2 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Rik van Riel
2c8340eda4 sh64: ascii armor the sh64 boot init stack canary
Use the ascii-armor canary to prevent unterminated C string overflows
from being able to successfully overwrite the canary, even if they
somehow obtain the canary value.

Inspired by execshield ascii-armor and Daniel Micay's linux-hardened
tree.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170524123446.78510066@annuminas.surriel.com
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-12 16:26:03 -07:00
Filippo Arcidiacono
5d920bb929 sh: initial stack protector support.
This implements basic -fstack-protector support, based on the early ARM
version in c743f38013aeff58ef6252601e397b5ba281c633. The SMP case is
limited to the initial canary value, while the UP case handles per-task
granularity (limited to 32-bit sh until a new enough sh64 compiler
manifests itself).

Signed-off-by: Filippo Arcidiacono <filippo.arcidiacono@st.com>
Reviewed-by: Carmelo Amoroso <carmelo.amoroso@st.com>
Signed-off-by: Stuart Menefy <stuart.menefy@st.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
2012-04-19 15:45:57 +09:00