715328 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Stafford Horne
29db277234 crypto: skcipher - Fix -Wstringop-truncation warnings
[ Upstream commit cefd769fd0192c84d638f66da202459ed8ad63ba ]

As of GCC 9.0.0 the build is reporting warnings like:

    crypto/ablkcipher.c: In function ‘crypto_ablkcipher_report’:
    crypto/ablkcipher.c:374:2: warning: ‘strncpy’ specified bound 64 equals destination size [-Wstringop-truncation]
      strncpy(rblkcipher.geniv, alg->cra_ablkcipher.geniv ?: "<default>",
      ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
       sizeof(rblkcipher.geniv));
       ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

This means the strnycpy might create a non null terminated string.  Fix this by
explicitly performing '\0' termination.

Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <nick.desaulniers@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-10-03 17:00:45 -07:00
Greg Kroah-Hartman
3b65f403d7 Linux 4.14.73 2018-09-29 03:06:07 -07:00
Geert Uytterhoeven
97513162cd spi: Fix double IDR allocation with DT aliases
commit 04b2d03a75652bda989de1595048f0501dc0c0a0 upstream.

If the SPI bus number is provided by a DT alias, idr_alloc() is called
twice, leading to:

    WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1 at drivers/spi/spi.c:2179 spi_register_controller+0x11c/0x5d8
    couldn't get idr

Fix this by moving the handling of fixed SPI bus numbers up, before the
DT handling code fills in ctlr->bus_num.

Fixes: 1a4327fbf4554d5b ("spi: fix IDR collision on systems with both fixed and dynamic SPI bus numbers")
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Tested-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com>
Cc: Kirill Kapranov <kirill.kapranov@compulab.co.il>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-29 03:06:07 -07:00
Thomas Gleixner
ed5e9462f6 tick/nohz: Prevent bogus softirq pending warning
Commit 0a0e0829f990 ("nohz: Fix missing tick reprogram when interrupting an
inline softirq") got backported to stable trees and now causes the NOHZ
softirq pending warning to trigger. It's not an upstream issue as the NOHZ
update logic has been changed there.

The problem is when a softirq disabled section gets interrupted and on
return from interrupt the tick/nohz state is evaluated, which then can
observe pending soft interrupts. These soft interrupts are legitimately
pending because they cannot be processed as long as soft interrupts are
disabled and the interrupted code will correctly process them when soft
interrupts are reenabled.

Add a check for softirqs disabled to the pending check to prevent the
warning.

Reported-by: Grygorii Strashko <grygorii.strashko@ti.com>
Reported-by: John Crispin <john@phrozen.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Grygorii Strashko <grygorii.strashko@ti.com>
Tested-by: John Crispin <john@phrozen.org>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Anna-Maria Gleixner <anna-maria@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 2d898915ccf4838c ("nohz: Fix missing tick reprogram when interrupting an inline softirq")
Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
2018-09-29 03:06:07 -07:00
Steve Wise
3a411a04be iw_cxgb4: only allow 1 flush on user qps
commit 308aa2b8f7b7db3332a7d41099fd37851fb793b2 upstream.

Once the qp has been flushed, it cannot be flushed again.  The user qp
flush logic wasn't enforcing it however.  The bug can cause
touch-after-free crashes like:

Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address 0x000001ec
Faulting instruction address: 0xc008000016069100
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
...
NIP [c008000016069100] flush_qp+0x80/0x480 [iw_cxgb4]
LR [c00800001606cd6c] c4iw_modify_qp+0x71c/0x11d0 [iw_cxgb4]
Call Trace:
[c00800001606cd6c] c4iw_modify_qp+0x71c/0x11d0 [iw_cxgb4]
[c00800001606e868] c4iw_ib_modify_qp+0x118/0x200 [iw_cxgb4]
[c0080000119eae80] ib_security_modify_qp+0xd0/0x3d0 [ib_core]
[c0080000119c4e24] ib_modify_qp+0xc4/0x2c0 [ib_core]
[c008000011df0284] iwcm_modify_qp_err+0x44/0x70 [iw_cm]
[c008000011df0fec] destroy_cm_id+0xcc/0x370 [iw_cm]
[c008000011ed4358] rdma_destroy_id+0x3c8/0x520 [rdma_cm]
[c0080000134b0540] ucma_close+0x90/0x1b0 [rdma_ucm]
[c000000000444da4] __fput+0xe4/0x2f0

So fix flush_qp() to only flush the wq once.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Steve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-29 03:06:07 -07:00
Nadav Amit
956fa50745 vmw_balloon: include asm/io.h
commit a3b92ee6fc171d7c9d9b6b829b7fef169210440c upstream.

Fix a build error due to missing virt_to_phys()

Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Fixes: f0a1bf29d821b ("vmw_balloon: fix inflation with batching")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Xavier Deguillard <xdeguillard@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-29 03:06:07 -07:00
Zachary Zhang
23ac2a32b2 PCI: aardvark: Size bridges before resources allocation
commit 91a2968e245d6ba616db37001fa1a043078b1a65 upstream.

The PCIE I/O and MEM resource allocation mechanism is that root bus
goes through the following steps:

1. Check PCI bridges' range and computes I/O and Mem base/limits.

2. Sort all subordinate devices I/O and MEM resource requirements and
   allocate the resources and writes/updates subordinate devices'
   requirements to PCI bridges I/O and Mem MEM/limits registers.

Currently, PCI Aardvark driver only handles the second step and lacks
the first step, so there is an I/O and MEM resource allocation failure
when using a PCI switch. This commit fixes that by sizing bridges
before doing the resource allocation.

Fixes: 8c39d710363c1 ("PCI: aardvark: Add Aardvark PCI host controller
driver")
Signed-off-by: Zachary Zhang <zhangzg@marvell.com>
[Thomas: edit commit log.]
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-29 03:06:07 -07:00
Steve Muckle
fe87d18b14 sched/fair: Fix vruntime_normalized() for remote non-migration wakeup
commit d0cdb3ce8834332d918fc9c8ff74f8a169ec9abe upstream.

When a task which previously ran on a given CPU is remotely queued to
wake up on that same CPU, there is a period where the task's state is
TASK_WAKING and its vruntime is not normalized. This is not accounted
for in vruntime_normalized() which will cause an error in the task's
vruntime if it is switched from the fair class during this time.

For example if it is boosted to RT priority via rt_mutex_setprio(),
rq->min_vruntime will not be subtracted from the task's vruntime but
it will be added again when the task returns to the fair class. The
task's vruntime will have been erroneously doubled and the effective
priority of the task will be reduced.

Note this will also lead to inflation of all vruntimes since the doubled
vruntime value will become the rq's min_vruntime when other tasks leave
the rq. This leads to repeated doubling of the vruntime and priority
penalty.

Fix this by recognizing a WAKING task's vruntime as normalized only if
sched_remote_wakeup is true. This indicates a migration, in which case
the vruntime would have been normalized in migrate_task_rq_fair().

Based on a similar patch from John Dias <joaodias@google.com>.

Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Muckle <smuckle@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Chris Redpath <Chris.Redpath@arm.com>
Cc: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Miguel de Dios <migueldedios@google.com>
Cc: Morten Rasmussen <Morten.Rasmussen@arm.com>
Cc: Patrick Bellasi <Patrick.Bellasi@arm.com>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Cc: Quentin Perret <quentin.perret@arm.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Cc: kernel-team@android.com
Fixes: b5179ac70de8 ("sched/fair: Prepare to fix fairness problems on migration")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180831224217.169476-1-smuckle@google.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-29 03:06:07 -07:00
Eric Biggers
0d09307bc2 ext4: show test_dummy_encryption mount option in /proc/mounts
commit 338affb548c243d2af25b1ca628e67819350de6b upstream.

When in effect, add "test_dummy_encryption" to _ext4_show_options() so
that it is shown in /proc/mounts and other relevant procfs files.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-29 03:06:06 -07:00
Li Dongyang
3dc006d212 ext4: don't mark mmp buffer head dirty
commit fe18d649891d813964d3aaeebad873f281627fbc upstream.

Marking mmp bh dirty before writing it will make writeback
pick up mmp block later and submit a write, we don't want the
duplicate write as kmmpd thread should have full control of
reading and writing the mmp block.
Another reason is we will also have random I/O error on
the writeback request when blk integrity is enabled, because
kmmpd could modify the content of the mmp block(e.g. setting
new seq and time) while the mmp block is under I/O requested
by writeback.

Signed-off-by: Li Dongyang <dongyangli@ddn.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-29 03:06:06 -07:00
Theodore Ts'o
ba48e66e3f ext4: fix online resizing for bigalloc file systems with a 1k block size
commit 5f8c10936fab2b69a487400f2872902e597dd320 upstream.

An online resize of a file system with the bigalloc feature enabled
and a 1k block size would be refused since ext4_resize_begin() did not
understand s_first_data_block is 0 for all bigalloc file systems, even
when the block size is 1k.

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-29 03:06:06 -07:00
Theodore Ts'o
6a4d7b584d ext4: fix online resize's handling of a too-small final block group
commit f0a459dec5495a3580f8d784555e6f8f3bf7f263 upstream.

Avoid growing the file system to an extent so that the last block
group is too small to hold all of the metadata that must be stored in
the block group.

This problem can be triggered with the following reproducer:

umount /mnt
mke2fs -F -m0 -b 4096 -t ext4 -O resize_inode,^has_journal \
	-E resize=1073741824 /tmp/foo.img 128M
mount /tmp/foo.img /mnt
truncate --size 1708M /tmp/foo.img
resize2fs /dev/loop0 295400
umount /mnt
e2fsck -fy /tmp/foo.img

Reported-by: Torsten Hilbrich <torsten.hilbrich@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-29 03:06:06 -07:00
Theodore Ts'o
22654a3b4a ext4: recalucate superblock checksum after updating free blocks/inodes
commit 4274f516d4bc50648a4d97e4f67ecbd7b65cde4a upstream.

When mounting the superblock, ext4_fill_super() calculates the free
blocks and free inodes and stores them in the superblock.  It's not
strictly necessary, since we don't use them any more, but it's nice to
keep them roughly aligned to reality.

Since it's not critical for file system correctness, the code doesn't
call ext4_commit_super().  The problem is that it's in
ext4_commit_super() that we recalculate the superblock checksum.  So
if we're not going to call ext4_commit_super(), we need to call
ext4_superblock_csum_set() to make sure the superblock checksum is
consistent.

Most of the time, this doesn't matter, since we end up calling
ext4_commit_super() very soon thereafter, and definitely by the time
the file system is unmounted.  However, it doesn't work in this
sequence:

mke2fs -Fq -t ext4 /dev/vdc 128M
mount /dev/vdc /vdc
cp xfstests/git-versions /vdc
godown /vdc
umount /vdc
mount /dev/vdc
tune2fs -l /dev/vdc

With this commit, the "tune2fs -l" no longer fails.

Reported-by: Chengguang Xu <cgxu519@gmx.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-29 03:06:06 -07:00
Theodore Ts'o
779af00b3f ext4: avoid arithemetic overflow that can trigger a BUG
commit bcd8e91f98c156f4b1ebcfacae675f9cfd962441 upstream.

A maliciously crafted file system can cause an overflow when the
results of a 64-bit calculation is stored into a 32-bit length
parameter.

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200623

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reported-by: Wen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-29 03:06:06 -07:00
Theodore Ts'o
3f9eafe877 ext4: avoid divide by zero fault when deleting corrupted inline directories
commit 4d982e25d0bdc83d8c64e66fdeca0b89240b3b85 upstream.

A specially crafted file system can trick empty_inline_dir() into
reading past the last valid entry in a inline directory, and then run
into the end of xattr marker. This will trigger a divide by zero
fault.  Fix this by using the size of the inline directory instead of
dir->i_size.

Also clean up error reporting in __ext4_check_dir_entry so that the
message is clearer and more understandable --- and avoids the division
by zero trap if the size passed in is zero.  (I'm not sure why we
coded it that way in the first place; printing offset % size is
actually more confusing and less useful.)

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200933

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reported-by: Wen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-29 03:06:06 -07:00
Theodore Ts'o
31343d27f1 ext4: check to make sure the rename(2)'s destination is not freed
commit b50282f3241acee880514212d88b6049fb5039c8 upstream.

If the destination of the rename(2) system call exists, the inode's
link count (i_nlinks) must be non-zero.  If it is, the inode can end
up on the orphan list prematurely, leading to all sorts of hilarity,
including a use-after-free.

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200931

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reported-by: Wen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-29 03:06:06 -07:00
Gustavo A. R. Silva
4334a6ae86 tty: vt_ioctl: fix potential Spectre v1
commit e97267cb4d1ee01ca0929638ec0fcbb0904f903d upstream.

vsa.console is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c:711 vt_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue
'vc_cons' [r]

Fix this by sanitizing vsa.console before using it to index vc_cons

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Reviewed-by: Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-29 03:06:06 -07:00
Alex Deucher
57c806be01 drm/amdgpu: add new polaris pci id
commit 30f3984ede683b98a4e8096e200df78bf0609b4f upstream.

Add new pci id.

Reviewed-by: Rex Zhu <Rex.Zhu@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-29 03:06:05 -07:00
Emil Lundmark
5575041b09 drm: udl: Destroy framebuffer only if it was initialized
commit fcb74da1eb8edd3a4ef9b9724f88ed709d684227 upstream.

This fixes a NULL pointer dereference that can happen if the UDL
driver is unloaded before the framebuffer is initialized. This can
happen e.g. if the USB device is unplugged right after it was plugged
in.

As explained by Stéphane Marchesin:

It happens when fbdev is disabled (which is the case for Chrome OS).
Even though intialization of the fbdev part is optional (it's done in
udlfb_create which is the callback for fb_probe()), the teardown isn't
optional (udl_driver_unload -> udl_fbdev_cleanup ->
udl_fbdev_destroy).

Note that udl_fbdev_cleanup *tries* to be conditional (you can see it
does if (!udl->fbdev)) but that doesn't work, because udl->fbdev is
always set during udl_fbdev_init.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Sean Paul <seanpaul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sean Paul <seanpaul@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Signed-off-by: Emil Lundmark <lndmrk@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Sean Paul <seanpaul@chromium.org>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20180528142711.142466-1-lndmrk@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Paul <seanpaul@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-29 03:06:05 -07:00
Boris Brezillon
c70d8a488a drm/vc4: Fix the "no scaling" case on multi-planar YUV formats
commit 658d8cbd07dae22ccecf49399e18c609c4e85c53 upstream.

When there's no scaling requested ->is_unity should be true no matter
the format.

Also, when no scaling is requested and we have a multi-planar YUV
format, we should leave ->y_scaling[0] to VC4_SCALING_NONE and only
set ->x_scaling[0] to VC4_SCALING_PPF.

Doing this fixes an hardly visible artifact (seen when using modetest
and a rather big overlay plane in YUV420).

Fixes: fc04023fafec ("drm/vc4: Add support for YUV planes.")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@bootlin.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Anholt <eric@anholt.net>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20180725122907.13702-1-boris.brezillon@bootlin.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Paul <seanpaul@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-29 03:06:05 -07:00
Lyude Paul
35e48a0860 drm/nouveau/drm/nouveau: Prevent handling ACPI HPD events too early
commit 79e765ad665da4b8aa7e9c878bd2fef837f6fea5 upstream.

On most systems with ACPI hotplugging support, it seems that we always
receive a hotplug event once we re-enable EC interrupts even if the GPU
hasn't even been resumed yet.

This can cause problems since even though we schedule hpd_work to handle
connector reprobing for us, hpd_work synchronizes on
pm_runtime_get_sync() to wait until the device is ready to perform
reprobing. Since runtime suspend/resume callbacks are disabled before
the PM core calls ->suspend(), any calls to pm_runtime_get_sync() during
this period will grab a runtime PM ref and return immediately with
-EACCES. Because we schedule hpd_work from our ACPI HPD handler, and
hpd_work synchronizes on pm_runtime_get_sync(), this causes us to launch
a connector reprobe immediately even if the GPU isn't actually resumed
just yet. This causes various warnings in dmesg and occasionally, also
prevents some displays connected to the dedicated GPU from coming back
up after suspend. Example:

usb 1-4: USB disconnect, device number 14
usb 1-4.1: USB disconnect, device number 15
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 838 at drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/include/nvkm/subdev/i2c.h:170 nouveau_dp_detect+0x17e/0x370 [nouveau]
CPU: 0 PID: 838 Comm: kworker/0:6 Not tainted 4.17.14-201.Lyude.bz1477182.V3.fc28.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: LENOVO 20EQS64N00/20EQS64N00, BIOS N1EET77W (1.50 ) 03/28/2018
Workqueue: events nouveau_display_hpd_work [nouveau]
RIP: 0010:nouveau_dp_detect+0x17e/0x370 [nouveau]
RSP: 0018:ffffa15143933cf0 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8cb4f656c400 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffffa1514500e4e4 RSI: ffffa1514500e4e4 RDI: 0000000001009002
RBP: ffff8cb4f4a8a800 R08: ffffa15143933cfd R09: ffffa15143933cfc
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8cb4fb57a000
R13: ffff8cb4fb57a000 R14: ffff8cb4f4a8f800 R15: ffff8cb4f656c418
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8cb51f400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f78ec938000 CR3: 000000073720a003 CR4: 00000000003606f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x30
 nouveau_connector_detect+0x2ce/0x520 [nouveau]
 ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x30
 ? ww_mutex_lock+0x12/0x40
 drm_helper_probe_detect_ctx+0x8b/0xe0 [drm_kms_helper]
 drm_helper_hpd_irq_event+0xa8/0x120 [drm_kms_helper]
 nouveau_display_hpd_work+0x2a/0x60 [nouveau]
 process_one_work+0x187/0x340
 worker_thread+0x2e/0x380
 ? pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0xd0/0xd0
 kthread+0x112/0x130
 ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70
 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
Code: 4c 8d 44 24 0d b9 00 05 00 00 48 89 ef ba 09 00 00 00 be 01 00 00 00 e8 e1 09 f8 ff 85 c0 0f 85 b2 01 00 00 80 7c 24 0c 03 74 02 <0f> 0b 48 89 ef e8 b8 07 f8 ff f6 05 51 1b c8 ff 02 0f 84 72 ff
---[ end trace 55d811b38fc8e71a ]---

So, to fix this we attempt to grab a runtime PM reference in the ACPI
handler itself asynchronously. If the GPU is already awake (it will have
normal hotplugging at this point) or runtime PM callbacks are currently
disabled on the device, we drop our reference without updating the
autosuspend delay. We only schedule connector reprobes when we
successfully managed to queue up a resume request with our asynchronous
PM ref.

This also has the added benefit of preventing redundant connector
reprobes from ACPI while the GPU is runtime resumed!

Signed-off-by: Lyude Paul <lyude@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Karol Herbst <kherbst@redhat.com>
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1477182#c41
Signed-off-by: Lyude Paul <lyude@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Skeggs <bskeggs@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-29 03:06:05 -07:00
Lyude Paul
0f966da783 drm/nouveau/drm/nouveau: Use pm_runtime_get_noresume() in connector_detect()
commit 6833fb1ec120bf078e1a527c573a09d4de286224 upstream.

It's true we can't resume the device from poll workers in
nouveau_connector_detect(). We can however, prevent the autosuspend
timer from elapsing immediately if it hasn't already without risking any
sort of deadlock with the runtime suspend/resume operations. So do that
instead of entirely avoiding grabbing a power reference.

Signed-off-by: Lyude Paul <lyude@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Karol Herbst <kherbst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Skeggs <bskeggs@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-29 03:06:05 -07:00
Lyude Paul
409af02c20 drm/nouveau/drm/nouveau: Fix bogus drm_kms_helper_poll_enable() placement
commit d77ef138ff572409ab93d492e5e6c826ee6fb21d upstream.

Turns out this part is my fault for not noticing when reviewing
9a2eba337cace ("drm/nouveau: Fix drm poll_helper handling"). Currently
we call drm_kms_helper_poll_enable() from nouveau_display_hpd_work().
This makes basically no sense however, because that means we're calling
drm_kms_helper_poll_enable() every time we schedule the hotplug
detection work. This is also against the advice mentioned in
drm_kms_helper_poll_enable()'s documentation:

 Note that calls to enable and disable polling must be strictly ordered,
 which is automatically the case when they're only call from
 suspend/resume callbacks.

Of course, hotplugs can't really be ordered. They could even happen
immediately after we called drm_kms_helper_poll_disable() in
nouveau_display_fini(), which can lead to all sorts of issues.

Additionally; enabling polling /after/ we call
drm_helper_hpd_irq_event() could also mean that we'd miss a hotplug
event anyway, since drm_helper_hpd_irq_event() wouldn't bother trying to
probe connectors so long as polling is disabled.

So; simply move this back into nouveau_display_init() again. The race
condition that both of these patches attempted to work around has
already been fixed properly in

  d61a5c106351 ("drm/nouveau: Fix deadlock on runtime suspend")

Fixes: 9a2eba337cace ("drm/nouveau: Fix drm poll_helper handling")
Signed-off-by: Lyude Paul <lyude@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Karol Herbst <kherbst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch>
Cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Cc: Peter Ujfalusi <peter.ujfalusi@ti.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ben Skeggs <bskeggs@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-29 03:06:05 -07:00
Lyude Paul
9ac837e079 drm/nouveau/drm/nouveau: Don't forget to cancel hpd_work on suspend/unload
commit 2f7ca781fd382cf8dde73ed36dfdd93fd05b3332 upstream.

Currently, there's nothing in nouveau that actually cancels this work
struct. So, cancel it on suspend/unload. Otherwise, if we're unlucky
enough hpd_work might try to keep running up until the system is
suspended.

Signed-off-by: Lyude Paul <lyude@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ben Skeggs <bskeggs@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-29 03:06:05 -07:00
Lyude Paul
42387d8e4a drm/nouveau: Fix deadlocks in nouveau_connector_detect()
commit 3e1a12754d4df5804bfca5dedf09d2ba291bdc2a upstream.

When we disable hotplugging on the GPU, we need to be able to
synchronize with each connector's hotplug interrupt handler before the
interrupt is finally disabled. This can be a problem however, since
nouveau_connector_detect() currently grabs a runtime power reference
when handling connector probing. This will deadlock the runtime suspend
handler like so:

[  861.480896] INFO: task kworker/0:2:61 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
[  861.483290]       Tainted: G           O      4.18.0-rc6Lyude-Test+ #1
[  861.485158] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
[  861.486332] kworker/0:2     D    0    61      2 0x80000000
[  861.487044] Workqueue: events nouveau_display_hpd_work [nouveau]
[  861.487737] Call Trace:
[  861.488394]  __schedule+0x322/0xaf0
[  861.489070]  schedule+0x33/0x90
[  861.489744]  rpm_resume+0x19c/0x850
[  861.490392]  ? finish_wait+0x90/0x90
[  861.491068]  __pm_runtime_resume+0x4e/0x90
[  861.491753]  nouveau_display_hpd_work+0x22/0x60 [nouveau]
[  861.492416]  process_one_work+0x231/0x620
[  861.493068]  worker_thread+0x44/0x3a0
[  861.493722]  kthread+0x12b/0x150
[  861.494342]  ? wq_pool_ids_show+0x140/0x140
[  861.494991]  ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70
[  861.495648]  ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
[  861.496304] INFO: task kworker/6:2:320 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
[  861.496968]       Tainted: G           O      4.18.0-rc6Lyude-Test+ #1
[  861.497654] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
[  861.498341] kworker/6:2     D    0   320      2 0x80000080
[  861.499045] Workqueue: pm pm_runtime_work
[  861.499739] Call Trace:
[  861.500428]  __schedule+0x322/0xaf0
[  861.501134]  ? wait_for_completion+0x104/0x190
[  861.501851]  schedule+0x33/0x90
[  861.502564]  schedule_timeout+0x3a5/0x590
[  861.503284]  ? mark_held_locks+0x58/0x80
[  861.503988]  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x2c/0x40
[  861.504710]  ? wait_for_completion+0x104/0x190
[  861.505417]  ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xf4/0x190
[  861.506136]  ? wait_for_completion+0x104/0x190
[  861.506845]  wait_for_completion+0x12c/0x190
[  861.507555]  ? wake_up_q+0x80/0x80
[  861.508268]  flush_work+0x1c9/0x280
[  861.508990]  ? flush_workqueue_prep_pwqs+0x1b0/0x1b0
[  861.509735]  nvif_notify_put+0xb1/0xc0 [nouveau]
[  861.510482]  nouveau_display_fini+0xbd/0x170 [nouveau]
[  861.511241]  nouveau_display_suspend+0x67/0x120 [nouveau]
[  861.511969]  nouveau_do_suspend+0x5e/0x2d0 [nouveau]
[  861.512715]  nouveau_pmops_runtime_suspend+0x47/0xb0 [nouveau]
[  861.513435]  pci_pm_runtime_suspend+0x6b/0x180
[  861.514165]  ? pci_has_legacy_pm_support+0x70/0x70
[  861.514897]  __rpm_callback+0x7a/0x1d0
[  861.515618]  ? pci_has_legacy_pm_support+0x70/0x70
[  861.516313]  rpm_callback+0x24/0x80
[  861.517027]  ? pci_has_legacy_pm_support+0x70/0x70
[  861.517741]  rpm_suspend+0x142/0x6b0
[  861.518449]  pm_runtime_work+0x97/0xc0
[  861.519144]  process_one_work+0x231/0x620
[  861.519831]  worker_thread+0x44/0x3a0
[  861.520522]  kthread+0x12b/0x150
[  861.521220]  ? wq_pool_ids_show+0x140/0x140
[  861.521925]  ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70
[  861.522622]  ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
[  861.523299] INFO: task kworker/6:0:1329 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
[  861.523977]       Tainted: G           O      4.18.0-rc6Lyude-Test+ #1
[  861.524644] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
[  861.525349] kworker/6:0     D    0  1329      2 0x80000000
[  861.526073] Workqueue: events nvif_notify_work [nouveau]
[  861.526751] Call Trace:
[  861.527411]  __schedule+0x322/0xaf0
[  861.528089]  schedule+0x33/0x90
[  861.528758]  rpm_resume+0x19c/0x850
[  861.529399]  ? finish_wait+0x90/0x90
[  861.530073]  __pm_runtime_resume+0x4e/0x90
[  861.530798]  nouveau_connector_detect+0x7e/0x510 [nouveau]
[  861.531459]  ? ww_mutex_lock+0x47/0x80
[  861.532097]  ? ww_mutex_lock+0x47/0x80
[  861.532819]  ? drm_modeset_lock+0x88/0x130 [drm]
[  861.533481]  drm_helper_probe_detect_ctx+0xa0/0x100 [drm_kms_helper]
[  861.534127]  drm_helper_hpd_irq_event+0xa4/0x120 [drm_kms_helper]
[  861.534940]  nouveau_connector_hotplug+0x98/0x120 [nouveau]
[  861.535556]  nvif_notify_work+0x2d/0xb0 [nouveau]
[  861.536221]  process_one_work+0x231/0x620
[  861.536994]  worker_thread+0x44/0x3a0
[  861.537757]  kthread+0x12b/0x150
[  861.538463]  ? wq_pool_ids_show+0x140/0x140
[  861.539102]  ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70
[  861.539815]  ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
[  861.540521]
               Showing all locks held in the system:
[  861.541696] 2 locks held by kworker/0:2/61:
[  861.542406]  #0: 000000002dbf8af5 ((wq_completion)"events"){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1b3/0x620
[  861.543071]  #1: 0000000076868126 ((work_completion)(&drm->hpd_work)){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1b3/0x620
[  861.543814] 1 lock held by khungtaskd/64:
[  861.544535]  #0: 0000000059db4b53 (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x23/0x185
[  861.545160] 3 locks held by kworker/6:2/320:
[  861.545896]  #0: 00000000d9e1bc59 ((wq_completion)"pm"){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1b3/0x620
[  861.546702]  #1: 00000000c9f92d84 ((work_completion)(&dev->power.work)){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1b3/0x620
[  861.547443]  #2: 000000004afc5de1 (drm_connector_list_iter){.+.+}, at: nouveau_display_fini+0x96/0x170 [nouveau]
[  861.548146] 1 lock held by dmesg/983:
[  861.548889] 2 locks held by zsh/1250:
[  861.549605]  #0: 00000000348e3cf6 (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}, at: ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40
[  861.550393]  #1: 000000007009a7a8 (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: n_tty_read+0xc1/0x870
[  861.551122] 6 locks held by kworker/6:0/1329:
[  861.551957]  #0: 000000002dbf8af5 ((wq_completion)"events"){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1b3/0x620
[  861.552765]  #1: 00000000ddb499ad ((work_completion)(&notify->work)#2){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1b3/0x620
[  861.553582]  #2: 000000006e013cbe (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.}, at: drm_helper_hpd_irq_event+0x6c/0x120 [drm_kms_helper]
[  861.554357]  #3: 000000004afc5de1 (drm_connector_list_iter){.+.+}, at: drm_helper_hpd_irq_event+0x78/0x120 [drm_kms_helper]
[  861.555227]  #4: 0000000044f294d9 (crtc_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}, at: drm_helper_probe_detect_ctx+0x3d/0x100 [drm_kms_helper]
[  861.556133]  #5: 00000000db193642 (crtc_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}, at: drm_modeset_lock+0x4b/0x130 [drm]

[  861.557864] =============================================

[  861.559507] NMI backtrace for cpu 2
[  861.560363] CPU: 2 PID: 64 Comm: khungtaskd Tainted: G           O      4.18.0-rc6Lyude-Test+ #1
[  861.561197] Hardware name: LENOVO 20EQS64N0B/20EQS64N0B, BIOS N1EET78W (1.51 ) 05/18/2018
[  861.561948] Call Trace:
[  861.562757]  dump_stack+0x8e/0xd3
[  861.563516]  nmi_cpu_backtrace.cold.3+0x14/0x5a
[  861.564269]  ? lapic_can_unplug_cpu.cold.27+0x42/0x42
[  861.565029]  nmi_trigger_cpumask_backtrace+0xa1/0xae
[  861.565789]  arch_trigger_cpumask_backtrace+0x19/0x20
[  861.566558]  watchdog+0x316/0x580
[  861.567355]  kthread+0x12b/0x150
[  861.568114]  ? reset_hung_task_detector+0x20/0x20
[  861.568863]  ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70
[  861.569598]  ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
[  861.570370] Sending NMI from CPU 2 to CPUs 0-1,3-7:
[  861.571426] NMI backtrace for cpu 6 skipped: idling at intel_idle+0x7f/0x120
[  861.571429] NMI backtrace for cpu 7 skipped: idling at intel_idle+0x7f/0x120
[  861.571432] NMI backtrace for cpu 3 skipped: idling at intel_idle+0x7f/0x120
[  861.571464] NMI backtrace for cpu 5 skipped: idling at intel_idle+0x7f/0x120
[  861.571467] NMI backtrace for cpu 0 skipped: idling at intel_idle+0x7f/0x120
[  861.571469] NMI backtrace for cpu 4 skipped: idling at intel_idle+0x7f/0x120
[  861.571472] NMI backtrace for cpu 1 skipped: idling at intel_idle+0x7f/0x120
[  861.572428] Kernel panic - not syncing: hung_task: blocked tasks

So: fix this by making it so that normal hotplug handling /only/ happens
so long as the GPU is currently awake without any pending runtime PM
requests. In the event that a hotplug occurs while the device is
suspending or resuming, we can simply defer our response until the GPU
is fully runtime resumed again.

Changes since v4:
- Use a new trick I came up with using pm_runtime_get() instead of the
  hackish junk we had before

Signed-off-by: Lyude Paul <lyude@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Karol Herbst <kherbst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Skeggs <bskeggs@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-29 03:06:05 -07:00
Junxiao Bi
7c1ca8fb86 ocfs2: fix ocfs2 read block panic
commit 234b69e3e089d850a98e7b3145bd00e9b52b1111 upstream.

While reading block, it is possible that io error return due to underlying
storage issue, in this case, BH_NeedsValidate was left in the buffer head.
Then when reading the very block next time, if it was already linked into
journal, that will trigger the following panic.

[203748.702517] kernel BUG at fs/ocfs2/buffer_head_io.c:342!
[203748.702533] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[203748.702561] Modules linked in: ocfs2 ocfs2_dlmfs ocfs2_stack_o2cb ocfs2_dlm ocfs2_nodemanager ocfs2_stackglue configfs sunrpc dm_switch dm_queue_length dm_multipath bonding be2iscsi iscsi_boot_sysfs bnx2i cnic uio cxgb4i iw_cxgb4 cxgb4 cxgb3i libcxgbi iw_cxgb3 cxgb3 mdio ib_iser rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm ib_sa ib_mad ib_core ib_addr ipv6 iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ipmi_devintf iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support dcdbas ipmi_ssif i2c_core ipmi_si ipmi_msghandler acpi_pad pcspkr sb_edac edac_core lpc_ich mfd_core shpchp sg tg3 ptp pps_core ext4 jbd2 mbcache2 sr_mod cdrom sd_mod ahci libahci megaraid_sas wmi dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
[203748.703024] CPU: 7 PID: 38369 Comm: touch Not tainted 4.1.12-124.18.6.el6uek.x86_64 #2
[203748.703045] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R620/0PXXHP, BIOS 2.5.2 01/28/2015
[203748.703067] task: ffff880768139c00 ti: ffff88006ff48000 task.ti: ffff88006ff48000
[203748.703088] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa05e9f09>]  [<ffffffffa05e9f09>] ocfs2_read_blocks+0x669/0x7f0 [ocfs2]
[203748.703130] RSP: 0018:ffff88006ff4b818  EFLAGS: 00010206
[203748.703389] RAX: 0000000008620029 RBX: ffff88006ff4b910 RCX: 0000000000000000
[203748.703885] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000023079fe
[203748.704382] RBP: ffff88006ff4b8d8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff8807578c25b0
[203748.704877] R10: 000000000f637376 R11: 000000003030322e R12: 0000000000000000
[203748.705373] R13: ffff88006ff4b910 R14: ffff880732fe38f0 R15: 0000000000000000
[203748.705871] FS:  00007f401992c700(0000) GS:ffff880bfebc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[203748.706370] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[203748.706627] CR2: 00007f4019252440 CR3: 00000000a621e000 CR4: 0000000000060670
[203748.707124] Stack:
[203748.707371]  ffff88006ff4b828 ffffffffa0609f52 ffff88006ff4b838 0000000000000001
[203748.707885]  0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff880bf67c3800 ffffffffa05eca00
[203748.708399]  00000000023079ff ffffffff81c58b80 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[203748.708915] Call Trace:
[203748.709175]  [<ffffffffa0609f52>] ? ocfs2_inode_cache_io_unlock+0x12/0x20 [ocfs2]
[203748.709680]  [<ffffffffa05eca00>] ? ocfs2_empty_dir_filldir+0x80/0x80 [ocfs2]
[203748.710185]  [<ffffffffa05ec0cb>] ocfs2_read_dir_block_direct+0x3b/0x200 [ocfs2]
[203748.710691]  [<ffffffffa05f0fbf>] ocfs2_prepare_dx_dir_for_insert.isra.57+0x19f/0xf60 [ocfs2]
[203748.711204]  [<ffffffffa065660f>] ? ocfs2_metadata_cache_io_unlock+0x1f/0x30 [ocfs2]
[203748.711716]  [<ffffffffa05f4f3a>] ocfs2_prepare_dir_for_insert+0x13a/0x890 [ocfs2]
[203748.712227]  [<ffffffffa05f442e>] ? ocfs2_check_dir_for_entry+0x8e/0x140 [ocfs2]
[203748.712737]  [<ffffffffa061b2f2>] ocfs2_mknod+0x4b2/0x1370 [ocfs2]
[203748.713003]  [<ffffffffa061c385>] ocfs2_create+0x65/0x170 [ocfs2]
[203748.713263]  [<ffffffff8121714b>] vfs_create+0xdb/0x150
[203748.713518]  [<ffffffff8121b225>] do_last+0x815/0x1210
[203748.713772]  [<ffffffff812192e9>] ? path_init+0xb9/0x450
[203748.714123]  [<ffffffff8121bca0>] path_openat+0x80/0x600
[203748.714378]  [<ffffffff811bcd45>] ? handle_pte_fault+0xd15/0x1620
[203748.714634]  [<ffffffff8121d7ba>] do_filp_open+0x3a/0xb0
[203748.714888]  [<ffffffff8122a767>] ? __alloc_fd+0xa7/0x130
[203748.715143]  [<ffffffff81209ffc>] do_sys_open+0x12c/0x220
[203748.715403]  [<ffffffff81026ddb>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase1+0x11b/0x180
[203748.715668]  [<ffffffff816f0c9f>] ? system_call_after_swapgs+0xe9/0x190
[203748.715928]  [<ffffffff8120a10e>] SyS_open+0x1e/0x20
[203748.716184]  [<ffffffff816f0d5e>] system_call_fastpath+0x18/0xd7
[203748.716440] Code: 00 00 48 8b 7b 08 48 83 c3 10 45 89 f8 44 89 e1 44 89 f2 4c 89 ee e8 07 06 11 e1 48 8b 03 48 85 c0 75 df 8b 5d c8 e9 4d fa ff ff <0f> 0b 48 8b 7d a0 e8 dc c6 06 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 10
[203748.717505] RIP  [<ffffffffa05e9f09>] ocfs2_read_blocks+0x669/0x7f0 [ocfs2]
[203748.717775]  RSP <ffff88006ff4b818>

Joesph ever reported a similar panic.
Link: https://oss.oracle.com/pipermail/ocfs2-devel/2013-May/008931.html

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180912063207.29484-1-junxiao.bi@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Changwei Ge <ge.changwei@h3c.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-29 03:06:05 -07:00
Richard Weinberger
1d7e23f906 Revert "ubifs: xattr: Don't operate on deleted inodes"
commit f061c1cc404a618858a77aea233fde0aeaad2f2d upstream.

This reverts commit 11a6fc3dc743e22fb50f2196ec55bee5140d3c52.
UBIFS wants to assert that xattr operations are only issued on files
with positive link count. The said patch made this operations return
-ENOENT for unlinked files such that the asserts will no longer trigger.
This was wrong since xattr operations are perfectly fine on unlinked
files.
Instead the assertions need to be fixed/removed.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 11a6fc3dc743 ("ubifs: xattr: Don't operate on deleted inodes")
Reported-by: Koen Vandeputte <koen.vandeputte@ncentric.com>
Tested-by: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-29 03:06:04 -07:00
Vincent Pelletier
44383139a3 scsi: target: iscsi: Use bin2hex instead of a re-implementation
commit 8c39e2699f8acb2e29782a834e56306da24937fe upstream.

Signed-off-by: Vincent Pelletier <plr.vincent@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <mchristi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-29 03:06:04 -07:00
Vincent Pelletier
755e45f315 scsi: target: iscsi: Use hex2bin instead of a re-implementation
commit 1816494330a83f2a064499d8ed2797045641f92c upstream.

This change has the following effects, in order of descreasing importance:

1) Prevent a stack buffer overflow

2) Do not append an unnecessary NULL to an anyway binary buffer, which
   is writing one byte past client_digest when caller is:
   chap_string_to_hex(client_digest, chap_r, strlen(chap_r));

The latter was found by KASAN (see below) when input value hes expected size
(32 hex chars), and further analysis revealed a stack buffer overflow can
happen when network-received value is longer, allowing an unauthenticated
remote attacker to smash up to 17 bytes after destination buffer (16 bytes
attacker-controlled and one null).  As switching to hex2bin requires
specifying destination buffer length, and does not internally append any null,
it solves both issues.

This addresses CVE-2018-14633.

Beyond this:

- Validate received value length and check hex2bin accepted the input, to log
  this rejection reason instead of just failing authentication.

- Only log received CHAP_R and CHAP_C values once they passed sanity checks.

==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in chap_string_to_hex+0x32/0x60 [iscsi_target_mod]
Write of size 1 at addr ffff8801090ef7c8 by task kworker/0:0/1021

CPU: 0 PID: 1021 Comm: kworker/0:0 Tainted: G           O      4.17.8kasan.sess.connops+ #2
Hardware name: To be filled by O.E.M. To be filled by O.E.M./Aptio CRB, BIOS 5.6.5 05/19/2014
Workqueue: events iscsi_target_do_login_rx [iscsi_target_mod]
Call Trace:
 dump_stack+0x71/0xac
 print_address_description+0x65/0x22e
 ? chap_string_to_hex+0x32/0x60 [iscsi_target_mod]
 kasan_report.cold.6+0x241/0x2fd
 chap_string_to_hex+0x32/0x60 [iscsi_target_mod]
 chap_server_compute_md5.isra.2+0x2cb/0x860 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? chap_binaryhex_to_asciihex.constprop.5+0x50/0x50 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? ftrace_caller_op_ptr+0xe/0xe
 ? __orc_find+0x6f/0xc0
 ? unwind_next_frame+0x231/0x850
 ? kthread+0x1a0/0x1c0
 ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
 ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
 ? iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x3bc/0x4c0 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? deref_stack_reg+0xd0/0xd0
 ? iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x3bc/0x4c0 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? is_module_text_address+0xa/0x11
 ? kernel_text_address+0x4c/0x110
 ? __save_stack_trace+0x82/0x100
 ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
 ? save_stack+0x8c/0xb0
 ? 0xffffffffc1660000
 ? iscsi_target_do_login+0x155/0x8d0 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x3bc/0x4c0 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? process_one_work+0x35c/0x640
 ? worker_thread+0x66/0x5d0
 ? kthread+0x1a0/0x1c0
 ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
 ? iscsi_update_param_value+0x80/0x80 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? iscsit_release_cmd+0x170/0x170 [iscsi_target_mod]
 chap_main_loop+0x172/0x570 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? chap_server_compute_md5.isra.2+0x860/0x860 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? rx_data+0xd6/0x120 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? iscsit_print_session_params+0xd0/0xd0 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? cyc2ns_read_begin.part.2+0x90/0x90
 ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x25/0x50
 ? memcmp+0x45/0x70
 iscsi_target_do_login+0x875/0x8d0 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? iscsi_target_check_first_request.isra.5+0x1a0/0x1a0 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? del_timer+0xe0/0xe0
 ? memset+0x1f/0x40
 ? flush_sigqueue+0x29/0xd0
 iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x3bc/0x4c0 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? iscsi_target_nego_release+0x80/0x80 [iscsi_target_mod]
 ? iscsi_target_restore_sock_callbacks+0x130/0x130 [iscsi_target_mod]
 process_one_work+0x35c/0x640
 worker_thread+0x66/0x5d0
 ? flush_rcu_work+0x40/0x40
 kthread+0x1a0/0x1c0
 ? kthread_bind+0x30/0x30
 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40

The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0004243bc0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0
flags: 0x17fffc000000000()
raw: 017fffc000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff
raw: ffffea0004243c20 ffffea0004243ba0 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff8801090ef680: f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 01 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00
 ffff8801090ef700: f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 02 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00
>ffff8801090ef780: 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00
                                              ^
 ffff8801090ef800: 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 02 f2 f2 f2 f2
 ffff8801090ef880: f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 00
==================================================================

Signed-off-by: Vincent Pelletier <plr.vincent@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <mchristi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-29 03:06:04 -07:00
Lubomir Rintel
50ec69edf3 Revert "uapi/linux/keyctl.h: don't use C++ reserved keyword as a struct member name"
commit 8c0f9f5b309d627182d5da72a69246f58bde1026 upstream.

This changes UAPI, breaking iwd and libell:

  ell/key.c: In function 'kernel_dh_compute':
  ell/key.c:205:38: error: 'struct keyctl_dh_params' has no member named 'private'; did you mean 'dh_private'?
    struct keyctl_dh_params params = { .private = private,
                                        ^~~~~~~
                                        dh_private

This reverts commit 8a2336e549d385bb0b46880435b411df8d8200e8.

Fixes: 8a2336e549d3 ("uapi/linux/keyctl.h: don't use C++ reserved keyword as a struct member name")
Signed-off-by: Lubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
cc: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
cc: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
cc: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-29 03:06:04 -07:00
Greg Kroah-Hartman
13d216167d Revert "rpmsg: core: add support to power domains for devices"
This reverts commit 1ed3a93072307265d6385031b72929a904b50f87 which is
commit fe782affd0f440a4e60e2cc81b8f2eccb2923113 upstream

Rafael reports that this patch causes problems:
	> -rc2 looks good. There is a problem on dragonboard during boot that was
	> introduced in v4.14.71 that I didn't notice last week. We'll bisect it
	> and report back later this week. dragonboard on the other branches (4.9,
	> 4.18, mainline) looks fine.

	As Dan pointed out, during validation, we have bisected this issue on
	a dragonboard 410c (can't find root device) to the following commit
	for v4.14:

	[1ed3a9307230] rpmsg: core: add support to power domains for devices

	There is an on-going discussion on "[PATCH] rpmsg: core: add support
	to power domains for devices" about this patch having other
	dependencies and breaking something else on v4.14 as well.

so drop it.

Reported-by: Rafael Tinoco <rafael.tinoco@linaro.org>
Cc: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org>
Cc: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org>
Cc: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-29 03:06:04 -07:00
Joel Fernandes (Google)
6447b34fc2 mm: shmem.c: Correctly annotate new inodes for lockdep
commit b45d71fb89ab8adfe727b9d0ee188ed58582a647 upstream.

Directories and inodes don't necessarily need to be in the same lockdep
class.  For ex, hugetlbfs splits them out too to prevent false positives
in lockdep.  Annotate correctly after new inode creation.  If its a
directory inode, it will be put into a different class.

This should fix a lockdep splat reported by syzbot:

> ======================================================
> WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
> 4.18.0-rc8-next-20180810+ #36 Not tainted
> ------------------------------------------------------
> syz-executor900/4483 is trying to acquire lock:
> 00000000d2bfc8fe (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#9){++++}, at: inode_lock
> include/linux/fs.h:765 [inline]
> 00000000d2bfc8fe (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#9){++++}, at:
> shmem_fallocate+0x18b/0x12e0 mm/shmem.c:2602
>
> but task is already holding lock:
> 0000000025208078 (ashmem_mutex){+.+.}, at: ashmem_shrink_scan+0xb4/0x630
> drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c:448
>
> which lock already depends on the new lock.
>
> -> #2 (ashmem_mutex){+.+.}:
>        __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:925 [inline]
>        __mutex_lock+0x171/0x1700 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1073
>        mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1088
>        ashmem_mmap+0x55/0x520 drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c:361
>        call_mmap include/linux/fs.h:1844 [inline]
>        mmap_region+0xf27/0x1c50 mm/mmap.c:1762
>        do_mmap+0xa10/0x1220 mm/mmap.c:1535
>        do_mmap_pgoff include/linux/mm.h:2298 [inline]
>        vm_mmap_pgoff+0x213/0x2c0 mm/util.c:357
>        ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x4da/0x660 mm/mmap.c:1585
>        __do_sys_mmap arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:100 [inline]
>        __se_sys_mmap arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:91 [inline]
>        __x64_sys_mmap+0xe9/0x1b0 arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:91
>        do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
>        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
>
> -> #1 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}:
>        __might_fault+0x155/0x1e0 mm/memory.c:4568
>        _copy_to_user+0x30/0x110 lib/usercopy.c:25
>        copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:155 [inline]
>        filldir+0x1ea/0x3a0 fs/readdir.c:196
>        dir_emit_dot include/linux/fs.h:3464 [inline]
>        dir_emit_dots include/linux/fs.h:3475 [inline]
>        dcache_readdir+0x13a/0x620 fs/libfs.c:193
>        iterate_dir+0x48b/0x5d0 fs/readdir.c:51
>        __do_sys_getdents fs/readdir.c:231 [inline]
>        __se_sys_getdents fs/readdir.c:212 [inline]
>        __x64_sys_getdents+0x29f/0x510 fs/readdir.c:212
>        do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
>        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
>
> -> #0 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#9){++++}:
>        lock_acquire+0x1e4/0x540 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3924
>        down_write+0x8f/0x130 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:70
>        inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:765 [inline]
>        shmem_fallocate+0x18b/0x12e0 mm/shmem.c:2602
>        ashmem_shrink_scan+0x236/0x630 drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c:455
>        ashmem_ioctl+0x3ae/0x13a0 drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c:797
>        vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline]
>        file_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:501 [inline]
>        do_vfs_ioctl+0x1de/0x1720 fs/ioctl.c:685
>        ksys_ioctl+0xa9/0xd0 fs/ioctl.c:702
>        __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:709 [inline]
>        __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:707 [inline]
>        __x64_sys_ioctl+0x73/0xb0 fs/ioctl.c:707
>        do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
>        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
>
> other info that might help us debug this:
>
> Chain exists of:
>   &sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#9 --> &mm->mmap_sem --> ashmem_mutex
>
>  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
>
>        CPU0                    CPU1
>        ----                    ----
>   lock(ashmem_mutex);
>                                lock(&mm->mmap_sem);
>                                lock(ashmem_mutex);
>   lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#9);
>
>  *** DEADLOCK ***
>
> 1 lock held by syz-executor900/4483:
>  #0: 0000000025208078 (ashmem_mutex){+.+.}, at:
> ashmem_shrink_scan+0xb4/0x630 drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c:448

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180821231835.166639-1-joel@joelfernandes.org
Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Reviewed-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Suggested-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-29 03:06:04 -07:00
Vaibhav Nagarnaik
7eba38a3f6 ring-buffer: Allow for rescheduling when removing pages
commit 83f365554e47997ec68dc4eca3f5dce525cd15c3 upstream.

When reducing ring buffer size, pages are removed by scheduling a work
item on each CPU for the corresponding CPU ring buffer. After the pages
are removed from ring buffer linked list, the pages are free()d in a
tight loop. The loop does not give up CPU until all pages are removed.
In a worst case behavior, when lot of pages are to be freed, it can
cause system stall.

After the pages are removed from the list, the free() can happen while
the work is rescheduled. Call cond_resched() in the loop to prevent the
system hangup.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180907223129.71994-1-vnagarnaik@google.com

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 83f40318dab00 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic")
Reported-by: Jason Behmer <jbehmer@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Vaibhav Nagarnaik <vnagarnaik@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-29 03:06:04 -07:00
Mika Westerberg
0e5cdbac03 Revert "PCI: Add ACS quirk for Intel 300 series"
commit 50ca031b51106b1b46162d4e9ecccb7edc95682f upstream.

This reverts f154a718e6cc ("PCI: Add ACS quirk for Intel 300 series").

It turns out that erratum "PCH PCIe* Controller Root Port (ACSCTLR) Appear
As Read Only" has been fixed in 300 series chipsets, even though the
datasheet [1] claims otherwise.  To make ACS work properly on 300 series
root ports, revert the faulty commit.

[1] https://www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/specification-updates/300-series-c240-series-chipset-pch-spec-update.pdf

Fixes: f154a718e6cc ("PCI: Add ACS quirk for Intel 300 series")
Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org	# v4.18+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-29 03:06:04 -07:00
Kirill Kapranov
f3765abb60 spi: fix IDR collision on systems with both fixed and dynamic SPI bus numbers
commit 1a4327fbf4554d5b78d75b19a13d40d6de220159 upstream.

On systems where some controllers get a dynamic ID assigned and some have
a fixed number (e.g. from ACPI tables), the current implementation might
run into an IDR collision: in case of a fixed bus number is gotten by a
driver (but not marked busy in IDR tree) and a driver with dynamic bus
number gets the same ID and predictably fails.

Fix this by means of checking-in fixed IDsin IDR as far as dynamic ones
at the moment of the controller registration.

Fixes: 9b61e302210e (spi: Pick spi bus number from Linux idr or spi alias)
Signed-off-by: Kirill Kapranov <kirill.kapranov@compulab.co.il>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-29 03:06:03 -07:00
Boris Ostrovsky
5ca87a3820 xen/x86/vpmu: Zero struct pt_regs before calling into sample handling code
commit 70513d58751d7c6c1a0133557b13089b9f2e3e66 upstream.

Otherwise we may leak kernel stack for events that sample user
registers.

Reported-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-29 03:06:03 -07:00
Juergen Gross
7eced4478f xen/netfront: don't bug in case of too many frags
commit ad4f15dc2c70b1de5e0a64d27335962fbc9cf71c upstream.

Commit 57f230ab04d291 ("xen/netfront: raise max number of slots in
xennet_get_responses()") raised the max number of allowed slots by one.
This seems to be problematic in some configurations with netback using
a larger MAX_SKB_FRAGS value (e.g. old Linux kernel with MAX_SKB_FRAGS
defined as 18 instead of nowadays 17).

Instead of BUG_ON() in this case just fall back to retransmission.

Fixes: 57f230ab04d291 ("xen/netfront: raise max number of slots in xennet_get_responses()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-29 03:06:03 -07:00
Mario Limonciello
e2d5285b98 platform/x86: alienware-wmi: Correct a memory leak
commit ff0e9f26288d2daee4950f42b37a3d3d30d36ec1 upstream.

An ACPI buffer that was allocated was not being freed after use.

Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@dell.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart (VMware) <dvhart@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-29 03:06:03 -07:00
Takashi Sakamoto
ff6805037d ALSA: oxfw: fix memory leak of private data
commit 498fe23aad8e3b5a9554f55719c537603b4476ea upstream.

Although private data of sound card instance is usually allocated in the
tail of the instance, drivers in ALSA firewire stack allocate the private
data before allocating the instance. In this case, the private data
should be released explicitly at .private_free callback of the instance.

This commit fixes memory leak following to the above design.

Fixes: 6c29230e2a5f ('ALSA: oxfw: delayed registration of sound card')
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.7+
Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-29 03:06:03 -07:00
Takashi Sakamoto
08f4f8b938 ALSA: oxfw: fix memory leak of discovered stream formats at error path
commit 1064bc685d359f549f91c2d5f111965a9284f328 upstream.

After finishing discover of stream formats, ALSA OXFW driver has memory
leak of allocated memory object at error path.

This commit releases the memory object at the error path.

Fixes: 6c29230e2a5f ('ALSA: oxfw: delayed registration of sound card')
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.7+
Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-29 03:06:03 -07:00
Takashi Sakamoto
996899a9cb ALSA: oxfw: fix memory leak for model-dependent data at error path
commit ce925f088b979537f22f9e05eb923ef9822ca139 upstream.

After allocating model-dependent data, ALSA OXFW driver has memory leak
of the data at error path.

This commit releases the data at the error path.

Fixes: 6c29230e2a5f ('ALSA: oxfw: delayed registration of sound card')
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.7+
Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-29 03:06:03 -07:00
Takashi Sakamoto
d992909717 ALSA: fireworks: fix memory leak of response buffer at error path
commit c3b55e2ec9c76e7a0de2a0b1dc851fdc9440385b upstream.

After allocating memory object for response buffer, ALSA fireworks
driver has leak of the memory object at error path.

This commit releases the object at the error path.

Fixes: 7d3c1d5901aa('ALSA: fireworks: delayed registration of sound card')
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.7+
Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-29 03:06:03 -07:00
Takashi Sakamoto
40e2596f06 ALSA: firewire-tascam: fix memory leak of private data
commit 8d28277c065a974873c6781d44b7bcdcd8fb4e8a upstream.

Although private data of sound card instance is usually allocated in the
tail of the instance, drivers in ALSA firewire stack allocate the private
data before allocating the instance. In this case, the private data
should be released explicitly at .private_free callback of the instance.

This commit fixes memory leak following to the above design.

Fixes: b610386c8afb ('ALSA: firewire-tascam: deleyed registration of sound card')
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.7+
Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-29 03:06:02 -07:00
Takashi Sakamoto
933f20a61e ALSA: firewire-digi00x: fix memory leak of private data
commit a49a83ab05e34edd6c71a4fbd062c9a7ba6d18aa upstream.

Although private data of sound card instance is usually allocated in the
tail of the instance, drivers in ALSA firewire stack allocate the private
data before allocating the instance. In this case, the private data
should be released explicitly at .private_free callback of the instance.

This commit fixes memory leak following to the above design.

Fixes: 86c8dd7f4da3 ('ALSA: firewire-digi00x: delayed registration of sound card')
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.7+
Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-29 03:06:02 -07:00
Takashi Sakamoto
70165a445b ALSA: fireface: fix memory leak in ff400_switch_fetching_mode()
commit 36f3a6e02c143a7e9e4e143e416371f67bc1fae6 upstream.

An allocated memory forgets to be released.

Fixes: 76fdb3a9e13 ('ALSA: fireface: add support for Fireface 400')
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.12+
Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-29 03:06:02 -07:00
Willy Tarreau
352701c288 ALSA: emu10k1: fix possible info leak to userspace on SNDRV_EMU10K1_IOCTL_INFO
commit 49434c6c575d2008c0abbc93e615019f39e01252 upstream.

snd_emu10k1_fx8010_ioctl(SNDRV_EMU10K1_IOCTL_INFO) allocates
memory using kmalloc() and partially fills it by calling
snd_emu10k1_fx8010_info() before returning the resulting
structure to userspace, leaving uninitialized holes. Let's
just use kzalloc() here.

BugLink: http://blog.infosectcbr.com.au/2018/09/linux-kernel-infoleaks.html
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-29 03:06:02 -07:00
Takashi Sakamoto
7c4881d64e ALSA: bebob: use address returned by kmalloc() instead of kernel stack for streaming DMA mapping
commit 493626f2d87a74e6dbea1686499ed6e7e600484e upstream.

When executing 'fw_run_transaction()' with 'TCODE_WRITE_BLOCK_REQUEST',
an address of 'payload' argument is used for streaming DMA mapping by
'firewire_ohci' module if 'size' argument is larger than 8 byte.
Although in this case the address should not be on kernel stack, current
implementation of ALSA bebob driver uses data in kernel stack for a cue
to boot M-Audio devices. This often brings unexpected result, especially
for a case of CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y.

This commit fixes the bug.

Reference: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=201021
Reference: https://forum.manjaro.org/t/firewire-m-audio-410-driver-wont-load-firmware/51165
Fixes: a2b2a7798fb6('ALSA: bebob: Send a cue to load firmware for M-Audio Firewire series')
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.16+
Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-29 03:06:02 -07:00
Takashi Sakamoto
16b8c03864 ALSA: bebob: fix memory leak for M-Audio FW1814 and ProjectMix I/O at error path
commit b1fbebd4164b3d170ad916dcd692cf843c9c065d upstream.

After allocating model-dependent data for M-Audio FW1814 and ProjectMix
I/O, ALSA bebob driver has memory leak at error path.

This commit releases the allocated data at the error path.

Fixes: 04a2c73c97eb('ALSA: bebob: delayed registration of sound card')
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.7+
Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-29 03:06:02 -07:00
Jiada Wang
c7cf0304d4 ASoC: rsnd: fixup not to call clk_get/set under non-atomic
commit 4d230d12710646788af581ba0155d83ab48b955c upstream.

Clocking operations clk_get/set_rate, are non-atomic,
they shouldn't be called in soc_pcm_trigger() which is atomic.

Following issue was found due to execution of clk_get_rate() causes
sleep in soc_pcm_trigger(), which shouldn't be blocked.

We can reproduce this issue by following
	> enable CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP=y
	> compile, and boot
	> mount -t debugfs none /sys/kernel/debug
	> while true; do cat /sys/kernel/debug/clk/clk_summary > /dev/null; done &
	> while true; do aplay xxx; done

This patch adds support to .prepare callback, and moves non-atomic
clocking operations to it. As .prepare is non-atomic, it is always
called before trigger_start/trigger_stop.

	BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:620
	in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 128, pid: 2242, name: aplay
	INFO: lockdep is turned off.
	irq event stamp: 5964
	hardirqs last enabled at (5963): [<ffff200008e59e40>] mutex_lock_nested+0x6e8/0x6f0
	hardirqs last disabled at (5964): [<ffff200008e623f0>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x24/0x68
	softirqs last enabled at (5502): [<ffff200008081838>] __do_softirq+0x560/0x10c0
	softirqs last disabled at (5495): [<ffff2000080c2e78>] irq_exit+0x160/0x25c
	Preemption disabled at:[ 62.904063] [<ffff200008be4d48>] snd_pcm_stream_lock+0xb4/0xc0
	CPU: 2 PID: 2242 Comm: aplay Tainted: G B C 4.9.54+ #186
	Hardware name: Renesas Salvator-X board based on r8a7795 (DT)
	Call trace:
	[<ffff20000808fe48>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x37c
	[<ffff2000080901d8>] show_stack+0x14/0x1c
	[<ffff2000086f4458>] dump_stack+0xfc/0x154
	[<ffff2000081134a0>] ___might_sleep+0x57c/0x58c
	[<ffff2000081136b8>] __might_sleep+0x208/0x21c
	[<ffff200008e5980c>] mutex_lock_nested+0xb4/0x6f0
	[<ffff2000087cac74>] clk_prepare_lock+0xb0/0x184
	[<ffff2000087cb094>] clk_core_get_rate+0x14/0x54
	[<ffff2000087cb0f4>] clk_get_rate+0x20/0x34
	[<ffff20000113aa00>] rsnd_adg_ssi_clk_try_start+0x158/0x4f8 [snd_soc_rcar]
	[<ffff20000113da00>] rsnd_ssi_init+0x668/0x7a0 [snd_soc_rcar]
	[<ffff200001133ff4>] rsnd_soc_dai_trigger+0x4bc/0xcf8 [snd_soc_rcar]
	[<ffff200008c1af24>] soc_pcm_trigger+0x2a4/0x2d4

Fixes: e7d850dd10f4 ("ASoC: rsnd: use mod base common method on SSI-parent")
Signed-off-by: Jiada Wang <jiada_wang@mentor.com>
Signed-off-by: Timo Wischer <twischer@de.adit-jv.com>
[Kuninori: tidyup for upstream]
Signed-off-by: Kuninori Morimoto <kuninori.morimoto.gx@renesas.com>
Tested-by: Hiroyuki Yokoyama <hiroyuki.yokoyama.vx@renesas.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-29 03:06:02 -07:00
Sébastien Szymanski
a388e6d7a8 ASoC: cs4265: fix MMTLR Data switch control
commit 90a3b7f8aba3011badacd6d8121e03aa24ac79d1 upstream.

The MMTLR bit is in the CS4265_SPDIF_CTL2 register at address 0x12 bit 0
and not at address 0x0 bit 1. Fix this.

Signed-off-by: Sébastien Szymanski <sebastien.szymanski@armadeus.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-29 03:06:02 -07:00