46323 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Eiichi Tsukata
472970a3b5 vsock: prevent unnecessary refcnt inc for nonblocking connect
[ Upstream commit c7cd82b90599fa10915f41e3dd9098a77d0aa7b6 ]

Currently vosck_connect() increments sock refcount for nonblocking
socket each time it's called, which can lead to memory leak if
it's called multiple times because connect timeout function decrements
sock refcount only once.

Fixes it by making vsock_connect() return -EALREADY immediately when
sock state is already SS_CONNECTING.

Fixes: d021c344051a ("VSOCK: Introduce VM Sockets")
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eiichi Tsukata <eiichi.tsukata@nutanix.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-11-26 11:48:39 +01:00
Florian Westphal
e1e27f9ff1 netfilter: nfnetlink_queue: fix OOB when mac header was cleared
[ Upstream commit 5648b5e1169ff1d6d6a46c35c0b5fbebd2a5cbb2 ]

On 64bit platforms the MAC header is set to 0xffff on allocation and
also when a helper like skb_unset_mac_header() is called.

dev_parse_header may call skb_mac_header() which assumes valid mac offset:

 BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in eth_header_parse+0x75/0x90
 Read of size 6 at addr ffff8881075a5c05 by task nf-queue/1364
 Call Trace:
  memcpy+0x20/0x60
  eth_header_parse+0x75/0x90
  __nfqnl_enqueue_packet+0x1a61/0x3380
  __nf_queue+0x597/0x1300
  nf_queue+0xf/0x40
  nf_hook_slow+0xed/0x190
  nf_hook+0x184/0x440
  ip_output+0x1c0/0x2a0
  nf_reinject+0x26f/0x700
  nfqnl_recv_verdict+0xa16/0x18b0
  nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x506/0xe70

The existing code only works if the skb has a mac header.

Fixes: 2c38de4c1f8da7 ("netfilter: fix looped (broad|multi)cast's MAC handling")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-11-26 11:48:38 +01:00
Jakub Kicinski
7737b104c2 net: stream: don't purge sk_error_queue in sk_stream_kill_queues()
[ Upstream commit 24bcbe1cc69fa52dc4f7b5b2456678ed464724d8 ]

sk_stream_kill_queues() can be called on close when there are
still outstanding skbs to transmit. Those skbs may try to queue
notifications to the error queue (e.g. timestamps).
If sk_stream_kill_queues() purges the queue without taking
its lock the queue may get corrupted, and skbs leaked.

This shows up as a warning about an rmem leak:

WARNING: CPU: 24 PID: 0 at net/ipv4/af_inet.c:154 inet_sock_destruct+0x...

The leak is always a multiple of 0x300 bytes (the value is in
%rax on my builds, so RAX: 0000000000000300). 0x300 is truesize of
an empty sk_buff. Indeed if we dump the socket state at the time
of the warning the sk_error_queue is often (but not always)
corrupted. The ->next pointer points back at the list head,
but not the ->prev pointer. Indeed we can find the leaked skb
by scanning the kernel memory for something that looks like
an skb with ->sk = socket in question, and ->truesize = 0x300.
The contents of ->cb[] of the skb confirms the suspicion that
it is indeed a timestamp notification (as generated in
__skb_complete_tx_timestamp()).

Removing purging of sk_error_queue should be okay, since
inet_sock_destruct() does it again once all socket refs
are gone. Eric suggests this may cause sockets that go
thru disconnect() to maintain notifications from the
previous incarnations of the socket, but that should be
okay since the race was there anyway, and disconnect()
is not exactly dependable.

Thanks to Jonathan Lemon and Omar Sandoval for help at various
stages of tracing the issue.

Fixes: cb9eff097831 ("net: new user space API for time stamping of incoming and outgoing packets")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-11-26 11:48:34 +01:00
Wang ShaoBo
d19ea7da0e Bluetooth: fix use-after-free error in lock_sock_nested()
[ Upstream commit 1bff51ea59a9afb67d2dd78518ab0582a54a472c ]

use-after-free error in lock_sock_nested is reported:

[  179.140137][ T3731] =====================================================
[  179.142675][ T3731] BUG: KMSAN: use-after-free in lock_sock_nested+0x280/0x2c0
[  179.145494][ T3731] CPU: 4 PID: 3731 Comm: kworker/4:2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ 
[  179.148432][ T3731] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
[  179.151806][ T3731] Workqueue: events l2cap_chan_timeout
[  179.152730][ T3731] Call Trace:
[  179.153301][ T3731]  dump_stack+0x24c/0x2e0
[  179.154063][ T3731]  kmsan_report+0xfb/0x1e0
[  179.154855][ T3731]  __msan_warning+0x5c/0xa0
[  179.155579][ T3731]  lock_sock_nested+0x280/0x2c0
[  179.156436][ T3731]  ? kmsan_get_metadata+0x116/0x180
[  179.157257][ T3731]  l2cap_sock_teardown_cb+0xb8/0x890
[  179.158154][ T3731]  ? __msan_metadata_ptr_for_load_8+0x10/0x20
[  179.159141][ T3731]  ? kmsan_get_metadata+0x116/0x180
[  179.159994][ T3731]  ? kmsan_get_shadow_origin_ptr+0x84/0xb0
[  179.160959][ T3731]  ? l2cap_sock_recv_cb+0x420/0x420
[  179.161834][ T3731]  l2cap_chan_del+0x3e1/0x1d50
[  179.162608][ T3731]  ? kmsan_get_metadata+0x116/0x180
[  179.163435][ T3731]  ? kmsan_get_shadow_origin_ptr+0x84/0xb0
[  179.164406][ T3731]  l2cap_chan_close+0xeea/0x1050
[  179.165189][ T3731]  ? kmsan_internal_unpoison_shadow+0x42/0x70
[  179.166180][ T3731]  l2cap_chan_timeout+0x1da/0x590
[  179.167066][ T3731]  ? __msan_metadata_ptr_for_load_8+0x10/0x20
[  179.168023][ T3731]  ? l2cap_chan_create+0x560/0x560
[  179.168818][ T3731]  process_one_work+0x121d/0x1ff0
[  179.169598][ T3731]  worker_thread+0x121b/0x2370
[  179.170346][ T3731]  kthread+0x4ef/0x610
[  179.171010][ T3731]  ? process_one_work+0x1ff0/0x1ff0
[  179.171828][ T3731]  ? kthread_blkcg+0x110/0x110
[  179.172587][ T3731]  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[  179.173348][ T3731]
[  179.173752][ T3731] Uninit was created at:
[  179.174409][ T3731]  kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0x5c/0xf0
[  179.175373][ T3731]  kmsan_slab_free+0x76/0xc0
[  179.176060][ T3731]  kfree+0x3a5/0x1180
[  179.176664][ T3731]  __sk_destruct+0x8af/0xb80
[  179.177375][ T3731]  __sk_free+0x812/0x8c0
[  179.178032][ T3731]  sk_free+0x97/0x130
[  179.178686][ T3731]  l2cap_sock_release+0x3d5/0x4d0
[  179.179457][ T3731]  sock_close+0x150/0x450
[  179.180117][ T3731]  __fput+0x6bd/0xf00
[  179.180787][ T3731]  ____fput+0x37/0x40
[  179.181481][ T3731]  task_work_run+0x140/0x280
[  179.182219][ T3731]  do_exit+0xe51/0x3e60
[  179.182930][ T3731]  do_group_exit+0x20e/0x450
[  179.183656][ T3731]  get_signal+0x2dfb/0x38f0
[  179.184344][ T3731]  arch_do_signal_or_restart+0xaa/0xe10
[  179.185266][ T3731]  exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x2d2/0x560
[  179.186136][ T3731]  syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x35/0x60
[  179.186984][ T3731]  do_syscall_64+0xc5/0x140
[  179.187681][ T3731]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[  179.188604][ T3731] =====================================================

In our case, there are two Thread A and B:

Context: Thread A:              Context: Thread B:

l2cap_chan_timeout()            __se_sys_shutdown()
  l2cap_chan_close()              l2cap_sock_shutdown()
    l2cap_chan_del()                l2cap_chan_close()
      l2cap_sock_teardown_cb()        l2cap_sock_teardown_cb()

Once l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() excuted, this sock will be marked as SOCK_ZAPPED,
and can be treated as killable in l2cap_sock_kill() if sock_orphan() has
excuted, at this time we close sock through sock_close() which end to call
l2cap_sock_kill() like Thread C:

Context: Thread C:

sock_close()
  l2cap_sock_release()
    sock_orphan()
    l2cap_sock_kill()  #free sock if refcnt is 1

If C completed, Once A or B reaches l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() again,
use-after-free happened.

We should set chan->data to NULL if sock is destructed, for telling teardown
operation is not allowed in l2cap_sock_teardown_cb(), and also we should
avoid killing an already killed socket in l2cap_sock_close_cb().

Signed-off-by: Wang ShaoBo <bobo.shaobowang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-11-26 11:48:27 +01:00
Takashi Iwai
9bbe312ebe Bluetooth: sco: Fix lock_sock() blockage by memcpy_from_msg()
[ Upstream commit 99c23da0eed4fd20cae8243f2b51e10e66aa0951 ]

The sco_send_frame() also takes lock_sock() during memcpy_from_msg()
call that may be endlessly blocked by a task with userfaultd
technique, and this will result in a hung task watchdog trigger.

Just like the similar fix for hci_sock_sendmsg() in commit
92c685dc5de0 ("Bluetooth: reorganize functions..."), this patch moves
the  memcpy_from_msg() out of lock_sock() for addressing the hang.

This should be the last piece for fixing CVE-2021-3640 after a few
already queued fixes.

Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-11-26 11:48:26 +01:00
Lorenz Bauer
045644540e bpf: Prevent increasing bpf_jit_limit above max
[ Upstream commit fadb7ff1a6c2c565af56b4aacdd086b067eed440 ]

Restrict bpf_jit_limit to the maximum supported by the arch's JIT.

Signed-off-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20211014142554.53120-4-lmb@cloudflare.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-11-26 11:48:20 +01:00
Xin Long
16d0bfb045 sctp: add vtag check in sctp_sf_violation
[ Upstream commit aa0f697e45286a6b5f0ceca9418acf54b9099d99 ]

sctp_sf_violation() is called when processing HEARTBEAT_ACK chunk
in cookie_wait state, and some other places are also using it.

The vtag in the chunk's sctphdr should be verified, otherwise, as
later in chunk length check, it may send abort with the existent
asoc's vtag, which can be exploited by one to cook a malicious
chunk to terminate a SCTP asoc.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-11-02 17:39:23 +01:00
Xin Long
42ce7a69f8 sctp: use init_tag from inithdr for ABORT chunk
[ Upstream commit 4f7019c7eb33967eb87766e0e4602b5576873680 ]

Currently Linux SCTP uses the verification tag of the existing SCTP
asoc when failing to process and sending the packet with the ABORT
chunk. This will result in the peer accepting the ABORT chunk and
removing the SCTP asoc. One could exploit this to terminate a SCTP
asoc.

This patch is to fix it by always using the initiate tag of the
received INIT chunk for the ABORT chunk to be sent.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-11-02 17:39:23 +01:00
Pavel Skripkin
07533f1a67 net: batman-adv: fix error handling
commit 6f68cd634856f8ca93bafd623ba5357e0f648c68 upstream.

Syzbot reported ODEBUG warning in batadv_nc_mesh_free(). The problem was
in wrong error handling in batadv_mesh_init().

Before this patch batadv_mesh_init() was calling batadv_mesh_free() in case
of any batadv_*_init() calls failure. This approach may work well, when
there is some kind of indicator, which can tell which parts of batadv are
initialized; but there isn't any.

All written above lead to cleaning up uninitialized fields. Even if we hide
ODEBUG warning by initializing bat_priv->nc.work, syzbot was able to hit
GPF in batadv_nc_purge_paths(), because hash pointer in still NULL. [1]

To fix these bugs we can unwind batadv_*_init() calls one by one.
It is good approach for 2 reasons: 1) It fixes bugs on error handling
path 2) It improves the performance, since we won't call unneeded
batadv_*_free() functions.

So, this patch makes all batadv_*_init() clean up all allocated memory
before returning with an error to no call correspoing batadv_*_free()
and open-codes batadv_mesh_free() with proper order to avoid touching
uninitialized fields.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/000000000000c87fbd05cef6bcb0@google.com/ [1]
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+28b0702ada0bf7381f58@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: c6c8fea29769 ("net: Add batman-adv meshing protocol")
Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-11-02 17:39:23 +01:00
Vegard Nossum
a0dfc9d195 netfilter: Kconfig: use 'default y' instead of 'm' for bool config option
commit 77076934afdcd46516caf18ed88b2f88025c9ddb upstream.

This option, NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK, is a bool, so it can never be 'm'.

Fixes: 33b8e77605620 ("[NETFILTER]: Add CONFIG_NETFILTER_ADVANCED option")
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-10-27 09:34:00 +02:00
Lin Ma
8a44904ce8 nfc: nci: fix the UAF of rf_conn_info object
commit 1b1499a817c90fd1ce9453a2c98d2a01cca0e775 upstream.

The nci_core_conn_close_rsp_packet() function will release the conn_info
with given conn_id. However, it needs to set the rf_conn_info to NULL to
prevent other routines like nci_rf_intf_activated_ntf_packet() to trigger
the UAF.

Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-10-27 09:34:00 +02:00
Antoine Tenart
cb9094f408 netfilter: ipvs: make global sysctl readonly in non-init netns
[ Upstream commit 174c376278949c44aad89c514a6b5db6cee8db59 ]

Because the data pointer of net/ipv4/vs/debug_level is not updated per
netns, it must be marked as read-only in non-init netns.

Fixes: c6d2d445d8de ("IPVS: netns, final patch enabling network name space.")
Signed-off-by: Antoine Tenart <atenart@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-10-27 09:33:59 +02:00
Ziyang Xuan
88c890b0b9 NFC: digital: fix possible memory leak in digital_in_send_sdd_req()
commit 291c932fc3692e4d211a445ba8aa35663831bac7 upstream.

'skb' is allocated in digital_in_send_sdd_req(), but not free when
digital_in_send_cmd() failed, which will cause memory leak. Fix it
by freeing 'skb' if digital_in_send_cmd() return failed.

Fixes: 2c66daecc409 ("NFC Digital: Add NFC-A technology support")
Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-10-27 09:33:59 +02:00
Ziyang Xuan
a67d47e32c NFC: digital: fix possible memory leak in digital_tg_listen_mdaa()
commit 58e7dcc9ca29c14e44267a4d0ea61e3229124907 upstream.

'params' is allocated in digital_tg_listen_mdaa(), but not free when
digital_send_cmd() failed, which will cause memory leak. Fix it by
freeing 'params' if digital_send_cmd() return failed.

Fixes: 1c7a4c24fbfd ("NFC Digital: Add target NFC-DEP support")
Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-10-27 09:33:58 +02:00
Ziyang Xuan
9285dbe896 nfc: fix error handling of nfc_proto_register()
commit 0911ab31896f0e908540746414a77dd63912748d upstream.

When nfc proto id is using, nfc_proto_register() return -EBUSY error
code, but forgot to unregister proto. Fix it by adding proto_unregister()
in the error handling case.

Fixes: c7fe3b52c128 ("NFC: add NFC socket family")
Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211013034932.2833737-1-william.xuanziyang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-10-27 09:33:58 +02:00
YueHaibing
2db11e4501 mac80211: Drop frames from invalid MAC address in ad-hoc mode
[ Upstream commit a6555f844549cd190eb060daef595f94d3de1582 ]

WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 9 at net/mac80211/sta_info.c:554
sta_info_insert_rcu+0x121/0x12a0
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/u8:1 Not tainted 5.14.0-rc7+ 
Workqueue: phy3 ieee80211_iface_work
RIP: 0010:sta_info_insert_rcu+0x121/0x12a0
...
Call Trace:
 ieee80211_ibss_finish_sta+0xbc/0x170
 ieee80211_ibss_work+0x13f/0x7d0
 ieee80211_iface_work+0x37a/0x500
 process_one_work+0x357/0x850
 worker_thread+0x41/0x4d0

If an Ad-Hoc node receives packets with invalid source MAC address,
it hits a WARN_ON in sta_info_insert_check(), this can spam the log.

Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210827144230.39944-1-yuehaibing@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-10-17 10:05:40 +02:00
Jeremy Sowden
a86b3285f3 netfilter: ip6_tables: zero-initialize fragment offset
[ Upstream commit 310e2d43c3ad429c1fba4b175806cf1f55ed73a6 ]

ip6tables only sets the `IP6T_F_PROTO` flag on a rule if a protocol is
specified (`-p tcp`, for example).  However, if the flag is not set,
`ip6_packet_match` doesn't call `ipv6_find_hdr` for the skb, in which
case the fragment offset is left uninitialized and a garbage value is
passed to each matcher.

Signed-off-by: Jeremy Sowden <jeremy@azazel.net>
Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-10-17 10:05:40 +02:00
Eric Dumazet
9e3614f513 rtnetlink: fix if_nlmsg_stats_size() under estimation
[ Upstream commit d34367991933d28bd7331f67a759be9a8c474014 ]

rtnl_fill_statsinfo() is filling skb with one mandatory if_stats_msg structure.

nlmsg_put(skb, pid, seq, type, sizeof(struct if_stats_msg), flags);

But if_nlmsg_stats_size() never considered the needed storage.

This bug did not show up because alloc_skb(X) allocates skb with
extra tailroom, because of added alignments. This could very well
be changed in the future to have deterministic behavior.

Fixes: 10c9ead9f3c6 ("rtnetlink: add new RTM_GETSTATS message to dump link stats")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Roopa Prabhu <roopa@nvidia.com>
Acked-by: Roopa Prabhu <roopa@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-10-17 10:05:39 +02:00
Eric Dumazet
edaf13a293 netlink: annotate data races around nlk->bound
[ Upstream commit 7707a4d01a648e4c655101a469c956cb11273655 ]

While existing code is correct, KCSAN is reporting
a data-race in netlink_insert / netlink_sendmsg [1]

It is correct to read nlk->bound without a lock, as netlink_autobind()
will acquire all needed locks.

[1]
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in netlink_insert / netlink_sendmsg

write to 0xffff8881031c8b30 of 1 bytes by task 18752 on cpu 0:
 netlink_insert+0x5cc/0x7f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:597
 netlink_autobind+0xa9/0x150 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:842
 netlink_sendmsg+0x479/0x7c0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1892
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:703 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:723 [inline]
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x360/0x4d0 net/socket.c:2392
 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2446 [inline]
 __sys_sendmsg+0x1ed/0x270 net/socket.c:2475
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2484 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2482 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x42/0x50 net/socket.c:2482
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

read to 0xffff8881031c8b30 of 1 bytes by task 18751 on cpu 1:
 netlink_sendmsg+0x270/0x7c0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1891
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:703 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:723 [inline]
 __sys_sendto+0x2a8/0x370 net/socket.c:2019
 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2031 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2027 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendto+0x74/0x90 net/socket.c:2027
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

value changed: 0x00 -> 0x01

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 18751 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.14.0-rc1-syzkaller 
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011

Fixes: da314c9923fe ("netlink: Replace rhash_portid with bound")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-10-17 10:05:39 +02:00
Eric Dumazet
49c85ce900 net: bridge: use nla_total_size_64bit() in br_get_linkxstats_size()
[ Upstream commit dbe0b88064494b7bb6a9b2aa7e085b14a3112d44 ]

bridge_fill_linkxstats() is using nla_reserve_64bit().

We must use nla_total_size_64bit() instead of nla_total_size()
for corresponding data structure.

Fixes: 1080ab95e3c7 ("net: bridge: add support for IGMP/MLD stats and export them via netlink")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@nvidia.com>
Cc: Vivien Didelot <vivien.didelot@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-10-17 10:05:39 +02:00
Eric Dumazet
08d7056e8e net_sched: fix NULL deref in fifo_set_limit()
[ Upstream commit 560ee196fe9e5037e5015e2cdb14b3aecb1cd7dc ]

syzbot reported another NULL deref in fifo_set_limit() [1]

I could repro the issue with :

unshare -n
tc qd add dev lo root handle 1:0 tbf limit 200000 burst 70000 rate 100Mbit
tc qd replace dev lo parent 1:0 pfifo_fast
tc qd change dev lo root handle 1:0 tbf limit 300000 burst 70000 rate 100Mbit

pfifo_fast does not have a change() operation.
Make fifo_set_limit() more robust about this.

[1]
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
PGD 1cf99067 P4D 1cf99067 PUD 7ca49067 PMD 0
Oops: 0010 [] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 1 PID: 14443 Comm: syz-executor959 Not tainted 5.15.0-rc3-syzkaller 
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:0x0
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0xffffffffffffffd6.
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000e2f7310 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffffff8d6ecc00 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff888024c27910 RDI: ffff888071e34000
RBP: ffff888071e34000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffffff8fcfb947
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888024c27910
R13: ffff888071e34018 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88801ef74800
FS:  00007f321d897700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 00000000722c3000 CR4: 00000000003506e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 fifo_set_limit net/sched/sch_fifo.c:242 [inline]
 fifo_set_limit+0x198/0x210 net/sched/sch_fifo.c:227
 tbf_change+0x6ec/0x16d0 net/sched/sch_tbf.c:418
 qdisc_change net/sched/sch_api.c:1332 [inline]
 tc_modify_qdisc+0xd9a/0x1a60 net/sched/sch_api.c:1634
 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x413/0xb80 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5572
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2504
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1314 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1340
 netlink_sendmsg+0x86d/0xdb0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1929
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:704 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:724
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2409
 ___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2463
 __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2492
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Fixes: fb0305ce1b03 ("net-sched: consolidate default fifo qdisc setup")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210930212239.3430364-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-10-17 10:05:39 +02:00
Eric Dumazet
09818f629b af_unix: fix races in sk_peer_pid and sk_peer_cred accesses
commit 35306eb23814444bd4021f8a1c3047d3cb0c8b2b upstream.

Jann Horn reported that SO_PEERCRED and SO_PEERGROUPS implementations
are racy, as af_unix can concurrently change sk_peer_pid and sk_peer_cred.

In order to fix this issue, this patch adds a new spinlock that needs
to be used whenever these fields are read or written.

Jann also pointed out that l2cap_sock_get_peer_pid_cb() is currently
reading sk->sk_peer_pid which makes no sense, as this field
is only possibly set by AF_UNIX sockets.
We will have to clean this in a separate patch.
This could be done by reverting b48596d1dc25 "Bluetooth: L2CAP: Add get_peer_pid callback"
or implementing what was truly expected.

Fixes: 109f6e39fa07 ("af_unix: Allow SO_PEERCRED to work across namespaces.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[backport note: 4.4 and 4.9 don't have SO_PEERGROUPS, only SO_PEERCRED]
[backport note: got rid of sk_get_peer_cred(), no users in 4.4/4.9]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-10-09 13:25:58 +02:00
Jozsef Kadlecsik
c3a2856d3d netfilter: ipset: Fix oversized kvmalloc() calls
commit 7bbc3d385bd813077acaf0e6fdb2a86a901f5382 upstream.

The commit

commit 7661809d493b426e979f39ab512e3adf41fbcc69
Author: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Date:   Wed Jul 14 09:45:49 2021 -0700

    mm: don't allow oversized kvmalloc() calls

limits the max allocatable memory via kvmalloc() to MAX_INT. Apply the
same limit in ipset.

Reported-by: syzbot+3493b1873fb3ea827986@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+2b8443c35458a617c904@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+ee5cb15f4a0e85e0d54e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-10-06 10:23:43 +02:00
Eric Dumazet
b8e3343e11 net: udp: annotate data race around udp_sk(sk)->corkflag
commit a9f5970767d11eadc805d5283f202612c7ba1f59 upstream.

up->corkflag field can be read or written without any lock.
Annotate accesses to avoid possible syzbot/KCSAN reports.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-10-06 10:23:42 +02:00
Lorenzo Bianconi
e5bb852aa2 mac80211: limit injected vht mcs/nss in ieee80211_parse_tx_radiotap
[ Upstream commit 13cb6d826e0ac0d144b0d48191ff1a111d32f0c6 ]

Limit max values for vht mcs and nss in ieee80211_parse_tx_radiotap
routine in order to fix the following warning reported by syzbot:

WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 10717 at include/net/mac80211.h:989 ieee80211_rate_set_vht include/net/mac80211.h:989 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 10717 at include/net/mac80211.h:989 ieee80211_parse_tx_radiotap+0x101e/0x12d0 net/mac80211/tx.c:2244
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 10717 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.14.0-syzkaller 
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:ieee80211_rate_set_vht include/net/mac80211.h:989 [inline]
RIP: 0010:ieee80211_parse_tx_radiotap+0x101e/0x12d0 net/mac80211/tx.c:2244
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000186f3e8 EFLAGS: 00010216
RAX: 0000000000000618 RBX: ffff88804ef76500 RCX: ffffc900143a5000
RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: ffffffff888f478e RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000ffffffff R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000100
R10: ffffffff888f46f9 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000fffffff8
R13: ffff88804ef7653c R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000004
FS:  00007fbf5718f700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000001b2de23000 CR3: 000000006a671000 CR4: 00000000001506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600
Call Trace:
 ieee80211_monitor_select_queue+0xa6/0x250 net/mac80211/iface.c:740
 netdev_core_pick_tx+0x169/0x2e0 net/core/dev.c:4089
 __dev_queue_xmit+0x6f9/0x3710 net/core/dev.c:4165
 __bpf_tx_skb net/core/filter.c:2114 [inline]
 __bpf_redirect_no_mac net/core/filter.c:2139 [inline]
 __bpf_redirect+0x5ba/0xd20 net/core/filter.c:2162
 ____bpf_clone_redirect net/core/filter.c:2429 [inline]
 bpf_clone_redirect+0x2ae/0x420 net/core/filter.c:2401
 bpf_prog_eeb6f53a69e5c6a2+0x59/0x234
 bpf_dispatcher_nop_func include/linux/bpf.h:717 [inline]
 __bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:624 [inline]
 bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:631 [inline]
 bpf_test_run+0x381/0xa30 net/bpf/test_run.c:119
 bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0xb84/0x1ee0 net/bpf/test_run.c:663
 bpf_prog_test_run kernel/bpf/syscall.c:3307 [inline]
 __sys_bpf+0x2137/0x5df0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4605
 __do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4691 [inline]
 __se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4689 [inline]
 __x64_sys_bpf+0x75/0xb0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4689
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x4665f9

Reported-by: syzbot+0196ac871673f0c20f68@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 646e76bb5daf4 ("mac80211: parse VHT info in injected frames")
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c26c3f02dcb38ab63b2f2534cb463d95ee81bb13.1632141760.git.lorenzo@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-10-06 10:23:41 +02:00
Andrea Claudi
ed0d756e92 ipvs: check that ip_vs_conn_tab_bits is between 8 and 20
[ Upstream commit 69e73dbfda14fbfe748d3812da1244cce2928dcb ]

ip_vs_conn_tab_bits may be provided by the user through the
conn_tab_bits module parameter. If this value is greater than 31, or
less than 0, the shift operator used to derive tab_size causes undefined
behaviour.

Fix this checking ip_vs_conn_tab_bits value to be in the range specified
in ipvs Kconfig. If not, simply use default value.

Fixes: 6f7edb4881bf ("IPVS: Allow boot time change of hash size")
Reported-by: Yi Chen <yiche@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Claudi <aclaudi@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Acked-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-10-06 10:23:41 +02:00
Johannes Berg
31de381aef mac80211: fix use-after-free in CCMP/GCMP RX
commit 94513069eb549737bcfc3d988d6ed4da948a2de8 upstream.

When PN checking is done in mac80211, for fragmentation we need
to copy the PN to the RX struct so we can later use it to do a
comparison, since commit bf30ca922a0c ("mac80211: check defrag
PN against current frame").

Unfortunately, in that commit I used the 'hdr' variable without
it being necessarily valid, so use-after-free could occur if it
was necessary to reallocate (parts of) the frame.

Fix this by reloading the variable after the code that results
in the reallocations, if any.

This fixes https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=214401.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: bf30ca922a0c ("mac80211: check defrag PN against current frame")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210927115838.12b9ac6bb233.I1d066acd5408a662c3b6e828122cd314fcb28cdb@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-10-06 10:23:41 +02:00
Marcelo Ricardo Leitner
92e7bca984 sctp: validate from_addr_param return
commit 0c5dc070ff3d6246d22ddd931f23a6266249e3db upstream.

Ilja reported that, simply putting it, nothing was validating that
from_addr_param functions were operating on initialized memory. That is,
the parameter itself was being validated by sctp_walk_params, but it
doesn't check for types and their specific sizes and it could be a 0-length
one, causing from_addr_param to potentially work over the next parameter or
even uninitialized memory.

The fix here is to, in all calls to from_addr_param, check if enough space
is there for the wanted IP address type.

Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-09-26 13:36:19 +02:00
Xie Yongji
591777ef0a 9p/trans_virtio: Remove sysfs file on probe failure
commit f997ea3b7afc108eb9761f321b57de2d089c7c48 upstream.

This ensures we don't leak the sysfs file if we failed to
allocate chan->vc_wq during probe.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210517083557.172-1-xieyongji@bytedance.com
Fixes: 86c8437383ac ("net/9p: Add sysfs mount_tag file for virtio 9P device")
Signed-off-by: Xie Yongji <xieyongji@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet <asmadeus@codewreck.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-09-26 13:36:18 +02:00
Marcelo Ricardo Leitner
4d2de0d232 sctp: add param size validation for SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY
commit ef6c8d6ccf0c1dccdda092ebe8782777cd7803c9 upstream.

When SCTP handles an INIT chunk, it calls for example:
sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init
  sctp_verify_init
    sctp_verify_param
  sctp_process_init
    sctp_process_param
      handling of SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY

sctp_verify_init() wasn't doing proper size validation and neither the
later handling, allowing it to work over the chunk itself, possibly being
uninitialized memory.

Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-09-26 13:36:18 +02:00
Marcelo Ricardo Leitner
6b53618688 sctp: validate chunk size in __rcv_asconf_lookup
commit b6ffe7671b24689c09faa5675dd58f93758a97ae upstream.

In one of the fallbacks that SCTP has for identifying an association for an
incoming packet, it looks for AddIp chunk (from ASCONF) and take a peek.
Thing is, at this stage nothing was validating that the chunk actually had
enough content for that, allowing the peek to happen over uninitialized
memory.

Similar check already exists in actual asconf handling in
sctp_verify_asconf().

Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-09-26 13:36:18 +02:00
zhenggy
b3507f2bef tcp: fix tp->undo_retrans accounting in tcp_sacktag_one()
commit 4f884f3962767877d7aabbc1ec124d2c307a4257 upstream.

Commit 10d3be569243 ("tcp-tso: do not split TSO packets at retransmit
time") may directly retrans a multiple segments TSO/GSO packet without
split, Since this commit, we can no longer assume that a retransmitted
packet is a single segment.

This patch fixes the tp->undo_retrans accounting in tcp_sacktag_one()
that use the actual segments(pcount) of the retransmitted packet.

Before that commit (10d3be569243), the assumption underlying the
tp->undo_retrans-- seems correct.

Fixes: 10d3be569243 ("tcp-tso: do not split TSO packets at retransmit time")
Signed-off-by: zhenggy <zhenggy@chinatelecom.cn>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-09-22 11:43:09 +02:00
Eric Dumazet
69407175c6 net/af_unix: fix a data-race in unix_dgram_poll
commit 04f08eb44b5011493d77b602fdec29ff0f5c6cd5 upstream.

syzbot reported another data-race in af_unix [1]

Lets change __skb_insert() to use WRITE_ONCE() when changing
skb head qlen.

Also, change unix_dgram_poll() to use lockless version
of unix_recvq_full()

It is verry possible we can switch all/most unix_recvq_full()
to the lockless version, this will be done in a future kernel version.

[1] HEAD commit: 8596e589b787732c8346f0482919e83cc9362db1

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in skb_queue_tail / unix_dgram_poll

write to 0xffff88814eeb24e0 of 4 bytes by task 25815 on cpu 0:
 __skb_insert include/linux/skbuff.h:1938 [inline]
 __skb_queue_before include/linux/skbuff.h:2043 [inline]
 __skb_queue_tail include/linux/skbuff.h:2076 [inline]
 skb_queue_tail+0x80/0xa0 net/core/skbuff.c:3264
 unix_dgram_sendmsg+0xff2/0x1600 net/unix/af_unix.c:1850
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:703 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:723 [inline]
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x360/0x4d0 net/socket.c:2392
 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2446 [inline]
 __sys_sendmmsg+0x315/0x4b0 net/socket.c:2532
 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2561 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2558 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x53/0x60 net/socket.c:2558
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

read to 0xffff88814eeb24e0 of 4 bytes by task 25834 on cpu 1:
 skb_queue_len include/linux/skbuff.h:1869 [inline]
 unix_recvq_full net/unix/af_unix.c:194 [inline]
 unix_dgram_poll+0x2bc/0x3e0 net/unix/af_unix.c:2777
 sock_poll+0x23e/0x260 net/socket.c:1288
 vfs_poll include/linux/poll.h:90 [inline]
 ep_item_poll fs/eventpoll.c:846 [inline]
 ep_send_events fs/eventpoll.c:1683 [inline]
 ep_poll fs/eventpoll.c:1798 [inline]
 do_epoll_wait+0x6ad/0xf00 fs/eventpoll.c:2226
 __do_sys_epoll_wait fs/eventpoll.c:2238 [inline]
 __se_sys_epoll_wait fs/eventpoll.c:2233 [inline]
 __x64_sys_epoll_wait+0xf6/0x120 fs/eventpoll.c:2233
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

value changed: 0x0000001b -> 0x00000001

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 25834 Comm: syz-executor.1 Tainted: G        W         5.14.0-syzkaller 
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011

Fixes: 86b18aaa2b5b ("skbuff: fix a data race in skb_queue_len()")
Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-09-22 11:43:09 +02:00
Hoang Le
de9b2e5256 tipc: increase timeout in tipc_sk_enqueue()
commit f4bb62e64c88c93060c051195d3bbba804e56945 upstream.

In tipc_sk_enqueue() we use hardcoded 2 jiffies to extract
socket buffer from generic queue to particular socket.
The 2 jiffies is too short in case there are other high priority
tasks get CPU cycles for multiple jiffies update. As result, no
buffer could be enqueued to particular socket.

To solve this, we switch to use constant timeout 20msecs.
Then, the function will be expired between 2 jiffies (CONFIG_100HZ)
and 20 jiffies (CONFIG_1000HZ).

Fixes: c637c1035534 ("tipc: resolve race problem at unicast message reception")
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hoang Le <hoang.h.le@dektech.com.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-09-22 11:43:09 +02:00
Xiyu Yang
41a59c6f1f net/l2tp: Fix reference count leak in l2tp_udp_recv_core
commit 9b6ff7eb666415e1558f1ba8a742f5db6a9954de upstream.

The reference count leak issue may take place in an error handling
path. If both conditions of tunnel->version == L2TP_HDR_VER_3 and the
return value of l2tp_v3_ensure_opt_in_linear is nonzero, the function
would directly jump to label invalid, without decrementing the reference
count of the l2tp_session object session increased earlier by
l2tp_tunnel_get_session(). This may result in refcount leaks.

Fix this issue by decrease the reference count before jumping to the
label invalid.

Fixes: 4522a70db7aa ("l2tp: fix reading optional fields of L2TPv3")
Signed-off-by: Xiyu Yang <xiyuyang19@fudan.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Xin Xiong <xiongx18@fudan.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Xin Tan <tanxin.ctf@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-09-22 11:43:09 +02:00
Lin, Zhenpeng
40ea36ffa7 dccp: don't duplicate ccid when cloning dccp sock
commit d9ea761fdd197351890418acd462c51f241014a7 upstream.

Commit 2677d2067731 ("dccp: don't free ccid2_hc_tx_sock ...") fixed
a UAF but reintroduced CVE-2017-6074.

When the sock is cloned, two dccps_hc_tx_ccid will reference to the
same ccid. So one can free the ccid object twice from two socks after
cloning.

This issue was found by "Hadar Manor" as well and assigned with
CVE-2020-16119, which was fixed in Ubuntu's kernel. So here I port
the patch from Ubuntu to fix it.

The patch prevents cloned socks from referencing the same ccid.

Fixes: 2677d2067731410 ("dccp: don't free ccid2_hc_tx_sock ...")
Signed-off-by: Zhenpeng Lin <zplin@psu.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-09-22 11:43:09 +02:00
Eric Dumazet
2416ca634e net-caif: avoid user-triggerable WARN_ON(1)
commit 550ac9c1aaaaf51fd42e20d461f0b1cdbd55b3d2 upstream.

syszbot triggers this warning, which looks something
we can easily prevent.

If we initialize priv->list_field in chnl_net_init(),
then always use list_del_init(), we can remove robust_list_del()
completely.

WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3233 at net/caif/chnl_net.c:67 robust_list_del net/caif/chnl_net.c:67 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3233 at net/caif/chnl_net.c:67 chnl_net_uninit+0xc9/0x2e0 net/caif/chnl_net.c:375
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 3233 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.14.0-syzkaller 
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:robust_list_del net/caif/chnl_net.c:67 [inline]
RIP: 0010:chnl_net_uninit+0xc9/0x2e0 net/caif/chnl_net.c:375
Code: 89 eb e8 3a a3 ba f8 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 28 00 0f 85 bf 01 00 00 48 81 fb 00 14 4e 8d 48 8b 2b 75 d0 e8 17 a3 ba f8 <0f> 0b 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d e9 0a a3 ba f8 4c 89 e3 e8 02 a3 ba f8 4c
RSP: 0018:ffffc90009067248 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000008780 RBX: ffffffff8d4e1400 RCX: ffffc9000fd34000
RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: ffffffff88bb6e49 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: ffff88802cd9ee08 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff8d0e6647
R10: ffffffff88bb6dc2 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88803791ae08
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 00000000e600ffce R15: ffff888073ed3480
FS:  00007fed10fa0700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000001b2c322000 CR3: 00000000164a6000 CR4: 00000000001506e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 register_netdevice+0xadf/0x1500 net/core/dev.c:10347
 ipcaif_newlink+0x4c/0x260 net/caif/chnl_net.c:468
 __rtnl_newlink+0x106d/0x1750 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3458
 rtnl_newlink+0x64/0xa0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3506
 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x413/0xb80 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5572
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2504
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1314 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1340
 netlink_sendmsg+0x86d/0xdb0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1929
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:704 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:724
 __sys_sendto+0x21c/0x320 net/socket.c:2036
 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2048 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2044 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendto+0xdd/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2044
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Fixes: cc36a070b590 ("net-caif: add CAIF netdevice")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-09-22 11:43:09 +02:00
王贇
1a694b9977 net: fix NULL pointer reference in cipso_v4_doi_free
[ Upstream commit 733c99ee8be9a1410287cdbb943887365e83b2d6 ]

In netlbl_cipsov4_add_std() when 'doi_def->map.std' alloc
failed, we sometime observe panic:

  BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address:
  ...
  RIP: 0010:cipso_v4_doi_free+0x3a/0x80
  ...
  Call Trace:
   netlbl_cipsov4_add_std+0xf4/0x8c0
   netlbl_cipsov4_add+0x13f/0x1b0
   genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.15+0x132/0x170
   genl_rcv_msg+0x125/0x240

This is because in cipso_v4_doi_free() there is no check
on 'doi_def->map.std' when 'doi_def->type' equal 1, which
is possibe, since netlbl_cipsov4_add_std() haven't initialize
it before alloc 'doi_def->map.std'.

This patch just add the check to prevent panic happen for similar
cases.

Reported-by: Abaci <abaci@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Wang <yun.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-09-22 11:43:08 +02:00
J. Bruce Fields
470eb6e956 rpc: fix gss_svc_init cleanup on failure
[ Upstream commit 5a4753446253a427c0ff1e433b9c4933e5af207c ]

The failure case here should be rare, but it's obviously wrong.

Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-09-22 11:43:07 +02:00
Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi
2240cbbd0d Bluetooth: avoid circular locks in sco_sock_connect
[ Upstream commit 734bc5ff783115aa3164f4e9dd5967ae78e0a8ab ]

In a future patch, calls to bh_lock_sock in sco.c should be replaced
by lock_sock now that none of the functions are run in IRQ context.

However, doing so results in a circular locking dependency:

======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
5.14.0-rc4-syzkaller  Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syz-executor.2/14867 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff88803e3c1120 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_SCO){+.+.}-{0:0}, at:
lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1613 [inline]
ffff88803e3c1120 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_SCO){+.+.}-{0:0}, at:
sco_conn_del+0x12a/0x2a0 net/bluetooth/sco.c:191

but task is already holding lock:
ffffffff8d2dc7c8 (hci_cb_list_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at:
hci_disconn_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:1497 [inline]
ffffffff8d2dc7c8 (hci_cb_list_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at:
hci_conn_hash_flush+0xda/0x260 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1608

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

->  (hci_cb_list_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:959 [inline]
       __mutex_lock+0x12a/0x10a0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1104
       hci_connect_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:1482 [inline]
       hci_remote_features_evt net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:3263 [inline]
       hci_event_packet+0x2f4d/0x7c50 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6240
       hci_rx_work+0x4f8/0xd30 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:5122
       process_one_work+0x98d/0x1630 kernel/workqueue.c:2276
       worker_thread+0x658/0x11f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2422
       kthread+0x3e5/0x4d0 kernel/kthread.c:319
       ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:295

->  (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:959 [inline]
       __mutex_lock+0x12a/0x10a0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1104
       sco_connect net/bluetooth/sco.c:245 [inline]
       sco_sock_connect+0x227/0xa10 net/bluetooth/sco.c:601
       __sys_connect_file+0x155/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1879
       __sys_connect+0x161/0x190 net/socket.c:1896
       __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:1906 [inline]
       __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:1903 [inline]
       __x64_sys_connect+0x6f/0xb0 net/socket.c:1903
       do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
       do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

->  (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_SCO){+.+.}-{0:0}:
       check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3051 [inline]
       check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3174 [inline]
       validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3789 [inline]
       __lock_acquire+0x2a07/0x54a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5015
       lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5625 [inline]
       lock_acquire+0x1ab/0x510 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5590
       lock_sock_nested+0xca/0x120 net/core/sock.c:3170
       lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1613 [inline]
       sco_conn_del+0x12a/0x2a0 net/bluetooth/sco.c:191
       sco_disconn_cfm+0x71/0xb0 net/bluetooth/sco.c:1202
       hci_disconn_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:1500 [inline]
       hci_conn_hash_flush+0x127/0x260 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1608
       hci_dev_do_close+0x528/0x1130 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:1778
       hci_unregister_dev+0x1c0/0x5a0 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4015
       vhci_release+0x70/0xe0 drivers/bluetooth/hci_vhci.c:340
       __fput+0x288/0x920 fs/file_table.c:280
       task_work_run+0xdd/0x1a0 kernel/task_work.c:164
       exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:32 [inline]
       do_exit+0xbd4/0x2a60 kernel/exit.c:825
       do_group_exit+0x125/0x310 kernel/exit.c:922
       get_signal+0x47f/0x2160 kernel/signal.c:2808
       arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x2a9/0x1c40 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:865
       handle_signal_work kernel/entry/common.c:148 [inline]
       exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:172 [inline]
       exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x17d/0x290 kernel/entry/common.c:209
       __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:291 [inline]
       syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x19/0x60 kernel/entry/common.c:302
       ret_from_fork+0x15/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:288

other info that might help us debug this:

Chain exists of:
  sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_SCO --> &hdev->lock --> hci_cb_list_lock

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(hci_cb_list_lock);
                               lock(&hdev->lock);
                               lock(hci_cb_list_lock);
  lock(sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_SCO);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

The issue is that the lock hierarchy should go from &hdev->lock -->
hci_cb_list_lock --> sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_SCO. For example,
one such call trace is:

  hci_dev_do_close():
    hci_dev_lock();
    hci_conn_hash_flush():
      hci_disconn_cfm():
        mutex_lock(&hci_cb_list_lock);
        sco_disconn_cfm():
        sco_conn_del():
          lock_sock(sk);

However, in sco_sock_connect, we call lock_sock before calling
hci_dev_lock inside sco_connect, thus inverting the lock hierarchy.

We fix this by pulling the call to hci_dev_lock out from sco_connect.

Signed-off-by: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi <desmondcheongzx@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-09-22 11:43:07 +02:00
Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi
433c3febcb Bluetooth: skip invalid hci_sync_conn_complete_evt
[ Upstream commit 92fe24a7db751b80925214ede43f8d2be792ea7b ]

Syzbot reported a corrupted list in kobject_add_internal [1]. This
happens when multiple HCI_EV_SYNC_CONN_COMPLETE event packets with
status 0 are sent for the same HCI connection. This causes us to
register the device more than once which corrupts the kset list.

As this is forbidden behavior, we add a check for whether we're
trying to process the same HCI_EV_SYNC_CONN_COMPLETE event multiple
times for one connection. If that's the case, the event is invalid, so
we report an error that the device is misbehaving, and ignore the
packet.

Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=66264bf2fd0476be7e6c [1]
Reported-by: syzbot+66264bf2fd0476be7e6c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Tested-by: syzbot+66264bf2fd0476be7e6c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi <desmondcheongzx@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-09-22 11:43:06 +02:00
Gustavo A. R. Silva
9bf4b86e6b flow_dissector: Fix out-of-bounds warnings
[ Upstream commit 323e0cb473e2a8706ff162b6b4f4fa16023c9ba7 ]

Fix the following out-of-bounds warnings:

    net/core/flow_dissector.c: In function '__skb_flow_dissect':
>> net/core/flow_dissector.c:1104:4: warning: 'memcpy' offset [24, 39] from the object at '<unknown>' is out of the bounds of referenced subobject 'saddr' with type 'struct in6_addr' at offset 8 [-Warray-bounds]
     1104 |    memcpy(&key_addrs->v6addrs, &iph->saddr,
          |    ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
     1105 |           sizeof(key_addrs->v6addrs));
          |           ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    In file included from include/linux/ipv6.h:5,
                     from net/core/flow_dissector.c:6:
    include/uapi/linux/ipv6.h:133:18: note: subobject 'saddr' declared here
      133 |  struct in6_addr saddr;
          |                  ^~~~~
>> net/core/flow_dissector.c:1059:4: warning: 'memcpy' offset [16, 19] from the object at '<unknown>' is out of the bounds of referenced subobject 'saddr' with type 'unsigned int' at offset 12 [-Warray-bounds]
     1059 |    memcpy(&key_addrs->v4addrs, &iph->saddr,
          |    ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
     1060 |           sizeof(key_addrs->v4addrs));
          |           ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    In file included from include/linux/ip.h:17,
                     from net/core/flow_dissector.c:5:
    include/uapi/linux/ip.h:103:9: note: subobject 'saddr' declared here
      103 |  __be32 saddr;
          |         ^~~~~

The problem is that the original code is trying to copy data into a
couple of struct members adjacent to each other in a single call to
memcpy().  So, the compiler legitimately complains about it. As these
are just a couple of members, fix this by copying each one of them in
separate calls to memcpy().

This helps with the ongoing efforts to globally enable -Warray-bounds
and get us closer to being able to tighten the FORTIFY_SOURCE routines
on memcpy().

Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/109
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/d5ae2e65-1f18-2577-246f-bada7eee6ccd@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-09-22 11:43:06 +02:00
Gustavo A. R. Silva
2f7094f743 ipv4: ip_output.c: Fix out-of-bounds warning in ip_copy_addrs()
[ Upstream commit 6321c7acb82872ef6576c520b0e178eaad3a25c0 ]

Fix the following out-of-bounds warning:

    In function 'ip_copy_addrs',
        inlined from '__ip_queue_xmit' at net/ipv4/ip_output.c:517:2:
net/ipv4/ip_output.c:449:2: warning: 'memcpy' offset [40, 43] from the object at 'fl' is out of the bounds of referenced subobject 'saddr' with type 'unsigned int' at offset 36 [-Warray-bounds]
      449 |  memcpy(&iph->saddr, &fl4->saddr,
          |  ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      450 |         sizeof(fl4->saddr) + sizeof(fl4->daddr));
          |         ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

The problem is that the original code is trying to copy data into a
couple of struct members adjacent to each other in a single call to
memcpy(). This causes a legitimate compiler warning because memcpy()
overruns the length of &iph->saddr and &fl4->saddr. As these are just
a couple of struct members, fix this by using direct assignments,
instead of memcpy().

This helps with the ongoing efforts to globally enable -Warray-bounds
and get us closer to being able to tighten the FORTIFY_SOURCE routines
on memcpy().

Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/109
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/d5ae2e65-1f18-2577-246f-bada7eee6ccd@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-09-22 11:43:06 +02:00
Yajun Deng
2c98fa72f3 netlink: Deal with ESRCH error in nlmsg_notify()
[ Upstream commit fef773fc8110d8124c73a5e6610f89e52814637d ]

Yonghong Song report:
The bpf selftest tc_bpf failed with latest bpf-next.
The following is the command to run and the result:
$ ./test_progs -n 132
[   40.947571] bpf_testmod: loading out-of-tree module taints kernel.
test_tc_bpf:PASS:test_tc_bpf__open_and_load 0 nsec
test_tc_bpf:PASS:bpf_tc_hook_create(BPF_TC_INGRESS) 0 nsec
test_tc_bpf:PASS:bpf_tc_hook_create invalid hook.attach_point 0 nsec
test_tc_bpf_basic:PASS:bpf_obj_get_info_by_fd 0 nsec
test_tc_bpf_basic:PASS:bpf_tc_attach 0 nsec
test_tc_bpf_basic:PASS:handle set 0 nsec
test_tc_bpf_basic:PASS:priority set 0 nsec
test_tc_bpf_basic:PASS:prog_id set 0 nsec
test_tc_bpf_basic:PASS:bpf_tc_attach replace mode 0 nsec
test_tc_bpf_basic:PASS:bpf_tc_query 0 nsec
test_tc_bpf_basic:PASS:handle set 0 nsec
test_tc_bpf_basic:PASS:priority set 0 nsec
test_tc_bpf_basic:PASS:prog_id set 0 nsec
libbpf: Kernel error message: Failed to send filter delete notification
test_tc_bpf_basic:FAIL:bpf_tc_detach unexpected error: -3 (errno 3)
test_tc_bpf:FAIL:test_tc_internal ingress unexpected error: -3 (errno 3)

The failure seems due to the commit
    cfdf0d9ae75b ("rtnetlink: use nlmsg_notify() in rtnetlink_send()")

Deal with ESRCH error in nlmsg_notify() even the report variable is zero.

Reported-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Yajun Deng <yajun.deng@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210719051816.11762-1-yajun.deng@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-09-22 11:43:04 +02:00
Eric Dumazet
f10ce783bc ipv4: make exception cache less predictible
[ Upstream commit 67d6d681e15b578c1725bad8ad079e05d1c48a8e ]

Even after commit 6457378fe796 ("ipv4: use siphash instead of Jenkins in
fnhe_hashfun()"), an attacker can still use brute force to learn
some secrets from a victim linux host.

One way to defeat these attacks is to make the max depth of the hash
table bucket a random value.

Before this patch, each bucket of the hash table used to store exceptions
could contain 6 items under attack.

After the patch, each bucket would contains a random number of items,
between 6 and 10. The attacker can no longer infer secrets.

This is slightly increasing memory size used by the hash table,
by 50% in average, we do not expect this to be a problem.

This patch is more complex than the prior one (IPv6 equivalent),
because IPv4 was reusing the oldest entry.
Since we need to be able to evict more than one entry per
update_or_create_fnhe() call, I had to replace
fnhe_oldest() with fnhe_remove_oldest().

Also note that we will queue extra kfree_rcu() calls under stress,
which hopefully wont be a too big issue.

Fixes: 4895c771c7f0 ("ipv4: Add FIB nexthop exceptions.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Keyu Man <kman001@ucr.edu>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Tested-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-09-22 11:43:02 +02:00
Pavel Skripkin
0687bf2829 Bluetooth: add timeout sanity check to hci_inquiry
[ Upstream commit f41a4b2b5eb7872109723dab8ae1603bdd9d9ec1 ]

Syzbot hit "task hung" bug in hci_req_sync(). The problem was in
unreasonable huge inquiry timeout passed from userspace.
Fix it by adding sanity check for timeout value to hci_inquiry().

Since hci_inquiry() is the only user of hci_req_sync() with user
controlled timeout value, it makes sense to check timeout value in
hci_inquiry() and don't touch hci_req_sync().

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+be2baed593ea56c6a84c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-09-22 11:43:01 +02:00
Kai-Heng Feng
b3bb6fa71b Bluetooth: Move shutdown callback before flushing tx and rx queue
[ Upstream commit 0ea53674d07fb6db2dd7a7ec2fdc85a12eb246c2 ]

Commit 0ea9fd001a14 ("Bluetooth: Shutdown controller after workqueues
are flushed or cancelled") introduced a regression that makes mtkbtsdio
driver stops working:
[   36.593956] Bluetooth: hci0: Firmware already downloaded
[   46.814613] Bluetooth: hci0: Execution of wmt command timed out
[   46.814619] Bluetooth: hci0: Failed to send wmt func ctrl (-110)

The shutdown callback depends on the result of hdev->rx_work, so we
should call it before flushing rx_work:
-> btmtksdio_shutdown()
 -> mtk_hci_wmt_sync()
  -> __hci_cmd_send()
   -> wait for BTMTKSDIO_TX_WAIT_VND_EVT gets cleared

-> btmtksdio_recv_event()
 -> hci_recv_frame()
  -> queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &hdev->rx_work)
   -> clears BTMTKSDIO_TX_WAIT_VND_EVT

So move the shutdown callback before flushing TX/RX queue to resolve the
issue.

Reported-and-tested-by: Mattijs Korpershoek <mkorpershoek@baylibre.com>
Tested-by: Hsin-Yi Wang <hsinyi@chromium.org>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Fixes: 0ea9fd001a14 ("Bluetooth: Shutdown controller after workqueues are flushed or cancelled")
Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-09-22 11:43:01 +02:00
Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi
22c66af082 Bluetooth: fix repeated calls to sco_sock_kill
[ Upstream commit e1dee2c1de2b4dd00eb44004a4bda6326ed07b59 ]

In commit 4e1a720d0312 ("Bluetooth: avoid killing an already killed
socket"), a check was added to sco_sock_kill to skip killing a socket
if the SOCK_DEAD flag was set.

This was done after a trace for a use-after-free bug showed that the
same sock pointer was being killed twice.

Unfortunately, this check prevents sco_sock_kill from running on any
socket. sco_sock_kill kills a socket only if it's zapped and orphaned,
however sock_orphan announces that the socket is dead before detaching
it. i.e., orphaned sockets have the SOCK_DEAD flag set.

To fix this, we remove the check for SOCK_DEAD, and avoid repeated
calls to sco_sock_kill by removing incorrect calls in:

1. sco_sock_timeout. The socket should not be killed on timeout as
further processing is expected to be done. For example,
sco_sock_connect sets the timer then waits for the socket to be
connected or for an error to be returned.

2. sco_conn_del. This function should clean up resources for the
connection, but the socket itself should be cleaned up in
sco_sock_release.

3. sco_sock_close. Calls to sco_sock_close in sco_sock_cleanup_listen
and sco_sock_release are followed by sco_sock_kill. Hence the
duplicated call should be removed.

Fixes: 4e1a720d0312 ("Bluetooth: avoid killing an already killed socket")
Signed-off-by: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi <desmondcheongzx@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-09-22 11:43:00 +02:00
Colin Ian King
7c779102f3 Bluetooth: increase BTNAMSIZ to 21 chars to fix potential buffer overflow
[ Upstream commit 713baf3dae8f45dc8ada4ed2f5fdcbf94a5c274d ]

An earlier commit replaced using batostr to using %pMR sprintf for the
construction of session->name. Static analysis detected that this new
method can use a total of 21 characters (including the trailing '\0')
so we need to increase the BTNAMSIZ from 18 to 21 to fix potential
buffer overflows.

Addresses-Coverity: ("Out-of-bounds write")
Fixes: fcb73338ed53 ("Bluetooth: Use %pMR in sprintf/seq_printf instead of batostr")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-09-22 11:43:00 +02:00
Pavel Skripkin
57744fad62 net: cipso: fix warnings in netlbl_cipsov4_add_std
[ Upstream commit 8ca34a13f7f9b3fa2c464160ffe8cc1a72088204 ]

Syzbot reported warning in netlbl_cipsov4_add(). The
problem was in too big doi_def->map.std->lvl.local_size
passed to kcalloc(). Since this value comes from userpace there is
no need to warn if value is not correct.

The same problem may occur with other kcalloc() calls in
this function, so, I've added __GFP_NOWARN flag to all
kcalloc() calls there.

Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+cdd51ee2e6b0b2e18c0d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 96cb8e3313c7 ("[NetLabel]: CIPSOv4 and Unlabeled packet integration")
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-09-22 11:43:00 +02:00