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Fix cpuid_deps[] to list the correct dependencies for GFNI, VAES, and
VPCLMULQDQ. These features don't depend on AVX512, and there exist CPUs
that support these features but not AVX512. GFNI actually doesn't even
depend on AVX.
This prevents GFNI from being unnecessarily disabled if AVX is disabled
to mitigate the GDS vulnerability.
This also prevents all three features from being unnecessarily disabled
if AVX512VL (or its dependency AVX512F) were to be disabled, but it
looks like there isn't any case where this happens anyway.
Fixes: c128dbfa0f87 ("x86/cpufeatures: Enable new SSE/AVX/AVX512 CPU features")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240417060434.47101-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
regs->orig_ax has been set to -1 on entry so in the printout,
fred_bad_type() should use the passed parameter error_code.
Fixes: 14619d912b65 ("x86/fred: FRED entry/exit and dispatch code")
Signed-off-by: Hou Wenlong <houwenlong.hwl@antgroup.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin (Intel) <hpa@zytor.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b2a8f0a41449d25240e314a2ddfbf6549511fb04.1713353612.git.houwenlong.hwl@antgroup.com
Add a FRED-specific INT80 handler and document why it differs from the
current one. Eventually, the common bits will be unified once FRED hw is
available and it turns out that no further changes are needed but for
now, keep the handlers separate for everyone's sanity's sake.
[ bp: Zap duplicated commit message, massage. ]
Fixes: 55617fb991df ("x86/entry: Do not allow external 0x80 interrupts")
Suggested-by: H. Peter Anvin (Intel) <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240417174731.4189592-1-xin@zytor.com
The using-default-thunk warning check makes sense only with
configurations which actually enable the special return thunks.
Otherwise, it fires on unrelated 32-bit configs on which the special
return thunks won't even work (they're 64-bit only) and, what is more,
those configs even go off into the weeds when booting in the
alternatives patching code, leading to a dead machine.
Fixes: 4461438a8405 ("x86/retpoline: Ensure default return thunk isn't used at runtime")
Reported-by: Klara Modin <klarasmodin@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Erhard Furtner <erhard_f@mailbox.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Tested-by: Klara Modin <klarasmodin@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/78e0d19c-b77a-4169-a80f-2eef91f4a1d6@gmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240413024956.488d474e@yea
Confusingly, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE doesn't mean retpolines are enabled,
as it also includes the original "AMD retpoline" which isn't a retpoline
at all.
Also replace cpu_feature_enabled() with boot_cpu_has() because this is
before alternatives are patched and cpu_feature_enabled()'s fallback
path is slower than plain old boot_cpu_has().
Fixes: ec9404e40e8f ("x86/bhi: Add BHI mitigation knob")
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ad3807424a3953f0323c011a643405619f2a4927.1712944776.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
The topology rework missed that early_init_amd() tries to re-enable the
Topology Extensions when the BIOS disabled them.
The new parser is invoked before early_init_amd() so the re-enable attempt
happens too late.
Move it into the AMD specific topology parser code where it belongs.
Fixes: f7fb3b2dd92c ("x86/cpu: Provide an AMD/HYGON specific topology parser")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/878r1j260l.ffs@tglx
A system with NODEID_MSR was reported to crash during early boot without
any output.
The reason is that the union which is used for accessing the bitfields in
the MSR is written wrongly and the resulting executable code accesses the
wrong part of the MSR data.
As a consequence a later division by that value results in 0 and that
result is used for another division as divisor, which obviously does not
work well.
The magic world of C, unions and bitfields:
union {
u64 bita : 3,
bitb : 3;
u64 all;
} x;
x.all = foo();
a = x.bita;
b = x.bitb;
results in the effective executable code of:
a = b = x.bita;
because bita and bitb are treated as union members and therefore both end
up at bit offset 0.
Wrapping the bitfield into an anonymous struct:
union {
struct {
u64 bita : 3,
bitb : 3;
};
u64 all;
} x;
works like expected.
Rework the NODEID_MSR union in exactly that way to cure the problem.
Fixes: f7fb3b2dd92c ("x86/cpu: Provide an AMD/HYGON specific topology parser")
Reported-by: "kernelci.org bot" <bot@kernelci.org>
Reported-by: Laura Nao <laura.nao@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Laura Nao <laura.nao@collabora.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240410194311.596282919@linutronix.de
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240322175210.124416-1-laura.nao@collabora.com/
CPUID 0x80000008 ECX.cpu_nthreads describes the number of threads in the
package. The parser uses this value to initialize the SMT domain level.
That's wrong because cpu_nthreads does not describe the number of threads
per physical core. So this needs to set the CORE domain level and let the
later parsers set the SMT shift if available.
Preset the SMT domain level with the assumption of one thread per core,
which is correct ifrt here are no other CPUID leafs to parse, and propagate
cpu_nthreads and the core level APIC bitwidth into the CORE domain.
Fixes: f7fb3b2dd92c ("x86/cpu: Provide an AMD/HYGON specific topology parser")
Reported-by: "kernelci.org bot" <bot@kernelci.org>
Reported-by: Laura Nao <laura.nao@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Laura Nao <laura.nao@collabora.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240410194311.535206450@linutronix.de
For consistency with the other CONFIG_MITIGATION_* options, replace the
CONFIG_SPECTRE_BHI_{ON,OFF} options with a single
CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI option.
[ mingo: Fix ]
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/3833812ea63e7fdbe36bf8b932e63f70d18e2a2a.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
Unlike most other mitigations' "auto" options, spectre_bhi=auto only
mitigates newer systems, which is confusing and not particularly useful.
Remove it.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/412e9dc87971b622bbbaf64740ebc1f140bff343.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
While syscall hardening helps prevent some BHI attacks, there's still
other low-hanging fruit remaining. Don't classify it as a mitigation
and make it clear that the system may still be vulnerable if it doesn't
have a HW or SW mitigation enabled.
Fixes: ec9404e40e8f ("x86/bhi: Add BHI mitigation knob")
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b5951dae3fdee7f1520d5136a27be3bdfe95f88b.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
The ARCH_CAP_RRSBA check isn't correct: RRSBA may have already been
disabled by the Spectre v2 mitigation (or can otherwise be disabled by
the BHI mitigation itself if needed). In that case retpolines are fine.
Fixes: ec9404e40e8f ("x86/bhi: Add BHI mitigation knob")
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/6f56f13da34a0834b69163467449be7f58f253dc.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
So we are using the 'ia32_cap' value in a number of places,
which got its name from MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR register.
But there's very little 'IA32' about it - this isn't 32-bit only
code, nor does it originate from there, it's just a historic
quirk that many Intel MSR names are prefixed with IA32_.
This is already clear from the helper method around the MSR:
x86_read_arch_cap_msr(), which doesn't have the IA32 prefix.
So rename 'ia32_cap' to 'x86_arch_cap_msr' to be consistent with
its role and with the naming of the helper function.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/9592a18a814368e75f8f4b9d74d3883aa4fd1eaf.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
There's no need to keep reading MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES over and
over. It's even read in the BHI sysfs function which is a big no-no.
Just read it once and cache it.
Fixes: ec9404e40e8f ("x86/bhi: Add BHI mitigation knob")
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/9592a18a814368e75f8f4b9d74d3883aa4fd1eaf.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
Initialize cpu_mitigations to CPU_MITIGATIONS_OFF if the kernel is built
with CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS=n, as the help text quite clearly
states that disabling SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS is supposed to turn off all
mitigations by default.
│ If you say N, all mitigations will be disabled. You really
│ should know what you are doing to say so.
As is, the kernel still defaults to CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO, which results in
some mitigations being enabled in spite of SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS=n.
Fixes: f43b9876e857 ("x86/retbleed: Add fine grained Kconfig knobs")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240409175108.1512861-2-seanjc@google.com
topo_set_cpuids() updates cpu_present_map and cpu_possible map. It is
invoked during enumeration and "physical hotplug" operations. In the
latter case this results in a kernel crash because cpu_possible_map is
marked read only after init completes.
There is no reason to update cpu_possible_map in that function. During
enumeration cpu_possible_map is not relevant and gets fully initialized
after enumeration completed. On "physical hotplug" the bit is already set
because the kernel allows only CPUs to be plugged which have been
enumerated and associated to a CPU number during early boot.
Remove the bogus update of cpu_possible_map.
Fixes: 0e53e7b656cf ("x86/cpu/topology: Sanitize the APIC admission logic")
Reported-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@Huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87ttkc6kwx.ffs@tglx
The definition of spectre_bhi_state() incorrectly returns a const char
* const. This causes the a compiler warning when building with W=1:
warning: type qualifiers ignored on function return type [-Wignored-qualifiers]
2812 | static const char * const spectre_bhi_state(void)
Remove the const qualifier from the pointer.
Fixes: ec9404e40e8f ("x86/bhi: Add BHI mitigation knob")
Reported-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240409230806.1545822-1-daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com
nouveau:
- regression fix for GSP display enable.
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Merge tag 'drm-fixes-2024-04-09' of https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/kernel
Pull drm nouveau fix from Dave Airlie:
"A previous fix to nouveau devinit on the GSP paths fixed the Turing
but broke Ampere, I did some more digging and found the proper fix.
Sending it early as I want to make sure it makes the next 6.8 stable
kernels to fix the regression.
Regular fixes will be at end of week as usual.
nouveau:
- regression fix for GSP display enable"
* tag 'drm-fixes-2024-04-09' of https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/kernel:
nouveau: fix devinit paths to only handle display on GSP.
This reverts:
nouveau/gsp: don't check devinit disable on GSP.
and applies a further fix.
It turns out the open gpu driver, checks this register,
but only for display.
Match that behaviour and in the turing path only disable
the display block. (ampere already only does displays).
Fixes: 5d4e8ae6e57b ("nouveau/gsp: don't check devinit disable on GSP.")
Reviewed-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20240408064243.2219527-1-airlied@gmail.com
Branch History Injection (BHI) attacks may allow a malicious application to
influence indirect branch prediction in kernel by poisoning the branch
history. eIBRS isolates indirect branch targets in ring0. The BHB can
still influence the choice of indirect branch predictor entry, and although
branch predictor entries are isolated between modes when eIBRS is enabled,
the BHB itself is not isolated between modes.
Add mitigations against it either with the help of microcode or with
software sequences for the affected CPUs.
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Merge tag 'nativebhi' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 mitigations from Thomas Gleixner:
"Mitigations for the native BHI hardware vulnerabilty:
Branch History Injection (BHI) attacks may allow a malicious
application to influence indirect branch prediction in kernel by
poisoning the branch history. eIBRS isolates indirect branch targets
in ring0. The BHB can still influence the choice of indirect branch
predictor entry, and although branch predictor entries are isolated
between modes when eIBRS is enabled, the BHB itself is not isolated
between modes.
Add mitigations against it either with the help of microcode or with
software sequences for the affected CPUs"
[ This also ends up enabling the full mitigation by default despite the
system call hardening, because apparently there are other indirect
calls that are still sufficiently reachable, and the 'auto' case just
isn't hardened enough.
We'll have some more inevitable tweaking in the future - Linus ]
* tag 'nativebhi' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
KVM: x86: Add BHI_NO
x86/bhi: Mitigate KVM by default
x86/bhi: Add BHI mitigation knob
x86/bhi: Enumerate Branch History Injection (BHI) bug
x86/bhi: Define SPEC_CTRL_BHI_DIS_S
x86/bhi: Add support for clearing branch history at syscall entry
x86/syscall: Don't force use of indirect calls for system calls
x86/bugs: Change commas to semicolons in 'spectre_v2' sysfs file
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Merge tag 'for-6.9-rc2-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux
Pull btrfs fixes from David Sterba:
"Several fixes to qgroups that have been recently identified by test
generic/475:
- fix prealloc reserve leak in subvolume operations
- various other fixes in reservation setup, conversion or cleanup"
* tag 'for-6.9-rc2-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux:
btrfs: always clear PERTRANS metadata during commit
btrfs: make btrfs_clear_delalloc_extent() free delalloc reserve
btrfs: qgroup: convert PREALLOC to PERTRANS after record_root_in_trans
btrfs: record delayed inode root in transaction
btrfs: qgroup: fix qgroup prealloc rsv leak in subvolume operations
btrfs: qgroup: correctly model root qgroup rsv in convert
Intel processors that aren't vulnerable to BHI will set
MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES[BHI_NO] = 1;. Guests may use this BHI_NO bit to
determine if they need to implement BHI mitigations or not. Allow this bit
to be passed to the guests.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
BHI mitigation mode spectre_bhi=auto does not deploy the software
mitigation by default. In a cloud environment, it is a likely scenario
where userspace is trusted but the guests are not trusted. Deploying
system wide mitigation in such cases is not desirable.
Update the auto mode to unconditionally mitigate against malicious
guests. Deploy the software sequence at VMexit in auto mode also, when
hardware mitigation is not available. Unlike the force =on mode,
software sequence is not deployed at syscalls in auto mode.
Suggested-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Branch history clearing software sequences and hardware control
BHI_DIS_S were defined to mitigate Branch History Injection (BHI).
Add cmdline spectre_bhi={on|off|auto} to control BHI mitigation:
auto - Deploy the hardware mitigation BHI_DIS_S, if available.
on - Deploy the hardware mitigation BHI_DIS_S, if available,
otherwise deploy the software sequence at syscall entry and
VMexit.
off - Turn off BHI mitigation.
The default is auto mode which does not deploy the software sequence
mitigation. This is because of the hardening done in the syscall
dispatch path, which is the likely target of BHI.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Mitigation for BHI is selected based on the bug enumeration. Add bits
needed to enumerate BHI bug.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Newer processors supports a hardware control BHI_DIS_S to mitigate
Branch History Injection (BHI). Setting BHI_DIS_S protects the kernel
from userspace BHI attacks without having to manually overwrite the
branch history.
Define MSR_SPEC_CTRL bit BHI_DIS_S and its enumeration CPUID.BHI_CTRL.
Mitigation is enabled later.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Branch History Injection (BHI) attacks may allow a malicious application to
influence indirect branch prediction in kernel by poisoning the branch
history. eIBRS isolates indirect branch targets in ring0. The BHB can
still influence the choice of indirect branch predictor entry, and although
branch predictor entries are isolated between modes when eIBRS is enabled,
the BHB itself is not isolated between modes.
Alder Lake and new processors supports a hardware control BHI_DIS_S to
mitigate BHI. For older processors Intel has released a software sequence
to clear the branch history on parts that don't support BHI_DIS_S. Add
support to execute the software sequence at syscall entry and VMexit to
overwrite the branch history.
For now, branch history is not cleared at interrupt entry, as malicious
applications are not believed to have sufficient control over the
registers, since previous register state is cleared at interrupt
entry. Researchers continue to poke at this area and it may become
necessary to clear at interrupt entry as well in the future.
This mitigation is only defined here. It is enabled later.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Make <asm/syscall.h> build a switch statement instead, and the compiler can
either decide to generate an indirect jump, or - more likely these days due
to mitigations - just a series of conditional branches.
Yes, the conditional branches also have branch prediction, but the branch
prediction is much more controlled, in that it just causes speculatively
running the wrong system call (harmless), rather than speculatively running
possibly wrong random less controlled code gadgets.
This doesn't mitigate other indirect calls, but the system call indirection
is the first and most easily triggered case.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Change the format of the 'spectre_v2' vulnerabilities sysfs file
slightly by converting the commas to semicolons, so that mitigations for
future variants can be grouped together and separated by commas.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
* add stubs to functions that calls to them were recently added to memblock
but they were missing in tests
* update gfp_types.h to include bits.h so that BIT() definitions won't
depend on other includes
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Merge tag 'fixes-2024-04-08' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rppt/memblock
Pull memblock fixes from Mike Rapoport:
"Fix build errors in memblock tests:
- add stubs to functions that calls to them were recently added to
memblock but they were missing in tests
- update gfp_types.h to include bits.h so that BIT() definitions
won't depend on other includes"
* tag 'fixes-2024-04-08' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rppt/memblock:
memblock tests: fix undefined reference to `BIT'
memblock tests: fix undefined reference to `panic'
memblock tests: fix undefined reference to `early_pfn_to_nid'
When done from a virtual machine, instructions that touch APIC memory
must be emulated. By convention, MMIO accesses are typically performed
via io.h helpers such as readl() or writeq() to simplify instruction
emulation/decoding (ex: in KVM hosts and SEV guests) [0].
Currently, native_apic_mem_read() does not follow this convention,
allowing the compiler to emit instructions other than the MOV
instruction generated by readl(). In particular, when the kernel is
compiled with clang and run as a SEV-ES or SEV-SNP guest, the compiler
would emit a TESTL instruction which is not supported by the SEV-ES
emulator, causing a boot failure in that environment. It is likely the
same problem would happen in a TDX guest as that uses the same
instruction emulator as SEV-ES.
To make sure all emulators can emulate APIC memory reads via MOV, use
the readl() function in native_apic_mem_read(). It is expected that any
emulator would support MOV in any addressing mode as it is the most
generic and is what is usually emitted currently.
The TESTL instruction is emitted when native_apic_mem_read() is inlined
into apic_mem_wait_icr_idle(). The emulator comes from
insn_decode_mmio() in arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c. It's not worth it to
extend insn_decode_mmio() to support more instructions since, in theory,
the compiler could choose to output nearly any instruction for such
reads which would bloat the emulator beyond reason.
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220405232939.73860-12-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com/
[ bp: Massage commit message, fix typos. ]
Signed-off-by: Adam Dunlap <acdunlap@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Kevin Loughlin <kevinloughlin@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240318230927.2191933-1-acdunlap@google.com
- Fix a timer migration bug that may result in missed events
- Fix timer migration group hierarchy event updates
- Fix a PowerPC64 build warning
- Fix a handful of DocBook annotation bugs
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Merge tag 'timers-urgent-2024-04-07' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull timer fixes from Ingo Molnar:
"Fix various timer bugs:
- Fix a timer migration bug that may result in missed events
- Fix timer migration group hierarchy event updates
- Fix a PowerPC64 build warning
- Fix a handful of DocBook annotation bugs"
* tag 'timers-urgent-2024-04-07' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
timers/migration: Return early on deactivation
timers/migration: Fix ignored event due to missing CPU update
vdso: Use CONFIG_PAGE_SHIFT in vdso/datapage.h
timers: Fix text inconsistencies and spelling
tick/sched: Fix struct tick_sched doc warnings
tick/sched: Fix various kernel-doc warnings
timers: Fix kernel-doc format and add Return values
time/timekeeping: Fix kernel-doc warnings and typos
time/timecounter: Fix inline documentation
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Merge tag 'perf-urgent-2024-04-07' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 perf fix from Ingo Molnar:
"Fix a combined PEBS events bug on x86 Intel CPUs"
* tag 'perf-urgent-2024-04-07' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
perf/x86/intel/ds: Don't clear ->pebs_data_cfg for the last PEBS event
- Address a slow memory leak with RPC-over-TCP
- Prevent another NFS4ERR_DELAY loop during CREATE_SESSION
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Merge tag 'nfsd-6.9-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cel/linux
Pull nfsd fixes from Chuck Lever:
- Address a slow memory leak with RPC-over-TCP
- Prevent another NFS4ERR_DELAY loop during CREATE_SESSION
* tag 'nfsd-6.9-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cel/linux:
nfsd: hold a lighter-weight client reference over CB_RECALL_ANY
SUNRPC: Fix a slow server-side memory leak with RPC-over-TCP
* Allow creating new links to special files which were not associated with a
project quota.
Signed-off-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanbabu@kernel.org>
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Merge tag 'xfs-6.9-fixes-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/xfs/xfs-linux
Pull xfs fix from Chandan Babu:
- Allow creating new links to special files which were not associated
with a project quota
* tag 'xfs-6.9-fixes-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/xfs/xfs-linux:
xfs: allow cross-linking special files without project quota
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Merge tag '6.9-rc2-smb3-client-fixes' of git://git.samba.org/sfrench/cifs-2.6
Pull smb client fixes from Steve French:
- fix to retry close to avoid potential handle leaks when server
returns EBUSY
- DFS fixes including a fix for potential use after free
- fscache fix
- minor strncpy cleanup
- reconnect race fix
- deal with various possible UAF race conditions tearing sessions down
* tag '6.9-rc2-smb3-client-fixes' of git://git.samba.org/sfrench/cifs-2.6:
smb: client: fix potential UAF in cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect()
smb: client: fix potential UAF in smb2_is_network_name_deleted()
smb: client: fix potential UAF in is_valid_oplock_break()
smb: client: fix potential UAF in smb2_is_valid_oplock_break()
smb: client: fix potential UAF in smb2_is_valid_lease_break()
smb: client: fix potential UAF in cifs_stats_proc_show()
smb: client: fix potential UAF in cifs_stats_proc_write()
smb: client: fix potential UAF in cifs_dump_full_key()
smb: client: fix potential UAF in cifs_debug_files_proc_show()
smb3: retrying on failed server close
smb: client: serialise cifs_construct_tcon() with cifs_mount_mutex
smb: client: handle DFS tcons in cifs_construct_tcon()
smb: client: refresh referral without acquiring refpath_lock
smb: client: guarantee refcounted children from parent session
cifs: Fix caching to try to do open O_WRONLY as rdwr on server
smb: client: fix UAF in smb2_reconnect_server()
smb: client: replace deprecated strncpy with strscpy
srso_alias_untrain_ret() is special code, even if it is a dummy
which is called in the !SRSO case, so annotate it like its real
counterpart, to address the following objtool splat:
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: .export_symbol+0x2b290: data relocation to !ENDBR: srso_alias_untrain_ret+0x0
Fixes: 4535e1a4174c ("x86/bugs: Fix the SRSO mitigation on Zen3/4")
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240405144637.17908-1-bp@kernel.org
We want to fix:
0e110732473e ("x86/retpoline: Do the necessary fixup to the Zen3/4 srso return thunk for !SRSO")
So merge in Linus's latest into x86/urgent to have it available.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
the definition of icr_bits[] inside the ifdef block where it is
used.
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Merge tag 'i2c-host-fixes-6.9-rc3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/andi.shyti/linux into i2c/for-current
An unused const variable kind of error has been fixed by placing
the definition of icr_bits[] inside the ifdef block where it is
used.
The firewire-ohci kernel module has a parameter for verbose kernel logging.
It is well-known that it logs the spurious IRQ for bus-reset event due to
the unmasked register for IRQ event. This update fixes the issue.
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Merge tag 'firewire-fixes-6.9-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ieee1394/linux1394
Pull firewire fixes from Takashi Sakamoto:
"The firewire-ohci kernel module has a parameter for verbose kernel
logging. It is well-known that it logs the spurious IRQ for bus-reset
event due to the unmasked register for IRQ event. This update fixes
the issue"
* tag 'firewire-fixes-6.9-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ieee1394/linux1394:
firewire: ohci: mask bus reset interrupts between ISR and bottom half
In the FireWire OHCI interrupt handler, if a bus reset interrupt has
occurred, mask bus reset interrupts until bus_reset_work has serviced and
cleared the interrupt.
Normally, we always leave bus reset interrupts masked. We infer the bus
reset from the self-ID interrupt that happens shortly thereafter. A
scenario where we unmask bus reset interrupts was introduced in 2008 in
a007bb857e0b26f5d8b73c2ff90782d9c0972620: If
OHCI_PARAM_DEBUG_BUSRESETS (8) is set in the debug parameter bitmask, we
will unmask bus reset interrupts so we can log them.
irq_handler logs the bus reset interrupt. However, we can't clear the bus
reset event flag in irq_handler, because we won't service the event until
later. irq_handler exits with the event flag still set. If the
corresponding interrupt is still unmasked, the first bus reset will
usually freeze the system due to irq_handler being called again each
time it exits. This freeze can be reproduced by loading firewire_ohci
with "modprobe firewire_ohci debug=-1" (to enable all debugging output).
Apparently there are also some cases where bus_reset_work will get called
soon enough to clear the event, and operation will continue normally.
This freeze was first reported a few months after a007bb85 was committed,
but until now it was never fixed. The debug level could safely be set
to -1 through sysfs after the module was loaded, but this would be
ineffectual in logging bus reset interrupts since they were only
unmasked during initialization.
irq_handler will now leave the event flag set but mask bus reset
interrupts, so irq_handler won't be called again and there will be no
freeze. If OHCI_PARAM_DEBUG_BUSRESETS is enabled, bus_reset_work will
unmask the interrupt after servicing the event, so future interrupts
will be caught as desired.
As a side effect to this change, OHCI_PARAM_DEBUG_BUSRESETS can now be
enabled through sysfs in addition to during initial module loading.
However, when enabled through sysfs, logging of bus reset interrupts will
be effective only starting with the second bus reset, after
bus_reset_work has executed.
Signed-off-by: Adam Goldman <adamg@pobox.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp>
A few small driver specific fixes, the most important being the s3c64xx
change which is likely to be hit during normal operation.
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Merge tag 'spi-fix-v6.9-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/broonie/spi
Pull spi fixes from Mark Brown:
"A few small driver specific fixes, the most important being the
s3c64xx change which is likely to be hit during normal operation"
* tag 'spi-fix-v6.9-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/broonie/spi:
spi: mchp-pci1xxx: Fix a possible null pointer dereference in pci1xxx_spi_probe
spi: spi-fsl-lpspi: remove redundant spi_controller_put call
spi: s3c64xx: Use DMA mode from fifo size
Richard found a nasty corner case in the maple tree code which he fixed,
and also fixed a compiler warning which was showing up with the
toolchain he uses and helpfully identified a possible incorrect error
code which could have runtime impacts.
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Merge tag 'regmap-fix-v6.9-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/broonie/regmap
Pull regmap fixes from Mark Brown:
"Richard found a nasty corner case in the maple tree code which he
fixed, and also fixed a compiler warning which was showing up with the
toolchain he uses and helpfully identified a possible incorrect error
code which could have runtime impacts"
* tag 'regmap-fix-v6.9-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/broonie/regmap:
regmap: maple: Fix uninitialized symbol 'ret' warnings
regmap: maple: Fix cache corruption in regcache_maple_drop()
