Peter Zijlstra
e5d981df9a
sched/core: Fix cpu.max vs. cpuhotplug deadlock
...
commit ce48c146495a1a50e48cdbfbfaba3e708be7c07c upstream
Tejun reported the following cpu-hotplug lock (percpu-rwsem) read recursion:
tg_set_cfs_bandwidth()
get_online_cpus()
cpus_read_lock()
cfs_bandwidth_usage_inc()
static_key_slow_inc()
cpus_read_lock()
Reported-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180122215328.GP3397@worktop
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-12-05 19:41:17 +01:00
Bernd Eckstein
72e5a2bdf7
usbnet: ipheth: fix potential recvmsg bug and recvmsg bug 2
...
[ Upstream commit 45611c61dd503454b2edae00aabe1e429ec49ebe ]
The bug is not easily reproducable, as it may occur very infrequently
(we had machines with 20minutes heavy downloading before it occurred)
However, on a virual machine (VMWare on Windows 10 host) it occurred
pretty frequently (1-2 seconds after a speedtest was started)
dev->tx_skb mab be freed via dev_kfree_skb_irq on a callback
before it is set.
This causes the following problems:
- double free of the skb or potential memory leak
- in dmesg: 'recvmsg bug' and 'recvmsg bug 2' and eventually
general protection fault
Example dmesg output:
[ 134.841986] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 134.841987] recvmsg bug: copied 9C24A555 seq 9C24B557 rcvnxt 9C25A6B3 fl 0
[ 134.841993] WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 2629 at /build/linux-hwe-On9fm7/linux-hwe-4.15.0/net/ipv4/tcp.c:1865 tcp_recvmsg+0x44d/0xab0
[ 134.841994] Modules linked in: ipheth(OE) kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc aesni_intel aes_x86_64 crypto_simd glue_helper cryptd vmw_balloon intel_rapl_perf joydev input_leds serio_raw vmw_vsock_vmci_transport vsock shpchp i2c_piix4 mac_hid binfmt_misc vmw_vmci parport_pc ppdev lp parport autofs4 vmw_pvscsi vmxnet3 hid_generic usbhid hid vmwgfx ttm drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect mptspi mptscsih sysimgblt ahci psmouse fb_sys_fops pata_acpi mptbase libahci e1000 drm scsi_transport_spi
[ 134.842046] CPU: 7 PID: 2629 Comm: python Tainted: G W OE 4.15.0-34-generic #37~16.04.1-Ubuntu
[ 134.842046] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/19/2017
[ 134.842048] RIP: 0010:tcp_recvmsg+0x44d/0xab0
[ 134.842048] RSP: 0018:ffffa6630422bcc8 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 134.842049] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff997616f4f200 RCX: 0000000000000006
[ 134.842049] RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: 0000000000000082 RDI: ffff9976257d6490
[ 134.842050] RBP: ffffa6630422bd98 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 000000000004bba4
[ 134.842050] R10: 0000000001e00c6f R11: 000000000004bba4 R12: ffff99760dee3000
[ 134.842051] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff99760dee3514 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 134.842051] FS: 00007fe332347700(0000) GS:ffff9976257c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 134.842052] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 134.842053] CR2: 0000000001e41000 CR3: 000000020e9b4006 CR4: 00000000003606e0
[ 134.842055] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 134.842055] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 134.842057] Call Trace:
[ 134.842060] ? aa_sk_perm+0x53/0x1a0
[ 134.842064] inet_recvmsg+0x51/0xc0
[ 134.842066] sock_recvmsg+0x43/0x50
[ 134.842070] SYSC_recvfrom+0xe4/0x160
[ 134.842072] ? __schedule+0x3de/0x8b0
[ 134.842075] ? ktime_get_ts64+0x4c/0xf0
[ 134.842079] SyS_recvfrom+0xe/0x10
[ 134.842082] do_syscall_64+0x73/0x130
[ 134.842086] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2
[ 134.842086] RIP: 0033:0x7fe331f5a81d
[ 134.842088] RSP: 002b:00007ffe8da98398 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002d
[ 134.842090] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: ffffffffffffffff RCX: 00007fe331f5a81d
[ 134.842094] RDX: 00000000000003fb RSI: 0000000001e00874 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 134.842095] RBP: 00007fe32f642c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 134.842097] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fe332347698
[ 134.842099] R13: 0000000001b7e0a0 R14: 0000000001e00874 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 134.842103] Code: 24 fd ff ff e9 cc fe ff ff 48 89 d8 41 8b 8c 24 10 05 00 00 44 8b 45 80 48 c7 c7 08 bd 59 8b 48 89 85 68 ff ff ff e8 b3 c4 7d ff <0f> 0b 48 8b 85 68 ff ff ff e9 e9 fe ff ff 41 8b 8c 24 10 05 00
[ 134.842126] ---[ end trace b7138fc08c83147f ]---
[ 134.842144] general protection fault: 0000 [#1 ] SMP PTI
[ 134.842145] Modules linked in: ipheth(OE) kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc aesni_intel aes_x86_64 crypto_simd glue_helper cryptd vmw_balloon intel_rapl_perf joydev input_leds serio_raw vmw_vsock_vmci_transport vsock shpchp i2c_piix4 mac_hid binfmt_misc vmw_vmci parport_pc ppdev lp parport autofs4 vmw_pvscsi vmxnet3 hid_generic usbhid hid vmwgfx ttm drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect mptspi mptscsih sysimgblt ahci psmouse fb_sys_fops pata_acpi mptbase libahci e1000 drm scsi_transport_spi
[ 134.842161] CPU: 7 PID: 2629 Comm: python Tainted: G W OE 4.15.0-34-generic #37~16.04.1-Ubuntu
[ 134.842162] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/19/2017
[ 134.842164] RIP: 0010:tcp_close+0x2c6/0x440
[ 134.842165] RSP: 0018:ffffa6630422bde8 EFLAGS: 00010202
[ 134.842167] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff99760dee3000 RCX: 0000000180400034
[ 134.842168] RDX: 5c4afd407207a6c4 RSI: ffffe868495bd300 RDI: ffff997616f4f200
[ 134.842169] RBP: ffffa6630422be08 R08: 0000000016f4d401 R09: 0000000180400034
[ 134.842169] R10: ffffa6630422bd98 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 000000000000600c
[ 134.842170] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff99760dee30c8 R15: ffff9975bd44fe00
[ 134.842171] FS: 00007fe332347700(0000) GS:ffff9976257c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 134.842173] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 134.842174] CR2: 0000000001e41000 CR3: 000000020e9b4006 CR4: 00000000003606e0
[ 134.842177] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 134.842178] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 134.842179] Call Trace:
[ 134.842181] inet_release+0x42/0x70
[ 134.842183] __sock_release+0x42/0xb0
[ 134.842184] sock_close+0x15/0x20
[ 134.842187] __fput+0xea/0x220
[ 134.842189] ____fput+0xe/0x10
[ 134.842191] task_work_run+0x8a/0xb0
[ 134.842193] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xc4/0xd0
[ 134.842195] do_syscall_64+0xf4/0x130
[ 134.842197] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2
[ 134.842197] RIP: 0033:0x7fe331f5a560
[ 134.842198] RSP: 002b:00007ffe8da982e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003
[ 134.842200] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00007fe32f642c70 RCX: 00007fe331f5a560
[ 134.842201] RDX: 00000000008f5320 RSI: 0000000001cd4b50 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 134.842202] RBP: 00007fe32f6500f8 R08: 000000000000003c R09: 00000000009343c0
[ 134.842203] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fe32f6500d0
[ 134.842204] R13: 00000000008f5320 R14: 00000000008f5320 R15: 0000000001cd4770
[ 134.842205] Code: c8 00 00 00 45 31 e4 49 39 fe 75 4d eb 50 83 ab d8 00 00 00 01 48 8b 17 48 8b 47 08 48 c7 07 00 00 00 00 48 c7 47 08 00 00 00 00 <48> 89 42 08 48 89 10 0f b6 57 34 8b 47 2c 2b 47 28 83 e2 01 80
[ 134.842226] RIP: tcp_close+0x2c6/0x440 RSP: ffffa6630422bde8
[ 134.842227] ---[ end trace b7138fc08c831480 ]---
The proposed patch eliminates a potential racing condition.
Before, usb_submit_urb was called and _after_ that, the skb was attached
(dev->tx_skb). So, on a callback it was possible, however unlikely that the
skb was freed before it was set. That way (because dev->tx_skb was not set
to NULL after it was freed), it could happen that a skb from a earlier
transmission was freed a second time (and the skb we should have freed did
not get freed at all)
Now we free the skb directly in ipheth_tx(). It is not passed to the
callback anymore, eliminating the posibility of a double free of the same
skb. Depending on the retval of usb_submit_urb() we use dev_kfree_skb_any()
respectively dev_consume_skb_any() to free the skb.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Zweigle <Oliver.Zweigle@faro.com>
Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <3ernd.Eckstein@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-12-05 19:41:17 +01:00
Julian Wiedmann
eb09c6dbe4
s390/qeth: fix length check in SNMP processing
...
[ Upstream commit 9a764c1e59684c0358e16ccaafd870629f2cfe67 ]
The response for a SNMP request can consist of multiple parts, which
the cmd callback stages into a kernel buffer until all parts have been
received. If the callback detects that the staging buffer provides
insufficient space, it bails out with error.
This processing is buggy for the first part of the response - while it
initially checks for a length of 'data_len', it later copies an
additional amount of 'offsetof(struct qeth_snmp_cmd, data)' bytes.
Fix the calculation of 'data_len' for the first part of the response.
This also nicely cleans up the memcpy code.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Julian Wiedmann <jwi@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ursula Braun <ubraun@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-12-05 19:41:17 +01:00
Pan Bian
47897682fe
rapidio/rionet: do not free skb before reading its length
...
[ Upstream commit cfc435198f53a6fa1f656d98466b24967ff457d0 ]
skb is freed via dev_kfree_skb_any, however, skb->len is read then. This
may result in a use-after-free bug.
Fixes: e6161d64263 ("rapidio/rionet: rework driver initialization and removal")
Signed-off-by: Pan Bian <bianpan2016@163.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-12-05 19:41:17 +01:00
Willem de Bruijn
67f6fba765
packet: copy user buffers before orphan or clone
...
[ Upstream commit 5cd8d46ea1562be80063f53c7c6a5f40224de623 ]
tpacket_snd sends packets with user pages linked into skb frags. It
notifies that pages can be reused when the skb is released by setting
skb->destructor to tpacket_destruct_skb.
This can cause data corruption if the skb is orphaned (e.g., on
transmit through veth) or cloned (e.g., on mirror to another psock).
Create a kernel-private copy of data in these cases, same as tun/tap
zerocopy transmission. Reuse that infrastructure: mark the skb as
SKBTX_ZEROCOPY_FRAG, which will trigger copy in skb_orphan_frags(_rx).
Unlike other zerocopy packets, do not set shinfo destructor_arg to
struct ubuf_info. tpacket_destruct_skb already uses that ptr to notify
when the original skb is released and a timestamp is recorded. Do not
change this timestamp behavior. The ubuf_info->callback is not needed
anyway, as no zerocopy notification is expected.
Mark destructor_arg as not-a-uarg by setting the lower bit to 1. The
resulting value is not a valid ubuf_info pointer, nor a valid
tpacket_snd frame address. Add skb_zcopy_.._nouarg helpers for this.
The fix relies on features introduced in commit 52267790ef52 ("sock:
add MSG_ZEROCOPY"), so can be backported as is only to 4.14.
Tested with from `./in_netns.sh ./txring_overwrite` from
http://github.com/wdebruij/kerneltools/tests
Fixes: 69e3c75f4d54 ("net: TX_RING and packet mmap")
Reported-by: Anand H. Krishnan <anandhkrishnan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-12-05 19:41:17 +01:00
Lorenzo Bianconi
42412faf1a
net: thunderx: set tso_hdrs pointer to NULL in nicvf_free_snd_queue
...
[ Upstream commit ef2a7cf1d8831535b8991459567b385661eb4a36 ]
Reset snd_queue tso_hdrs pointer to NULL in nicvf_free_snd_queue routine
since it is used to check if tso dma descriptor queue has been previously
allocated. The issue can be triggered with the following reproducer:
$ip link set dev enP2p1s0v0 xdpdrv obj xdp_dummy.o
$ip link set dev enP2p1s0v0 xdpdrv off
[ 341.467649] WARNING: CPU: 74 PID: 2158 at mm/vmalloc.c:1511 __vunmap+0x98/0xe0
[ 341.515010] Hardware name: GIGABYTE H270-T70/MT70-HD0, BIOS T49 02/02/2018
[ 341.521874] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO)
[ 341.526654] pc : __vunmap+0x98/0xe0
[ 341.530132] lr : __vunmap+0x98/0xe0
[ 341.533609] sp : ffff00001c5db860
[ 341.536913] x29: ffff00001c5db860 x28: 0000000000020000
[ 341.542214] x27: ffff810feb5090b0 x26: ffff000017e57000
[ 341.547515] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 00000000fbd00000
[ 341.552816] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: ffff810feb5090b0
[ 341.558117] x21: 0000000000000000 x20: 0000000000000000
[ 341.563418] x19: ffff000017e57000 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 341.568719] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 341.574020] x15: 0000000000000010 x14: ffffffffffffffff
[ 341.579321] x13: ffff00008985eb27 x12: ffff00000985eb2f
[ 341.584622] x11: ffff0000096b3000 x10: ffff00001c5db510
[ 341.589923] x9 : 00000000ffffffd0 x8 : ffff0000086868e8
[ 341.595224] x7 : 3430303030303030 x6 : 00000000000006ef
[ 341.600525] x5 : 00000000003fffff x4 : 0000000000000000
[ 341.605825] x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : ffffffffffffffff
[ 341.611126] x1 : ffff0000096b3728 x0 : 0000000000000038
[ 341.616428] Call trace:
[ 341.618866] __vunmap+0x98/0xe0
[ 341.621997] vunmap+0x3c/0x50
[ 341.624961] arch_dma_free+0x68/0xa0
[ 341.628534] dma_direct_free+0x50/0x80
[ 341.632285] nicvf_free_resources+0x160/0x2d8 [nicvf]
[ 341.637327] nicvf_config_data_transfer+0x174/0x5e8 [nicvf]
[ 341.642890] nicvf_stop+0x298/0x340 [nicvf]
[ 341.647066] __dev_close_many+0x9c/0x108
[ 341.650977] dev_close_many+0xa4/0x158
[ 341.654720] rollback_registered_many+0x140/0x530
[ 341.659414] rollback_registered+0x54/0x80
[ 341.663499] unregister_netdevice_queue+0x9c/0xe8
[ 341.668192] unregister_netdev+0x28/0x38
[ 341.672106] nicvf_remove+0xa4/0xa8 [nicvf]
[ 341.676280] nicvf_shutdown+0x20/0x30 [nicvf]
[ 341.680630] pci_device_shutdown+0x44/0x88
[ 341.684720] device_shutdown+0x144/0x250
[ 341.688640] kernel_restart_prepare+0x44/0x50
[ 341.692986] kernel_restart+0x20/0x68
[ 341.696638] __se_sys_reboot+0x210/0x238
[ 341.700550] __arm64_sys_reboot+0x24/0x30
[ 341.704555] el0_svc_handler+0x94/0x110
[ 341.708382] el0_svc+0x8/0xc
[ 341.711252] ---[ end trace 3f4019c8439959c9 ]---
[ 341.715874] page:ffff7e0003ef4000 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x4
[ 341.723872] flags: 0x1fffe000000000()
[ 341.727527] raw: 001fffe000000000 ffff7e0003f1a008 ffff7e0003ef4048 0000000000000000
[ 341.735263] raw: 0000000000000004 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 341.742994] page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(page_ref_count(page) == 0)
where xdp_dummy.c is a simple bpf program that forwards the incoming
frames to the network stack (available here:
https://github.com/altoor/xdp_walkthrough_examples/blob/master/sample_1/xdp_dummy.c )
Fixes: 05c773f52b96 ("net: thunderx: Add basic XDP support")
Fixes: 4863dea3fab0 ("net: Adding support for Cavium ThunderX network controller")
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo.bianconi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-12-05 19:41:17 +01:00
Jason Wang
0435cabc0d
virtio-net: fail XDP set if guest csum is negotiated
...
[ Upstream commit 18ba58e1c234ea1a2d9835ac8c1735d965ce4640 ]
We don't support partial csumed packet since its metadata will be lost
or incorrect during XDP processing. So fail the XDP set if guest_csum
feature is negotiated.
Fixes: f600b6905015 ("virtio_net: Add XDP support")
Reported-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Cc: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Cc: Pavel Popa <pashinho1990@gmail.com>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-12-05 19:41:17 +01:00
Jason Wang
e5cfda6c5d
virtio-net: disable guest csum during XDP set
...
[ Upstream commit e59ff2c49ae16e1d179de679aca81405829aee6c ]
We don't disable VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_CSUM if XDP was set. This means we
can receive partial csumed packets with metadata kept in the
vnet_hdr. This may have several side effects:
- It could be overridden by header adjustment, thus is might be not
correct after XDP processing.
- There's no way to pass such metadata information through
XDP_REDIRECT to another driver.
- XDP does not support checksum offload right now.
So simply disable guest csum if possible in this the case of XDP.
Fixes: 3f93522ffab2d ("virtio-net: switch off offloads on demand if possible on XDP set")
Reported-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Cc: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Cc: Pavel Popa <pashinho1990@gmail.com>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-12-05 19:41:16 +01:00
Lorenzo Bianconi
44e4f36449
net: thunderx: set xdp_prog to NULL if bpf_prog_add fails
...
[ Upstream commit 6d0f60b0f8588fd4380ea5df9601e12fddd55ce2 ]
Set xdp_prog pointer to NULL if bpf_prog_add fails since that routine
reports the error code instead of NULL in case of failure and xdp_prog
pointer value is used in the driver to verify if XDP is currently
enabled.
Moreover report the error code to userspace if nicvf_xdp_setup fails
Fixes: 05c773f52b96 ("net: thunderx: Add basic XDP support")
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo.bianconi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-12-05 19:41:16 +01:00
Petr Machata
3a8a411c92
net: skb_scrub_packet(): Scrub offload_fwd_mark
...
[ Upstream commit b5dd186d10ba59e6b5ba60e42b3b083df56df6f3 ]
When a packet is trapped and the corresponding SKB marked as
already-forwarded, it retains this marking even after it is forwarded
across veth links into another bridge. There, since it ingresses the
bridge over veth, which doesn't have offload_fwd_mark, it triggers a
warning in nbp_switchdev_frame_mark().
Then nbp_switchdev_allowed_egress() decides not to allow egress from
this bridge through another veth, because the SKB is already marked, and
the mark (of 0) of course matches. Thus the packet is incorrectly
blocked.
Solve by resetting offload_fwd_mark() in skb_scrub_packet(). That
function is called from tunnels and also from veth, and thus catches the
cases where traffic is forwarded between bridges and transformed in a
way that invalidates the marking.
Fixes: 6bc506b4fb06 ("bridge: switchdev: Add forward mark support for stacked devices")
Fixes: abf4bb6b63d0 ("skbuff: Add the offload_mr_fwd_mark field")
Signed-off-by: Petr Machata <petrm@mellanox.com>
Suggested-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-12-05 19:41:16 +01:00
Sasha Levin
04d269610e
Revert "wlcore: Add missing PM call for wlcore_cmd_wait_for_event_or_timeout()"
...
This reverts commit e87efc44dd36ba3db59847c418354711ebad779b which was
upstream commit 4ec7cece87b3ed21ffcd407c62fb2f151a366bc1.
From Dietmar May's report on the stable mailing list
(https://www.spinics.net/lists/stable/msg272201.html ):
> I've run into some problems which appear due to (a) recent patch(es) on
> the wlcore wifi driver.
>
> 4.4.160 - commit 3fdd34643ffc378b5924941fad40352c04610294
> 4.9.131 - commit afeeecc764436f31d4447575bb9007732333818c
>
> Earlier versions (4.9.130 and 4.4.159 - tested back to 4.4.49) do not
> exhibit this problem. It is still present in 4.9.141.
>
> master as of 4.20.0-rc4 does not exhibit this problem.
>
> Basically, during client association when in AP mode (running hostapd),
> handshake may or may not complete following a noticeable delay. If
> successful, then the driver fails consistently in warn_slowpath_null
> during disassociation. If unsuccessful, the wifi client attempts multiple
> times, sometimes failing repeatedly. I've had clients unable to connect
> for 3-5 minutes during testing, with the syslog filled with dozens of
> backtraces. syslog details are below.
>
> I'm working on an embedded device with a TI 3352 ARM processor and a
> murata wl1271 module in sdio mode. We're running a fully patched ubuntu
> 18.04 ARM build, with a kernel built from kernel.org's stable/linux repo <https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?h=linux-4.9.y&id=afeeecc764436f31d4447575bb9007732333818c >.
> Relevant parts of the kernel config are included below.
>
> The commit message states:
>
> > /I've only seen this few times with the runtime PM patches enabled so
> > this one is probably not needed before that. This seems to work
> > currently based on the current PM implementation timer. Let's apply
> > this separately though in case others are hitting this issue./
> We're not doing anything explicit with power management. The device is an
> IoT edge gateway with battery backup, normally running on wall power. The
> battery is currently used solely to shut down the system cleanly to avoid
> filesystem corruption.
>
> The device tree is configured to keep power in suspend; but the device
> should never suspend, so in our case, there is no need to call
> wl1271_ps_elp_wakeup() or wl1271_ps_elp_sleep(), as occurs in the patch.
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2018-12-05 19:41:16 +01:00
Darrick J. Wong
cb7ccb9924
xfs: don't fail when converting shortform attr to long form during ATTR_REPLACE
...
commit 7b38460dc8e4eafba06c78f8e37099d3b34d473c upstream.
Kanda Motohiro reported that expanding a tiny xattr into a large xattr
fails on XFS because we remove the tiny xattr from a shortform fork and
then try to re-add it after converting the fork to extents format having
not removed the ATTR_REPLACE flag. This fails because the attr is no
longer present, causing a fs shutdown.
This is derived from the patch in his bug report, but we really
shouldn't ignore a nonzero retval from the remove call.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199119
Reported-by: kanda.motohiro@gmail.com
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2018-12-05 19:41:16 +01:00
Chao Yu
30130700ac
f2fs: fix to do sanity check with cp_pack_start_sum
...
commit e494c2f995d6181d6e29c4927d68e0f295ecf75b upstream.
After fuzzing, cp_pack_start_sum could be corrupted, so current log's
summary info should be wrong due to loading incorrect summary block.
Then, if segment's type in current log is exceeded NR_CURSEG_TYPE, it
can lead accessing invalid dirty_i->dirty_segmap bitmap finally.
Add sanity check for cp_pack_start_sum to fix this issue.
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200419
- Reproduce
- Kernel message (f2fs-dev w/ KASAN)
[ 3117.578432] F2FS-fs (loop0): Invalid log blocks per segment (8)
[ 3117.578445] F2FS-fs (loop0): Can't find valid F2FS filesystem in 2th superblock
[ 3117.581364] F2FS-fs (loop0): invalid crc_offset: 30716
[ 3117.583564] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1225 at fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:90 __get_meta_page+0x448/0x4b0
[ 3117.583570] Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep snd_pcm snd_timer joydev input_leds serio_raw snd soundcore mac_hid i2c_piix4 ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core configfs iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi btrfs zstd_decompress zstd_compress xxhash raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx xor raid6_pq libcrc32c raid1 raid0 multipath linear 8139too qxl ttm drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops drm crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc aesni_intel psmouse aes_x86_64 8139cp crypto_simd cryptd mii glue_helper pata_acpi floppy
[ 3117.584014] CPU: 1 PID: 1225 Comm: mount Not tainted 4.17.0+ #1
[ 3117.584017] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 3117.584022] RIP: 0010:__get_meta_page+0x448/0x4b0
[ 3117.584023] Code: 00 49 8d bc 24 84 00 00 00 e8 74 54 da ff 41 83 8c 24 84 00 00 00 08 4c 89 f6 4c 89 ef e8 c0 d9 95 00 48 89 ef e8 18 e3 00 00 <0f> 0b f0 80 4d 48 04 e9 0f fe ff ff 0f 0b 48 89 c7 48 89 04 24 e8
[ 3117.584072] RSP: 0018:ffff88018eb678c0 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 3117.584082] RAX: ffff88018f0a6a78 RBX: ffffea0007a46600 RCX: ffffffff9314d1b2
[ 3117.584085] RDX: ffffffff00000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88018f0a6a98
[ 3117.584087] RBP: ffff88018ebe9980 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000001
[ 3117.584090] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed00326e4450 R12: ffff880193722200
[ 3117.584092] R13: ffff88018ebe9afc R14: 0000000000000206 R15: ffff88018eb67900
[ 3117.584096] FS: 00007f5694636840(0000) GS:ffff8801f3b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 3117.584098] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 3117.584101] CR2: 00000000016f21b8 CR3: 0000000191c22000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 3117.584112] Call Trace:
[ 3117.584121] ? f2fs_set_meta_page_dirty+0x150/0x150
[ 3117.584127] ? f2fs_build_segment_manager+0xbf9/0x3190
[ 3117.584133] ? f2fs_npages_for_summary_flush+0x75/0x120
[ 3117.584145] f2fs_build_segment_manager+0xda8/0x3190
[ 3117.584151] ? f2fs_get_valid_checkpoint+0x298/0xa00
[ 3117.584156] ? f2fs_flush_sit_entries+0x10e0/0x10e0
[ 3117.584184] ? map_id_range_down+0x17c/0x1b0
[ 3117.584188] ? __put_user_ns+0x30/0x30
[ 3117.584206] ? find_next_bit+0x53/0x90
[ 3117.584237] ? cpumask_next+0x16/0x20
[ 3117.584249] f2fs_fill_super+0x1948/0x2b40
[ 3117.584258] ? f2fs_commit_super+0x1a0/0x1a0
[ 3117.584279] ? sget_userns+0x65e/0x690
[ 3117.584296] ? set_blocksize+0x88/0x130
[ 3117.584302] ? f2fs_commit_super+0x1a0/0x1a0
[ 3117.584305] mount_bdev+0x1c0/0x200
[ 3117.584310] mount_fs+0x5c/0x190
[ 3117.584320] vfs_kern_mount+0x64/0x190
[ 3117.584330] do_mount+0x2e4/0x1450
[ 3117.584343] ? lockref_put_return+0x130/0x130
[ 3117.584347] ? copy_mount_string+0x20/0x20
[ 3117.584357] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x31/0x40
[ 3117.584362] ? kasan_kmalloc+0xa6/0xd0
[ 3117.584373] ? memcg_kmem_put_cache+0x16/0x90
[ 3117.584377] ? __kmalloc_track_caller+0x196/0x210
[ 3117.584383] ? _copy_from_user+0x61/0x90
[ 3117.584396] ? memdup_user+0x3e/0x60
[ 3117.584401] ksys_mount+0x7e/0xd0
[ 3117.584405] __x64_sys_mount+0x62/0x70
[ 3117.584427] do_syscall_64+0x73/0x160
[ 3117.584440] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 3117.584455] RIP: 0033:0x7f5693f14b9a
[ 3117.584456] Code: 48 8b 0d 01 c3 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d ce c2 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 3117.584505] RSP: 002b:00007fff27346488 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
[ 3117.584510] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000016e2030 RCX: 00007f5693f14b9a
[ 3117.584512] RDX: 00000000016e2210 RSI: 00000000016e3f30 RDI: 00000000016ee040
[ 3117.584514] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000013
[ 3117.584516] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00000000016ee040
[ 3117.584519] R13: 00000000016e2210 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000003
[ 3117.584523] ---[ end trace a8e0d899985faf31 ]---
[ 3117.685663] F2FS-fs (loop0): f2fs_check_nid_range: out-of-range nid=2, run fsck to fix.
[ 3117.685673] F2FS-fs (loop0): recover_data: ino = 2 (i_size: recover) recovered = 1, err = 0
[ 3117.685707] ==================================================================
[ 3117.685955] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __remove_dirty_segment+0xdd/0x1e0
[ 3117.686175] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88018f0a63d0 by task mount/1225
[ 3117.686477] CPU: 0 PID: 1225 Comm: mount Tainted: G W 4.17.0+ #1
[ 3117.686481] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 3117.686483] Call Trace:
[ 3117.686494] dump_stack+0x71/0xab
[ 3117.686512] print_address_description+0x6b/0x290
[ 3117.686517] kasan_report+0x28e/0x390
[ 3117.686522] ? __remove_dirty_segment+0xdd/0x1e0
[ 3117.686527] __remove_dirty_segment+0xdd/0x1e0
[ 3117.686532] locate_dirty_segment+0x189/0x190
[ 3117.686538] f2fs_allocate_new_segments+0xa9/0xe0
[ 3117.686543] recover_data+0x703/0x2c20
[ 3117.686547] ? f2fs_recover_fsync_data+0x48f/0xd50
[ 3117.686553] ? ksys_mount+0x7e/0xd0
[ 3117.686564] ? policy_nodemask+0x1a/0x90
[ 3117.686567] ? policy_node+0x56/0x70
[ 3117.686571] ? add_fsync_inode+0xf0/0xf0
[ 3117.686592] ? blk_finish_plug+0x44/0x60
[ 3117.686597] ? f2fs_ra_meta_pages+0x38b/0x5e0
[ 3117.686602] ? find_inode_fast+0xac/0xc0
[ 3117.686606] ? f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr+0x320/0x320
[ 3117.686618] ? __radix_tree_lookup+0x150/0x150
[ 3117.686633] ? dqget+0x670/0x670
[ 3117.686648] ? pagecache_get_page+0x29/0x410
[ 3117.686656] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x176/0x1e0
[ 3117.686660] ? f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr+0x11d/0x320
[ 3117.686664] f2fs_recover_fsync_data+0xc23/0xd50
[ 3117.686670] ? f2fs_space_for_roll_forward+0x60/0x60
[ 3117.686674] ? rb_insert_color+0x323/0x3d0
[ 3117.686678] ? f2fs_recover_orphan_inodes+0xa5/0x700
[ 3117.686683] ? proc_register+0x153/0x1d0
[ 3117.686686] ? f2fs_remove_orphan_inode+0x10/0x10
[ 3117.686695] ? f2fs_attr_store+0x50/0x50
[ 3117.686700] ? proc_create_single_data+0x52/0x60
[ 3117.686707] f2fs_fill_super+0x1d06/0x2b40
[ 3117.686728] ? f2fs_commit_super+0x1a0/0x1a0
[ 3117.686735] ? sget_userns+0x65e/0x690
[ 3117.686740] ? set_blocksize+0x88/0x130
[ 3117.686745] ? f2fs_commit_super+0x1a0/0x1a0
[ 3117.686748] mount_bdev+0x1c0/0x200
[ 3117.686753] mount_fs+0x5c/0x190
[ 3117.686758] vfs_kern_mount+0x64/0x190
[ 3117.686762] do_mount+0x2e4/0x1450
[ 3117.686769] ? lockref_put_return+0x130/0x130
[ 3117.686773] ? copy_mount_string+0x20/0x20
[ 3117.686777] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x31/0x40
[ 3117.686780] ? kasan_kmalloc+0xa6/0xd0
[ 3117.686786] ? memcg_kmem_put_cache+0x16/0x90
[ 3117.686790] ? __kmalloc_track_caller+0x196/0x210
[ 3117.686795] ? _copy_from_user+0x61/0x90
[ 3117.686801] ? memdup_user+0x3e/0x60
[ 3117.686804] ksys_mount+0x7e/0xd0
[ 3117.686809] __x64_sys_mount+0x62/0x70
[ 3117.686816] do_syscall_64+0x73/0x160
[ 3117.686824] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 3117.686829] RIP: 0033:0x7f5693f14b9a
[ 3117.686830] Code: 48 8b 0d 01 c3 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d ce c2 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 3117.686887] RSP: 002b:00007fff27346488 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
[ 3117.686892] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000016e2030 RCX: 00007f5693f14b9a
[ 3117.686894] RDX: 00000000016e2210 RSI: 00000000016e3f30 RDI: 00000000016ee040
[ 3117.686896] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000013
[ 3117.686899] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00000000016ee040
[ 3117.686901] R13: 00000000016e2210 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000003
[ 3117.687005] Allocated by task 1225:
[ 3117.687152] kasan_kmalloc+0xa6/0xd0
[ 3117.687157] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xfd/0x200
[ 3117.687161] f2fs_build_segment_manager+0x2d09/0x3190
[ 3117.687165] f2fs_fill_super+0x1948/0x2b40
[ 3117.687168] mount_bdev+0x1c0/0x200
[ 3117.687171] mount_fs+0x5c/0x190
[ 3117.687174] vfs_kern_mount+0x64/0x190
[ 3117.687177] do_mount+0x2e4/0x1450
[ 3117.687180] ksys_mount+0x7e/0xd0
[ 3117.687182] __x64_sys_mount+0x62/0x70
[ 3117.687186] do_syscall_64+0x73/0x160
[ 3117.687190] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 3117.687285] Freed by task 19:
[ 3117.687412] __kasan_slab_free+0x137/0x190
[ 3117.687416] kfree+0x8b/0x1b0
[ 3117.687460] ttm_bo_man_put_node+0x61/0x80 [ttm]
[ 3117.687476] ttm_bo_cleanup_refs+0x15f/0x250 [ttm]
[ 3117.687492] ttm_bo_delayed_delete+0x2f0/0x300 [ttm]
[ 3117.687507] ttm_bo_delayed_workqueue+0x17/0x50 [ttm]
[ 3117.687528] process_one_work+0x2f9/0x740
[ 3117.687531] worker_thread+0x78/0x6b0
[ 3117.687541] kthread+0x177/0x1c0
[ 3117.687545] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
[ 3117.687638] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88018f0a6300
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-192 of size 192
[ 3117.688014] The buggy address is located 16 bytes to the right of
192-byte region [ffff88018f0a6300, ffff88018f0a63c0)
[ 3117.688382] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 3117.688554] page:ffffea00063c2980 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8801f3403180 index:0x0
[ 3117.688788] flags: 0x17fff8000000100(slab)
[ 3117.688944] raw: 017fff8000000100 ffffea00063c2840 0000000e0000000e ffff8801f3403180
[ 3117.689166] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 3117.689386] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 3117.689653] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 3117.689816] ffff88018f0a6280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 3117.690027] ffff88018f0a6300: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 3117.690239] >ffff88018f0a6380: 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 3117.690448] ^
[ 3117.690644] ffff88018f0a6400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 3117.690868] ffff88018f0a6480: 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 3117.691077] ==================================================================
[ 3117.691290] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
[ 3117.693893] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000
[ 3117.694120] PGD 80000001f01bc067 P4D 80000001f01bc067 PUD 1d9638067 PMD 0
[ 3117.694338] Oops: 0002 [#1 ] SMP KASAN PTI
[ 3117.694490] CPU: 1 PID: 1225 Comm: mount Tainted: G B W 4.17.0+ #1
[ 3117.694703] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 3117.695073] RIP: 0010:__remove_dirty_segment+0xe2/0x1e0
[ 3117.695246] Code: c4 48 89 c7 e8 cf bb d7 ff 45 0f b6 24 24 41 83 e4 3f 44 88 64 24 07 41 83 e4 3f 4a 8d 7c e3 08 e8 b3 bc d7 ff 4a 8b 4c e3 08 <f0> 4c 0f b3 29 0f 82 94 00 00 00 48 8d bd 20 04 00 00 e8 97 bb d7
[ 3117.695793] RSP: 0018:ffff88018eb67638 EFLAGS: 00010292
[ 3117.695969] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88018f0a6300 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 3117.696182] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000297 RDI: 0000000000000297
[ 3117.696391] RBP: ffff88018ebe9980 R08: ffffed003e743ebb R09: ffffed003e743ebb
[ 3117.696604] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed003e743eba R12: 0000000000000019
[ 3117.696813] R13: 0000000000000014 R14: 0000000000000320 R15: ffff88018ebe99e0
[ 3117.697032] FS: 00007f5694636840(0000) GS:ffff8801f3b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 3117.697280] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 3117.702357] CR2: 00007fe89bb1a000 CR3: 0000000191c22000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 3117.707235] Call Trace:
[ 3117.712077] locate_dirty_segment+0x189/0x190
[ 3117.716891] f2fs_allocate_new_segments+0xa9/0xe0
[ 3117.721617] recover_data+0x703/0x2c20
[ 3117.726316] ? f2fs_recover_fsync_data+0x48f/0xd50
[ 3117.730957] ? ksys_mount+0x7e/0xd0
[ 3117.735573] ? policy_nodemask+0x1a/0x90
[ 3117.740198] ? policy_node+0x56/0x70
[ 3117.744829] ? add_fsync_inode+0xf0/0xf0
[ 3117.749487] ? blk_finish_plug+0x44/0x60
[ 3117.754152] ? f2fs_ra_meta_pages+0x38b/0x5e0
[ 3117.758831] ? find_inode_fast+0xac/0xc0
[ 3117.763448] ? f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr+0x320/0x320
[ 3117.768046] ? __radix_tree_lookup+0x150/0x150
[ 3117.772603] ? dqget+0x670/0x670
[ 3117.777159] ? pagecache_get_page+0x29/0x410
[ 3117.781648] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x176/0x1e0
[ 3117.786067] ? f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr+0x11d/0x320
[ 3117.790476] f2fs_recover_fsync_data+0xc23/0xd50
[ 3117.794790] ? f2fs_space_for_roll_forward+0x60/0x60
[ 3117.799086] ? rb_insert_color+0x323/0x3d0
[ 3117.803304] ? f2fs_recover_orphan_inodes+0xa5/0x700
[ 3117.807563] ? proc_register+0x153/0x1d0
[ 3117.811766] ? f2fs_remove_orphan_inode+0x10/0x10
[ 3117.815947] ? f2fs_attr_store+0x50/0x50
[ 3117.820087] ? proc_create_single_data+0x52/0x60
[ 3117.824262] f2fs_fill_super+0x1d06/0x2b40
[ 3117.828367] ? f2fs_commit_super+0x1a0/0x1a0
[ 3117.832432] ? sget_userns+0x65e/0x690
[ 3117.836500] ? set_blocksize+0x88/0x130
[ 3117.840501] ? f2fs_commit_super+0x1a0/0x1a0
[ 3117.844420] mount_bdev+0x1c0/0x200
[ 3117.848275] mount_fs+0x5c/0x190
[ 3117.852053] vfs_kern_mount+0x64/0x190
[ 3117.855810] do_mount+0x2e4/0x1450
[ 3117.859441] ? lockref_put_return+0x130/0x130
[ 3117.862996] ? copy_mount_string+0x20/0x20
[ 3117.866417] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x31/0x40
[ 3117.869719] ? kasan_kmalloc+0xa6/0xd0
[ 3117.872948] ? memcg_kmem_put_cache+0x16/0x90
[ 3117.876121] ? __kmalloc_track_caller+0x196/0x210
[ 3117.879333] ? _copy_from_user+0x61/0x90
[ 3117.882467] ? memdup_user+0x3e/0x60
[ 3117.885604] ksys_mount+0x7e/0xd0
[ 3117.888700] __x64_sys_mount+0x62/0x70
[ 3117.891742] do_syscall_64+0x73/0x160
[ 3117.894692] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 3117.897669] RIP: 0033:0x7f5693f14b9a
[ 3117.900563] Code: 48 8b 0d 01 c3 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d ce c2 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 3117.906922] RSP: 002b:00007fff27346488 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
[ 3117.910159] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000016e2030 RCX: 00007f5693f14b9a
[ 3117.913469] RDX: 00000000016e2210 RSI: 00000000016e3f30 RDI: 00000000016ee040
[ 3117.916764] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000013
[ 3117.920071] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00000000016ee040
[ 3117.923393] R13: 00000000016e2210 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000003
[ 3117.926680] Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep snd_pcm snd_timer joydev input_leds serio_raw snd soundcore mac_hid i2c_piix4 ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core configfs iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi btrfs zstd_decompress zstd_compress xxhash raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx xor raid6_pq libcrc32c raid1 raid0 multipath linear 8139too qxl ttm drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops drm crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc aesni_intel psmouse aes_x86_64 8139cp crypto_simd cryptd mii glue_helper pata_acpi floppy
[ 3117.949979] CR2: 0000000000000000
[ 3117.954283] ---[ end trace a8e0d899985faf32 ]---
[ 3117.958575] RIP: 0010:__remove_dirty_segment+0xe2/0x1e0
[ 3117.962810] Code: c4 48 89 c7 e8 cf bb d7 ff 45 0f b6 24 24 41 83 e4 3f 44 88 64 24 07 41 83 e4 3f 4a 8d 7c e3 08 e8 b3 bc d7 ff 4a 8b 4c e3 08 <f0> 4c 0f b3 29 0f 82 94 00 00 00 48 8d bd 20 04 00 00 e8 97 bb d7
[ 3117.971789] RSP: 0018:ffff88018eb67638 EFLAGS: 00010292
[ 3117.976333] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88018f0a6300 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 3117.980926] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000297 RDI: 0000000000000297
[ 3117.985497] RBP: ffff88018ebe9980 R08: ffffed003e743ebb R09: ffffed003e743ebb
[ 3117.990098] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed003e743eba R12: 0000000000000019
[ 3117.994761] R13: 0000000000000014 R14: 0000000000000320 R15: ffff88018ebe99e0
[ 3117.999392] FS: 00007f5694636840(0000) GS:ffff8801f3b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 3118.004096] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 3118.008816] CR2: 00007fe89bb1a000 CR3: 0000000191c22000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
- Location
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v4.18-rc3/source/fs/f2fs/segment.c#L775
if (test_and_clear_bit(segno, dirty_i->dirty_segmap[t]))
dirty_i->nr_dirty[t]--;
Here dirty_i->dirty_segmap[t] can be NULL which leads to crash in test_and_clear_bit()
Reported-by Wen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 4.14: The function is called sanity_check_ckpt()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2018-12-05 19:41:16 +01:00
Chao Yu
d7d9d29a83
f2fs: fix to do sanity check with i_extra_isize
...
commit 18dd6470c2d14d10f5a2dd926925dc80dbd3abfd upstream.
If inode.i_extra_isize was fuzzed to an abnormal value, when
calculating inline data size, the result will overflow, result
in accessing invalid memory area when operating inline data.
Let's do sanity check with i_extra_isize during inode loading
for fixing.
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200421
- Reproduce
- POC (poc.c)
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/xattr.h>
#include <dirent.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <error.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <linux/falloc.h>
#include <linux/loop.h>
static void activity(char *mpoint) {
char *foo_bar_baz;
char *foo_baz;
char *xattr;
int err;
err = asprintf(&foo_bar_baz, "%s/foo/bar/baz", mpoint);
err = asprintf(&foo_baz, "%s/foo/baz", mpoint);
err = asprintf(&xattr, "%s/foo/bar/xattr", mpoint);
rename(foo_bar_baz, foo_baz);
char buf2[113];
memset(buf2, 0, sizeof(buf2));
listxattr(xattr, buf2, sizeof(buf2));
removexattr(xattr, "user.mime_type");
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
activity(argv[1]);
return 0;
}
- Kernel message
Umount the image will leave the following message
[ 2910.995489] F2FS-fs (loop0): Mounted with checkpoint version = 2
[ 2918.416465] ==================================================================
[ 2918.416807] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in f2fs_iget+0xcb9/0x1a80
[ 2918.417009] Read of size 4 at addr ffff88018efc2068 by task a.out/1229
[ 2918.417311] CPU: 1 PID: 1229 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.17.0+ #1
[ 2918.417314] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 2918.417323] Call Trace:
[ 2918.417366] dump_stack+0x71/0xab
[ 2918.417401] print_address_description+0x6b/0x290
[ 2918.417407] kasan_report+0x28e/0x390
[ 2918.417411] ? f2fs_iget+0xcb9/0x1a80
[ 2918.417415] f2fs_iget+0xcb9/0x1a80
[ 2918.417422] ? f2fs_lookup+0x2e7/0x580
[ 2918.417425] f2fs_lookup+0x2e7/0x580
[ 2918.417433] ? __recover_dot_dentries+0x400/0x400
[ 2918.417447] ? legitimize_path.isra.29+0x5a/0xa0
[ 2918.417453] __lookup_slow+0x11c/0x220
[ 2918.417457] ? may_delete+0x2a0/0x2a0
[ 2918.417475] ? deref_stack_reg+0xe0/0xe0
[ 2918.417479] ? __lookup_hash+0xb0/0xb0
[ 2918.417483] lookup_slow+0x3e/0x60
[ 2918.417488] walk_component+0x3ac/0x990
[ 2918.417492] ? generic_permission+0x51/0x1e0
[ 2918.417495] ? inode_permission+0x51/0x1d0
[ 2918.417499] ? pick_link+0x3e0/0x3e0
[ 2918.417502] ? link_path_walk+0x4b1/0x770
[ 2918.417513] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x25/0x50
[ 2918.417518] ? walk_component+0x990/0x990
[ 2918.417522] ? path_init+0x2e6/0x580
[ 2918.417526] path_lookupat+0x13f/0x430
[ 2918.417531] ? trailing_symlink+0x3a0/0x3a0
[ 2918.417534] ? do_renameat2+0x270/0x7b0
[ 2918.417538] ? __kasan_slab_free+0x14c/0x190
[ 2918.417541] ? do_renameat2+0x270/0x7b0
[ 2918.417553] ? kmem_cache_free+0x85/0x1e0
[ 2918.417558] ? do_renameat2+0x270/0x7b0
[ 2918.417563] filename_lookup+0x13c/0x280
[ 2918.417567] ? filename_parentat+0x2b0/0x2b0
[ 2918.417572] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x31/0x40
[ 2918.417575] ? kasan_kmalloc+0xa6/0xd0
[ 2918.417593] ? strncpy_from_user+0xaa/0x1c0
[ 2918.417598] ? getname_flags+0x101/0x2b0
[ 2918.417614] ? path_listxattr+0x87/0x110
[ 2918.417619] path_listxattr+0x87/0x110
[ 2918.417623] ? listxattr+0xc0/0xc0
[ 2918.417637] ? mm_fault_error+0x1b0/0x1b0
[ 2918.417654] do_syscall_64+0x73/0x160
[ 2918.417660] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 2918.417676] RIP: 0033:0x7f2f3a3480d7
[ 2918.417677] Code: f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d be dd 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 b8 c2 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 91 dd 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 2918.417732] RSP: 002b:00007fff4095b7d8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000c2
[ 2918.417744] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f2f3a3480d7
[ 2918.417746] RDX: 0000000000000071 RSI: 00007fff4095b810 RDI: 000000000126a0c0
[ 2918.417749] RBP: 00007fff4095b890 R08: 000000000126a010 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 2918.417751] R10: 00000000000001ab R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00000000004005e0
[ 2918.417753] R13: 00007fff4095b990 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 2918.417853] Allocated by task 329:
[ 2918.418002] kasan_kmalloc+0xa6/0xd0
[ 2918.418007] kmem_cache_alloc+0xc8/0x1e0
[ 2918.418023] mempool_init_node+0x194/0x230
[ 2918.418027] mempool_init+0x12/0x20
[ 2918.418042] bioset_init+0x2bd/0x380
[ 2918.418052] blk_alloc_queue_node+0xe9/0x540
[ 2918.418075] dm_create+0x2c0/0x800
[ 2918.418080] dev_create+0xd2/0x530
[ 2918.418083] ctl_ioctl+0x2a3/0x5b0
[ 2918.418087] dm_ctl_ioctl+0xa/0x10
[ 2918.418092] do_vfs_ioctl+0x13e/0x8c0
[ 2918.418095] ksys_ioctl+0x66/0x70
[ 2918.418098] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x3d/0x50
[ 2918.418102] do_syscall_64+0x73/0x160
[ 2918.418106] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 2918.418204] Freed by task 0:
[ 2918.418301] (stack is not available)
[ 2918.418521] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88018efc0000
which belongs to the cache biovec-max of size 8192
[ 2918.418894] The buggy address is located 104 bytes to the right of
8192-byte region [ffff88018efc0000, ffff88018efc2000)
[ 2918.419257] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 2918.419431] page:ffffea00063bf000 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8801f2242540 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
[ 2918.419702] flags: 0x17fff8000008100(slab|head)
[ 2918.419879] raw: 017fff8000008100 dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff8801f2242540
[ 2918.420101] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000030003 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 2918.420322] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 2918.420599] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 2918.420764] ffff88018efc1f00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 2918.420975] ffff88018efc1f80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 2918.421194] >ffff88018efc2000: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 2918.421406] ^
[ 2918.421627] ffff88018efc2080: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 2918.421838] ffff88018efc2100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 2918.422046] ==================================================================
[ 2918.422264] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
[ 2923.901641] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff88018f0db000
[ 2923.901884] PGD 22226a067 P4D 22226a067 PUD 222273067 PMD 18e642063 PTE 800000018f0db061
[ 2923.902120] Oops: 0003 [#1 ] SMP KASAN PTI
[ 2923.902274] CPU: 1 PID: 1231 Comm: umount Tainted: G B 4.17.0+ #1
[ 2923.902490] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 2923.902761] RIP: 0010:__memset+0x24/0x30
[ 2923.902906] Code: 90 90 90 90 90 90 66 66 90 66 90 49 89 f9 48 89 d1 83 e2 07 48 c1 e9 03 40 0f b6 f6 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 48 0f af c6 <f3> 48 ab 89 d1 f3 aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 f9 40 88 f0 48 89 d1 f3
[ 2923.903446] RSP: 0018:ffff88018ddf7ae0 EFLAGS: 00010206
[ 2923.903622] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8801d549d888 RCX: 1ffffffffffdaffb
[ 2923.903833] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88018f0daffc
[ 2923.904062] RBP: ffff88018efc206c R08: 1ffff10031df840d R09: ffff88018efc206c
[ 2923.904273] R10: ffffffffffffe1ee R11: ffffed0031df65fa R12: 0000000000000000
[ 2923.904485] R13: ffff8801d549dc98 R14: 00000000ffffc3db R15: ffffea00063bec80
[ 2923.904693] FS: 00007fa8b2f8a840(0000) GS:ffff8801f3b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 2923.904937] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 2923.910080] CR2: ffff88018f0db000 CR3: 000000018f892000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 2923.914930] Call Trace:
[ 2923.919724] f2fs_truncate_inline_inode+0x114/0x170
[ 2923.924487] f2fs_truncate_blocks+0x11b/0x7c0
[ 2923.929178] ? f2fs_truncate_data_blocks+0x10/0x10
[ 2923.933834] ? dqget+0x670/0x670
[ 2923.938437] ? f2fs_destroy_extent_tree+0xd6/0x270
[ 2923.943107] ? __radix_tree_lookup+0x2f/0x150
[ 2923.947772] f2fs_truncate+0xd4/0x1a0
[ 2923.952491] f2fs_evict_inode+0x5ab/0x610
[ 2923.957204] evict+0x15f/0x280
[ 2923.961898] __dentry_kill+0x161/0x250
[ 2923.966634] shrink_dentry_list+0xf3/0x250
[ 2923.971897] shrink_dcache_parent+0xa9/0x100
[ 2923.976561] ? shrink_dcache_sb+0x1f0/0x1f0
[ 2923.981177] ? wait_for_completion+0x8a/0x210
[ 2923.985781] ? migrate_swap_stop+0x2d0/0x2d0
[ 2923.990332] do_one_tree+0xe/0x40
[ 2923.994735] shrink_dcache_for_umount+0x3a/0xa0
[ 2923.999077] generic_shutdown_super+0x3e/0x1c0
[ 2924.003350] kill_block_super+0x4b/0x70
[ 2924.007619] deactivate_locked_super+0x65/0x90
[ 2924.011812] cleanup_mnt+0x5c/0xa0
[ 2924.015995] task_work_run+0xce/0xf0
[ 2924.020174] exit_to_usermode_loop+0x115/0x120
[ 2924.024293] do_syscall_64+0x12f/0x160
[ 2924.028479] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 2924.032709] RIP: 0033:0x7fa8b2868487
[ 2924.036888] Code: 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 31 f6 e9 09 00 00 00 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 b8 a6 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d e1 c9 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 2924.045750] RSP: 002b:00007ffc39824d58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a6
[ 2924.050190] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00000000008ea030 RCX: 00007fa8b2868487
[ 2924.054604] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000008f4360
[ 2924.058940] RBP: 00000000008f4360 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000014
[ 2924.063186] R10: 00000000000006b2 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fa8b2d7183c
[ 2924.067418] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000008ea210 R15: 00007ffc39824fe0
[ 2924.071534] Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep snd_pcm snd_timer joydev input_leds serio_raw snd soundcore mac_hid i2c_piix4 ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core configfs iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi btrfs zstd_decompress zstd_compress xxhash raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx xor raid6_pq libcrc32c raid1 raid0 multipath linear 8139too qxl ttm drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops drm crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc aesni_intel psmouse aes_x86_64 8139cp crypto_simd cryptd mii glue_helper pata_acpi floppy
[ 2924.098044] CR2: ffff88018f0db000
[ 2924.102520] ---[ end trace a8e0d899985faf31 ]---
[ 2924.107012] RIP: 0010:__memset+0x24/0x30
[ 2924.111448] Code: 90 90 90 90 90 90 66 66 90 66 90 49 89 f9 48 89 d1 83 e2 07 48 c1 e9 03 40 0f b6 f6 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 48 0f af c6 <f3> 48 ab 89 d1 f3 aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 f9 40 88 f0 48 89 d1 f3
[ 2924.120724] RSP: 0018:ffff88018ddf7ae0 EFLAGS: 00010206
[ 2924.125312] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8801d549d888 RCX: 1ffffffffffdaffb
[ 2924.129931] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88018f0daffc
[ 2924.134537] RBP: ffff88018efc206c R08: 1ffff10031df840d R09: ffff88018efc206c
[ 2924.139175] R10: ffffffffffffe1ee R11: ffffed0031df65fa R12: 0000000000000000
[ 2924.143825] R13: ffff8801d549dc98 R14: 00000000ffffc3db R15: ffffea00063bec80
[ 2924.148500] FS: 00007fa8b2f8a840(0000) GS:ffff8801f3b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 2924.153247] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 2924.158003] CR2: ffff88018f0db000 CR3: 000000018f892000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 2924.164641] BUG: Bad rss-counter state mm:00000000fa04621e idx:0 val:4
[ 2924.170007] BUG: Bad rss-counter
tate mm:00000000fa04621e idx:1 val:2
- Location
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v4.18-rc3/source/fs/f2fs/inline.c#L78
memset(addr + from, 0, MAX_INLINE_DATA(inode) - from);
Here the length can be negative.
Reported-by Wen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 4.14: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2018-12-05 19:41:16 +01:00
Chao Yu
ad19d1e78f
f2fs: fix to do sanity check with block address in main area
...
commit c9b60788fc760d136211853f10ce73dc152d1f4a upstream.
This patch add to do sanity check with below field:
- cp_pack_total_block_count
- blkaddr of data/node
- extent info
- Overview
BUG() in verify_block_addr() when writing to a corrupted f2fs image
- Reproduce (4.18 upstream kernel)
- POC (poc.c)
static void activity(char *mpoint) {
char *foo_bar_baz;
int err;
static int buf[8192];
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
err = asprintf(&foo_bar_baz, "%s/foo/bar/baz", mpoint);
int fd = open(foo_bar_baz, O_RDWR | O_TRUNC, 0777);
if (fd >= 0) {
write(fd, (char *)buf, sizeof(buf));
fdatasync(fd);
close(fd);
}
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
activity(argv[1]);
return 0;
}
- Kernel message
[ 689.349473] F2FS-fs (loop0): Mounted with checkpoint version = 3
[ 699.728662] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1309 at fs/f2fs/segment.c:2860 f2fs_inplace_write_data+0x232/0x240
[ 699.728670] Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core snd_pcm snd_timer snd mac_hid i2c_piix4 soundcore ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx raid1 raid0 multipath linear 8139too crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul qxl drm_kms_helper syscopyarea aesni_intel sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm drm aes_x86_64 crypto_simd cryptd 8139cp glue_helper mii pata_acpi floppy
[ 699.729056] CPU: 0 PID: 1309 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.18.0-rc1+ #4
[ 699.729064] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 699.729074] RIP: 0010:f2fs_inplace_write_data+0x232/0x240
[ 699.729076] Code: ff e9 cf fe ff ff 49 8d 7d 10 e8 39 45 ad ff 4d 8b 7d 10 be 04 00 00 00 49 8d 7f 48 e8 07 49 ad ff 45 8b 7f 48 e9 fb fe ff ff <0f> 0b f0 41 80 4d 48 04 e9 65 fe ff ff 90 66 66 66 66 90 55 48 8d
[ 699.729130] RSP: 0018:ffff8801f43af568 EFLAGS: 00010202
[ 699.729139] RAX: 000000000000003f RBX: ffff8801f43af7b8 RCX: ffffffffb88c9113
[ 699.729142] RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff8802024e5540
[ 699.729144] RBP: ffff8801f43af590 R08: 0000000000000009 R09: ffffffffffffffe8
[ 699.729147] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed0039b0596a R12: ffff8802024e5540
[ 699.729149] R13: ffff8801f0335500 R14: ffff8801e3e7a700 R15: ffff8801e1ee4450
[ 699.729154] FS: 00007f9bf97f5700(0000) GS:ffff8801f6e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 699.729156] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 699.729159] CR2: 00007f9bf925d170 CR3: 00000001f0c34000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[ 699.729171] Call Trace:
[ 699.729192] f2fs_do_write_data_page+0x2e2/0xe00
[ 699.729203] ? f2fs_should_update_outplace+0xd0/0xd0
[ 699.729238] ? memcg_drain_all_list_lrus+0x280/0x280
[ 699.729269] ? __radix_tree_replace+0xa3/0x120
[ 699.729276] __write_data_page+0x5c7/0xe30
[ 699.729291] ? kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[ 699.729310] ? page_mapped+0x8a/0x110
[ 699.729321] ? page_mkclean+0xe9/0x160
[ 699.729327] ? f2fs_do_write_data_page+0xe00/0xe00
[ 699.729331] ? invalid_page_referenced_vma+0x130/0x130
[ 699.729345] ? clear_page_dirty_for_io+0x332/0x450
[ 699.729351] f2fs_write_cache_pages+0x4ca/0x860
[ 699.729358] ? __write_data_page+0xe30/0xe30
[ 699.729374] ? percpu_counter_add_batch+0x22/0xa0
[ 699.729380] ? kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[ 699.729391] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x17/0x40
[ 699.729403] ? f2fs_mark_inode_dirty_sync.part.18+0x16/0x30
[ 699.729413] ? iov_iter_advance+0x113/0x640
[ 699.729418] ? f2fs_write_end+0x133/0x2e0
[ 699.729423] ? balance_dirty_pages_ratelimited+0x239/0x640
[ 699.729428] f2fs_write_data_pages+0x329/0x520
[ 699.729433] ? generic_perform_write+0x250/0x320
[ 699.729438] ? f2fs_write_cache_pages+0x860/0x860
[ 699.729454] ? current_time+0x110/0x110
[ 699.729459] ? f2fs_preallocate_blocks+0x1ef/0x370
[ 699.729464] do_writepages+0x37/0xb0
[ 699.729468] ? f2fs_write_cache_pages+0x860/0x860
[ 699.729472] ? do_writepages+0x37/0xb0
[ 699.729478] __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x19a/0x1f0
[ 699.729483] ? delete_from_page_cache_batch+0x4e0/0x4e0
[ 699.729496] ? __vfs_write+0x2b2/0x410
[ 699.729501] file_write_and_wait_range+0x66/0xb0
[ 699.729506] f2fs_do_sync_file+0x1f9/0xd90
[ 699.729511] ? truncate_partial_data_page+0x290/0x290
[ 699.729521] ? __sb_end_write+0x30/0x50
[ 699.729526] ? vfs_write+0x20f/0x260
[ 699.729530] f2fs_sync_file+0x9a/0xb0
[ 699.729534] ? f2fs_do_sync_file+0xd90/0xd90
[ 699.729548] vfs_fsync_range+0x68/0x100
[ 699.729554] ? __fget_light+0xc9/0xe0
[ 699.729558] do_fsync+0x3d/0x70
[ 699.729562] __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x24/0x30
[ 699.729585] do_syscall_64+0x78/0x170
[ 699.729595] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 699.729613] RIP: 0033:0x7f9bf930d800
[ 699.729615] Code: 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 83 3d 49 bf 2c 00 00 75 10 b8 4b 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 be 78 01 00 48 89 04 24
[ 699.729668] RSP: 002b:00007ffee3606c68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004b
[ 699.729673] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f9bf930d800
[ 699.729675] RDX: 0000000000008000 RSI: 00000000006010a0 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 699.729678] RBP: 00007ffee3606ca0 R08: 0000000001503010 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 699.729680] R10: 00000000000002e8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400610
[ 699.729683] R13: 00007ffee3606da0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 699.729687] ---[ end trace 4ce02f25ff7d3df5 ]---
[ 699.729782] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 699.729785] kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/segment.h:654!
[ 699.731055] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1 ] SMP KASAN PTI
[ 699.732104] CPU: 0 PID: 1309 Comm: a.out Tainted: G W 4.18.0-rc1+ #4
[ 699.733684] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 699.735611] RIP: 0010:f2fs_submit_page_bio+0x29b/0x730
[ 699.736649] Code: 54 49 8d bd 18 04 00 00 e8 b2 59 af ff 41 8b 8d 18 04 00 00 8b 45 b8 41 d3 e6 44 01 f0 4c 8d 73 14 41 39 c7 0f 82 37 fe ff ff <0f> 0b 65 8b 05 2c 04 77 47 89 c0 48 0f a3 05 52 c1 d5 01 0f 92 c0
[ 699.740524] RSP: 0018:ffff8801f43af508 EFLAGS: 00010283
[ 699.741573] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8801f43af7b8 RCX: ffffffffb88a7cef
[ 699.743006] RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff8801e3e7a64c
[ 699.744426] RBP: ffff8801f43af558 R08: ffffed003e066b55 R09: ffffed003e066b55
[ 699.745833] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed003e066b54 R12: ffffea0007876940
[ 699.747256] R13: ffff8801f0335500 R14: ffff8801e3e7a600 R15: 0000000000000001
[ 699.748683] FS: 00007f9bf97f5700(0000) GS:ffff8801f6e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 699.750293] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 699.751462] CR2: 00007f9bf925d170 CR3: 00000001f0c34000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[ 699.752874] Call Trace:
[ 699.753386] ? f2fs_inplace_write_data+0x93/0x240
[ 699.754341] f2fs_inplace_write_data+0xd2/0x240
[ 699.755271] f2fs_do_write_data_page+0x2e2/0xe00
[ 699.756214] ? f2fs_should_update_outplace+0xd0/0xd0
[ 699.757215] ? memcg_drain_all_list_lrus+0x280/0x280
[ 699.758209] ? __radix_tree_replace+0xa3/0x120
[ 699.759164] __write_data_page+0x5c7/0xe30
[ 699.760002] ? kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[ 699.760823] ? page_mapped+0x8a/0x110
[ 699.761573] ? page_mkclean+0xe9/0x160
[ 699.762345] ? f2fs_do_write_data_page+0xe00/0xe00
[ 699.763332] ? invalid_page_referenced_vma+0x130/0x130
[ 699.764374] ? clear_page_dirty_for_io+0x332/0x450
[ 699.765347] f2fs_write_cache_pages+0x4ca/0x860
[ 699.766276] ? __write_data_page+0xe30/0xe30
[ 699.767161] ? percpu_counter_add_batch+0x22/0xa0
[ 699.768112] ? kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[ 699.768951] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x17/0x40
[ 699.769739] ? f2fs_mark_inode_dirty_sync.part.18+0x16/0x30
[ 699.770885] ? iov_iter_advance+0x113/0x640
[ 699.771743] ? f2fs_write_end+0x133/0x2e0
[ 699.772569] ? balance_dirty_pages_ratelimited+0x239/0x640
[ 699.773680] f2fs_write_data_pages+0x329/0x520
[ 699.774603] ? generic_perform_write+0x250/0x320
[ 699.775544] ? f2fs_write_cache_pages+0x860/0x860
[ 699.776510] ? current_time+0x110/0x110
[ 699.777299] ? f2fs_preallocate_blocks+0x1ef/0x370
[ 699.778279] do_writepages+0x37/0xb0
[ 699.779026] ? f2fs_write_cache_pages+0x860/0x860
[ 699.779978] ? do_writepages+0x37/0xb0
[ 699.780755] __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x19a/0x1f0
[ 699.781746] ? delete_from_page_cache_batch+0x4e0/0x4e0
[ 699.782820] ? __vfs_write+0x2b2/0x410
[ 699.783597] file_write_and_wait_range+0x66/0xb0
[ 699.784540] f2fs_do_sync_file+0x1f9/0xd90
[ 699.785381] ? truncate_partial_data_page+0x290/0x290
[ 699.786415] ? __sb_end_write+0x30/0x50
[ 699.787204] ? vfs_write+0x20f/0x260
[ 699.787941] f2fs_sync_file+0x9a/0xb0
[ 699.788694] ? f2fs_do_sync_file+0xd90/0xd90
[ 699.789572] vfs_fsync_range+0x68/0x100
[ 699.790360] ? __fget_light+0xc9/0xe0
[ 699.791128] do_fsync+0x3d/0x70
[ 699.791779] __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x24/0x30
[ 699.792614] do_syscall_64+0x78/0x170
[ 699.793371] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 699.794406] RIP: 0033:0x7f9bf930d800
[ 699.795134] Code: 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 83 3d 49 bf 2c 00 00 75 10 b8 4b 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 be 78 01 00 48 89 04 24
[ 699.798960] RSP: 002b:00007ffee3606c68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004b
[ 699.800483] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f9bf930d800
[ 699.801923] RDX: 0000000000008000 RSI: 00000000006010a0 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 699.803373] RBP: 00007ffee3606ca0 R08: 0000000001503010 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 699.804798] R10: 00000000000002e8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400610
[ 699.806233] R13: 00007ffee3606da0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 699.807667] Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core snd_pcm snd_timer snd mac_hid i2c_piix4 soundcore ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx raid1 raid0 multipath linear 8139too crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul qxl drm_kms_helper syscopyarea aesni_intel sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm drm aes_x86_64 crypto_simd cryptd 8139cp glue_helper mii pata_acpi floppy
[ 699.817079] ---[ end trace 4ce02f25ff7d3df6 ]---
[ 699.818068] RIP: 0010:f2fs_submit_page_bio+0x29b/0x730
[ 699.819114] Code: 54 49 8d bd 18 04 00 00 e8 b2 59 af ff 41 8b 8d 18 04 00 00 8b 45 b8 41 d3 e6 44 01 f0 4c 8d 73 14 41 39 c7 0f 82 37 fe ff ff <0f> 0b 65 8b 05 2c 04 77 47 89 c0 48 0f a3 05 52 c1 d5 01 0f 92 c0
[ 699.822919] RSP: 0018:ffff8801f43af508 EFLAGS: 00010283
[ 699.823977] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8801f43af7b8 RCX: ffffffffb88a7cef
[ 699.825436] RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff8801e3e7a64c
[ 699.826881] RBP: ffff8801f43af558 R08: ffffed003e066b55 R09: ffffed003e066b55
[ 699.828292] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed003e066b54 R12: ffffea0007876940
[ 699.829750] R13: ffff8801f0335500 R14: ffff8801e3e7a600 R15: 0000000000000001
[ 699.831192] FS: 00007f9bf97f5700(0000) GS:ffff8801f6e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 699.832793] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 699.833981] CR2: 00007f9bf925d170 CR3: 00000001f0c34000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[ 699.835556] ==================================================================
[ 699.837029] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in update_stack_state+0x38c/0x3e0
[ 699.838462] Read of size 8 at addr ffff8801f43af970 by task a.out/1309
[ 699.840086] CPU: 0 PID: 1309 Comm: a.out Tainted: G D W 4.18.0-rc1+ #4
[ 699.841603] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 699.843475] Call Trace:
[ 699.843982] dump_stack+0x7b/0xb5
[ 699.844661] print_address_description+0x70/0x290
[ 699.845607] kasan_report+0x291/0x390
[ 699.846351] ? update_stack_state+0x38c/0x3e0
[ 699.853831] __asan_load8+0x54/0x90
[ 699.854569] update_stack_state+0x38c/0x3e0
[ 699.855428] ? __read_once_size_nocheck.constprop.7+0x20/0x20
[ 699.856601] ? __save_stack_trace+0x5e/0x100
[ 699.857476] unwind_next_frame.part.5+0x18e/0x490
[ 699.858448] ? unwind_dump+0x290/0x290
[ 699.859217] ? clear_page_dirty_for_io+0x332/0x450
[ 699.860185] __unwind_start+0x106/0x190
[ 699.860974] __save_stack_trace+0x5e/0x100
[ 699.861808] ? __save_stack_trace+0x5e/0x100
[ 699.862691] ? unlink_anon_vmas+0xba/0x2c0
[ 699.863525] save_stack_trace+0x1f/0x30
[ 699.864312] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 699.864993] ? __alloc_pages_slowpath+0x1420/0x1420
[ 699.865990] ? flush_tlb_mm_range+0x15e/0x220
[ 699.866889] ? kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[ 699.867724] ? __dec_node_state+0x92/0xb0
[ 699.868543] ? lock_page_memcg+0x85/0xf0
[ 699.869350] ? unlock_page_memcg+0x16/0x80
[ 699.870185] ? page_remove_rmap+0x198/0x520
[ 699.871048] ? mark_page_accessed+0x133/0x200
[ 699.871930] ? _cond_resched+0x1a/0x50
[ 699.872700] ? unmap_page_range+0xcd4/0xe50
[ 699.873551] ? rb_next+0x58/0x80
[ 699.874217] ? rb_next+0x58/0x80
[ 699.874895] __kasan_slab_free+0x13c/0x1a0
[ 699.875734] ? unlink_anon_vmas+0xba/0x2c0
[ 699.876563] kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10
[ 699.877315] kmem_cache_free+0x89/0x1e0
[ 699.878095] unlink_anon_vmas+0xba/0x2c0
[ 699.878913] free_pgtables+0x101/0x1b0
[ 699.879677] exit_mmap+0x146/0x2a0
[ 699.880378] ? __ia32_sys_munmap+0x50/0x50
[ 699.881214] ? kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[ 699.882052] ? mm_update_next_owner+0x322/0x380
[ 699.882985] mmput+0x8b/0x1d0
[ 699.883602] do_exit+0x43a/0x1390
[ 699.884288] ? mm_update_next_owner+0x380/0x380
[ 699.885212] ? f2fs_sync_file+0x9a/0xb0
[ 699.885995] ? f2fs_do_sync_file+0xd90/0xd90
[ 699.886877] ? vfs_fsync_range+0x68/0x100
[ 699.887694] ? __fget_light+0xc9/0xe0
[ 699.888442] ? do_fsync+0x3d/0x70
[ 699.889118] ? __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x24/0x30
[ 699.889996] rewind_stack_do_exit+0x17/0x20
[ 699.890860] RIP: 0033:0x7f9bf930d800
[ 699.891585] Code: Bad RIP value.
[ 699.892268] RSP: 002b:00007ffee3606c68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004b
[ 699.893781] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f9bf930d800
[ 699.895220] RDX: 0000000000008000 RSI: 00000000006010a0 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 699.896643] RBP: 00007ffee3606ca0 R08: 0000000001503010 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 699.898069] R10: 00000000000002e8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400610
[ 699.899505] R13: 00007ffee3606da0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 699.901241] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 699.902215] page:ffffea0007d0ebc0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0
[ 699.903811] flags: 0x2ffff0000000000()
[ 699.904585] raw: 02ffff0000000000 0000000000000000 ffffffff07d00101 0000000000000000
[ 699.906125] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000240000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 699.907673] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 699.909108] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 699.910077] ffff8801f43af800: 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 f4 f4 f4 f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00
[ 699.911528] ffff8801f43af880: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 699.912953] >ffff8801f43af900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 01 f4 f4 f4 f2 f2 f2
[ 699.914392] ^
[ 699.915758] ffff8801f43af980: f2 00 f4 f4 00 00 00 00 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 699.917193] ffff8801f43afa00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00
[ 699.918634] ==================================================================
- Location
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v4.18-rc1/source/fs/f2fs/segment.h#L644
Reported-by Wen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 4.14:
- Error label is different in validate_checkpoint() due to the earlier
backport of "f2fs: fix invalid memory access"
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2018-12-05 19:41:16 +01:00
Chao Yu
b8321ccd04
f2fs: fix to do sanity check with node footer and iblocks
...
commit e34438c903b653daca2b2a7de95aed46226f8ed3 upstream.
This patch adds to do sanity check with below fields of inode to
avoid reported panic.
- node footer
- iblocks
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200223
- Overview
BUG() triggered in f2fs_truncate_inode_blocks() when un-mounting a mounted f2fs image after writing to it
- Reproduce
- POC (poc.c)
static void activity(char *mpoint) {
char *foo_bar_baz;
int err;
static int buf[8192];
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
err = asprintf(&foo_bar_baz, "%s/foo/bar/baz", mpoint);
// open / write / read
int fd = open(foo_bar_baz, O_RDWR | O_TRUNC, 0777);
if (fd >= 0) {
write(fd, (char *)buf, 517);
write(fd, (char *)buf, sizeof(buf));
close(fd);
}
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
activity(argv[1]);
return 0;
}
- Kernel meesage
[ 552.479723] F2FS-fs (loop0): Mounted with checkpoint version = 2
[ 556.451891] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 556.451899] kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/node.c:987!
[ 556.452920] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1 ] SMP KASAN PTI
[ 556.453936] CPU: 1 PID: 1310 Comm: umount Not tainted 4.18.0-rc1+ #4
[ 556.455213] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 556.457140] RIP: 0010:f2fs_truncate_inode_blocks+0x4a7/0x6f0
[ 556.458280] Code: e8 ae ea ff ff 41 89 c7 c1 e8 1f 84 c0 74 0a 41 83 ff fe 0f 85 35 ff ff ff 81 85 b0 fe ff ff fb 03 00 00 e9 f7 fd ff ff 0f 0b <0f> 0b e8 62 b7 9a 00 48 8b bd a0 fe ff ff e8 56 54 ae ff 48 8b b5
[ 556.462015] RSP: 0018:ffff8801f292f808 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 556.463068] RAX: ffffed003e73242d RBX: ffff8801f292f958 RCX: ffffffffb88b81bc
[ 556.464479] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffff8801f3992164
[ 556.465901] RBP: ffff8801f292f980 R08: ffffed003e73242d R09: ffffed003e73242d
[ 556.467311] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed003e73242c R12: 00000000fffffc64
[ 556.468706] R13: ffff8801f3992000 R14: 0000000000000058 R15: 00000000ffff8801
[ 556.470117] FS: 00007f8029297840(0000) GS:ffff8801f6f00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 556.471702] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 556.472838] CR2: 000055f5f57305d8 CR3: 00000001f18b0000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 556.474265] Call Trace:
[ 556.474782] ? f2fs_alloc_nid_failed+0xf0/0xf0
[ 556.475686] ? truncate_nodes+0x980/0x980
[ 556.476516] ? pagecache_get_page+0x21f/0x2f0
[ 556.477412] ? __asan_loadN+0xf/0x20
[ 556.478153] ? __get_node_page+0x331/0x5b0
[ 556.478992] ? reweight_entity+0x1e6/0x3b0
[ 556.479826] f2fs_truncate_blocks+0x55e/0x740
[ 556.480709] ? f2fs_truncate_data_blocks+0x20/0x20
[ 556.481689] ? __radix_tree_lookup+0x34/0x160
[ 556.482630] ? radix_tree_lookup+0xd/0x10
[ 556.483445] f2fs_truncate+0xd4/0x1a0
[ 556.484206] f2fs_evict_inode+0x5ce/0x630
[ 556.485032] evict+0x16f/0x290
[ 556.485664] iput+0x280/0x300
[ 556.486300] dentry_unlink_inode+0x165/0x1e0
[ 556.487169] __dentry_kill+0x16a/0x260
[ 556.487936] dentry_kill+0x70/0x250
[ 556.488651] shrink_dentry_list+0x125/0x260
[ 556.489504] shrink_dcache_parent+0xc1/0x110
[ 556.490379] ? shrink_dcache_sb+0x200/0x200
[ 556.491231] ? bit_wait_timeout+0xc0/0xc0
[ 556.492047] do_one_tree+0x12/0x40
[ 556.492743] shrink_dcache_for_umount+0x3f/0xa0
[ 556.493656] generic_shutdown_super+0x43/0x1c0
[ 556.494561] kill_block_super+0x52/0x80
[ 556.495341] kill_f2fs_super+0x62/0x70
[ 556.496105] deactivate_locked_super+0x6f/0xa0
[ 556.497004] deactivate_super+0x5e/0x80
[ 556.497785] cleanup_mnt+0x61/0xa0
[ 556.498492] __cleanup_mnt+0x12/0x20
[ 556.499218] task_work_run+0xc8/0xf0
[ 556.499949] exit_to_usermode_loop+0x125/0x130
[ 556.500846] do_syscall_64+0x138/0x170
[ 556.501609] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 556.502659] RIP: 0033:0x7f8028b77487
[ 556.503384] Code: 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 31 f6 e9 09 00 00 00 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 b8 a6 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d e1 c9 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 556.507137] RSP: 002b:00007fff9f2e3598 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a6
[ 556.508637] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000ebd030 RCX: 00007f8028b77487
[ 556.510069] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000ec41e0
[ 556.511481] RBP: 0000000000ec41e0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000014
[ 556.512892] R10: 00000000000006b2 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f802908083c
[ 556.514320] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000ebd210 R15: 00007fff9f2e3820
[ 556.515745] Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core snd_pcm snd_timer snd mac_hid i2c_piix4 soundcore ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx raid1 raid0 multipath linear 8139too crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul qxl drm_kms_helper syscopyarea aesni_intel sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm drm aes_x86_64 crypto_simd cryptd 8139cp glue_helper mii pata_acpi floppy
[ 556.529276] ---[ end trace 4ce02f25ff7d3df5 ]---
[ 556.530340] RIP: 0010:f2fs_truncate_inode_blocks+0x4a7/0x6f0
[ 556.531513] Code: e8 ae ea ff ff 41 89 c7 c1 e8 1f 84 c0 74 0a 41 83 ff fe 0f 85 35 ff ff ff 81 85 b0 fe ff ff fb 03 00 00 e9 f7 fd ff ff 0f 0b <0f> 0b e8 62 b7 9a 00 48 8b bd a0 fe ff ff e8 56 54 ae ff 48 8b b5
[ 556.535330] RSP: 0018:ffff8801f292f808 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 556.536395] RAX: ffffed003e73242d RBX: ffff8801f292f958 RCX: ffffffffb88b81bc
[ 556.537824] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffff8801f3992164
[ 556.539290] RBP: ffff8801f292f980 R08: ffffed003e73242d R09: ffffed003e73242d
[ 556.540709] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed003e73242c R12: 00000000fffffc64
[ 556.542131] R13: ffff8801f3992000 R14: 0000000000000058 R15: 00000000ffff8801
[ 556.543579] FS: 00007f8029297840(0000) GS:ffff8801f6f00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 556.545180] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 556.546338] CR2: 000055f5f57305d8 CR3: 00000001f18b0000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 556.547809] ==================================================================
[ 556.549248] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in arch_tlb_gather_mmu+0x52/0x170
[ 556.550672] Write of size 8 at addr ffff8801f292fd10 by task umount/1310
[ 556.552338] CPU: 1 PID: 1310 Comm: umount Tainted: G D 4.18.0-rc1+ #4
[ 556.553886] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 556.555756] Call Trace:
[ 556.556264] dump_stack+0x7b/0xb5
[ 556.556944] print_address_description+0x70/0x290
[ 556.557903] kasan_report+0x291/0x390
[ 556.558649] ? arch_tlb_gather_mmu+0x52/0x170
[ 556.559537] __asan_store8+0x57/0x90
[ 556.560268] arch_tlb_gather_mmu+0x52/0x170
[ 556.561110] tlb_gather_mmu+0x12/0x40
[ 556.561862] exit_mmap+0x123/0x2a0
[ 556.562555] ? __ia32_sys_munmap+0x50/0x50
[ 556.563384] ? exit_aio+0x98/0x230
[ 556.564079] ? __x32_compat_sys_io_submit+0x260/0x260
[ 556.565099] ? taskstats_exit+0x1f4/0x640
[ 556.565925] ? kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[ 556.566739] ? mm_update_next_owner+0x322/0x380
[ 556.567652] mmput+0x8b/0x1d0
[ 556.568260] do_exit+0x43a/0x1390
[ 556.568937] ? mm_update_next_owner+0x380/0x380
[ 556.569855] ? deactivate_super+0x5e/0x80
[ 556.570668] ? cleanup_mnt+0x61/0xa0
[ 556.571395] ? __cleanup_mnt+0x12/0x20
[ 556.572156] ? task_work_run+0xc8/0xf0
[ 556.572917] ? exit_to_usermode_loop+0x125/0x130
[ 556.573861] rewind_stack_do_exit+0x17/0x20
[ 556.574707] RIP: 0033:0x7f8028b77487
[ 556.575428] Code: Bad RIP value.
[ 556.576106] RSP: 002b:00007fff9f2e3598 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a6
[ 556.577599] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000ebd030 RCX: 00007f8028b77487
[ 556.579020] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000ec41e0
[ 556.580422] RBP: 0000000000ec41e0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000014
[ 556.581833] R10: 00000000000006b2 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f802908083c
[ 556.583252] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000ebd210 R15: 00007fff9f2e3820
[ 556.584983] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 556.585961] page:ffffea0007ca4bc0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0
[ 556.587540] flags: 0x2ffff0000000000()
[ 556.588296] raw: 02ffff0000000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000200 0000000000000000
[ 556.589822] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 556.591359] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 556.592786] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 556.593753] ffff8801f292fc00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 556.595191] ffff8801f292fc80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00
[ 556.596613] >ffff8801f292fd00: 00 00 f3 00 00 00 00 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 f4 f4 f4
[ 556.598044] ^
[ 556.598797] ffff8801f292fd80: f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 556.600225] ffff8801f292fe00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 f4 f4 f4
[ 556.601647] ==================================================================
- Location
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v4.18-rc1/source/fs/f2fs/node.c#L987
case NODE_DIND_BLOCK:
err = truncate_nodes(&dn, nofs, offset[1], 3);
cont = 0;
break;
default:
BUG(); <---
}
Reported-by Wen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2018-12-05 19:41:16 +01:00
Chao Yu
f9cf5462b5
f2fs: fix to do sanity check with user_block_count
...
commit 9dc956b2c8523aed39d1e6508438be9fea28c8fc upstream.
This patch fixs to do sanity check with user_block_count.
- Overview
Divide zero in utilization when mount() a corrupted f2fs image
- Reproduce (4.18 upstream kernel)
- Kernel message
[ 564.099503] F2FS-fs (loop0): invalid crc value
[ 564.101991] divide error: 0000 [#1 ] SMP KASAN PTI
[ 564.103103] CPU: 1 PID: 1298 Comm: f2fs_discard-7: Not tainted 4.18.0-rc1+ #4
[ 564.104584] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 564.106624] RIP: 0010:issue_discard_thread+0x248/0x5c0
[ 564.107692] Code: ff ff 48 8b bd e8 fe ff ff 41 8b 9d 4c 04 00 00 e8 cd b8 ad ff 41 8b 85 50 04 00 00 31 d2 48 8d 04 80 48 8d 04 80 48 c1 e0 02 <48> f7 f3 83 f8 50 7e 16 41 c7 86 7c ff ff ff 01 00 00 00 41 c7 86
[ 564.111686] RSP: 0018:ffff8801f3117dc0 EFLAGS: 00010206
[ 564.112775] RAX: 0000000000000384 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffffb88c1e03
[ 564.114250] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff8801e3aa4850
[ 564.115706] RBP: ffff8801f3117f00 R08: 1ffffffff751a1d0 R09: fffffbfff751a1d0
[ 564.117177] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: fffffbfff751a1d0 R12: 00000000fffffffc
[ 564.118634] R13: ffff8801e3aa4400 R14: ffff8801f3117ed8 R15: ffff8801e2050000
[ 564.120094] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8801f6f00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 564.121748] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 564.122923] CR2: 000000000202b078 CR3: 00000001f11ac000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 564.124383] Call Trace:
[ 564.124924] ? __issue_discard_cmd+0x480/0x480
[ 564.125882] ? __sched_text_start+0x8/0x8
[ 564.126756] ? __kthread_parkme+0xcb/0x100
[ 564.127620] ? kthread_blkcg+0x70/0x70
[ 564.128412] kthread+0x180/0x1d0
[ 564.129105] ? __issue_discard_cmd+0x480/0x480
[ 564.130029] ? kthread_associate_blkcg+0x150/0x150
[ 564.131033] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
[ 564.131794] Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core snd_pcm snd_timer snd mac_hid i2c_piix4 soundcore ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx raid1 raid0 multipath linear 8139too crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul qxl drm_kms_helper syscopyarea aesni_intel sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm drm aes_x86_64 crypto_simd cryptd 8139cp glue_helper mii pata_acpi floppy
[ 564.141798] ---[ end trace 4ce02f25ff7d3df5 ]---
[ 564.142773] RIP: 0010:issue_discard_thread+0x248/0x5c0
[ 564.143885] Code: ff ff 48 8b bd e8 fe ff ff 41 8b 9d 4c 04 00 00 e8 cd b8 ad ff 41 8b 85 50 04 00 00 31 d2 48 8d 04 80 48 8d 04 80 48 c1 e0 02 <48> f7 f3 83 f8 50 7e 16 41 c7 86 7c ff ff ff 01 00 00 00 41 c7 86
[ 564.147776] RSP: 0018:ffff8801f3117dc0 EFLAGS: 00010206
[ 564.148856] RAX: 0000000000000384 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffffb88c1e03
[ 564.150424] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff8801e3aa4850
[ 564.151906] RBP: ffff8801f3117f00 R08: 1ffffffff751a1d0 R09: fffffbfff751a1d0
[ 564.153463] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: fffffbfff751a1d0 R12: 00000000fffffffc
[ 564.154915] R13: ffff8801e3aa4400 R14: ffff8801f3117ed8 R15: ffff8801e2050000
[ 564.156405] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8801f6f00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 564.158070] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 564.159279] CR2: 000000000202b078 CR3: 00000001f11ac000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 564.161043] ==================================================================
[ 564.162587] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in from_kuid_munged+0x1d/0x50
[ 564.163994] Read of size 4 at addr ffff8801f3117c84 by task f2fs_discard-7:/1298
[ 564.165852] CPU: 1 PID: 1298 Comm: f2fs_discard-7: Tainted: G D 4.18.0-rc1+ #4
[ 564.167593] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 564.169522] Call Trace:
[ 564.170057] dump_stack+0x7b/0xb5
[ 564.170778] print_address_description+0x70/0x290
[ 564.171765] kasan_report+0x291/0x390
[ 564.172540] ? from_kuid_munged+0x1d/0x50
[ 564.173408] __asan_load4+0x78/0x80
[ 564.174148] from_kuid_munged+0x1d/0x50
[ 564.174962] do_notify_parent+0x1f5/0x4f0
[ 564.175808] ? send_sigqueue+0x390/0x390
[ 564.176639] ? css_set_move_task+0x152/0x340
[ 564.184197] do_exit+0x1290/0x1390
[ 564.184950] ? __issue_discard_cmd+0x480/0x480
[ 564.185884] ? mm_update_next_owner+0x380/0x380
[ 564.186829] ? __sched_text_start+0x8/0x8
[ 564.187672] ? __kthread_parkme+0xcb/0x100
[ 564.188528] ? kthread_blkcg+0x70/0x70
[ 564.189333] ? kthread+0x180/0x1d0
[ 564.190052] ? __issue_discard_cmd+0x480/0x480
[ 564.190983] rewind_stack_do_exit+0x17/0x20
[ 564.192190] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 564.193213] page:ffffea0007cc45c0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0
[ 564.194856] flags: 0x2ffff0000000000()
[ 564.195644] raw: 02ffff0000000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000200 0000000000000000
[ 564.197247] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 564.198826] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 564.200299] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 564.201306] ffff8801f3117b80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 564.202779] ffff8801f3117c00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3
[ 564.204252] >ffff8801f3117c80: f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1
[ 564.205742] ^
[ 564.206424] ffff8801f3117d00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 564.207908] ffff8801f3117d80: f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 564.209389] ==================================================================
[ 564.231795] F2FS-fs (loop0): Mounted with checkpoint version = 2
- Location
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v4.18-rc1/source/fs/f2fs/segment.h#L586
return div_u64((u64)valid_user_blocks(sbi) * 100,
sbi->user_block_count);
Missing checks on sbi->user_block_count.
Reported-by: Wen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2018-12-05 19:41:15 +01:00
Chao Yu
0081c90eba
f2fs: fix to do sanity check with extra_attr feature
...
commit 76d56d4ab4f2a9e4f085c7d77172194ddaccf7d2 upstream.
If FI_EXTRA_ATTR is set in inode by fuzzing, inode.i_addr[0] will be
parsed as inode.i_extra_isize, then in __recover_inline_status, inline
data address will beyond boundary of page, result in accessing invalid
memory.
So in this condition, during reading inode page, let's do sanity check
with EXTRA_ATTR feature of fs and extra_attr bit of inode, if they're
inconsistent, deny to load this inode.
- Overview
Out-of-bound access in f2fs_iget() when mounting a corrupted f2fs image
- Reproduce
The following message will be got in KASAN build of 4.18 upstream kernel.
[ 819.392227] ==================================================================
[ 819.393901] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in f2fs_iget+0x736/0x1530
[ 819.395329] Read of size 4 at addr ffff8801f099c968 by task mount/1292
[ 819.397079] CPU: 1 PID: 1292 Comm: mount Not tainted 4.18.0-rc1+ #4
[ 819.397082] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 819.397088] Call Trace:
[ 819.397124] dump_stack+0x7b/0xb5
[ 819.397154] print_address_description+0x70/0x290
[ 819.397159] kasan_report+0x291/0x390
[ 819.397163] ? f2fs_iget+0x736/0x1530
[ 819.397176] check_memory_region+0x139/0x190
[ 819.397182] __asan_loadN+0xf/0x20
[ 819.397185] f2fs_iget+0x736/0x1530
[ 819.397197] f2fs_fill_super+0x1b4f/0x2b40
[ 819.397202] ? f2fs_fill_super+0x1b4f/0x2b40
[ 819.397208] ? f2fs_commit_super+0x1b0/0x1b0
[ 819.397227] ? set_blocksize+0x90/0x140
[ 819.397241] mount_bdev+0x1c5/0x210
[ 819.397245] ? f2fs_commit_super+0x1b0/0x1b0
[ 819.397252] f2fs_mount+0x15/0x20
[ 819.397256] mount_fs+0x60/0x1a0
[ 819.397267] ? alloc_vfsmnt+0x309/0x360
[ 819.397272] vfs_kern_mount+0x6b/0x1a0
[ 819.397282] do_mount+0x34a/0x18c0
[ 819.397300] ? lockref_put_or_lock+0xcf/0x160
[ 819.397306] ? copy_mount_string+0x20/0x20
[ 819.397318] ? memcg_kmem_put_cache+0x1b/0xa0
[ 819.397324] ? kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[ 819.397334] ? _copy_from_user+0x6a/0x90
[ 819.397353] ? memdup_user+0x42/0x60
[ 819.397359] ksys_mount+0x83/0xd0
[ 819.397365] __x64_sys_mount+0x67/0x80
[ 819.397388] do_syscall_64+0x78/0x170
[ 819.397403] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 819.397422] RIP: 0033:0x7f54c667cb9a
[ 819.397424] Code: 48 8b 0d 01 c3 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d ce c2 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 819.397483] RSP: 002b:00007ffd8f46cd08 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
[ 819.397496] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000dfa030 RCX: 00007f54c667cb9a
[ 819.397498] RDX: 0000000000dfa210 RSI: 0000000000dfbf30 RDI: 0000000000e02ec0
[ 819.397501] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000013
[ 819.397503] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000e02ec0
[ 819.397505] R13: 0000000000dfa210 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000003
[ 819.397866] Allocated by task 139:
[ 819.398702] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 819.398705] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
[ 819.398709] kasan_slab_alloc+0x11/0x20
[ 819.398713] kmem_cache_alloc+0xd1/0x1e0
[ 819.398717] dup_fd+0x50/0x4c0
[ 819.398740] copy_process.part.37+0xbed/0x32e0
[ 819.398744] _do_fork+0x16e/0x590
[ 819.398748] __x64_sys_clone+0x69/0x80
[ 819.398752] do_syscall_64+0x78/0x170
[ 819.398756] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 819.399097] Freed by task 159:
[ 819.399743] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 819.399747] __kasan_slab_free+0x13c/0x1a0
[ 819.399750] kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10
[ 819.399754] kmem_cache_free+0x89/0x1e0
[ 819.399757] put_files_struct+0x132/0x150
[ 819.399761] exit_files+0x62/0x70
[ 819.399766] do_exit+0x47b/0x1390
[ 819.399770] do_group_exit+0x86/0x130
[ 819.399774] __x64_sys_exit_group+0x2c/0x30
[ 819.399778] do_syscall_64+0x78/0x170
[ 819.399782] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 819.400115] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8801f099c680
which belongs to the cache files_cache of size 704
[ 819.403234] The buggy address is located 40 bytes to the right of
704-byte region [ffff8801f099c680, ffff8801f099c940)
[ 819.405689] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 819.406709] page:ffffea0007c26700 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8801f69a3340 index:0xffff8801f099d380 compound_mapcount: 0
[ 819.408984] flags: 0x2ffff0000008100(slab|head)
[ 819.409932] raw: 02ffff0000008100 ffffea00077fb600 0000000200000002 ffff8801f69a3340
[ 819.411514] raw: ffff8801f099d380 0000000080130000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 819.413073] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 819.414539] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 819.415521] ffff8801f099c800: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 819.416981] ffff8801f099c880: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 819.418454] >ffff8801f099c900: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 819.419921] ^
[ 819.421265] ffff8801f099c980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 819.422745] ffff8801f099ca00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 819.424206] ==================================================================
[ 819.425668] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
[ 819.457463] F2FS-fs (loop0): Mounted with checkpoint version = 3
The kernel still mounts the image. If you run the following program on the mounted folder mnt,
(poc.c)
static void activity(char *mpoint) {
char *foo_bar_baz;
int err;
static int buf[8192];
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
err = asprintf(&foo_bar_baz, "%s/foo/bar/baz", mpoint);
int fd = open(foo_bar_baz, O_RDONLY, 0);
if (fd >= 0) {
read(fd, (char *)buf, 11);
close(fd);
}
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
activity(argv[1]);
return 0;
}
You can get kernel crash:
[ 819.457463] F2FS-fs (loop0): Mounted with checkpoint version = 3
[ 918.028501] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffed0048000d82
[ 918.044020] PGD 23ffee067 P4D 23ffee067 PUD 23fbef067 PMD 0
[ 918.045207] Oops: 0000 [#1 ] SMP KASAN PTI
[ 918.046048] CPU: 0 PID: 1309 Comm: poc Tainted: G B 4.18.0-rc1+ #4
[ 918.047573] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 918.049552] RIP: 0010:check_memory_region+0x5e/0x190
[ 918.050565] Code: f8 49 c1 e8 03 49 89 db 49 c1 eb 03 4d 01 cb 4d 01 c1 4d 8d 63 01 4c 89 c8 4d 89 e2 4d 29 ca 49 83 fa 10 7f 3d 4d 85 d2 74 32 <41> 80 39 00 75 23 48 b8 01 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4d 01 d1 49 01 c0
[ 918.054322] RSP: 0018:ffff8801e3a1f258 EFLAGS: 00010202
[ 918.055400] RAX: ffffed0048000d82 RBX: ffff880240006c11 RCX: ffffffffb8867d14
[ 918.056832] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: ffff880240006c10
[ 918.058253] RBP: ffff8801e3a1f268 R08: 1ffff10048000d82 R09: ffffed0048000d82
[ 918.059717] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed0048000d82 R12: ffffed0048000d83
[ 918.061159] R13: ffff8801e3a1f390 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff880240006c08
[ 918.062614] FS: 00007fac9732c700(0000) GS:ffff8801f6e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 918.064246] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 918.065412] CR2: ffffed0048000d82 CR3: 00000001df77a000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[ 918.066882] Call Trace:
[ 918.067410] __asan_loadN+0xf/0x20
[ 918.068149] f2fs_find_target_dentry+0xf4/0x270
[ 918.069083] ? __get_node_page+0x331/0x5b0
[ 918.069925] f2fs_find_in_inline_dir+0x24b/0x310
[ 918.070881] ? f2fs_recover_inline_data+0x4c0/0x4c0
[ 918.071905] ? unwind_next_frame.part.5+0x34f/0x490
[ 918.072901] ? unwind_dump+0x290/0x290
[ 918.073695] ? is_bpf_text_address+0xe/0x20
[ 918.074566] __f2fs_find_entry+0x599/0x670
[ 918.075408] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50
[ 918.076315] ? kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
[ 918.077100] ? memcg_kmem_put_cache+0x55/0xa0
[ 918.077998] ? f2fs_find_target_dentry+0x270/0x270
[ 918.079006] ? d_set_d_op+0x30/0x100
[ 918.079749] ? __d_lookup_rcu+0x69/0x2e0
[ 918.080556] ? __d_alloc+0x275/0x450
[ 918.081297] ? kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[ 918.082135] ? memset+0x31/0x40
[ 918.082820] ? fscrypt_setup_filename+0x1ec/0x4c0
[ 918.083782] ? d_alloc_parallel+0x5bb/0x8c0
[ 918.084640] f2fs_find_entry+0xe9/0x110
[ 918.085432] ? __f2fs_find_entry+0x670/0x670
[ 918.086308] ? kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[ 918.087163] f2fs_lookup+0x297/0x590
[ 918.087902] ? f2fs_link+0x2b0/0x2b0
[ 918.088646] ? legitimize_path.isra.29+0x61/0xa0
[ 918.089589] __lookup_slow+0x12e/0x240
[ 918.090371] ? may_delete+0x2b0/0x2b0
[ 918.091123] ? __nd_alloc_stack+0xa0/0xa0
[ 918.091944] lookup_slow+0x44/0x60
[ 918.092642] walk_component+0x3ee/0xa40
[ 918.093428] ? is_bpf_text_address+0xe/0x20
[ 918.094283] ? pick_link+0x3e0/0x3e0
[ 918.095047] ? in_group_p+0xa5/0xe0
[ 918.095771] ? generic_permission+0x53/0x1e0
[ 918.096666] ? security_inode_permission+0x1d/0x70
[ 918.097646] ? inode_permission+0x7a/0x1f0
[ 918.098497] link_path_walk+0x2a2/0x7b0
[ 918.099298] ? apparmor_capget+0x3d0/0x3d0
[ 918.100140] ? walk_component+0xa40/0xa40
[ 918.100958] ? path_init+0x2e6/0x580
[ 918.101695] path_openat+0x1bb/0x2160
[ 918.102471] ? __save_stack_trace+0x92/0x100
[ 918.103352] ? save_stack+0xb5/0xd0
[ 918.104070] ? vfs_unlink+0x250/0x250
[ 918.104822] ? save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 918.105538] ? kasan_slab_alloc+0x11/0x20
[ 918.106370] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0xd1/0x1e0
[ 918.107213] ? getname_flags+0x76/0x2c0
[ 918.107997] ? getname+0x12/0x20
[ 918.108677] ? do_sys_open+0x14b/0x2c0
[ 918.109450] ? __x64_sys_open+0x4c/0x60
[ 918.110255] ? do_syscall_64+0x78/0x170
[ 918.111083] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 918.112148] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 918.113204] ? f2fs_empty_inline_dir+0x1e0/0x1e0
[ 918.114150] ? timespec64_trunc+0x5c/0x90
[ 918.114993] ? wb_io_lists_depopulated+0x1a/0xc0
[ 918.115937] ? inode_io_list_move_locked+0x102/0x110
[ 918.116949] do_filp_open+0x12b/0x1d0
[ 918.117709] ? may_open_dev+0x50/0x50
[ 918.118475] ? kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
[ 918.119246] do_sys_open+0x17c/0x2c0
[ 918.119983] ? do_sys_open+0x17c/0x2c0
[ 918.120751] ? filp_open+0x60/0x60
[ 918.121463] ? task_work_run+0x4d/0xf0
[ 918.122237] __x64_sys_open+0x4c/0x60
[ 918.123001] do_syscall_64+0x78/0x170
[ 918.123759] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 918.124802] RIP: 0033:0x7fac96e3e040
[ 918.125537] Code: 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 83 3d 09 27 2d 00 00 75 10 b8 02 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 7e e0 01 00 48 89 04 24
[ 918.129341] RSP: 002b:00007fff1b37f848 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000002
[ 918.130870] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fac96e3e040
[ 918.132295] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 000000000122d080
[ 918.133748] RBP: 00007fff1b37f9b0 R08: 00007fac9710bbd8 R09: 0000000000000001
[ 918.135209] R10: 000000000000069d R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400c20
[ 918.136650] R13: 00007fff1b37fab0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 918.138093] Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core snd_pcm snd_timer snd mac_hid i2c_piix4 soundcore ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx raid1 raid0 multipath linear 8139too crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul qxl drm_kms_helper syscopyarea aesni_intel sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm drm aes_x86_64 crypto_simd cryptd 8139cp glue_helper mii pata_acpi floppy
[ 918.147924] CR2: ffffed0048000d82
[ 918.148619] ---[ end trace 4ce02f25ff7d3df5 ]---
[ 918.149563] RIP: 0010:check_memory_region+0x5e/0x190
[ 918.150576] Code: f8 49 c1 e8 03 49 89 db 49 c1 eb 03 4d 01 cb 4d 01 c1 4d 8d 63 01 4c 89 c8 4d 89 e2 4d 29 ca 49 83 fa 10 7f 3d 4d 85 d2 74 32 <41> 80 39 00 75 23 48 b8 01 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4d 01 d1 49 01 c0
[ 918.154360] RSP: 0018:ffff8801e3a1f258 EFLAGS: 00010202
[ 918.155411] RAX: ffffed0048000d82 RBX: ffff880240006c11 RCX: ffffffffb8867d14
[ 918.156833] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: ffff880240006c10
[ 918.158257] RBP: ffff8801e3a1f268 R08: 1ffff10048000d82 R09: ffffed0048000d82
[ 918.159722] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed0048000d82 R12: ffffed0048000d83
[ 918.161149] R13: ffff8801e3a1f390 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff880240006c08
[ 918.162587] FS: 00007fac9732c700(0000) GS:ffff8801f6e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 918.164203] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 918.165356] CR2: ffffed0048000d82 CR3: 00000001df77a000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Reported-by: Wen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 4.14: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2018-12-05 19:41:15 +01:00
Ben Hutchings
2598fc56ed
f2fs: Add sanity_check_inode() function
...
This was done as part of commit 5d64600d4f33 "f2fs: avoid bug_on on
corrupted inode" upstream, but the specific check that commit added is
not applicable to 4.14.
Cc: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Cc: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2018-12-05 19:41:15 +01:00
Chao Yu
f3d6361a96
f2fs: fix to do sanity check with secs_per_zone
...
commit 42bf546c1fe3f3654bdf914e977acbc2b80a5be5 upstream.
As Wen Xu reported in below link:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200183
- Overview
Divide zero in reset_curseg() when mounting a crafted f2fs image
- Reproduce
- Kernel message
[ 588.281510] divide error: 0000 [#1 ] SMP KASAN PTI
[ 588.282701] CPU: 0 PID: 1293 Comm: mount Not tainted 4.18.0-rc1+ #4
[ 588.284000] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 588.286178] RIP: 0010:reset_curseg+0x94/0x1a0
[ 588.298166] RSP: 0018:ffff8801e88d7940 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 588.299360] RAX: 0000000000000014 RBX: ffff8801e1d46d00 RCX: ffffffffb88bf60b
[ 588.300809] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff8801e1d46d64
[ 588.305272] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000014 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 588.306822] FS: 00007fad85008840(0000) GS:ffff8801f6e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 588.308456] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 588.309623] CR2: 0000000001705078 CR3: 00000001f30f8000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[ 588.311085] Call Trace:
[ 588.311637] f2fs_build_segment_manager+0x103f/0x3410
[ 588.316136] ? f2fs_commit_super+0x1b0/0x1b0
[ 588.317031] ? set_blocksize+0x90/0x140
[ 588.319473] f2fs_mount+0x15/0x20
[ 588.320166] mount_fs+0x60/0x1a0
[ 588.320847] ? alloc_vfsmnt+0x309/0x360
[ 588.321647] vfs_kern_mount+0x6b/0x1a0
[ 588.322432] do_mount+0x34a/0x18c0
[ 588.323175] ? strndup_user+0x46/0x70
[ 588.323937] ? copy_mount_string+0x20/0x20
[ 588.324793] ? memcg_kmem_put_cache+0x1b/0xa0
[ 588.325702] ? kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[ 588.326562] ? _copy_from_user+0x6a/0x90
[ 588.327375] ? memdup_user+0x42/0x60
[ 588.328118] ksys_mount+0x83/0xd0
[ 588.328808] __x64_sys_mount+0x67/0x80
[ 588.329607] do_syscall_64+0x78/0x170
[ 588.330400] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 588.331461] RIP: 0033:0x7fad848e8b9a
[ 588.336022] RSP: 002b:00007ffd7c5b6be8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
[ 588.337547] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000016f8030 RCX: 00007fad848e8b9a
[ 588.338999] RDX: 00000000016f8210 RSI: 00000000016f9f30 RDI: 0000000001700ec0
[ 588.340442] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000013
[ 588.341887] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000001700ec0
[ 588.343341] R13: 00000000016f8210 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000003
[ 588.354891] ---[ end trace 4ce02f25ff7d3df5 ]---
[ 588.355862] RIP: 0010:reset_curseg+0x94/0x1a0
[ 588.360742] RSP: 0018:ffff8801e88d7940 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 588.361812] RAX: 0000000000000014 RBX: ffff8801e1d46d00 RCX: ffffffffb88bf60b
[ 588.363485] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff8801e1d46d64
[ 588.365213] RBP: ffff8801e88d7968 R08: ffffed003c32266f R09: ffffed003c32266f
[ 588.366661] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed003c32266e R12: ffff8801f0337700
[ 588.368110] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000014 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 588.370057] FS: 00007fad85008840(0000) GS:ffff8801f6e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 588.372099] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 588.373291] CR2: 0000000001705078 CR3: 00000001f30f8000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
- Location
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/latest/source/fs/f2fs/segment.c#L2147
curseg->zone = GET_ZONE_FROM_SEG(sbi, curseg->segno);
If secs_per_zone is corrupted due to fuzzing test, it will cause divide
zero operation when using GET_ZONE_FROM_SEG macro, so we should do more
sanity check with secs_per_zone during mount to avoid this issue.
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2018-12-05 19:41:15 +01:00
Chao Yu
eea7157046
f2fs: introduce and spread verify_blkaddr
...
commit e1da7872f6eda977bd812346bf588c35e4495a1e upstream.
This patch introduces verify_blkaddr to check meta/data block address
with valid range to detect bug earlier.
In addition, once we encounter an invalid blkaddr, notice user to run
fsck to fix, and let the kernel panic.
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 4.14: I skipped an earlier renaming of
is_valid_meta_blkaddr() to f2fs_is_valid_meta_blkaddr()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2018-12-05 19:41:15 +01:00
Chao Yu
9e6c4a8557
f2fs: clean up with is_valid_blkaddr()
...
commit 7b525dd01365c6764018e374d391c92466be1b7a upstream.
- rename is_valid_blkaddr() to is_valid_meta_blkaddr() for readability.
- introduce is_valid_blkaddr() for cleanup.
No logic change in this patch.
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2018-12-05 19:41:15 +01:00
Jaegeuk Kim
e60b972319
f2fs: enhance sanity_check_raw_super() to avoid potential overflow
...
commit 0cfe75c5b011994651a4ca6d74f20aa997bfc69a upstream.
In order to avoid the below overflow issue, we should have checked the
boundaries in superblock before reaching out to allocation. As Linus suggested,
the right place should be sanity_check_raw_super().
Dr Silvio Cesare of InfoSect reported:
There are integer overflows with using the cp_payload superblock field in the
f2fs filesystem potentially leading to memory corruption.
include/linux/f2fs_fs.h
struct f2fs_super_block {
...
__le32 cp_payload;
fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
typedef u32 block_t; /*
* should not change u32, since it is the on-disk block
* address format, __le32.
*/
...
static inline block_t __cp_payload(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
{
return le32_to_cpu(F2FS_RAW_SUPER(sbi)->cp_payload);
}
fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c
block_t start_blk, orphan_blocks, i, j;
...
start_blk = __start_cp_addr(sbi) + 1 + __cp_payload(sbi);
orphan_blocks = __start_sum_addr(sbi) - 1 - __cp_payload(sbi);
+++ integer overflows
...
unsigned int cp_blks = 1 + __cp_payload(sbi);
...
sbi->ckpt = kzalloc(cp_blks * blk_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+++ integer overflow leading to incorrect heap allocation.
int cp_payload_blks = __cp_payload(sbi);
...
ckpt->cp_pack_start_sum = cpu_to_le32(1 + cp_payload_blks +
orphan_blocks);
+++ sign bug and integer overflow
...
for (i = 1; i < 1 + cp_payload_blks; i++)
+++ integer overflow
...
sbi->max_orphans = (sbi->blocks_per_seg - F2FS_CP_PACKS -
NR_CURSEG_TYPE - __cp_payload(sbi)) *
F2FS_ORPHANS_PER_BLOCK;
+++ integer overflow
Reported-by: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Reported-by: Silvio Cesare <silvio.cesare@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 4.14: No hot file extension support]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2018-12-05 19:41:15 +01:00
Jaegeuk Kim
a8f40be69f
f2fs: sanity check on sit entry
...
commit b2ca374f33bd33fd822eb871876e4888cf79dc97 upstream.
syzbot hit the following crash on upstream commit
87ef12027b9b1dd0e0b12cf311fbcb19f9d92539 (Wed Apr 18 19:48:17 2018 +0000)
Merge tag 'ceph-for-4.17-rc2' of git://github.com/ceph/ceph-client
syzbot dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=83699adeb2d13579c31e
C reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?id=5805208181407744
syzkaller reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?id=6005073343676416
Raw console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?id=6555047731134464
Kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?id=1808800213120130118
compiler: gcc (GCC) 8.0.1 20180413 (experimental)
IMPORTANT: if you fix the bug, please add the following tag to the commit:
Reported-by: syzbot+83699adeb2d13579c31e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
It will help syzbot understand when the bug is fixed. See footer for details.
If you forward the report, please keep this part and the footer.
F2FS-fs (loop0): Magic Mismatch, valid(0xf2f52010) - read(0x0)
F2FS-fs (loop0): Can't find valid F2FS filesystem in 1th superblock
F2FS-fs (loop0): invalid crc value
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffed006b2a50c0
PGD 21ffee067 P4D 21ffee067 PUD 21fbeb067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1 ] SMP KASAN
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 4514 Comm: syzkaller989480 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc1+ #8
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:build_sit_entries fs/f2fs/segment.c:3653 [inline]
RIP: 0010:build_segment_manager+0x7ef7/0xbf70 fs/f2fs/segment.c:3852
RSP: 0018:ffff8801b102e5b0 EFLAGS: 00010a06
RAX: 1ffff1006b2a50c0 RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8801ac74243e
RBP: ffff8801b102f410 R08: ffff8801acbd46c0 R09: fffffbfff14d9af8
R10: fffffbfff14d9af8 R11: ffff8801acbd46c0 R12: ffff8801ac742a80
R13: ffff8801d9519100 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff880359528600
FS: 0000000001e04880(0000) GS:ffff8801dae00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffed006b2a50c0 CR3: 00000001ac6ac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
f2fs_fill_super+0x4095/0x7bf0 fs/f2fs/super.c:2803
mount_bdev+0x30c/0x3e0 fs/super.c:1165
f2fs_mount+0x34/0x40 fs/f2fs/super.c:3020
mount_fs+0xae/0x328 fs/super.c:1268
vfs_kern_mount.part.34+0xd4/0x4d0 fs/namespace.c:1037
vfs_kern_mount fs/namespace.c:1027 [inline]
do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2517 [inline]
do_mount+0x564/0x3070 fs/namespace.c:2847
ksys_mount+0x12d/0x140 fs/namespace.c:3063
__do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3077 [inline]
__se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3074 [inline]
__x64_sys_mount+0xbe/0x150 fs/namespace.c:3074
do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x443d6a
RSP: 002b:00007ffd312813c8 EFLAGS: 00000297 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020000c00 RCX: 0000000000443d6a
RDX: 0000000020000000 RSI: 0000000020000100 RDI: 00007ffd312813d0
RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000020016a00 R09: 000000000000000a
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000297 R12: 0000000000000004
R13: 0000000000402c60 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
RIP: build_sit_entries fs/f2fs/segment.c:3653 [inline] RSP: ffff8801b102e5b0
RIP: build_segment_manager+0x7ef7/0xbf70 fs/f2fs/segment.c:3852 RSP: ffff8801b102e5b0
CR2: ffffed006b2a50c0
---[ end trace a2034989e196ff17 ]---
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+83699adeb2d13579c31e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2018-12-05 19:41:15 +01:00
Yunlei He
aec6ccb3dc
f2fs: check blkaddr more accuratly before issue a bio
...
commit 0833721ec3658a4e9d5e58b6fa82cf9edc431e59 upstream.
This patch check blkaddr more accuratly before issue a
write or read bio.
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2018-12-05 19:41:14 +01:00
Shaokun Zhang
4b356df11b
btrfs: tree-checker: Fix misleading group system information
...
commit 761333f2f50ccc887aa9957ae829300262c0d15b upstream.
block_group_err shows the group system as a decimal value with a '0x'
prefix, which is somewhat misleading.
Fix it to print hexadecimal, as was intended.
Fixes: fce466eab7ac6 ("btrfs: tree-checker: Verify block_group_item")
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Shaokun Zhang <zhangshaokun@hisilicon.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2018-12-05 19:41:13 +01:00
Qu Wenruo
cf968bbccb
btrfs: tree-checker: Check level for leaves and nodes
...
commit f556faa46eb4e96d0d0772e74ecf66781e132f72 upstream.
Although we have tree level check at tree read runtime, it's completely
based on its parent level.
We still need to do accurate level check to avoid invalid tree blocks
sneak into kernel space.
The check itself is simple, for leaf its level should always be 0.
For nodes its level should be in range [1, BTRFS_MAX_LEVEL - 1].
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Su Yue <suy.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[bwh: Backported to 4.14:
- Pass root instead of fs_info to generic_err()
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2018-12-05 19:41:13 +01:00
Qu Wenruo
34407a175a
btrfs: Check that each block group has corresponding chunk at mount time
...
commit 514c7dca85a0bf40be984dab0b477403a6db901f upstream.
A crafted btrfs image with incorrect chunk<->block group mapping will
trigger a lot of unexpected things as the mapping is essential.
Although the problem can be caught by block group item checker
added in "btrfs: tree-checker: Verify block_group_item", it's still not
sufficient. A sufficiently valid block group item can pass the check
added by the mentioned patch but could fail to match the existing chunk.
This patch will add extra block group -> chunk mapping check, to ensure
we have a completely matching (start, len, flags) chunk for each block
group at mount time.
Here we reuse the original helper find_first_block_group(), which is
already doing the basic bg -> chunk checks, adding further checks of the
start/len and type flags.
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199837
Reported-by: Xu Wen <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Su Yue <suy.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2018-12-05 19:41:12 +01:00
Qu Wenruo
c0dfb99847
btrfs: tree-checker: Detect invalid and empty essential trees
...
commit ba480dd4db9f1798541eb2d1c423fc95feee8d36 upstream.
A crafted image has empty root tree block, which will later cause NULL
pointer dereference.
The following trees should never be empty:
1) Tree root
Must contain at least root items for extent tree, device tree and fs
tree
2) Chunk tree
Or we can't even bootstrap as it contains the mapping.
3) Fs tree
At least inode item for top level inode (.).
4) Device tree
Dev extents for chunks
5) Extent tree
Must have corresponding extent for each chunk.
If any of them is empty, we are sure the fs is corrupted and no need to
mount it.
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199847
Reported-by: Xu Wen <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Tested-by: Gu Jinxiang <gujx@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[bwh: Backported to 4.14: Pass root instead of fs_info to generic_err()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2018-12-05 19:41:12 +01:00
Qu Wenruo
9f268b5cf2
btrfs: tree-checker: Verify block_group_item
...
commit fce466eab7ac6baa9d2dcd88abcf945be3d4a089 upstream.
A crafted image with invalid block group items could make free space cache
code to cause panic.
We could detect such invalid block group item by checking:
1) Item size
Known fixed value.
2) Block group size (key.offset)
We have an upper limit on block group item (10G)
3) Chunk objectid
Known fixed value.
4) Type
Only 4 valid type values, DATA, METADATA, SYSTEM and DATA|METADATA.
No more than 1 bit set for profile type.
5) Used space
No more than the block group size.
This should allow btrfs to detect and refuse to mount the crafted image.
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199849
Reported-by: Xu Wen <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Gu Jinxiang <gujx@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Tested-by: Gu Jinxiang <gujx@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[bwh: Backported to 4.14:
- In check_leaf_item(), pass root->fs_info to check_block_group_item()
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2018-12-05 19:41:12 +01:00
David Sterba
e07e1c7561
btrfs: tree-check: reduce stack consumption in check_dir_item
...
commit e2683fc9d219430f5b78889b50cde7f40efeba7b upstream.
I've noticed that the updated item checker stack consumption increased
dramatically in 542f5385e20cf97447 ("btrfs: tree-checker: Add checker
for dir item")
tree-checker.c:check_leaf +552 (176 -> 728)
The array is 255 bytes long, dynamic allocation would slow down the
sanity checks so it's more reasonable to keep it on-stack. Moving the
variable to the scope of use reduces the stack usage again
tree-checker.c:check_leaf -264 (728 -> 464)
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2018-12-05 19:41:12 +01:00
Arnd Bergmann
52ea16655a
btrfs: tree-checker: use %zu format string for size_t
...
commit 7cfad65297bfe0aa2996cd72d21c898aa84436d9 upstream.
The return value of sizeof() is of type size_t, so we must print it
using the %z format modifier rather than %l to avoid this warning
on some architectures:
fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c: In function 'check_dir_item':
fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c:273:50: error: format '%lu' expects argument of type 'long unsigned int', but argument 5 has type 'u32' {aka 'unsigned int'} [-Werror=format=]
Fixes: 005887f2e3e0 ("btrfs: tree-checker: Add checker for dir item")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2018-12-05 19:41:12 +01:00
Qu Wenruo
fe09fe216e
btrfs: tree-checker: Add checker for dir item
...
commit ad7b0368f33cffe67fecd302028915926e50ef7e upstream.
Add checker for dir item, for key types DIR_ITEM, DIR_INDEX and
XATTR_ITEM.
This checker does comprehensive checks for:
1) dir_item header and its data size
Against item boundary and maximum name/xattr length.
This part is mostly the same as old verify_dir_item().
2) dir_type
Against maximum file types, and against key type.
Since XATTR key should only have FT_XATTR dir item, and normal dir
item type should not have XATTR key.
The check between key->type and dir_type is newly introduced by this
patch.
3) name hash
For XATTR and DIR_ITEM key, key->offset is name hash (crc32c).
Check the hash of the name against the key to ensure it's correct.
The name hash check is only found in btrfs-progs before this patch.
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Su Yue <suy.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2018-12-05 19:41:12 +01:00
Qu Wenruo
b6a07f9035
btrfs: tree-checker: Fix false panic for sanity test
...
commit 69fc6cbbac542c349b3d350d10f6e394c253c81d upstream.
[BUG]
If we run btrfs with CONFIG_BTRFS_FS_RUN_SANITY_TESTS=y, it will
instantly cause kernel panic like:
------
...
assertion failed: 0, file: fs/btrfs/disk-io.c, line: 3853
...
Call Trace:
btrfs_mark_buffer_dirty+0x187/0x1f0 [btrfs]
setup_items_for_insert+0x385/0x650 [btrfs]
__btrfs_drop_extents+0x129a/0x1870 [btrfs]
...
-----
[Cause]
Btrfs will call btrfs_check_leaf() in btrfs_mark_buffer_dirty() to check
if the leaf is valid with CONFIG_BTRFS_FS_RUN_SANITY_TESTS=y.
However quite some btrfs_mark_buffer_dirty() callers(*) don't really
initialize its item data but only initialize its item pointers, leaving
item data uninitialized.
This makes tree-checker catch uninitialized data as error, causing
such panic.
*: These callers include but not limited to
setup_items_for_insert()
btrfs_split_item()
btrfs_expand_item()
[Fix]
Add a new parameter @check_item_data to btrfs_check_leaf().
With @check_item_data set to false, item data check will be skipped and
fallback to old btrfs_check_leaf() behavior.
So we can still get early warning if we screw up item pointers, and
avoid false panic.
Cc: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Lakshmipathi.G <lakshmipathi.g@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Liu Bo <bo.li.liu@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2018-12-05 19:41:12 +01:00
Qu Wenruo
b3032dc25f
btrfs: tree-checker: Enhance btrfs_check_node output
...
commit bba4f29896c986c4cec17bc0f19f2ce644fceae1 upstream.
Use inline function to replace macro since we don't need
stringification.
(Macro still exists until all callers get updated)
And add more info about the error, and replace EIO with EUCLEAN.
For nr_items error, report if it's too large or too small, and output
the valid value range.
For node block pointer, added a new alignment checker.
For key order, also output the next key to make the problem more
obvious.
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <quwenruo.btrfs@gmx.com>
[ wording adjustments, unindented long strings ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2018-12-05 19:41:12 +01:00
Qu Wenruo
eb3493e247
btrfs: Move leaf and node validation checker to tree-checker.c
...
commit 557ea5dd003d371536f6b4e8f7c8209a2b6fd4e3 upstream.
It's no doubt the comprehensive tree block checker will become larger,
so moving them into their own files is quite reasonable.
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <quwenruo.btrfs@gmx.com>
[ wording adjustments ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2018-12-05 19:41:12 +01:00
Qu Wenruo
64948fd63f
btrfs: Add checker for EXTENT_CSUM
...
commit 4b865cab96fe2a30ed512cf667b354bd291b3b0a upstream.
EXTENT_CSUM checker is a relatively easy one, only needs to check:
1) Objectid
Fixed to BTRFS_EXTENT_CSUM_OBJECTID
2) Key offset alignment
Must be aligned to sectorsize
3) Item size alignedment
Must be aligned to csum size
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <quwenruo.btrfs@gmx.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2018-12-05 19:41:11 +01:00
Qu Wenruo
fa5d29e6d7
btrfs: Add sanity check for EXTENT_DATA when reading out leaf
...
commit 40c3c40947324d9f40bf47830c92c59a9bbadf4a upstream.
Add extra checks for item with EXTENT_DATA type. This checks the
following thing:
0) Key offset
All key offsets must be aligned to sectorsize.
Inline extent must have 0 for key offset.
1) Item size
Uncompressed inline file extent size must match item size.
(Compressed inline file extent has no information about its on-disk size.)
Regular/preallocated file extent size must be a fixed value.
2) Every member of regular file extent item
Including alignment for bytenr and offset, possible value for
compression/encryption/type.
3) Type/compression/encode must be one of the valid values.
This should be the most comprehensive and strict check in the context
of btrfs_item for EXTENT_DATA.
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <quwenruo.btrfs@gmx.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[ switch to BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_TYPES, similar to what
BTRFS_COMPRESS_TYPES does ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2018-12-05 19:41:11 +01:00
Qu Wenruo
ac6ea50bb6
btrfs: Check if item pointer overlaps with the item itself
...
commit 7f43d4affb2a254d421ab20b0cf65ac2569909fb upstream.
Function check_leaf() checks if any item pointer points outside of the
leaf, but it doesn't check if the pointer overlaps with the item itself.
Normally only the last item may be the victim, but adding such check is
never a bad idea anyway.
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <quwenruo.btrfs@gmx.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2018-12-05 19:41:11 +01:00
Qu Wenruo
a5cc85fe13
btrfs: Refactor check_leaf function for later expansion
...
commit c3267bbaa9cae09b62960eafe33ad19196803285 upstream.
Current check_leaf() function does a good job checking key order and
item offset/size.
However it only checks from slot 0 to the last but one slot, this is
good but makes later expansion hard.
So this refactoring iterates from slot 0 to the last slot.
For key comparison, it uses a key with all 0 as initial key, so all
valid keys should be larger than that.
And for item size/offset checks, it compares current item end with
previous item offset.
For slot 0, use leaf end as a special case.
This makes later item/key offset checks and item size checks easier to
be implemented.
Also, makes check_leaf() to return -EUCLEAN other than -EIO to indicate
error.
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <quwenruo.btrfs@gmx.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2018-12-05 19:41:11 +01:00
Qu Wenruo
895586ecb7
btrfs: Verify that every chunk has corresponding block group at mount time
...
commit 7ef49515fa6727cb4b6f2f5b0ffbc5fc20a9f8c6 upstream.
If a crafted image has missing block group items, it could cause
unexpected behavior and breaks the assumption of 1:1 chunk<->block group
mapping.
Although we have the block group -> chunk mapping check, we still need
chunk -> block group mapping check.
This patch will do extra check to ensure each chunk has its
corresponding block group.
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199847
Reported-by: Xu Wen <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Gu Jinxiang <gujx@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2018-12-05 19:41:11 +01:00
Gu Jinxiang
f7eef132cc
btrfs: validate type when reading a chunk
...
commit 315409b0098fb2651d86553f0436b70502b29bb2 upstream.
Reported in https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199839 , with an
image that has an invalid chunk type but does not return an error.
Add chunk type check in btrfs_check_chunk_valid, to detect the wrong
type combinations.
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199839
Reported-by: Xu Wen <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Gu Jinxiang <gujx@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2018-12-05 19:41:11 +01:00
Lior David
107b02c81a
wil6210: missing length check in wmi_set_ie
...
commit b5a8ffcae4103a9d823ea3aa3a761f65779fbe2a upstream.
Add a length check in wmi_set_ie to detect unsigned integer
overflow.
Signed-off-by: Lior David <qca_liord@qca.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Maya Erez <qca_merez@qca.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@qca.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2018-12-05 19:41:11 +01:00
Vakul Garg
39d9e1c62e
net/tls: Fixed return value when tls_complete_pending_work() fails
...
commit 150085791afb8054e11d2e080d4b9cd755dd7f69 upstream.
In tls_sw_sendmsg() and tls_sw_sendpage(), the variable 'ret' has
been set to return value of tls_complete_pending_work(). This allows
return of proper error code if tls_complete_pending_work() fails.
Fixes: 3c4d7559159b ("tls: kernel TLS support")
Signed-off-by: Vakul Garg <vakul.garg@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[bwh: Backported to 4.14: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2018-12-05 19:41:11 +01:00
Boris Pismenny
2a0f5919e1
tls: Use correct sk->sk_prot for IPV6
...
commit c113187d38ff85dc302a1bb55864b203ebb2ba10 upstream.
The tls ulp overrides sk->prot with a new tls specific proto structs.
The tls specific structs were previously based on the ipv4 specific
tcp_prot sturct.
As a result, attaching the tls ulp to an ipv6 tcp socket replaced
some ipv6 callback with the ipv4 equivalents.
This patch adds ipv6 tls proto structs and uses them when
attached to ipv6 sockets.
Fixes: 3c4d7559159b ('tls: kernel TLS support')
Signed-off-by: Boris Pismenny <borisp@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Lesokhin <ilyal@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2018-12-05 19:41:11 +01:00
Ilya Lesokhin
2b8b2e7622
tls: don't override sk_write_space if tls_set_sw_offload fails.
...
commit ee181e5201e640a4b92b217e9eab2531dab57d2c upstream.
If we fail to enable tls in the kernel we shouldn't override
the sk_write_space callback
Fixes: 3c4d7559159b ('tls: kernel TLS support')
Signed-off-by: Ilya Lesokhin <ilyal@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2018-12-05 19:41:10 +01:00
Ilya Lesokhin
93f16446c8
tls: Avoid copying crypto_info again after cipher_type check.
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commit 196c31b4b54474b31dee3c30352c45c2a93e9226 upstream.
Avoid copying crypto_info again after cipher_type check
to avoid a TOCTOU exploits.
The temporary array on the stack is removed as we don't really need it
Fixes: 3c4d7559159b ('tls: kernel TLS support')
Signed-off-by: Ilya Lesokhin <ilyal@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[bwh: Backported to 4.14: Preserve changes made by earlier backports of
"tls: return -EBUSY if crypto_info is already set" and "tls: zero the
crypto information from tls_context before freeing"]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2018-12-05 19:41:10 +01:00
Ilya Lesokhin
797b8bb47f
tls: Fix TLS ulp context leak, when TLS_TX setsockopt is not used.
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commit ff45d820a2df163957ad8ab459b6eb6976144c18 upstream.
Previously the TLS ulp context would leak if we attached a TLS ulp
to a socket but did not use the TLS_TX setsockopt,
or did use it but it failed.
This patch solves the issue by overriding prot[TLS_BASE_TX].close
and fixing tls_sk_proto_close to work properly
when its called with ctx->tx_conf == TLS_BASE_TX.
This patch also removes ctx->free_resources as we can use ctx->tx_conf
to obtain the relevant information.
Fixes: 3c4d7559159b ('tls: kernel TLS support')
Signed-off-by: Ilya Lesokhin <ilyal@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[bwh: Backported to 4.14: Keep using tls_ctx_free() as introduced by
the earlier backport of "tls: zero the crypto information from
tls_context before freeing"]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2018-12-05 19:41:10 +01:00
Ilya Lesokhin
25f03991a5
tls: Add function to update the TLS socket configuration
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commit 6d88207fcfddc002afe3e2e4a455e5201089d5d9 upstream.
The tx configuration is now stored in ctx->tx_conf.
And sk->sk_prot is updated trough a function
This will simplify things when we add rx
and support for different possible
tx and rx cross configurations.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Lesokhin <ilyal@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2018-12-05 19:41:10 +01:00
Alexei Starovoitov
83b570c004
bpf: Prevent memory disambiguation attack
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commit af86ca4e3088fe5eacf2f7e58c01fa68ca067672 upstream.
Detect code patterns where malicious 'speculative store bypass' can be used
and sanitize such patterns.
39: (bf) r3 = r10
40: (07) r3 += -216
41: (79) r8 = *(u64 *)(r7 +0) // slow read
42: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -72) = 0 // verifier inserts this instruction
43: (7b) *(u64 *)(r8 +0) = r3 // this store becomes slow due to r8
44: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r6 +0) // cpu speculatively executes this load
45: (71) r2 = *(u8 *)(r1 +0) // speculatively arbitrary 'load byte'
// is now sanitized
Above code after x86 JIT becomes:
e5: mov %rbp,%rdx
e8: add $0xffffffffffffff28,%rdx
ef: mov 0x0(%r13),%r14
f3: movq $0x0,-0x48(%rbp)
fb: mov %rdx,0x0(%r14)
ff: mov 0x0(%rbx),%rdi
103: movzbq 0x0(%rdi),%rsi
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
[bwh: Backported to 4.14:
- Add bpf_verifier_env parameter to check_stack_write()
- Look up stack slot_types with state->stack_slot_type[] rather than
state->stack[].slot_type[]
- Drop bpf_verifier_env argument to verbose()
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2018-12-05 19:41:10 +01:00
Peter Zijlstra
Bernd Eckstein
Julian Wiedmann
Pan Bian
Willem de Bruijn
Lorenzo Bianconi
Jason Wang
Petr Machata
Sasha Levin
Darrick J. Wong
Chao Yu
Ben Hutchings
Jaegeuk Kim
Yunlei He
Shaokun Zhang
Qu Wenruo
David Sterba
Arnd Bergmann
Qu Wenruo
Gu Jinxiang
Lior David
Vakul Garg
Boris Pismenny
Ilya Lesokhin
Alexei Starovoitov