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[ Upstream commit 6ed6356b07714e0198be3bc3ecccc8b40a212de4 ]
The "bufsize" comes from the root user. If "bufsize" is negative then,
because of type promotion, neither of the validation checks at the start
of the function are able to catch it:
if (bufsize < sizeof(struct xfs_attrlist) ||
bufsize > XFS_XATTR_LIST_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
This means "bufsize" will trigger (WARN_ON_ONCE(size > INT_MAX)) in
kvmalloc_node(). Fix this by changing the type from int to size_t.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Leah Rumancik <leah.rumancik@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 892a666fafa19ab04b5e948f6c92f98f1dafb489 ]
The for_each_perag*() set of macros are hacky in that some (i.e.
those based on sb_agcount) rely on the assumption that perag
iteration terminates naturally with a NULL perag at the specified
end_agno. Others allow for the final AG to have a valid perag and
require the calling function to clean up any potential leftover
xfs_perag reference on termination of the loop.
Aside from providing a subtly inconsistent interface, the former
variant is racy with growfs because growfs can create discoverable
post-eofs perags before the final superblock update that completes
the grow operation and increases sb_agcount. This leads to the
following assert failure (reproduced by xfs/104) in the perag free
path during unmount:
XFS: Assertion failed: atomic_read(&pag->pag_ref) == 0, file: fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_ag.c, line: 195
This occurs because one of the many for_each_perag() loops in the
code that is expected to terminate with a NULL pag (and thus has no
post-loop xfs_perag_put() check) raced with a growfs and found a
non-NULL post-EOFS perag, but terminated naturally based on the
end_agno check without releasing the post-EOFS perag.
Rework the iteration logic to lift the agno check from the main for
loop conditional to the iteration helper function. The for loop now
purely terminates on a NULL pag and xfs_perag_next() avoids taking a
reference to any perag beyond end_agno in the first place.
Fixes: f250eedcf762 ("xfs: make for_each_perag... a first class citizen")
Signed-off-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Leah Rumancik <leah.rumancik@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 8ed004eb9d07a5d6114db3e97a166707c186262d ]
The for_each_perag_from() iteration macro relies on sb_agcount to
process every perag currently within EOFS from a given starting
point. It's perfectly valid to have perag structures beyond
sb_agcount, however, such as if a growfs is in progress. If a perag
loop happens to race with growfs in this manner, it will actually
attempt to process the post-EOFS perag where ->pag_agno ==
sb_agcount. This is reproduced by xfs/104 and manifests as the
following assert failure in superblock write verifier context:
XFS: Assertion failed: agno < mp->m_sb.sb_agcount, file: fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_types.c, line: 22
Update the corresponding macro to only process perags that are
within the current sb_agcount.
Fixes: 58d43a7e3263 ("xfs: pass perags around in fsmap data dev functions")
Signed-off-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Leah Rumancik <leah.rumancik@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit f1788b5e5ee25bedf00bb4d25f82b93820d61189 ]
Rename the next_agno variable to be consistent across the several
iteration macros and shorten line length.
[backport: dependency for 8ed004eb9d07a5d6114db3e97a166707c186262d]
Signed-off-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Leah Rumancik <leah.rumancik@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit bf2307b195135ed9c95eebb38920d8bd41843092 ]
Fold the loop iteration logic into a helper in preparation for
further fixups. No functional change in this patch.
[backport: dependency for f1788b5e5ee25bedf00bb4d25f82b93820d61189]
Signed-off-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Leah Rumancik <leah.rumancik@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 78e8ec83a404d63dcc86b251f42e4ee8aff27465 ]
The btree geometry computation function has an off-by-one error in that
it does not allow maximally tall btrees (nlevels == XFS_BTREE_MAXLEVELS).
This can result in repairs failing unnecessarily on very fragmented
filesystems. Subsequent patches to remove MAXLEVELS usage in favor of
the per-btree type computations will make this a much more likely
occurrence.
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Chandan Babu R <chandan.babu@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Leah Rumancik <leah.rumancik@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4e90db5e21eb3bb272fe47386dc3506755e209e9 upstream.
In case of error, some resources must be freed, as already done above and
below the devm_kmemdup() and __mt7921e_mcu_drv_pmctrl() calls added in the
commit in Fixes:.
Fixes: 602cc0c9618a ("mt76: mt7921e: fix possible probe failure after reboot")
Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 602cc0c9618a819ab00ea3c9400742a0ca318380 upstream.
It doesn't guarantee the mt7921e gets started with ASPM L0 after each
machine reboot on every platform.
If mt7921e gets started with not ASPM L0, it would be possible that the
driver encounters time to time failure in mt7921_pci_probe, like a
weird chip identifier is read
[ 215.514503] mt7921e 0000:05:00.0: ASIC revision: feed0000
[ 216.604741] mt7921e: probe of 0000:05:00.0 failed with error -110
or failing to init hardware because the driver is not allowed to access the
register until the device is in ASPM L0 state. So, we call
__mt7921e_mcu_drv_pmctrl in early mt7921_pci_probe to force the device
to bring back to the L0 state for we can safely access registers in any
case.
In the patch, we move all functions from dma.c to pci.c and register mt76
bus operation earilier, that is the __mt7921e_mcu_drv_pmctrl depends on.
Fixes: bf3747ae2e25 ("mt76: mt7921: enable aspm by default")
Reported-by: Kai-Chuan Hsieh <kaichuan.hsieh@canonical.com>
Co-developed-by: Deren Wu <deren.wu@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Deren Wu <deren.wu@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Wang <sean.wang@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f1e2eef111018a4f0d280656be4351c37e9e554b upstream.
Use physical address to unify the register access and reorder the
entries in fixed_map table to accelerate the address lookup for
MT7921e. Cosmetics the patch with adding an extra space to make all
entries in the array style consistent.
Tested-by: Deren Wu <deren.wu@mediatek.com>
Acked-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sean Wang <sean.wang@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This reverts commit 649178c0493e4080b2b226b0ef9fa2d834b1b412 that is the
commit 602cc0c9618a819ab00ea3c9400742a0ca318380 upstream.
Because there was mistake in
'649178c0493e ("mt76: mt7921e: fix possible probe failure after reboot")'
that caused WiFi reset cannot work well as the reported issue
"PROBLEM: [Stable v5.15.42+] [mt7921] Wake after suspend locks up system
when mt7921-driver is used on a Lenovo ThinkPad E15 G3" described in
http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/linux-mediatek/2022-June/042668.html
So, we need to revert it before fixing and landing it again on the stable
tree from upstream.
Signed-off-by: Sean Wang <sean.wang@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This reverts commit 663457f421d41e9d2fcb1e84baf43d1433f80c08 that is the
commit 44c4237cf3436bda2b185ff728123651ad133f69 upstream.
Because there was mistake in
'649178c0493e ("mt76: mt7921e: fix possible probe failure after reboot")'
that caused WiFi reset cannot work well as the reported issue
"PROBLEM: [Stable v5.15.42+] [mt7921] Wake after suspend locks up system
when mt7921-driver is used on a Lenovo ThinkPad E15 G3" described in
http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/linux-mediatek/2022-June/042668.html
So we need to revert the patch first to avoid the conflict of reverting
'649178c0493e ("mt76: mt7921e: fix possible probe failure after reboot")'
and will be applied back later after fixing.
Signed-off-by: Sean Wang <sean.wang@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This reverts the stable commit
e65d78b12fbc0 ("batman-adv: Use netif_rx().")
The commit message says:
| Since commit
| baebdf48c3600 ("net: dev: Makes sure netif_rx() can be invoked in any context.")
|
| the function netif_rx() can be used in preemptible/thread context as
| well as in interrupt context.
This commit (baebdf48c3600) has not been backported to the 5.15 stable
series and therefore, the commit which builds upon it, must not be
backported either.
Revert the backport and use netif_rx_any_context() again.
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4f532c1e25319e42996ec18a1f473fd50c8e575d upstream.
Functions tty_termios_encode_baud_rate() and uart_update_timeout() should
be called with the baudrate value which was set to hardware. Linux then
report exact values via ioctl(TCGETS2) to userspace.
Change mvebu_uart_baud_rate_set() function to return baudrate value which
was set to hardware and propagate this value to above mentioned functions.
With this change userspace would see precise value in termios c_ospeed
field.
Fixes: 68a0db1d7da2 ("serial: mvebu-uart: add function to change baudrate")
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Pali Rohár <pali@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220628100922.10717-1-pali@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a2bad844a67b1c7740bda63e87453baf63c3a7f7 upstream.
According to Dexuan, the hypervisor folks beleive that multi-msi
allocations are not correct. compose_msi_msg() will allocate multi-msi
one by one. However, multi-msi is a block of related MSIs, with alignment
requirements. In order for the hypervisor to allocate properly aligned
and consecutive entries in the IOMMU Interrupt Remapping Table, there
should be a single mapping request that requests all of the multi-msi
vectors in one shot.
Dexuan suggests detecting the multi-msi case and composing a single
request related to the first MSI. Then for the other MSIs in the same
block, use the cached information. This appears to be viable, so do it.
5.15 backport - add hv_msi_get_int_vector helper function. Fixed merge
conflict due to delivery_mode name change (APIC_DELIVERY_MODE_FIXED
is the value given to DELIVERY_MODE on x86). Removed unused variable
in hv_compose_msi_msg. Fixed reference to msi_desc->pci to point to
the same is_msix variable.
Suggested-by: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Hugo <quic_jhugo@quicinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>
Tested-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1652282599-21643-1-git-send-email-quic_jhugo@quicinc.com
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Carl Vanderlip <quic_carlv@quicinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b4b77778ecc5bfbd4e77de1b2fd5c1dd3c655f1f upstream.
Currently if compose_msi_msg() is called multiple times, it will free any
previous IRTE allocation, and generate a new allocation. While nothing
prevents this from occurring, it is extraneous when Linux could just reuse
the existing allocation and avoid a bunch of overhead.
However, when future IRTE allocations operate on blocks of MSIs instead of
a single line, freeing the allocation will impact all of the lines. This
could cause an issue where an allocation of N MSIs occurs, then some of
the lines are retargeted, and finally the allocation is freed/reallocated.
The freeing of the allocation removes all of the configuration for the
entire block, which requires all the lines to be retargeted, which might
not happen since some lines might already be unmasked/active.
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Hugo <quic_jhugo@quicinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>
Tested-by: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>
Tested-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1652282582-21595-1-git-send-email-quic_jhugo@quicinc.com
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Carl Vanderlip <quic_carlv@quicinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 455880dfe292a2bdd3b4ad6a107299fce610e64b upstream.
In the multi-MSI case, hv_arch_irq_unmask() will only operate on the first
MSI of the N allocated. This is because only the first msi_desc is cached
and it is shared by all the MSIs of the multi-MSI block. This means that
hv_arch_irq_unmask() gets the correct address, but the wrong data (always
0).
This can break MSIs.
Lets assume MSI0 is vector 34 on CPU0, and MSI1 is vector 33 on CPU0.
hv_arch_irq_unmask() is called on MSI0. It uses a hypercall to configure
the MSI address and data (0) to vector 34 of CPU0. This is correct. Then
hv_arch_irq_unmask is called on MSI1. It uses another hypercall to
configure the MSI address and data (0) to vector 33 of CPU0. This is
wrong, and results in both MSI0 and MSI1 being routed to vector 33. Linux
will observe extra instances of MSI1 and no instances of MSI0 despite the
endpoint device behaving correctly.
For the multi-MSI case, we need unique address and data info for each MSI,
but the cached msi_desc does not provide that. However, that information
can be gotten from the int_desc cached in the chip_data by
compose_msi_msg(). Fix the multi-MSI case to use that cached information
instead. Since hv_set_msi_entry_from_desc() is no longer applicable,
remove it.
5.15 backport - no changes to code, but merge conflict due to refactor.
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Hugo <quic_jhugo@quicinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1651068453-29588-1-git-send-email-quic_jhugo@quicinc.com
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Carl Vanderlip <quic_carlv@quicinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 08e61e861a0e47e5e1a3fb78406afd6b0cea6b6d upstream.
If the allocation of multiple MSI vectors for multi-MSI fails in the core
PCI framework, the framework will retry the allocation as a single MSI
vector, assuming that meets the min_vecs specified by the requesting
driver.
Hyper-V advertises that multi-MSI is supported, but reuses the VECTOR
domain to implement that for x86. The VECTOR domain does not support
multi-MSI, so the alloc will always fail and fallback to a single MSI
allocation.
In short, Hyper-V advertises a capability it does not implement.
Hyper-V can support multi-MSI because it coordinates with the hypervisor
to map the MSIs in the IOMMU's interrupt remapper, which is something the
VECTOR domain does not have. Therefore the fix is simple - copy what the
x86 IOMMU drivers (AMD/Intel-IR) do by removing
X86_IRQ_ALLOC_CONTIGUOUS_VECTORS after calling the VECTOR domain's
pci_msi_prepare().
5.15 backport - adds the hv_msi_prepare wrapper function
Fixes: 4daace0d8ce8 ("PCI: hv: Add paravirtual PCI front-end for Microsoft Hyper-V VMs")
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Hugo <quic_jhugo@quicinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1649856981-14649-1-git-send-email-quic_jhugo@quicinc.com
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Carl Vanderlip <quic_carlv@quicinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This reverts commit e8b9989597daac896b3400b7005f24bf15233d9a.
The upstream commit 9c85a9bae267 ("selftest/vm: verify mmap addr in
mremap_test") was backported as commit a17404fcbfd0 ("selftest/vm:
verify mmap addr in mremap_test"). Repeated backport introduced the
duplicate of function get_mmap_min_addr to the file breakign the vm
selftest build.
Fixes: e8b9989597da ("selftest/vm: verify mmap addr in mremap_test")
Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Tymoshenko <ovt@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This reverts commit 0b4e16093e081a3ab08b0d6cedf79b249f41b248.
The upstream commit 18d609daa546 ("selftest/vm: verify remap destination
address in mremap_test") was backported as commit 2688d967ec65
("selftest/vm: verify remap destination address in mremap_test").
Repeated backport introduced the duplicate of function
is_remap_region_valid to the file breakign the vm selftest build.
Fixes: 0b4e16093e08 ("selftest/vm: verify remap destination address in mremap_test")
Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Tymoshenko <ovt@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit dbd0da2453c694f2f74651834d90fb280b57f151 upstream.
I've stumbled over this while reviewing patches for DMA-buf and it looks
like we completely messed the locking up here.
In general most TTM function should only be called while holding the
appropriate BO resv lock. Without this we could break the internal
buffer object state here.
Only compile tested!
Signed-off-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Fixes: 43676605f890 ("drm/ttm: Add vmap/vunmap to TTM and TTM GEM helpers")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Osipenko <dmitry.osipenko@collabora.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20220715111533.467012-1-christian.koenig@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 543ce63b664e2c2f9533d089a4664b559c3e6b5b upstream.
The lockdown LSM is primarily used in conjunction with UEFI Secure Boot.
This LSM may also be used on machines without UEFI. It can also be
enabled when UEFI Secure Boot is disabled. One of lockdown's features
is to prevent kexec from loading untrusted kernels. Lockdown can be
enabled through a bootparam or after the kernel has booted through
securityfs.
If IMA appraisal is used with the "ima_appraise=log" boot param,
lockdown can be defeated with kexec on any machine when Secure Boot is
disabled or unavailable. IMA prevents setting "ima_appraise=log" from
the boot param when Secure Boot is enabled, but this does not cover
cases where lockdown is used without Secure Boot.
To defeat lockdown, boot without Secure Boot and add ima_appraise=log to
the kernel command line; then:
$ echo "integrity" > /sys/kernel/security/lockdown
$ echo "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig" > \
/sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
$ kexec -ls unsigned-kernel
Add a call to verify ima appraisal is set to "enforce" whenever lockdown
is enabled. This fixes CVE-2022-21505.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 29d3c1c8dfe7 ("kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down")
Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: John Haxby <john.haxby@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e5ec6a2513383fe2ecc2ee3b5f51d97acbbcd4d8 upstream.
mlxsw needs to distinguish nexthops with a gateway from connected
nexthops in order to write the former to the adjacency table of the
device. The check used to rely on the fact that nexthops with a gateway
have a 'link' scope whereas connected nexthops have a 'host' scope. This
is no longer correct after commit 747c14307214 ("ip: fix dflt addr
selection for connected nexthop").
Fix that by instead checking the address family of the gateway IP. This
is a more direct way and also consistent with the IPv6 counterpart in
mlxsw_sp_rt6_is_gateway().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 747c14307214 ("ip: fix dflt addr selection for connected nexthop")
Fixes: 597cfe4fc339 ("nexthop: Add support for IPv4 nexthops")
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Amit Cohen <amcohen@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c1f6eff304e4dfa4558b6a8c6b2d26a91db6c998 upstream.
When trying to load modules built for RISC-V which include assembly files
the kernel loader errors with "unexpected relocation type 'R_RISCV_ALIGN'"
due to R_RISCV_ALIGN relocations being generated by the assembler.
The R_RISCV_ALIGN relocations can be removed at the expense of code space
by adding -mno-relax to gcc and as. In commit 7a8e7da42250138
("RISC-V: Fixes to module loading") -mno-relax is added to the build
variable KBUILD_CFLAGS_MODULE. See [1] for more info.
The issue is that when kbuild builds a .S file, it invokes gcc with
the -mno-relax flag, but this is not being passed through to the
assembler. Adding -Wa,-mno-relax to KBUILD_AFLAGS_MODULE ensures that
the assembler is invoked correctly. This may have now been fixed in
gcc[2] and this addition should not stop newer gcc and as from working.
[1] https://github.com/riscv/riscv-elf-psabi-doc/issues/183
[2] 3b0a7d624e
Signed-off-by: Ben Dooks <ben.dooks@codethink.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Bin Meng <bmeng.cn@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220529152200.609809-1-ben.dooks@codethink.co.uk
Fixes: ab1ef68e5401 ("RISC-V: Add sections of PLT and GOT for kernel module")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a1d4ef1adf8bbd302067534ead671a94759687ed upstream.
To act as an interrupt controller, a gpio bank relies on the
"interrupt-parent" of the pin controller.
When this optional "interrupt-parent" misses, do not create any IRQ domain.
This fixes a "NULL pointer in stm32_gpio_domain_alloc()" kernel crash when
the interrupt-parent = <exti> property is not declared in the Device Tree.
Fixes: 0eb9f683336d ("pinctrl: Add IRQ support to STM32 gpios")
Signed-off-by: Fabien Dessenne <fabien.dessenne@foss.st.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220627142350.742973-1-fabien.dessenne@foss.st.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 564d998106397394b6aad260f219b882b3347e62 upstream.
Implement apply_returns() stub for UM, just like all the other patching
routines.
Fixes: 15e67227c49a ("x86: Undo return-thunk damage")
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org)
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/Ys%2Ft45l%2FgarIrD0u@worktop.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f098addbdb44c8a565367f5162f3ab170ed9404a upstream.
To pick the changes from:
f43b9876e857c739 ("x86/retbleed: Add fine grained Kconfig knobs")
a149180fbcf336e9 ("x86: Add magic AMD return-thunk")
15e67227c49a5783 ("x86: Undo return-thunk damage")
369ae6ffc41a3c11 ("x86/retpoline: Cleanup some #ifdefery")
4ad3278df6fe2b08 x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behavior
26aae8ccbc197223 x86/cpu/amd: Enumerate BTC_NO
9756bba28470722d x86/speculation: Fill RSB on vmexit for IBRS
3ebc170068885b6f x86/bugs: Add retbleed=ibpb
2dbb887e875b1de3 x86/entry: Add kernel IBRS implementation
6b80b59b35557065 x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability
a149180fbcf336e9 x86: Add magic AMD return-thunk
15e67227c49a5783 x86: Undo return-thunk damage
a883d624aed463c8 x86/cpufeatures: Move RETPOLINE flags to word 11
51802186158c74a0 x86/speculation/mmio: Enumerate Processor MMIO Stale Data bug
This only causes these perf files to be rebuilt:
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memcpy-x86-64-asm.o
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memset-x86-64-asm.o
And addresses this perf build warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h'
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h'
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YtQM40VmiLTkPND2@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 91d248c3b903b46a58cbc7e8d38d684d3e4007c2 upstream.
To pick up the changes from these csets:
4ad3278df6fe2b08 ("x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behavior")
d7caac991feeef1b ("x86/cpu/amd: Add Spectral Chicken")
That cause no changes to tooling:
$ tools/perf/trace/beauty/tracepoints/x86_msr.sh > before
$ cp arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
$ tools/perf/trace/beauty/tracepoints/x86_msr.sh > after
$ diff -u before after
$
Just silences this perf build warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h'
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YtQTm9wsB3hxQWvy@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 79629181607e801c0b41b8790ac4ee2eb5d7bc3e upstream.
Instead of doing complicated calculations to find the size of the subroutines
(which are even more complicated because they need to be stringified into
an asm statement), just hardcode to 16.
It is less dense for a few combinations of IBT/SLS/retbleed, but it has
the advantage of being really simple.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.15.x: 84e7051c0bc1: x86/kvm: fix FASTOP_SIZE when return thunks are enabled
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3131ef39fb03bbde237d0b8260445898f3dfda5b upstream.
The build on x86_32 currently fails after commit
9bb2ec608a20 (objtool: Update Retpoline validation)
with:
arch/x86/kernel/../../x86/xen/xen-head.S:35: Error: no such instruction: `annotate_unret_safe'
ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE is defined in nospec-branch.h. And head_32.S is
missing this include. Fix this.
Fixes: 9bb2ec608a20 ("objtool: Update Retpoline validation")
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/63e23f80-033f-f64e-7522-2816debbc367@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
The hypercall_page is special and the RETs there should not be changed
into rethunk calls (but can have SLS mitigation). Change the initial
instructions to ret + int3 padding, as was done in upstream commit
5b2fc51576ef "x86/ibt,xen: Sprinkle the ENDBR".
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c27c753ea6fd1237f4f96abf8b623d7bab505513 upstream.
__static_call_fixup() invokes __static_call_transform() without holding
text_mutex, which causes lockdep to complain in text_poke_bp().
Adding the proper locking cures that, but as this is either used during
early boot or during module finalizing, it's not required to use
text_poke_bp(). Add an argument to __static_call_transform() which tells
it to use text_poke_early() for it.
Fixes: ee88d363d156 ("x86,static_call: Use alternative RET encoding")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4ad3278df6fe2b0852b00d5757fc2ccd8e92c26e upstream.
Some Intel processors may use alternate predictors for RETs on
RSB-underflow. This condition may be vulnerable to Branch History
Injection (BHI) and intramode-BTI.
Kernel earlier added spectre_v2 mitigation modes (eIBRS+Retpolines,
eIBRS+LFENCE, Retpolines) which protect indirect CALLs and JMPs against
such attacks. However, on RSB-underflow, RET target prediction may
fallback to alternate predictors. As a result, RET's predicted target
may get influenced by branch history.
A new MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL bit (RRSBA_DIS_S) controls this fallback
behavior when in kernel mode. When set, RETs will not take predictions
from alternate predictors, hence mitigating RETs as well. Support for
this is enumerated by CPUID.7.2.EDX[RRSBA_CTRL] (bit2).
For spectre v2 mitigation, when a user selects a mitigation that
protects indirect CALLs and JMPs against BHI and intramode-BTI, set
RRSBA_DIS_S also to protect RETs for RSB-underflow case.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: no X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 697977d8415d61f3acbc4ee6d564c9dcf0309507 upstream.
All the invocations unroll to __x86_return_thunk and this file
must be PIC independent.
This fixes kexec on 64-bit AMD boxes.
[ bp: Fix 32-bit build. ]
Reported-by: Edward Tran <edward.tran@oracle.com>
Reported-by: Awais Tanveer <awais.tanveer@oracle.com>
Suggested-by: Ankur Arora <ankur.a.arora@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2259da159fbe5dba8ac00b560cf00b6a6537fa18 upstream.
There are some VM configurations which have Skylake model but do not
support IBPB. In those cases, when using retbleed=ibpb, userspace is going
to be killed and kernel is going to panic.
If the CPU does not support IBPB, warn and proceed with the auto option. Also,
do not fallback to IBPB on AMD/Hygon systems if it is not supported.
Fixes: 3ebc17006888 ("x86/bugs: Add retbleed=ibpb")
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2c08b9b38f5b0f4a6c2d29be22b695e4ec4a556b upstream.
Commit
ee774dac0da1 ("x86/entry: Move PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS out of error_entry()")
moved PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS out of error_entry, into its own function, in
part to avoid calling error_entry() for XenPV.
However, commit
7c81c0c9210c ("x86/entry: Avoid very early RET")
had to change that because the 'ret' was too early and moved it into
idtentry, bloating the text size, since idtentry is expanded for every
exception vector.
However, with the advent of xen_error_entry() in commit
d147553b64bad ("x86/xen: Add UNTRAIN_RET")
it became possible to remove PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS from idtentry, back
into *error_entry().
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: error_entry still does cld]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f54d45372c6ac9c993451de5e51312485f7d10bc upstream.
Cannon lake is also affected by RETBleed, add it to the list.
Fixes: 6ad0ad2bf8a6 ("x86/bugs: Report Intel retbleed vulnerability")
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f43b9876e857c739d407bc56df288b0ebe1a9164 upstream.
Do fine-grained Kconfig for all the various retbleed parts.
NOTE: if your compiler doesn't support return thunks this will
silently 'upgrade' your mitigation to IBPB, you might not like this.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: there is no CONFIG_OBJTOOL]
[cascardo: objtool calling and option parsing has changed]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 26aae8ccbc1972233afd08fb3f368947c0314265 upstream.
BTC_NO indicates that hardware is not susceptible to Branch Type Confusion.
Zen3 CPUs don't suffer BTC.
Hypervisors are expected to synthesise BTC_NO when it is appropriate
given the migration pool, to prevent kernels using heuristics.
[ bp: Massage. ]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: no X86_FEATURE_BRS]
[cascardo: no X86_FEATURE_CPPC]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7a05bc95ed1c5a59e47aaade9fb4083c27de9e62 upstream.
The whole MMIO/RETBLEED enumeration went overboard on steppings. Get
rid of all that and simply use ANY.
If a future stepping of these models would not be affected, it had
better set the relevant ARCH_CAP_$FOO_NO bit in
IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9756bba28470722dacb79ffce554336dd1f6a6cd upstream.
Prevent RSB underflow/poisoning attacks with RSB. While at it, add a
bunch of comments to attempt to document the current state of tribal
knowledge about RSB attacks and what exactly is being mitigated.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit bea7e31a5caccb6fe8ed989c065072354f0ecb52 upstream.
For legacy IBRS to work, the IBRS bit needs to be always re-written
after vmexit, even if it's already on.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit fc02735b14fff8c6678b521d324ade27b1a3d4cf upstream.
On eIBRS systems, the returns in the vmexit return path from
__vmx_vcpu_run() to vmx_vcpu_run() are exposed to RSB poisoning attacks.
Fix that by moving the post-vmexit spec_ctrl handling to immediately
after the vmexit.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
