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commit 9a1536b093bb5bf60689021275fd24d513bb8db0 upstream.
With SHA-1 no longer being used for anything performance oriented, and
also soon to be phased out entirely, we can make up for the space added
by unrolled BLAKE2s by simply re-rolling SHA-1. Since SHA-1 is so much
more complex, re-rolling it more or less takes care of the code size
added by BLAKE2s. And eventually, hopefully we'll see SHA-1 removed
entirely from most small kernel builds.
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d8d83d8ab0a453e17e68b3a3bed1f940c34b8646 upstream.
Basically nobody should use blake2s in an HMAC construction; it already
has a keyed variant. But unfortunately for historical reasons, Noise,
used by WireGuard, uses HKDF quite strictly, which means we have to use
this. Because this really shouldn't be used by others, this commit moves
it into wireguard's noise.c locally, so that kernels that aren't using
WireGuard don't get this superfluous code baked in. On m68k systems,
this shaves off ~314 bytes.
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
[Jason: for stable, skip the wireguard changes, since this kernel
doesn't have wireguard.]
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 66d7fb94e4ffe5acc589e0b2b4710aecc1f07a28 upstream.
The C implementation was originally based on Samuel Neves' public
domain reference implementation but has since been heavily modified
for the kernel. We're able to do compile-time optimizations by moving
some scaffolding around the final function into the header file.
Information: https://blake2.net/
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Samuel Neves <sneves@dei.uc.pt>
Co-developed-by: Samuel Neves <sneves@dei.uc.pt>
[ardb: - move from lib/zinc to lib/crypto
- remove simd handling
- rewrote selftest for better coverage
- use fixed digest length for blake2s_hmac() and rename to
blake2s256_hmac() ]
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
[Jason: for stable, skip kconfig and wire up directly, and skip the arch
hooks; optimized implementations need not be backported.]
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f2e19b36593caed4c977c2f55aeba7408aeb2132 upstream.
The transaction buffer is allocated by using the size of the packet buf,
and subtracting two which seem intended to remove the two tags which are
not present in the target structure. This calculation leads to under
counting memory because of differences between the packet contents and the
target structure. The aid_len field is a u8 in the packet, but a u32 in
the structure, resulting in at least 3 bytes always being under counted.
Further, the aid data is a variable length field in the packet, but fixed
in the structure, so if this field is less than the max, the difference is
added to the under counting.
The last validation check for transaction->params_len is also incorrect
since it employs the same accounting error.
To fix, perform validation checks progressively to safely reach the
next field, to determine the size of both buffers and verify both tags.
Once all validation checks pass, allocate the buffer and copy the data.
This eliminates freeing memory on the error path, as those checks are
moved ahead of memory allocation.
Fixes: 26fc6c7f02cb ("NFC: st21nfca: Add HCI transaction event support")
Fixes: 4fbcc1a4cb20 ("nfc: st21nfca: Fix potential buffer overflows in EVT_TRANSACTION")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Martin Faltesek <mfaltesek@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b45043192b3e481304062938a6561da2ceea46a6 upstream.
This is a backport of the original upstream patch for 5.4/5.10.
The original upstream patch has been applied to 5.4/5.10 branches, which
simply removed the line:
cost += n_buckets * (value_size + sizeof(struct stack_map_bucket));
This is correct for upstream branch but incorrect for 5.4/5.10 branches,
as the 5.4/5.10 branches do not have the commit 370868107bf6 ("bpf:
Eliminate rlimit-based memory accounting for stackmap maps"), so the
bpf_map_charge_init() function has not been removed.
Currently the bpf_map_charge_init() function in 5.4/5.10 branches takes a
wrong memory charge cost, the
attr->max_entries * (sizeof(struct stack_map_bucket) + (u64)value_size))
part is missing, let's fix it.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.4.y
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.10.y
Signed-off-by: Yuntao Wang <ytcoode@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b577d0cd2104fdfcf0ded3707540a12be8ddd8b0 upstream.
In commit 45089142b149 Aneesh had missed one (admittedly, very unlikely
to hit) case in v9fs_stat2inode_dotl(). However, the same considerations
apply there as well - we have no business whatsoever to change ->i_rdev
or the file type.
Cc: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1dc6ff02c8bf77d71b9b5d11cbc9df77cfb28626 upstream
Similar to MDS and TAA, print a warning if SMT is enabled for the MMIO
Stale Data vulnerability.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 027bbb884be006b05d9c577d6401686053aa789e upstream
The enumeration of MD_CLEAR in CPUID(EAX=7,ECX=0).EDX{bit 10} is not an
accurate indicator on all CPUs of whether the VERW instruction will
overwrite fill buffers. FB_CLEAR enumeration in
IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES{bit 17} covers the case of CPUs that are not
vulnerable to MDS/TAA, indicating that microcode does overwrite fill
buffers.
Guests running in VMM environments may not be aware of all the
capabilities/vulnerabilities of the host CPU. Specifically, a guest may
apply MDS/TAA mitigations when a virtual CPU is enumerated as vulnerable
to MDS/TAA even when the physical CPU is not. On CPUs that enumerate
FB_CLEAR_CTRL the VMM may set FB_CLEAR_DIS to skip overwriting of fill
buffers by the VERW instruction. This is done by setting FB_CLEAR_DIS
during VMENTER and resetting on VMEXIT. For guests that enumerate
FB_CLEAR (explicitly asking for fill buffer clear capability) the VMM
will not use FB_CLEAR_DIS.
Irrespective of guest state, host overwrites CPU buffers before VMENTER
to protect itself from an MMIO capable guest, as part of mitigation for
MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a992b8a4682f119ae035a01b40d4d0665c4a2875 upstream
The Shared Buffers Data Sampling (SBDS) variant of Processor MMIO Stale
Data vulnerabilities may expose RDRAND, RDSEED and SGX EGETKEY data.
Mitigation for this is added by a microcode update.
As some of the implications of SBDS are similar to SRBDS, SRBDS mitigation
infrastructure can be leveraged by SBDS. Set X86_BUG_SRBDS and use SRBDS
mitigation.
Mitigation is enabled by default; use srbds=off to opt-out. Mitigation
status can be checked from below file:
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 22cac9c677c95f3ac5c9244f8ca0afdc7c8afb19 upstream
Currently, Linux disables SRBDS mitigation on CPUs not affected by
MDS and have the TSX feature disabled. On such CPUs, secrets cannot
be extracted from CPU fill buffers using MDS or TAA. Without SRBDS
mitigation, Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities can be used to
extract RDRAND, RDSEED, and EGETKEY data.
Do not disable SRBDS mitigation by default when CPU is also affected by
Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8d50cdf8b8341770bc6367bce40c0c1bb0e1d5b3 upstream
Add the sysfs reporting file for Processor MMIO Stale Data
vulnerability. It exposes the vulnerability and mitigation state similar
to the existing files for the other hardware vulnerabilities.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 99a83db5a605137424e1efe29dc0573d6a5b6316 upstream
When the CPU is affected by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities,
Fill Buffer Stale Data Propagator (FBSDP) can propagate stale data out
of Fill buffer to uncore buffer when CPU goes idle. Stale data can then
be exploited with other variants using MMIO operations.
Mitigate it by clearing the Fill buffer before entering idle state.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Co-developed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e5925fb867290ee924fcf2fe3ca887b792714366 upstream
MDS, TAA and Processor MMIO Stale Data mitigations rely on clearing CPU
buffers. Moreover, status of these mitigations affects each other.
During boot, it is important to maintain the order in which these
mitigations are selected. This is especially true for
md_clear_update_mitigation() that needs to be called after MDS, TAA and
Processor MMIO Stale Data mitigation selection is done.
Introduce md_clear_select_mitigation(), and select all these mitigations
from there. This reflects relationships between these mitigations and
ensures proper ordering.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8cb861e9e3c9a55099ad3d08e1a3b653d29c33ca upstream
Processor MMIO Stale Data is a class of vulnerabilities that may
expose data after an MMIO operation. For details please refer to
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst.
These vulnerabilities are broadly categorized as:
Device Register Partial Write (DRPW):
Some endpoint MMIO registers incorrectly handle writes that are
smaller than the register size. Instead of aborting the write or only
copying the correct subset of bytes (for example, 2 bytes for a 2-byte
write), more bytes than specified by the write transaction may be
written to the register. On some processors, this may expose stale
data from the fill buffers of the core that created the write
transaction.
Shared Buffers Data Sampling (SBDS):
After propagators may have moved data around the uncore and copied
stale data into client core fill buffers, processors affected by MFBDS
can leak data from the fill buffer.
Shared Buffers Data Read (SBDR):
It is similar to Shared Buffer Data Sampling (SBDS) except that the
data is directly read into the architectural software-visible state.
An attacker can use these vulnerabilities to extract data from CPU fill
buffers using MDS and TAA methods. Mitigate it by clearing the CPU fill
buffers using the VERW instruction before returning to a user or a
guest.
On CPUs not affected by MDS and TAA, user application cannot sample data
from CPU fill buffers using MDS or TAA. A guest with MMIO access can
still use DRPW or SBDR to extract data architecturally. Mitigate it with
VERW instruction to clear fill buffers before VMENTER for MMIO capable
guests.
Add a kernel parameter mmio_stale_data={off|full|full,nosmt} to control
the mitigation.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f52ea6c26953fed339aa4eae717ee5c2133c7ff2 upstream
Processor MMIO Stale Data mitigation uses similar mitigation as MDS and
TAA. In preparation for adding its mitigation, add a common function to
update all mitigations that depend on MD_CLEAR.
[ bp: Add a newline in md_clear_update_mitigation() to separate
statements better. ]
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 51802186158c74a0304f51ab963e7c2b3a2b046f upstream
Processor MMIO Stale Data is a class of vulnerabilities that may
expose data after an MMIO operation. For more details please refer to
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst
Add the Processor MMIO Stale Data bug enumeration. A microcode update
adds new bits to the MSR IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, define them.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6e1239c13953f3c2a76e70031f74ddca9ae57cd3 upstream.
Add Alder Lake mobile CPU model number to Intel family.
Signed-off-by: Gayatri Kammela <gayatri.kammela@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210121215004.11618-1-tony.luck@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b2d32af0bff402b4c1fce28311759dd1f6af058a upstream.
Japser Lake is an Atom family processor.
It uses Tremont cores and is targeted at mobile platforms.
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2accfa69050c2a0d6fc6106f609208b3e9622b26 upstream.
0-day is not happy that there is no prototype for cpu_show_srbds():
drivers/base/cpu.c:565:16: error: no previous prototype for 'cpu_show_srbds'
Fixes: 7e5b3c267d25 ("x86/speculation: Add Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS) mitigation")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200617141410.93338-1-linux@roeck-us.net
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0a8e98305f63deaf0a799d5cf5532cc83af035d1 upstream.
Since commit dfeae1073583("mtd: cfi_cmdset_0002: Change write buffer to
check correct value") buffered writes fail on S29GL064N. This is
because, on S29GL064N, reads return 0xFF at the end of DQ polling for
write completion, where as, chip_good() check expects actual data
written to the last location to be returned post DQ polling completion.
Fix is to revert to using chip_good() for S29GL064N which only checks
for DQ lines to settle down to determine write completion.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b687c259-6413-26c9-d4c9-b3afa69ea124@pengutronix.de/
Fixes: dfeae1073583("mtd: cfi_cmdset_0002: Change write buffer to check correct value")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tokunori Ikegami <ikegami.t@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Vignesh Raghavendra <vigneshr@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mtd/20220323170458.5608-3-ikegami.t@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ea23994edc4169bd90d7a9b5908c6ccefd82fa40 upstream.
The RAID0 layout is irrelevant if all members have the same size so the
array has only one zone. It is *also* irrelevant if the array has two
zones and the second zone has only one device, for example if the array
has two members of different sizes.
So in that case it makes sense to allow assembly even when the layout is
undefined, like what is done when the array has only one zone.
Reviewed-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Pascal Hambourg <pascal@plouf.fr.eu.org>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8e1278444446fc97778a5e5c99bca1ce0bbc5ec9 upstream.
The ptrace PEEKUSR/POKEUSR (aka PEEKUSER/POKEUSER) API allows a process
to read/write registers of another process.
To get/set a register, the API takes an index into an imaginary address
space called the "USER area", where the registers of the process are
laid out in some fashion.
The kernel then maps that index to a particular register in its own data
structures and gets/sets the value.
The API only allows a single machine-word to be read/written at a time.
So 4 bytes on 32-bit kernels and 8 bytes on 64-bit kernels.
The way floating point registers (FPRs) are addressed is somewhat
complicated, because double precision float values are 64-bit even on
32-bit CPUs. That means on 32-bit kernels each FPR occupies two
word-sized locations in the USER area. On 64-bit kernels each FPR
occupies one word-sized location in the USER area.
Internally the kernel stores the FPRs in an array of u64s, or if VSX is
enabled, an array of pairs of u64s where one half of each pair stores
the FPR. Which half of the pair stores the FPR depends on the kernel's
endianness.
To handle the different layouts of the FPRs depending on VSX/no-VSX and
big/little endian, the TS_FPR() macro was introduced.
Unfortunately the TS_FPR() macro does not take into account the fact
that the addressing of each FPR differs between 32-bit and 64-bit
kernels. It just takes the index into the "USER area" passed from
userspace and indexes into the fp_state.fpr array.
On 32-bit there are 64 indexes that address FPRs, but only 32 entries in
the fp_state.fpr array, meaning the user can read/write 256 bytes past
the end of the array. Because the fp_state sits in the middle of the
thread_struct there are various fields than can be overwritten,
including some pointers. As such it may be exploitable.
It has also been observed to cause systems to hang or otherwise
misbehave when using gdbserver, and is probably the root cause of this
report which could not be easily reproduced:
https://lore.kernel.org/linuxppc-dev/dc38afe9-6b78-f3f5-666b-986939e40fc6@keymile.com/
Rather than trying to make the TS_FPR() macro even more complicated to
fix the bug, or add more macros, instead add a special-case for 32-bit
kernels. This is more obvious and hopefully avoids a similar bug
happening again in future.
Note that because 32-bit kernels never have VSX enabled the code doesn't
need to consider TS_FPRWIDTH/OFFSET at all. Add a BUILD_BUG_ON() to
ensure that 32-bit && VSX is never enabled.
Fixes: 87fec0514f61 ("powerpc: PTRACE_PEEKUSR/PTRACE_POKEUSER of FPR registers in little endian builds")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Reported-by: Ariel Miculas <ariel.miculas@belden.com>
Tested-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220609133245.573565-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c42e65664390be7c1ef3838cd84956d3a2739d60 upstream.
The bcm5974 driver does the allocation and dma mapping of the usb urb
data buffer, but driver does not set the URB_NO_TRANSFER_DMA_MAP flag
to let usb core know the buffer is already mapped.
usb core tries to map the already mapped buffer, causing a warning:
"xhci_hcd 0000:00:14.0: rejecting DMA map of vmalloc memory"
Fix this by setting the URB_NO_TRANSFER_DMA_MAP, letting usb core
know buffer is already mapped by bcm5974 driver
Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215890
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220606113636.588955-1-mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7bb0fb7c63df95d6027dc50d6af3bc3bbbc25483 upstream.
When the promiscuous mode is enabled on a VF, the IXGBE_VMOLR_VPE
bit (VLAN Promiscuous Enable) is set. This means that the VF will
receive packets whose VLAN is not the same than the VLAN of the VF.
For instance, in this situation:
┌────────┐ ┌────────┐ ┌────────┐
│ │ │ │ │ │
│ │ │ │ │ │
│ VF0├────┤VF1 VF2├────┤VF3 │
│ │ │ │ │ │
└────────┘ └────────┘ └────────┘
VM1 VM2 VM3
vf 0: vlan 1000
vf 1: vlan 1000
vf 2: vlan 1001
vf 3: vlan 1001
If we tcpdump on VF3, we see all the packets, even those transmitted
on vlan 1000.
This behavior prevents to bridge VF1 and VF2 in VM2, because it will
create a loop: packets transmitted on VF1 will be received by VF2 and
vice-versa, and bridged again through the software bridge.
This patch remove the activation of VLAN Promiscuous when a VF enables
the promiscuous mode. However, the IXGBE_VMOLR_UPE bit (Unicast
Promiscuous) is kept, so that a VF receives all packets that has the
same VLAN, whatever the destination MAC address.
Fixes: 8443c1a4b192 ("ixgbe, ixgbevf: Add new mbox API xcast mode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Olivier Matz <olivier.matz@6wind.com>
Tested-by: Konrad Jankowski <konrad0.jankowski@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 803e9895ea2b0fe80bc85980ae2d7a7e44037914 upstream.
After a VF requested to remove the promiscuous flag on an interface, the
broadcast packets are not received anymore. This breaks some protocols
like ARP.
In ixgbe_update_vf_xcast_mode(), we should keep the IXGBE_VMOLR_BAM
bit (Broadcast Accept) on promiscuous removal.
This flag is already set by default in ixgbe_set_vmolr() on VF reset.
Fixes: 8443c1a4b192 ("ixgbe, ixgbevf: Add new mbox API xcast mode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Olivier Matz <olivier.matz@6wind.com>
Tested-by: Konrad Jankowski <konrad0.jankowski@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 77e5fe8f176a525523ae091d6fd0fbb8834c156d upstream.
The first validation check for EVT_TRANSACTION has two different checks
tied together with logical AND. One is a check for minimum packet length,
and the other is for a valid aid_tag. If either condition is true (fails),
then an error should be triggered. The fix is to change && to ||.
Fixes: 26fc6c7f02cb ("NFC: st21nfca: Add HCI transaction event support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Martin Faltesek <mfaltesek@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a051246b786af7e4a9d9219cc7038a6e8a411531 upstream.
The intention of the use of mmc_blk_reset_success() in
mmc_blk_cqe_recovery() was to prevent repeated resets when retrying and
getting the same error. However, that may not be the case - any amount
of time and I/O may pass before another recovery is needed, in which
case there would be no reason to deny it the opportunity to recover via
a reset if necessary. CQE recovery is expected seldom and failure to
recover (if the clear tasks command fails), even more seldom, so it is
better to allow the reset always, which can be done by calling
mmc_blk_reset_success() always.
Fixes: 1e8e55b67030c6 ("mmc: block: Add CQE support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220531171922.76080-1-adrian.hunter@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 72aad489f992871e908ff6d9055b26c6366fb864 upstream.
The {dma|pio}_mode sysfs files are incorrectly documented as having a
list of the supported DMA/PIO transfer modes, while the corresponding
fields of the *struct* ata_device hold the transfer mode IDs, not masks.
To match these docs, the {dma|pio}_mode (and even xfer_mode!) sysfs
files are handled by the ata_bitfield_name_match() macro which leads to
reading such kind of nonsense from them:
$ cat /sys/class/ata_device/dev3.0/pio_mode
XFER_UDMA_7, XFER_UDMA_6, XFER_UDMA_5, XFER_UDMA_4, XFER_MW_DMA_4,
XFER_PIO_6, XFER_PIO_5, XFER_PIO_4, XFER_PIO_3, XFER_PIO_2, XFER_PIO_1,
XFER_PIO_0
Using the correct ata_bitfield_name_search() macro fixes that:
$ cat /sys/class/ata_device/dev3.0/pio_mode
XFER_PIO_4
While fixing the file documentation, somewhat reword the {dma|pio}_mode
file doc and add a note about being mostly useful for PATA devices to
the xfer_mode file doc...
Fixes: d9027470b886 ("[libata] Add ATA transport class")
Signed-off-by: Sergey Shtylyov <s.shtylyov@omp.ru>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal <damien.lemoal@opensource.wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8ea21823aa584b55ba4b861307093b78054b0c1b upstream.
During reconnects, we check the return value from
cifs_negotiate_protocol, and have handlers for both success
and failures. But if that passes, and cifs_setup_session
returns any errors other than -EACCES, we do not handle
that. This fix adds a handler for that, so that we don't
go ahead and try a tree_connect on a failed session.
Signed-off-by: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Enzo Matsumiya <ematsumiya@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 1f7a6cf6b07c74a17343c2559cd5f5018a245961 ]
MAGIC_START("IKCFG_ST") and MAGIC_END("IKCFG_ED") are moved out
from the kernel_config_data variable.
Thus, we parse kernel_config_data directly instead of considering
offset of MAGIC_START and MAGIC_END.
Fixes: 13610aa908dc ("kernel/configs: use .incbin directive to embed config_data.gz")
Signed-off-by: Kuan-Ying Lee <Kuan-Ying.Lee@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit dbd29e0752286af74243cf891accf472b2f3edd8 ]
We should use size of descriptor chain to test loop condition
in the indirect case. And another statistical count is also introduced
for indirect descriptors to avoid conflict with the statistical count
of direct descriptors.
Fixes: f87d0fbb5798 ("vringh: host-side implementation of virtio rings.")
Signed-off-by: Xie Yongji <xieyongji@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Fam Zheng <fam.zheng@bytedance.com>
Message-Id: <20220505100910.137-1-xieyongji@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 0dfe54071d7c828a02917b595456bfde1afdddc9 ]
The nodemask routines had mixed return values that provided potentially
signed return values that could never happen. This was leading to the
compiler getting confusing about the range of possible return values
(it was thinking things could be negative where they could not be). Fix
all the nodemask routines that should be returning unsigned
(or bool) values. Silences:
mm/swapfile.c: In function ‘setup_swap_info’:
mm/swapfile.c:2291:47: error: array subscript -1 is below array bounds of ‘struct plist_node[]’ [-Werror=array-bounds]
2291 | p->avail_lists[i].prio = 1;
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~
In file included from mm/swapfile.c:16:
./include/linux/swap.h:292:27: note: while referencing ‘avail_lists’
292 | struct plist_node avail_lists[]; /*
| ^~~~~~~~~~~
Reported-by: Christophe de Dinechin <dinechin@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220414150855.2407137-3-dinechin@redhat.com/
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Yury Norov <yury.norov@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Zhen Lei <thunder.leizhen@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Yury Norov <yury.norov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 7ef93ffccd55fb0ba000ed16ef6a81cd7dee07b5 ]
We should not be including unused smb20 specific code when legacy
support is disabled (CONFIG_CIFS_ALLOW_INSECURE_LEGACY turned
off). For example smb2_operations and smb2_values aren't used
in that case. Over time we can move more and more SMB1/CIFS and SMB2.0
code into the insecure legacy ifdefs
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 6d5946274df1fff539a7eece458a43be733d1db8 ]
With large and many guest with storage keys it is possible to create
large latencies or stalls during initial key setting:
rcu: INFO: rcu_sched self-detected stall on CPU
rcu: 18-....: (2099 ticks this GP) idle=54e/1/0x4000000000000002 softirq=35598716/35598716 fqs=998
(t=2100 jiffies g=155867385 q=20879)
Task dump for CPU 18:
CPU 1/KVM R running task 0 1030947 256019 0x06000004
Call Trace:
sched_show_task
rcu_dump_cpu_stacks
rcu_sched_clock_irq
update_process_times
tick_sched_handle
tick_sched_timer
__hrtimer_run_queues
hrtimer_interrupt
do_IRQ
ext_int_handler
ptep_zap_key
The mmap lock is held during the page walking but since this is a
semaphore scheduling is still possible. Same for the kvm srcu.
To minimize overhead do this on every segment table entry or large page.
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220530092706.11637-2-borntraeger@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 09dadb5985023e27d4740ebd17e6fea4640110e5 ]
In our tests, "qemu-nbd" triggers a io hung:
INFO: task qemu-nbd:11445 blocked for more than 368 seconds.
Not tainted 5.18.0-rc3-next-20220422-00003-g2176915513ca #884
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:qemu-nbd state:D stack: 0 pid:11445 ppid: 1 flags:0x00000000
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__schedule+0x480/0x1050
? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x3e/0xb0
schedule+0x9c/0x1b0
blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait+0x9d/0xf0
? ipi_rseq+0x70/0x70
blk_mq_freeze_queue+0x2b/0x40
nbd_add_socket+0x6b/0x270 [nbd]
nbd_ioctl+0x383/0x510 [nbd]
blkdev_ioctl+0x18e/0x3e0
__x64_sys_ioctl+0xac/0x120
do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7fd8ff706577
RSP: 002b:00007fd8fcdfebf8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000040000000 RCX: 00007fd8ff706577
RDX: 000000000000000d RSI: 000000000000ab00 RDI: 000000000000000f
RBP: 000000000000000f R08: 000000000000fbe8 R09: 000055fe497c62b0
R10: 00000002aff20000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000000006d
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffe82dc5e70 R15: 00007fd8fcdff9c0
"qemu-ndb -d" will call ioctl 'NBD_DISCONNECT' first, however, following
message was found:
block nbd0: Send disconnect failed -32
Which indicate that something is wrong with the server. Then,
"qemu-nbd -d" will call ioctl 'NBD_CLEAR_SOCK', however ioctl can't clear
requests after commit 2516ab1543fd("nbd: only clear the queue on device
teardown"). And in the meantime, request can't complete through timeout
because nbd_xmit_timeout() will always return 'BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER', which
means such request will never be completed in this situation.
Now that the flag 'NBD_CMD_INFLIGHT' can make sure requests won't
complete multiple times, switch back to call nbd_clear_sock() in
nbd_clear_sock_ioctl(), so that inflight requests can be cleared.
Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220521073749.3146892-5-yukuai3@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit c55b2b983b0fa012942c3eb16384b2b722caa810 ]
When nbd module is being removing, nbd_alloc_config() may be
called concurrently by nbd_genl_connect(), although try_module_get()
will return false, but nbd_alloc_config() doesn't handle it.
The race may lead to the leak of nbd_config and its related
resources (e.g, recv_workq) and oops in nbd_read_stat() due
to the unload of nbd module as shown below:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000040
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 5 PID: 13840 Comm: kworker/u17:33 Not tainted 5.14.0+ #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)
Workqueue: knbd16-recv recv_work [nbd]
RIP: 0010:nbd_read_stat.cold+0x130/0x1a4 [nbd]
Call Trace:
recv_work+0x3b/0xb0 [nbd]
process_one_work+0x1ed/0x390
worker_thread+0x4a/0x3d0
kthread+0x12a/0x150
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
Fixing it by checking the return value of try_module_get()
in nbd_alloc_config(). As nbd_alloc_config() may return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV),
assign nbd->config only when nbd_alloc_config() succeeds to ensure
the value of nbd->config is binary (valid or NULL).
Also adding a debug message to check the reference counter
of nbd_config during module removal.
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220521073749.3146892-3-yukuai3@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit a6a5eb269f6f3a2fe392f725a8d9052190c731e2 ]
As x86 uses the <asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-*.h> headers, the
regular forms of all bitops are instrumented with explicit calls to
KASAN and KCSAN checks. As these are explicit calls, these are not
suppressed by the noinstr function attribute.
This can result in calls to those check functions in noinstr code, which
objtool warns about:
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: enter_from_user_mode+0x24: call to __kcsan_check_access() leaves .noinstr.text section
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x28: call to __kcsan_check_access() leaves .noinstr.text section
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: syscall_enter_from_user_mode_prepare+0x24: call to __kcsan_check_access() leaves .noinstr.text section
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: irqentry_enter_from_user_mode+0x24: call to __kcsan_check_access() leaves .noinstr.text section
Prevent this by using the arch_*() bitops, which are the underlying
bitops without explciit instrumentation.
[null: Changelog]
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220502111216.290518605@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit d6b732666a1bae0df3c3ae06925043bba34502b1 ]
The return value of is_arm_mapping_symbol() is unpredictable when "$"
is passed in.
strchr(3) says:
The strchr() and strrchr() functions return a pointer to the matched
character or NULL if the character is not found. The terminating null
byte is considered part of the string, so that if c is specified as
'\0', these functions return a pointer to the terminator.
When str[1] is '\0', strchr("axtd", str[1]) is not NULL, and str[2] is
referenced (i.e. buffer overrun).
Test code
---------
char str1[] = "abc";
char str2[] = "ab";
strcpy(str1, "$");
strcpy(str2, "$");
printf("test1: %d\n", is_arm_mapping_symbol(str1));
printf("test2: %d\n", is_arm_mapping_symbol(str2));
Result
------
test1: 0
test2: 1
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit a2b28708b645c5632dc93669ab06e97874c8244f ]
In radeon_fp_native_mode(), the return value of drm_mode_duplicate()
is assigned to mode, which will lead to a NULL pointer dereference
on failure of drm_mode_duplicate(). Add a check to avoid npd.
The failure status of drm_cvt_mode() on the other path is checked too.
Signed-off-by: Gong Yuanjun <ruc_gongyuanjun@163.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit d7a2dc523085f8b8c60548ceedc696934aefeb0e ]
`rctime' has been a pain point in cephfs due to its buggy
nature - inconsistent values reported and those sorts.
Fixing rctime is non-trivial needing an overall redesign
of the entire nested statistics infrastructure.
As a workaround, PR
http://github.com/ceph/ceph/pull/37938
allows this extended attribute to be manually set. This allows
users to "fixup" inconsistent rctime values. While this sounds
messy, its probably the wisest approach allowing users/scripts
to workaround buggy rctime values.
The above PR enables Ceph MDS to allow manually setting
rctime extended attribute with the corresponding user-land
changes. We may as well allow the same to be done via kclient
for parity.
Signed-off-by: Venky Shankar <vshankar@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 9c90c9b3e50e16d03c7f87d63e9db373974781e0 ]
This reverts commit 4dc2a5a8f6754492180741facf2a8787f2c415d7.
A non-zero return value from pfkey_broadcast() does not necessarily mean
an error occurred as this function returns -ESRCH when no registered
listener received the message. In particular, a call with
BROADCAST_PROMISC_ONLY flag and null one_sk argument can never return
zero so that this commit in fact prevents processing any PF_KEY message.
One visible effect is that racoon daemon fails to find encryption
algorithms like aes and refuses to start.
Excluding -ESRCH return value would fix this but it's not obvious that
we really want to bail out here and most other callers of
pfkey_broadcast() also ignore the return value. Also, as pointed out by
Steffen Klassert, PF_KEY is kind of deprecated and newer userspace code
should use netlink instead so that we should only disturb the code for
really important fixes.
v2: add a comment explaining why is the return value ignored
Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit f9f0a46141e2e39bedb4779c88380d1b5f018c14 ]
When myrb_probe() fails the callback might not be set, so we need to
validate the 'disable_intr' callback in myrb_cleanup() to not cause a null
pointer exception. And while at it do not call myrb_cleanup() if we cannot
enable the PCI device at all.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220523120244.99515-1-hare@suse.de
Reported-by: Zheyu Ma <zheyuma97@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Zheyu Ma <zheyuma97@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
