled slab caches were reduced from 12G
to 300MB, the page caches were decreased from 17G to 4G.
But the most disappointing thing is all the effort doesn't make the page
offline, it just returns:
soft_offline: 0x1469f2: unknown non LRU page type 5ffff0000000000 ()
It seems the aggressive behavior for non-LRU page didn't pay back, so it
doesn't make too much sense to keep it considering the terrible side
effect.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210819054116.266126-1-shy828301@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Reported-by: David Mackey <tdmackey@twitter.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-09-03 00:58:31 +03:00
* lru_add_drain_all .
2009-12-16 14:19:57 +03:00
*/
mm: hwpoison: don't drop slab caches for offlining non-LRU page
In the current implementation of soft offline, if non-LRU page is met,
all the slab caches will be dropped to free the page then offline. But
if the page is not slab page all the effort is wasted in vain. Even
though it is a slab page, it is not guaranteed the page could be freed
at all.
However the side effect and cost is quite high. It does not only drop
the slab caches, but also may drop a significant amount of page caches
which are associated with inode caches. It could make the most
workingset gone in order to just offline a page. And the offline is not
guaranteed to succeed at all, actually I really doubt the success rate
for real life workload.
Furthermore the worse consequence is the system may be locked up and
unusable since the page cache release may incur huge amount of works
queued for memcg release.
Actually we ran into such unpleasant case in our production environment.
Firstly, the workqueue of memory_failure_work_func is locked up as
below:
BUG: workqueue lockup - pool cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 stuck for 53s!
Showing busy workqueues and worker pools:
workqueue events: flags=0x0
pwq 2: cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=14/256 refcnt=15
in-flight: 409271:memory_failure_work_func
pending: kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_monitor, kfree_rcu_work, rht_deferred_worker, rht_deferred_worker, rht_deferred_worker, rht_deferred_worker, kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_work, drain_local_stock, kfree_rcu_work
workqueue mm_percpu_wq: flags=0x8
pwq 2: cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=1/256 refcnt=2
pending: vmstat_update
workqueue cgroup_destroy: flags=0x0
pwq 2: cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=1/1 refcnt=12072
pending: css_release_work_fn
There were over 12K css_release_work_fn queued, and this caused a few
lockups due to the contention of worker pool lock with IRQ disabled, for
example:
NMI watchdog: Watchdog detected hard LOCKUP on cpu 1
Modules linked in: amd64_edac_mod edac_mce_amd crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel xt_DSCP iptable_mangle kvm_amd bpfilter vfat fat acpi_ipmi i2c_piix4 usb_storage ipmi_si k10temp i2c_core ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler acpi_cpufreq sch_fq_codel xfs libcrc32c crc32c_intel mlx5_core mlxfw nvme xhci_pci ptp nvme_core pps_core xhci_hcd
CPU: 1 PID: 205500 Comm: kworker/1:0 Tainted: G L 5.10.32-t1.el7.twitter.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: TYAN F5AMT /z /S8026GM2NRE-CGN, BIOS V8.030 03/30/2021
Workqueue: events memory_failure_work_func
RIP: 0010:queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x41/0x1a0
Code: 41 f0 0f ba 2f 08 0f 92 c0 0f b6 c0 c1 e0 08 89 c2 8b 07 30 e4 09 d0 a9 00 01 ff ff 75 1b 85 c0 74 0e 8b 07 84 c0 74 08 f3 90 <8b> 07 84 c0 75 f8 b8 01 00 00 00 66 89 07 c3 f6 c4 01 75 04 c6 47
RSP: 0018:ffff9b2ac278f900 EFLAGS: 00000002
RAX: 0000000000480101 RBX: ffff8ce98ce71800 RCX: 0000000000000084
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8ce98ce6a140
RBP: 00000000000284c8 R08: ffffd7248dcb6808 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffff9b2ac278f9b0 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: ffff8cb44dab9c00 R14: ffffffffbd1ce6a0 R15: ffff8cacaa37f068
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8ce98ce40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fcf6e8cb000 CR3: 0000000a0c60a000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0
Call Trace:
__queue_work+0xd6/0x3c0
queue_work_on+0x1c/0x30
uncharge_batch+0x10e/0x110
mem_cgroup_uncharge_list+0x6d/0x80
release_pages+0x37f/0x3f0
__pagevec_release+0x1c/0x50
__invalidate_mapping_pages+0x348/0x380
inode_lru_isolate+0x10a/0x160
__list_lru_walk_one+0x7b/0x170
list_lru_walk_one+0x4a/0x60
prune_icache_sb+0x37/0x50
super_cache_scan+0x123/0x1a0
do_shrink_slab+0x10c/0x2c0
shrink_slab+0x1f1/0x290
drop_slab_node+0x4d/0x70
soft_offline_page+0x1ac/0x5b0
memory_failure_work_func+0x6a/0x90
process_one_work+0x19e/0x340
worker_thread+0x30/0x360
kthread+0x116/0x130
The lockup made the machine is quite unusable. And it also made the
most workingset gone, the reclaimabled slab caches were reduced from 12G
to 300MB, the page caches were decreased from 17G to 4G.
But the most disappointing thing is all the effort doesn't make the page
offline, it just returns:
soft_offline: 0x1469f2: unknown non LRU page type 5ffff0000000000 ()
It seems the aggressive behavior for non-LRU page didn't pay back, so it
doesn't make too much sense to keep it considering the terrible side
effect.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210819054116.266126-1-shy828301@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Reported-by: David Mackey <tdmackey@twitter.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-09-03 00:58:31 +03:00
void shake_page ( struct page * p )
2009-12-16 14:19:57 +03:00
{
2017-05-04 00:56:19 +03:00
if ( PageHuge ( p ) )
return ;
2009-12-16 14:19:57 +03:00
if ( ! PageSlab ( p ) ) {
lru_add_drain_all ( ) ;
if ( PageLRU ( p ) | | is_free_buddy_page ( p ) )
return ;
}
2009-12-16 14:20:00 +03:00
2009-12-16 14:19:57 +03:00
/*
mm: hwpoison: don't drop slab caches for offlining non-LRU page
In the current implementation of soft offline, if non-LRU page is met,
all the slab caches will be dropped to free the page then offline. But
if the page is not slab page all the effort is wasted in vain. Even
though it is a slab page, it is not guaranteed the page could be freed
at all.
However the side effect and cost is quite high. It does not only drop
the slab caches, but also may drop a significant amount of page caches
which are associated with inode caches. It could make the most
workingset gone in order to just offline a page. And the offline is not
guaranteed to succeed at all, actually I really doubt the success rate
for real life workload.
Furthermore the worse consequence is the system may be locked up and
unusable since the page cache release may incur huge amount of works
queued for memcg release.
Actually we ran into such unpleasant case in our production environment.
Firstly, the workqueue of memory_failure_work_func is locked up as
below:
BUG: workqueue lockup - pool cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 stuck for 53s!
Showing busy workqueues and worker pools:
workqueue events: flags=0x0
pwq 2: cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=14/256 refcnt=15
in-flight: 409271:memory_failure_work_func
pending: kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_monitor, kfree_rcu_work, rht_deferred_worker, rht_deferred_worker, rht_deferred_worker, rht_deferred_worker, kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_work, drain_local_stock, kfree_rcu_work
workqueue mm_percpu_wq: flags=0x8
pwq 2: cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=1/256 refcnt=2
pending: vmstat_update
workqueue cgroup_destroy: flags=0x0
pwq 2: cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=1/1 refcnt=12072
pending: css_release_work_fn
There were over 12K css_release_work_fn queued, and this caused a few
lockups due to the contention of worker pool lock with IRQ disabled, for
example:
NMI watchdog: Watchdog detected hard LOCKUP on cpu 1
Modules linked in: amd64_edac_mod edac_mce_amd crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel xt_DSCP iptable_mangle kvm_amd bpfilter vfat fat acpi_ipmi i2c_piix4 usb_storage ipmi_si k10temp i2c_core ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler acpi_cpufreq sch_fq_codel xfs libcrc32c crc32c_intel mlx5_core mlxfw nvme xhci_pci ptp nvme_core pps_core xhci_hcd
CPU: 1 PID: 205500 Comm: kworker/1:0 Tainted: G L 5.10.32-t1.el7.twitter.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: TYAN F5AMT /z /S8026GM2NRE-CGN, BIOS V8.030 03/30/2021
Workqueue: events memory_failure_work_func
RIP: 0010:queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x41/0x1a0
Code: 41 f0 0f ba 2f 08 0f 92 c0 0f b6 c0 c1 e0 08 89 c2 8b 07 30 e4 09 d0 a9 00 01 ff ff 75 1b 85 c0 74 0e 8b 07 84 c0 74 08 f3 90 <8b> 07 84 c0 75 f8 b8 01 00 00 00 66 89 07 c3 f6 c4 01 75 04 c6 47
RSP: 0018:ffff9b2ac278f900 EFLAGS: 00000002
RAX: 0000000000480101 RBX: ffff8ce98ce71800 RCX: 0000000000000084
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8ce98ce6a140
RBP: 00000000000284c8 R08: ffffd7248dcb6808 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffff9b2ac278f9b0 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: ffff8cb44dab9c00 R14: ffffffffbd1ce6a0 R15: ffff8cacaa37f068
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8ce98ce40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fcf6e8cb000 CR3: 0000000a0c60a000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0
Call Trace:
__queue_work+0xd6/0x3c0
queue_work_on+0x1c/0x30
uncharge_batch+0x10e/0x110
mem_cgroup_uncharge_list+0x6d/0x80
release_pages+0x37f/0x3f0
__pagevec_release+0x1c/0x50
__invalidate_mapping_pages+0x348/0x380
inode_lru_isolate+0x10a/0x160
__list_lru_walk_one+0x7b/0x170
list_lru_walk_one+0x4a/0x60
prune_icache_sb+0x37/0x50
super_cache_scan+0x123/0x1a0
do_shrink_slab+0x10c/0x2c0
shrink_slab+0x1f1/0x290
drop_slab_node+0x4d/0x70
soft_offline_page+0x1ac/0x5b0
memory_failure_work_func+0x6a/0x90
process_one_work+0x19e/0x340
worker_thread+0x30/0x360
kthread+0x116/0x130
The lockup made the machine is quite unusable. And it also made the
most workingset gone, the reclaimabled slab caches were reduced from 12G
to 300MB, the page caches were decreased from 17G to 4G.
But the most disappointing thing is all the effort doesn't make the page
offline, it just returns:
soft_offline: 0x1469f2: unknown non LRU page type 5ffff0000000000 ()
It seems the aggressive behavior for non-LRU page didn't pay back, so it
doesn't make too much sense to keep it considering the terrible side
effect.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210819054116.266126-1-shy828301@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Reported-by: David Mackey <tdmackey@twitter.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-09-03 00:58:31 +03:00
* TODO : Could shrink slab caches here if a lightweight range - based
* shrinker will be available .
2009-12-16 14:19:57 +03:00
*/
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL ( shake_page ) ;
2018-07-14 07:50:21 +03:00
static unsigned long dev_pagemap_mapping_shift ( struct page * page ,
struct vm_area_struct * vma )
{
unsigned long address = vma_address ( page , vma ) ;
2021-09-25 01:44:03 +03:00
unsigned long ret = 0 ;
2018-07-14 07:50:21 +03:00
pgd_t * pgd ;
p4d_t * p4d ;
pud_t * pud ;
pmd_t * pmd ;
pte_t * pte ;
2022-03-23 00:44:15 +03:00
VM_BUG_ON_VMA ( address = = - EFAULT , vma ) ;
2018-07-14 07:50:21 +03:00
pgd = pgd_offset ( vma - > vm_mm , address ) ;
if ( ! pgd_present ( * pgd ) )
return 0 ;
p4d = p4d_offset ( pgd , address ) ;
if ( ! p4d_present ( * p4d ) )
return 0 ;
pud = pud_offset ( p4d , address ) ;
if ( ! pud_present ( * pud ) )
return 0 ;
if ( pud_devmap ( * pud ) )
return PUD_SHIFT ;
pmd = pmd_offset ( pud , address ) ;
if ( ! pmd_present ( * pmd ) )
return 0 ;
if ( pmd_devmap ( * pmd ) )
return PMD_SHIFT ;
pte = pte_offset_map ( pmd , address ) ;
2021-09-25 01:44:03 +03:00
if ( pte_present ( * pte ) & & pte_devmap ( * pte ) )
ret = PAGE_SHIFT ;
pte_unmap ( pte ) ;
return ret ;
2018-07-14 07:50:21 +03:00
}
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
/*
* Failure handling : if we can ' t find or can ' t kill a process there ' s
* not much we can do . We just print a message and ignore otherwise .
*/
/*
* Schedule a process for later kill .
* Uses GFP_ATOMIC allocations to avoid potential recursions in the VM .
*/
static void add_to_kill ( struct task_struct * tsk , struct page * p ,
struct vm_area_struct * vma ,
2019-12-01 04:53:35 +03:00
struct list_head * to_kill )
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
{
struct to_kill * tk ;
2019-12-01 04:53:35 +03:00
tk = kmalloc ( sizeof ( struct to_kill ) , GFP_ATOMIC ) ;
if ( ! tk ) {
pr_err ( " Memory failure: Out of memory while machine check handling \n " ) ;
return ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
}
2019-12-01 04:53:35 +03:00
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
tk - > addr = page_address_in_vma ( p , vma ) ;
2018-07-14 07:50:21 +03:00
if ( is_zone_device_page ( p ) )
tk - > size_shift = dev_pagemap_mapping_shift ( p , vma ) ;
else
2019-12-01 04:53:41 +03:00
tk - > size_shift = page_shift ( compound_head ( p ) ) ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
/*
2019-10-15 00:12:29 +03:00
* Send SIGKILL if " tk->addr == -EFAULT " . Also , as
* " tk->size_shift " is always non - zero for ! is_zone_device_page ( ) ,
* so " tk->size_shift == 0 " effectively checks no mapping on
* ZONE_DEVICE . Indeed , when a devdax page is mmapped N times
* to a process ' address space , it ' s possible not all N VMAs
* contain mappings for the page , but at least one VMA does .
* Only deliver SIGBUS with payload derived from the VMA that
* has a mapping for the page .
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
*/
2019-10-15 00:12:29 +03:00
if ( tk - > addr = = - EFAULT ) {
2016-05-21 02:57:32 +03:00
pr_info ( " Memory failure: Unable to find user space address %lx in %s \n " ,
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
page_to_pfn ( p ) , tsk - > comm ) ;
2019-10-15 00:12:29 +03:00
} else if ( tk - > size_shift = = 0 ) {
kfree ( tk ) ;
return ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
}
2019-12-01 04:53:35 +03:00
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
get_task_struct ( tsk ) ;
tk - > tsk = tsk ;
list_add_tail ( & tk - > nd , to_kill ) ;
}
/*
* Kill the processes that have been collected earlier .
*
2021-09-03 00:58:28 +03:00
* Only do anything when FORCEKILL is set , otherwise just free the
* list ( this is used for clean pages which do not need killing )
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
* Also when FAIL is set do a force kill because something went
* wrong earlier .
*/
2018-07-14 07:50:11 +03:00
static void kill_procs ( struct list_head * to_kill , int forcekill , bool fail ,
unsigned long pfn , int flags )
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
{
struct to_kill * tk , * next ;
list_for_each_entry_safe ( tk , next , to_kill , nd ) {
2012-07-11 21:20:47 +04:00
if ( forcekill ) {
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
/*
tree-wide: fix assorted typos all over the place
That is "success", "unknown", "through", "performance", "[re|un]mapping"
, "access", "default", "reasonable", "[con]currently", "temperature"
, "channel", "[un]used", "application", "example","hierarchy", "therefore"
, "[over|under]flow", "contiguous", "threshold", "enough" and others.
Signed-off-by: André Goddard Rosa <andre.goddard@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
2009-11-14 18:09:05 +03:00
* In case something went wrong with munmapping
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
* make sure the process doesn ' t catch the
* signal and then access the memory . Just kill it .
*/
2019-10-15 00:12:29 +03:00
if ( fail | | tk - > addr = = - EFAULT ) {
2016-05-21 02:57:32 +03:00
pr_err ( " Memory failure: %#lx: forcibly killing %s:%d because of failure to unmap corrupted page \n " ,
2016-03-18 00:19:50 +03:00
pfn , tk - > tsk - > comm , tk - > tsk - > pid ) ;
2019-02-02 01:21:08 +03:00
do_send_sig_info ( SIGKILL , SEND_SIG_PRIV ,
tk - > tsk , PIDTYPE_PID ) ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
}
/*
* In theory the process could have mapped
* something else on the address in - between . We could
* check for that , but we need to tell the
* process anyways .
*/
2018-07-14 07:50:11 +03:00
else if ( kill_proc ( tk , pfn , flags ) < 0 )
2016-05-21 02:57:32 +03:00
pr_err ( " Memory failure: %#lx: Cannot send advisory machine check signal to %s:%d \n " ,
2016-03-18 00:19:50 +03:00
pfn , tk - > tsk - > comm , tk - > tsk - > pid ) ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
}
put_task_struct ( tk - > tsk ) ;
kfree ( tk ) ;
}
}
2014-06-05 03:11:02 +04:00
/*
* Find a dedicated thread which is supposed to handle SIGBUS ( BUS_MCEERR_AO )
* on behalf of the thread group . Return task_struct of the ( first found )
* dedicated thread if found , and return NULL otherwise .
*
* We already hold read_lock ( & tasklist_lock ) in the caller , so we don ' t
* have to call rcu_read_lock / unlock ( ) in this function .
*/
static struct task_struct * find_early_kill_thread ( struct task_struct * tsk )
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
{
2014-06-05 03:11:02 +04:00
struct task_struct * t ;
2020-06-12 03:34:45 +03:00
for_each_thread ( tsk , t ) {
if ( t - > flags & PF_MCE_PROCESS ) {
if ( t - > flags & PF_MCE_EARLY )
return t ;
} else {
if ( sysctl_memory_failure_early_kill )
return t ;
}
}
2014-06-05 03:11:02 +04:00
return NULL ;
}
/*
* Determine whether a given process is " early kill " process which expects
* to be signaled when some page under the process is hwpoisoned .
* Return task_struct of the dedicated thread ( main thread unless explicitly
2021-02-24 23:06:39 +03:00
* specified ) if the process is " early kill " and otherwise returns NULL .
2020-06-12 03:34:48 +03:00
*
2021-02-24 23:06:39 +03:00
* Note that the above is true for Action Optional case . For Action Required
* case , it ' s only meaningful to the current thread which need to be signaled
* with SIGBUS , this error is Action Optional for other non current
* processes sharing the same error page , if the process is " early kill " , the
* task_struct of the dedicated thread will also be returned .
2014-06-05 03:11:02 +04:00
*/
static struct task_struct * task_early_kill ( struct task_struct * tsk ,
int force_early )
{
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
if ( ! tsk - > mm )
2014-06-05 03:11:02 +04:00
return NULL ;
2021-02-24 23:06:39 +03:00
/*
* Comparing - > mm here because current task might represent
* a subthread , while tsk always points to the main thread .
*/
if ( force_early & & tsk - > mm = = current - > mm )
return current ;
2020-06-12 03:34:45 +03:00
return find_early_kill_thread ( tsk ) ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
}
/*
* Collect processes when the error hit an anonymous page .
*/
static void collect_procs_anon ( struct page * page , struct list_head * to_kill ,
2019-12-01 04:53:35 +03:00
int force_early )
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
{
2022-02-02 07:33:08 +03:00
struct folio * folio = page_folio ( page ) ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
struct vm_area_struct * vma ;
struct task_struct * tsk ;
struct anon_vma * av ;
mm anon rmap: replace same_anon_vma linked list with an interval tree.
When a large VMA (anon or private file mapping) is first touched, which
will populate its anon_vma field, and then split into many regions through
the use of mprotect(), the original anon_vma ends up linking all of the
vmas on a linked list. This can cause rmap to become inefficient, as we
have to walk potentially thousands of irrelevent vmas before finding the
one a given anon page might fall into.
By replacing the same_anon_vma linked list with an interval tree (where
each avc's interval is determined by its vma's start and last pgoffs), we
can make rmap efficient for this use case again.
While the change is large, all of its pieces are fairly simple.
Most places that were walking the same_anon_vma list were looking for a
known pgoff, so they can just use the anon_vma_interval_tree_foreach()
interval tree iterator instead. The exception here is ksm, where the
page's index is not known. It would probably be possible to rework ksm so
that the index would be known, but for now I have decided to keep things
simple and just walk the entirety of the interval tree there.
When updating vma's that already have an anon_vma assigned, we must take
care to re-index the corresponding avc's on their interval tree. This is
done through the use of anon_vma_interval_tree_pre_update_vma() and
anon_vma_interval_tree_post_update_vma(), which remove the avc's from
their interval tree before the update and re-insert them after the update.
The anon_vma stays locked during the update, so there is no chance that
rmap would miss the vmas that are being updated.
Signed-off-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Daniel Santos <daniel.santos@pobox.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-10-09 03:31:39 +04:00
pgoff_t pgoff ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
mm: don't be stuck to rmap lock on reclaim path
The rmap locks(i_mmap_rwsem and anon_vma->root->rwsem) could be contended
under memory pressure if processes keep working on their vmas(e.g., fork,
mmap, munmap). It makes reclaim path stuck. In our real workload traces,
we see kswapd is waiting the lock for 300ms+(worst case, a sec) and it
makes other processes entering direct reclaim, which were also stuck on
the lock.
This patch makes lru aging path try_lock mode like shink_page_list so the
reclaim context will keep working with next lru pages without being stuck.
if it found the rmap lock contended, it rotates the page back to head of
lru in both active/inactive lrus to make them consistent behavior, which
is basic starting point rather than adding more heristic.
Since this patch introduces a new "contended" field as out-param along
with try_lock in-param in rmap_walk_control, it's not immutable any longer
if the try_lock is set so remove const keywords on rmap related functions.
Since rmap walking is already expensive operation, I doubt the const
would help sizable benefit( And we didn't have it until 5.17).
In a heavy app workload in Android, trace shows following statistics. It
almost removes rmap lock contention from reclaim path.
Martin Liu reported:
Before:
max_dur(ms) min_dur(ms) max-min(dur)ms avg_dur(ms) sum_dur(ms) count blocked_function
1632 0 1631 151.542173 31672 209 page_lock_anon_vma_read
601 0 601 145.544681 28817 198 rmap_walk_file
After:
max_dur(ms) min_dur(ms) max-min(dur)ms avg_dur(ms) sum_dur(ms) count blocked_function
NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN 0.0 NaN
0 0 0 0.127645 1 12 rmap_walk_file
[minchan@kernel.org: add comment, per Matthew]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/YnNqeB5tUf6LZ57b@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220510215423.164547-1-minchan@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Cc: Tim Murray <timmurray@google.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com>
Cc: Martin Liu <liumartin@google.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-05-20 00:08:54 +03:00
av = folio_lock_anon_vma_read ( folio , NULL ) ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
if ( av = = NULL ) /* Not actually mapped anymore */
2011-06-28 03:18:09 +04:00
return ;
2014-07-24 01:00:01 +04:00
pgoff = page_to_pgoff ( page ) ;
2011-06-28 03:18:09 +04:00
read_lock ( & tasklist_lock ) ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
for_each_process ( tsk ) {
mm: change anon_vma linking to fix multi-process server scalability issue
The old anon_vma code can lead to scalability issues with heavily forking
workloads. Specifically, each anon_vma will be shared between the parent
process and all its child processes.
In a workload with 1000 child processes and a VMA with 1000 anonymous
pages per process that get COWed, this leads to a system with a million
anonymous pages in the same anon_vma, each of which is mapped in just one
of the 1000 processes. However, the current rmap code needs to walk them
all, leading to O(N) scanning complexity for each page.
This can result in systems where one CPU is walking the page tables of
1000 processes in page_referenced_one, while all other CPUs are stuck on
the anon_vma lock. This leads to catastrophic failure for a benchmark
like AIM7, where the total number of processes can reach in the tens of
thousands. Real workloads are still a factor 10 less process intensive
than AIM7, but they are catching up.
This patch changes the way anon_vmas and VMAs are linked, which allows us
to associate multiple anon_vmas with a VMA. At fork time, each child
process gets its own anon_vmas, in which its COWed pages will be
instantiated. The parents' anon_vma is also linked to the VMA, because
non-COWed pages could be present in any of the children.
This reduces rmap scanning complexity to O(1) for the pages of the 1000
child processes, with O(N) complexity for at most 1/N pages in the system.
This reduces the average scanning cost in heavily forking workloads from
O(N) to 2.
The only real complexity in this patch stems from the fact that linking a
VMA to anon_vmas now involves memory allocations. This means vma_adjust
can fail, if it needs to attach a VMA to anon_vma structures. This in
turn means error handling needs to be added to the calling functions.
A second source of complexity is that, because there can be multiple
anon_vmas, the anon_vma linking in vma_adjust can no longer be done under
"the" anon_vma lock. To prevent the rmap code from walking up an
incomplete VMA, this patch introduces the VM_LOCK_RMAP VMA flag. This bit
flag uses the same slot as the NOMMU VM_MAPPED_COPY, with an ifdef in mm.h
to make sure it is impossible to compile a kernel that needs both symbolic
values for the same bitflag.
Some test results:
Without the anon_vma changes, when AIM7 hits around 9.7k users (on a test
box with 16GB RAM and not quite enough IO), the system ends up running
>99% in system time, with every CPU on the same anon_vma lock in the
pageout code.
With these changes, AIM7 hits the cross-over point around 29.7k users.
This happens with ~99% IO wait time, there never seems to be any spike in
system time. The anon_vma lock contention appears to be resolved.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan.kim@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh.dickins@tiscali.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-03-06 00:42:07 +03:00
struct anon_vma_chain * vmac ;
2014-06-05 03:11:02 +04:00
struct task_struct * t = task_early_kill ( tsk , force_early ) ;
mm: change anon_vma linking to fix multi-process server scalability issue
The old anon_vma code can lead to scalability issues with heavily forking
workloads. Specifically, each anon_vma will be shared between the parent
process and all its child processes.
In a workload with 1000 child processes and a VMA with 1000 anonymous
pages per process that get COWed, this leads to a system with a million
anonymous pages in the same anon_vma, each of which is mapped in just one
of the 1000 processes. However, the current rmap code needs to walk them
all, leading to O(N) scanning complexity for each page.
This can result in systems where one CPU is walking the page tables of
1000 processes in page_referenced_one, while all other CPUs are stuck on
the anon_vma lock. This leads to catastrophic failure for a benchmark
like AIM7, where the total number of processes can reach in the tens of
thousands. Real workloads are still a factor 10 less process intensive
than AIM7, but they are catching up.
This patch changes the way anon_vmas and VMAs are linked, which allows us
to associate multiple anon_vmas with a VMA. At fork time, each child
process gets its own anon_vmas, in which its COWed pages will be
instantiated. The parents' anon_vma is also linked to the VMA, because
non-COWed pages could be present in any of the children.
This reduces rmap scanning complexity to O(1) for the pages of the 1000
child processes, with O(N) complexity for at most 1/N pages in the system.
This reduces the average scanning cost in heavily forking workloads from
O(N) to 2.
The only real complexity in this patch stems from the fact that linking a
VMA to anon_vmas now involves memory allocations. This means vma_adjust
can fail, if it needs to attach a VMA to anon_vma structures. This in
turn means error handling needs to be added to the calling functions.
A second source of complexity is that, because there can be multiple
anon_vmas, the anon_vma linking in vma_adjust can no longer be done under
"the" anon_vma lock. To prevent the rmap code from walking up an
incomplete VMA, this patch introduces the VM_LOCK_RMAP VMA flag. This bit
flag uses the same slot as the NOMMU VM_MAPPED_COPY, with an ifdef in mm.h
to make sure it is impossible to compile a kernel that needs both symbolic
values for the same bitflag.
Some test results:
Without the anon_vma changes, when AIM7 hits around 9.7k users (on a test
box with 16GB RAM and not quite enough IO), the system ends up running
>99% in system time, with every CPU on the same anon_vma lock in the
pageout code.
With these changes, AIM7 hits the cross-over point around 29.7k users.
This happens with ~99% IO wait time, there never seems to be any spike in
system time. The anon_vma lock contention appears to be resolved.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan.kim@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh.dickins@tiscali.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-03-06 00:42:07 +03:00
2014-06-05 03:11:02 +04:00
if ( ! t )
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
continue ;
mm anon rmap: replace same_anon_vma linked list with an interval tree.
When a large VMA (anon or private file mapping) is first touched, which
will populate its anon_vma field, and then split into many regions through
the use of mprotect(), the original anon_vma ends up linking all of the
vmas on a linked list. This can cause rmap to become inefficient, as we
have to walk potentially thousands of irrelevent vmas before finding the
one a given anon page might fall into.
By replacing the same_anon_vma linked list with an interval tree (where
each avc's interval is determined by its vma's start and last pgoffs), we
can make rmap efficient for this use case again.
While the change is large, all of its pieces are fairly simple.
Most places that were walking the same_anon_vma list were looking for a
known pgoff, so they can just use the anon_vma_interval_tree_foreach()
interval tree iterator instead. The exception here is ksm, where the
page's index is not known. It would probably be possible to rework ksm so
that the index would be known, but for now I have decided to keep things
simple and just walk the entirety of the interval tree there.
When updating vma's that already have an anon_vma assigned, we must take
care to re-index the corresponding avc's on their interval tree. This is
done through the use of anon_vma_interval_tree_pre_update_vma() and
anon_vma_interval_tree_post_update_vma(), which remove the avc's from
their interval tree before the update and re-insert them after the update.
The anon_vma stays locked during the update, so there is no chance that
rmap would miss the vmas that are being updated.
Signed-off-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Daniel Santos <daniel.santos@pobox.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-10-09 03:31:39 +04:00
anon_vma_interval_tree_foreach ( vmac , & av - > rb_root ,
pgoff , pgoff ) {
mm: change anon_vma linking to fix multi-process server scalability issue
The old anon_vma code can lead to scalability issues with heavily forking
workloads. Specifically, each anon_vma will be shared between the parent
process and all its child processes.
In a workload with 1000 child processes and a VMA with 1000 anonymous
pages per process that get COWed, this leads to a system with a million
anonymous pages in the same anon_vma, each of which is mapped in just one
of the 1000 processes. However, the current rmap code needs to walk them
all, leading to O(N) scanning complexity for each page.
This can result in systems where one CPU is walking the page tables of
1000 processes in page_referenced_one, while all other CPUs are stuck on
the anon_vma lock. This leads to catastrophic failure for a benchmark
like AIM7, where the total number of processes can reach in the tens of
thousands. Real workloads are still a factor 10 less process intensive
than AIM7, but they are catching up.
This patch changes the way anon_vmas and VMAs are linked, which allows us
to associate multiple anon_vmas with a VMA. At fork time, each child
process gets its own anon_vmas, in which its COWed pages will be
instantiated. The parents' anon_vma is also linked to the VMA, because
non-COWed pages could be present in any of the children.
This reduces rmap scanning complexity to O(1) for the pages of the 1000
child processes, with O(N) complexity for at most 1/N pages in the system.
This reduces the average scanning cost in heavily forking workloads from
O(N) to 2.
The only real complexity in this patch stems from the fact that linking a
VMA to anon_vmas now involves memory allocations. This means vma_adjust
can fail, if it needs to attach a VMA to anon_vma structures. This in
turn means error handling needs to be added to the calling functions.
A second source of complexity is that, because there can be multiple
anon_vmas, the anon_vma linking in vma_adjust can no longer be done under
"the" anon_vma lock. To prevent the rmap code from walking up an
incomplete VMA, this patch introduces the VM_LOCK_RMAP VMA flag. This bit
flag uses the same slot as the NOMMU VM_MAPPED_COPY, with an ifdef in mm.h
to make sure it is impossible to compile a kernel that needs both symbolic
values for the same bitflag.
Some test results:
Without the anon_vma changes, when AIM7 hits around 9.7k users (on a test
box with 16GB RAM and not quite enough IO), the system ends up running
>99% in system time, with every CPU on the same anon_vma lock in the
pageout code.
With these changes, AIM7 hits the cross-over point around 29.7k users.
This happens with ~99% IO wait time, there never seems to be any spike in
system time. The anon_vma lock contention appears to be resolved.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan.kim@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh.dickins@tiscali.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-03-06 00:42:07 +03:00
vma = vmac - > vma ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
if ( ! page_mapped_in_vma ( page , vma ) )
continue ;
2014-06-05 03:11:02 +04:00
if ( vma - > vm_mm = = t - > mm )
2019-12-01 04:53:35 +03:00
add_to_kill ( t , page , vma , to_kill ) ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
}
}
read_unlock ( & tasklist_lock ) ;
2012-12-02 23:56:50 +04:00
page_unlock_anon_vma_read ( av ) ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
}
/*
* Collect processes when the error hit a file mapped page .
*/
static void collect_procs_file ( struct page * page , struct list_head * to_kill ,
2019-12-01 04:53:35 +03:00
int force_early )
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
{
struct vm_area_struct * vma ;
struct task_struct * tsk ;
struct address_space * mapping = page - > mapping ;
2020-10-14 02:54:42 +03:00
pgoff_t pgoff ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
2014-12-13 03:54:36 +03:00
i_mmap_lock_read ( mapping ) ;
2011-06-28 03:18:09 +04:00
read_lock ( & tasklist_lock ) ;
2020-10-14 02:54:42 +03:00
pgoff = page_to_pgoff ( page ) ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
for_each_process ( tsk ) {
2014-06-05 03:11:02 +04:00
struct task_struct * t = task_early_kill ( tsk , force_early ) ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
2014-06-05 03:11:02 +04:00
if ( ! t )
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
continue ;
2012-10-09 03:31:25 +04:00
vma_interval_tree_foreach ( vma , & mapping - > i_mmap , pgoff ,
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
pgoff ) {
/*
* Send early kill signal to tasks where a vma covers
* the page but the corrupted page is not necessarily
* mapped it in its pte .
* Assume applications who requested early kill want
* to be informed of all such data corruptions .
*/
2014-06-05 03:11:02 +04:00
if ( vma - > vm_mm = = t - > mm )
2019-12-01 04:53:35 +03:00
add_to_kill ( t , page , vma , to_kill ) ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
}
}
read_unlock ( & tasklist_lock ) ;
2014-12-13 03:54:36 +03:00
i_mmap_unlock_read ( mapping ) ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
}
/*
* Collect the processes who have the corrupted page mapped to kill .
*/
2014-06-05 03:11:01 +04:00
static void collect_procs ( struct page * page , struct list_head * tokill ,
int force_early )
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
{
if ( ! page - > mapping )
return ;
if ( PageAnon ( page ) )
2019-12-01 04:53:35 +03:00
collect_procs_anon ( page , tokill , force_early ) ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
else
2019-12-01 04:53:35 +03:00
collect_procs_file ( page , tokill , force_early ) ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
}
2021-06-29 05:43:14 +03:00
struct hwp_walk {
struct to_kill tk ;
unsigned long pfn ;
int flags ;
} ;
static void set_to_kill ( struct to_kill * tk , unsigned long addr , short shift )
{
tk - > addr = addr ;
tk - > size_shift = shift ;
}
static int check_hwpoisoned_entry ( pte_t pte , unsigned long addr , short shift ,
unsigned long poisoned_pfn , struct to_kill * tk )
{
unsigned long pfn = 0 ;
if ( pte_present ( pte ) ) {
pfn = pte_pfn ( pte ) ;
} else {
swp_entry_t swp = pte_to_swp_entry ( pte ) ;
if ( is_hwpoison_entry ( swp ) )
pfn = hwpoison_entry_to_pfn ( swp ) ;
}
if ( ! pfn | | pfn ! = poisoned_pfn )
return 0 ;
set_to_kill ( tk , addr , shift ) ;
return 1 ;
}
# ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
static int check_hwpoisoned_pmd_entry ( pmd_t * pmdp , unsigned long addr ,
struct hwp_walk * hwp )
{
pmd_t pmd = * pmdp ;
unsigned long pfn ;
unsigned long hwpoison_vaddr ;
if ( ! pmd_present ( pmd ) )
return 0 ;
pfn = pmd_pfn ( pmd ) ;
if ( pfn < = hwp - > pfn & & hwp - > pfn < pfn + HPAGE_PMD_NR ) {
hwpoison_vaddr = addr + ( ( hwp - > pfn - pfn ) < < PAGE_SHIFT ) ;
set_to_kill ( & hwp - > tk , hwpoison_vaddr , PAGE_SHIFT ) ;
return 1 ;
}
return 0 ;
}
# else
static int check_hwpoisoned_pmd_entry ( pmd_t * pmdp , unsigned long addr ,
struct hwp_walk * hwp )
{
return 0 ;
}
# endif
static int hwpoison_pte_range ( pmd_t * pmdp , unsigned long addr ,
unsigned long end , struct mm_walk * walk )
{
2022-04-29 09:16:01 +03:00
struct hwp_walk * hwp = walk - > private ;
2021-06-29 05:43:14 +03:00
int ret = 0 ;
2021-09-03 00:58:22 +03:00
pte_t * ptep , * mapped_pte ;
2021-06-29 05:43:14 +03:00
spinlock_t * ptl ;
ptl = pmd_trans_huge_lock ( pmdp , walk - > vma ) ;
if ( ptl ) {
ret = check_hwpoisoned_pmd_entry ( pmdp , addr , hwp ) ;
spin_unlock ( ptl ) ;
goto out ;
}
if ( pmd_trans_unstable ( pmdp ) )
goto out ;
2021-09-03 00:58:22 +03:00
mapped_pte = ptep = pte_offset_map_lock ( walk - > vma - > vm_mm , pmdp ,
addr , & ptl ) ;
2021-06-29 05:43:14 +03:00
for ( ; addr ! = end ; ptep + + , addr + = PAGE_SIZE ) {
ret = check_hwpoisoned_entry ( * ptep , addr , PAGE_SHIFT ,
hwp - > pfn , & hwp - > tk ) ;
if ( ret = = 1 )
break ;
}
2021-09-03 00:58:22 +03:00
pte_unmap_unlock ( mapped_pte , ptl ) ;
2021-06-29 05:43:14 +03:00
out :
cond_resched ( ) ;
return ret ;
}
# ifdef CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE
static int hwpoison_hugetlb_range ( pte_t * ptep , unsigned long hmask ,
unsigned long addr , unsigned long end ,
struct mm_walk * walk )
{
2022-04-29 09:16:01 +03:00
struct hwp_walk * hwp = walk - > private ;
2021-06-29 05:43:14 +03:00
pte_t pte = huge_ptep_get ( ptep ) ;
struct hstate * h = hstate_vma ( walk - > vma ) ;
return check_hwpoisoned_entry ( pte , addr , huge_page_shift ( h ) ,
hwp - > pfn , & hwp - > tk ) ;
}
# else
# define hwpoison_hugetlb_range NULL
# endif
2021-11-05 23:41:01 +03:00
static const struct mm_walk_ops hwp_walk_ops = {
2021-06-29 05:43:14 +03:00
. pmd_entry = hwpoison_pte_range ,
. hugetlb_entry = hwpoison_hugetlb_range ,
} ;
/*
* Sends SIGBUS to the current process with error info .
*
* This function is intended to handle " Action Required " MCEs on already
* hardware poisoned pages . They could happen , for example , when
* memory_failure ( ) failed to unmap the error page at the first call , or
* when multiple local machine checks happened on different CPUs .
*
* MCE handler currently has no easy access to the error virtual address ,
* so this function walks page table to find it . The returned virtual address
* is proper in most cases , but it could be wrong when the application
* process has multiple entries mapping the error page .
*/
static int kill_accessing_process ( struct task_struct * p , unsigned long pfn ,
int flags )
{
int ret ;
struct hwp_walk priv = {
. pfn = pfn ,
} ;
priv . tk . tsk = p ;
mmap_read_lock ( p - > mm ) ;
ret = walk_page_range ( p - > mm , 0 , TASK_SIZE , & hwp_walk_ops ,
( void * ) & priv ) ;
if ( ret = = 1 & & priv . tk . addr )
kill_proc ( & priv . tk , pfn , flags ) ;
2022-03-23 00:44:06 +03:00
else
ret = 0 ;
2021-06-29 05:43:14 +03:00
mmap_read_unlock ( p - > mm ) ;
2022-03-23 00:44:06 +03:00
return ret > 0 ? - EHWPOISON : - EFAULT ;
2021-06-29 05:43:14 +03:00
}
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
static const char * action_name [ ] = {
2015-06-25 02:57:30 +03:00
[ MF_IGNORED ] = " Ignored " ,
[ MF_FAILED ] = " Failed " ,
[ MF_DELAYED ] = " Delayed " ,
[ MF_RECOVERED ] = " Recovered " ,
2015-04-16 02:13:05 +03:00
} ;
static const char * const action_page_types [ ] = {
2015-06-25 02:57:30 +03:00
[ MF_MSG_KERNEL ] = " reserved kernel page " ,
[ MF_MSG_KERNEL_HIGH_ORDER ] = " high-order kernel page " ,
[ MF_MSG_SLAB ] = " kernel slab page " ,
[ MF_MSG_DIFFERENT_COMPOUND ] = " different compound page after locking " ,
[ MF_MSG_HUGE ] = " huge page " ,
[ MF_MSG_FREE_HUGE ] = " free huge page " ,
2018-04-06 02:23:05 +03:00
[ MF_MSG_NON_PMD_HUGE ] = " non-pmd-sized huge page " ,
2015-06-25 02:57:30 +03:00
[ MF_MSG_UNMAP_FAILED ] = " unmapping failed page " ,
[ MF_MSG_DIRTY_SWAPCACHE ] = " dirty swapcache page " ,
[ MF_MSG_CLEAN_SWAPCACHE ] = " clean swapcache page " ,
[ MF_MSG_DIRTY_MLOCKED_LRU ] = " dirty mlocked LRU page " ,
[ MF_MSG_CLEAN_MLOCKED_LRU ] = " clean mlocked LRU page " ,
[ MF_MSG_DIRTY_UNEVICTABLE_LRU ] = " dirty unevictable LRU page " ,
[ MF_MSG_CLEAN_UNEVICTABLE_LRU ] = " clean unevictable LRU page " ,
[ MF_MSG_DIRTY_LRU ] = " dirty LRU page " ,
[ MF_MSG_CLEAN_LRU ] = " clean LRU page " ,
[ MF_MSG_TRUNCATED_LRU ] = " already truncated LRU page " ,
[ MF_MSG_BUDDY ] = " free buddy page " ,
2018-07-14 07:50:21 +03:00
[ MF_MSG_DAX ] = " dax page " ,
2020-10-16 06:07:21 +03:00
[ MF_MSG_UNSPLIT_THP ] = " unsplit thp " ,
2015-06-25 02:57:30 +03:00
[ MF_MSG_UNKNOWN ] = " unknown page " ,
2015-04-16 02:13:05 +03:00
} ;
2009-12-16 14:19:58 +03:00
/*
* XXX : It is possible that a page is isolated from LRU cache ,
* and then kept in swap cache or failed to remove from page cache .
* The page count will stop it from being freed by unpoison .
* Stress tests should be aware of this memory leak problem .
*/
static int delete_from_lru_cache ( struct page * p )
{
if ( ! isolate_lru_page ( p ) ) {
/*
* Clear sensible page flags , so that the buddy system won ' t
* complain when the page is unpoison - and - freed .
*/
ClearPageActive ( p ) ;
ClearPageUnevictable ( p ) ;
2017-05-13 01:46:26 +03:00
/*
* Poisoned page might never drop its ref count to 0 so we have
* to uncharge it manually from its memcg .
*/
2021-05-02 03:42:23 +03:00
mem_cgroup_uncharge ( page_folio ( p ) ) ;
2017-05-13 01:46:26 +03:00
2009-12-16 14:19:58 +03:00
/*
* drop the page count elevated by isolate_lru_page ( )
*/
mm, fs: get rid of PAGE_CACHE_* and page_cache_{get,release} macros
PAGE_CACHE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN} macros were introduced *long* time
ago with promise that one day it will be possible to implement page
cache with bigger chunks than PAGE_SIZE.
This promise never materialized. And unlikely will.
We have many places where PAGE_CACHE_SIZE assumed to be equal to
PAGE_SIZE. And it's constant source of confusion on whether
PAGE_CACHE_* or PAGE_* constant should be used in a particular case,
especially on the border between fs and mm.
Global switching to PAGE_CACHE_SIZE != PAGE_SIZE would cause to much
breakage to be doable.
Let's stop pretending that pages in page cache are special. They are
not.
The changes are pretty straight-forward:
- <foo> << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) -> <foo>;
- <foo> >> (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) -> <foo>;
- PAGE_CACHE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN} -> PAGE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN};
- page_cache_get() -> get_page();
- page_cache_release() -> put_page();
This patch contains automated changes generated with coccinelle using
script below. For some reason, coccinelle doesn't patch header files.
I've called spatch for them manually.
The only adjustment after coccinelle is revert of changes to
PAGE_CAHCE_ALIGN definition: we are going to drop it later.
There are few places in the code where coccinelle didn't reach. I'll
fix them manually in a separate patch. Comments and documentation also
will be addressed with the separate patch.
virtual patch
@@
expression E;
@@
- E << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT)
+ E
@@
expression E;
@@
- E >> (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT)
+ E
@@
@@
- PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT
+ PAGE_SHIFT
@@
@@
- PAGE_CACHE_SIZE
+ PAGE_SIZE
@@
@@
- PAGE_CACHE_MASK
+ PAGE_MASK
@@
expression E;
@@
- PAGE_CACHE_ALIGN(E)
+ PAGE_ALIGN(E)
@@
expression E;
@@
- page_cache_get(E)
+ get_page(E)
@@
expression E;
@@
- page_cache_release(E)
+ put_page(E)
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-04-01 15:29:47 +03:00
put_page ( p ) ;
2009-12-16 14:19:58 +03:00
return 0 ;
}
return - EIO ;
}
2017-07-11 01:47:50 +03:00
static int truncate_error_page ( struct page * p , unsigned long pfn ,
struct address_space * mapping )
{
int ret = MF_FAILED ;
if ( mapping - > a_ops - > error_remove_page ) {
int err = mapping - > a_ops - > error_remove_page ( mapping , p ) ;
if ( err ! = 0 ) {
pr_info ( " Memory failure: %#lx: Failed to punch page: %d \n " ,
pfn , err ) ;
} else if ( page_has_private ( p ) & &
! try_to_release_page ( p , GFP_NOIO ) ) {
pr_info ( " Memory failure: %#lx: failed to release buffers \n " ,
pfn ) ;
} else {
ret = MF_RECOVERED ;
}
} else {
/*
* If the file system doesn ' t support it just invalidate
* This fails on dirty or anything with private pages
*/
if ( invalidate_inode_page ( p ) )
ret = MF_RECOVERED ;
else
pr_info ( " Memory failure: %#lx: Failed to invalidate \n " ,
pfn ) ;
}
return ret ;
}
2021-11-05 23:41:07 +03:00
struct page_state {
unsigned long mask ;
unsigned long res ;
enum mf_action_page_type type ;
/* Callback ->action() has to unlock the relevant page inside it. */
int ( * action ) ( struct page_state * ps , struct page * p ) ;
} ;
/*
* Return true if page is still referenced by others , otherwise return
* false .
*
* The extra_pins is true when one extra refcount is expected .
*/
static bool has_extra_refcount ( struct page_state * ps , struct page * p ,
bool extra_pins )
{
int count = page_count ( p ) - 1 ;
if ( extra_pins )
count - = 1 ;
if ( count > 0 ) {
pr_err ( " Memory failure: %#lx: %s still referenced by %d users \n " ,
page_to_pfn ( p ) , action_page_types [ ps - > type ] , count ) ;
return true ;
}
return false ;
}
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
/*
* Error hit kernel page .
* Do nothing , try to be lucky and not touch this instead . For a few cases we
* could be more sophisticated .
*/
2021-11-05 23:41:07 +03:00
static int me_kernel ( struct page_state * ps , struct page * p )
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
{
2021-06-25 04:40:01 +03:00
unlock_page ( p ) ;
2015-06-25 02:57:30 +03:00
return MF_IGNORED ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
}
/*
* Page in unknown state . Do nothing .
*/
2021-11-05 23:41:07 +03:00
static int me_unknown ( struct page_state * ps , struct page * p )
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
{
2021-11-05 23:41:07 +03:00
pr_err ( " Memory failure: %#lx: Unknown page state \n " , page_to_pfn ( p ) ) ;
2021-06-25 04:40:01 +03:00
unlock_page ( p ) ;
2015-06-25 02:57:30 +03:00
return MF_FAILED ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
}
/*
* Clean ( or cleaned ) page cache page .
*/
2021-11-05 23:41:07 +03:00
static int me_pagecache_clean ( struct page_state * ps , struct page * p )
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
{
2021-06-25 04:40:01 +03:00
int ret ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
struct address_space * mapping ;
2022-01-15 01:05:19 +03:00
bool extra_pins ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
2009-12-16 14:19:58 +03:00
delete_from_lru_cache ( p ) ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
/*
* For anonymous pages we ' re done the only reference left
* should be the one m_f ( ) holds .
*/
2021-06-25 04:40:01 +03:00
if ( PageAnon ( p ) ) {
ret = MF_RECOVERED ;
goto out ;
}
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
/*
* Now truncate the page in the page cache . This is really
* more like a " temporary hole punch "
* Don ' t do this for block devices when someone else
* has a reference , because it could be file system metadata
* and that ' s not safe to truncate .
*/
mapping = page_mapping ( p ) ;
if ( ! mapping ) {
/*
* Page has been teared down in the meanwhile
*/
2021-06-25 04:40:01 +03:00
ret = MF_FAILED ;
goto out ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
}
2022-01-15 01:05:19 +03:00
/*
* The shmem page is kept in page cache instead of truncating
* so is expected to have an extra refcount after error - handling .
*/
extra_pins = shmem_mapping ( mapping ) ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
/*
* Truncation is a bit tricky . Enable it per file system for now .
*
2021-04-12 16:50:21 +03:00
* Open : to take i_rwsem or not for this ? Right now we don ' t .
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
*/
2021-11-05 23:41:07 +03:00
ret = truncate_error_page ( p , page_to_pfn ( p ) , mapping ) ;
2022-01-15 01:05:19 +03:00
if ( has_extra_refcount ( ps , p , extra_pins ) )
ret = MF_FAILED ;
2021-06-25 04:40:01 +03:00
out :
unlock_page ( p ) ;
2021-11-05 23:41:07 +03:00
2021-06-25 04:40:01 +03:00
return ret ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
}
/*
2014-01-22 03:49:08 +04:00
* Dirty pagecache page
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
* Issues : when the error hit a hole page the error is not properly
* propagated .
*/
2021-11-05 23:41:07 +03:00
static int me_pagecache_dirty ( struct page_state * ps , struct page * p )
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
{
struct address_space * mapping = page_mapping ( p ) ;
SetPageError ( p ) ;
/* TBD: print more information about the file. */
if ( mapping ) {
/*
* IO error will be reported by write ( ) , fsync ( ) , etc .
* who check the mapping .
* This way the application knows that something went
* wrong with its dirty file data .
*
* There ' s one open issue :
*
* The EIO will be only reported on the next IO
* operation and then cleared through the IO map .
* Normally Linux has two mechanisms to pass IO error
* first through the AS_EIO flag in the address space
* and then through the PageError flag in the page .
* Since we drop pages on memory failure handling the
* only mechanism open to use is through AS_AIO .
*
* This has the disadvantage that it gets cleared on
* the first operation that returns an error , while
* the PageError bit is more sticky and only cleared
* when the page is reread or dropped . If an
* application assumes it will always get error on
* fsync , but does other operations on the fd before
2011-03-31 05:57:33 +04:00
* and the page is dropped between then the error
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
* will not be properly reported .
*
* This can already happen even without hwpoisoned
* pages : first on metadata IO errors ( which only
* report through AS_EIO ) or when the page is dropped
* at the wrong time .
*
* So right now we assume that the application DTRT on
* the first EIO , but we ' re not worse than other parts
* of the kernel .
*/
2017-07-06 14:02:19 +03:00
mapping_set_error ( mapping , - EIO ) ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
}
2021-11-05 23:41:07 +03:00
return me_pagecache_clean ( ps , p ) ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
}
/*
* Clean and dirty swap cache .
*
* Dirty swap cache page is tricky to handle . The page could live both in page
* cache and swap cache ( ie . page is freshly swapped in ) . So it could be
* referenced concurrently by 2 types of PTEs :
* normal PTEs and swap PTEs . We try to handle them consistently by calling
* try_to_unmap ( TTU_IGNORE_HWPOISON ) to convert the normal PTEs to swap PTEs ,
* and then
* - clear dirty bit to prevent IO
* - remove from LRU
* - but keep in the swap cache , so that when we return to it on
* a later page fault , we know the application is accessing
* corrupted data and shall be killed ( we installed simple
* interception code in do_swap_page to catch it ) .
*
* Clean swap cache pages can be directly isolated . A later page fault will
* bring in the known good data from disk .
*/
2021-11-05 23:41:07 +03:00
static int me_swapcache_dirty ( struct page_state * ps , struct page * p )
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
{
2021-06-25 04:40:01 +03:00
int ret ;
2021-11-05 23:41:07 +03:00
bool extra_pins = false ;
2021-06-25 04:40:01 +03:00
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
ClearPageDirty ( p ) ;
/* Trigger EIO in shmem: */
ClearPageUptodate ( p ) ;
2021-06-25 04:40:01 +03:00
ret = delete_from_lru_cache ( p ) ? MF_FAILED : MF_DELAYED ;
unlock_page ( p ) ;
2021-11-05 23:41:07 +03:00
if ( ret = = MF_DELAYED )
extra_pins = true ;
if ( has_extra_refcount ( ps , p , extra_pins ) )
ret = MF_FAILED ;
2021-06-25 04:40:01 +03:00
return ret ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
}
2021-11-05 23:41:07 +03:00
static int me_swapcache_clean ( struct page_state * ps , struct page * p )
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
{
2022-06-17 20:50:19 +03:00
struct folio * folio = page_folio ( p ) ;
2021-06-25 04:40:01 +03:00
int ret ;
2022-06-17 20:50:19 +03:00
delete_from_swap_cache ( folio ) ;
2009-09-29 09:16:20 +04:00
2021-06-25 04:40:01 +03:00
ret = delete_from_lru_cache ( p ) ? MF_FAILED : MF_RECOVERED ;
2022-06-17 20:50:19 +03:00
folio_unlock ( folio ) ;
2021-11-05 23:41:07 +03:00
if ( has_extra_refcount ( ps , p , false ) )
ret = MF_FAILED ;
2021-06-25 04:40:01 +03:00
return ret ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
}
/*
* Huge pages . Needs work .
* Issues :
2010-05-28 04:29:20 +04:00
* - Error on hugepage is contained in hugepage unit ( not in raw page unit . )
* To narrow down kill region to one page , we need to break up pmd .
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
*/
2021-11-05 23:41:07 +03:00
static int me_huge_page ( struct page_state * ps , struct page * p )
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
{
mm,hwpoison: take free pages off the buddy freelists
The crux of the matter is that historically we left poisoned pages in the
buddy system because we have some checks in place when allocating a page
that are gatekeeper for poisoned pages. Unfortunately, we do have other
users (e.g: compaction [1]) that scan buddy freelists and try to get a
page from there without checking whether the page is HWPoison.
As I stated already, I think it is fundamentally wrong to keep HWPoison
pages within the buddy systems, checks in place or not.
Let us fix this the same way we did for soft_offline [2], taking the page
off the buddy freelist so it is completely unreachable.
Note that this is fairly simple to trigger, as we only need to poison free
buddy pages (madvise MADV_HWPOISON) and then run some sort of memory
stress system.
Just for a matter of reference, I put a dump_page() in compaction_alloc()
to trigger for HWPoison patches:
page:0000000012b2982b refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x1 pfn:0x1d5db
flags: 0xfffffc0800000(hwpoison)
raw: 000fffffc0800000 ffffea00007573c8 ffffc90000857de0 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: compaction_alloc
CPU: 4 PID: 123 Comm: kcompactd0 Tainted: G E 5.9.0-rc2-mm1-1-default+ #5
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.10.2-0-g5f4c7b1-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x6d/0x8b
compaction_alloc+0xb2/0xc0
migrate_pages+0x2a6/0x12a0
compact_zone+0x5eb/0x11c0
proactive_compact_node+0x89/0xf0
kcompactd+0x2d0/0x3a0
kthread+0x118/0x130
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
After that, if e.g: a process faults in the page, it will get killed
unexpectedly.
Fix it by containing the page immediatelly.
Besides that, two more changes can be noticed:
* MF_DELAYED no longer suits as we are fixing the issue by containing
the page immediately, so it does no longer rely on the allocation-time
checks to stop HWPoison to be handed over.
gain unless it is unpoisoned, so we fixed the situation.
Because of that, let us use MF_RECOVERED from now on.
* The second block that handles PageBuddy pages is no longer needed:
We call shake_page and then check whether the page is Buddy
because shake_page calls drain_all_pages, which sends pcp-pages back to
the buddy freelists, so we could have a chance to handle free pages.
Currently, get_hwpoison_page already calls drain_all_pages, and we call
get_hwpoison_page right before coming here, so we should be on the safe
side.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20190826104144.GA7849@linux/T/#u
[2] https://patchwork.kernel.org/cover/11792607/
[osalvador@suse.de: take the poisoned subpage off the buddy frelists]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201013144447.6706-4-osalvador@suse.de
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201013144447.6706-3-osalvador@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-15 06:11:32 +03:00
int res ;
2010-05-28 04:29:20 +04:00
struct page * hpage = compound_head ( p ) ;
2017-07-11 01:47:50 +03:00
struct address_space * mapping ;
2015-06-25 02:56:53 +03:00
if ( ! PageHuge ( hpage ) )
return MF_DELAYED ;
2017-07-11 01:47:50 +03:00
mapping = page_mapping ( hpage ) ;
if ( mapping ) {
2021-11-05 23:41:07 +03:00
res = truncate_error_page ( hpage , page_to_pfn ( p ) , mapping ) ;
2021-06-25 04:40:01 +03:00
unlock_page ( hpage ) ;
2017-07-11 01:47:50 +03:00
} else {
mm,hwpoison: take free pages off the buddy freelists
The crux of the matter is that historically we left poisoned pages in the
buddy system because we have some checks in place when allocating a page
that are gatekeeper for poisoned pages. Unfortunately, we do have other
users (e.g: compaction [1]) that scan buddy freelists and try to get a
page from there without checking whether the page is HWPoison.
As I stated already, I think it is fundamentally wrong to keep HWPoison
pages within the buddy systems, checks in place or not.
Let us fix this the same way we did for soft_offline [2], taking the page
off the buddy freelist so it is completely unreachable.
Note that this is fairly simple to trigger, as we only need to poison free
buddy pages (madvise MADV_HWPOISON) and then run some sort of memory
stress system.
Just for a matter of reference, I put a dump_page() in compaction_alloc()
to trigger for HWPoison patches:
page:0000000012b2982b refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x1 pfn:0x1d5db
flags: 0xfffffc0800000(hwpoison)
raw: 000fffffc0800000 ffffea00007573c8 ffffc90000857de0 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: compaction_alloc
CPU: 4 PID: 123 Comm: kcompactd0 Tainted: G E 5.9.0-rc2-mm1-1-default+ #5
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.10.2-0-g5f4c7b1-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x6d/0x8b
compaction_alloc+0xb2/0xc0
migrate_pages+0x2a6/0x12a0
compact_zone+0x5eb/0x11c0
proactive_compact_node+0x89/0xf0
kcompactd+0x2d0/0x3a0
kthread+0x118/0x130
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
After that, if e.g: a process faults in the page, it will get killed
unexpectedly.
Fix it by containing the page immediatelly.
Besides that, two more changes can be noticed:
* MF_DELAYED no longer suits as we are fixing the issue by containing
the page immediately, so it does no longer rely on the allocation-time
checks to stop HWPoison to be handed over.
gain unless it is unpoisoned, so we fixed the situation.
Because of that, let us use MF_RECOVERED from now on.
* The second block that handles PageBuddy pages is no longer needed:
We call shake_page and then check whether the page is Buddy
because shake_page calls drain_all_pages, which sends pcp-pages back to
the buddy freelists, so we could have a chance to handle free pages.
Currently, get_hwpoison_page already calls drain_all_pages, and we call
get_hwpoison_page right before coming here, so we should be on the safe
side.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20190826104144.GA7849@linux/T/#u
[2] https://patchwork.kernel.org/cover/11792607/
[osalvador@suse.de: take the poisoned subpage off the buddy frelists]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201013144447.6706-4-osalvador@suse.de
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201013144447.6706-3-osalvador@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-15 06:11:32 +03:00
res = MF_FAILED ;
2017-07-11 01:47:50 +03:00
unlock_page ( hpage ) ;
/*
2022-04-29 09:16:02 +03:00
* migration entry prevents later access on error hugepage ,
* so we can free and dissolve it into buddy to save healthy
* subpages .
2017-07-11 01:47:50 +03:00
*/
2022-04-29 09:16:02 +03:00
put_page ( hpage ) ;
2021-07-01 04:48:38 +03:00
if ( __page_handle_poison ( p ) ) {
mm,hwpoison: take free pages off the buddy freelists
The crux of the matter is that historically we left poisoned pages in the
buddy system because we have some checks in place when allocating a page
that are gatekeeper for poisoned pages. Unfortunately, we do have other
users (e.g: compaction [1]) that scan buddy freelists and try to get a
page from there without checking whether the page is HWPoison.
As I stated already, I think it is fundamentally wrong to keep HWPoison
pages within the buddy systems, checks in place or not.
Let us fix this the same way we did for soft_offline [2], taking the page
off the buddy freelist so it is completely unreachable.
Note that this is fairly simple to trigger, as we only need to poison free
buddy pages (madvise MADV_HWPOISON) and then run some sort of memory
stress system.
Just for a matter of reference, I put a dump_page() in compaction_alloc()
to trigger for HWPoison patches:
page:0000000012b2982b refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x1 pfn:0x1d5db
flags: 0xfffffc0800000(hwpoison)
raw: 000fffffc0800000 ffffea00007573c8 ffffc90000857de0 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: compaction_alloc
CPU: 4 PID: 123 Comm: kcompactd0 Tainted: G E 5.9.0-rc2-mm1-1-default+ #5
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.10.2-0-g5f4c7b1-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x6d/0x8b
compaction_alloc+0xb2/0xc0
migrate_pages+0x2a6/0x12a0
compact_zone+0x5eb/0x11c0
proactive_compact_node+0x89/0xf0
kcompactd+0x2d0/0x3a0
kthread+0x118/0x130
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
After that, if e.g: a process faults in the page, it will get killed
unexpectedly.
Fix it by containing the page immediatelly.
Besides that, two more changes can be noticed:
* MF_DELAYED no longer suits as we are fixing the issue by containing
the page immediately, so it does no longer rely on the allocation-time
checks to stop HWPoison to be handed over.
gain unless it is unpoisoned, so we fixed the situation.
Because of that, let us use MF_RECOVERED from now on.
* The second block that handles PageBuddy pages is no longer needed:
We call shake_page and then check whether the page is Buddy
because shake_page calls drain_all_pages, which sends pcp-pages back to
the buddy freelists, so we could have a chance to handle free pages.
Currently, get_hwpoison_page already calls drain_all_pages, and we call
get_hwpoison_page right before coming here, so we should be on the safe
side.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20190826104144.GA7849@linux/T/#u
[2] https://patchwork.kernel.org/cover/11792607/
[osalvador@suse.de: take the poisoned subpage off the buddy frelists]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201013144447.6706-4-osalvador@suse.de
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201013144447.6706-3-osalvador@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-15 06:11:32 +03:00
page_ref_inc ( p ) ;
res = MF_RECOVERED ;
}
2010-05-28 04:29:20 +04:00
}
2017-07-11 01:47:50 +03:00
2021-11-05 23:41:07 +03:00
if ( has_extra_refcount ( ps , p , false ) )
res = MF_FAILED ;
2017-07-11 01:47:50 +03:00
return res ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
}
/*
* Various page states we can handle .
*
* A page state is defined by its current page - > flags bits .
* The table matches them in order and calls the right handler .
*
* This is quite tricky because we can access page at any time
2011-03-31 05:57:33 +04:00
* in its live cycle , so all accesses have to be extremely careful .
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
*
* This is not complete . More states could be added .
* For any missing state don ' t attempt recovery .
*/
# define dirty (1UL << PG_dirty)
2016-12-25 06:00:29 +03:00
# define sc ((1UL << PG_swapcache) | (1UL << PG_swapbacked))
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
# define unevict (1UL << PG_unevictable)
# define mlock (1UL << PG_mlocked)
# define lru (1UL << PG_lru)
# define head (1UL << PG_head)
# define slab (1UL << PG_slab)
# define reserved (1UL << PG_reserved)
2021-11-05 23:41:07 +03:00
static struct page_state error_states [ ] = {
2015-06-25 02:57:30 +03:00
{ reserved , reserved , MF_MSG_KERNEL , me_kernel } ,
2009-12-16 14:19:58 +03:00
/*
* free pages are specially detected outside this table :
* PG_buddy pages only make a small fraction of all free pages .
*/
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
/*
* Could in theory check if slab page is free or if we can drop
* currently unused objects without touching them . But just
* treat it as standard kernel for now .
*/
2015-06-25 02:57:30 +03:00
{ slab , slab , MF_MSG_SLAB , me_kernel } ,
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
2015-06-25 02:57:30 +03:00
{ head , head , MF_MSG_HUGE , me_huge_page } ,
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
2015-06-25 02:57:30 +03:00
{ sc | dirty , sc | dirty , MF_MSG_DIRTY_SWAPCACHE , me_swapcache_dirty } ,
{ sc | dirty , sc , MF_MSG_CLEAN_SWAPCACHE , me_swapcache_clean } ,
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
2015-06-25 02:57:30 +03:00
{ mlock | dirty , mlock | dirty , MF_MSG_DIRTY_MLOCKED_LRU , me_pagecache_dirty } ,
{ mlock | dirty , mlock , MF_MSG_CLEAN_MLOCKED_LRU , me_pagecache_clean } ,
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
2015-06-25 02:57:30 +03:00
{ unevict | dirty , unevict | dirty , MF_MSG_DIRTY_UNEVICTABLE_LRU , me_pagecache_dirty } ,
{ unevict | dirty , unevict , MF_MSG_CLEAN_UNEVICTABLE_LRU , me_pagecache_clean } ,
2013-02-23 04:35:53 +04:00
2015-06-25 02:57:30 +03:00
{ lru | dirty , lru | dirty , MF_MSG_DIRTY_LRU , me_pagecache_dirty } ,
{ lru | dirty , lru , MF_MSG_CLEAN_LRU , me_pagecache_clean } ,
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
/*
* Catchall entry : must be at end .
*/
2015-06-25 02:57:30 +03:00
{ 0 , 0 , MF_MSG_UNKNOWN , me_unknown } ,
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
} ;
2009-12-16 14:20:00 +03:00
# undef dirty
# undef sc
# undef unevict
# undef mlock
# undef lru
# undef head
# undef slab
# undef reserved
2012-12-12 04:01:32 +04:00
/*
* " Dirty/Clean " indication is not 100 % accurate due to the possibility of
* setting PG_dirty outside page lock . See also comment above set_page_dirty ( ) .
*/
2015-06-25 02:57:33 +03:00
static void action_result ( unsigned long pfn , enum mf_action_page_type type ,
enum mf_result result )
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
{
2015-06-25 02:57:36 +03:00
trace_memory_failure_event ( pfn , type , result ) ;
2022-05-13 06:23:10 +03:00
num_poisoned_pages_inc ( ) ;
2016-05-21 02:57:32 +03:00
pr_err ( " Memory failure: %#lx: recovery action for %s: %s \n " ,
2015-04-16 02:13:05 +03:00
pfn , action_page_types [ type ] , action_name [ result ] ) ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
}
static int page_action ( struct page_state * ps , struct page * p ,
2009-12-16 14:19:57 +03:00
unsigned long pfn )
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
{
int result ;
2021-06-25 04:40:01 +03:00
/* page p should be unlocked after returning from ps->action(). */
2021-11-05 23:41:07 +03:00
result = ps - > action ( ps , p ) ;
2009-10-19 10:15:01 +04:00
2015-04-16 02:13:05 +03:00
action_result ( pfn , ps - > type , result ) ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
/* Could do more checks here if page looks ok */
/*
* Could adjust zone counters here to correct for the missing page .
*/
2015-06-25 02:57:30 +03:00
return ( result = = MF_RECOVERED | | result = = MF_DELAYED ) ? 0 : - EBUSY ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
}
mm/hwpoison: fix unpoison_memory()
After recent soft-offline rework, error pages can be taken off from
buddy allocator, but the existing unpoison_memory() does not properly
undo the operation. Moreover, due to the recent change on
__get_hwpoison_page(), get_page_unless_zero() is hardly called for
hwpoisoned pages. So __get_hwpoison_page() highly likely returns -EBUSY
(meaning to fail to grab page refcount) and unpoison just clears
PG_hwpoison without releasing a refcount. That does not lead to a
critical issue like kernel panic, but unpoisoned pages never get back to
buddy (leaked permanently), which is not good.
To (partially) fix this, we need to identify "taken off" pages from
other types of hwpoisoned pages. We can't use refcount or page flags
for this purpose, so a pseudo flag is defined by hacking ->private
field. Someone might think that put_page() is enough to cancel
taken-off pages, but the normal free path contains some operations not
suitable for the current purpose, and can fire VM_BUG_ON().
Note that unpoison_memory() is now supposed to be cancel hwpoison events
injected only by madvise() or
/sys/devices/system/memory/{hard,soft}_offline_page, not by MCE
injection, so please don't try to use unpoison when testing with MCE
injection.
[lkp@intel.com: report build failure for ARCH=i386]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211115084006.3728254-4-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Ding Hui <dinghui@sangfor.com.cn>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-15 01:09:09 +03:00
static inline bool PageHWPoisonTakenOff ( struct page * page )
{
return PageHWPoison ( page ) & & page_private ( page ) = = MAGIC_HWPOISON ;
}
void SetPageHWPoisonTakenOff ( struct page * page )
{
set_page_private ( page , MAGIC_HWPOISON ) ;
}
void ClearPageHWPoisonTakenOff ( struct page * page )
{
if ( PageHWPoison ( page ) )
set_page_private ( page , 0 ) ;
}
2021-06-16 04:23:13 +03:00
/*
* Return true if a page type of a given page is supported by hwpoison
* mechanism ( while handling could fail ) , otherwise false . This function
* does not return true for hugetlb or device memory pages , so it ' s assumed
* to be called only in the context where we never have such pages .
*/
2022-03-23 00:44:50 +03:00
static inline bool HWPoisonHandlable ( struct page * page , unsigned long flags )
2021-06-16 04:23:13 +03:00
{
2022-04-29 09:16:02 +03:00
/* Soft offline could migrate non-LRU movable pages */
2022-03-23 00:44:50 +03:00
if ( ( flags & MF_SOFT_OFFLINE ) & & __PageMovable ( page ) )
2022-04-29 09:16:02 +03:00
return true ;
2022-03-23 00:44:50 +03:00
2022-04-29 09:16:02 +03:00
return PageLRU ( page ) | | is_free_buddy_page ( page ) ;
2021-06-16 04:23:13 +03:00
}
2022-03-23 00:44:50 +03:00
static int __get_hwpoison_page ( struct page * page , unsigned long flags )
2015-06-25 02:56:48 +03:00
{
struct page * head = compound_head ( page ) ;
2021-06-16 04:23:13 +03:00
int ret = 0 ;
bool hugetlb = false ;
ret = get_hwpoison_huge_page ( head , & hugetlb ) ;
if ( hugetlb )
return ret ;
/*
* This check prevents from calling get_hwpoison_unless_zero ( )
* for any unsupported type of page in order to reduce the risk of
* unexpected races caused by taking a page refcount .
*/
2022-03-23 00:44:50 +03:00
if ( ! HWPoisonHandlable ( head , flags ) )
2021-08-20 05:04:24 +03:00
return - EBUSY ;
2015-06-25 02:56:48 +03:00
2016-04-29 02:19:03 +03:00
if ( get_page_unless_zero ( head ) ) {
if ( head = = compound_head ( page ) )
return 1 ;
2016-05-21 02:57:32 +03:00
pr_info ( " Memory failure: %#lx cannot catch tail \n " ,
page_to_pfn ( page ) ) ;
2016-04-29 02:19:03 +03:00
put_page ( head ) ;
}
return 0 ;
2015-06-25 02:56:48 +03:00
}
2020-12-15 06:11:41 +03:00
static int get_any_page ( struct page * p , unsigned long flags )
2020-12-15 06:11:28 +03:00
{
2020-12-15 06:11:41 +03:00
int ret = 0 , pass = 0 ;
bool count_increased = false ;
2020-12-15 06:11:28 +03:00
2020-12-15 06:11:41 +03:00
if ( flags & MF_COUNT_INCREASED )
count_increased = true ;
try_again :
2021-06-29 05:43:17 +03:00
if ( ! count_increased ) {
2022-03-23 00:44:50 +03:00
ret = __get_hwpoison_page ( p , flags ) ;
2021-06-29 05:43:17 +03:00
if ( ! ret ) {
if ( page_count ( p ) ) {
/* We raced with an allocation, retry. */
if ( pass + + < 3 )
goto try_again ;
ret = - EBUSY ;
} else if ( ! PageHuge ( p ) & & ! is_free_buddy_page ( p ) ) {
/* We raced with put_page, retry. */
if ( pass + + < 3 )
goto try_again ;
ret = - EIO ;
}
goto out ;
} else if ( ret = = - EBUSY ) {
2021-08-20 05:04:24 +03:00
/*
* We raced with ( possibly temporary ) unhandlable
* page , retry .
*/
if ( pass + + < 3 ) {
mm: hwpoison: don't drop slab caches for offlining non-LRU page
In the current implementation of soft offline, if non-LRU page is met,
all the slab caches will be dropped to free the page then offline. But
if the page is not slab page all the effort is wasted in vain. Even
though it is a slab page, it is not guaranteed the page could be freed
at all.
However the side effect and cost is quite high. It does not only drop
the slab caches, but also may drop a significant amount of page caches
which are associated with inode caches. It could make the most
workingset gone in order to just offline a page. And the offline is not
guaranteed to succeed at all, actually I really doubt the success rate
for real life workload.
Furthermore the worse consequence is the system may be locked up and
unusable since the page cache release may incur huge amount of works
queued for memcg release.
Actually we ran into such unpleasant case in our production environment.
Firstly, the workqueue of memory_failure_work_func is locked up as
below:
BUG: workqueue lockup - pool cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 stuck for 53s!
Showing busy workqueues and worker pools:
workqueue events: flags=0x0
pwq 2: cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=14/256 refcnt=15
in-flight: 409271:memory_failure_work_func
pending: kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_monitor, kfree_rcu_work, rht_deferred_worker, rht_deferred_worker, rht_deferred_worker, rht_deferred_worker, kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_work, drain_local_stock, kfree_rcu_work
workqueue mm_percpu_wq: flags=0x8
pwq 2: cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=1/256 refcnt=2
pending: vmstat_update
workqueue cgroup_destroy: flags=0x0
pwq 2: cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=1/1 refcnt=12072
pending: css_release_work_fn
There were over 12K css_release_work_fn queued, and this caused a few
lockups due to the contention of worker pool lock with IRQ disabled, for
example:
NMI watchdog: Watchdog detected hard LOCKUP on cpu 1
Modules linked in: amd64_edac_mod edac_mce_amd crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel xt_DSCP iptable_mangle kvm_amd bpfilter vfat fat acpi_ipmi i2c_piix4 usb_storage ipmi_si k10temp i2c_core ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler acpi_cpufreq sch_fq_codel xfs libcrc32c crc32c_intel mlx5_core mlxfw nvme xhci_pci ptp nvme_core pps_core xhci_hcd
CPU: 1 PID: 205500 Comm: kworker/1:0 Tainted: G L 5.10.32-t1.el7.twitter.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: TYAN F5AMT /z /S8026GM2NRE-CGN, BIOS V8.030 03/30/2021
Workqueue: events memory_failure_work_func
RIP: 0010:queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x41/0x1a0
Code: 41 f0 0f ba 2f 08 0f 92 c0 0f b6 c0 c1 e0 08 89 c2 8b 07 30 e4 09 d0 a9 00 01 ff ff 75 1b 85 c0 74 0e 8b 07 84 c0 74 08 f3 90 <8b> 07 84 c0 75 f8 b8 01 00 00 00 66 89 07 c3 f6 c4 01 75 04 c6 47
RSP: 0018:ffff9b2ac278f900 EFLAGS: 00000002
RAX: 0000000000480101 RBX: ffff8ce98ce71800 RCX: 0000000000000084
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8ce98ce6a140
RBP: 00000000000284c8 R08: ffffd7248dcb6808 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffff9b2ac278f9b0 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: ffff8cb44dab9c00 R14: ffffffffbd1ce6a0 R15: ffff8cacaa37f068
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8ce98ce40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fcf6e8cb000 CR3: 0000000a0c60a000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0
Call Trace:
__queue_work+0xd6/0x3c0
queue_work_on+0x1c/0x30
uncharge_batch+0x10e/0x110
mem_cgroup_uncharge_list+0x6d/0x80
release_pages+0x37f/0x3f0
__pagevec_release+0x1c/0x50
__invalidate_mapping_pages+0x348/0x380
inode_lru_isolate+0x10a/0x160
__list_lru_walk_one+0x7b/0x170
list_lru_walk_one+0x4a/0x60
prune_icache_sb+0x37/0x50
super_cache_scan+0x123/0x1a0
do_shrink_slab+0x10c/0x2c0
shrink_slab+0x1f1/0x290
drop_slab_node+0x4d/0x70
soft_offline_page+0x1ac/0x5b0
memory_failure_work_func+0x6a/0x90
process_one_work+0x19e/0x340
worker_thread+0x30/0x360
kthread+0x116/0x130
The lockup made the machine is quite unusable. And it also made the
most workingset gone, the reclaimabled slab caches were reduced from 12G
to 300MB, the page caches were decreased from 17G to 4G.
But the most disappointing thing is all the effort doesn't make the page
offline, it just returns:
soft_offline: 0x1469f2: unknown non LRU page type 5ffff0000000000 ()
It seems the aggressive behavior for non-LRU page didn't pay back, so it
doesn't make too much sense to keep it considering the terrible side
effect.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210819054116.266126-1-shy828301@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Reported-by: David Mackey <tdmackey@twitter.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-09-03 00:58:31 +03:00
shake_page ( p ) ;
2020-12-15 06:11:41 +03:00
goto try_again ;
2021-08-20 05:04:24 +03:00
}
ret = - EIO ;
2021-06-29 05:43:17 +03:00
goto out ;
2020-12-15 06:11:41 +03:00
}
2021-06-29 05:43:17 +03:00
}
2022-03-23 00:44:50 +03:00
if ( PageHuge ( p ) | | HWPoisonHandlable ( p , flags ) ) {
2021-06-29 05:43:17 +03:00
ret = 1 ;
2020-12-15 06:11:41 +03:00
} else {
2021-06-29 05:43:17 +03:00
/*
* A page we cannot handle . Check whether we can turn
* it into something we can handle .
*/
if ( pass + + < 3 ) {
2020-12-15 06:11:41 +03:00
put_page ( p ) ;
mm: hwpoison: don't drop slab caches for offlining non-LRU page
In the current implementation of soft offline, if non-LRU page is met,
all the slab caches will be dropped to free the page then offline. But
if the page is not slab page all the effort is wasted in vain. Even
though it is a slab page, it is not guaranteed the page could be freed
at all.
However the side effect and cost is quite high. It does not only drop
the slab caches, but also may drop a significant amount of page caches
which are associated with inode caches. It could make the most
workingset gone in order to just offline a page. And the offline is not
guaranteed to succeed at all, actually I really doubt the success rate
for real life workload.
Furthermore the worse consequence is the system may be locked up and
unusable since the page cache release may incur huge amount of works
queued for memcg release.
Actually we ran into such unpleasant case in our production environment.
Firstly, the workqueue of memory_failure_work_func is locked up as
below:
BUG: workqueue lockup - pool cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 stuck for 53s!
Showing busy workqueues and worker pools:
workqueue events: flags=0x0
pwq 2: cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=14/256 refcnt=15
in-flight: 409271:memory_failure_work_func
pending: kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_monitor, kfree_rcu_work, rht_deferred_worker, rht_deferred_worker, rht_deferred_worker, rht_deferred_worker, kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_work, drain_local_stock, kfree_rcu_work
workqueue mm_percpu_wq: flags=0x8
pwq 2: cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=1/256 refcnt=2
pending: vmstat_update
workqueue cgroup_destroy: flags=0x0
pwq 2: cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=1/1 refcnt=12072
pending: css_release_work_fn
There were over 12K css_release_work_fn queued, and this caused a few
lockups due to the contention of worker pool lock with IRQ disabled, for
example:
NMI watchdog: Watchdog detected hard LOCKUP on cpu 1
Modules linked in: amd64_edac_mod edac_mce_amd crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel xt_DSCP iptable_mangle kvm_amd bpfilter vfat fat acpi_ipmi i2c_piix4 usb_storage ipmi_si k10temp i2c_core ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler acpi_cpufreq sch_fq_codel xfs libcrc32c crc32c_intel mlx5_core mlxfw nvme xhci_pci ptp nvme_core pps_core xhci_hcd
CPU: 1 PID: 205500 Comm: kworker/1:0 Tainted: G L 5.10.32-t1.el7.twitter.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: TYAN F5AMT /z /S8026GM2NRE-CGN, BIOS V8.030 03/30/2021
Workqueue: events memory_failure_work_func
RIP: 0010:queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x41/0x1a0
Code: 41 f0 0f ba 2f 08 0f 92 c0 0f b6 c0 c1 e0 08 89 c2 8b 07 30 e4 09 d0 a9 00 01 ff ff 75 1b 85 c0 74 0e 8b 07 84 c0 74 08 f3 90 <8b> 07 84 c0 75 f8 b8 01 00 00 00 66 89 07 c3 f6 c4 01 75 04 c6 47
RSP: 0018:ffff9b2ac278f900 EFLAGS: 00000002
RAX: 0000000000480101 RBX: ffff8ce98ce71800 RCX: 0000000000000084
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8ce98ce6a140
RBP: 00000000000284c8 R08: ffffd7248dcb6808 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffff9b2ac278f9b0 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: ffff8cb44dab9c00 R14: ffffffffbd1ce6a0 R15: ffff8cacaa37f068
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8ce98ce40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fcf6e8cb000 CR3: 0000000a0c60a000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0
Call Trace:
__queue_work+0xd6/0x3c0
queue_work_on+0x1c/0x30
uncharge_batch+0x10e/0x110
mem_cgroup_uncharge_list+0x6d/0x80
release_pages+0x37f/0x3f0
__pagevec_release+0x1c/0x50
__invalidate_mapping_pages+0x348/0x380
inode_lru_isolate+0x10a/0x160
__list_lru_walk_one+0x7b/0x170
list_lru_walk_one+0x4a/0x60
prune_icache_sb+0x37/0x50
super_cache_scan+0x123/0x1a0
do_shrink_slab+0x10c/0x2c0
shrink_slab+0x1f1/0x290
drop_slab_node+0x4d/0x70
soft_offline_page+0x1ac/0x5b0
memory_failure_work_func+0x6a/0x90
process_one_work+0x19e/0x340
worker_thread+0x30/0x360
kthread+0x116/0x130
The lockup made the machine is quite unusable. And it also made the
most workingset gone, the reclaimabled slab caches were reduced from 12G
to 300MB, the page caches were decreased from 17G to 4G.
But the most disappointing thing is all the effort doesn't make the page
offline, it just returns:
soft_offline: 0x1469f2: unknown non LRU page type 5ffff0000000000 ()
It seems the aggressive behavior for non-LRU page didn't pay back, so it
doesn't make too much sense to keep it considering the terrible side
effect.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210819054116.266126-1-shy828301@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Reported-by: David Mackey <tdmackey@twitter.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-09-03 00:58:31 +03:00
shake_page ( p ) ;
2021-06-29 05:43:17 +03:00
count_increased = false ;
goto try_again ;
2020-12-15 06:11:41 +03:00
}
2021-06-29 05:43:17 +03:00
put_page ( p ) ;
ret = - EIO ;
2020-12-15 06:11:28 +03:00
}
2021-06-29 05:43:17 +03:00
out :
2021-09-03 00:58:37 +03:00
if ( ret = = - EIO )
2022-04-29 09:14:44 +03:00
pr_err ( " Memory failure: %#lx: unhandlable page. \n " , page_to_pfn ( p ) ) ;
2021-09-03 00:58:37 +03:00
2020-12-15 06:11:28 +03:00
return ret ;
}
mm/hwpoison: fix unpoison_memory()
After recent soft-offline rework, error pages can be taken off from
buddy allocator, but the existing unpoison_memory() does not properly
undo the operation. Moreover, due to the recent change on
__get_hwpoison_page(), get_page_unless_zero() is hardly called for
hwpoisoned pages. So __get_hwpoison_page() highly likely returns -EBUSY
(meaning to fail to grab page refcount) and unpoison just clears
PG_hwpoison without releasing a refcount. That does not lead to a
critical issue like kernel panic, but unpoisoned pages never get back to
buddy (leaked permanently), which is not good.
To (partially) fix this, we need to identify "taken off" pages from
other types of hwpoisoned pages. We can't use refcount or page flags
for this purpose, so a pseudo flag is defined by hacking ->private
field. Someone might think that put_page() is enough to cancel
taken-off pages, but the normal free path contains some operations not
suitable for the current purpose, and can fire VM_BUG_ON().
Note that unpoison_memory() is now supposed to be cancel hwpoison events
injected only by madvise() or
/sys/devices/system/memory/{hard,soft}_offline_page, not by MCE
injection, so please don't try to use unpoison when testing with MCE
injection.
[lkp@intel.com: report build failure for ARCH=i386]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211115084006.3728254-4-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Ding Hui <dinghui@sangfor.com.cn>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-15 01:09:09 +03:00
static int __get_unpoison_page ( struct page * page )
{
struct page * head = compound_head ( page ) ;
int ret = 0 ;
bool hugetlb = false ;
ret = get_hwpoison_huge_page ( head , & hugetlb ) ;
if ( hugetlb )
return ret ;
/*
* PageHWPoisonTakenOff pages are not only marked as PG_hwpoison ,
* but also isolated from buddy freelist , so need to identify the
* state and have to cancel both operations to unpoison .
*/
if ( PageHWPoisonTakenOff ( page ) )
return - EHWPOISON ;
return get_page_unless_zero ( page ) ? 1 : 0 ;
}
2021-06-29 05:43:17 +03:00
/**
* get_hwpoison_page ( ) - Get refcount for memory error handling
* @ p : Raw error page ( hit by memory error )
* @ flags : Flags controlling behavior of error handling
*
* get_hwpoison_page ( ) takes a page refcount of an error page to handle memory
* error on it , after checking that the error page is in a well - defined state
2022-01-15 01:09:25 +03:00
* ( defined as a page - type we can successfully handle the memory error on it ,
2021-06-29 05:43:17 +03:00
* such as LRU page and hugetlb page ) .
*
* Memory error handling could be triggered at any time on any type of page ,
* so it ' s prone to race with typical memory management lifecycle ( like
* allocation and free ) . So to avoid such races , get_hwpoison_page ( ) takes
* extra care for the error page ' s state ( as done in __get_hwpoison_page ( ) ) ,
* and has some retry logic in get_any_page ( ) .
*
mm/hwpoison: fix unpoison_memory()
After recent soft-offline rework, error pages can be taken off from
buddy allocator, but the existing unpoison_memory() does not properly
undo the operation. Moreover, due to the recent change on
__get_hwpoison_page(), get_page_unless_zero() is hardly called for
hwpoisoned pages. So __get_hwpoison_page() highly likely returns -EBUSY
(meaning to fail to grab page refcount) and unpoison just clears
PG_hwpoison without releasing a refcount. That does not lead to a
critical issue like kernel panic, but unpoisoned pages never get back to
buddy (leaked permanently), which is not good.
To (partially) fix this, we need to identify "taken off" pages from
other types of hwpoisoned pages. We can't use refcount or page flags
for this purpose, so a pseudo flag is defined by hacking ->private
field. Someone might think that put_page() is enough to cancel
taken-off pages, but the normal free path contains some operations not
suitable for the current purpose, and can fire VM_BUG_ON().
Note that unpoison_memory() is now supposed to be cancel hwpoison events
injected only by madvise() or
/sys/devices/system/memory/{hard,soft}_offline_page, not by MCE
injection, so please don't try to use unpoison when testing with MCE
injection.
[lkp@intel.com: report build failure for ARCH=i386]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211115084006.3728254-4-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Ding Hui <dinghui@sangfor.com.cn>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-15 01:09:09 +03:00
* When called from unpoison_memory ( ) , the caller should already ensure that
* the given page has PG_hwpoison . So it ' s never reused for other page
* allocations , and __get_unpoison_page ( ) never races with them .
*
2021-06-29 05:43:17 +03:00
* Return : 0 on failure ,
* 1 on success for in - use pages in a well - defined state ,
* - EIO for pages on which we can not handle memory errors ,
* - EBUSY when get_hwpoison_page ( ) has raced with page lifecycle
mm/hwpoison: fix unpoison_memory()
After recent soft-offline rework, error pages can be taken off from
buddy allocator, but the existing unpoison_memory() does not properly
undo the operation. Moreover, due to the recent change on
__get_hwpoison_page(), get_page_unless_zero() is hardly called for
hwpoisoned pages. So __get_hwpoison_page() highly likely returns -EBUSY
(meaning to fail to grab page refcount) and unpoison just clears
PG_hwpoison without releasing a refcount. That does not lead to a
critical issue like kernel panic, but unpoisoned pages never get back to
buddy (leaked permanently), which is not good.
To (partially) fix this, we need to identify "taken off" pages from
other types of hwpoisoned pages. We can't use refcount or page flags
for this purpose, so a pseudo flag is defined by hacking ->private
field. Someone might think that put_page() is enough to cancel
taken-off pages, but the normal free path contains some operations not
suitable for the current purpose, and can fire VM_BUG_ON().
Note that unpoison_memory() is now supposed to be cancel hwpoison events
injected only by madvise() or
/sys/devices/system/memory/{hard,soft}_offline_page, not by MCE
injection, so please don't try to use unpoison when testing with MCE
injection.
[lkp@intel.com: report build failure for ARCH=i386]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211115084006.3728254-4-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Ding Hui <dinghui@sangfor.com.cn>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-15 01:09:09 +03:00
* operations like allocation and free ,
* - EHWPOISON when the page is hwpoisoned and taken off from buddy .
2021-06-29 05:43:17 +03:00
*/
static int get_hwpoison_page ( struct page * p , unsigned long flags )
2020-12-15 06:11:41 +03:00
{
int ret ;
zone_pcp_disable ( page_zone ( p ) ) ;
mm/hwpoison: fix unpoison_memory()
After recent soft-offline rework, error pages can be taken off from
buddy allocator, but the existing unpoison_memory() does not properly
undo the operation. Moreover, due to the recent change on
__get_hwpoison_page(), get_page_unless_zero() is hardly called for
hwpoisoned pages. So __get_hwpoison_page() highly likely returns -EBUSY
(meaning to fail to grab page refcount) and unpoison just clears
PG_hwpoison without releasing a refcount. That does not lead to a
critical issue like kernel panic, but unpoisoned pages never get back to
buddy (leaked permanently), which is not good.
To (partially) fix this, we need to identify "taken off" pages from
other types of hwpoisoned pages. We can't use refcount or page flags
for this purpose, so a pseudo flag is defined by hacking ->private
field. Someone might think that put_page() is enough to cancel
taken-off pages, but the normal free path contains some operations not
suitable for the current purpose, and can fire VM_BUG_ON().
Note that unpoison_memory() is now supposed to be cancel hwpoison events
injected only by madvise() or
/sys/devices/system/memory/{hard,soft}_offline_page, not by MCE
injection, so please don't try to use unpoison when testing with MCE
injection.
[lkp@intel.com: report build failure for ARCH=i386]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211115084006.3728254-4-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Ding Hui <dinghui@sangfor.com.cn>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-15 01:09:09 +03:00
if ( flags & MF_UNPOISON )
ret = __get_unpoison_page ( p ) ;
else
ret = get_any_page ( p , flags ) ;
2020-12-15 06:11:41 +03:00
zone_pcp_enable ( page_zone ( p ) ) ;
return ret ;
}
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
/*
* Do all that is necessary to remove user space mappings . Unmap
* the pages and send SIGBUS to the processes if the data was dirty .
*/
2017-05-04 00:54:20 +03:00
static bool hwpoison_user_mappings ( struct page * p , unsigned long pfn ,
2021-09-03 00:58:25 +03:00
int flags , struct page * hpage )
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
{
2022-02-15 17:28:49 +03:00
struct folio * folio = page_folio ( hpage ) ;
2021-07-01 04:52:08 +03:00
enum ttu_flags ttu = TTU_IGNORE_MLOCK | TTU_SYNC ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
struct address_space * mapping ;
LIST_HEAD ( tokill ) ;
2021-07-01 04:52:01 +03:00
bool unmap_success ;
2012-07-11 21:20:47 +04:00
int kill = 1 , forcekill ;
2017-05-04 00:56:22 +03:00
bool mlocked = PageMlocked ( hpage ) ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
2014-07-31 03:08:28 +04:00
/*
* Here we are interested only in user - mapped pages , so skip any
* other types of pages .
*/
if ( PageReserved ( p ) | | PageSlab ( p ) )
2017-05-04 00:54:20 +03:00
return true ;
2014-07-31 03:08:28 +04:00
if ( ! ( PageLRU ( hpage ) | | PageHuge ( p ) ) )
2017-05-04 00:54:20 +03:00
return true ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
/*
* This check implies we don ' t kill processes if their pages
* are in the swap cache early . Those are always late kills .
*/
2010-05-28 04:29:17 +04:00
if ( ! page_mapped ( hpage ) )
2017-05-04 00:54:20 +03:00
return true ;
2009-12-16 14:19:58 +03:00
2014-07-31 03:08:30 +04:00
if ( PageKsm ( p ) ) {
2016-05-21 02:57:32 +03:00
pr_err ( " Memory failure: %#lx: can't handle KSM pages. \n " , pfn ) ;
2017-05-04 00:54:20 +03:00
return false ;
2014-07-31 03:08:30 +04:00
}
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
if ( PageSwapCache ( p ) ) {
2016-05-21 02:57:32 +03:00
pr_err ( " Memory failure: %#lx: keeping poisoned page in swap cache \n " ,
pfn ) ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
ttu | = TTU_IGNORE_HWPOISON ;
}
/*
* Propagate the dirty bit from PTEs to struct page first , because we
* need this to decide if we should kill or just drop the page .
2009-12-16 14:19:58 +03:00
* XXX : the dirty test could be racy : set_page_dirty ( ) may not always
* be called inside page lock ( it ' s recommended but not enforced ) .
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
*/
2010-05-28 04:29:17 +04:00
mapping = page_mapping ( hpage ) ;
2012-07-11 21:20:47 +04:00
if ( ! ( flags & MF_MUST_KILL ) & & ! PageDirty ( hpage ) & & mapping & &
2020-09-24 09:51:40 +03:00
mapping_can_writeback ( mapping ) ) {
2010-05-28 04:29:17 +04:00
if ( page_mkclean ( hpage ) ) {
SetPageDirty ( hpage ) ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
} else {
kill = 0 ;
ttu | = TTU_IGNORE_HWPOISON ;
2016-05-21 02:57:32 +03:00
pr_info ( " Memory failure: %#lx: corrupted page was clean: dropped without side effects \n " ,
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
pfn ) ;
}
}
/*
* First collect all the processes that have the page
* mapped in dirty form . This has to be done before try_to_unmap ,
* because ttu takes the rmap data structures down .
*
* Error handling : We ignore errors here because
* there ' s nothing that can be done .
*/
if ( kill )
2015-06-25 02:56:45 +03:00
collect_procs ( hpage , & tokill , flags & MF_ACTION_REQUIRED ) ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
2022-03-23 00:44:27 +03:00
if ( PageHuge ( hpage ) & & ! PageAnon ( hpage ) ) {
/*
* For hugetlb pages in shared mappings , try_to_unmap
* could potentially call huge_pmd_unshare . Because of
* this , take semaphore in write mode here and set
* TTU_RMAP_LOCKED to indicate we have taken the lock
* at this higher level .
*/
mapping = hugetlb_page_mapping_lock_write ( hpage ) ;
if ( mapping ) {
2022-03-23 03:03:12 +03:00
try_to_unmap ( folio , ttu | TTU_RMAP_LOCKED ) ;
2022-03-23 00:44:27 +03:00
i_mmap_unlock_write ( mapping ) ;
} else
pr_info ( " Memory failure: %#lx: could not lock mapping for mapped huge page \n " , pfn ) ;
hugetlbfs: use i_mmap_rwsem for more pmd sharing synchronization
Patch series "hugetlbfs: use i_mmap_rwsem for more synchronization", v2.
While discussing the issue with huge_pte_offset [1], I remembered that
there were more outstanding hugetlb races. These issues are:
1) For shared pmds, huge PTE pointers returned by huge_pte_alloc can become
invalid via a call to huge_pmd_unshare by another thread.
2) hugetlbfs page faults can race with truncation causing invalid global
reserve counts and state.
A previous attempt was made to use i_mmap_rwsem in this manner as
described at [2]. However, those patches were reverted starting with [3]
due to locking issues.
To effectively use i_mmap_rwsem to address the above issues it needs to be
held (in read mode) during page fault processing. However, during fault
processing we need to lock the page we will be adding. Lock ordering
requires we take page lock before i_mmap_rwsem. Waiting until after
taking the page lock is too late in the fault process for the
synchronization we want to do.
To address this lock ordering issue, the following patches change the lock
ordering for hugetlb pages. This is not too invasive as hugetlbfs
processing is done separate from core mm in many places. However, I don't
really like this idea. Much ugliness is contained in the new routine
hugetlb_page_mapping_lock_write() of patch 1.
The only other way I can think of to address these issues is by catching
all the races. After catching a race, cleanup, backout, retry ... etc,
as needed. This can get really ugly, especially for huge page
reservations. At one time, I started writing some of the reservation
backout code for page faults and it got so ugly and complicated I went
down the path of adding synchronization to avoid the races. Any other
suggestions would be welcome.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/1582342427-230392-1-git-send-email-longpeng2@huawei.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20181222223013.22193-1-mike.kravetz@oracle.com/
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20190103235452.29335-1-mike.kravetz@oracle.com
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/1584028670.7365.182.camel@lca.pw/
[5] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200312183142.108df9ac@canb.auug.org.au/
This patch (of 2):
While looking at BUGs associated with invalid huge page map counts, it was
discovered and observed that a huge pte pointer could become 'invalid' and
point to another task's page table. Consider the following:
A task takes a page fault on a shared hugetlbfs file and calls
huge_pte_alloc to get a ptep. Suppose the returned ptep points to a
shared pmd.
Now, another task truncates the hugetlbfs file. As part of truncation, it
unmaps everyone who has the file mapped. If the range being truncated is
covered by a shared pmd, huge_pmd_unshare will be called. For all but the
last user of the shared pmd, huge_pmd_unshare will clear the pud pointing
to the pmd. If the task in the middle of the page fault is not the last
user, the ptep returned by huge_pte_alloc now points to another task's
page table or worse. This leads to bad things such as incorrect page
map/reference counts or invalid memory references.
To fix, expand the use of i_mmap_rwsem as follows:
- i_mmap_rwsem is held in read mode whenever huge_pmd_share is called.
huge_pmd_share is only called via huge_pte_alloc, so callers of
huge_pte_alloc take i_mmap_rwsem before calling. In addition, callers
of huge_pte_alloc continue to hold the semaphore until finished with
the ptep.
- i_mmap_rwsem is held in write mode whenever huge_pmd_unshare is called.
One problem with this scheme is that it requires taking i_mmap_rwsem
before taking the page lock during page faults. This is not the order
specified in the rest of mm code. Handling of hugetlbfs pages is mostly
isolated today. Therefore, we use this alternative locking order for
PageHuge() pages.
mapping->i_mmap_rwsem
hugetlb_fault_mutex (hugetlbfs specific page fault mutex)
page->flags PG_locked (lock_page)
To help with lock ordering issues, hugetlb_page_mapping_lock_write() is
introduced to write lock the i_mmap_rwsem associated with a page.
In most cases it is easy to get address_space via vma->vm_file->f_mapping.
However, in the case of migration or memory errors for anon pages we do
not have an associated vma. A new routine _get_hugetlb_page_mapping()
will use anon_vma to get address_space in these cases.
Signed-off-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K . V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Prakash Sangappa <prakash.sangappa@oracle.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200316205756.146666-2-mike.kravetz@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-04-02 07:11:05 +03:00
} else {
2022-03-23 03:03:12 +03:00
try_to_unmap ( folio , ttu ) ;
hugetlbfs: use i_mmap_rwsem for more pmd sharing synchronization
Patch series "hugetlbfs: use i_mmap_rwsem for more synchronization", v2.
While discussing the issue with huge_pte_offset [1], I remembered that
there were more outstanding hugetlb races. These issues are:
1) For shared pmds, huge PTE pointers returned by huge_pte_alloc can become
invalid via a call to huge_pmd_unshare by another thread.
2) hugetlbfs page faults can race with truncation causing invalid global
reserve counts and state.
A previous attempt was made to use i_mmap_rwsem in this manner as
described at [2]. However, those patches were reverted starting with [3]
due to locking issues.
To effectively use i_mmap_rwsem to address the above issues it needs to be
held (in read mode) during page fault processing. However, during fault
processing we need to lock the page we will be adding. Lock ordering
requires we take page lock before i_mmap_rwsem. Waiting until after
taking the page lock is too late in the fault process for the
synchronization we want to do.
To address this lock ordering issue, the following patches change the lock
ordering for hugetlb pages. This is not too invasive as hugetlbfs
processing is done separate from core mm in many places. However, I don't
really like this idea. Much ugliness is contained in the new routine
hugetlb_page_mapping_lock_write() of patch 1.
The only other way I can think of to address these issues is by catching
all the races. After catching a race, cleanup, backout, retry ... etc,
as needed. This can get really ugly, especially for huge page
reservations. At one time, I started writing some of the reservation
backout code for page faults and it got so ugly and complicated I went
down the path of adding synchronization to avoid the races. Any other
suggestions would be welcome.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/1582342427-230392-1-git-send-email-longpeng2@huawei.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20181222223013.22193-1-mike.kravetz@oracle.com/
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20190103235452.29335-1-mike.kravetz@oracle.com
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/1584028670.7365.182.camel@lca.pw/
[5] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200312183142.108df9ac@canb.auug.org.au/
This patch (of 2):
While looking at BUGs associated with invalid huge page map counts, it was
discovered and observed that a huge pte pointer could become 'invalid' and
point to another task's page table. Consider the following:
A task takes a page fault on a shared hugetlbfs file and calls
huge_pte_alloc to get a ptep. Suppose the returned ptep points to a
shared pmd.
Now, another task truncates the hugetlbfs file. As part of truncation, it
unmaps everyone who has the file mapped. If the range being truncated is
covered by a shared pmd, huge_pmd_unshare will be called. For all but the
last user of the shared pmd, huge_pmd_unshare will clear the pud pointing
to the pmd. If the task in the middle of the page fault is not the last
user, the ptep returned by huge_pte_alloc now points to another task's
page table or worse. This leads to bad things such as incorrect page
map/reference counts or invalid memory references.
To fix, expand the use of i_mmap_rwsem as follows:
- i_mmap_rwsem is held in read mode whenever huge_pmd_share is called.
huge_pmd_share is only called via huge_pte_alloc, so callers of
huge_pte_alloc take i_mmap_rwsem before calling. In addition, callers
of huge_pte_alloc continue to hold the semaphore until finished with
the ptep.
- i_mmap_rwsem is held in write mode whenever huge_pmd_unshare is called.
One problem with this scheme is that it requires taking i_mmap_rwsem
before taking the page lock during page faults. This is not the order
specified in the rest of mm code. Handling of hugetlbfs pages is mostly
isolated today. Therefore, we use this alternative locking order for
PageHuge() pages.
mapping->i_mmap_rwsem
hugetlb_fault_mutex (hugetlbfs specific page fault mutex)
page->flags PG_locked (lock_page)
To help with lock ordering issues, hugetlb_page_mapping_lock_write() is
introduced to write lock the i_mmap_rwsem associated with a page.
In most cases it is easy to get address_space via vma->vm_file->f_mapping.
However, in the case of migration or memory errors for anon pages we do
not have an associated vma. A new routine _get_hugetlb_page_mapping()
will use anon_vma to get address_space in these cases.
Signed-off-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K . V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Prakash Sangappa <prakash.sangappa@oracle.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200316205756.146666-2-mike.kravetz@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-04-02 07:11:05 +03:00
}
2021-07-01 04:52:01 +03:00
unmap_success = ! page_mapped ( hpage ) ;
2017-05-04 00:54:20 +03:00
if ( ! unmap_success )
2016-05-21 02:57:32 +03:00
pr_err ( " Memory failure: %#lx: failed to unmap page (mapcount=%d) \n " ,
2016-03-18 00:19:50 +03:00
pfn , page_mapcount ( hpage ) ) ;
2011-02-02 02:52:40 +03:00
2017-05-04 00:56:22 +03:00
/*
* try_to_unmap ( ) might put mlocked page in lru cache , so call
* shake_page ( ) again to ensure that it ' s flushed .
*/
if ( mlocked )
mm: hwpoison: don't drop slab caches for offlining non-LRU page
In the current implementation of soft offline, if non-LRU page is met,
all the slab caches will be dropped to free the page then offline. But
if the page is not slab page all the effort is wasted in vain. Even
though it is a slab page, it is not guaranteed the page could be freed
at all.
However the side effect and cost is quite high. It does not only drop
the slab caches, but also may drop a significant amount of page caches
which are associated with inode caches. It could make the most
workingset gone in order to just offline a page. And the offline is not
guaranteed to succeed at all, actually I really doubt the success rate
for real life workload.
Furthermore the worse consequence is the system may be locked up and
unusable since the page cache release may incur huge amount of works
queued for memcg release.
Actually we ran into such unpleasant case in our production environment.
Firstly, the workqueue of memory_failure_work_func is locked up as
below:
BUG: workqueue lockup - pool cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 stuck for 53s!
Showing busy workqueues and worker pools:
workqueue events: flags=0x0
pwq 2: cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=14/256 refcnt=15
in-flight: 409271:memory_failure_work_func
pending: kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_monitor, kfree_rcu_work, rht_deferred_worker, rht_deferred_worker, rht_deferred_worker, rht_deferred_worker, kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_work, drain_local_stock, kfree_rcu_work
workqueue mm_percpu_wq: flags=0x8
pwq 2: cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=1/256 refcnt=2
pending: vmstat_update
workqueue cgroup_destroy: flags=0x0
pwq 2: cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=1/1 refcnt=12072
pending: css_release_work_fn
There were over 12K css_release_work_fn queued, and this caused a few
lockups due to the contention of worker pool lock with IRQ disabled, for
example:
NMI watchdog: Watchdog detected hard LOCKUP on cpu 1
Modules linked in: amd64_edac_mod edac_mce_amd crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel xt_DSCP iptable_mangle kvm_amd bpfilter vfat fat acpi_ipmi i2c_piix4 usb_storage ipmi_si k10temp i2c_core ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler acpi_cpufreq sch_fq_codel xfs libcrc32c crc32c_intel mlx5_core mlxfw nvme xhci_pci ptp nvme_core pps_core xhci_hcd
CPU: 1 PID: 205500 Comm: kworker/1:0 Tainted: G L 5.10.32-t1.el7.twitter.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: TYAN F5AMT /z /S8026GM2NRE-CGN, BIOS V8.030 03/30/2021
Workqueue: events memory_failure_work_func
RIP: 0010:queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x41/0x1a0
Code: 41 f0 0f ba 2f 08 0f 92 c0 0f b6 c0 c1 e0 08 89 c2 8b 07 30 e4 09 d0 a9 00 01 ff ff 75 1b 85 c0 74 0e 8b 07 84 c0 74 08 f3 90 <8b> 07 84 c0 75 f8 b8 01 00 00 00 66 89 07 c3 f6 c4 01 75 04 c6 47
RSP: 0018:ffff9b2ac278f900 EFLAGS: 00000002
RAX: 0000000000480101 RBX: ffff8ce98ce71800 RCX: 0000000000000084
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8ce98ce6a140
RBP: 00000000000284c8 R08: ffffd7248dcb6808 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffff9b2ac278f9b0 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: ffff8cb44dab9c00 R14: ffffffffbd1ce6a0 R15: ffff8cacaa37f068
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8ce98ce40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fcf6e8cb000 CR3: 0000000a0c60a000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0
Call Trace:
__queue_work+0xd6/0x3c0
queue_work_on+0x1c/0x30
uncharge_batch+0x10e/0x110
mem_cgroup_uncharge_list+0x6d/0x80
release_pages+0x37f/0x3f0
__pagevec_release+0x1c/0x50
__invalidate_mapping_pages+0x348/0x380
inode_lru_isolate+0x10a/0x160
__list_lru_walk_one+0x7b/0x170
list_lru_walk_one+0x4a/0x60
prune_icache_sb+0x37/0x50
super_cache_scan+0x123/0x1a0
do_shrink_slab+0x10c/0x2c0
shrink_slab+0x1f1/0x290
drop_slab_node+0x4d/0x70
soft_offline_page+0x1ac/0x5b0
memory_failure_work_func+0x6a/0x90
process_one_work+0x19e/0x340
worker_thread+0x30/0x360
kthread+0x116/0x130
The lockup made the machine is quite unusable. And it also made the
most workingset gone, the reclaimabled slab caches were reduced from 12G
to 300MB, the page caches were decreased from 17G to 4G.
But the most disappointing thing is all the effort doesn't make the page
offline, it just returns:
soft_offline: 0x1469f2: unknown non LRU page type 5ffff0000000000 ()
It seems the aggressive behavior for non-LRU page didn't pay back, so it
doesn't make too much sense to keep it considering the terrible side
effect.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210819054116.266126-1-shy828301@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Reported-by: David Mackey <tdmackey@twitter.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-09-03 00:58:31 +03:00
shake_page ( hpage ) ;
2017-05-04 00:56:22 +03:00
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
/*
* Now that the dirty bit has been propagated to the
* struct page and all unmaps done we can decide if
* killing is needed or not . Only kill when the page
2012-07-11 21:20:47 +04:00
* was dirty or the process is not restartable ,
* otherwise the tokill list is merely
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
* freed . When there was a problem unmapping earlier
* use a more force - full uncatchable kill to prevent
* any accesses to the poisoned memory .
*/
2015-06-25 02:56:45 +03:00
forcekill = PageDirty ( hpage ) | | ( flags & MF_MUST_KILL ) ;
2018-07-14 07:50:11 +03:00
kill_procs ( & tokill , forcekill , ! unmap_success , pfn , flags ) ;
2009-12-16 14:19:58 +03:00
2017-05-04 00:54:20 +03:00
return unmap_success ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
}
2017-07-11 01:47:56 +03:00
static int identify_page_state ( unsigned long pfn , struct page * p ,
unsigned long page_flags )
2017-07-11 01:47:47 +03:00
{
struct page_state * ps ;
2017-07-11 01:47:56 +03:00
/*
* The first check uses the current page flags which may not have any
* relevant information . The second check with the saved page flags is
* carried out only if the first check can ' t determine the page status .
*/
for ( ps = error_states ; ; ps + + )
if ( ( p - > flags & ps - > mask ) = = ps - > res )
break ;
page_flags | = ( p - > flags & ( 1UL < < PG_dirty ) ) ;
if ( ! ps - > mask )
for ( ps = error_states ; ; ps + + )
if ( ( page_flags & ps - > mask ) = = ps - > res )
break ;
return page_action ( ps , p , pfn ) ;
}
2020-10-16 06:07:01 +03:00
static int try_to_split_thp_page ( struct page * page , const char * msg )
{
lock_page ( page ) ;
2021-11-05 23:41:14 +03:00
if ( unlikely ( split_huge_page ( page ) ) ) {
2020-10-16 06:07:01 +03:00
unsigned long pfn = page_to_pfn ( page ) ;
unlock_page ( page ) ;
2021-11-05 23:41:14 +03:00
pr_info ( " %s: %#lx: thp split failed \n " , msg , pfn ) ;
2020-10-16 06:07:01 +03:00
put_page ( page ) ;
return - EBUSY ;
}
unlock_page ( page ) ;
return 0 ;
}
mm/hwpoison: fix race between hugetlb free/demotion and memory_failure_hugetlb()
There is a race condition between memory_failure_hugetlb() and hugetlb
free/demotion, which causes setting PageHWPoison flag on the wrong page.
The one simple result is that wrong processes can be killed, but another
(more serious) one is that the actual error is left unhandled, so no one
prevents later access to it, and that might lead to more serious results
like consuming corrupted data.
Think about the below race window:
CPU 1 CPU 2
memory_failure_hugetlb
struct page *head = compound_head(p);
hugetlb page might be freed to
buddy, or even changed to another
compound page.
get_hwpoison_page -- page is not what we want now...
The current code first does prechecks roughly and then reconfirms after
taking refcount, but it's found that it makes code overly complicated,
so move the prechecks in a single hugetlb_lock range.
A newly introduced function, try_memory_failure_hugetlb(), always takes
hugetlb_lock (even for non-hugetlb pages). That can be improved, but
memory_failure() is rare in principle, so should not be a big problem.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220408135323.1559401-2-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev
Fixes: 761ad8d7c7b5 ("mm: hwpoison: introduce memory_failure_hugetlb()")
Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Reported-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-04-22 02:35:33 +03:00
/*
* Called from hugetlb code with hugetlb_lock held .
*
* Return values :
* 0 - free hugepage
* 1 - in - use hugepage
* 2 - not a hugepage
* - EBUSY - the hugepage is busy ( try to retry )
* - EHWPOISON - the hugepage is already hwpoisoned
*/
int __get_huge_page_for_hwpoison ( unsigned long pfn , int flags )
{
struct page * page = pfn_to_page ( pfn ) ;
struct page * head = compound_head ( page ) ;
int ret = 2 ; /* fallback to normal page handling */
bool count_increased = false ;
if ( ! PageHeadHuge ( head ) )
goto out ;
if ( flags & MF_COUNT_INCREASED ) {
ret = 1 ;
count_increased = true ;
2022-04-29 09:16:02 +03:00
} else if ( HPageFreed ( head ) ) {
ret = 0 ;
} else if ( HPageMigratable ( head ) ) {
mm/hwpoison: fix race between hugetlb free/demotion and memory_failure_hugetlb()
There is a race condition between memory_failure_hugetlb() and hugetlb
free/demotion, which causes setting PageHWPoison flag on the wrong page.
The one simple result is that wrong processes can be killed, but another
(more serious) one is that the actual error is left unhandled, so no one
prevents later access to it, and that might lead to more serious results
like consuming corrupted data.
Think about the below race window:
CPU 1 CPU 2
memory_failure_hugetlb
struct page *head = compound_head(p);
hugetlb page might be freed to
buddy, or even changed to another
compound page.
get_hwpoison_page -- page is not what we want now...
The current code first does prechecks roughly and then reconfirms after
taking refcount, but it's found that it makes code overly complicated,
so move the prechecks in a single hugetlb_lock range.
A newly introduced function, try_memory_failure_hugetlb(), always takes
hugetlb_lock (even for non-hugetlb pages). That can be improved, but
memory_failure() is rare in principle, so should not be a big problem.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220408135323.1559401-2-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev
Fixes: 761ad8d7c7b5 ("mm: hwpoison: introduce memory_failure_hugetlb()")
Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Reported-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-04-22 02:35:33 +03:00
ret = get_page_unless_zero ( head ) ;
if ( ret )
count_increased = true ;
} else {
ret = - EBUSY ;
goto out ;
}
if ( TestSetPageHWPoison ( head ) ) {
ret = - EHWPOISON ;
goto out ;
}
return ret ;
out :
if ( count_increased )
put_page ( head ) ;
return ret ;
}
# ifdef CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE
/*
* Taking refcount of hugetlb pages needs extra care about race conditions
* with basic operations like hugepage allocation / free / demotion .
* So some of prechecks for hwpoison ( pinning , and testing / setting
* PageHWPoison ) should be done in single hugetlb_lock range .
*/
static int try_memory_failure_hugetlb ( unsigned long pfn , int flags , int * hugetlb )
2017-07-11 01:47:56 +03:00
{
2017-07-11 01:47:47 +03:00
int res ;
mm/hwpoison: fix race between hugetlb free/demotion and memory_failure_hugetlb()
There is a race condition between memory_failure_hugetlb() and hugetlb
free/demotion, which causes setting PageHWPoison flag on the wrong page.
The one simple result is that wrong processes can be killed, but another
(more serious) one is that the actual error is left unhandled, so no one
prevents later access to it, and that might lead to more serious results
like consuming corrupted data.
Think about the below race window:
CPU 1 CPU 2
memory_failure_hugetlb
struct page *head = compound_head(p);
hugetlb page might be freed to
buddy, or even changed to another
compound page.
get_hwpoison_page -- page is not what we want now...
The current code first does prechecks roughly and then reconfirms after
taking refcount, but it's found that it makes code overly complicated,
so move the prechecks in a single hugetlb_lock range.
A newly introduced function, try_memory_failure_hugetlb(), always takes
hugetlb_lock (even for non-hugetlb pages). That can be improved, but
memory_failure() is rare in principle, so should not be a big problem.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220408135323.1559401-2-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev
Fixes: 761ad8d7c7b5 ("mm: hwpoison: introduce memory_failure_hugetlb()")
Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Reported-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-04-22 02:35:33 +03:00
struct page * p = pfn_to_page ( pfn ) ;
struct page * head ;
2017-07-11 01:47:47 +03:00
unsigned long page_flags ;
mm/hwpoison: fix race between hugetlb free/demotion and memory_failure_hugetlb()
There is a race condition between memory_failure_hugetlb() and hugetlb
free/demotion, which causes setting PageHWPoison flag on the wrong page.
The one simple result is that wrong processes can be killed, but another
(more serious) one is that the actual error is left unhandled, so no one
prevents later access to it, and that might lead to more serious results
like consuming corrupted data.
Think about the below race window:
CPU 1 CPU 2
memory_failure_hugetlb
struct page *head = compound_head(p);
hugetlb page might be freed to
buddy, or even changed to another
compound page.
get_hwpoison_page -- page is not what we want now...
The current code first does prechecks roughly and then reconfirms after
taking refcount, but it's found that it makes code overly complicated,
so move the prechecks in a single hugetlb_lock range.
A newly introduced function, try_memory_failure_hugetlb(), always takes
hugetlb_lock (even for non-hugetlb pages). That can be improved, but
memory_failure() is rare in principle, so should not be a big problem.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220408135323.1559401-2-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev
Fixes: 761ad8d7c7b5 ("mm: hwpoison: introduce memory_failure_hugetlb()")
Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Reported-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-04-22 02:35:33 +03:00
bool retry = true ;
2017-07-11 01:47:47 +03:00
mm/hwpoison: fix race between hugetlb free/demotion and memory_failure_hugetlb()
There is a race condition between memory_failure_hugetlb() and hugetlb
free/demotion, which causes setting PageHWPoison flag on the wrong page.
The one simple result is that wrong processes can be killed, but another
(more serious) one is that the actual error is left unhandled, so no one
prevents later access to it, and that might lead to more serious results
like consuming corrupted data.
Think about the below race window:
CPU 1 CPU 2
memory_failure_hugetlb
struct page *head = compound_head(p);
hugetlb page might be freed to
buddy, or even changed to another
compound page.
get_hwpoison_page -- page is not what we want now...
The current code first does prechecks roughly and then reconfirms after
taking refcount, but it's found that it makes code overly complicated,
so move the prechecks in a single hugetlb_lock range.
A newly introduced function, try_memory_failure_hugetlb(), always takes
hugetlb_lock (even for non-hugetlb pages). That can be improved, but
memory_failure() is rare in principle, so should not be a big problem.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220408135323.1559401-2-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev
Fixes: 761ad8d7c7b5 ("mm: hwpoison: introduce memory_failure_hugetlb()")
Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Reported-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-04-22 02:35:33 +03:00
* hugetlb = 1 ;
retry :
res = get_huge_page_for_hwpoison ( pfn , flags ) ;
if ( res = = 2 ) { /* fallback to normal page handling */
* hugetlb = 0 ;
return 0 ;
} else if ( res = = - EHWPOISON ) {
pr_err ( " Memory failure: %#lx: already hardware poisoned \n " , pfn ) ;
if ( flags & MF_ACTION_REQUIRED ) {
head = compound_head ( p ) ;
2021-06-29 05:43:14 +03:00
res = kill_accessing_process ( current , page_to_pfn ( head ) , flags ) ;
mm/hwpoison: fix race between hugetlb free/demotion and memory_failure_hugetlb()
There is a race condition between memory_failure_hugetlb() and hugetlb
free/demotion, which causes setting PageHWPoison flag on the wrong page.
The one simple result is that wrong processes can be killed, but another
(more serious) one is that the actual error is left unhandled, so no one
prevents later access to it, and that might lead to more serious results
like consuming corrupted data.
Think about the below race window:
CPU 1 CPU 2
memory_failure_hugetlb
struct page *head = compound_head(p);
hugetlb page might be freed to
buddy, or even changed to another
compound page.
get_hwpoison_page -- page is not what we want now...
The current code first does prechecks roughly and then reconfirms after
taking refcount, but it's found that it makes code overly complicated,
so move the prechecks in a single hugetlb_lock range.
A newly introduced function, try_memory_failure_hugetlb(), always takes
hugetlb_lock (even for non-hugetlb pages). That can be improved, but
memory_failure() is rare in principle, so should not be a big problem.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220408135323.1559401-2-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev
Fixes: 761ad8d7c7b5 ("mm: hwpoison: introduce memory_failure_hugetlb()")
Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Reported-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-04-22 02:35:33 +03:00
}
return res ;
} else if ( res = = - EBUSY ) {
if ( retry ) {
retry = false ;
goto retry ;
}
action_result ( pfn , MF_MSG_UNKNOWN , MF_IGNORED ) ;
2021-06-29 05:43:14 +03:00
return res ;
2017-07-11 01:47:47 +03:00
}
mm/hwpoison: fix race between hugetlb free/demotion and memory_failure_hugetlb()
There is a race condition between memory_failure_hugetlb() and hugetlb
free/demotion, which causes setting PageHWPoison flag on the wrong page.
The one simple result is that wrong processes can be killed, but another
(more serious) one is that the actual error is left unhandled, so no one
prevents later access to it, and that might lead to more serious results
like consuming corrupted data.
Think about the below race window:
CPU 1 CPU 2
memory_failure_hugetlb
struct page *head = compound_head(p);
hugetlb page might be freed to
buddy, or even changed to another
compound page.
get_hwpoison_page -- page is not what we want now...
The current code first does prechecks roughly and then reconfirms after
taking refcount, but it's found that it makes code overly complicated,
so move the prechecks in a single hugetlb_lock range.
A newly introduced function, try_memory_failure_hugetlb(), always takes
hugetlb_lock (even for non-hugetlb pages). That can be improved, but
memory_failure() is rare in principle, so should not be a big problem.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220408135323.1559401-2-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev
Fixes: 761ad8d7c7b5 ("mm: hwpoison: introduce memory_failure_hugetlb()")
Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Reported-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-04-22 02:35:33 +03:00
head = compound_head ( p ) ;
lock_page ( head ) ;
if ( hwpoison_filter ( p ) ) {
ClearPageHWPoison ( head ) ;
res = - EOPNOTSUPP ;
goto out ;
}
/*
* Handling free hugepage . The possible race with hugepage allocation
* or demotion can be prevented by PageHWPoison flag .
*/
if ( res = = 0 ) {
unlock_page ( head ) ;
res = MF_FAILED ;
if ( __page_handle_poison ( p ) ) {
page_ref_inc ( p ) ;
res = MF_RECOVERED ;
2017-07-11 01:47:47 +03:00
}
mm/hwpoison: fix race between hugetlb free/demotion and memory_failure_hugetlb()
There is a race condition between memory_failure_hugetlb() and hugetlb
free/demotion, which causes setting PageHWPoison flag on the wrong page.
The one simple result is that wrong processes can be killed, but another
(more serious) one is that the actual error is left unhandled, so no one
prevents later access to it, and that might lead to more serious results
like consuming corrupted data.
Think about the below race window:
CPU 1 CPU 2
memory_failure_hugetlb
struct page *head = compound_head(p);
hugetlb page might be freed to
buddy, or even changed to another
compound page.
get_hwpoison_page -- page is not what we want now...
The current code first does prechecks roughly and then reconfirms after
taking refcount, but it's found that it makes code overly complicated,
so move the prechecks in a single hugetlb_lock range.
A newly introduced function, try_memory_failure_hugetlb(), always takes
hugetlb_lock (even for non-hugetlb pages). That can be improved, but
memory_failure() is rare in principle, so should not be a big problem.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220408135323.1559401-2-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev
Fixes: 761ad8d7c7b5 ("mm: hwpoison: introduce memory_failure_hugetlb()")
Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Reported-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-04-22 02:35:33 +03:00
action_result ( pfn , MF_MSG_FREE_HUGE , res ) ;
return res = = MF_RECOVERED ? 0 : - EBUSY ;
2017-07-11 01:47:47 +03:00
}
page_flags = head - > flags ;
2018-04-06 02:23:05 +03:00
/*
* TODO : hwpoison for pud - sized hugetlb doesn ' t work right now , so
* simply disable it . In order to make it work properly , we need
* make sure that :
* - conversion of a pud that maps an error hugetlb into hwpoison
* entry properly works , and
* - other mm code walking over page table is aware of pud - aligned
* hwpoison entries .
*/
if ( huge_page_size ( page_hstate ( head ) ) > PMD_SIZE ) {
action_result ( pfn , MF_MSG_NON_PMD_HUGE , MF_IGNORED ) ;
res = - EBUSY ;
goto out ;
}
2021-09-03 00:58:25 +03:00
if ( ! hwpoison_user_mappings ( p , pfn , flags , head ) ) {
2017-07-11 01:47:47 +03:00
action_result ( pfn , MF_MSG_UNMAP_FAILED , MF_IGNORED ) ;
res = - EBUSY ;
goto out ;
}
2021-06-25 04:40:01 +03:00
return identify_page_state ( pfn , p , page_flags ) ;
2017-07-11 01:47:47 +03:00
out :
unlock_page ( head ) ;
return res ;
}
mm/hwpoison: fix race between hugetlb free/demotion and memory_failure_hugetlb()
There is a race condition between memory_failure_hugetlb() and hugetlb
free/demotion, which causes setting PageHWPoison flag on the wrong page.
The one simple result is that wrong processes can be killed, but another
(more serious) one is that the actual error is left unhandled, so no one
prevents later access to it, and that might lead to more serious results
like consuming corrupted data.
Think about the below race window:
CPU 1 CPU 2
memory_failure_hugetlb
struct page *head = compound_head(p);
hugetlb page might be freed to
buddy, or even changed to another
compound page.
get_hwpoison_page -- page is not what we want now...
The current code first does prechecks roughly and then reconfirms after
taking refcount, but it's found that it makes code overly complicated,
so move the prechecks in a single hugetlb_lock range.
A newly introduced function, try_memory_failure_hugetlb(), always takes
hugetlb_lock (even for non-hugetlb pages). That can be improved, but
memory_failure() is rare in principle, so should not be a big problem.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220408135323.1559401-2-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev
Fixes: 761ad8d7c7b5 ("mm: hwpoison: introduce memory_failure_hugetlb()")
Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Reported-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-04-22 02:35:33 +03:00
# else
static inline int try_memory_failure_hugetlb ( unsigned long pfn , int flags , int * hugetlb )
{
return 0 ;
}
# endif
2017-07-11 01:47:47 +03:00
2018-07-14 07:50:21 +03:00
static int memory_failure_dev_pagemap ( unsigned long pfn , int flags ,
struct dev_pagemap * pgmap )
{
struct page * page = pfn_to_page ( pfn ) ;
unsigned long size = 0 ;
struct to_kill * tk ;
LIST_HEAD ( tokill ) ;
int rc = - EBUSY ;
loff_t start ;
2018-11-30 19:05:06 +03:00
dax_entry_t cookie ;
2018-07-14 07:50:21 +03:00
2020-12-15 06:11:48 +03:00
if ( flags & MF_COUNT_INCREASED )
/*
* Drop the extra refcount in case we come from madvise ( ) .
*/
put_page ( page ) ;
2021-02-26 04:17:08 +03:00
/* device metadata space is not recoverable */
if ( ! pgmap_pfn_valid ( pgmap , pfn ) ) {
rc = - ENXIO ;
goto out ;
}
2022-01-30 00:41:01 +03:00
/*
* Pages instantiated by device - dax ( not filesystem - dax )
* may be compound pages .
*/
page = compound_head ( page ) ;
2018-07-14 07:50:21 +03:00
/*
* Prevent the inode from being freed while we are interrogating
* the address_space , typically this would be handled by
* lock_page ( ) , but dax pages do not use the page lock . This
* also prevents changes to the mapping of this pfn until
* poison signaling is complete .
*/
2018-11-30 19:05:06 +03:00
cookie = dax_lock_page ( page ) ;
if ( ! cookie )
2018-07-14 07:50:21 +03:00
goto out ;
if ( hwpoison_filter ( page ) ) {
2022-03-23 00:44:38 +03:00
rc = - EOPNOTSUPP ;
2018-07-14 07:50:21 +03:00
goto unlock ;
}
2022-07-15 18:05:10 +03:00
switch ( pgmap - > type ) {
case MEMORY_DEVICE_PRIVATE :
case MEMORY_DEVICE_COHERENT :
2018-07-14 07:50:21 +03:00
/*
2022-07-15 18:05:10 +03:00
* TODO : Handle device pages which may need coordination
2018-07-14 07:50:21 +03:00
* with device - side memory .
*/
goto unlock ;
2022-07-15 18:05:10 +03:00
default :
break ;
2018-07-14 07:50:21 +03:00
}
/*
* Use this flag as an indication that the dax page has been
* remapped UC to prevent speculative consumption of poison .
*/
SetPageHWPoison ( page ) ;
/*
* Unlike System - RAM there is no possibility to swap in a
* different physical page at a given virtual address , so all
* userspace consumption of ZONE_DEVICE memory necessitates
* SIGBUS ( i . e . MF_MUST_KILL )
*/
flags | = MF_ACTION_REQUIRED | MF_MUST_KILL ;
2022-03-23 00:44:12 +03:00
collect_procs ( page , & tokill , true ) ;
2018-07-14 07:50:21 +03:00
list_for_each_entry ( tk , & tokill , nd )
if ( tk - > size_shift )
size = max ( size , 1UL < < tk - > size_shift ) ;
if ( size ) {
/*
* Unmap the largest mapping to avoid breaking up
* device - dax mappings which are constant size . The
* actual size of the mapping being torn down is
* communicated in siginfo , see kill_proc ( )
*/
start = ( page - > index < < PAGE_SHIFT ) & ~ ( size - 1 ) ;
2021-04-30 09:02:19 +03:00
unmap_mapping_range ( page - > mapping , start , size , 0 ) ;
2018-07-14 07:50:21 +03:00
}
2022-03-23 00:44:12 +03:00
kill_procs ( & tokill , true , false , pfn , flags ) ;
2018-07-14 07:50:21 +03:00
rc = 0 ;
unlock :
2018-11-30 19:05:06 +03:00
dax_unlock_page ( page , cookie ) ;
2018-07-14 07:50:21 +03:00
out :
/* drop pgmap ref acquired in caller */
put_dev_pagemap ( pgmap ) ;
action_result ( pfn , MF_MSG_DAX , rc ? MF_FAILED : MF_RECOVERED ) ;
return rc ;
}
2022-01-15 01:09:02 +03:00
static DEFINE_MUTEX ( mf_mutex ) ;
2011-12-15 22:48:12 +04:00
/**
* memory_failure - Handle memory failure of a page .
* @ pfn : Page Number of the corrupted page
* @ flags : fine tune action taken
*
* This function is called by the low level machine check code
* of an architecture when it detects hardware memory corruption
* of a page . It tries its best to recover , which includes
* dropping pages , killing processes etc .
*
* The function is primarily of use for corruptions that
* happen outside the current execution context ( e . g . when
* detected by a background scrubber )
*
* Must run in process context ( e . g . a work queue ) with interrupts
* enabled and no spinlocks hold .
2022-03-23 00:44:38 +03:00
*
* Return : 0 for successfully handled the memory error ,
2022-05-13 06:23:10 +03:00
* - EOPNOTSUPP for hwpoison_filter ( ) filtered the error event ,
2022-03-23 00:44:38 +03:00
* < 0 ( except - EOPNOTSUPP ) on failure .
2011-12-15 22:48:12 +04:00
*/
2017-07-10 02:14:01 +03:00
int memory_failure ( unsigned long pfn , int flags )
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
{
struct page * p ;
2010-05-28 04:29:17 +04:00
struct page * hpage ;
2018-07-14 07:50:21 +03:00
struct dev_pagemap * pgmap ;
2021-06-25 04:39:55 +03:00
int res = 0 ;
2013-02-23 04:35:51 +04:00
unsigned long page_flags ;
mm,hwpoison: take free pages off the buddy freelists
The crux of the matter is that historically we left poisoned pages in the
buddy system because we have some checks in place when allocating a page
that are gatekeeper for poisoned pages. Unfortunately, we do have other
users (e.g: compaction [1]) that scan buddy freelists and try to get a
page from there without checking whether the page is HWPoison.
As I stated already, I think it is fundamentally wrong to keep HWPoison
pages within the buddy systems, checks in place or not.
Let us fix this the same way we did for soft_offline [2], taking the page
off the buddy freelist so it is completely unreachable.
Note that this is fairly simple to trigger, as we only need to poison free
buddy pages (madvise MADV_HWPOISON) and then run some sort of memory
stress system.
Just for a matter of reference, I put a dump_page() in compaction_alloc()
to trigger for HWPoison patches:
page:0000000012b2982b refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x1 pfn:0x1d5db
flags: 0xfffffc0800000(hwpoison)
raw: 000fffffc0800000 ffffea00007573c8 ffffc90000857de0 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: compaction_alloc
CPU: 4 PID: 123 Comm: kcompactd0 Tainted: G E 5.9.0-rc2-mm1-1-default+ #5
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.10.2-0-g5f4c7b1-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x6d/0x8b
compaction_alloc+0xb2/0xc0
migrate_pages+0x2a6/0x12a0
compact_zone+0x5eb/0x11c0
proactive_compact_node+0x89/0xf0
kcompactd+0x2d0/0x3a0
kthread+0x118/0x130
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
After that, if e.g: a process faults in the page, it will get killed
unexpectedly.
Fix it by containing the page immediatelly.
Besides that, two more changes can be noticed:
* MF_DELAYED no longer suits as we are fixing the issue by containing
the page immediately, so it does no longer rely on the allocation-time
checks to stop HWPoison to be handed over.
gain unless it is unpoisoned, so we fixed the situation.
Because of that, let us use MF_RECOVERED from now on.
* The second block that handles PageBuddy pages is no longer needed:
We call shake_page and then check whether the page is Buddy
because shake_page calls drain_all_pages, which sends pcp-pages back to
the buddy freelists, so we could have a chance to handle free pages.
Currently, get_hwpoison_page already calls drain_all_pages, and we call
get_hwpoison_page right before coming here, so we should be on the safe
side.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20190826104144.GA7849@linux/T/#u
[2] https://patchwork.kernel.org/cover/11792607/
[osalvador@suse.de: take the poisoned subpage off the buddy frelists]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201013144447.6706-4-osalvador@suse.de
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201013144447.6706-3-osalvador@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-15 06:11:32 +03:00
bool retry = true ;
mm/hwpoison: fix race between hugetlb free/demotion and memory_failure_hugetlb()
There is a race condition between memory_failure_hugetlb() and hugetlb
free/demotion, which causes setting PageHWPoison flag on the wrong page.
The one simple result is that wrong processes can be killed, but another
(more serious) one is that the actual error is left unhandled, so no one
prevents later access to it, and that might lead to more serious results
like consuming corrupted data.
Think about the below race window:
CPU 1 CPU 2
memory_failure_hugetlb
struct page *head = compound_head(p);
hugetlb page might be freed to
buddy, or even changed to another
compound page.
get_hwpoison_page -- page is not what we want now...
The current code first does prechecks roughly and then reconfirms after
taking refcount, but it's found that it makes code overly complicated,
so move the prechecks in a single hugetlb_lock range.
A newly introduced function, try_memory_failure_hugetlb(), always takes
hugetlb_lock (even for non-hugetlb pages). That can be improved, but
memory_failure() is rare in principle, so should not be a big problem.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220408135323.1559401-2-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev
Fixes: 761ad8d7c7b5 ("mm: hwpoison: introduce memory_failure_hugetlb()")
Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Reported-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-04-22 02:35:33 +03:00
int hugetlb = 0 ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
if ( ! sysctl_memory_failure_recovery )
2017-07-10 02:14:01 +03:00
panic ( " Memory failure on page %lx " , pfn ) ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
2021-10-27 01:00:48 +03:00
mutex_lock ( & mf_mutex ) ;
2022-06-15 12:32:09 +03:00
if ( ! ( flags & MF_SW_SIMULATED ) )
hw_memory_failure = true ;
2019-10-19 06:19:23 +03:00
p = pfn_to_online_page ( pfn ) ;
if ( ! p ) {
2021-10-27 01:00:48 +03:00
res = arch_memory_failure ( pfn , flags ) ;
if ( res = = 0 )
goto unlock_mutex ;
2019-10-19 06:19:23 +03:00
if ( pfn_valid ( pfn ) ) {
pgmap = get_dev_pagemap ( pfn , NULL ) ;
2021-10-27 01:00:48 +03:00
if ( pgmap ) {
res = memory_failure_dev_pagemap ( pfn , flags ,
pgmap ) ;
goto unlock_mutex ;
}
2019-10-19 06:19:23 +03:00
}
2016-05-21 02:57:32 +03:00
pr_err ( " Memory failure: %#lx: memory outside kernel control \n " ,
pfn ) ;
2021-10-27 01:00:48 +03:00
res = - ENXIO ;
goto unlock_mutex ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
}
mm,hwpoison: take free pages off the buddy freelists
The crux of the matter is that historically we left poisoned pages in the
buddy system because we have some checks in place when allocating a page
that are gatekeeper for poisoned pages. Unfortunately, we do have other
users (e.g: compaction [1]) that scan buddy freelists and try to get a
page from there without checking whether the page is HWPoison.
As I stated already, I think it is fundamentally wrong to keep HWPoison
pages within the buddy systems, checks in place or not.
Let us fix this the same way we did for soft_offline [2], taking the page
off the buddy freelist so it is completely unreachable.
Note that this is fairly simple to trigger, as we only need to poison free
buddy pages (madvise MADV_HWPOISON) and then run some sort of memory
stress system.
Just for a matter of reference, I put a dump_page() in compaction_alloc()
to trigger for HWPoison patches:
page:0000000012b2982b refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x1 pfn:0x1d5db
flags: 0xfffffc0800000(hwpoison)
raw: 000fffffc0800000 ffffea00007573c8 ffffc90000857de0 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: compaction_alloc
CPU: 4 PID: 123 Comm: kcompactd0 Tainted: G E 5.9.0-rc2-mm1-1-default+ #5
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.10.2-0-g5f4c7b1-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x6d/0x8b
compaction_alloc+0xb2/0xc0
migrate_pages+0x2a6/0x12a0
compact_zone+0x5eb/0x11c0
proactive_compact_node+0x89/0xf0
kcompactd+0x2d0/0x3a0
kthread+0x118/0x130
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
After that, if e.g: a process faults in the page, it will get killed
unexpectedly.
Fix it by containing the page immediatelly.
Besides that, two more changes can be noticed:
* MF_DELAYED no longer suits as we are fixing the issue by containing
the page immediately, so it does no longer rely on the allocation-time
checks to stop HWPoison to be handed over.
gain unless it is unpoisoned, so we fixed the situation.
Because of that, let us use MF_RECOVERED from now on.
* The second block that handles PageBuddy pages is no longer needed:
We call shake_page and then check whether the page is Buddy
because shake_page calls drain_all_pages, which sends pcp-pages back to
the buddy freelists, so we could have a chance to handle free pages.
Currently, get_hwpoison_page already calls drain_all_pages, and we call
get_hwpoison_page right before coming here, so we should be on the safe
side.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20190826104144.GA7849@linux/T/#u
[2] https://patchwork.kernel.org/cover/11792607/
[osalvador@suse.de: take the poisoned subpage off the buddy frelists]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201013144447.6706-4-osalvador@suse.de
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201013144447.6706-3-osalvador@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-15 06:11:32 +03:00
try_again :
mm/hwpoison: fix race between hugetlb free/demotion and memory_failure_hugetlb()
There is a race condition between memory_failure_hugetlb() and hugetlb
free/demotion, which causes setting PageHWPoison flag on the wrong page.
The one simple result is that wrong processes can be killed, but another
(more serious) one is that the actual error is left unhandled, so no one
prevents later access to it, and that might lead to more serious results
like consuming corrupted data.
Think about the below race window:
CPU 1 CPU 2
memory_failure_hugetlb
struct page *head = compound_head(p);
hugetlb page might be freed to
buddy, or even changed to another
compound page.
get_hwpoison_page -- page is not what we want now...
The current code first does prechecks roughly and then reconfirms after
taking refcount, but it's found that it makes code overly complicated,
so move the prechecks in a single hugetlb_lock range.
A newly introduced function, try_memory_failure_hugetlb(), always takes
hugetlb_lock (even for non-hugetlb pages). That can be improved, but
memory_failure() is rare in principle, so should not be a big problem.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220408135323.1559401-2-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev
Fixes: 761ad8d7c7b5 ("mm: hwpoison: introduce memory_failure_hugetlb()")
Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Reported-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-04-22 02:35:33 +03:00
res = try_memory_failure_hugetlb ( pfn , flags , & hugetlb ) ;
if ( hugetlb )
2021-06-25 04:39:55 +03:00
goto unlock_mutex ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
if ( TestSetPageHWPoison ( p ) ) {
2016-05-21 02:57:32 +03:00
pr_err ( " Memory failure: %#lx: already hardware poisoned \n " ,
pfn ) ;
mm,hwpoison: return -EHWPOISON to denote that the page has already been poisoned
When memory_failure() is called with MF_ACTION_REQUIRED on the page that
has already been hwpoisoned, memory_failure() could fail to send SIGBUS
to the affected process, which results in infinite loop of MCEs.
Currently memory_failure() returns 0 if it's called for already
hwpoisoned page, then the caller, kill_me_maybe(), could return without
sending SIGBUS to current process. An action required MCE is raised
when the current process accesses to the broken memory, so no SIGBUS
means that the current process continues to run and access to the error
page again soon, so running into MCE loop.
This issue can arise for example in the following scenarios:
- Two or more threads access to the poisoned page concurrently. If
local MCE is enabled, MCE handler independently handles the MCE
events. So there's a race among MCE events, and the second or latter
threads fall into the situation in question.
- If there was a precedent memory error event and memory_failure() for
the event failed to unmap the error page for some reason, the
subsequent memory access to the error page triggers the MCE loop
situation.
To fix the issue, make memory_failure() return an error code when the
error page has already been hwpoisoned. This allows memory error
handler to control how it sends signals to userspace. And make sure
that any process touching a hwpoisoned page should get a SIGBUS even in
"already hwpoisoned" path of memory_failure() as is done in page fault
path.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210521030156.2612074-3-nao.horiguchi@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Aili Yao <yaoaili@kingsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Jue Wang <juew@google.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-06-25 04:39:58 +03:00
res = - EHWPOISON ;
2021-06-29 05:43:14 +03:00
if ( flags & MF_ACTION_REQUIRED )
res = kill_accessing_process ( current , pfn , flags ) ;
2022-04-29 09:16:02 +03:00
if ( flags & MF_COUNT_INCREASED )
put_page ( p ) ;
2021-06-25 04:39:55 +03:00
goto unlock_mutex ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
}
2022-03-23 00:44:21 +03:00
hpage = compound_head ( p ) ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
/*
* We need / can do nothing about count = 0 pages .
* 1 ) it ' s a free page , and therefore in safe hand :
* prep_new_page ( ) will be the gate keeper .
2017-07-11 01:47:47 +03:00
* 2 ) it ' s part of a non - compound high order page .
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
* Implies some kernel user : cannot stop them from
* R / W the page ; let ' s pray that the page has been
* used and will be freed some time later .
* In fact it ' s dangerous to directly bump up page count from 0 ,
2018-08-22 07:53:13 +03:00
* that may make page_ref_freeze ( ) / page_ref_unfreeze ( ) mismatch .
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
*/
2021-06-29 05:43:17 +03:00
if ( ! ( flags & MF_COUNT_INCREASED ) ) {
res = get_hwpoison_page ( p , flags ) ;
if ( ! res ) {
if ( is_free_buddy_page ( p ) ) {
if ( take_page_off_buddy ( p ) ) {
page_ref_inc ( p ) ;
res = MF_RECOVERED ;
} else {
/* We lost the race, try again */
if ( retry ) {
ClearPageHWPoison ( p ) ;
retry = false ;
goto try_again ;
}
res = MF_FAILED ;
mm,hwpoison: take free pages off the buddy freelists
The crux of the matter is that historically we left poisoned pages in the
buddy system because we have some checks in place when allocating a page
that are gatekeeper for poisoned pages. Unfortunately, we do have other
users (e.g: compaction [1]) that scan buddy freelists and try to get a
page from there without checking whether the page is HWPoison.
As I stated already, I think it is fundamentally wrong to keep HWPoison
pages within the buddy systems, checks in place or not.
Let us fix this the same way we did for soft_offline [2], taking the page
off the buddy freelist so it is completely unreachable.
Note that this is fairly simple to trigger, as we only need to poison free
buddy pages (madvise MADV_HWPOISON) and then run some sort of memory
stress system.
Just for a matter of reference, I put a dump_page() in compaction_alloc()
to trigger for HWPoison patches:
page:0000000012b2982b refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x1 pfn:0x1d5db
flags: 0xfffffc0800000(hwpoison)
raw: 000fffffc0800000 ffffea00007573c8 ffffc90000857de0 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: compaction_alloc
CPU: 4 PID: 123 Comm: kcompactd0 Tainted: G E 5.9.0-rc2-mm1-1-default+ #5
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.10.2-0-g5f4c7b1-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x6d/0x8b
compaction_alloc+0xb2/0xc0
migrate_pages+0x2a6/0x12a0
compact_zone+0x5eb/0x11c0
proactive_compact_node+0x89/0xf0
kcompactd+0x2d0/0x3a0
kthread+0x118/0x130
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
After that, if e.g: a process faults in the page, it will get killed
unexpectedly.
Fix it by containing the page immediatelly.
Besides that, two more changes can be noticed:
* MF_DELAYED no longer suits as we are fixing the issue by containing
the page immediately, so it does no longer rely on the allocation-time
checks to stop HWPoison to be handed over.
gain unless it is unpoisoned, so we fixed the situation.
Because of that, let us use MF_RECOVERED from now on.
* The second block that handles PageBuddy pages is no longer needed:
We call shake_page and then check whether the page is Buddy
because shake_page calls drain_all_pages, which sends pcp-pages back to
the buddy freelists, so we could have a chance to handle free pages.
Currently, get_hwpoison_page already calls drain_all_pages, and we call
get_hwpoison_page right before coming here, so we should be on the safe
side.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20190826104144.GA7849@linux/T/#u
[2] https://patchwork.kernel.org/cover/11792607/
[osalvador@suse.de: take the poisoned subpage off the buddy frelists]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201013144447.6706-4-osalvador@suse.de
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201013144447.6706-3-osalvador@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-15 06:11:32 +03:00
}
2021-06-29 05:43:17 +03:00
action_result ( pfn , MF_MSG_BUDDY , res ) ;
res = res = = MF_RECOVERED ? 0 : - EBUSY ;
} else {
action_result ( pfn , MF_MSG_KERNEL_HIGH_ORDER , MF_IGNORED ) ;
res = - EBUSY ;
mm,hwpoison: take free pages off the buddy freelists
The crux of the matter is that historically we left poisoned pages in the
buddy system because we have some checks in place when allocating a page
that are gatekeeper for poisoned pages. Unfortunately, we do have other
users (e.g: compaction [1]) that scan buddy freelists and try to get a
page from there without checking whether the page is HWPoison.
As I stated already, I think it is fundamentally wrong to keep HWPoison
pages within the buddy systems, checks in place or not.
Let us fix this the same way we did for soft_offline [2], taking the page
off the buddy freelist so it is completely unreachable.
Note that this is fairly simple to trigger, as we only need to poison free
buddy pages (madvise MADV_HWPOISON) and then run some sort of memory
stress system.
Just for a matter of reference, I put a dump_page() in compaction_alloc()
to trigger for HWPoison patches:
page:0000000012b2982b refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x1 pfn:0x1d5db
flags: 0xfffffc0800000(hwpoison)
raw: 000fffffc0800000 ffffea00007573c8 ffffc90000857de0 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: compaction_alloc
CPU: 4 PID: 123 Comm: kcompactd0 Tainted: G E 5.9.0-rc2-mm1-1-default+ #5
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.10.2-0-g5f4c7b1-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x6d/0x8b
compaction_alloc+0xb2/0xc0
migrate_pages+0x2a6/0x12a0
compact_zone+0x5eb/0x11c0
proactive_compact_node+0x89/0xf0
kcompactd+0x2d0/0x3a0
kthread+0x118/0x130
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
After that, if e.g: a process faults in the page, it will get killed
unexpectedly.
Fix it by containing the page immediatelly.
Besides that, two more changes can be noticed:
* MF_DELAYED no longer suits as we are fixing the issue by containing
the page immediately, so it does no longer rely on the allocation-time
checks to stop HWPoison to be handed over.
gain unless it is unpoisoned, so we fixed the situation.
Because of that, let us use MF_RECOVERED from now on.
* The second block that handles PageBuddy pages is no longer needed:
We call shake_page and then check whether the page is Buddy
because shake_page calls drain_all_pages, which sends pcp-pages back to
the buddy freelists, so we could have a chance to handle free pages.
Currently, get_hwpoison_page already calls drain_all_pages, and we call
get_hwpoison_page right before coming here, so we should be on the safe
side.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20190826104144.GA7849@linux/T/#u
[2] https://patchwork.kernel.org/cover/11792607/
[osalvador@suse.de: take the poisoned subpage off the buddy frelists]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201013144447.6706-4-osalvador@suse.de
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201013144447.6706-3-osalvador@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-15 06:11:32 +03:00
}
2021-06-29 05:43:17 +03:00
goto unlock_mutex ;
} else if ( res < 0 ) {
action_result ( pfn , MF_MSG_UNKNOWN , MF_IGNORED ) ;
2021-06-25 04:39:55 +03:00
res = - EBUSY ;
2021-06-29 05:43:17 +03:00
goto unlock_mutex ;
2009-12-16 14:19:58 +03:00
}
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
}
2017-07-11 01:47:47 +03:00
if ( PageTransHuge ( hpage ) ) {
2021-10-29 00:36:11 +03:00
/*
* The flag must be set after the refcount is bumped
* otherwise it may race with THP split .
* And the flag can ' t be set in get_hwpoison_page ( ) since
* it is called by soft offline too and it is just called
* for ! MF_COUNT_INCREASE . So here seems to be the best
* place .
*
* Don ' t need care about the above error handling paths for
* get_hwpoison_page ( ) since they handle either free page
* or unhandlable page . The refcount is bumped iff the
* page is a valid handlable page .
*/
SetPageHasHWPoisoned ( hpage ) ;
2020-10-16 06:07:21 +03:00
if ( try_to_split_thp_page ( p , " Memory Failure " ) < 0 ) {
action_result ( pfn , MF_MSG_UNSPLIT_THP , MF_IGNORED ) ;
2021-06-25 04:39:55 +03:00
res = - EBUSY ;
goto unlock_mutex ;
2020-10-16 06:07:21 +03:00
}
2015-06-25 02:56:45 +03:00
VM_BUG_ON_PAGE ( ! page_count ( p ) , p ) ;
}
2009-09-29 09:16:20 +04:00
/*
* We ignore non - LRU pages for good reasons .
* - PG_locked is only well defined for LRU pages and a few others
2016-01-16 03:51:24 +03:00
* - to avoid races with __SetPageLocked ( )
2009-09-29 09:16:20 +04:00
* - to avoid races with __SetPageSlab * ( ) ( and more non - atomic ops )
* The check ( unnecessarily ) ignores LRU pages being isolated and
* walked by the page reclaim code , however that ' s not a big loss .
*/
mm: hwpoison: don't drop slab caches for offlining non-LRU page
In the current implementation of soft offline, if non-LRU page is met,
all the slab caches will be dropped to free the page then offline. But
if the page is not slab page all the effort is wasted in vain. Even
though it is a slab page, it is not guaranteed the page could be freed
at all.
However the side effect and cost is quite high. It does not only drop
the slab caches, but also may drop a significant amount of page caches
which are associated with inode caches. It could make the most
workingset gone in order to just offline a page. And the offline is not
guaranteed to succeed at all, actually I really doubt the success rate
for real life workload.
Furthermore the worse consequence is the system may be locked up and
unusable since the page cache release may incur huge amount of works
queued for memcg release.
Actually we ran into such unpleasant case in our production environment.
Firstly, the workqueue of memory_failure_work_func is locked up as
below:
BUG: workqueue lockup - pool cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 stuck for 53s!
Showing busy workqueues and worker pools:
workqueue events: flags=0x0
pwq 2: cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=14/256 refcnt=15
in-flight: 409271:memory_failure_work_func
pending: kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_monitor, kfree_rcu_work, rht_deferred_worker, rht_deferred_worker, rht_deferred_worker, rht_deferred_worker, kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_work, drain_local_stock, kfree_rcu_work
workqueue mm_percpu_wq: flags=0x8
pwq 2: cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=1/256 refcnt=2
pending: vmstat_update
workqueue cgroup_destroy: flags=0x0
pwq 2: cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=1/1 refcnt=12072
pending: css_release_work_fn
There were over 12K css_release_work_fn queued, and this caused a few
lockups due to the contention of worker pool lock with IRQ disabled, for
example:
NMI watchdog: Watchdog detected hard LOCKUP on cpu 1
Modules linked in: amd64_edac_mod edac_mce_amd crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel xt_DSCP iptable_mangle kvm_amd bpfilter vfat fat acpi_ipmi i2c_piix4 usb_storage ipmi_si k10temp i2c_core ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler acpi_cpufreq sch_fq_codel xfs libcrc32c crc32c_intel mlx5_core mlxfw nvme xhci_pci ptp nvme_core pps_core xhci_hcd
CPU: 1 PID: 205500 Comm: kworker/1:0 Tainted: G L 5.10.32-t1.el7.twitter.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: TYAN F5AMT /z /S8026GM2NRE-CGN, BIOS V8.030 03/30/2021
Workqueue: events memory_failure_work_func
RIP: 0010:queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x41/0x1a0
Code: 41 f0 0f ba 2f 08 0f 92 c0 0f b6 c0 c1 e0 08 89 c2 8b 07 30 e4 09 d0 a9 00 01 ff ff 75 1b 85 c0 74 0e 8b 07 84 c0 74 08 f3 90 <8b> 07 84 c0 75 f8 b8 01 00 00 00 66 89 07 c3 f6 c4 01 75 04 c6 47
RSP: 0018:ffff9b2ac278f900 EFLAGS: 00000002
RAX: 0000000000480101 RBX: ffff8ce98ce71800 RCX: 0000000000000084
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8ce98ce6a140
RBP: 00000000000284c8 R08: ffffd7248dcb6808 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffff9b2ac278f9b0 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: ffff8cb44dab9c00 R14: ffffffffbd1ce6a0 R15: ffff8cacaa37f068
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8ce98ce40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fcf6e8cb000 CR3: 0000000a0c60a000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0
Call Trace:
__queue_work+0xd6/0x3c0
queue_work_on+0x1c/0x30
uncharge_batch+0x10e/0x110
mem_cgroup_uncharge_list+0x6d/0x80
release_pages+0x37f/0x3f0
__pagevec_release+0x1c/0x50
__invalidate_mapping_pages+0x348/0x380
inode_lru_isolate+0x10a/0x160
__list_lru_walk_one+0x7b/0x170
list_lru_walk_one+0x4a/0x60
prune_icache_sb+0x37/0x50
super_cache_scan+0x123/0x1a0
do_shrink_slab+0x10c/0x2c0
shrink_slab+0x1f1/0x290
drop_slab_node+0x4d/0x70
soft_offline_page+0x1ac/0x5b0
memory_failure_work_func+0x6a/0x90
process_one_work+0x19e/0x340
worker_thread+0x30/0x360
kthread+0x116/0x130
The lockup made the machine is quite unusable. And it also made the
most workingset gone, the reclaimabled slab caches were reduced from 12G
to 300MB, the page caches were decreased from 17G to 4G.
But the most disappointing thing is all the effort doesn't make the page
offline, it just returns:
soft_offline: 0x1469f2: unknown non LRU page type 5ffff0000000000 ()
It seems the aggressive behavior for non-LRU page didn't pay back, so it
doesn't make too much sense to keep it considering the terrible side
effect.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210819054116.266126-1-shy828301@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Reported-by: David Mackey <tdmackey@twitter.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-09-03 00:58:31 +03:00
shake_page ( p ) ;
2009-09-29 09:16:20 +04:00
2017-07-11 01:47:47 +03:00
lock_page ( p ) ;
2009-12-16 14:19:58 +03:00
2014-08-07 03:06:49 +04:00
/*
2022-03-23 00:44:21 +03:00
* We ' re only intended to deal with the non - Compound page here .
* However , the page could have changed compound pages due to
* race window . If this happens , we could try again to hopefully
* handle the page next round .
2014-08-07 03:06:49 +04:00
*/
2022-03-23 00:44:21 +03:00
if ( PageCompound ( p ) ) {
if ( retry ) {
2022-05-13 06:23:10 +03:00
ClearPageHWPoison ( p ) ;
2022-03-23 00:44:21 +03:00
unlock_page ( p ) ;
put_page ( p ) ;
flags & = ~ MF_COUNT_INCREASED ;
retry = false ;
goto try_again ;
}
2015-06-25 02:57:30 +03:00
action_result ( pfn , MF_MSG_DIFFERENT_COMPOUND , MF_IGNORED ) ;
2014-08-07 03:06:49 +04:00
res = - EBUSY ;
2021-06-25 04:39:55 +03:00
goto unlock_page ;
2014-08-07 03:06:49 +04:00
}
2013-02-23 04:35:51 +04:00
/*
* We use page flags to determine what action should be taken , but
* the flags can be modified by the error containment action . One
* example is an mlocked page , where PG_mlocked is cleared by
* page_remove_rmap ( ) in try_to_unmap_one ( ) . So to determine page status
* correctly , we save a copy of the page flags at this time .
*/
mm,hwpoison: cleanup unused PageHuge() check
Patch series "HWPOISON: soft offline rework", v7.
This patchset fixes a couple of issues that the patchset Naoya sent [1]
contained due to rebasing problems and a misunterdansting.
Main focus of this series is to stabilize soft offline. Historically soft
offlined pages have suffered from racy conditions because PageHWPoison is
used to a little too aggressively, which (directly or indirectly) invades
other mm code which cares little about hwpoison. This results in
unexpected behavior or kernel panic, which is very far from soft offline's
"do not disturb userspace or other kernel component" policy. An example
of this can be found here [2].
Along with several cleanups, this code refactors and changes the way soft
offline work. Main point of this change set is to contain target page
"via buddy allocator" or in migrating path. For ther former we first free
the target page as we do for normal pages, and once it has reached buddy
and it has been taken off the freelists, we flag it as HWpoison. For the
latter we never get to release the page in unmap_and_move, so the page is
under our control and we can handle it in hwpoison code.
[1] https://patchwork.kernel.org/cover/11704083/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20190826104144.GA7849@linux/T/#u
This patch (of 14):
Drop the PageHuge check, which is dead code since memory_failure() forks
into memory_failure_hugetlb() for hugetlb pages.
memory_failure() and memory_failure_hugetlb() shares some functions like
hwpoison_user_mappings() and identify_page_state(), so they should
properly handle 4kB page, thp, and hugetlb.
Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Yakunin <zeil@yandex-team.ru>
Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Aristeu Rozanski <aris@ruivo.org>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200922135650.1634-1-osalvador@suse.de
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200922135650.1634-2-osalvador@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-10-16 06:06:38 +03:00
page_flags = p - > flags ;
2013-02-23 04:35:51 +04:00
2009-12-16 14:19:59 +03:00
if ( hwpoison_filter ( p ) ) {
2022-05-13 06:23:10 +03:00
TestClearPageHWPoison ( p ) ;
2017-07-11 01:47:47 +03:00
unlock_page ( p ) ;
2020-10-16 06:06:57 +03:00
put_page ( p ) ;
2022-03-23 00:44:38 +03:00
res = - EOPNOTSUPP ;
2021-06-25 04:39:55 +03:00
goto unlock_mutex ;
2009-12-16 14:19:59 +03:00
}
2009-12-16 14:19:58 +03:00
2021-06-16 04:23:32 +03:00
/*
* __munlock_pagevec may clear a writeback page ' s LRU flag without
* page_lock . We need wait writeback completion for this page or it
* may trigger vfs BUG while evict inode .
*/
2022-03-23 00:44:33 +03:00
if ( ! PageLRU ( p ) & & ! PageWriteback ( p ) )
hwpoison: fix the handling path of the victimized page frame that belong to non-LRU
Until now, the kernel has the same policy to handle victimized page
frames that belong to kernel-space(reserved/slab-subsystem) or
non-LRU(unknown page state). In other word, the result of handling
either of these victimized page frames is (IGNORED | FAILED), and the
return value of memory_failure() is -EBUSY.
This patch is to avoid that memory_failure() returns very soon due to
the "true" value of (!PageLRU(p)), and it also ensures that
action_result() can report more precise information("reserved kernel",
"kernel slab", and "unknown page state") instead of "non LRU",
especially for memory errors which are detected by memory-scrubbing.
Andi said:
: While running the mcelog test suite on 3.14 I hit the following VM_BUG_ON:
:
: soft_offline: 0x56d4: unknown non LRU page type 3ffff800008000
: page:ffffea000015b400 count:3 mapcount:2097169 mapping: (null) index:0xffff8800056d7000
: page flags: 0x3ffff800004081(locked|slab|head)
: ------------[ cut here ]------------
: kernel BUG at mm/rmap.c:1495!
:
: I think what happened is that a LRU page turned into a slab page in
: parallel with offlining. memory_failure initially tests for this case,
: but doesn't retest later after the page has been locked.
:
: ...
:
: I ran this patch in a loop over night with some stress plus
: the mcelog test suite running in a loop. I cannot guarantee it hit it,
: but it should have given it a good beating.
:
: The kernel survived with no messages, although the mcelog test suite
: got killed at some point because it couldn't fork anymore. Probably
: some unrelated problem.
:
: So the patch is ok for me for .16.
Signed-off-by: Chen Yucong <slaoub@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Reported-by: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-07-03 02:22:37 +04:00
goto identify_page_state ;
2014-06-05 03:10:35 +04:00
/*
* It ' s very difficult to mess with pages currently under IO
* and in many cases impossible , so we just avoid it here .
*/
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
wait_on_page_writeback ( p ) ;
/*
* Now take care of user space mappings .
2011-03-23 02:32:44 +03:00
* Abort on fail : __delete_from_page_cache ( ) assumes unmapped page .
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
*/
2021-09-03 00:58:25 +03:00
if ( ! hwpoison_user_mappings ( p , pfn , flags , p ) ) {
2015-06-25 02:57:30 +03:00
action_result ( pfn , MF_MSG_UNMAP_FAILED , MF_IGNORED ) ;
2009-12-16 14:19:58 +03:00
res = - EBUSY ;
2021-06-25 04:39:55 +03:00
goto unlock_page ;
2009-12-16 14:19:58 +03:00
}
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
/*
* Torn down by someone else ?
*/
2009-12-16 14:19:58 +03:00
if ( PageLRU ( p ) & & ! PageSwapCache ( p ) & & p - > mapping = = NULL ) {
2015-06-25 02:57:30 +03:00
action_result ( pfn , MF_MSG_TRUNCATED_LRU , MF_IGNORED ) ;
2009-12-16 14:19:58 +03:00
res = - EBUSY ;
2021-06-25 04:39:55 +03:00
goto unlock_page ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
}
hwpoison: fix the handling path of the victimized page frame that belong to non-LRU
Until now, the kernel has the same policy to handle victimized page
frames that belong to kernel-space(reserved/slab-subsystem) or
non-LRU(unknown page state). In other word, the result of handling
either of these victimized page frames is (IGNORED | FAILED), and the
return value of memory_failure() is -EBUSY.
This patch is to avoid that memory_failure() returns very soon due to
the "true" value of (!PageLRU(p)), and it also ensures that
action_result() can report more precise information("reserved kernel",
"kernel slab", and "unknown page state") instead of "non LRU",
especially for memory errors which are detected by memory-scrubbing.
Andi said:
: While running the mcelog test suite on 3.14 I hit the following VM_BUG_ON:
:
: soft_offline: 0x56d4: unknown non LRU page type 3ffff800008000
: page:ffffea000015b400 count:3 mapcount:2097169 mapping: (null) index:0xffff8800056d7000
: page flags: 0x3ffff800004081(locked|slab|head)
: ------------[ cut here ]------------
: kernel BUG at mm/rmap.c:1495!
:
: I think what happened is that a LRU page turned into a slab page in
: parallel with offlining. memory_failure initially tests for this case,
: but doesn't retest later after the page has been locked.
:
: ...
:
: I ran this patch in a loop over night with some stress plus
: the mcelog test suite running in a loop. I cannot guarantee it hit it,
: but it should have given it a good beating.
:
: The kernel survived with no messages, although the mcelog test suite
: got killed at some point because it couldn't fork anymore. Probably
: some unrelated problem.
:
: So the patch is ok for me for .16.
Signed-off-by: Chen Yucong <slaoub@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Reported-by: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-07-03 02:22:37 +04:00
identify_page_state :
2017-07-11 01:47:56 +03:00
res = identify_page_state ( pfn , p , page_flags ) ;
2021-06-25 04:40:01 +03:00
mutex_unlock ( & mf_mutex ) ;
return res ;
2021-06-25 04:39:55 +03:00
unlock_page :
2017-07-11 01:47:47 +03:00
unlock_page ( p ) ;
2021-06-25 04:39:55 +03:00
unlock_mutex :
mutex_unlock ( & mf_mutex ) ;
2009-09-16 13:50:15 +04:00
return res ;
}
2011-12-15 22:48:12 +04:00
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL ( memory_failure ) ;
2009-12-16 14:19:58 +03:00
2011-07-13 09:14:27 +04:00
# define MEMORY_FAILURE_FIFO_ORDER 4
# define MEMORY_FAILURE_FIFO_SIZE (1 << MEMORY_FAILURE_FIFO_ORDER)
struct memory_failure_entry {
unsigned long pfn ;
int flags ;
} ;
struct memory_failure_cpu {
DECLARE_KFIFO ( fifo , struct memory_failure_entry ,
MEMORY_FAILURE_FIFO_SIZE ) ;
spinlock_t lock ;
struct work_struct work ;
} ;
static DEFINE_PER_CPU ( struct memory_failure_cpu , memory_failure_cpu ) ;
/**
* memory_failure_queue - Schedule handling memory failure of a page .
* @ pfn : Page Number of the corrupted page
* @ flags : Flags for memory failure handling
*
* This function is called by the low level hardware error handler
* when it detects hardware memory corruption of a page . It schedules
* the recovering of error page , including dropping pages , killing
* processes etc .
*
* The function is primarily of use for corruptions that
* happen outside the current execution context ( e . g . when
* detected by a background scrubber )
*
* Can run in IRQ context .
*/
2017-07-10 02:14:01 +03:00
void memory_failure_queue ( unsigned long pfn , int flags )
2011-07-13 09:14:27 +04:00
{
struct memory_failure_cpu * mf_cpu ;
unsigned long proc_flags ;
struct memory_failure_entry entry = {
. pfn = pfn ,
. flags = flags ,
} ;
mf_cpu = & get_cpu_var ( memory_failure_cpu ) ;
spin_lock_irqsave ( & mf_cpu - > lock , proc_flags ) ;
2013-11-15 02:32:17 +04:00
if ( kfifo_put ( & mf_cpu - > fifo , entry ) )
2011-07-13 09:14:27 +04:00
schedule_work_on ( smp_processor_id ( ) , & mf_cpu - > work ) ;
else
2013-07-25 22:53:25 +04:00
pr_err ( " Memory failure: buffer overflow when queuing memory failure at %#lx \n " ,
2011-07-13 09:14:27 +04:00
pfn ) ;
spin_unlock_irqrestore ( & mf_cpu - > lock , proc_flags ) ;
put_cpu_var ( memory_failure_cpu ) ;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL ( memory_failure_queue ) ;
static void memory_failure_work_func ( struct work_struct * work )
{
struct memory_failure_cpu * mf_cpu ;
struct memory_failure_entry entry = { 0 , } ;
unsigned long proc_flags ;
int gotten ;
2020-05-01 19:45:41 +03:00
mf_cpu = container_of ( work , struct memory_failure_cpu , work ) ;
2011-07-13 09:14:27 +04:00
for ( ; ; ) {
spin_lock_irqsave ( & mf_cpu - > lock , proc_flags ) ;
gotten = kfifo_get ( & mf_cpu - > fifo , & entry ) ;
spin_unlock_irqrestore ( & mf_cpu - > lock , proc_flags ) ;
if ( ! gotten )
break ;
2013-07-10 13:27:01 +04:00
if ( entry . flags & MF_SOFT_OFFLINE )
2019-12-01 04:53:38 +03:00
soft_offline_page ( entry . pfn , entry . flags ) ;
2013-07-10 13:27:01 +04:00
else
2017-07-10 02:14:01 +03:00
memory_failure ( entry . pfn , entry . flags ) ;
2011-07-13 09:14:27 +04:00
}
}
2020-05-01 19:45:41 +03:00
/*
* Process memory_failure work queued on the specified CPU .
* Used to avoid return - to - userspace racing with the memory_failure workqueue .
*/
void memory_failure_queue_kick ( int cpu )
{
struct memory_failure_cpu * mf_cpu ;
mf_cpu = & per_cpu ( memory_failure_cpu , cpu ) ;
cancel_work_sync ( & mf_cpu - > work ) ;
memory_failure_work_func ( & mf_cpu - > work ) ;
}
2011-07-13 09:14:27 +04:00
static int __init memory_failure_init ( void )
{
struct memory_failure_cpu * mf_cpu ;
int cpu ;
for_each_possible_cpu ( cpu ) {
mf_cpu = & per_cpu ( memory_failure_cpu , cpu ) ;
spin_lock_init ( & mf_cpu - > lock ) ;
INIT_KFIFO ( mf_cpu - > fifo ) ;
INIT_WORK ( & mf_cpu - > work , memory_failure_work_func ) ;
}
return 0 ;
}
core_initcall ( memory_failure_init ) ;
2015-11-06 05:47:26 +03:00
# define unpoison_pr_info(fmt, pfn, rs) \
( { \
if ( __ratelimit ( rs ) ) \
pr_info ( fmt , pfn ) ; \
} )
2009-12-16 14:19:58 +03:00
/**
* unpoison_memory - Unpoison a previously poisoned page
* @ pfn : Page number of the to be unpoisoned page
*
* Software - unpoison a page that has been poisoned by
* memory_failure ( ) earlier .
*
* This is only done on the software - level , so it only works
* for linux injected failures , not real hardware failures
*
* Returns 0 for success , otherwise - errno .
*/
int unpoison_memory ( unsigned long pfn )
{
struct page * page ;
struct page * p ;
mm/hwpoison: fix unpoison_memory()
After recent soft-offline rework, error pages can be taken off from
buddy allocator, but the existing unpoison_memory() does not properly
undo the operation. Moreover, due to the recent change on
__get_hwpoison_page(), get_page_unless_zero() is hardly called for
hwpoisoned pages. So __get_hwpoison_page() highly likely returns -EBUSY
(meaning to fail to grab page refcount) and unpoison just clears
PG_hwpoison without releasing a refcount. That does not lead to a
critical issue like kernel panic, but unpoisoned pages never get back to
buddy (leaked permanently), which is not good.
To (partially) fix this, we need to identify "taken off" pages from
other types of hwpoisoned pages. We can't use refcount or page flags
for this purpose, so a pseudo flag is defined by hacking ->private
field. Someone might think that put_page() is enough to cancel
taken-off pages, but the normal free path contains some operations not
suitable for the current purpose, and can fire VM_BUG_ON().
Note that unpoison_memory() is now supposed to be cancel hwpoison events
injected only by madvise() or
/sys/devices/system/memory/{hard,soft}_offline_page, not by MCE
injection, so please don't try to use unpoison when testing with MCE
injection.
[lkp@intel.com: report build failure for ARCH=i386]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211115084006.3728254-4-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Ding Hui <dinghui@sangfor.com.cn>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-15 01:09:09 +03:00
int ret = - EBUSY ;
2022-05-13 06:23:09 +03:00
int freeit = 0 ;
2015-11-06 05:47:26 +03:00
static DEFINE_RATELIMIT_STATE ( unpoison_rs , DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_INTERVAL ,
DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_BURST ) ;
2009-12-16 14:19:58 +03:00
if ( ! pfn_valid ( pfn ) )
return - ENXIO ;
p = pfn_to_page ( pfn ) ;
page = compound_head ( p ) ;
2022-01-15 01:09:02 +03:00
mutex_lock ( & mf_mutex ) ;
2022-06-15 12:32:09 +03:00
if ( hw_memory_failure ) {
unpoison_pr_info ( " Unpoison: Disabled after HW memory failure %#lx \n " ,
pfn , & unpoison_rs ) ;
ret = - EOPNOTSUPP ;
goto unlock_mutex ;
}
2009-12-16 14:19:58 +03:00
if ( ! PageHWPoison ( p ) ) {
2016-05-21 02:57:32 +03:00
unpoison_pr_info ( " Unpoison: Page was already unpoisoned %#lx \n " ,
2015-11-06 05:47:26 +03:00
pfn , & unpoison_rs ) ;
2022-01-15 01:09:02 +03:00
goto unlock_mutex ;
2009-12-16 14:19:58 +03:00
}
2015-09-09 01:03:29 +03:00
if ( page_count ( page ) > 1 ) {
2016-05-21 02:57:32 +03:00
unpoison_pr_info ( " Unpoison: Someone grabs the hwpoison page %#lx \n " ,
2015-11-06 05:47:26 +03:00
pfn , & unpoison_rs ) ;
2022-01-15 01:09:02 +03:00
goto unlock_mutex ;
2015-09-09 01:03:29 +03:00
}
if ( page_mapped ( page ) ) {
2016-05-21 02:57:32 +03:00
unpoison_pr_info ( " Unpoison: Someone maps the hwpoison page %#lx \n " ,
2015-11-06 05:47:26 +03:00
pfn , & unpoison_rs ) ;
2022-01-15 01:09:02 +03:00
goto unlock_mutex ;
2015-09-09 01:03:29 +03:00
}
if ( page_mapping ( page ) ) {
2016-05-21 02:57:32 +03:00
unpoison_pr_info ( " Unpoison: the hwpoison page has non-NULL mapping %#lx \n " ,
2015-11-06 05:47:26 +03:00
pfn , & unpoison_rs ) ;
2022-01-15 01:09:02 +03:00
goto unlock_mutex ;
2013-09-12 01:22:53 +04:00
}
mm/hwpoison: fix unpoison_memory()
After recent soft-offline rework, error pages can be taken off from
buddy allocator, but the existing unpoison_memory() does not properly
undo the operation. Moreover, due to the recent change on
__get_hwpoison_page(), get_page_unless_zero() is hardly called for
hwpoisoned pages. So __get_hwpoison_page() highly likely returns -EBUSY
(meaning to fail to grab page refcount) and unpoison just clears
PG_hwpoison without releasing a refcount. That does not lead to a
critical issue like kernel panic, but unpoisoned pages never get back to
buddy (leaked permanently), which is not good.
To (partially) fix this, we need to identify "taken off" pages from
other types of hwpoisoned pages. We can't use refcount or page flags
for this purpose, so a pseudo flag is defined by hacking ->private
field. Someone might think that put_page() is enough to cancel
taken-off pages, but the normal free path contains some operations not
suitable for the current purpose, and can fire VM_BUG_ON().
Note that unpoison_memory() is now supposed to be cancel hwpoison events
injected only by madvise() or
/sys/devices/system/memory/{hard,soft}_offline_page, not by MCE
injection, so please don't try to use unpoison when testing with MCE
injection.
[lkp@intel.com: report build failure for ARCH=i386]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211115084006.3728254-4-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Ding Hui <dinghui@sangfor.com.cn>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-15 01:09:09 +03:00
if ( PageSlab ( page ) | | PageTable ( page ) )
2022-01-15 01:09:02 +03:00
goto unlock_mutex ;
2009-12-16 14:19:58 +03:00
mm/hwpoison: fix unpoison_memory()
After recent soft-offline rework, error pages can be taken off from
buddy allocator, but the existing unpoison_memory() does not properly
undo the operation. Moreover, due to the recent change on
__get_hwpoison_page(), get_page_unless_zero() is hardly called for
hwpoisoned pages. So __get_hwpoison_page() highly likely returns -EBUSY
(meaning to fail to grab page refcount) and unpoison just clears
PG_hwpoison without releasing a refcount. That does not lead to a
critical issue like kernel panic, but unpoisoned pages never get back to
buddy (leaked permanently), which is not good.
To (partially) fix this, we need to identify "taken off" pages from
other types of hwpoisoned pages. We can't use refcount or page flags
for this purpose, so a pseudo flag is defined by hacking ->private
field. Someone might think that put_page() is enough to cancel
taken-off pages, but the normal free path contains some operations not
suitable for the current purpose, and can fire VM_BUG_ON().
Note that unpoison_memory() is now supposed to be cancel hwpoison events
injected only by madvise() or
/sys/devices/system/memory/{hard,soft}_offline_page, not by MCE
injection, so please don't try to use unpoison when testing with MCE
injection.
[lkp@intel.com: report build failure for ARCH=i386]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211115084006.3728254-4-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Ding Hui <dinghui@sangfor.com.cn>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-15 01:09:09 +03:00
ret = get_hwpoison_page ( p , MF_UNPOISON ) ;
if ( ! ret ) {
2022-05-13 06:23:09 +03:00
ret = TestClearPageHWPoison ( page ) ? 0 : - EBUSY ;
mm/hwpoison: fix unpoison_memory()
After recent soft-offline rework, error pages can be taken off from
buddy allocator, but the existing unpoison_memory() does not properly
undo the operation. Moreover, due to the recent change on
__get_hwpoison_page(), get_page_unless_zero() is hardly called for
hwpoisoned pages. So __get_hwpoison_page() highly likely returns -EBUSY
(meaning to fail to grab page refcount) and unpoison just clears
PG_hwpoison without releasing a refcount. That does not lead to a
critical issue like kernel panic, but unpoisoned pages never get back to
buddy (leaked permanently), which is not good.
To (partially) fix this, we need to identify "taken off" pages from
other types of hwpoisoned pages. We can't use refcount or page flags
for this purpose, so a pseudo flag is defined by hacking ->private
field. Someone might think that put_page() is enough to cancel
taken-off pages, but the normal free path contains some operations not
suitable for the current purpose, and can fire VM_BUG_ON().
Note that unpoison_memory() is now supposed to be cancel hwpoison events
injected only by madvise() or
/sys/devices/system/memory/{hard,soft}_offline_page, not by MCE
injection, so please don't try to use unpoison when testing with MCE
injection.
[lkp@intel.com: report build failure for ARCH=i386]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211115084006.3728254-4-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Ding Hui <dinghui@sangfor.com.cn>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-15 01:09:09 +03:00
} else if ( ret < 0 ) {
if ( ret = = - EHWPOISON ) {
2022-05-13 06:23:09 +03:00
ret = put_page_back_buddy ( p ) ? 0 : - EBUSY ;
mm/hwpoison: fix unpoison_memory()
After recent soft-offline rework, error pages can be taken off from
buddy allocator, but the existing unpoison_memory() does not properly
undo the operation. Moreover, due to the recent change on
__get_hwpoison_page(), get_page_unless_zero() is hardly called for
hwpoisoned pages. So __get_hwpoison_page() highly likely returns -EBUSY
(meaning to fail to grab page refcount) and unpoison just clears
PG_hwpoison without releasing a refcount. That does not lead to a
critical issue like kernel panic, but unpoisoned pages never get back to
buddy (leaked permanently), which is not good.
To (partially) fix this, we need to identify "taken off" pages from
other types of hwpoisoned pages. We can't use refcount or page flags
for this purpose, so a pseudo flag is defined by hacking ->private
field. Someone might think that put_page() is enough to cancel
taken-off pages, but the normal free path contains some operations not
suitable for the current purpose, and can fire VM_BUG_ON().
Note that unpoison_memory() is now supposed to be cancel hwpoison events
injected only by madvise() or
/sys/devices/system/memory/{hard,soft}_offline_page, not by MCE
injection, so please don't try to use unpoison when testing with MCE
injection.
[lkp@intel.com: report build failure for ARCH=i386]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211115084006.3728254-4-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Ding Hui <dinghui@sangfor.com.cn>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-15 01:09:09 +03:00
} else
unpoison_pr_info ( " Unpoison: failed to grab page %#lx \n " ,
pfn , & unpoison_rs ) ;
} else {
2022-05-13 06:23:09 +03:00
freeit = ! ! TestClearPageHWPoison ( p ) ;
2009-12-16 14:19:58 +03:00
2020-10-16 06:06:57 +03:00
put_page ( page ) ;
mm/hwpoison: fix unpoison_memory()
After recent soft-offline rework, error pages can be taken off from
buddy allocator, but the existing unpoison_memory() does not properly
undo the operation. Moreover, due to the recent change on
__get_hwpoison_page(), get_page_unless_zero() is hardly called for
hwpoisoned pages. So __get_hwpoison_page() highly likely returns -EBUSY
(meaning to fail to grab page refcount) and unpoison just clears
PG_hwpoison without releasing a refcount. That does not lead to a
critical issue like kernel panic, but unpoisoned pages never get back to
buddy (leaked permanently), which is not good.
To (partially) fix this, we need to identify "taken off" pages from
other types of hwpoisoned pages. We can't use refcount or page flags
for this purpose, so a pseudo flag is defined by hacking ->private
field. Someone might think that put_page() is enough to cancel
taken-off pages, but the normal free path contains some operations not
suitable for the current purpose, and can fire VM_BUG_ON().
Note that unpoison_memory() is now supposed to be cancel hwpoison events
injected only by madvise() or
/sys/devices/system/memory/{hard,soft}_offline_page, not by MCE
injection, so please don't try to use unpoison when testing with MCE
injection.
[lkp@intel.com: report build failure for ARCH=i386]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211115084006.3728254-4-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Ding Hui <dinghui@sangfor.com.cn>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-15 01:09:09 +03:00
if ( freeit & & ! ( pfn = = my_zero_pfn ( 0 ) & & page_count ( p ) = = 1 ) ) {
put_page ( page ) ;
ret = 0 ;
}
}
2009-12-16 14:19:58 +03:00
2022-01-15 01:09:02 +03:00
unlock_mutex :
mutex_unlock ( & mf_mutex ) ;
2022-05-13 06:23:09 +03:00
if ( ! ret | | freeit ) {
num_poisoned_pages_dec ( ) ;
unpoison_pr_info ( " Unpoison: Software-unpoisoned page %#lx \n " ,
page_to_pfn ( p ) , & unpoison_rs ) ;
}
2022-01-15 01:09:02 +03:00
return ret ;
2009-12-16 14:19:58 +03:00
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL ( unpoison_memory ) ;
2009-12-16 14:20:00 +03:00
2020-10-16 06:07:13 +03:00
static bool isolate_page ( struct page * page , struct list_head * pagelist )
2010-09-08 05:19:39 +04:00
{
2020-10-16 06:07:13 +03:00
bool isolated = false ;
bool lru = PageLRU ( page ) ;
2010-09-08 05:19:39 +04:00
2020-10-16 06:07:13 +03:00
if ( PageHuge ( page ) ) {
2022-05-30 14:30:15 +03:00
isolated = ! isolate_hugetlb ( page , pagelist ) ;
2020-10-16 06:07:13 +03:00
} else {
if ( lru )
isolated = ! isolate_lru_page ( page ) ;
else
isolated = ! isolate_movable_page ( page , ISOLATE_UNEVICTABLE ) ;
if ( isolated )
list_add ( & page - > lru , pagelist ) ;
2013-02-23 04:33:59 +04:00
}
2010-09-08 05:19:39 +04:00
2020-10-16 06:07:13 +03:00
if ( isolated & & lru )
inc_node_page_state ( page , NR_ISOLATED_ANON +
page_is_file_lru ( page ) ) ;
2015-08-15 01:34:59 +03:00
/*
2020-10-16 06:07:13 +03:00
* If we succeed to isolate the page , we grabbed another refcount on
* the page , so we can safely drop the one we got from get_any_pages ( ) .
* If we failed to isolate the page , it means that we cannot go further
* and we will return an error , so drop the reference we got from
* get_any_pages ( ) as well .
2015-08-15 01:34:59 +03:00
*/
2020-10-16 06:07:13 +03:00
put_page ( page ) ;
return isolated ;
2010-09-08 05:19:39 +04:00
}
2020-10-16 06:07:13 +03:00
/*
* __soft_offline_page handles hugetlb - pages and non - hugetlb pages .
* If the page is a non - dirty unmapped page - cache page , it simply invalidates .
* If the page is mapped , it migrates the contents over .
*/
static int __soft_offline_page ( struct page * page )
2013-02-23 04:34:03 +04:00
{
2022-02-13 23:22:28 +03:00
long ret = 0 ;
2013-02-23 04:34:03 +04:00
unsigned long pfn = page_to_pfn ( page ) ;
2020-10-16 06:07:13 +03:00
struct page * hpage = compound_head ( page ) ;
char const * msg_page [ ] = { " page " , " hugepage " } ;
bool huge = PageHuge ( page ) ;
LIST_HEAD ( pagelist ) ;
2020-10-18 02:13:57 +03:00
struct migration_target_control mtc = {
. nid = NUMA_NO_NODE ,
. gfp_mask = GFP_USER | __GFP_MOVABLE | __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL ,
} ;
2009-12-16 14:20:00 +03:00
2013-02-23 04:33:59 +04:00
lock_page ( page ) ;
2020-10-16 06:07:13 +03:00
if ( ! PageHuge ( page ) )
wait_on_page_writeback ( page ) ;
2013-02-23 04:34:03 +04:00
if ( PageHWPoison ( page ) ) {
unlock_page ( page ) ;
2020-10-16 06:06:57 +03:00
put_page ( page ) ;
2013-02-23 04:34:03 +04:00
pr_info ( " soft offline: %#lx page already poisoned \n " , pfn ) ;
2020-10-16 06:07:17 +03:00
return 0 ;
2013-02-23 04:34:03 +04:00
}
2020-10-16 06:07:13 +03:00
2022-03-23 00:44:47 +03:00
if ( ! PageHuge ( page ) & & PageLRU ( page ) & & ! PageSwapCache ( page ) )
2020-10-16 06:07:13 +03:00
/*
* Try to invalidate first . This should work for
* non dirty unmapped page cache pages .
*/
ret = invalidate_inode_page ( page ) ;
2009-12-16 14:20:00 +03:00
unlock_page ( page ) ;
2020-10-16 06:07:13 +03:00
if ( ret ) {
2010-09-28 01:31:30 +04:00
pr_info ( " soft_offline: %#lx: invalidated \n " , pfn ) ;
2020-10-16 06:07:13 +03:00
page_handle_poison ( page , false , true ) ;
2013-02-23 04:34:03 +04:00
return 0 ;
2009-12-16 14:20:00 +03:00
}
2020-10-16 06:07:13 +03:00
if ( isolate_page ( hpage , & pagelist ) ) {
2020-10-18 02:13:57 +03:00
ret = migrate_pages ( & pagelist , alloc_migration_target , NULL ,
2021-09-03 00:59:13 +03:00
( unsigned long ) & mtc , MIGRATE_SYNC , MR_MEMORY_FAILURE , NULL ) ;
mm,hwpoison: rework soft offline for in-use pages
This patch changes the way we set and handle in-use poisoned pages. Until
now, poisoned pages were released to the buddy allocator, trusting that
the checks that take place at allocation time would act as a safe net and
would skip that page.
This has proved to be wrong, as we got some pfn walkers out there, like
compaction, that all they care is the page to be in a buddy freelist.
Although this might not be the only user, having poisoned pages in the
buddy allocator seems a bad idea as we should only have free pages that
are ready and meant to be used as such.
Before explaining the taken approach, let us break down the kind of pages
we can soft offline.
- Anonymous THP (after the split, they end up being 4K pages)
- Hugetlb
- Order-0 pages (that can be either migrated or invalited)
* Normal pages (order-0 and anon-THP)
- If they are clean and unmapped page cache pages, we invalidate
then by means of invalidate_inode_page().
- If they are mapped/dirty, we do the isolate-and-migrate dance.
Either way, do not call put_page directly from those paths. Instead, we
keep the page and send it to page_handle_poison to perform the right
handling.
page_handle_poison sets the HWPoison flag and does the last put_page.
Down the chain, we placed a check for HWPoison page in
free_pages_prepare, that just skips any poisoned page, so those pages
do not end up in any pcplist/freelist.
After that, we set the refcount on the page to 1 and we increment
the poisoned pages counter.
If we see that the check in free_pages_prepare creates trouble, we can
always do what we do for free pages:
- wait until the page hits buddy's freelists
- take it off, and flag it
The downside of the above approach is that we could race with an
allocation, so by the time we want to take the page off the buddy, the
page has been already allocated so we cannot soft offline it.
But the user could always retry it.
* Hugetlb pages
- We isolate-and-migrate them
After the migration has been successful, we call dissolve_free_huge_page,
and we set HWPoison on the page if we succeed.
Hugetlb has a slightly different handling though.
While for non-hugetlb pages we cared about closing the race with an
allocation, doing so for hugetlb pages requires quite some additional
and intrusive code (we would need to hook in free_huge_page and some other
places).
So I decided to not make the code overly complicated and just fail
normally if the page we allocated in the meantime.
We can always build on top of this.
As a bonus, because of the way we handle now in-use pages, we no longer
need the put-as-isolation-migratetype dance, that was guarding for poisoned
pages to end up in pcplists.
Signed-off-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Aristeu Rozanski <aris@ruivo.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Yakunin <zeil@yandex-team.ru>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.com>
Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200922135650.1634-10-osalvador@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-10-16 06:07:09 +03:00
if ( ! ret ) {
2020-10-16 06:07:13 +03:00
bool release = ! huge ;
if ( ! page_handle_poison ( page , huge , release ) )
ret = - EBUSY ;
mm,hwpoison: rework soft offline for in-use pages
This patch changes the way we set and handle in-use poisoned pages. Until
now, poisoned pages were released to the buddy allocator, trusting that
the checks that take place at allocation time would act as a safe net and
would skip that page.
This has proved to be wrong, as we got some pfn walkers out there, like
compaction, that all they care is the page to be in a buddy freelist.
Although this might not be the only user, having poisoned pages in the
buddy allocator seems a bad idea as we should only have free pages that
are ready and meant to be used as such.
Before explaining the taken approach, let us break down the kind of pages
we can soft offline.
- Anonymous THP (after the split, they end up being 4K pages)
- Hugetlb
- Order-0 pages (that can be either migrated or invalited)
* Normal pages (order-0 and anon-THP)
- If they are clean and unmapped page cache pages, we invalidate
then by means of invalidate_inode_page().
- If they are mapped/dirty, we do the isolate-and-migrate dance.
Either way, do not call put_page directly from those paths. Instead, we
keep the page and send it to page_handle_poison to perform the right
handling.
page_handle_poison sets the HWPoison flag and does the last put_page.
Down the chain, we placed a check for HWPoison page in
free_pages_prepare, that just skips any poisoned page, so those pages
do not end up in any pcplist/freelist.
After that, we set the refcount on the page to 1 and we increment
the poisoned pages counter.
If we see that the check in free_pages_prepare creates trouble, we can
always do what we do for free pages:
- wait until the page hits buddy's freelists
- take it off, and flag it
The downside of the above approach is that we could race with an
allocation, so by the time we want to take the page off the buddy, the
page has been already allocated so we cannot soft offline it.
But the user could always retry it.
* Hugetlb pages
- We isolate-and-migrate them
After the migration has been successful, we call dissolve_free_huge_page,
and we set HWPoison on the page if we succeed.
Hugetlb has a slightly different handling though.
While for non-hugetlb pages we cared about closing the race with an
allocation, doing so for hugetlb pages requires quite some additional
and intrusive code (we would need to hook in free_huge_page and some other
places).
So I decided to not make the code overly complicated and just fail
normally if the page we allocated in the meantime.
We can always build on top of this.
As a bonus, because of the way we handle now in-use pages, we no longer
need the put-as-isolation-migratetype dance, that was guarding for poisoned
pages to end up in pcplists.
Signed-off-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Aristeu Rozanski <aris@ruivo.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Yakunin <zeil@yandex-team.ru>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.com>
Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200922135650.1634-10-osalvador@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-10-16 06:07:09 +03:00
} else {
2017-02-25 01:57:35 +03:00
if ( ! list_empty ( & pagelist ) )
putback_movable_pages ( & pagelist ) ;
2014-01-22 03:51:17 +04:00
2022-02-13 23:22:28 +03:00
pr_info ( " soft offline: %#lx: %s migration failed %ld, type %pGp \n " ,
2021-10-19 17:26:21 +03:00
pfn , msg_page [ huge ] , ret , & page - > flags ) ;
2009-12-16 14:20:00 +03:00
if ( ret > 0 )
2020-12-15 06:11:51 +03:00
ret = - EBUSY ;
2009-12-16 14:20:00 +03:00
}
} else {
2021-10-19 17:26:21 +03:00
pr_info ( " soft offline: %#lx: %s isolation failed, page count %d, type %pGp \n " ,
pfn , msg_page [ huge ] , page_count ( page ) , & page - > flags ) ;
2020-10-16 06:07:13 +03:00
ret = - EBUSY ;
2009-12-16 14:20:00 +03:00
}
return ret ;
}
2013-09-12 01:22:56 +04:00
2020-10-16 06:07:13 +03:00
static int soft_offline_in_use_page ( struct page * page )
2016-01-16 03:57:43 +03:00
{
struct page * hpage = compound_head ( page ) ;
2020-10-16 06:07:01 +03:00
if ( ! PageHuge ( page ) & & PageTransHuge ( hpage ) )
if ( try_to_split_thp_page ( page , " soft offline " ) < 0 )
2016-01-16 03:57:43 +03:00
return - EBUSY ;
2020-10-16 06:07:13 +03:00
return __soft_offline_page ( page ) ;
2016-01-16 03:57:43 +03:00
}
2018-08-24 03:00:42 +03:00
static int soft_offline_free_page ( struct page * page )
2016-01-16 03:57:43 +03:00
{
2020-10-16 06:07:13 +03:00
int rc = 0 ;
2016-01-16 03:57:43 +03:00
2020-10-16 06:07:13 +03:00
if ( ! page_handle_poison ( page , true , false ) )
rc = - EBUSY ;
2020-10-16 06:07:05 +03:00
2018-08-24 03:00:42 +03:00
return rc ;
2016-01-16 03:57:43 +03:00
}
2021-01-24 08:01:52 +03:00
static void put_ref_page ( struct page * page )
{
if ( page )
put_page ( page ) ;
}
2013-09-12 01:22:56 +04:00
/**
* soft_offline_page - Soft offline a page .
2019-12-01 04:53:38 +03:00
* @ pfn : pfn to soft - offline
2013-09-12 01:22:56 +04:00
* @ flags : flags . Same as memory_failure ( ) .
*
2022-05-13 06:23:10 +03:00
* Returns 0 on success
* - EOPNOTSUPP for hwpoison_filter ( ) filtered the error event
* < 0 otherwise negated errno .
2013-09-12 01:22:56 +04:00
*
* Soft offline a page , by migration or invalidation ,
* without killing anything . This is for the case when
* a page is not corrupted yet ( so it ' s still valid to access ) ,
* but has had a number of corrected errors and is better taken
* out .
*
* The actual policy on when to do that is maintained by
* user space .
*
* This should never impact any application or cause data loss ,
* however it might take some time .
*
* This is not a 100 % solution for all memory , but tries to be
* ` ` good enough ' ' for the majority of memory .
*/
2019-12-01 04:53:38 +03:00
int soft_offline_page ( unsigned long pfn , int flags )
2013-09-12 01:22:56 +04:00
{
int ret ;
2020-10-16 06:07:29 +03:00
bool try_again = true ;
2021-01-24 08:01:52 +03:00
struct page * page , * ref_page = NULL ;
WARN_ON_ONCE ( ! pfn_valid ( pfn ) & & ( flags & MF_COUNT_INCREASED ) ) ;
2013-09-12 01:22:56 +04:00
2019-12-01 04:53:38 +03:00
if ( ! pfn_valid ( pfn ) )
return - ENXIO ;
2021-01-24 08:01:52 +03:00
if ( flags & MF_COUNT_INCREASED )
ref_page = pfn_to_page ( pfn ) ;
2019-12-01 04:53:38 +03:00
/* Only online pages can be soft-offlined (esp., not ZONE_DEVICE). */
page = pfn_to_online_page ( pfn ) ;
2021-01-24 08:01:52 +03:00
if ( ! page ) {
put_ref_page ( ref_page ) ;
2018-07-14 07:49:56 +03:00
return - EIO ;
2021-01-24 08:01:52 +03:00
}
2018-07-14 07:49:56 +03:00
2022-01-15 01:09:02 +03:00
mutex_lock ( & mf_mutex ) ;
2013-09-12 01:22:56 +04:00
if ( PageHWPoison ( page ) ) {
2020-12-15 06:11:38 +03:00
pr_info ( " %s: %#lx page already poisoned \n " , __func__ , pfn ) ;
2021-01-24 08:01:52 +03:00
put_ref_page ( ref_page ) ;
2022-01-15 01:09:02 +03:00
mutex_unlock ( & mf_mutex ) ;
2020-10-16 06:07:17 +03:00
return 0 ;
2013-09-12 01:22:56 +04:00
}
2020-10-16 06:07:29 +03:00
retry :
mem-hotplug: implement get/put_online_mems
kmem_cache_{create,destroy,shrink} need to get a stable value of
cpu/node online mask, because they init/destroy/access per-cpu/node
kmem_cache parts, which can be allocated or destroyed on cpu/mem
hotplug. To protect against cpu hotplug, these functions use
{get,put}_online_cpus. However, they do nothing to synchronize with
memory hotplug - taking the slab_mutex does not eliminate the
possibility of race as described in patch 2.
What we need there is something like get_online_cpus, but for memory.
We already have lock_memory_hotplug, which serves for the purpose, but
it's a bit of a hammer right now, because it's backed by a mutex. As a
result, it imposes some limitations to locking order, which are not
desirable, and can't be used just like get_online_cpus. That's why in
patch 1 I substitute it with get/put_online_mems, which work exactly
like get/put_online_cpus except they block not cpu, but memory hotplug.
[ v1 can be found at https://lkml.org/lkml/2014/4/6/68. I NAK'ed it by
myself, because it used an rw semaphore for get/put_online_mems,
making them dead lock prune. ]
This patch (of 2):
{un}lock_memory_hotplug, which is used to synchronize against memory
hotplug, is currently backed by a mutex, which makes it a bit of a
hammer - threads that only want to get a stable value of online nodes
mask won't be able to proceed concurrently. Also, it imposes some
strong locking ordering rules on it, which narrows down the set of its
usage scenarios.
This patch introduces get/put_online_mems, which are the same as
get/put_online_cpus, but for memory hotplug, i.e. executing a code
inside a get/put_online_mems section will guarantee a stable value of
online nodes, present pages, etc.
lock_memory_hotplug()/unlock_memory_hotplug() are removed altogether.
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Tang Chen <tangchen@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Zhang Yanfei <zhangyanfei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com>
Cc: Xishi Qiu <qiuxishi@huawei.com>
Cc: Jiang Liu <liuj97@gmail.com>
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Wen Congyang <wency@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Yasuaki Ishimatsu <isimatu.yasuaki@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-06-05 03:07:18 +04:00
get_online_mems ( ) ;
2022-03-23 00:44:50 +03:00
ret = get_hwpoison_page ( page , flags | MF_SOFT_OFFLINE ) ;
mem-hotplug: implement get/put_online_mems
kmem_cache_{create,destroy,shrink} need to get a stable value of
cpu/node online mask, because they init/destroy/access per-cpu/node
kmem_cache parts, which can be allocated or destroyed on cpu/mem
hotplug. To protect against cpu hotplug, these functions use
{get,put}_online_cpus. However, they do nothing to synchronize with
memory hotplug - taking the slab_mutex does not eliminate the
possibility of race as described in patch 2.
What we need there is something like get_online_cpus, but for memory.
We already have lock_memory_hotplug, which serves for the purpose, but
it's a bit of a hammer right now, because it's backed by a mutex. As a
result, it imposes some limitations to locking order, which are not
desirable, and can't be used just like get_online_cpus. That's why in
patch 1 I substitute it with get/put_online_mems, which work exactly
like get/put_online_cpus except they block not cpu, but memory hotplug.
[ v1 can be found at https://lkml.org/lkml/2014/4/6/68. I NAK'ed it by
myself, because it used an rw semaphore for get/put_online_mems,
making them dead lock prune. ]
This patch (of 2):
{un}lock_memory_hotplug, which is used to synchronize against memory
hotplug, is currently backed by a mutex, which makes it a bit of a
hammer - threads that only want to get a stable value of online nodes
mask won't be able to proceed concurrently. Also, it imposes some
strong locking ordering rules on it, which narrows down the set of its
usage scenarios.
This patch introduces get/put_online_mems, which are the same as
get/put_online_cpus, but for memory hotplug, i.e. executing a code
inside a get/put_online_mems section will guarantee a stable value of
online nodes, present pages, etc.
lock_memory_hotplug()/unlock_memory_hotplug() are removed altogether.
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Tang Chen <tangchen@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Zhang Yanfei <zhangyanfei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com>
Cc: Xishi Qiu <qiuxishi@huawei.com>
Cc: Jiang Liu <liuj97@gmail.com>
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Wen Congyang <wency@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Yasuaki Ishimatsu <isimatu.yasuaki@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-06-05 03:07:18 +04:00
put_online_mems ( ) ;
2016-01-16 03:54:07 +03:00
2022-05-13 06:23:10 +03:00
if ( hwpoison_filter ( page ) ) {
if ( ret > 0 )
put_page ( page ) ;
else
put_ref_page ( ref_page ) ;
mutex_unlock ( & mf_mutex ) ;
return - EOPNOTSUPP ;
}
2020-12-15 06:11:38 +03:00
if ( ret > 0 ) {
2020-10-16 06:07:13 +03:00
ret = soft_offline_in_use_page ( page ) ;
2020-12-15 06:11:38 +03:00
} else if ( ret = = 0 ) {
2020-10-16 06:07:29 +03:00
if ( soft_offline_free_page ( page ) & & try_again ) {
try_again = false ;
2021-12-25 08:12:58 +03:00
flags & = ~ MF_COUNT_INCREASED ;
2020-10-16 06:07:29 +03:00
goto retry ;
}
2020-12-15 06:11:38 +03:00
}
2016-01-16 03:54:07 +03:00
2022-01-15 01:09:02 +03:00
mutex_unlock ( & mf_mutex ) ;
2013-09-12 01:22:56 +04:00
return ret ;
}
mm/memory-failure.c: move clear_hwpoisoned_pages
Patch series "memory-failure: fix hwpoison_filter", v2.
As well known, the memory failure mechanism handles memory corrupted
event, and try to send SIGBUS to the user process which uses this
corrupted page.
For the virtualization case, QEMU catches SIGBUS and tries to inject MCE
into the guest, and the guest handles memory failure again. Thus the
guest gets the minimal effect from hardware memory corruption.
The further step I'm working on:
1, try to modify code to decrease poisoned pages in a single place
(mm/memofy-failure.c: simplify num_poisoned_pages_dec in this series).
2, try to use page_handle_poison() to handle SetPageHWPoison() and
num_poisoned_pages_inc() together. It would be best to call
num_poisoned_pages_inc() in a single place too.
3, introduce memory failure notifier list in memory-failure.c: notify
the corrupted PFN to someone who registers this list. If I can
complete [1] and [2] part, [3] will be quite easy(just call notifier
list after increasing poisoned page).
4, introduce memory recover VQ for memory balloon device, and registers
memory failure notifier list. During the guest kernel handles memory
failure, balloon device gets notified by memory failure notifier list,
and tells the host to recover the corrupted PFN(GPA) by the new VQ.
5, host side remaps the corrupted page(HVA), and tells the guest side
to unpoison the PFN(GPA). Then the guest fixes the corrupted page(GPA)
dynamically.
This patch (of 5):
clear_hwpoisoned_pages() clears HWPoison flag and decreases the number of
poisoned pages, this actually works as part of memory failure.
Move this function from sparse.c to memory-failure.c, finally there is no
CONFIG_MEMORY_FAILURE in sparse.c.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220509105641.491313-1-pizhenwei@bytedance.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220509105641.491313-2-pizhenwei@bytedance.com
Signed-off-by: zhenwei pi <pizhenwei@bytedance.com>
Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-05-13 06:23:09 +03:00
void clear_hwpoisoned_pages ( struct page * memmap , int nr_pages )
{
int i ;
/*
* A further optimization is to have per section refcounted
* num_poisoned_pages . But that would need more space per memmap , so
* for now just do a quick global check to speed up this routine in the
* absence of bad pages .
*/
if ( atomic_long_read ( & num_poisoned_pages ) = = 0 )
return ;
for ( i = 0 ; i < nr_pages ; i + + ) {
if ( PageHWPoison ( & memmap [ i ] ) ) {
num_poisoned_pages_dec ( ) ;
ClearPageHWPoison ( & memmap [ i ] ) ;
}
}
}