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Use __maybe_unused and pm_ptr() for pm ops.
Signed-off-by: Claudiu Beznea <claudiu.beznea@microchip.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Move set of TRNG_HALFR in atmel_trng_init() as this function is
also called on resume path. In case of SAMA7G5 where backup and
self-refresh PM mode is available most of the SoC parts are
powered of (including TRNG) when entering suspend. In that case
on resuming path TRNG_HALFR should also be re-configured.
Signed-off-by: Claudiu Beznea <claudiu.beznea@microchip.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
s/atmel_trng_disable/atmel_trng_cleanup/g and
s/atmel_trng_enable/atmel_trng_init/g to cope with
struct hwrng::{init, cleanup} members.
Signed-off-by: Claudiu Beznea <claudiu.beznea@microchip.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Add wait for ready support on read.
Signed-off-by: Claudiu Beznea <claudiu.beznea@microchip.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
It's been a few releases since we depreciated the "v1" bindings. Remove
support from the driver as all known device trees have been updated to
use the new bindings.
Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au>
Message-Id: <20220228062840.449215-1-joel@jms.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Taking spinlocks from IRQ context is generally problematic for
PREEMPT_RT. That is, in part, why we take trylocks instead. However, a
spin_try_lock() is also problematic since another spin_lock() invocation
can potentially PI-boost the wrong task, as the spin_try_lock() is
invoked from an IRQ-context, so the task on CPU (random task or idle) is
not the actual owner.
Additionally, by deferring the crng pre-init loading to the worker, we
can use the cryptographic hash function rather than xor, which is
perhaps a meaningful difference when considering this data has only been
through the relatively weak fast_mix() function.
The biggest downside of this approach is that the pre-init loading is
now deferred until later, which means things that need random numbers
after interrupts are enabled, but before workqueues are running -- or
before this particular worker manages to run -- are going to get into
trouble. Hopefully in the real world, this window is rather small,
especially since this code won't run until 64 interrupts had occurred.
Cc: Sultan Alsawaf <sultan@kerneltoast.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
random_get_entropy() returns a cycles_t, not an unsigned long, which is
sometimes 64 bits on various 32-bit platforms, including x86.
Conversely, jiffies is always unsigned long. This commit fixes things to
use cycles_t for fields that use random_get_entropy(), named "cycles",
and unsigned long for fields that use jiffies, named "now". It's also
good to mix in a cycles_t and a jiffies in the same way for both
add_device_randomness and add_timer_randomness, rather than using xor in
one case. Finally, we unify the order of these volatile reads, always
reading the more precise cycles counter, and then jiffies, so that the
cycle counter is as close to the event as possible.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Rather than hard coding various lengths, we can use the right constants.
Strings should be `char *` while buffers should be `u8 *`. Rather than
have a nonsensical and unused maxlength, just remove it. Finally, use
snprintf instead of sprintf, just out of good hygiene.
As well, remove the old comment about returning a binary UUID via the
binary sysctl syscall. That syscall was removed from the kernel in 5.5,
and actually, the "uuid_strategy" function and related infrastructure
for even serving it via the binary sysctl syscall was removed with
894d2491153a ("sysctl drivers: Remove dead binary sysctl support") back
in 2.6.33.
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
When building with -Warray-bounds under GCC 11.2, this warning was
emitted:
In function 'memset',
inlined from 'vtpm_proxy_fops_read' at drivers/char/tpm/tpm_vtpm_proxy.c:102:2:
./include/linux/fortify-string.h:43:33: warning: '__builtin_memset' pointer overflow between offset 164 and size [2147483648, 4294967295]
[-Warray-bounds]
43 | #define __underlying_memset __builtin_memset
| ^
This warning appears to be triggered due to the "count < len"
check in vtpm_proxy_fops_read() splitting the CFG[1], and the compiler
attempting to reason about the possible value range in len compared
to the buffer size.
In order to silence this warning, and to keep this code robust if the
use of proxy_dev->req_len ever changes in the future, explicitly check
the size of len before reaching the memset().
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez1iTF9KegKJrW5a3WzXgCPZJ73nS2_e5esKJRppdzvv8g@mail.gmail.com
Cc: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/4b59d305-6858-1514-751a-37853ad777be@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220119184354.3367603-1-keescook@chromium.org
- The TEE shared memory pool based on two pools is replaced with a single
somewhat more capable pool.
- Replaces tee_shm_alloc() and tee_shm_register() with new functions
easier to use and maintain. The TEE subsystem and the TEE drivers are
updated to use the new functions instead.
- The TEE based Trusted keys routines are updated to use the new
simplified functions above.
- The OP-TEE based rng driver is updated to use the new simplified
functions above.
- The TEE_SHM-flags are refactored to better match their usage
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Merge tag 'tee-shm-for-v5.18' of git://git.linaro.org:/people/jens.wiklander/linux-tee into arm/drivers
TEE shared memory cleanup for v5.18
- The TEE shared memory pool based on two pools is replaced with a single
somewhat more capable pool.
- Replaces tee_shm_alloc() and tee_shm_register() with new functions
easier to use and maintain. The TEE subsystem and the TEE drivers are
updated to use the new functions instead.
- The TEE based Trusted keys routines are updated to use the new
simplified functions above.
- The OP-TEE based rng driver is updated to use the new simplified
functions above.
- The TEE_SHM-flags are refactored to better match their usage
* tag 'tee-shm-for-v5.18' of git://git.linaro.org:/people/jens.wiklander/linux-tee:
tee: refactor TEE_SHM_* flags
tee: replace tee_shm_register()
KEYS: trusted: tee: use tee_shm_register_kernel_buf()
tee: add tee_shm_register_{user,kernel}_buf()
optee: add optee_pool_op_free_helper()
tee: replace tee_shm_alloc()
tee: simplify shm pool handling
tee: add tee_shm_alloc_user_buf()
tee: remove unused tee_shm_pool_alloc_res_mem()
hwrng: optee-rng: use tee_shm_alloc_kernel_buf()
optee: use driver internal tee_context for some rpc
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220218184802.GA968155@jade
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Replace "struct list_head head = LIST_HEAD_INIT(head)" with
"LIST_HEAD(head)" to simplify the code.
Signed-off-by: Cai Huoqing <cai.huoqing@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220209032450.37849-1-cai.huoqing@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
The only time that we need to wake up /dev/random writers on
RNDCLEARPOOL/RNDZAPPOOL is when we're changing from a value that is
greater than or equal to POOL_MIN_BITS to zero, because if we're
changing from below POOL_MIN_BITS to zero, the writers are already
unblocked.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
When the interrupt handler does not have a valid cycle counter, it calls
get_reg() to read a register from the irq stack, in round-robin.
Currently it does this assuming that registers are 32-bit. This is
_probably_ the case, and probably all platforms without cycle counters
are in fact 32-bit platforms. But maybe not, and either way, it's not
quite correct. This commit fixes that to deal with `unsigned long`
rather than `u32`.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
A situation has come up where there is a slave-only device for the slave
and a separate master device on the same bug. Allow a separate slave
device to be registered.
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <minyard@acm.org>
The AST2600 is already described in the bindings, but the driver never
gained a compatible string.
Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au>
Message-Id: <20220221070351.121905-1-joel@jms.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
For the irq randomness fast pool, rather than having to use expensive
atomics, which were visibly the most expensive thing in the entire irq
handler, simply take care of the extreme edge case of resetting count to
zero in the cpuhp online handler, just after workqueues have been
reenabled. This simplifies the code a bit and lets us use vanilla
variables rather than atomics, and performance should be improved.
As well, very early on when the CPU comes up, while interrupts are still
disabled, we clear out the per-cpu crng and its batches, so that it
always starts with fresh randomness.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Sultan Alsawaf <sultan@kerneltoast.com>
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Acked-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
add_hwgenerator_randomness() is a function implemented and documented
inside of random.c. It is the way that hardware RNGs push data into it.
Therefore, it should be declared in random.h. Otherwise sparse complains
with:
random.c:1137:6: warning: symbol 'add_hwgenerator_randomness' was not declared. Should it be static?
The alternative would be to include hw_random.h into random.c, but that
wouldn't really be good for anything except slowing down compile time.
Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
This has no real functional change, as crng_pre_init_inject() (and
before that, crng_slow_init()) always checks for == 0, not >= 2. So
correct the outer unlocked change to reflect that. Before this used
crng_ready(), which was not correct.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
crng_fast_load() and crng_slow_load() have different semantics:
- crng_fast_load() xors and accounts with crng_init_cnt.
- crng_slow_load() hashes and doesn't account.
However add_hwgenerator_randomness() can afford to hash (it's called
from a kthread), and it should account. Additionally, ones that can
afford to hash don't need to take a trylock but can take a normal lock.
So, we combine these into one function, crng_pre_init_inject(), which
allows us to control these in a uniform way. This will make it simpler
later to simplify this all down when the time comes for that.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Since rand_initialize() is run while interrupts are still off and
nothing else is running, we don't need to repeatedly take and release
the pool spinlock, especially in the RDSEED loop.
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
On PREEMPT_RT, it's problematic to take spinlocks from hard irq
handlers. We can fix this by deferring to a workqueue the dumping of
the fast pool into the input pool.
We accomplish this with some careful rules on fast_pool->count:
- When it's incremented to >= 64, we schedule the work.
- If the top bit is set, we never schedule the work, even if >= 64.
- The worker is responsible for setting it back to 0 when it's done.
There are two small issues around using workqueues for this purpose that
we work around.
The first issue is that mix_interrupt_randomness() might be migrated to
another CPU during CPU hotplug. This issue is rectified by checking that
it hasn't been migrated (after disabling irqs). If it has been migrated,
then we set the count to zero, so that when the CPU comes online again,
it can requeue the work. As part of this, we switch to using an
atomic_t, so that the increment in the irq handler doesn't wipe out the
zeroing if the CPU comes back online while this worker is running.
The second issue is that, though relatively minor in effect, we probably
want to make sure we get a consistent view of the pool onto the stack,
in case it's interrupted by an irq while reading. To do this, we don't
reenable irqs until after the copy. There are only 18 instructions
between the cli and sti, so this is a pretty tiny window.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Jonathan Neuschäfer <j.neuschaefer@gmx.net>
Acked-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Sultan Alsawaf <sultan@kerneltoast.com>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Now that we've re-documented the various sections, we can remove the
outdated text here and replace it with a high-level overview.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
This pulls all of the sysctl-focused functions into the sixth labeled
section.
No functional changes.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
This pulls all of the userspace read/write-focused functions into the
fifth labeled section.
No functional changes.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
This pulls all of the entropy collection-focused functions into the
fourth labeled section.
No functional changes.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
This pulls all of the entropy extraction-focused functions into the
third labeled section.
No functional changes.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
This pulls all of the crng-focused functions into the second labeled
section.
No functional changes.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
This pulls all of the readiness waiting-focused functions into the first
labeled section.
No functional changes.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
This is purely cosmetic. Future work involves figuring out which of
these headers we need and which we don't.
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
In preparation for separating responsibilities, break out the entropy
count management part of crng_reseed() into its own function.
No functional changes.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
In the irq handler, we fill out 16 bytes differently on 32-bit and
64-bit platforms, and for 32-bit vs 64-bit cycle counters, which doesn't
always correspond with the bitness of the platform. Whether or not you
like this strangeness, it is a matter of fact. But it might not be a
fact you well realized until now, because the code that loaded the irq
info into 4 32-bit words was quite confusing. Instead, this commit
makes everything explicit by having separate (compile-time) branches for
32-bit and 64-bit types.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Convert the current license into the SPDX notation of "(GPL-2.0 OR
BSD-3-Clause)". This infers GPL-2.0 from the text "ALTERNATIVELY, this
product may be distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public
License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are required INSTEAD OF
the above restrictions" and it infers BSD-3-Clause from the verbatim
BSD 3 clause license in the file.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
These explicit tracepoints aren't really used and show sign of aging.
It's work to keep these up to date, and before I attempted to keep them
up to date, they weren't up to date, which indicates that they're not
really used. These days there are better ways of introspecting anyway.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
With tools like kbench9000 giving more finegrained responses, and this
basically never having been used ever since it was initially added,
let's just get rid of this. There *is* still work to be done on the
interrupt handler, but this really isn't the way it's being developed.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Now that we have an explicit base_crng generation counter, we don't need
a separate one for batched entropy. Rather, we can just move the
generation forward every time we change crng_init state or update the
base_crng key.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
crng_init is protected by primary_crng->lock. Therefore, we need
to hold this lock when increasing crng_init to 2. As we shouldn't
hold this lock for too long, only hold it for those parts which
require protection.
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
This buffer may contain entropic data that shouldn't stick around longer
than needed, so zero out the temporary buffer at the end of write_pool().
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
In 79a8468747c5 ("random: check for increase of entropy_count because of
signed conversion"), a number of checks were added around what values
were passed to account(), because account() was doing fancy fixed point
fractional arithmetic, and a user had some ability to pass large values
directly into it. One of things in that commit was limiting those values
to INT_MAX >> 6. The first >> 3 was for bytes to bits, and the next >> 3
was for bits to 1/8 fractional bits.
However, for several years now, urandom reads no longer touch entropy
accounting, and so this check serves no purpose. The current flow is:
urandom_read_nowarn()-->get_random_bytes_user()-->chacha20_block()
Of course, we don't want that size_t to be truncated when adding it into
the ssize_t. But we arrive at urandom_read_nowarn() in the first place
either via ordinary fops, which limits reads to MAX_RW_COUNT, or via
getrandom() which limits reads to INT_MAX.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
We've been using a flurry of int, unsigned int, size_t, and ssize_t.
Let's unify all of this into size_t where it makes sense, as it does in
most places, and leave ssize_t for return values with possible errors.
In addition, keeping with the convention of other functions in this
file, functions that are dealing with raw bytes now take void *
consistently instead of a mix of that and u8 *, because much of the time
we're actually passing some other structure that is then interpreted as
bytes by the function.
We also take the opportunity to fix the outdated and incorrect comment
in get_random_bytes_arch().
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Since we have a hash function that's really fast, and the goal of
crng_slow_load() is reportedly to "touch all of the crng's state", we
can just hash the old state together with the new state and call it a
day. This way we dont need to reason about another LFSR or worry about
various attacks there. This code is only ever used at early boot and
then never again.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Rather than the clunky NUMA full ChaCha state system we had prior, this
commit is closer to the original "fast key erasure RNG" proposal from
<https://blog.cr.yp.to/20170723-random.html>, by simply treating ChaCha
keys on a per-cpu basis.
All entropy is extracted to a base crng key of 32 bytes. This base crng
has a birthdate and a generation counter. When we go to take bytes from
the crng, we first check if the birthdate is too old; if it is, we
reseed per usual. Then we start working on a per-cpu crng.
This per-cpu crng makes sure that it has the same generation counter as
the base crng. If it doesn't, it does fast key erasure with the base
crng key and uses the output as its new per-cpu key, and then updates
its local generation counter. Then, using this per-cpu state, we do
ordinary fast key erasure. Half of this first block is used to overwrite
the per-cpu crng key for the next call -- this is the fast key erasure
RNG idea -- and the other half, along with the ChaCha state, is returned
to the caller. If the caller desires more than this remaining half, it
can generate more ChaCha blocks, unlocked, using the now detached ChaCha
state that was just returned. Crypto-wise, this is more or less what we
were doing before, but this simply makes it more explicit and ensures
that we always have backtrack protection by not playing games with a
shared block counter.
The flow looks like this:
──extract()──► base_crng.key ◄──memcpy()───┐
│ │
└──chacha()──────┬─► new_base_key
└─► crngs[n].key ◄──memcpy()───┐
│ │
└──chacha()───┬─► new_key
└─► random_bytes
│
└────►
There are a few hairy details around early init. Just as was done
before, prior to having gathered enough entropy, crng_fast_load() and
crng_slow_load() dump bytes directly into the base crng, and when we go
to take bytes from the crng, in that case, we're doing fast key erasure
with the base crng rather than the fast unlocked per-cpu crngs. This is
fine as that's only the state of affairs during very early boot; once
the crng initializes we never use these paths again.
In the process of all this, the APIs into the crng become a bit simpler:
we have get_random_bytes(buf, len) and get_random_bytes_user(buf, len),
which both do what you'd expect. All of the details of fast key erasure
and per-cpu selection happen only in a very short critical section of
crng_make_state(), which selects the right per-cpu key, does the fast
key erasure, and returns a local state to the caller's stack. So, we no
longer have a need for a separate backtrack function, as this happens
all at once here. The API then allows us to extend backtrack protection
to batched entropy without really having to do much at all.
The result is a bit simpler than before and has fewer foot guns. The
init time state machine also gets a lot simpler as we don't need to wait
for workqueues to come online and do deferred work. And the multi-core
performance should be increased significantly, by virtue of having hardly
any locking on the fast path.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
During crng_init == 0, we never credit entropy in add_interrupt_
randomness(), but instead dump it directly into the primary_crng. That's
fine, except for the fact that we then wind up throwing away that
entropy later when we switch to extracting from the input pool and
xoring into (and later in this series overwriting) the primary_crng key.
The two other early init sites -- add_hwgenerator_randomness()'s use
crng_fast_load() and add_device_ randomness()'s use of crng_slow_load()
-- always additionally give their inputs to the input pool. But not
add_interrupt_randomness().
This commit fixes that shortcoming by calling mix_pool_bytes() after
crng_fast_load() in add_interrupt_randomness(). That's partially
verboten on PREEMPT_RT, where it implies taking spinlock_t from an IRQ
handler. But this also only happens during early boot and then never
again after that. Plus it's a trylock so it has the same considerations
as calling crng_fast_load(), which we're already using.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Continuing the reasoning of "random: ensure early RDSEED goes through
mixer on init", we don't want RDRAND interacting with anything without
going through the mixer function, as a backdoored CPU could presumably
cancel out data during an xor, which it'd have a harder time doing when
being forced through a cryptographic hash function. There's actually no
need at all to be calling RDRAND in write_pool(), because before we
extract from the pool, we always do so with 32 bytes of RDSEED hashed in
at that stage. Xoring at this stage is needless and introduces a minor
liability.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Continuing the reasoning of "random: use RDSEED instead of RDRAND in
entropy extraction" from this series, at init time we also don't want to
be xoring RDSEED directly into the crng. Instead it's safer to put it
into our entropy collector and then re-extract it, so that it goes
through a hash function with preimage resistance. As a matter of hygiene,
we also order these now so that the RDSEED byte are hashed in first,
followed by the bytes that are likely more predictable (e.g. utsname()).
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
