sh64: ascii armor the sh64 boot init stack canary
Use the ascii-armor canary to prevent unterminated C string overflows from being able to successfully overwrite the canary, even if they somehow obtain the canary value. Inspired by execshield ascii-armor and Daniel Micay's linux-hardened tree. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170524123446.78510066@annuminas.surriel.com Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
parent
d21f54988b
commit
2c8340eda4
@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ static __always_inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void)
|
||||
/* Try to get a semi random initial value. */
|
||||
get_random_bytes(&canary, sizeof(canary));
|
||||
canary ^= LINUX_VERSION_CODE;
|
||||
canary &= CANARY_MASK;
|
||||
|
||||
current->stack_canary = canary;
|
||||
__stack_chk_guard = current->stack_canary;
|
||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user