fs/exec.c: account for argv/envp pointers
When limiting the argv/envp strings during exec to 1/4 of the stack limit,
the storage of the pointers to the strings was not included. This means
that an exec with huge numbers of tiny strings could eat 1/4 of the stack
limit in strings and then additional space would be later used by the
pointers to the strings.
For example, on 32-bit with a 8MB stack rlimit, an exec with 1677721
single-byte strings would consume less than 2MB of stack, the max (8MB /
4) amount allowed, but the pointers to the strings would consume the
remaining additional stack space (1677721 * 4 == 6710884).
The result (1677721 + 6710884 == 8388605) would exhaust stack space
entirely. Controlling this stack exhaustion could result in
pathological behavior in setuid binaries (CVE-2017-1000365).
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: additional commenting from Kees]
Fixes: b6a2fea393
("mm: variable length argument support")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170622001720.GA32173@beast
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
parent
8818efaaac
commit
98da7d0885
28
fs/exec.c
28
fs/exec.c
@ -220,8 +220,26 @@ static struct page *get_arg_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long pos,
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if (write) {
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unsigned long size = bprm->vma->vm_end - bprm->vma->vm_start;
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unsigned long ptr_size;
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struct rlimit *rlim;
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/*
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* Since the stack will hold pointers to the strings, we
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* must account for them as well.
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*
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* The size calculation is the entire vma while each arg page is
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* built, so each time we get here it's calculating how far it
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* is currently (rather than each call being just the newly
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* added size from the arg page). As a result, we need to
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* always add the entire size of the pointers, so that on the
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* last call to get_arg_page() we'll actually have the entire
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* correct size.
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*/
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ptr_size = (bprm->argc + bprm->envc) * sizeof(void *);
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if (ptr_size > ULONG_MAX - size)
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goto fail;
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size += ptr_size;
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acct_arg_size(bprm, size / PAGE_SIZE);
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/*
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@ -239,13 +257,15 @@ static struct page *get_arg_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long pos,
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* to work from.
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*/
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rlim = current->signal->rlim;
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if (size > ACCESS_ONCE(rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur) / 4) {
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put_page(page);
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return NULL;
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}
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if (size > READ_ONCE(rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur) / 4)
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goto fail;
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}
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return page;
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fail:
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put_page(page);
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return NULL;
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}
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static void put_arg_page(struct page *page)
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