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[ Upstream commit f638a84afef3dfe10554c51820c16e39a278c915 ]
When len >= INT_MAX - transhdrlen, ulen = len + transhdrlen will be
overflow. To fix, we can follow what udpv6 does and subtract the
transhdrlen from the max.
Signed-off-by: Wang Yufen <wangyufen@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220607120028.845916-2-wangyufen@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 8a4d480702b71184fabcf379b80bf7539716752e ]
Similar to the handling of play_deferred in commit 19cfe912c37b
("Bluetooth: btusb: Fix memory leak in play_deferred"), we thought
a patch might be needed here as well.
Currently usb_submit_urb is called directly to submit deferred tx
urbs after unanchor them.
So the usb_giveback_urb_bh would failed to unref it in usb_unanchor_urb
and cause memory leak.
Put those urbs in tx_anchor to avoid the leak, and also fix the error
handling.
Signed-off-by: Xiaohui Zhang <xiaohuizhang@ruc.edu.cn>
Acked-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220607083230.6182-1-xiaohuizhang@ruc.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit a58a7f97ba11391d2d0d408e0b24f38d86ae748e ]
The reference must be released when device_register(&vm_cmdline_parent)
failed. Add the corresponding 'put_device()' in the error handling path.
Signed-off-by: chengkaitao <pilgrimtao@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20220602005542.16489-1-chengkaitao@didiglobal.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 527f4643e03c298c1e3321cfa27866b1374a55e1 ]
Added the support of new Huawei codec HW8326. The HW8326 is developed
by Huawei with Realtek's IP Core, and it's compatible with ALC256.
Signed-off-by: huangwenhui <huangwenhuia@uniontech.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220608082357.26898-1-huangwenhuia@uniontech.com
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit d64c491911322af1dcada98e5b9ee0d87e8c8fee ]
Fix missing resource cleanup (when '(--i) == 0') for error case in
ipr_alloc_mem() and skip incorrect resource cleanup (when '(--i) == 0') for
error case in ipr_request_other_msi_irqs() because variable i started from
1.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220529153456.4183738-4-cgxu519@mykernel.net
Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Brian King <brking@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Chengguang Xu <cgxu519@mykernel.net>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 120f1d95efb1cdb6fe023c84e38ba06d8f78cd03 ]
I'm facing this warning when building for the parisc64 architecture:
drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_base.c: In function ‘_base_make_ioc_operational’:
drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_base.c:5396:40: warning: array subscript ‘Mpi2SasIOUnitPage1_t {aka struct _MPI2_CONFIG_PAGE_SASIOUNIT_1}[0]’ is partly outside array bounds of ‘unsigned char[20]’ [-Warray-bounds]
5396 | (le16_to_cpu(sas_iounit_pg1->SASWideMaxQueueDepth)) ?
drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_base.c:5382:26: note: referencing an object of size 20 allocated by ‘kzalloc’
5382 | sas_iounit_pg1 = kzalloc(sz, GFP_KERNEL);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The problem is, that only 20 bytes are allocated with kmalloc(), which is
sufficient to hold the bytes which are needed. Nevertheless, gcc complains
because the whole Mpi2SasIOUnitPage1_t struct is 32 bytes in size and thus
doesn't fit into those 20 bytes.
This patch simply allocates all 32 bytes (instead of 20) and thus avoids
the warning. There is no functional change introduced by this patch.
While touching the code I cleaned up to calculation of max_wideport_qd,
max_narrowport_qd and max_sata_qd to make it easier readable.
Test successfully tested on a HP C8000 PA-RISC workstation with 64-bit
kernel.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YpZ197iZdDZSCzrT@p100
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 2e7e9c0c1ec05f18d320ecc8a31eec59d2af1af9 ]
NVMe Asynchronous Event Request commands have no command timeout value per
specifications.
Set WQE option to allow a reduced FLUSH polling rate for I/O error
detection specifically for nvme_admin_async_event commands.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220603174329.63777-9-jsmart2021@gmail.com
Co-developed-by: Justin Tee <justin.tee@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Justin Tee <justin.tee@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: James Smart <jsmart2021@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 336d63615466b4c06b9401c987813fd19bdde39b ]
After issuing a LIP, a specific target vendor does not ACC the FLOGI that
lpfc sends. However, it does send its own FLOGI that lpfc ACCs. The
target then establishes the port IDs by sending a PLOGI. lpfc PLOGI_ACCs
and starts the RPI registration for DID 0x000001. The target then sends a
LOGO to the fabric DID. lpfc is currently treating the LOGO from the
fabric DID as a link down and cleans up all the ndlps. The ndlp for DID
0x000001 is put back into NPR and discovery stops, leaving the port in
stuck in bypassed mode.
Change lpfc behavior such that if a LOGO is received for the fabric DID in
PT2PT topology skip the lpfc_linkdown_port() routine and just move the
fabric DID back to NPR.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220603174329.63777-7-jsmart2021@gmail.com
Co-developed-by: Justin Tee <justin.tee@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Justin Tee <justin.tee@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: James Smart <jsmart2021@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit b1b3440f437b75fb2a9b0cfe58df461e40eca474 ]
A use-after-free crash can occur after an ELS LOGO is aborted.
Specifically, a nodelist structure is freed and then
ndlp->vport->cfg_log_verbose is dereferenced in lpfc_nlp_get() when the
discovery state machine is mistakenly called a second time with
NLP_EVT_DEVICE_RM argument.
Rework lpfc_cmpl_els_logo() to prevent the duplicate calls to release a
nodelist structure.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220603174329.63777-6-jsmart2021@gmail.com
Co-developed-by: Justin Tee <justin.tee@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Justin Tee <justin.tee@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: James Smart <jsmart2021@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit cf71d59c2eceadfcde0fb52e237990a0909880d7 ]
vcpuHint has been expanded to 16 bit on host to enable routing to more
CPUs. Guest side should align with the change. This change has been tested
with hosts with 8-bit and 16-bit vcpuHint, on both platforms host side can
get correct value.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/EF35F4D5-5DCC-42C5-BCC4-29DF1729B24C@vmware.com
Signed-off-by: Wentao Wang <wwentao@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 6ab2e51898cd4343bbdf8587af8ce8fbabddbcb5 ]
Commit 223f61b8c5ad ("Input: soc_button_array - add Lenovo Yoga Tablet2
1051L to the dmi_use_low_level_irq list") added the 1051L to this list
already, but the same problem applies to the 1051F. As there are no
further 1051 variants (just the F/L), we can just DMI match 1051.
Tested on a Lenovo Yoga Tablet2 1051F: Without this patch the
home-button stops working after a wakeup from suspend.
Signed-off-by: Marius Hoch <mail@mariushoch.de>
Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220603120246.3065-1-mail@mariushoch.de
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 2abdf9f80019e8244d3806ed0e1c9f725e50b452 ]
Currently wm_adsp_fw_put() returns 0 rather than 1 when updating the value
of the control, meaning that no event is generated to userspace. Fix this
by setting the default return value to 1, the code already exits early with
a return value of 0 if the value is unchanged.
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Fitzgerald <rf@opensource.cirrus.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220603115003.3865834-1-broonie@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 8259610c2ec01c5cbfb61882ae176aabacac9c19 ]
Currently the put() method for the deemphasis control returns 0 when a new
value is written to the control even if the value changed, meaning events
are not generated. Fix this, skip the work of updating the value when it is
unchanged and then return 1 after having done so.
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220603123937.4013603-1-broonie@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit d1f5272c0f7d2e53c6f2480f46725442776f5f78 ]
If the audio CODEC is playing sound when the system is suspended,
it can be left in a state which throws the following error:
wm8962 3-001a: ASoC: error at soc_component_read_no_lock on wm8962.3-001a: -16
Once this error has occurred, the audio will not work again until rebooted.
Fix this by configuring SET_SYSTEM_SLEEP_PM_OPS.
Signed-off-by: Adam Ford <aford173@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Charles Keepax <ckeepax@opensource.cirrus.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220526182129.538472-1-aford173@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 537e11cdc7a6b3ce94fa25ed41306193df9677b7 ]
As described in commit 02117b8ae9c0 ("f2fs: Set GF_NOFS in
read_cache_page_gfp while doing f2fs_quota_read"), we must not enter
filesystem reclaim while holding the dq_lock. Prevent this more generally
by using memalloc_nofs_save() while holding the lock.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220605143815.2330891-2-willy@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit bf476fe22aa1851bab4728e0c49025a6a0bea307 ]
In an unlikely (and probably wrong?) case that the 'ppi' parameter of
ata_host_alloc_pinfo() points to an array starting with a NULL pointer,
there's going to be a kernel oops as the 'pi' local variable won't get
reassigned from the initial value of NULL. Initialize 'pi' instead to
'&ata_dummy_port_info' to fix the possible kernel oops for good...
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with the SVACE static
analysis tool.
Signed-off-by: Sergey Shtylyov <s.shtylyov@omp.ru>
Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal <damien.lemoal@opensource.wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 4fac4fcf4500bce515b0f32195e7bb86aa0246c6 ]
The kfd_bo_list is used to restore process BOs after
evictions. As page tables could be destroyed during
evictions, we should also update pinned BOs' page tables
during restoring to make sure they are valid.
So for pinned BOs,
1, Validate them and update their page tables.
2, Don't add eviction fence for them.
v2:
- Don't handle pinned ones specially in BO validation.(Felix)
Signed-off-by: Lang Yu <Lang.Yu@amd.com>
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Felix Kuehling <Felix.Kuehling@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit fcb3b5a58926d16d9a338841b74af06d4c29be15 ]
The minimum value for the PGA Volume is given as 0x1A, however the
values from there to 0x19 are all the same volume and this is not
represented in the TLV structure. The number of volumes given is correct
so this leads to all the volumes being shifted. Move the minimum value
up to 0x19 to fix this.
Signed-off-by: Charles Keepax <ckeepax@opensource.cirrus.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220602162119.3393857-7-ckeepax@opensource.cirrus.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit a8928ada9b96944cadd8b65d191e33199fd38782 ]
A couple of the SX volume controls specify 0x84 as the lowest volume
value, however the correct value from the datasheet is 0x44. The
datasheet don't include spaces in the value it displays as binary so
this was almost certainly just a typo reading 1000100.
Signed-off-by: Charles Keepax <ckeepax@opensource.cirrus.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220602162119.3393857-6-ckeepax@opensource.cirrus.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 91e90c712fade0b69cdff7cc6512f6099bd18ae5 ]
The Bypass Volume is accidentally using a -6dB minimum TLV rather than
the correct -60dB minimum. Add a new TLV to correct this.
Signed-off-by: Charles Keepax <ckeepax@opensource.cirrus.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220602162119.3393857-5-ckeepax@opensource.cirrus.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 7fbd6dd68127927e844912a16741016d432a0737 ]
This driver specified the maximum value rather than the number of volume
levels on the SX controls, this is incorrect, so correct them.
Reported-by: David Rhodes <david.rhodes@cirrus.com>
Signed-off-by: Charles Keepax <ckeepax@opensource.cirrus.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220602162119.3393857-4-ckeepax@opensource.cirrus.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 5005a2345825eb8346546d99bfe669f73111b5c5 ]
The digital volume TLV specifies the step as 0.25dB but the actual step
of the control is 0.125dB. Update the TLV to correct this.
Signed-off-by: Charles Keepax <ckeepax@opensource.cirrus.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220602162119.3393857-3-ckeepax@opensource.cirrus.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 8bf5aabf524eec61013e506f764a0b2652dc5665 ]
The datasheet specifies the range of the mixer volumes as between
-51.5dB and 12dB with a 0.5dB step. Update the TLVs for this.
Signed-off-by: Charles Keepax <ckeepax@opensource.cirrus.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220602162119.3393857-2-ckeepax@opensource.cirrus.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit e19f8fa6ce1ca9b8b934ba7d2e8f34c95abc6e60 ]
Limit the error msg to avoid flooding the console. If you have a lot of
threads hitting this at once, they could have already gotten passed the
dma_debug_disabled() check before they get to the point of allocation
failure, resulting in quite a lot of this error message spamming the
log. Use pr_err_once() to limit that.
Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit fa582c6f3684ac0098a9d02ddf0ed52a02b37127 ]
MMU notifier callback may pass in mm with mm->mm_users==0 when process
is exiting, use mmget_no_zero to avoid accessing invalid mm in deferred
list work after mm is gone.
Signed-off-by: Philip Yang <Philip.Yang@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Felix Kuehling <Felix.Kuehling@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 4b81dd2cc6f4f4e8cea0ed6ee8d5193a8ae14a72 ]
[Why]
Dmub read AUX_DPHY_RX_CONTROL0 from Golden Setting Table,
but driver will set it to default value 0x103d1110, which
causes issue in some case
[How]
Remove the driver code, use the value set by dmub in
dp_aux_init
Reviewed-by: Nicholas Kazlauskas <Nicholas.Kazlauskas@amd.com>
Acked-by: Jasdeep Dhillon <jdhillon@amd.com>
Tested-by: Daniel Wheeler <daniel.wheeler@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sherry Wang <YAO.WANG1@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit aeca8a3295022bcec46697f16e098140423d8463 ]
We tried to enable the audio on an imx6sx EVB with the codec nau8822,
after setting the internal PLL fractional parameters, the audio still
couldn't work and the there was no sdma irq at all.
After checking with the section "8.1.1 Phase Locked Loop (PLL) Design
Example" of "NAU88C22 Datasheet Rev 0.6", we found we need to
turn off the PLL before programming fractional parameters and turn on
the PLL after programming.
After this change, the audio driver could record and play sound and
the sdma's irq is triggered when playing or recording.
Cc: David Lin <ctlin0@nuvoton.com>
Cc: John Hsu <kchsu0@nuvoton.com>
Cc: Seven Li <wtli@nuvoton.com>
Signed-off-by: Hui Wang <hui.wang@canonical.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220530040151.95221-2-hui.wang@canonical.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit a1b29ba2f2c171b9bea73be993bfdf0a62d37d15 ]
The following KASAN warning was reported in our kernel.
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in get_wchan+0x188/0x250
Read of size 4 at addr d216f958 by task ps/14437
CPU: 3 PID: 14437 Comm: ps Tainted: G O 5.10.0 #1
Call Trace:
[daa63858] [c0654348] dump_stack+0x9c/0xe4 (unreliable)
[daa63888] [c035cf0c] print_address_description.constprop.3+0x8c/0x570
[daa63908] [c035d6bc] kasan_report+0x1ac/0x218
[daa63948] [c00496e8] get_wchan+0x188/0x250
[daa63978] [c0461ec8] do_task_stat+0xce8/0xe60
[daa63b98] [c0455ac8] proc_single_show+0x98/0x170
[daa63bc8] [c03cab8c] seq_read_iter+0x1ec/0x900
[daa63c38] [c03cb47c] seq_read+0x1dc/0x290
[daa63d68] [c037fc94] vfs_read+0x164/0x510
[daa63ea8] [c03808e4] ksys_read+0x144/0x1d0
[daa63f38] [c005b1dc] ret_from_syscall+0x0/0x38
--- interrupt: c00 at 0x8fa8f4
LR = 0x8fa8cc
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:98ebcdd2 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:00000000 index:0x2 pfn:0x1216f
flags: 0x0()
raw: 00000000 00000000 01010122 00000000 00000002 00000000 ffffffff 00000000
raw: 00000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
d216f800: 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
d216f880: f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>d216f900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00
^
d216f980: f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
d216fa00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
After looking into this issue, I find the buggy address belongs
to the task stack region. It seems KASAN has something wrong.
I look into the code of __get_wchan in x86 architecture and
find the same issue has been resolved by the commit
f7d27c35ddff ("x86/mm, kasan: Silence KASAN warnings in get_wchan()").
The solution could be applied to powerpc architecture too.
As Andrey Ryabinin said, get_wchan() is racy by design, it may
access volatile stack of running task, thus it may access
redzone in a stack frame and cause KASAN to warn about this.
Use READ_ONCE_NOCHECK() to silence these warnings.
Reported-by: Wanming Hu <huwanming@huaweil.com>
Signed-off-by: He Ying <heying24@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Chen Jingwen <chenjingwen6@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220121014418.155675-1-heying24@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 5446ff1a67160ad92d9aae9530846aa54750be36 upstream.
There is a header for a DB9 serial port, but any attempts to use
hardware handshaking fail. Enable RTS and CTS pin muxing and enable
handshaking in the uart node.
Signed-off-by: Adam Ford <aford173@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4ce01ce36d77137cf60776b320babed89de6bd4c upstream.
There is a header for a DB9 serial port, but any attempts to use
hardware handshaking fail. Enable RTS and CTS pin muxing and enable
handshaking in the uart node.
Signed-off-by: Adam Ford <aford173@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 555dbf1a9aac6d3150c8b52fa35f768a692f4eeb upstream.
The nfsd_file nf_rwsem is currently being used to separate file write
and commit instances to ensure that we catch errors and apply them to
the correct write/commit.
We can improve scalability at the expense of a little accuracy (some
extra false positives) by replacing the nf_rwsem with more careful
use of the errseq_t mechanism to track errors across the different
operations.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
[ cel: rebased on zero-verifier fix ]
Signed-off-by: Leah Rumancik <leah.rumancik@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1039188806d4cfdf9c412bb4ddb51b4d8cd15478 upstream.
This reverts commit 4b7786d87fb3adf3e534c4f1e4f824d8700b786b.
Commit 4b7786d87fb3 ("drm/amd/display: Fix DCN3 B0 DP Alt Mapping")
is causing 2nd USB-C display not lighting up.
Phy id remapping is done differently than is assumed in this
patch.
Signed-off-by: Stylon Wang <stylon.wang@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Nicholas Kazlauskas <Nicholas.Kazlauskas@amd.com>
Tested-by: Daniel Wheeler <daniel.wheeler@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Cc: "Limonciello, Mario" <Mario.Limonciello@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1dc6ff02c8bf77d71b9b5d11cbc9df77cfb28626 upstream
Similar to MDS and TAA, print a warning if SMT is enabled for the MMIO
Stale Data vulnerability.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 027bbb884be006b05d9c577d6401686053aa789e upstream
The enumeration of MD_CLEAR in CPUID(EAX=7,ECX=0).EDX{bit 10} is not an
accurate indicator on all CPUs of whether the VERW instruction will
overwrite fill buffers. FB_CLEAR enumeration in
IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES{bit 17} covers the case of CPUs that are not
vulnerable to MDS/TAA, indicating that microcode does overwrite fill
buffers.
Guests running in VMM environments may not be aware of all the
capabilities/vulnerabilities of the host CPU. Specifically, a guest may
apply MDS/TAA mitigations when a virtual CPU is enumerated as vulnerable
to MDS/TAA even when the physical CPU is not. On CPUs that enumerate
FB_CLEAR_CTRL the VMM may set FB_CLEAR_DIS to skip overwriting of fill
buffers by the VERW instruction. This is done by setting FB_CLEAR_DIS
during VMENTER and resetting on VMEXIT. For guests that enumerate
FB_CLEAR (explicitly asking for fill buffer clear capability) the VMM
will not use FB_CLEAR_DIS.
Irrespective of guest state, host overwrites CPU buffers before VMENTER
to protect itself from an MMIO capable guest, as part of mitigation for
MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a992b8a4682f119ae035a01b40d4d0665c4a2875 upstream
The Shared Buffers Data Sampling (SBDS) variant of Processor MMIO Stale
Data vulnerabilities may expose RDRAND, RDSEED and SGX EGETKEY data.
Mitigation for this is added by a microcode update.
As some of the implications of SBDS are similar to SRBDS, SRBDS mitigation
infrastructure can be leveraged by SBDS. Set X86_BUG_SRBDS and use SRBDS
mitigation.
Mitigation is enabled by default; use srbds=off to opt-out. Mitigation
status can be checked from below file:
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 22cac9c677c95f3ac5c9244f8ca0afdc7c8afb19 upstream
Currently, Linux disables SRBDS mitigation on CPUs not affected by
MDS and have the TSX feature disabled. On such CPUs, secrets cannot
be extracted from CPU fill buffers using MDS or TAA. Without SRBDS
mitigation, Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities can be used to
extract RDRAND, RDSEED, and EGETKEY data.
Do not disable SRBDS mitigation by default when CPU is also affected by
Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8d50cdf8b8341770bc6367bce40c0c1bb0e1d5b3 upstream
Add the sysfs reporting file for Processor MMIO Stale Data
vulnerability. It exposes the vulnerability and mitigation state similar
to the existing files for the other hardware vulnerabilities.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 99a83db5a605137424e1efe29dc0573d6a5b6316 upstream
When the CPU is affected by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities,
Fill Buffer Stale Data Propagator (FBSDP) can propagate stale data out
of Fill buffer to uncore buffer when CPU goes idle. Stale data can then
be exploited with other variants using MMIO operations.
Mitigate it by clearing the Fill buffer before entering idle state.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Co-developed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e5925fb867290ee924fcf2fe3ca887b792714366 upstream
MDS, TAA and Processor MMIO Stale Data mitigations rely on clearing CPU
buffers. Moreover, status of these mitigations affects each other.
During boot, it is important to maintain the order in which these
mitigations are selected. This is especially true for
md_clear_update_mitigation() that needs to be called after MDS, TAA and
Processor MMIO Stale Data mitigation selection is done.
Introduce md_clear_select_mitigation(), and select all these mitigations
from there. This reflects relationships between these mitigations and
ensures proper ordering.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8cb861e9e3c9a55099ad3d08e1a3b653d29c33ca upstream
Processor MMIO Stale Data is a class of vulnerabilities that may
expose data after an MMIO operation. For details please refer to
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst.
These vulnerabilities are broadly categorized as:
Device Register Partial Write (DRPW):
Some endpoint MMIO registers incorrectly handle writes that are
smaller than the register size. Instead of aborting the write or only
copying the correct subset of bytes (for example, 2 bytes for a 2-byte
write), more bytes than specified by the write transaction may be
written to the register. On some processors, this may expose stale
data from the fill buffers of the core that created the write
transaction.
Shared Buffers Data Sampling (SBDS):
After propagators may have moved data around the uncore and copied
stale data into client core fill buffers, processors affected by MFBDS
can leak data from the fill buffer.
Shared Buffers Data Read (SBDR):
It is similar to Shared Buffer Data Sampling (SBDS) except that the
data is directly read into the architectural software-visible state.
An attacker can use these vulnerabilities to extract data from CPU fill
buffers using MDS and TAA methods. Mitigate it by clearing the CPU fill
buffers using the VERW instruction before returning to a user or a
guest.
On CPUs not affected by MDS and TAA, user application cannot sample data
from CPU fill buffers using MDS or TAA. A guest with MMIO access can
still use DRPW or SBDR to extract data architecturally. Mitigate it with
VERW instruction to clear fill buffers before VMENTER for MMIO capable
guests.
Add a kernel parameter mmio_stale_data={off|full|full,nosmt} to control
the mitigation.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f52ea6c26953fed339aa4eae717ee5c2133c7ff2 upstream
Processor MMIO Stale Data mitigation uses similar mitigation as MDS and
TAA. In preparation for adding its mitigation, add a common function to
update all mitigations that depend on MD_CLEAR.
[ bp: Add a newline in md_clear_update_mitigation() to separate
statements better. ]
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 51802186158c74a0304f51ab963e7c2b3a2b046f upstream
Processor MMIO Stale Data is a class of vulnerabilities that may
expose data after an MMIO operation. For more details please refer to
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst
Add the Processor MMIO Stale Data bug enumeration. A microcode update
adds new bits to the MSR IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, define them.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2112b8f4fb5cc35d1c384324763765953186b81f upstream.
When setting DMA_INTERRUPT capability, a callback function
dma->device_prep_dma_interrupt() is needed to support this capability.
Without setting the callback, dma_async_device_register() will fail dma
capability check.
Fixes: 4e5a4eb20393 ("dmaengine: idxd: set DMA_INTERRUPT cap bit")
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165101232637.3951447.15765792791591763119.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1c27f1fc1549f0e470429f5497a76ad28a37f21a upstream.
Commit 6c77676645ad ("iov_iter: Fix iter_xarray_get_pages{,_alloc}()")
introduced a problem on some 32-bit architectures (at least arm, xtensa,
csky,sparc and mips), that have a 'size_t' that is 'unsigned int'.
The reason is that we now do
min(nr * PAGE_SIZE - offset, maxsize);
where 'nr' and 'offset' and both 'unsigned int', and PAGE_SIZE is
'unsigned long'. As a result, the normal C type rules means that the
first argument to 'min()' ends up being 'unsigned long'.
In contrast, 'maxsize' is of type 'size_t'.
Now, 'size_t' and 'unsigned long' are always the same physical type in
the kernel, so you'd think this doesn't matter, and from an actual
arithmetic standpoint it doesn't.
But on 32-bit architectures 'size_t' is commonly 'unsigned int', even if
it could also be 'unsigned long'. In that situation, both are unsigned
32-bit types, but they are not the *same* type.
And as a result 'min()' will complain about the distinct types (ignore
the "pointer types" part of the error message: that's an artifact of the
way we have made 'min()' check types for being the same):
lib/iov_iter.c: In function 'iter_xarray_get_pages':
include/linux/minmax.h:20:35: error: comparison of distinct pointer types lacks a cast [-Werror]
20 | (!!(sizeof((typeof(x) *)1 == (typeof(y) *)1)))
| ^~
lib/iov_iter.c:1464:16: note: in expansion of macro 'min'
1464 | return min(nr * PAGE_SIZE - offset, maxsize);
| ^~~
This was not visible on 64-bit architectures (where we always define
'size_t' to be 'unsigned long').
Force these cases to use 'min_t(size_t, x, y)' to make the type explicit
and avoid the issue.
[ Nit-picky note: technically 'size_t' doesn't have to match 'unsigned
long' arithmetically. We've certainly historically seen environments
with 16-bit address spaces and 32-bit 'unsigned long'.
Similarly, even in 64-bit modern environments, 'size_t' could be its
own type distinct from 'unsigned long', even if it were arithmetically
identical.
So the above type commentary is only really descriptive of the kernel
environment, not some kind of universal truth for the kinds of wild
and crazy situations that are allowed by the C standard ]
Reported-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/YqRyL2sIqQNDfky2@debian/
Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
