linux/fs/crypto/crypto.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* This contains encryption functions for per-file encryption.
*
* Copyright (C) 2015, Google, Inc.
* Copyright (C) 2015, Motorola Mobility
*
* Written by Michael Halcrow, 2014.
*
* Filename encryption additions
* Uday Savagaonkar, 2014
* Encryption policy handling additions
* Ildar Muslukhov, 2014
* Add fscrypt_pullback_bio_page()
* Jaegeuk Kim, 2015.
*
* This has not yet undergone a rigorous security audit.
*
* The usage of AES-XTS should conform to recommendations in NIST
* Special Publication 800-38E and IEEE P1619/D16.
*/
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <linux/mempool.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
#include <linux/dcache.h>
#include <linux/namei.h>
#include <crypto/aes.h>
#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
#include "fscrypt_private.h"
static unsigned int num_prealloc_crypto_pages = 32;
static unsigned int num_prealloc_crypto_ctxs = 128;
module_param(num_prealloc_crypto_pages, uint, 0444);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(num_prealloc_crypto_pages,
"Number of crypto pages to preallocate");
module_param(num_prealloc_crypto_ctxs, uint, 0444);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(num_prealloc_crypto_ctxs,
"Number of crypto contexts to preallocate");
static mempool_t *fscrypt_bounce_page_pool = NULL;
static LIST_HEAD(fscrypt_free_ctxs);
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(fscrypt_ctx_lock);
static struct workqueue_struct *fscrypt_read_workqueue;
static DEFINE_MUTEX(fscrypt_init_mutex);
static struct kmem_cache *fscrypt_ctx_cachep;
struct kmem_cache *fscrypt_info_cachep;
void fscrypt_enqueue_decrypt_work(struct work_struct *work)
{
queue_work(fscrypt_read_workqueue, work);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_enqueue_decrypt_work);
/**
* fscrypt_release_ctx() - Release a decryption context
* @ctx: The decryption context to release.
*
* If the decryption context was allocated from the pre-allocated pool, return
* it to that pool. Else, free it.
*/
void fscrypt_release_ctx(struct fscrypt_ctx *ctx)
{
unsigned long flags;
if (ctx->flags & FS_CTX_REQUIRES_FREE_ENCRYPT_FL) {
kmem_cache_free(fscrypt_ctx_cachep, ctx);
} else {
spin_lock_irqsave(&fscrypt_ctx_lock, flags);
list_add(&ctx->free_list, &fscrypt_free_ctxs);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&fscrypt_ctx_lock, flags);
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_release_ctx);
/**
* fscrypt_get_ctx() - Get a decryption context
* @gfp_flags: The gfp flag for memory allocation
*
* Allocate and initialize a decryption context.
*
* Return: A new decryption context on success; an ERR_PTR() otherwise.
*/
struct fscrypt_ctx *fscrypt_get_ctx(gfp_t gfp_flags)
{
struct fscrypt_ctx *ctx;
unsigned long flags;
/*
* First try getting a ctx from the free list so that we don't have to
* call into the slab allocator.
*/
spin_lock_irqsave(&fscrypt_ctx_lock, flags);
ctx = list_first_entry_or_null(&fscrypt_free_ctxs,
struct fscrypt_ctx, free_list);
if (ctx)
list_del(&ctx->free_list);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&fscrypt_ctx_lock, flags);
if (!ctx) {
ctx = kmem_cache_zalloc(fscrypt_ctx_cachep, gfp_flags);
if (!ctx)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
ctx->flags |= FS_CTX_REQUIRES_FREE_ENCRYPT_FL;
} else {
ctx->flags &= ~FS_CTX_REQUIRES_FREE_ENCRYPT_FL;
}
return ctx;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_get_ctx);
struct page *fscrypt_alloc_bounce_page(gfp_t gfp_flags)
{
return mempool_alloc(fscrypt_bounce_page_pool, gfp_flags);
}
/**
* fscrypt_free_bounce_page() - free a ciphertext bounce page
*
* Free a bounce page that was allocated by fscrypt_encrypt_pagecache_blocks(),
* or by fscrypt_alloc_bounce_page() directly.
*/
void fscrypt_free_bounce_page(struct page *bounce_page)
{
if (!bounce_page)
return;
set_page_private(bounce_page, (unsigned long)NULL);
ClearPagePrivate(bounce_page);
mempool_free(bounce_page, fscrypt_bounce_page_pool);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_free_bounce_page);
fscrypt: add Adiantum support Add support for the Adiantum encryption mode to fscrypt. Adiantum is a tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode with security provably reducible to that of XChaCha12 and AES-256, subject to a security bound. It's also a true wide-block mode, unlike XTS. See the paper "Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors" (https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf) for more details. Also see commit 059c2a4d8e16 ("crypto: adiantum - add Adiantum support"). On sufficiently long messages, Adiantum's bottlenecks are XChaCha12 and the NH hash function. These algorithms are fast even on processors without dedicated crypto instructions. Adiantum makes it feasible to enable storage encryption on low-end mobile devices that lack AES instructions; currently such devices are unencrypted. On ARM Cortex-A7, on 4096-byte messages Adiantum encryption is about 4 times faster than AES-256-XTS encryption; decryption is about 5 times faster. In fscrypt, Adiantum is suitable for encrypting both file contents and names. With filenames, it fixes a known weakness: when two filenames in a directory share a common prefix of >= 16 bytes, with CTS-CBC their encrypted filenames share a common prefix too, leaking information. Adiantum does not have this problem. Since Adiantum also accepts long tweaks (IVs), it's also safe to use the master key directly for Adiantum encryption rather than deriving per-file keys, provided that the per-file nonce is included in the IVs and the master key isn't used for any other encryption mode. This configuration saves memory and improves performance. A new fscrypt policy flag is added to allow users to opt-in to this configuration. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2019-01-06 16:36:21 +03:00
void fscrypt_generate_iv(union fscrypt_iv *iv, u64 lblk_num,
const struct fscrypt_info *ci)
{
memset(iv, 0, ci->ci_mode->ivsize);
iv->lblk_num = cpu_to_le64(lblk_num);
if (ci->ci_flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY)
fscrypt: add Adiantum support Add support for the Adiantum encryption mode to fscrypt. Adiantum is a tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode with security provably reducible to that of XChaCha12 and AES-256, subject to a security bound. It's also a true wide-block mode, unlike XTS. See the paper "Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors" (https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf) for more details. Also see commit 059c2a4d8e16 ("crypto: adiantum - add Adiantum support"). On sufficiently long messages, Adiantum's bottlenecks are XChaCha12 and the NH hash function. These algorithms are fast even on processors without dedicated crypto instructions. Adiantum makes it feasible to enable storage encryption on low-end mobile devices that lack AES instructions; currently such devices are unencrypted. On ARM Cortex-A7, on 4096-byte messages Adiantum encryption is about 4 times faster than AES-256-XTS encryption; decryption is about 5 times faster. In fscrypt, Adiantum is suitable for encrypting both file contents and names. With filenames, it fixes a known weakness: when two filenames in a directory share a common prefix of >= 16 bytes, with CTS-CBC their encrypted filenames share a common prefix too, leaking information. Adiantum does not have this problem. Since Adiantum also accepts long tweaks (IVs), it's also safe to use the master key directly for Adiantum encryption rather than deriving per-file keys, provided that the per-file nonce is included in the IVs and the master key isn't used for any other encryption mode. This configuration saves memory and improves performance. A new fscrypt policy flag is added to allow users to opt-in to this configuration. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2019-01-06 16:36:21 +03:00
memcpy(iv->nonce, ci->ci_nonce, FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE);
if (ci->ci_essiv_tfm != NULL)
crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(ci->ci_essiv_tfm, iv->raw, iv->raw);
}
/* Encrypt or decrypt a single filesystem block of file contents */
int fscrypt_crypt_block(const struct inode *inode, fscrypt_direction_t rw,
u64 lblk_num, struct page *src_page,
struct page *dest_page, unsigned int len,
unsigned int offs, gfp_t gfp_flags)
{
fscrypt: add Adiantum support Add support for the Adiantum encryption mode to fscrypt. Adiantum is a tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode with security provably reducible to that of XChaCha12 and AES-256, subject to a security bound. It's also a true wide-block mode, unlike XTS. See the paper "Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors" (https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf) for more details. Also see commit 059c2a4d8e16 ("crypto: adiantum - add Adiantum support"). On sufficiently long messages, Adiantum's bottlenecks are XChaCha12 and the NH hash function. These algorithms are fast even on processors without dedicated crypto instructions. Adiantum makes it feasible to enable storage encryption on low-end mobile devices that lack AES instructions; currently such devices are unencrypted. On ARM Cortex-A7, on 4096-byte messages Adiantum encryption is about 4 times faster than AES-256-XTS encryption; decryption is about 5 times faster. In fscrypt, Adiantum is suitable for encrypting both file contents and names. With filenames, it fixes a known weakness: when two filenames in a directory share a common prefix of >= 16 bytes, with CTS-CBC their encrypted filenames share a common prefix too, leaking information. Adiantum does not have this problem. Since Adiantum also accepts long tweaks (IVs), it's also safe to use the master key directly for Adiantum encryption rather than deriving per-file keys, provided that the per-file nonce is included in the IVs and the master key isn't used for any other encryption mode. This configuration saves memory and improves performance. A new fscrypt policy flag is added to allow users to opt-in to this configuration. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2019-01-06 16:36:21 +03:00
union fscrypt_iv iv;
Merge tag 'for-f2fs-4.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jaegeuk/f2fs Pull f2fs updates from Jaegeuk Kim: "New Features: - uplift filesystem encryption into fs/crypto/ - give sysfs entries to control memroy consumption Enhancements: - aio performance by preallocating blocks in ->write_iter - use writepages lock for only WB_SYNC_ALL - avoid redundant inline_data conversion - enhance forground GC - use wait_for_stable_page as possible - speed up SEEK_DATA and fiiemap Bug Fixes: - corner case in terms of -ENOSPC for inline_data - hung task caused by long latency in shrinker - corruption between atomic write and f2fs_trace_pid - avoid garbage lengths in dentries - revoke atomicly written pages if an error occurs In addition, there are various minor bug fixes and clean-ups" * tag 'for-f2fs-4.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jaegeuk/f2fs: (81 commits) f2fs: submit node page write bios when really required f2fs: add missing argument to f2fs_setxattr stub f2fs: fix to avoid unneeded unlock_new_inode f2fs: clean up opened code with f2fs_update_dentry f2fs: declare static functions f2fs: use cryptoapi crc32 functions f2fs: modify the readahead method in ra_node_page() f2fs crypto: sync ext4_lookup and ext4_file_open fs crypto: move per-file encryption from f2fs tree to fs/crypto f2fs: mutex can't be used by down_write_nest_lock() f2fs: recovery missing dot dentries in root directory f2fs: fix to avoid deadlock when merging inline data f2fs: introduce f2fs_flush_merged_bios for cleanup f2fs: introduce f2fs_update_data_blkaddr for cleanup f2fs crypto: fix incorrect positioning for GCing encrypted data page f2fs: fix incorrect upper bound when iterating inode mapping tree f2fs: avoid hungtask problem caused by losing wake_up f2fs: trace old block address for CoWed page f2fs: try to flush inode after merging inline data f2fs: show more info about superblock recovery ...
2016-03-21 21:03:02 +03:00
struct skcipher_request *req = NULL;
DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
struct scatterlist dst, src;
struct fscrypt_info *ci = inode->i_crypt_info;
Merge tag 'for-f2fs-4.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jaegeuk/f2fs Pull f2fs updates from Jaegeuk Kim: "New Features: - uplift filesystem encryption into fs/crypto/ - give sysfs entries to control memroy consumption Enhancements: - aio performance by preallocating blocks in ->write_iter - use writepages lock for only WB_SYNC_ALL - avoid redundant inline_data conversion - enhance forground GC - use wait_for_stable_page as possible - speed up SEEK_DATA and fiiemap Bug Fixes: - corner case in terms of -ENOSPC for inline_data - hung task caused by long latency in shrinker - corruption between atomic write and f2fs_trace_pid - avoid garbage lengths in dentries - revoke atomicly written pages if an error occurs In addition, there are various minor bug fixes and clean-ups" * tag 'for-f2fs-4.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jaegeuk/f2fs: (81 commits) f2fs: submit node page write bios when really required f2fs: add missing argument to f2fs_setxattr stub f2fs: fix to avoid unneeded unlock_new_inode f2fs: clean up opened code with f2fs_update_dentry f2fs: declare static functions f2fs: use cryptoapi crc32 functions f2fs: modify the readahead method in ra_node_page() f2fs crypto: sync ext4_lookup and ext4_file_open fs crypto: move per-file encryption from f2fs tree to fs/crypto f2fs: mutex can't be used by down_write_nest_lock() f2fs: recovery missing dot dentries in root directory f2fs: fix to avoid deadlock when merging inline data f2fs: introduce f2fs_flush_merged_bios for cleanup f2fs: introduce f2fs_update_data_blkaddr for cleanup f2fs crypto: fix incorrect positioning for GCing encrypted data page f2fs: fix incorrect upper bound when iterating inode mapping tree f2fs: avoid hungtask problem caused by losing wake_up f2fs: trace old block address for CoWed page f2fs: try to flush inode after merging inline data f2fs: show more info about superblock recovery ...
2016-03-21 21:03:02 +03:00
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = ci->ci_ctfm;
int res = 0;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(len <= 0))
return -EINVAL;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(len % FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE != 0))
return -EINVAL;
fscrypt: add Adiantum support Add support for the Adiantum encryption mode to fscrypt. Adiantum is a tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode with security provably reducible to that of XChaCha12 and AES-256, subject to a security bound. It's also a true wide-block mode, unlike XTS. See the paper "Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors" (https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf) for more details. Also see commit 059c2a4d8e16 ("crypto: adiantum - add Adiantum support"). On sufficiently long messages, Adiantum's bottlenecks are XChaCha12 and the NH hash function. These algorithms are fast even on processors without dedicated crypto instructions. Adiantum makes it feasible to enable storage encryption on low-end mobile devices that lack AES instructions; currently such devices are unencrypted. On ARM Cortex-A7, on 4096-byte messages Adiantum encryption is about 4 times faster than AES-256-XTS encryption; decryption is about 5 times faster. In fscrypt, Adiantum is suitable for encrypting both file contents and names. With filenames, it fixes a known weakness: when two filenames in a directory share a common prefix of >= 16 bytes, with CTS-CBC their encrypted filenames share a common prefix too, leaking information. Adiantum does not have this problem. Since Adiantum also accepts long tweaks (IVs), it's also safe to use the master key directly for Adiantum encryption rather than deriving per-file keys, provided that the per-file nonce is included in the IVs and the master key isn't used for any other encryption mode. This configuration saves memory and improves performance. A new fscrypt policy flag is added to allow users to opt-in to this configuration. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2019-01-06 16:36:21 +03:00
fscrypt_generate_iv(&iv, lblk_num, ci);
req = skcipher_request_alloc(tfm, gfp_flags);
if (!req)
return -ENOMEM;
Merge tag 'for-f2fs-4.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jaegeuk/f2fs Pull f2fs updates from Jaegeuk Kim: "New Features: - uplift filesystem encryption into fs/crypto/ - give sysfs entries to control memroy consumption Enhancements: - aio performance by preallocating blocks in ->write_iter - use writepages lock for only WB_SYNC_ALL - avoid redundant inline_data conversion - enhance forground GC - use wait_for_stable_page as possible - speed up SEEK_DATA and fiiemap Bug Fixes: - corner case in terms of -ENOSPC for inline_data - hung task caused by long latency in shrinker - corruption between atomic write and f2fs_trace_pid - avoid garbage lengths in dentries - revoke atomicly written pages if an error occurs In addition, there are various minor bug fixes and clean-ups" * tag 'for-f2fs-4.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jaegeuk/f2fs: (81 commits) f2fs: submit node page write bios when really required f2fs: add missing argument to f2fs_setxattr stub f2fs: fix to avoid unneeded unlock_new_inode f2fs: clean up opened code with f2fs_update_dentry f2fs: declare static functions f2fs: use cryptoapi crc32 functions f2fs: modify the readahead method in ra_node_page() f2fs crypto: sync ext4_lookup and ext4_file_open fs crypto: move per-file encryption from f2fs tree to fs/crypto f2fs: mutex can't be used by down_write_nest_lock() f2fs: recovery missing dot dentries in root directory f2fs: fix to avoid deadlock when merging inline data f2fs: introduce f2fs_flush_merged_bios for cleanup f2fs: introduce f2fs_update_data_blkaddr for cleanup f2fs crypto: fix incorrect positioning for GCing encrypted data page f2fs: fix incorrect upper bound when iterating inode mapping tree f2fs: avoid hungtask problem caused by losing wake_up f2fs: trace old block address for CoWed page f2fs: try to flush inode after merging inline data f2fs: show more info about superblock recovery ...
2016-03-21 21:03:02 +03:00
skcipher_request_set_callback(
req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
crypto_req_done, &wait);
sg_init_table(&dst, 1);
sg_set_page(&dst, dest_page, len, offs);
sg_init_table(&src, 1);
sg_set_page(&src, src_page, len, offs);
skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src, &dst, len, &iv);
if (rw == FS_DECRYPT)
res = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req), &wait);
else
res = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req), &wait);
Merge tag 'for-f2fs-4.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jaegeuk/f2fs Pull f2fs updates from Jaegeuk Kim: "New Features: - uplift filesystem encryption into fs/crypto/ - give sysfs entries to control memroy consumption Enhancements: - aio performance by preallocating blocks in ->write_iter - use writepages lock for only WB_SYNC_ALL - avoid redundant inline_data conversion - enhance forground GC - use wait_for_stable_page as possible - speed up SEEK_DATA and fiiemap Bug Fixes: - corner case in terms of -ENOSPC for inline_data - hung task caused by long latency in shrinker - corruption between atomic write and f2fs_trace_pid - avoid garbage lengths in dentries - revoke atomicly written pages if an error occurs In addition, there are various minor bug fixes and clean-ups" * tag 'for-f2fs-4.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jaegeuk/f2fs: (81 commits) f2fs: submit node page write bios when really required f2fs: add missing argument to f2fs_setxattr stub f2fs: fix to avoid unneeded unlock_new_inode f2fs: clean up opened code with f2fs_update_dentry f2fs: declare static functions f2fs: use cryptoapi crc32 functions f2fs: modify the readahead method in ra_node_page() f2fs crypto: sync ext4_lookup and ext4_file_open fs crypto: move per-file encryption from f2fs tree to fs/crypto f2fs: mutex can't be used by down_write_nest_lock() f2fs: recovery missing dot dentries in root directory f2fs: fix to avoid deadlock when merging inline data f2fs: introduce f2fs_flush_merged_bios for cleanup f2fs: introduce f2fs_update_data_blkaddr for cleanup f2fs crypto: fix incorrect positioning for GCing encrypted data page f2fs: fix incorrect upper bound when iterating inode mapping tree f2fs: avoid hungtask problem caused by losing wake_up f2fs: trace old block address for CoWed page f2fs: try to flush inode after merging inline data f2fs: show more info about superblock recovery ...
2016-03-21 21:03:02 +03:00
skcipher_request_free(req);
if (res) {
fscrypt_err(inode, "%scryption failed for block %llu: %d",
(rw == FS_DECRYPT ? "De" : "En"), lblk_num, res);
return res;
}
return 0;
}
/**
* fscrypt_encrypt_pagecache_blocks() - Encrypt filesystem blocks from a pagecache page
* @page: The locked pagecache page containing the block(s) to encrypt
* @len: Total size of the block(s) to encrypt. Must be a nonzero
* multiple of the filesystem's block size.
* @offs: Byte offset within @page of the first block to encrypt. Must be
* a multiple of the filesystem's block size.
* @gfp_flags: Memory allocation flags
*
* A new bounce page is allocated, and the specified block(s) are encrypted into
* it. In the bounce page, the ciphertext block(s) will be located at the same
* offsets at which the plaintext block(s) were located in the source page; any
* other parts of the bounce page will be left uninitialized. However, normally
* blocksize == PAGE_SIZE and the whole page is encrypted at once.
*
* This is for use by the filesystem's ->writepages() method.
*
* Return: the new encrypted bounce page on success; an ERR_PTR() on failure
*/
struct page *fscrypt_encrypt_pagecache_blocks(struct page *page,
unsigned int len,
unsigned int offs,
gfp_t gfp_flags)
{
const struct inode *inode = page->mapping->host;
const unsigned int blockbits = inode->i_blkbits;
const unsigned int blocksize = 1 << blockbits;
struct page *ciphertext_page;
u64 lblk_num = ((u64)page->index << (PAGE_SHIFT - blockbits)) +
(offs >> blockbits);
unsigned int i;
int err;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!PageLocked(page)))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(len <= 0 || !IS_ALIGNED(len | offs, blocksize)))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
ciphertext_page = fscrypt_alloc_bounce_page(gfp_flags);
if (!ciphertext_page)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
for (i = offs; i < offs + len; i += blocksize, lblk_num++) {
err = fscrypt_crypt_block(inode, FS_ENCRYPT, lblk_num,
page, ciphertext_page,
blocksize, i, gfp_flags);
if (err) {
fscrypt_free_bounce_page(ciphertext_page);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
}
SetPagePrivate(ciphertext_page);
set_page_private(ciphertext_page, (unsigned long)page);
return ciphertext_page;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_encrypt_pagecache_blocks);
/**
* fscrypt_encrypt_block_inplace() - Encrypt a filesystem block in-place
* @inode: The inode to which this block belongs
* @page: The page containing the block to encrypt
* @len: Size of block to encrypt. Doesn't need to be a multiple of the
* fs block size, but must be a multiple of FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE.
* @offs: Byte offset within @page at which the block to encrypt begins
* @lblk_num: Filesystem logical block number of the block, i.e. the 0-based
* number of the block within the file
* @gfp_flags: Memory allocation flags
*
* Encrypt a possibly-compressed filesystem block that is located in an
* arbitrary page, not necessarily in the original pagecache page. The @inode
* and @lblk_num must be specified, as they can't be determined from @page.
*
* Return: 0 on success; -errno on failure
*/
int fscrypt_encrypt_block_inplace(const struct inode *inode, struct page *page,
unsigned int len, unsigned int offs,
u64 lblk_num, gfp_t gfp_flags)
{
return fscrypt_crypt_block(inode, FS_ENCRYPT, lblk_num, page, page,
len, offs, gfp_flags);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_encrypt_block_inplace);
/**
* fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks() - Decrypt filesystem blocks in a pagecache page
* @page: The locked pagecache page containing the block(s) to decrypt
* @len: Total size of the block(s) to decrypt. Must be a nonzero
* multiple of the filesystem's block size.
* @offs: Byte offset within @page of the first block to decrypt. Must be
* a multiple of the filesystem's block size.
*
* The specified block(s) are decrypted in-place within the pagecache page,
* which must still be locked and not uptodate. Normally, blocksize ==
* PAGE_SIZE and the whole page is decrypted at once.
*
* This is for use by the filesystem's ->readpages() method.
*
* Return: 0 on success; -errno on failure
*/
int fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks(struct page *page, unsigned int len,
unsigned int offs)
{
const struct inode *inode = page->mapping->host;
const unsigned int blockbits = inode->i_blkbits;
const unsigned int blocksize = 1 << blockbits;
u64 lblk_num = ((u64)page->index << (PAGE_SHIFT - blockbits)) +
(offs >> blockbits);
unsigned int i;
int err;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!PageLocked(page)))
return -EINVAL;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(len <= 0 || !IS_ALIGNED(len | offs, blocksize)))
return -EINVAL;
for (i = offs; i < offs + len; i += blocksize, lblk_num++) {
err = fscrypt_crypt_block(inode, FS_DECRYPT, lblk_num, page,
page, blocksize, i, GFP_NOFS);
if (err)
return err;
}
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks);
/**
* fscrypt_decrypt_block_inplace() - Decrypt a filesystem block in-place
* @inode: The inode to which this block belongs
* @page: The page containing the block to decrypt
* @len: Size of block to decrypt. Doesn't need to be a multiple of the
* fs block size, but must be a multiple of FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE.
* @offs: Byte offset within @page at which the block to decrypt begins
* @lblk_num: Filesystem logical block number of the block, i.e. the 0-based
* number of the block within the file
*
* Decrypt a possibly-compressed filesystem block that is located in an
* arbitrary page, not necessarily in the original pagecache page. The @inode
* and @lblk_num must be specified, as they can't be determined from @page.
*
* Return: 0 on success; -errno on failure
*/
int fscrypt_decrypt_block_inplace(const struct inode *inode, struct page *page,
unsigned int len, unsigned int offs,
u64 lblk_num)
{
return fscrypt_crypt_block(inode, FS_DECRYPT, lblk_num, page, page,
len, offs, GFP_NOFS);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_decrypt_block_inplace);
/*
* Validate dentries in encrypted directories to make sure we aren't potentially
* caching stale dentries after a key has been added.
*/
static int fscrypt_d_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags)
{
struct dentry *dir;
int err;
int valid;
/*
* Plaintext names are always valid, since fscrypt doesn't support
* reverting to ciphertext names without evicting the directory's inode
* -- which implies eviction of the dentries in the directory.
*/
if (!(dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_ENCRYPTED_NAME))
return 1;
/*
* Ciphertext name; valid if the directory's key is still unavailable.
*
* Although fscrypt forbids rename() on ciphertext names, we still must
* use dget_parent() here rather than use ->d_parent directly. That's
* because a corrupted fs image may contain directory hard links, which
* the VFS handles by moving the directory's dentry tree in the dcache
* each time ->lookup() finds the directory and it already has a dentry
* elsewhere. Thus ->d_parent can be changing, and we must safely grab
* a reference to some ->d_parent to prevent it from being freed.
*/
if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU)
return -ECHILD;
dir = dget_parent(dentry);
err = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(d_inode(dir));
valid = !fscrypt_has_encryption_key(d_inode(dir));
dput(dir);
if (err < 0)
return err;
return valid;
}
const struct dentry_operations fscrypt_d_ops = {
.d_revalidate = fscrypt_d_revalidate,
};
static void fscrypt_destroy(void)
{
struct fscrypt_ctx *pos, *n;
list_for_each_entry_safe(pos, n, &fscrypt_free_ctxs, free_list)
kmem_cache_free(fscrypt_ctx_cachep, pos);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&fscrypt_free_ctxs);
mempool_destroy(fscrypt_bounce_page_pool);
fscrypt_bounce_page_pool = NULL;
}
/**
* fscrypt_initialize() - allocate major buffers for fs encryption.
* @cop_flags: fscrypt operations flags
*
* We only call this when we start accessing encrypted files, since it
* results in memory getting allocated that wouldn't otherwise be used.
*
* Return: Zero on success, non-zero otherwise.
*/
int fscrypt_initialize(unsigned int cop_flags)
{
int i, res = -ENOMEM;
/* No need to allocate a bounce page pool if this FS won't use it. */
if (cop_flags & FS_CFLG_OWN_PAGES)
return 0;
mutex_lock(&fscrypt_init_mutex);
if (fscrypt_bounce_page_pool)
goto already_initialized;
for (i = 0; i < num_prealloc_crypto_ctxs; i++) {
struct fscrypt_ctx *ctx;
ctx = kmem_cache_zalloc(fscrypt_ctx_cachep, GFP_NOFS);
if (!ctx)
goto fail;
list_add(&ctx->free_list, &fscrypt_free_ctxs);
}
fscrypt_bounce_page_pool =
mempool_create_page_pool(num_prealloc_crypto_pages, 0);
if (!fscrypt_bounce_page_pool)
goto fail;
already_initialized:
mutex_unlock(&fscrypt_init_mutex);
return 0;
fail:
fscrypt_destroy();
mutex_unlock(&fscrypt_init_mutex);
return res;
}
void fscrypt_msg(const struct inode *inode, const char *level,
const char *fmt, ...)
{
static DEFINE_RATELIMIT_STATE(rs, DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_INTERVAL,
DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_BURST);
struct va_format vaf;
va_list args;
if (!__ratelimit(&rs))
return;
va_start(args, fmt);
vaf.fmt = fmt;
vaf.va = &args;
if (inode)
printk("%sfscrypt (%s, inode %lu): %pV\n",
level, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, &vaf);
else
printk("%sfscrypt: %pV\n", level, &vaf);
va_end(args);
}
/**
* fscrypt_init() - Set up for fs encryption.
*/
static int __init fscrypt_init(void)
{
/*
* Use an unbound workqueue to allow bios to be decrypted in parallel
* even when they happen to complete on the same CPU. This sacrifices
* locality, but it's worthwhile since decryption is CPU-intensive.
*
* Also use a high-priority workqueue to prioritize decryption work,
* which blocks reads from completing, over regular application tasks.
*/
fscrypt_read_workqueue = alloc_workqueue("fscrypt_read_queue",
WQ_UNBOUND | WQ_HIGHPRI,
num_online_cpus());
if (!fscrypt_read_workqueue)
goto fail;
fscrypt_ctx_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(fscrypt_ctx, SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT);
if (!fscrypt_ctx_cachep)
goto fail_free_queue;
fscrypt_info_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(fscrypt_info, SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT);
if (!fscrypt_info_cachep)
goto fail_free_ctx;
return 0;
fail_free_ctx:
kmem_cache_destroy(fscrypt_ctx_cachep);
fail_free_queue:
destroy_workqueue(fscrypt_read_workqueue);
fail:
return -ENOMEM;
}
late_initcall(fscrypt_init)