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syzbot reported another task hung in __unix_gc(). [0]
The current while loop assumes that all of the left candidates
have oob_skb and calling kfree_skb(oob_skb) releases the remaining
candidates.
However, I missed a case that oob_skb has self-referencing fd and
another fd and the latter sk is placed before the former in the
candidate list. Then, the while loop never proceeds, resulting
the task hung.
__unix_gc() has the same loop just before purging the collected skb,
so we can call kfree_skb(oob_skb) there and let __skb_queue_purge()
release all inflight sockets.
[0]:
Sending NMI from CPU 0 to CPUs 1:
NMI backtrace for cpu 1
CPU: 1 PID: 2784 Comm: kworker/u4:8 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc4-syzkaller-01028-g71b605d32017 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/25/2024
Workqueue: events_unbound __unix_gc
RIP: 0010:__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc+0x0/0x70 kernel/kcov.c:200
Code: 89 fb e8 23 00 00 00 48 8b 3d 84 f5 1a 0c 48 89 de 5b e9 43 26 57 00 0f 1f 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 <f3> 0f 1e fa 48 8b 04 24 65 48 8b 0d 90 52 70 7e 65 8b 15 91 52 70
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000a17fa78 EFLAGS: 00000287
RAX: ffffffff8a0a6108 RBX: ffff88802b6c2640 RCX: ffff88802c0b3b80
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffffc9000a17fbf0 R08: ffffffff89383f1d R09: 1ffff1100ee5ff84
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed100ee5ff85 R12: 1ffff110056d84ee
R13: ffffc9000a17fae0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffffff8f47b840
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007ffef5687ff8 CR3: 0000000029b34000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<NMI>
</NMI>
<TASK>
__unix_gc+0xe69/0xf40 net/unix/garbage.c:343
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:2633 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0x913/0x1420 kernel/workqueue.c:2706
worker_thread+0xa5f/0x1000 kernel/workqueue.c:2787
kthread+0x2ef/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388
ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:242
</TASK>
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+ecab4d36f920c3574bf9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=ecab4d36f920c3574bf9
Fixes: 25236c91b5ab ("af_unix: Fix task hung while purging oob_skb in GC.")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cross-merge networking fixes after downstream PR.
No conflicts.
Adjacent changes:
drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/common.h
38cc3c6dcc09 ("net: stmmac: protect updates of 64-bit statistics counters")
fd5a6a71313e ("net: stmmac: est: Per Tx-queue error count for HLBF")
c5c3e1bfc9e0 ("net: stmmac: Offload queueMaxSDU from tc-taprio")
drivers/net/wireless/microchip/wilc1000/netdev.c
c9013880284d ("wifi: fill in MODULE_DESCRIPTION()s for wilc1000")
328efda22af8 ("wifi: wilc1000: do not realloc workqueue everytime an interface is added")
net/unix/garbage.c
11498715f266 ("af_unix: Remove io_uring code for GC.")
1279f9d9dec2 ("af_unix: Call kfree_skb() for dead unix_(sk)->oob_skb in GC.")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
syzbot reported a warning [0] in __unix_gc() with a repro, which
creates a socketpair and sends one socket's fd to itself using the
peer.
socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, [3, 4]) = 0
sendmsg(4, {msg_name=NULL, msg_namelen=0, msg_iov=[{iov_base="\360", iov_len=1}],
msg_iovlen=1, msg_control=[{cmsg_len=20, cmsg_level=SOL_SOCKET,
cmsg_type=SCM_RIGHTS, cmsg_data=[3]}],
msg_controllen=24, msg_flags=0}, MSG_OOB|MSG_PROBE|MSG_DONTWAIT|MSG_ZEROCOPY) = 1
This forms a self-cyclic reference that GC should finally untangle
but does not due to lack of MSG_OOB handling, resulting in memory
leak.
Recently, commit 11498715f266 ("af_unix: Remove io_uring code for
GC.") removed io_uring's dead code in GC and revealed the problem.
The code was executed at the final stage of GC and unconditionally
moved all GC candidates from gc_candidates to gc_inflight_list.
That papered over the reported problem by always making the following
WARN_ON_ONCE(!list_empty(&gc_candidates)) false.
The problem has been there since commit 2aab4b969002 ("af_unix: fix
struct pid leaks in OOB support") added full scm support for MSG_OOB
while fixing another bug.
To fix this problem, we must call kfree_skb() for unix_sk(sk)->oob_skb
if the socket still exists in gc_candidates after purging collected skb.
Then, we need to set NULL to oob_skb before calling kfree_skb() because
it calls last fput() and triggers unix_release_sock(), where we call
duplicate kfree_skb(u->oob_skb) if not NULL.
Note that the leaked socket remained being linked to a global list, so
kmemleak also could not detect it. We need to check /proc/net/protocol
to notice the unfreed socket.
[0]:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 2863 at net/unix/garbage.c:345 __unix_gc+0xc74/0xe80 net/unix/garbage.c:345
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 2863 Comm: kworker/u4:11 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc1-syzkaller-00583-g1701940b1a02 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/25/2024
Workqueue: events_unbound __unix_gc
RIP: 0010:__unix_gc+0xc74/0xe80 net/unix/garbage.c:345
Code: 8b 5c 24 50 e9 86 f8 ff ff e8 f8 e4 22 f8 31 d2 48 c7 c6 30 6a 69 89 4c 89 ef e8 97 ef ff ff e9 80 f9 ff ff e8 dd e4 22 f8 90 <0f> 0b 90 e9 7b fd ff ff 48 89 df e8 5c e7 7c f8 e9 d3 f8 ff ff e8
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000b03fba0 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc9000b03fc10 RCX: ffffffff816c493e
RDX: ffff88802c02d940 RSI: ffffffff896982f3 RDI: ffffc9000b03fb30
RBP: ffffc9000b03fce0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffff52001607f66
R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: dffffc0000000000
R13: ffffc9000b03fc10 R14: ffffc9000b03fc10 R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00005559c8677a60 CR3: 000000000d57a000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
process_one_work+0x889/0x15e0 kernel/workqueue.c:2633
process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:2706 [inline]
worker_thread+0x8b9/0x12a0 kernel/workqueue.c:2787
kthread+0x2c6/0x3b0 kernel/kthread.c:388
ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:242
</TASK>
Reported-by: syzbot+fa3ef895554bdbfd1183@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=fa3ef895554bdbfd1183
Fixes: 2aab4b969002 ("af_unix: fix struct pid leaks in OOB support")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240203183149.63573-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Originally, the code related to garbage collection was all in garbage.c.
Commit f4e65870e5ce ("net: split out functions related to registering
inflight socket files") moved some functions to scm.c for io_uring and
added CONFIG_UNIX_SCM just in case AF_UNIX was built as module.
However, since commit 97154bcf4d1b ("af_unix: Kconfig: make CONFIG_UNIX
bool"), AF_UNIX is no longer built separately. Also, io_uring does not
support SCM_RIGHTS now.
Let's move the functions back to garbage.c
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Acked-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240129190435.57228-4-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Since commit 705318a99a13 ("io_uring/af_unix: disable sending
io_uring over sockets"), io_uring's unix socket cannot be passed
via SCM_RIGHTS, so it does not contribute to cyclic reference and
no longer be candidate for garbage collection.
Also, commit 6e5e6d274956 ("io_uring: drop any code related to
SCM_RIGHTS") cleaned up SCM_RIGHTS code in io_uring.
Let's do it in AF_UNIX as well by reverting commit 0091bfc81741
("io_uring/af_unix: defer registered files gc to io_uring release")
and commit 10369080454d ("net: reclaim skb->scm_io_uring bit").
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Acked-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240129190435.57228-3-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
This is a prep patch for the last patch in this series so that
checkpatch will not warn about BUG_ON().
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Acked-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240129190435.57228-2-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
If more than 16000 inflight AF_UNIX sockets exist and the garbage
collector is not running, unix_(dgram|stream)_sendmsg() call unix_gc().
Also, they wait for unix_gc() to complete.
In unix_gc(), all inflight AF_UNIX sockets are traversed at least once,
and more if they are the GC candidate. Thus, sendmsg() significantly
slows down with too many inflight AF_UNIX sockets.
However, if a process sends data with no AF_UNIX FD, the sendmsg() call
does not need to wait for GC. After this change, only the process that
meets the condition below will be blocked under such a situation.
1) cmsg contains AF_UNIX socket
2) more than 32 AF_UNIX sent by the same user are still inflight
Note that even a sendmsg() call that does not meet the condition but has
AF_UNIX FD will be blocked later in unix_scm_to_skb() by the spinlock,
but we allow that as a bonus for sane users.
The results below are the time spent in unix_dgram_sendmsg() sending 1
byte of data with no FD 4096 times on a host where 32K inflight AF_UNIX
sockets exist.
Without series: the sane sendmsg() needs to wait gc unreasonably.
$ sudo /usr/share/bcc/tools/funclatency -p 11165 unix_dgram_sendmsg
Tracing 1 functions for "unix_dgram_sendmsg"... Hit Ctrl-C to end.
^C
nsecs : count distribution
[...]
524288 -> 1048575 : 0 | |
1048576 -> 2097151 : 3881 |****************************************|
2097152 -> 4194303 : 214 |** |
4194304 -> 8388607 : 1 | |
avg = 1825567 nsecs, total: 7477526027 nsecs, count: 4096
With series: the sane sendmsg() can finish much faster.
$ sudo /usr/share/bcc/tools/funclatency -p 8702 unix_dgram_sendmsg
Tracing 1 functions for "unix_dgram_sendmsg"... Hit Ctrl-C to end.
^C
nsecs : count distribution
[...]
128 -> 255 : 0 | |
256 -> 511 : 4092 |****************************************|
512 -> 1023 : 2 | |
1024 -> 2047 : 0 | |
2048 -> 4095 : 0 | |
4096 -> 8191 : 1 | |
8192 -> 16383 : 1 | |
avg = 410 nsecs, total: 1680510 nsecs, count: 4096
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240123170856.41348-6-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
If more than 16000 inflight AF_UNIX sockets exist and the garbage
collector is not running, unix_(dgram|stream)_sendmsg() call unix_gc().
Also, they wait for unix_gc() to complete.
In unix_gc(), all inflight AF_UNIX sockets are traversed at least once,
and more if they are the GC candidate. Thus, sendmsg() significantly
slows down with too many inflight AF_UNIX sockets.
There is a small window to invoke multiple unix_gc() instances, which
will then be blocked by the same spinlock except for one.
Let's convert unix_gc() to use struct work so that it will not consume
CPUs unnecessarily.
Note WRITE_ONCE(gc_in_progress, true) is moved before running GC.
If we leave the WRITE_ONCE() as is and use the following test to
call flush_work(), a process might not call it.
CPU 0 CPU 1
--- ---
start work and call __unix_gc()
if (work_pending(&unix_gc_work) || <-- false
READ_ONCE(gc_in_progress)) <-- false
flush_work(); <-- missed!
WRITE_ONCE(gc_in_progress, true)
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240123170856.41348-5-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Currently, unix_get_socket() returns struct sock, but after calling
it, we always cast it to unix_sk().
Let's return struct unix_sock from unix_get_socket().
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240123170856.41348-4-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
When touching unix_sk(sk)->inflight, we are always under
spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock).
Let's convert unix_sk(sk)->inflight to the normal unsigned long.
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240123170856.41348-3-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Following patch is going to use RCU instead of
sock_diag_table_mutex acquisition.
This patch is a preparation, no change of behavior yet.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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Merge tag 'for-6.8/io_uring-2024-01-08' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux
Pull io_uring updates from Jens Axboe:
"Mostly just come fixes and cleanups, but one feature as well. In
detail:
- Harden the check for handling IOPOLL based on return (Pavel)
- Various minor optimizations (Pavel)
- Drop remnants of SCM_RIGHTS fd passing support, now that it's no
longer supported since 6.7 (me)
- Fix for a case where bytes_done wasn't initialized properly on a
failure condition for read/write requests (me)
- Move the register related code to a separate file (me)
- Add support for returning the provided ring buffer head (me)
- Add support for adding a direct descriptor to the normal file table
(me, Christian Brauner)
- Fix for ensuring pending task_work for a ring with DEFER_TASKRUN is
run even if we timeout waiting (me)"
* tag 'for-6.8/io_uring-2024-01-08' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux:
io_uring: ensure local task_work is run on wait timeout
io_uring/kbuf: add method for returning provided buffer ring head
io_uring/rw: ensure io->bytes_done is always initialized
io_uring: drop any code related to SCM_RIGHTS
io_uring/unix: drop usage of io_uring socket
io_uring/register: move io_uring_register(2) related code to register.c
io_uring/openclose: add support for IORING_OP_FIXED_FD_INSTALL
io_uring/cmd: inline io_uring_cmd_get_task
io_uring/cmd: inline io_uring_cmd_do_in_task_lazy
io_uring: split out cmd api into a separate header
io_uring: optimise ltimeout for inline execution
io_uring: don't check iopoll if request completes
When sockets are added to a sockmap or sockhash we allocate and init a
psock. Then update the proto ops with sock_map_init_proto the flow is
sock_hash_update_common
sock_map_link
psock = sock_map_psock_get_checked() <-returns existing psock
sock_map_init_proto(sk, psock) <- updates sk_proto
If the socket is already in a map this results in the sock_map_init_proto
being called multiple times on the same socket. We do this because when
a socket is added to multiple maps this might result in a new set of BPF
programs being attached to the socket requiring an updated ops struct.
This creates a rule where it must be safe to call psock_update_sk_prot
multiple times. When we added a fix for UAF through unix sockets in patch
4dd9a38a753fc we broke this rule by adding a sock_hold in that path
to ensure the sock is not released. The result is if a af_unix stream sock
is placed in multiple maps it results in a memory leak because we call
sock_hold multiple times with only a single sock_put on it.
Fixes: 8866730aed51 ("bpf, sockmap: af_unix stream sockets need to hold ref for pair sock")
Reported-by: Xingwei Lee <xrivendell7@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231221232327.43678-2-john.fastabend@gmail.com
Since we no longer allow sending io_uring fds over SCM_RIGHTS, move to
using io_is_uring_fops() to detect whether this is a io_uring fd or not.
With that done, kill off io_uring_get_socket() as nobody calls it
anymore.
This is in preparation to yanking out the rest of the core related to
unix gc with io_uring.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
AF_UNIX stream sockets are a paired socket. So sending on one of the pairs
will lookup the paired socket as part of the send operation. It is possible
however to put just one of the pairs in a BPF map. This currently increments
the refcnt on the sock in the sockmap to ensure it is not free'd by the
stack before sockmap cleans up its state and stops any skbs being sent/recv'd
to that socket.
But we missed a case. If the peer socket is closed it will be free'd by the
stack. However, the paired socket can still be referenced from BPF sockmap
side because we hold a reference there. Then if we are sending traffic through
BPF sockmap to that socket it will try to dereference the free'd pair in its
send logic creating a use after free. And following splat:
[59.900375] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sk_wake_async+0x31/0x1b0
[59.901211] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88811acbf060 by task kworker/1:2/954
[...]
[59.905468] Call Trace:
[59.905787] <TASK>
[59.906066] dump_stack_lvl+0x130/0x1d0
[59.908877] print_report+0x16f/0x740
[59.910629] kasan_report+0x118/0x160
[59.912576] sk_wake_async+0x31/0x1b0
[59.913554] sock_def_readable+0x156/0x2a0
[59.914060] unix_stream_sendmsg+0x3f9/0x12a0
[59.916398] sock_sendmsg+0x20e/0x250
[59.916854] skb_send_sock+0x236/0xac0
[59.920527] sk_psock_backlog+0x287/0xaa0
To fix let BPF sockmap hold a refcnt on both the socket in the sockmap and its
paired socket. It wasn't obvious how to contain the fix to bpf_unix logic. The
primarily problem with keeping this logic in bpf_unix was: In the sock close()
we could handle the deref by having a close handler. But, when we are destroying
the psock through a map delete operation we wouldn't have gotten any signal
thorugh the proto struct other than it being replaced. If we do the deref from
the proto replace its too early because we need to deref the sk_pair after the
backlog worker has been stopped.
Given all this it seems best to just cache it at the end of the psock and eat 8B
for the af_unix and vsock users. Notice dgram sockets are OK because they handle
locking already.
Fixes: 94531cfcbe79 ("af_unix: Add unix_stream_proto for sockmap")
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231129012557.95371-2-john.fastabend@gmail.com
W=1 builds now warn if module is built without a MODULE_DESCRIPTION().
Add descriptions to all the sock diag modules in one fell swoop.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Since commit 97154bcf4d1b ("af_unix: Kconfig: make CONFIG_UNIX bool"),
af_unix.c is no longer built as module.
Let's remove unnecessary #if condition, exitcall, and module macros.
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231026212305.45545-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
These hooks allows intercepting connect(), getsockname(),
getpeername(), sendmsg() and recvmsg() for unix sockets. The unix
socket hooks get write access to the address length because the
address length is not fixed when dealing with unix sockets and
needs to be modified when a unix socket address is modified by
the hook. Because abstract socket unix addresses start with a
NUL byte, we cannot recalculate the socket address in kernelspace
after running the hook by calculating the length of the unix socket
path using strlen().
These hooks can be used when users want to multiplex syscall to a
single unix socket to multiple different processes behind the scenes
by redirecting the connect() and other syscalls to process specific
sockets.
We do not implement support for intercepting bind() because when
using bind() with unix sockets with a pathname address, this creates
an inode in the filesystem which must be cleaned up. If we rewrite
the address, the user might try to clean up the wrong file, leaking
the socket in the filesystem where it is never cleaned up. Until we
figure out a solution for this (and a use case for intercepting bind()),
we opt to not allow rewriting the sockaddr in bind() calls.
We also implement recvmsg() support for connected streams so that
after a connect() that is modified by a sockaddr hook, any corresponding
recmvsg() on the connected socket can also be modified to make the
connected program think it is connected to the "intended" remote.
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Daan De Meyer <daan.j.demeyer@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231011185113.140426-5-daan.j.demeyer@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Current release - regressions:
- eth: stmmac: fix failure to probe without MAC interface specified
Current release - new code bugs:
- docs: netlink: fix missing classic_netlink doc reference
Previous releases - regressions:
- deal with integer overflows in kmalloc_reserve()
- use sk_forward_alloc_get() in sk_get_meminfo()
- bpf_sk_storage: fix the missing uncharge in sk_omem_alloc
- fib: avoid warn splat in flow dissector after packet mangling
- skb_segment: call zero copy functions before using skbuff frags
- eth: sfc: check for zero length in EF10 RX prefix
Previous releases - always broken:
- af_unix: fix msg_controllen test in scm_pidfd_recv() for
MSG_CMSG_COMPAT
- xsk: fix xsk_build_skb() dereferencing possible ERR_PTR()
- netfilter:
- nft_exthdr: fix non-linear header modification
- xt_u32, xt_sctp: validate user space input
- nftables: exthdr: fix 4-byte stack OOB write
- nfnetlink_osf: avoid OOB read
- one more fix for the garbage collection work from last release
- igmp: limit igmpv3_newpack() packet size to IP_MAX_MTU
- bpf, sockmap: fix preempt_rt splat when using raw_spin_lock_t
- handshake: fix null-deref in handshake_nl_done_doit()
- ip: ignore dst hint for multipath routes to ensure packets
are hashed across the nexthops
- phy: micrel:
- correct bit assignments for cable test errata
- disable EEE according to the KSZ9477 errata
Misc:
- docs/bpf: document compile-once-run-everywhere (CO-RE) relocations
- Revert "net: macsec: preserve ingress frame ordering", it appears
to have been developed against an older kernel, problem doesn't
exist upstream
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Merge tag 'net-6.6-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net
Pull networking updates from Jakub Kicinski:
"Including fixes from netfilter and bpf.
Current release - regressions:
- eth: stmmac: fix failure to probe without MAC interface specified
Current release - new code bugs:
- docs: netlink: fix missing classic_netlink doc reference
Previous releases - regressions:
- deal with integer overflows in kmalloc_reserve()
- use sk_forward_alloc_get() in sk_get_meminfo()
- bpf_sk_storage: fix the missing uncharge in sk_omem_alloc
- fib: avoid warn splat in flow dissector after packet mangling
- skb_segment: call zero copy functions before using skbuff frags
- eth: sfc: check for zero length in EF10 RX prefix
Previous releases - always broken:
- af_unix: fix msg_controllen test in scm_pidfd_recv() for
MSG_CMSG_COMPAT
- xsk: fix xsk_build_skb() dereferencing possible ERR_PTR()
- netfilter:
- nft_exthdr: fix non-linear header modification
- xt_u32, xt_sctp: validate user space input
- nftables: exthdr: fix 4-byte stack OOB write
- nfnetlink_osf: avoid OOB read
- one more fix for the garbage collection work from last release
- igmp: limit igmpv3_newpack() packet size to IP_MAX_MTU
- bpf, sockmap: fix preempt_rt splat when using raw_spin_lock_t
- handshake: fix null-deref in handshake_nl_done_doit()
- ip: ignore dst hint for multipath routes to ensure packets are
hashed across the nexthops
- phy: micrel:
- correct bit assignments for cable test errata
- disable EEE according to the KSZ9477 errata
Misc:
- docs/bpf: document compile-once-run-everywhere (CO-RE) relocations
- Revert "net: macsec: preserve ingress frame ordering", it appears
to have been developed against an older kernel, problem doesn't
exist upstream"
* tag 'net-6.6-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net: (95 commits)
net: enetc: distinguish error from valid pointers in enetc_fixup_clear_rss_rfs()
Revert "net: team: do not use dynamic lockdep key"
net: hns3: remove GSO partial feature bit
net: hns3: fix the port information display when sfp is absent
net: hns3: fix invalid mutex between tc qdisc and dcb ets command issue
net: hns3: fix debugfs concurrency issue between kfree buffer and read
net: hns3: fix byte order conversion issue in hclge_dbg_fd_tcam_read()
net: hns3: Support query tx timeout threshold by debugfs
net: hns3: fix tx timeout issue
net: phy: Provide Module 4 KSZ9477 errata (DS80000754C)
netfilter: nf_tables: Unbreak audit log reset
netfilter: ipset: add the missing IP_SET_HASH_WITH_NET0 macro for ip_set_hash_netportnet.c
netfilter: nft_set_rbtree: skip sync GC for new elements in this transaction
netfilter: nf_tables: uapi: Describe NFTA_RULE_CHAIN_ID
netfilter: nfnetlink_osf: avoid OOB read
netfilter: nftables: exthdr: fix 4-byte stack OOB write
selftests/bpf: Check bpf_sk_storage has uncharged sk_omem_alloc
bpf: bpf_sk_storage: Fix the missing uncharge in sk_omem_alloc
bpf: bpf_sk_storage: Fix invalid wait context lockdep report
s390/bpf: Pass through tail call counter in trampolines
...
Long ago we set out to remove the kitchen sink on kernel/sysctl.c arrays and
placings sysctls to their own sybsystem or file to help avoid merge conflicts.
Matthew Wilcox pointed out though that if we're going to do that we might as
well also *save* space while at it and try to remove the extra last sysctl
entry added at the end of each array, a sentintel, instead of bloating the
kernel by adding a new sentinel with each array moved.
Doing that was not so trivial, and has required slowing down the moves of
kernel/sysctl.c arrays and measuring the impact on size by each new move.
The complex part of the effort to help reduce the size of each sysctl is being
done by the patient work of el señor Don Joel Granados. A lot of this is truly
painful code refactoring and testing and then trying to measure the savings of
each move and removing the sentinels. Although Joel already has code which does
most of this work, experience with sysctl moves in the past shows is we need to
be careful due to the slew of odd build failures that are possible due to the
amount of random Kconfig options sysctls use.
To that end Joel's work is split by first addressing the major housekeeping
needed to remove the sentinels, which is part of this merge request. The rest
of the work to actually remove the sentinels will be done later in future
kernel releases.
At first I was only going to send his first 7 patches of his patch series,
posted 1 month ago, but in retrospect due to the testing the changes have
received in linux-next and the minor changes they make this goes with the
entire set of patches Joel had planned: just sysctl house keeping. There are
networking changes but these are part of the house keeping too.
The preliminary math is showing this will all help reduce the overall build
time size of the kernel and run time memory consumed by the kernel by about
~64 bytes per array where we are able to remove each sentinel in the future.
That also means there is no more bloating the kernel with the extra ~64 bytes
per array moved as no new sentinels are created.
Most of this has been in linux-next for about a month, the last 7 patches took
a minor refresh 2 week ago based on feedback.
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Merge tag 'sysctl-6.6-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mcgrof/linux
Pull sysctl updates from Luis Chamberlain:
"Long ago we set out to remove the kitchen sink on kernel/sysctl.c
arrays and placings sysctls to their own sybsystem or file to help
avoid merge conflicts. Matthew Wilcox pointed out though that if we're
going to do that we might as well also *save* space while at it and
try to remove the extra last sysctl entry added at the end of each
array, a sentintel, instead of bloating the kernel by adding a new
sentinel with each array moved.
Doing that was not so trivial, and has required slowing down the moves
of kernel/sysctl.c arrays and measuring the impact on size by each new
move.
The complex part of the effort to help reduce the size of each sysctl
is being done by the patient work of el señor Don Joel Granados. A lot
of this is truly painful code refactoring and testing and then trying
to measure the savings of each move and removing the sentinels.
Although Joel already has code which does most of this work,
experience with sysctl moves in the past shows is we need to be
careful due to the slew of odd build failures that are possible due to
the amount of random Kconfig options sysctls use.
To that end Joel's work is split by first addressing the major
housekeeping needed to remove the sentinels, which is part of this
merge request. The rest of the work to actually remove the sentinels
will be done later in future kernel releases.
The preliminary math is showing this will all help reduce the overall
build time size of the kernel and run time memory consumed by the
kernel by about ~64 bytes per array where we are able to remove each
sentinel in the future. That also means there is no more bloating the
kernel with the extra ~64 bytes per array moved as no new sentinels
are created"
* tag 'sysctl-6.6-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mcgrof/linux:
sysctl: Use ctl_table_size as stopping criteria for list macro
sysctl: SIZE_MAX->ARRAY_SIZE in register_net_sysctl
vrf: Update to register_net_sysctl_sz
networking: Update to register_net_sysctl_sz
netfilter: Update to register_net_sysctl_sz
ax.25: Update to register_net_sysctl_sz
sysctl: Add size to register_net_sysctl function
sysctl: Add size arg to __register_sysctl_init
sysctl: Add size to register_sysctl
sysctl: Add a size arg to __register_sysctl_table
sysctl: Add size argument to init_header
sysctl: Add ctl_table_size to ctl_table_header
sysctl: Use ctl_table_header in list_for_each_table_entry
sysctl: Prefer ctl_table_header in proc_sysctl
Move from register_net_sysctl to register_net_sysctl_sz for all the
networking related files. Do this while making sure to mirror the NULL
assignments with a table_size of zero for the unprivileged users.
We need to move to the new function in preparation for when we change
SIZE_MAX to ARRAY_SIZE() in the register_net_sysctl macro. Failing to do
so would erroneously allow ARRAY_SIZE() to be called on a pointer. We
hold off the SIZE_MAX to ARRAY_SIZE change until we have migrated all
the relevant net sysctl registering functions to register_net_sysctl_sz
in subsequent commits.
An additional size function was added to the following files in order to
calculate the size of an array that is defined in another file:
include/net/ipv6.h
net/ipv6/icmp.c
net/ipv6/route.c
net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c
Signed-off-by: Joel Granados <j.granados@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
IPV6_ADDRFORM socket option is evil, because it can change sock->ops
while other threads might read it. Same issue for sk->sk_family
being set to AF_INET.
Adding READ_ONCE() over sock->ops reads is needed for sockets
that might be impacted by IPV6_ADDRFORM.
Note that mptcp_is_tcpsk() can also overwrite sock->ops.
Adding annotations for all sk->sk_family reads will require
more patches :/
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in ____sys_sendmsg / do_ipv6_setsockopt
write to 0xffff888109f24ca0 of 8 bytes by task 4470 on cpu 0:
do_ipv6_setsockopt+0x2c5e/0x2ce0 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:491
ipv6_setsockopt+0x57/0x130 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:1012
udpv6_setsockopt+0x95/0xa0 net/ipv6/udp.c:1690
sock_common_setsockopt+0x61/0x70 net/core/sock.c:3663
__sys_setsockopt+0x1c3/0x230 net/socket.c:2273
__do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2284 [inline]
__se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2281 [inline]
__x64_sys_setsockopt+0x66/0x80 net/socket.c:2281
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
read to 0xffff888109f24ca0 of 8 bytes by task 4469 on cpu 1:
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:724 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:747 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x349/0x4c0 net/socket.c:2503
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2557 [inline]
__sys_sendmmsg+0x263/0x500 net/socket.c:2643
__do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2672 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2669 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x57/0x60 net/socket.c:2669
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
value changed: 0xffffffff850e32b8 -> 0xffffffff850da890
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 4469 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 6.4.0-rc5-syzkaller-00313-g4c605260bc60 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/25/2023
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230808135809.2300241-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
sk_getsockopt() runs locklessly, thus we need to annotate the read
of sk->sk_peek_off.
While we are at it, add corresponding annotations to sk_set_peek_off()
and unix_set_peek_off().
Fixes: b9bb53f3836f ("sock: convert sk_peek_offset functions to WRITE_ONCE")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
kernel test robot reported slab-out-of-bounds access in strlen(). [0]
Commit 06d4c8a80836 ("af_unix: Fix fortify_panic() in unix_bind_bsd().")
removed unix_mkname_bsd() call in unix_bind_bsd().
If sunaddr->sun_path is not terminated by user and we don't enable
CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO=y, strlen() will do the out-of-bounds access
during file creation.
Let's go back to strlen()-with-sockaddr_storage way and pack all 108
trickiness into unix_mkname_bsd() with bold comments.
[0]:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in strlen (lib/string.c:?)
Read of size 1 at addr ffff000015492777 by task fortify_strlen_/168
CPU: 0 PID: 168 Comm: fortify_strlen_ Not tainted 6.5.0-rc1-00333-g3329b603ebba #16
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Call trace:
dump_backtrace (arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:235)
show_stack (arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:242)
dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:107)
print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:365 mm/kasan/report.c:475)
kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:590)
__asan_report_load1_noabort (mm/kasan/report_generic.c:378)
strlen (lib/string.c:?)
getname_kernel (./include/linux/fortify-string.h:? fs/namei.c:226)
kern_path_create (fs/namei.c:3926)
unix_bind (net/unix/af_unix.c:1221 net/unix/af_unix.c:1324)
__sys_bind (net/socket.c:1792)
__arm64_sys_bind (net/socket.c:1801)
invoke_syscall (arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:? arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52)
el0_svc_common (./include/linux/thread_info.h:127 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:147)
do_el0_svc (arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:189)
el0_svc (./arch/arm64/include/asm/daifflags.h:28 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:133 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:144 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:648)
el0t_64_sync_handler (arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:?)
el0t_64_sync (arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:591)
Allocated by task 168:
kasan_set_track (mm/kasan/common.c:45 mm/kasan/common.c:52)
kasan_save_alloc_info (mm/kasan/generic.c:512)
__kasan_kmalloc (mm/kasan/common.c:383)
__kmalloc (mm/slab_common.c:? mm/slab_common.c:998)
unix_bind (net/unix/af_unix.c:257 net/unix/af_unix.c:1213 net/unix/af_unix.c:1324)
__sys_bind (net/socket.c:1792)
__arm64_sys_bind (net/socket.c:1801)
invoke_syscall (arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:? arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52)
el0_svc_common (./include/linux/thread_info.h:127 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:147)
do_el0_svc (arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:189)
el0_svc (./arch/arm64/include/asm/daifflags.h:28 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:133 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:144 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:648)
el0t_64_sync_handler (arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:?)
el0t_64_sync (arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:591)
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff000015492700
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128 of size 128
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
allocated 119-byte region [ffff000015492700, ffff000015492777)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:00000000aeab52ba refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x55492
anon flags: 0x3fffc0000000200(slab|node=0|zone=0|lastcpupid=0xffff)
page_type: 0xffffffff()
raw: 03fffc0000000200 ffff0000084018c0 fffffc00003d0e00 0000000000000005
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff000015492600: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff000015492680: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff000015492700: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 07 fc
^
ffff000015492780: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff000015492800: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
Fixes: 06d4c8a80836 ("af_unix: Fix fortify_panic() in unix_bind_bsd().")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/202307262110.659e5e8-oliver.sang@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230726190828.47874-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
syzkaller found a bug in unix_bind_bsd() [0]. We can reproduce it
by bind()ing a socket on a path with length 108.
108 is the size of sun_addr of struct sockaddr_un and is the maximum
valid length for the pathname socket. When calling bind(), we use
struct sockaddr_storage as the actual buffer size, so terminating
sun_addr[108] with null is legitimate as done in unix_mkname_bsd().
However, strlen(sunaddr) for such a case causes fortify_panic() if
CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y. __fortify_strlen() has no idea about the
actual buffer size and see the string as unterminated.
Let's use strnlen() to allow sun_addr to be unterminated at 107.
[0]:
detected buffer overflow in __fortify_strlen
kernel BUG at lib/string_helpers.c:1031!
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 255 Comm: syz-executor296 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc1-00330-g60cc1f7d0605 #4
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : fortify_panic+0x1c/0x20 lib/string_helpers.c:1030
lr : fortify_panic+0x1c/0x20 lib/string_helpers.c:1030
sp : ffff800089817af0
x29: ffff800089817af0 x28: ffff800089817b40 x27: 1ffff00011302f68
x26: 000000000000006e x25: 0000000000000012 x24: ffff800087e60140
x23: dfff800000000000 x22: ffff800089817c20 x21: ffff800089817c8e
x20: 000000000000006c x19: ffff00000c323900 x18: ffff800086ab1630
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000001
x14: 1ffff00011302eb8 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 64a26b65474d2a00
x8 : 64a26b65474d2a00 x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : 0000000000000001
x5 : ffff800089817438 x4 : ffff800086ac99e0 x3 : ffff800080f19e8c
x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : 0000000100000000 x0 : 000000000000002c
Call trace:
fortify_panic+0x1c/0x20 lib/string_helpers.c:1030
_Z16__fortify_strlenPKcU25pass_dynamic_object_size1 include/linux/fortify-string.h:217 [inline]
unix_bind_bsd net/unix/af_unix.c:1212 [inline]
unix_bind+0xba8/0xc58 net/unix/af_unix.c:1326
__sys_bind+0x1ac/0x248 net/socket.c:1792
__do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1803 [inline]
__se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1801 [inline]
__arm64_sys_bind+0x7c/0x94 net/socket.c:1801
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:38 [inline]
invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2c0 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52
el0_svc_common+0x134/0x240 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:139
do_el0_svc+0x64/0x198 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:188
el0_svc+0x2c/0x7c arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:647
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:665
el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:591
Code: aa0003e1 d0000e80 91030000 97ffc91a (d4210000)
Fixes: df8fc4e934c1 ("kbuild: Enable -fstrict-flex-arrays=3")
Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230724213425.22920-2-kuniyu@amazon.com
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Recently, our friends from bluetooth subsystem reported [1] that after
commit 5e2ff6704a27 ("scm: add SO_PASSPIDFD and SCM_PIDFD") scm_recv()
helper become unusable in kernel modules (because it uses unexported
pidfd_prepare() API).
We were aware of this issue and workarounded it in a hard way
by commit 97154bcf4d1b ("af_unix: Kconfig: make CONFIG_UNIX bool").
But recently a new functionality was added in the scope of commit
817efd3cad74 ("Bluetooth: hci_sock: Forward credentials to monitor")
and after that bluetooth can't be compiled as a kernel module.
After some discussion in [1] we decided to split scm_recv() into
two helpers, one won't support SCM_PIDFD (used for unix sockets),
and another one will be completely the same as it was before commit
5e2ff6704a27 ("scm: add SO_PASSPIDFD and SCM_PIDFD").
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAJqdLrpFcga4n7wxBhsFqPQiN8PKFVr6U10fKcJ9W7AcZn+o6Q@mail.gmail.com/ [1]
Fixes: 5e2ff6704a27 ("scm: add SO_PASSPIDFD and SCM_PIDFD")
Signed-off-by: Alexander Mikhalitsyn <aleksandr.mikhalitsyn@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230627174314.67688-3-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
This reverts commit 3f5f118bb657f94641ea383c7c1b8c09a5d46ea2.
Konrad reported that desktop environment below cannot be reached after
commit 3f5f118bb657 ("af_unix: Call scm_recv() only after scm_set_cred().")
- postmarketOS (Alpine Linux w/ musl 1.2.4)
- busybox 1.36.1
- GNOME 44.1
- networkmanager 1.42.6
- openrc 0.47
Regarding to the warning of SO_PASSPIDFD, I'll post another patch to
suppress it by skipping SCM_PIDFD if scm->pid == NULL in scm_pidfd_recv().
Reported-by: Konrad Dybcio <konradybcio@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/8c7f9abd-4f84-7296-2788-1e130d6304a0@kernel.org/
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Tested-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Tested-by: Gal Pressman <gal@nvidia.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230626205837.82086-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Let's make CONFIG_UNIX a bool instead of a tristate.
We've decided to do that during discussion about SCM_PIDFD patchset [1].
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230524081933.44dc8bea@kernel.org/
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Cc: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Cc: Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@0pointer.de>
Cc: Luca Boccassi <bluca@debian.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Mikhalitsyn <aleksandr.mikhalitsyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Add SO_PEERPIDFD which allows to get pidfd of peer socket holder pidfd.
This thing is direct analog of SO_PEERCRED which allows to get plain PID.
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Cc: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Cc: Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@0pointer.de>
Cc: Luca Boccassi <bluca@debian.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Tested-by: Luca Boccassi <bluca@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Mikhalitsyn <aleksandr.mikhalitsyn@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Implement SCM_PIDFD, a new type of CMSG type analogical to SCM_CREDENTIALS,
but it contains pidfd instead of plain pid, which allows programmers not
to care about PID reuse problem.
We mask SO_PASSPIDFD feature if CONFIG_UNIX is not builtin because
it depends on a pidfd_prepare() API which is not exported to the kernel
modules.
Idea comes from UAPI kernel group:
https://uapi-group.org/kernel-features/
Big thanks to Christian Brauner and Lennart Poettering for productive
discussions about this.
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Cc: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Cc: Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@0pointer.de>
Cc: Luca Boccassi <bluca@debian.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Tested-by: Luca Boccassi <bluca@debian.org>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Mikhalitsyn <aleksandr.mikhalitsyn@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Convert unix_stream_sendpage() to use sendmsg() with MSG_SPLICE_PAGES
rather than directly splicing in the pages itself.
This allows ->sendpage() to be replaced by something that can handle
multiple multipage folios in a single transaction.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Make AF_UNIX sendmsg() support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES, splicing in pages from the
source iterator if possible and copying the data in otherwise.
This allows ->sendpage() to be replaced by something that can handle
multiple multipage folios in a single transaction.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Pass the maximum number of fragments into skb_append_pagefrags() rather
than using MAX_SKB_FRAGS so that it can be used from code that wants to
specify sysctl_max_skb_frags.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
The read_skb hook calls consume_skb() now, but this means that if the
recv_actor program wants to use the skb it needs to inc the ref cnt
so that the consume_skb() doesn't kfree the sk_buff.
This is problematic because in some error cases under memory pressure
we may need to linearize the sk_buff from sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue().
Then we get this,
skb_linearize()
__pskb_pull_tail()
pskb_expand_head()
BUG_ON(skb_shared(skb))
Because we incremented users refcnt from sk_psock_verdict_recv() we
hit the bug on with refcnt > 1 and trip it.
To fix lets simply pass ownership of the sk_buff through the skb_read
call. Then we can drop the consume from read_skb handlers and assume
the verdict recv does any required kfree.
Bug found while testing in our CI which runs in VMs that hit memory
constraints rather regularly. William tested TCP read_skb handlers.
[ 106.536188] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 106.536197] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:1693!
[ 106.536479] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
[ 106.536726] CPU: 3 PID: 1495 Comm: curl Not tainted 5.19.0-rc5 #1
[ 106.537023] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS ArchLinux 1.16.0-1 04/01/2014
[ 106.537467] RIP: 0010:pskb_expand_head+0x269/0x330
[ 106.538585] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000138b68 EFLAGS: 00010202
[ 106.538839] RAX: 000000000000003f RBX: ffff8881048940e8 RCX: 0000000000000a20
[ 106.539186] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8881048940e8
[ 106.539529] RBP: ffffc90000138be8 R08: 00000000e161fd1a R09: 0000000000000000
[ 106.539877] R10: 0000000000000018 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8881048940e8
[ 106.540222] R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8881048940e8
[ 106.540568] FS: 00007f277dde9f00(0000) GS:ffff88813bd80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 106.540954] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 106.541227] CR2: 00007f277eeede64 CR3: 000000000ad3e000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 106.541569] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 106.541915] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 106.542255] Call Trace:
[ 106.542383] <IRQ>
[ 106.542487] __pskb_pull_tail+0x4b/0x3e0
[ 106.542681] skb_ensure_writable+0x85/0xa0
[ 106.542882] sk_skb_pull_data+0x18/0x20
[ 106.543084] bpf_prog_b517a65a242018b0_bpf_skskb_http_verdict+0x3a9/0x4aa9
[ 106.543536] ? migrate_disable+0x66/0x80
[ 106.543871] sk_psock_verdict_recv+0xe2/0x310
[ 106.544258] ? sk_psock_write_space+0x1f0/0x1f0
[ 106.544561] tcp_read_skb+0x7b/0x120
[ 106.544740] tcp_data_queue+0x904/0xee0
[ 106.544931] tcp_rcv_established+0x212/0x7c0
[ 106.545142] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x174/0x2a0
[ 106.545326] tcp_v4_rcv+0xe70/0xf60
[ 106.545500] ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x48/0x290
[ 106.545744] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xa7/0x150
Fixes: 04919bed948dc ("tcp: Introduce tcp_read_skb()")
Reported-by: William Findlay <will@isovalent.com>
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Tested-by: William Findlay <will@isovalent.com>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230523025618.113937-2-john.fastabend@gmail.com
unix_poll() and unix_dgram_poll() read sk->sk_err
without any lock held.
Add relevant READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() annotations.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Jakub Kicinski
Kuniyuki Iwashima
Eric Dumazet
Linus Torvalds
John Fastabend
Jens Axboe
Daan De Meyer
Joel Granados
Alexander Mikhalitsyn
David Howells