60577 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Johannes Berg
0cfbb26ee5 wifi: nl80211: reject iftype change with mesh ID change
commit f78c1375339a291cba492a70eaf12ec501d28a8e upstream.

It's currently possible to change the mesh ID when the
interface isn't yet in mesh mode, at the same time as
changing it into mesh mode. This leads to an overwrite
of data in the wdev->u union for the interface type it
currently has, causing cfg80211_change_iface() to do
wrong things when switching.

We could probably allow setting an interface to mesh
while setting the mesh ID at the same time by doing a
different order of operations here, but realistically
there's no userspace that's going to do this, so just
disallow changes in iftype when setting mesh ID.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 29cbe68c516a ("cfg80211/mac80211: add mesh join/leave commands")
Reported-by: syzbot+dd4779978217b1973180@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-03-06 14:36:09 +00:00
Lin Ma
b9fbc44159 rtnetlink: fix error logic of IFLA_BRIDGE_FLAGS writing back
[ Upstream commit 743ad091fb46e622f1b690385bb15e3cd3daf874 ]

In the commit d73ef2d69c0d ("rtnetlink: let rtnl_bridge_setlink checks
IFLA_BRIDGE_MODE length"), an adjustment was made to the old loop logic
in the function `rtnl_bridge_setlink` to enable the loop to also check
the length of the IFLA_BRIDGE_MODE attribute. However, this adjustment
removed the `break` statement and led to an error logic of the flags
writing back at the end of this function.

if (have_flags)
    memcpy(nla_data(attr), &flags, sizeof(flags));
    // attr should point to IFLA_BRIDGE_FLAGS NLA !!!

Before the mentioned commit, the `attr` is granted to be IFLA_BRIDGE_FLAGS.
However, this is not necessarily true fow now as the updated loop will let
the attr point to the last NLA, even an invalid NLA which could cause
overflow writes.

This patch introduces a new variable `br_flag` to save the NLA pointer
that points to IFLA_BRIDGE_FLAGS and uses it to resolve the mentioned
error logic.

Fixes: d73ef2d69c0d ("rtnetlink: let rtnl_bridge_setlink checks IFLA_BRIDGE_MODE length")
Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn>
Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240227121128.608110-1-linma@zju.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-03-06 14:36:09 +00:00
Ignat Korchagin
260410c589 netfilter: nf_tables: allow NFPROTO_INET in nft_(match/target)_validate()
[ Upstream commit 7e0f122c65912740327e4c54472acaa5f85868cb ]

Commit d0009effa886 ("netfilter: nf_tables: validate NFPROTO_* family") added
some validation of NFPROTO_* families in the nft_compat module, but it broke
the ability to use legacy iptables modules in dual-stack nftables.

While with legacy iptables one had to independently manage IPv4 and IPv6
tables, with nftables it is possible to have dual-stack tables sharing the
rules. Moreover, it was possible to use rules based on legacy iptables
match/target modules in dual-stack nftables.

As an example, the program from [2] creates an INET dual-stack family table
using an xt_bpf based rule, which looks like the following (the actual output
was generated with a patched nft tool as the current nft tool does not parse
dual stack tables with legacy match rules, so consider it for illustrative
purposes only):

table inet testfw {
  chain input {
    type filter hook prerouting priority filter; policy accept;
    bytecode counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
  }
}

After d0009effa886 ("netfilter: nf_tables: validate NFPROTO_* family") we get
EOPNOTSUPP for the above program.

Fix this by allowing NFPROTO_INET for nft_(match/target)_validate(), but also
restrict the functions to classic iptables hooks.

Changes in v3:
  * clarify that upstream nft will not display such configuration properly and
    that the output was generated with a patched nft tool
  * remove example program from commit description and link to it instead
  * no code changes otherwise

Changes in v2:
  * restrict nft_(match/target)_validate() to classic iptables hooks
  * rewrite example program to use unmodified libnftnl

Fixes: d0009effa886 ("netfilter: nf_tables: validate NFPROTO_* family")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/Zc1PfoWN38UuFJRI@calendula/T/#mc947262582c90fec044c7a3398cc92fac7afea72 [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240220145509.53357-1-ignat@cloudflare.com/ [2]
Reported-by: Jordan Griege <jgriege@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-03-06 14:36:09 +00:00
Kai-Heng Feng
20f6f150e1 Bluetooth: Enforce validation on max value of connection interval
[ Upstream commit e4b019515f950b4e6e5b74b2e1bb03a90cb33039 ]

Right now Linux BT stack cannot pass test case "GAP/CONN/CPUP/BV-05-C
'Connection Parameter Update Procedure Invalid Parameters Central
Responder'" in Bluetooth Test Suite revision GAP.TS.p44. [0]

That was revoled by commit c49a8682fc5d ("Bluetooth: validate BLE
connection interval updates"), but later got reverted due to devices
like keyboards and mice may require low connection interval.

So only validate the max value connection interval to pass the Test
Suite, and let devices to request low connection interval if needed.

[0] https://www.bluetooth.org/docman/handlers/DownloadDoc.ashx?doc_id=229869

Fixes: 68d19d7d9957 ("Revert "Bluetooth: validate BLE connection interval updates"")
Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-03-06 14:36:09 +00:00
Luiz Augusto von Dentz
79820a7e1e Bluetooth: hci_event: Fix handling of HCI_EV_IO_CAPA_REQUEST
[ Upstream commit 7e74aa53a68bf60f6019bd5d9a9a1406ec4d4865 ]

If we received HCI_EV_IO_CAPA_REQUEST while
HCI_OP_READ_REMOTE_EXT_FEATURES is yet to be responded assume the remote
does support SSP since otherwise this event shouldn't be generated.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-bluetooth/CABBYNZ+9UdG1cMZVmdtN3U2aS16AKMCyTARZZyFX7xTEDWcMOw@mail.gmail.com/T/#t
Fixes: c7f59461f5a7 ("Bluetooth: Fix a refcnt underflow problem for hci_conn")
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-03-06 14:36:09 +00:00
Ying Hsu
98fb98fd37 Bluetooth: Avoid potential use-after-free in hci_error_reset
[ Upstream commit 2449007d3f73b2842c9734f45f0aadb522daf592 ]

While handling the HCI_EV_HARDWARE_ERROR event, if the underlying
BT controller is not responding, the GPIO reset mechanism would
free the hci_dev and lead to a use-after-free in hci_error_reset.

Here's the call trace observed on a ChromeOS device with Intel AX201:
   queue_work_on+0x3e/0x6c
   __hci_cmd_sync_sk+0x2ee/0x4c0 [bluetooth <HASH:3b4a6>]
   ? init_wait_entry+0x31/0x31
   __hci_cmd_sync+0x16/0x20 [bluetooth <HASH:3b4a 6>]
   hci_error_reset+0x4f/0xa4 [bluetooth <HASH:3b4a 6>]
   process_one_work+0x1d8/0x33f
   worker_thread+0x21b/0x373
   kthread+0x13a/0x152
   ? pr_cont_work+0x54/0x54
   ? kthread_blkcg+0x31/0x31
    ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

This patch holds the reference count on the hci_dev while processing
a HCI_EV_HARDWARE_ERROR event to avoid potential crash.

Fixes: c7741d16a57c ("Bluetooth: Perform a power cycle when receiving hardware error event")
Signed-off-by: Ying Hsu <yinghsu@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-03-06 14:36:09 +00:00
Eric Dumazet
9d4ffb5b9d ipv6: fix potential "struct net" leak in inet6_rtm_getaddr()
[ Upstream commit 10bfd453da64a057bcfd1a49fb6b271c48653cdb ]

It seems that if userspace provides a correct IFA_TARGET_NETNSID value
but no IFA_ADDRESS and IFA_LOCAL attributes, inet6_rtm_getaddr()
returns -EINVAL with an elevated "struct net" refcount.

Fixes: 6ecf4c37eb3e ("ipv6: enable IFA_TARGET_NETNSID for RTM_GETADDR")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-03-06 14:36:08 +00:00
Florian Westphal
f81e94d2dc net: ip_tunnel: prevent perpetual headroom growth
[ Upstream commit 5ae1e9922bbdbaeb9cfbe91085ab75927488ac0f ]

syzkaller triggered following kasan splat:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __skb_flow_dissect+0x19d1/0x7a50 net/core/flow_dissector.c:1170
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88812fb4000e by task syz-executor183/5191
[..]
 kasan_report+0xda/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:588
 __skb_flow_dissect+0x19d1/0x7a50 net/core/flow_dissector.c:1170
 skb_flow_dissect_flow_keys include/linux/skbuff.h:1514 [inline]
 ___skb_get_hash net/core/flow_dissector.c:1791 [inline]
 __skb_get_hash+0xc7/0x540 net/core/flow_dissector.c:1856
 skb_get_hash include/linux/skbuff.h:1556 [inline]
 ip_tunnel_xmit+0x1855/0x33c0 net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c:748
 ipip_tunnel_xmit+0x3cc/0x4e0 net/ipv4/ipip.c:308
 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4940 [inline]
 netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4954 [inline]
 xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3548 [inline]
 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x13d/0x6d0 net/core/dev.c:3564
 __dev_queue_xmit+0x7c1/0x3d60 net/core/dev.c:4349
 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3134 [inline]
 neigh_connected_output+0x42c/0x5d0 net/core/neighbour.c:1592
 ...
 ip_finish_output2+0x833/0x2550 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:235
 ip_finish_output+0x31/0x310 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:323
 ..
 iptunnel_xmit+0x5b4/0x9b0 net/ipv4/ip_tunnel_core.c:82
 ip_tunnel_xmit+0x1dbc/0x33c0 net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c:831
 ipgre_xmit+0x4a1/0x980 net/ipv4/ip_gre.c:665
 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4940 [inline]
 netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4954 [inline]
 xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3548 [inline]
 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x13d/0x6d0 net/core/dev.c:3564
 ...

The splat occurs because skb->data points past skb->head allocated area.
This is because neigh layer does:
  __skb_pull(skb, skb_network_offset(skb));

... but skb_network_offset() returns a negative offset and __skb_pull()
arg is unsigned.  IOW, we skb->data gets "adjusted" by a huge value.

The negative value is returned because skb->head and skb->data distance is
more than 64k and skb->network_header (u16) has wrapped around.

The bug is in the ip_tunnel infrastructure, which can cause
dev->needed_headroom to increment ad infinitum.

The syzkaller reproducer consists of packets getting routed via a gre
tunnel, and route of gre encapsulated packets pointing at another (ipip)
tunnel.  The ipip encapsulation finds gre0 as next output device.

This results in the following pattern:

1). First packet is to be sent out via gre0.
Route lookup found an output device, ipip0.

2).
ip_tunnel_xmit for gre0 bumps gre0->needed_headroom based on the future
output device, rt.dev->needed_headroom (ipip0).

3).
ip output / start_xmit moves skb on to ipip0. which runs the same
code path again (xmit recursion).

4).
Routing step for the post-gre0-encap packet finds gre0 as output device
to use for ipip0 encapsulated packet.

tunl0->needed_headroom is then incremented based on the (already bumped)
gre0 device headroom.

This repeats for every future packet:

gre0->needed_headroom gets inflated because previous packets' ipip0 step
incremented rt->dev (gre0) headroom, and ipip0 incremented because gre0
needed_headroom was increased.

For each subsequent packet, gre/ipip0->needed_headroom grows until
post-expand-head reallocations result in a skb->head/data distance of
more than 64k.

Once that happens, skb->network_header (u16) wraps around when
pskb_expand_head tries to make sure that skb_network_offset() is unchanged
after the headroom expansion/reallocation.

After this skb_network_offset(skb) returns a different (and negative)
result post headroom expansion.

The next trip to neigh layer (or anything else that would __skb_pull the
network header) makes skb->data point to a memory location outside
skb->head area.

v2: Cap the needed_headroom update to an arbitarily chosen upperlimit to
prevent perpetual increase instead of dropping the headroom increment
completely.

Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+bfde3bef047a81b8fde6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://groups.google.com/g/syzkaller-bugs/c/fL9G6GtWskY/m/VKk_PR5FBAAJ
Fixes: 243aad830e8a ("ip_gre: include route header_len in max_headroom calculation")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240220135606.4939-1-fw@strlen.de
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-03-06 14:36:08 +00:00
Ryosuke Yasuoka
9ae51361da netlink: Fix kernel-infoleak-after-free in __skb_datagram_iter
[ Upstream commit 661779e1fcafe1b74b3f3fe8e980c1e207fea1fd ]

syzbot reported the following uninit-value access issue [1]:

netlink_to_full_skb() creates a new `skb` and puts the `skb->data`
passed as a 1st arg of netlink_to_full_skb() onto new `skb`. The data
size is specified as `len` and passed to skb_put_data(). This `len`
is based on `skb->end` that is not data offset but buffer offset. The
`skb->end` contains data and tailroom. Since the tailroom is not
initialized when the new `skb` created, KMSAN detects uninitialized
memory area when copying the data.

This patch resolved this issue by correct the len from `skb->end` to
`skb->len`, which is the actual data offset.

BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak-after-free in instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:114 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak-after-free in copy_to_user_iter lib/iov_iter.c:24 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak-after-free in iterate_ubuf include/linux/iov_iter.h:29 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak-after-free in iterate_and_advance2 include/linux/iov_iter.h:245 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak-after-free in iterate_and_advance include/linux/iov_iter.h:271 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak-after-free in _copy_to_iter+0x364/0x2520 lib/iov_iter.c:186
 instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:114 [inline]
 copy_to_user_iter lib/iov_iter.c:24 [inline]
 iterate_ubuf include/linux/iov_iter.h:29 [inline]
 iterate_and_advance2 include/linux/iov_iter.h:245 [inline]
 iterate_and_advance include/linux/iov_iter.h:271 [inline]
 _copy_to_iter+0x364/0x2520 lib/iov_iter.c:186
 copy_to_iter include/linux/uio.h:197 [inline]
 simple_copy_to_iter+0x68/0xa0 net/core/datagram.c:532
 __skb_datagram_iter+0x123/0xdc0 net/core/datagram.c:420
 skb_copy_datagram_iter+0x5c/0x200 net/core/datagram.c:546
 skb_copy_datagram_msg include/linux/skbuff.h:3960 [inline]
 packet_recvmsg+0xd9c/0x2000 net/packet/af_packet.c:3482
 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1044 [inline]
 sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:1066 [inline]
 sock_read_iter+0x467/0x580 net/socket.c:1136
 call_read_iter include/linux/fs.h:2014 [inline]
 new_sync_read fs/read_write.c:389 [inline]
 vfs_read+0x8f6/0xe00 fs/read_write.c:470
 ksys_read+0x20f/0x4c0 fs/read_write.c:613
 __do_sys_read fs/read_write.c:623 [inline]
 __se_sys_read fs/read_write.c:621 [inline]
 __x64_sys_read+0x93/0xd0 fs/read_write.c:621
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x44/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b

Uninit was stored to memory at:
 skb_put_data include/linux/skbuff.h:2622 [inline]
 netlink_to_full_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:181 [inline]
 __netlink_deliver_tap_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:298 [inline]
 __netlink_deliver_tap+0x5be/0xc90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:325
 netlink_deliver_tap net/netlink/af_netlink.c:338 [inline]
 netlink_deliver_tap_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:347 [inline]
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1341 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0x10f1/0x1250 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1368
 netlink_sendmsg+0x1238/0x13d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1910
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
 __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline]
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x9c2/0xd60 net/socket.c:2584
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x28d/0x3c0 net/socket.c:2638
 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2667 [inline]
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2676 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x490 net/socket.c:2674
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x44/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b

Uninit was created at:
 free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1087 [inline]
 free_unref_page_prepare+0xb0/0xa40 mm/page_alloc.c:2347
 free_unref_page_list+0xeb/0x1100 mm/page_alloc.c:2533
 release_pages+0x23d3/0x2410 mm/swap.c:1042
 free_pages_and_swap_cache+0xd9/0xf0 mm/swap_state.c:316
 tlb_batch_pages_flush mm/mmu_gather.c:98 [inline]
 tlb_flush_mmu_free mm/mmu_gather.c:293 [inline]
 tlb_flush_mmu+0x6f5/0x980 mm/mmu_gather.c:300
 tlb_finish_mmu+0x101/0x260 mm/mmu_gather.c:392
 exit_mmap+0x49e/0xd30 mm/mmap.c:3321
 __mmput+0x13f/0x530 kernel/fork.c:1349
 mmput+0x8a/0xa0 kernel/fork.c:1371
 exit_mm+0x1b8/0x360 kernel/exit.c:567
 do_exit+0xd57/0x4080 kernel/exit.c:858
 do_group_exit+0x2fd/0x390 kernel/exit.c:1021
 __do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1032 [inline]
 __se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1030 [inline]
 __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3c/0x50 kernel/exit.c:1030
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x44/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b

Bytes 3852-3903 of 3904 are uninitialized
Memory access of size 3904 starts at ffff88812ea1e000
Data copied to user address 0000000020003280

CPU: 1 PID: 5043 Comm: syz-executor297 Not tainted 6.7.0-rc5-syzkaller-00047-g5bd7ef53ffe5 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/10/2023

Fixes: 1853c9496460 ("netlink, mmap: transform mmap skb into full skb on taps")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+34ad5fab48f7bf510349@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=34ad5fab48f7bf510349 [1]
Signed-off-by: Ryosuke Yasuoka <ryasuoka@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240221074053.1794118-1-ryasuoka@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-03-06 14:36:08 +00:00
Florian Westphal
ae4360cbd3 netfilter: nf_tables: set dormant flag on hook register failure
[ Upstream commit bccebf64701735533c8db37773eeacc6566cc8ec ]

We need to set the dormant flag again if we fail to register
the hooks.

During memory pressure hook registration can fail and we end up
with a table marked as active but no registered hooks.

On table/base chain deletion, nf_tables will attempt to unregister
the hook again which yields a warn splat from the nftables core.

Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+de4025c006ec68ac56fc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 179d9ba5559a ("netfilter: nf_tables: fix table flag updates")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-03-01 13:13:37 +01:00
Sabrina Dubroca
f310143961 tls: stop recv() if initial process_rx_list gave us non-DATA
[ Upstream commit fdfbaec5923d9359698cbb286bc0deadbb717504 ]

If we have a non-DATA record on the rx_list and another record of the
same type still on the queue, we will end up merging them:
 - process_rx_list copies the non-DATA record
 - we start the loop and process the first available record since it's
   of the same type
 - we break out of the loop since the record was not DATA

Just check the record type and jump to the end in case process_rx_list
did some work.

Fixes: 692d7b5d1f91 ("tls: Fix recvmsg() to be able to peek across multiple records")
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/bd31449e43bd4b6ff546f5c51cf958c31c511deb.1708007371.git.sd@queasysnail.net
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-03-01 13:13:37 +01:00
Jakub Kicinski
a26742ada7 tls: rx: drop pointless else after goto
[ Upstream commit d5123edd10cf9d324fcb88e276bdc7375f3c5321 ]

Pointless else branch after goto makes the code harder to refactor
down the line.

Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Stable-dep-of: fdfbaec5923d ("tls: stop recv() if initial process_rx_list gave us non-DATA")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-03-01 13:13:37 +01:00
Jakub Kicinski
c1287c1d6b tls: rx: jump to a more appropriate label
[ Upstream commit bfc06e1aaa130b86a81ce3c41ec71a2f5e191690 ]

'recv_end:' checks num_async and decrypted, and is then followed
by the 'end' label. Since we know that decrypted and num_async
are 0 at the start we can jump to 'end'.

Move the init of decrypted and num_async to let the compiler
catch if I'm wrong.

Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Stable-dep-of: fdfbaec5923d ("tls: stop recv() if initial process_rx_list gave us non-DATA")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-03-01 13:13:37 +01:00
Wolfram Sang
7eee00feb6 packet: move from strlcpy with unused retval to strscpy
[ Upstream commit 8fc9d51ea2d32a05f7d7cf86a25cc86ecc57eb45 ]

Follow the advice of the below link and prefer 'strscpy' in this
subsystem. Conversion is 1:1 because the return value is not used.
Generated by a coccinelle script.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAHk-=wgfRnXz0W3D37d01q3JFkr_i_uTL=V6A6G1oUZcprmknw@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220818210227.8611-1-wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: a7d6027790ac ("arp: Prevent overflow in arp_req_get().")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-03-01 13:13:37 +01:00
Vasiliy Kovalev
82831e3ff7 ipv6: sr: fix possible use-after-free and null-ptr-deref
[ Upstream commit 5559cea2d5aa3018a5f00dd2aca3427ba09b386b ]

The pernet operations structure for the subsystem must be registered
before registering the generic netlink family.

Fixes: 915d7e5e5930 ("ipv6: sr: add code base for control plane support of SR-IPv6")
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kovalev <kovalev@altlinux.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240215202717.29815-1-kovalev@altlinux.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-03-01 13:13:37 +01:00
Eric Dumazet
799a4afaa5 ipv6: properly combine dev_base_seq and ipv6.dev_addr_genid
[ Upstream commit e898e4cd1aab271ca414f9ac6e08e4c761f6913c ]

net->dev_base_seq and ipv6.dev_addr_genid are monotonically increasing.

If we XOR their values, we could miss to detect if both values
were changed with the same amount.

Fixes: 63998ac24f83 ("ipv6: provide addr and netconf dump consistency info")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-03-01 13:13:37 +01:00
Eric Dumazet
5888f34249 ipv4: properly combine dev_base_seq and ipv4.dev_addr_genid
[ Upstream commit 081a0e3b0d4c061419d3f4679dec9f68725b17e4 ]

net->dev_base_seq and ipv4.dev_addr_genid are monotonically increasing.

If we XOR their values, we could miss to detect if both values
were changed with the same amount.

Fixes: 0465277f6b3f ("ipv4: provide addr and netconf dump consistency info")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-03-01 13:13:37 +01:00
Tom Parkin
c1d3a84a67 l2tp: pass correct message length to ip6_append_data
commit 359e54a93ab43d32ee1bff3c2f9f10cb9f6b6e79 upstream.

l2tp_ip6_sendmsg needs to avoid accounting for the transport header
twice when splicing more data into an already partially-occupied skbuff.

To manage this, we check whether the skbuff contains data using
skb_queue_empty when deciding how much data to append using
ip6_append_data.

However, the code which performed the calculation was incorrect:

     ulen = len + skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_write_queue) ? transhdrlen : 0;

...due to C operator precedence, this ends up setting ulen to
transhdrlen for messages with a non-zero length, which results in
corrupted packets on the wire.

Add parentheses to correct the calculation in line with the original
intent.

Fixes: 9d4c75800f61 ("ipv4, ipv6: Fix handling of transhdrlen in __ip{,6}_append_data()")
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tom Parkin <tparkin@katalix.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240220122156.43131-1-tparkin@katalix.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-03-01 13:13:36 +01:00
Nikolay Aleksandrov
81e03f638d net: bridge: clear bridge's private skb space on xmit
[ Upstream commit fd65e5a95d08389444e8591a20538b3edece0e15 ]

We need to clear all of the bridge private skb variables as they can be
stale due to the packet being recirculated through the stack and then
transmitted through the bridge device. Similar memset is already done on
bridge's input. We've seen cases where proxyarp_replied was 1 on routed
multicast packets transmitted through the bridge to ports with neigh
suppress which were getting dropped. Same thing can in theory happen with
the port isolation bit as well.

Fixes: 821f1b21cabb ("bridge: add new BR_NEIGH_SUPPRESS port flag to suppress arp and nd flood")
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-03-01 13:13:35 +01:00
Eric Dumazet
99dc568545 tcp: add annotations around sk->sk_shutdown accesses
[ Upstream commit e14cadfd80d76f01bfaa1a8d745b1db19b57d6be ]

Now sk->sk_shutdown is no longer a bitfield, we can add
standard READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() annotations to silence
KCSAN reports like the following:

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in tcp_disconnect / tcp_poll

write to 0xffff88814588582c of 1 bytes by task 3404 on cpu 1:
tcp_disconnect+0x4d6/0xdb0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:3121
__inet_stream_connect+0x5dd/0x6e0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:715
inet_stream_connect+0x48/0x70 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:727
__sys_connect_file net/socket.c:2001 [inline]
__sys_connect+0x19b/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2018
__do_sys_connect net/socket.c:2028 [inline]
__se_sys_connect net/socket.c:2025 [inline]
__x64_sys_connect+0x41/0x50 net/socket.c:2025
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

read to 0xffff88814588582c of 1 bytes by task 3374 on cpu 0:
tcp_poll+0x2e6/0x7d0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:562
sock_poll+0x253/0x270 net/socket.c:1383
vfs_poll include/linux/poll.h:88 [inline]
io_poll_check_events io_uring/poll.c:281 [inline]
io_poll_task_func+0x15a/0x820 io_uring/poll.c:333
handle_tw_list io_uring/io_uring.c:1184 [inline]
tctx_task_work+0x1fe/0x4d0 io_uring/io_uring.c:1246
task_work_run+0x123/0x160 kernel/task_work.c:179
get_signal+0xe64/0xff0 kernel/signal.c:2635
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x89/0x2a0 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:306
exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x6f/0xe0 kernel/entry/common.c:168
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x6c/0xb0 kernel/entry/common.c:204
__syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:286 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x26/0x140 kernel/entry/common.c:297
do_syscall_64+0x4d/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

value changed: 0x03 -> 0x00

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-03-01 13:13:34 +01:00
Soheil Hassas Yeganeh
41ca938616 tcp: return EPOLLOUT from tcp_poll only when notsent_bytes is half the limit
[ Upstream commit 8ba3c9d1c6d75d1e6af2087278b30e17f68e1fff ]

If there was any event available on the TCP socket, tcp_poll()
will be called to retrieve all the events.  In tcp_poll(), we call
sk_stream_is_writeable() which returns true as long as we are at least
one byte below notsent_lowat.  This will result in quite a few
spurious EPLLOUT and frequent tiny sendmsg() calls as a result.

Similar to sk_stream_write_space(), use __sk_stream_is_writeable
with a wake value of 1, so that we set EPOLLOUT only if half the
space is available for write.

Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-03-01 13:13:34 +01:00
Paolo Abeni
5a9dc14df2 tcp: factor out __tcp_close() helper
[ Upstream commit 77c3c95637526f1e4330cc9a4b2065f668c2c4fe ]

unlocked version of protocol level close, will be used by
MPTCP to allow decouple orphaning and subflow level close.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-03-01 13:13:34 +01:00
Xin Long
ac524b7b3f netfilter: conntrack: check SCTP_CID_SHUTDOWN_ACK for vtag setting in sctp_new
[ Upstream commit 6e348067ee4bc5905e35faa3a8fafa91c9124bc7 ]

The annotation says in sctp_new(): "If it is a shutdown ack OOTB packet, we
expect a return shutdown complete, otherwise an ABORT Sec 8.4 (5) and (8)".
However, it does not check SCTP_CID_SHUTDOWN_ACK before setting vtag[REPLY]
in the conntrack entry(ct).

Because of that, if the ct in Router disappears for some reason in [1]
with the packet sequence like below:

   Client > Server: sctp (1) [INIT] [init tag: 3201533963]
   Server > Client: sctp (1) [INIT ACK] [init tag: 972498433]
   Client > Server: sctp (1) [COOKIE ECHO]
   Server > Client: sctp (1) [COOKIE ACK]
   Client > Server: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 3075057809]
   Server > Client: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 3075057809]
   Server > Client: sctp (1) [HB REQ]
   (the ct in Router disappears somehow)  <-------- [1]
   Client > Server: sctp (1) [HB ACK]
   Client > Server: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 3075057810]
   Client > Server: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 3075057810]
   Client > Server: sctp (1) [HB REQ]
   Client > Server: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 3075057810]
   Client > Server: sctp (1) [HB REQ]
   Client > Server: sctp (1) [ABORT]

when processing HB ACK packet in Router it calls sctp_new() to initialize
the new ct with vtag[REPLY] set to HB_ACK packet's vtag.

Later when sending DATA from Client, all the SACKs from Server will get
dropped in Router, as the SACK packet's vtag does not match vtag[REPLY]
in the ct. The worst thing is the vtag in this ct will never get fixed
by the upcoming packets from Server.

This patch fixes it by checking SCTP_CID_SHUTDOWN_ACK before setting
vtag[REPLY] in the ct in sctp_new() as the annotation says. With this
fix, it will leave vtag[REPLY] in ct to 0 in the case above, and the
next HB REQ/ACK from Server is able to fix the vtag as its value is 0
in nf_conntrack_sctp_packet().

Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-03-01 13:13:34 +01:00
Felix Fietkau
85720b69ae wifi: mac80211: fix race condition on enabling fast-xmit
[ Upstream commit bcbc84af1183c8cf3d1ca9b78540c2185cd85e7f ]

fast-xmit must only be enabled after the sta has been uploaded to the driver,
otherwise it could end up passing the not-yet-uploaded sta via drv_tx calls
to the driver, leading to potential crashes because of uninitialized drv_priv
data.
Add a missing sta->uploaded check and re-check fast xmit after inserting a sta.

Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Link: https://msgid.link/20240104181059.84032-1-nbd@nbd.name
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-03-01 13:13:33 +01:00
Michal Kazior
d3032de2c8 wifi: cfg80211: fix missing interfaces when dumping
[ Upstream commit a6e4f85d3820d00694ed10f581f4c650445dbcda ]

The nl80211_dump_interface() supports resumption
in case nl80211_send_iface() doesn't have the
resources to complete its work.

The logic would store the progress as iteration
offsets for rdev and wdev loops.

However the logic did not properly handle
resumption for non-last rdev. Assuming a system
with 2 rdevs, with 2 wdevs each, this could
happen:

 dump(cb=[0, 0]):
  if_start=cb[1] (=0)
  send rdev0.wdev0 -> ok
  send rdev0.wdev1 -> yield
  cb[1] = 1

 dump(cb=[0, 1]):
  if_start=cb[1] (=1)
  send rdev0.wdev1 -> ok
  // since if_start=1 the rdev0.wdev0 got skipped
  // through if_idx < if_start
  send rdev1.wdev1 -> ok

The if_start needs to be reset back to 0 upon wdev
loop end.

The problem is actually hard to hit on a desktop,
and even on most routers. The prerequisites for
this manifesting was:
 - more than 1 wiphy
 - a few handful of interfaces
 - dump without rdev or wdev filter

I was seeing this with 4 wiphys 9 interfaces each.
It'd miss 6 interfaces from the last wiphy
reported to userspace.

Signed-off-by: Michal Kazior <michal@plume.com>
Link: https://msgid.link/20240116142340.89678-1-kazikcz@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-03-01 13:13:33 +01:00
Jamal Hadi Salim
010dc505ea net/sched: Retire dsmark qdisc
commit bbe77c14ee6185a61ba6d5e435c1cbb489d2a9ed upstream.

The dsmark qdisc has served us well over the years for diffserv but has not
been getting much attention due to other more popular approaches to do diffserv
services. Most recently it has become a shooting target for syzkaller. For this
reason, we are retiring it.

Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-03-01 13:13:32 +01:00
Jamal Hadi Salim
40e8abb86d net/sched: Retire ATM qdisc
commit fb38306ceb9e770adfb5ffa6e3c64047b55f7a07 upstream.

The ATM qdisc has served us well over the years but has not been getting much
TLC due to lack of known users. Most recently it has become a shooting target
for syzkaller. For this reason, we are retiring it.

Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-03-01 13:13:32 +01:00
Jamal Hadi Salim
493685f3dd net/sched: Retire CBQ qdisc
commit 051d442098421c28c7951625652f61b1e15c4bd5 upstream.

While this amazing qdisc has served us well over the years it has not been
getting any tender love and care and has bitrotted over time.
It has become mostly a shooting target for syzkaller lately.
For this reason, we are retiring it. Goodbye CBQ - we loved you.

Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-03-01 13:13:32 +01:00
Dan Carpenter
25b42be4e0 netfilter: nf_tables: fix pointer math issue in nft_byteorder_eval()
commit c301f0981fdd3fd1ffac6836b423c4d7a8e0eb63 upstream.

The problem is in nft_byteorder_eval() where we are iterating through a
loop and writing to dst[0], dst[1], dst[2] and so on...  On each
iteration we are writing 8 bytes.  But dst[] is an array of u32 so each
element only has space for 4 bytes.  That means that every iteration
overwrites part of the previous element.

I spotted this bug while reviewing commit caf3ef7468f7 ("netfilter:
nf_tables: prevent OOB access in nft_byteorder_eval") which is a related
issue.  I think that the reason we have not detected this bug in testing
is that most of time we only write one element.

Fixes: ce1e7989d989 ("netfilter: nft_byteorder: provide 64bit le/be conversion")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
[Ajay: Modified to apply on v5.4.y]
Signed-off-by: Ajay Kaher <ajay.kaher@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-02-23 08:25:15 +01:00
Eric Dumazet
cd1022eaf8 net: prevent mss overflow in skb_segment()
commit 23d05d563b7e7b0314e65c8e882bc27eac2da8e7 upstream.

Once again syzbot is able to crash the kernel in skb_segment() [1]

GSO_BY_FRAGS is a forbidden value, but unfortunately the following
computation in skb_segment() can reach it quite easily :

	mss = mss * partial_segs;

65535 = 3 * 5 * 17 * 257, so many initial values of mss can lead to
a bad final result.

Make sure to limit segmentation so that the new mss value is smaller
than GSO_BY_FRAGS.

[1]

general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000e: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000070-0x0000000000000077]
CPU: 1 PID: 5079 Comm: syz-executor993 Not tainted 6.7.0-rc4-syzkaller-00141-g1ae4cd3cbdd0 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/10/2023
RIP: 0010:skb_segment+0x181d/0x3f30 net/core/skbuff.c:4551
Code: 83 e3 02 e9 fb ed ff ff e8 90 68 1c f9 48 8b 84 24 f8 00 00 00 48 8d 78 70 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e 8a 21 00 00 48 8b 84 24 f8 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc900043473d0 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000010046 RCX: ffffffff886b1597
RDX: 000000000000000e RSI: ffffffff886b2520 RDI: 0000000000000070
RBP: ffffc90004347578 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 000000000000ffff
R10: 000000000000ffff R11: 0000000000000002 R12: ffff888063202ac0
R13: 0000000000010000 R14: 000000000000ffff R15: 0000000000000046
FS: 0000555556e7e380(0000) GS:ffff8880b9900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020010000 CR3: 0000000027ee2000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
udp6_ufo_fragment+0xa0e/0xd00 net/ipv6/udp_offload.c:109
ipv6_gso_segment+0x534/0x17e0 net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c:120
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x290/0x610 net/core/gso.c:53
__skb_gso_segment+0x339/0x710 net/core/gso.c:124
skb_gso_segment include/net/gso.h:83 [inline]
validate_xmit_skb+0x36c/0xeb0 net/core/dev.c:3626
__dev_queue_xmit+0x6f3/0x3d60 net/core/dev.c:4338
dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3134 [inline]
packet_xmit+0x257/0x380 net/packet/af_packet.c:276
packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3087 [inline]
packet_sendmsg+0x24c6/0x5220 net/packet/af_packet.c:3119
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x180 net/socket.c:745
__sys_sendto+0x255/0x340 net/socket.c:2190
__do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2202 [inline]
__se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2198 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendto+0xe0/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2198
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x40/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
RIP: 0033:0x7f8692032aa9
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 d1 19 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fff8d685418 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007f8692032aa9
RDX: 0000000000010048 RSI: 00000000200000c0 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000000f4240 R08: 0000000020000540 R09: 0000000000000014
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fff8d685480
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 00007fff8d685480 R15: 0000000000000003
</TASK>
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
RIP: 0010:skb_segment+0x181d/0x3f30 net/core/skbuff.c:4551
Code: 83 e3 02 e9 fb ed ff ff e8 90 68 1c f9 48 8b 84 24 f8 00 00 00 48 8d 78 70 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e 8a 21 00 00 48 8b 84 24 f8 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc900043473d0 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000010046 RCX: ffffffff886b1597
RDX: 000000000000000e RSI: ffffffff886b2520 RDI: 0000000000000070
RBP: ffffc90004347578 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 000000000000ffff
R10: 000000000000ffff R11: 0000000000000002 R12: ffff888063202ac0
R13: 0000000000010000 R14: 000000000000ffff R15: 0000000000000046
FS: 0000555556e7e380(0000) GS:ffff8880b9900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020010000 CR3: 0000000027ee2000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400

Fixes: 3953c46c3ac7 ("sk_buff: allow segmenting based on frag sizes")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231212164621.4131800-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-02-23 08:25:14 +01:00
Jozsef Kadlecsik
6587af96ef netfilter: ipset: Missing gc cancellations fixed
commit 27c5a095e2518975e20a10102908ae8231699879 upstream.

The patch fdb8e12cc2cc ("netfilter: ipset: fix performance regression
in swap operation") missed to add the calls to gc cancellations
at the error path of create operations and at module unload. Also,
because the half of the destroy operations now executed by a
function registered by call_rcu(), neither NFNL_SUBSYS_IPSET mutex
or rcu read lock is held and therefore the checking of them results
false warnings.

Fixes: 97f7cf1cd80e ("netfilter: ipset: fix performance regression in swap operation")
Reported-by: syzbot+52bbc0ad036f6f0d4a25@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Reported-by: Стас Ничипорович <stasn77@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Tested-by: Стас Ничипорович <stasn77@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-02-23 08:25:14 +01:00
Jozsef Kadlecsik
c7f2733e50 netfilter: ipset: fix performance regression in swap operation
commit 97f7cf1cd80eeed3b7c808b7c12463295c751001 upstream.

The patch "netfilter: ipset: fix race condition between swap/destroy
and kernel side add/del/test", commit 28628fa9 fixes a race condition.
But the synchronize_rcu() added to the swap function unnecessarily slows
it down: it can safely be moved to destroy and use call_rcu() instead.

Eric Dumazet pointed out that simply calling the destroy functions as
rcu callback does not work: sets with timeout use garbage collectors
which need cancelling at destroy which can wait. Therefore the destroy
functions are split into two: cancelling garbage collectors safely at
executing the command received by netlink and moving the remaining
part only into the rcu callback.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/C0829B10-EAA6-4809-874E-E1E9C05A8D84@automattic.com/
Fixes: 28628fa952fe ("netfilter: ipset: fix race condition between swap/destroy and kernel side add/del/test")
Reported-by: Ale Crismani <ale.crismani@automattic.com>
Reported-by: David Wang <00107082@163.com>
Tested-by: David Wang <00107082@163.com>
Signed-off-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-02-23 08:25:14 +01:00
Oleksij Rempel
08de58abed can: j1939: Fix UAF in j1939_sk_match_filter during setsockopt(SO_J1939_FILTER)
commit efe7cf828039aedb297c1f9920b638fffee6aabc upstream.

Lock jsk->sk to prevent UAF when setsockopt(..., SO_J1939_FILTER, ...)
modifies jsk->filters while receiving packets.

Following trace was seen on affected system:
 ==================================================================
 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939]
 Read of size 4 at addr ffff888012144014 by task j1939/350

 CPU: 0 PID: 350 Comm: j1939 Tainted: G        W  OE      6.5.0-rc5 #1
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  print_report+0xd3/0x620
  ? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x7d/0x200
  ? j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939]
  kasan_report+0xc2/0x100
  ? j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939]
  __asan_load4+0x84/0xb0
  j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939]
  j1939_sk_recv+0x20b/0x320 [can_j1939]
  ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x20
  ? __pfx_j1939_sk_recv+0x10/0x10 [can_j1939]
  ? j1939_simple_recv+0x69/0x280 [can_j1939]
  ? j1939_ac_recv+0x5e/0x310 [can_j1939]
  j1939_can_recv+0x43f/0x580 [can_j1939]
  ? __pfx_j1939_can_recv+0x10/0x10 [can_j1939]
  ? raw_rcv+0x42/0x3c0 [can_raw]
  ? __pfx_j1939_can_recv+0x10/0x10 [can_j1939]
  can_rcv_filter+0x11f/0x350 [can]
  can_receive+0x12f/0x190 [can]
  ? __pfx_can_rcv+0x10/0x10 [can]
  can_rcv+0xdd/0x130 [can]
  ? __pfx_can_rcv+0x10/0x10 [can]
  __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x13d/0x150
  ? __pfx___netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x10/0x10
  ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x20
  ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x8c/0xe0
  __netif_receive_skb+0x23/0xb0
  process_backlog+0x107/0x260
  __napi_poll+0x69/0x310
  net_rx_action+0x2a1/0x580
  ? __pfx_net_rx_action+0x10/0x10
  ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
  ? handle_irq_event+0x7d/0xa0
  __do_softirq+0xf3/0x3f8
  do_softirq+0x53/0x80
  </IRQ>
  <TASK>
  __local_bh_enable_ip+0x6e/0x70
  netif_rx+0x16b/0x180
  can_send+0x32b/0x520 [can]
  ? __pfx_can_send+0x10/0x10 [can]
  ? __check_object_size+0x299/0x410
  raw_sendmsg+0x572/0x6d0 [can_raw]
  ? __pfx_raw_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 [can_raw]
  ? apparmor_socket_sendmsg+0x2f/0x40
  ? __pfx_raw_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 [can_raw]
  sock_sendmsg+0xef/0x100
  sock_write_iter+0x162/0x220
  ? __pfx_sock_write_iter+0x10/0x10
  ? __rtnl_unlock+0x47/0x80
  ? security_file_permission+0x54/0x320
  vfs_write+0x6ba/0x750
  ? __pfx_vfs_write+0x10/0x10
  ? __fget_light+0x1ca/0x1f0
  ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x5b/0x280
  ksys_write+0x143/0x170
  ? __pfx_ksys_write+0x10/0x10
  ? __kasan_check_read+0x15/0x20
  ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x62/0x70
  __x64_sys_write+0x47/0x60
  do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90
  ? do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x90
  ? irqentry_exit+0x3f/0x50
  ? exc_page_fault+0x79/0xf0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8

 Allocated by task 348:
  kasan_save_stack+0x2a/0x50
  kasan_set_track+0x29/0x40
  kasan_save_alloc_info+0x1f/0x30
  __kasan_kmalloc+0xb5/0xc0
  __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x67/0x160
  j1939_sk_setsockopt+0x284/0x450 [can_j1939]
  __sys_setsockopt+0x15c/0x2f0
  __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x6b/0x80
  do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8

 Freed by task 349:
  kasan_save_stack+0x2a/0x50
  kasan_set_track+0x29/0x40
  kasan_save_free_info+0x2f/0x50
  __kasan_slab_free+0x12e/0x1c0
  __kmem_cache_free+0x1b9/0x380
  kfree+0x7a/0x120
  j1939_sk_setsockopt+0x3b2/0x450 [can_j1939]
  __sys_setsockopt+0x15c/0x2f0
  __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x6b/0x80
  do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8

Fixes: 9d71dd0c70099 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol")
Reported-by: Sili Luo <rootlab@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: Sili Luo <rootlab@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231020133814.383996-1-o.rempel@pengutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-02-23 08:25:13 +01:00
Fedor Pchelkin
71349abe3a nfc: nci: free rx_data_reassembly skb on NCI device cleanup
commit bfb007aebe6bff451f7f3a4be19f4f286d0d5d9c upstream.

rx_data_reassembly skb is stored during NCI data exchange for processing
fragmented packets. It is dropped only when the last fragment is processed
or when an NTF packet with NCI_OP_RF_DEACTIVATE_NTF opcode is received.
However, the NCI device may be deallocated before that which leads to skb
leak.

As by design the rx_data_reassembly skb is bound to the NCI device and
nothing prevents the device to be freed before the skb is processed in
some way and cleaned, free it on the NCI device cleanup.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.

Fixes: 6a2968aaf50c ("NFC: basic NCI protocol implementation")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: syzbot+6b7c68d9c21e4ee4251b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/000000000000f43987060043da7b@google.com/
Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@ispras.ru>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-02-23 08:25:11 +01:00
Pablo Neira Ayuso
10e9cb3931 netfilter: nft_set_rbtree: skip end interval element from gc
commit 60c0c230c6f046da536d3df8b39a20b9a9fd6af0 upstream.

rbtree lazy gc on insert might collect an end interval element that has
been just added in this transactions, skip end interval elements that
are not yet active.

Fixes: f718863aca46 ("netfilter: nft_set_rbtree: fix overlap expiration walk")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: lonial con <kongln9170@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-02-23 08:25:08 +01:00
Julian Wiedmann
11ca9624cc net/af_iucv: clean up a try_then_request_module()
[ Upstream commit 4eb9eda6ba64114d98827e2870e024d5ab7cd35b ]

Use IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IUCV) to determine whether the iucv_if symbol
is available, and let depmod deal with the module dependency.

This was introduced back with commit 6fcd61f7bf5d ("af_iucv: use
loadable iucv interface"). And to avoid sprinkling IS_ENABLED() over
all the code, we're keeping the indirection through pr_iucv->...().

Signed-off-by: Julian Wiedmann <jwi@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Karsten Graul <kgraul@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-02-23 08:25:07 +01:00
Pablo Neira Ayuso
1c7488156e netfilter: nft_ct: reject direction for ct id
[ Upstream commit 38ed1c7062ada30d7c11e7a7acc749bf27aa14aa ]

Direction attribute is ignored, reject it in case this ever needs to be
supported

Fixes: 3087c3f7c23b ("netfilter: nft_ct: Add ct id support")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-02-23 08:25:07 +01:00
Pablo Neira Ayuso
8e2a84c6da netfilter: nft_compat: restrict match/target protocol to u16
[ Upstream commit d694b754894c93fb4d71a7f3699439dec111decc ]

xt_check_{match,target} expects u16, but NFTA_RULE_COMPAT_PROTO is u32.

NLA_POLICY_MAX(NLA_BE32, 65535) cannot be used because .max in
nla_policy is s16, see 3e48be05f3c7 ("netlink: add attribute range
validation to policy").

Fixes: 0ca743a55991 ("netfilter: nf_tables: add compatibility layer for x_tables")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-02-23 08:25:07 +01:00
Pablo Neira Ayuso
f139a4c6d2 netfilter: nft_compat: reject unused compat flag
[ Upstream commit 292781c3c5485ce33bd22b2ef1b2bed709b4d672 ]

Flag (1 << 0) is ignored is set, never used, reject it it with EINVAL
instead.

Fixes: 0ca743a55991 ("netfilter: nf_tables: add compatibility layer for x_tables")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-02-23 08:25:07 +01:00
Shigeru Yoshida
6f70f0b412 tipc: Check the bearer type before calling tipc_udp_nl_bearer_add()
[ Upstream commit 3871aa01e1a779d866fa9dfdd5a836f342f4eb87 ]

syzbot reported the following general protection fault [1]:

general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000010: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000080-0x0000000000000087]
...
RIP: 0010:tipc_udp_is_known_peer+0x9c/0x250 net/tipc/udp_media.c:291
...
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 tipc_udp_nl_bearer_add+0x212/0x2f0 net/tipc/udp_media.c:646
 tipc_nl_bearer_add+0x21e/0x360 net/tipc/bearer.c:1089
 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1fc/0x2e0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:972
 genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:1052 [inline]
 genl_rcv_msg+0x561/0x800 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1067
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x16b/0x440 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2544
 genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1076
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1341 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0x53b/0x810 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1367
 netlink_sendmsg+0x8b7/0xd70 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1909
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
 __sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x180 net/socket.c:745
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x6ac/0x940 net/socket.c:2584
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x135/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2638
 __sys_sendmsg+0x117/0x1e0 net/socket.c:2667
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x40/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b

The cause of this issue is that when tipc_nl_bearer_add() is called with
the TIPC_NLA_BEARER_UDP_OPTS attribute, tipc_udp_nl_bearer_add() is called
even if the bearer is not UDP.

tipc_udp_is_known_peer() called by tipc_udp_nl_bearer_add() assumes that
the media_ptr field of the tipc_bearer has an udp_bearer type object, so
the function goes crazy for non-UDP bearers.

This patch fixes the issue by checking the bearer type before calling
tipc_udp_nl_bearer_add() in tipc_nl_bearer_add().

Fixes: ef20cd4dd163 ("tipc: introduce UDP replicast")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+5142b87a9abc510e14fa@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=5142b87a9abc510e14fa [1]
Signed-off-by: Shigeru Yoshida <syoshida@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Tung Nguyen <tung.q.nguyen@dektech.com.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240131152310.4089541-1-syoshida@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-02-23 08:25:07 +01:00
David Howells
ef1f56f2cd rxrpc: Fix response to PING RESPONSE ACKs to a dead call
[ Upstream commit 6f769f22822aa4124b556339781b04d810f0e038 ]

Stop rxrpc from sending a DUP ACK in response to a PING RESPONSE ACK on a
dead call.  We may have initiated the ping but the call may have beaten the
response to completion.

Fixes: 18bfeba50dfd ("rxrpc: Perform terminal call ACK/ABORT retransmission from conn processor")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-02-23 08:25:07 +01:00
Eric Dumazet
5993f121fb inet: read sk->sk_family once in inet_recv_error()
[ Upstream commit eef00a82c568944f113f2de738156ac591bbd5cd ]

inet_recv_error() is called without holding the socket lock.

IPv6 socket could mutate to IPv4 with IPV6_ADDRFORM
socket option and trigger a KCSAN warning.

Fixes: f4713a3dfad0 ("net-timestamp: make tcp_recvmsg call ipv6_recv_error for AF_INET6 socks")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-02-23 08:25:07 +01:00
Eric Dumazet
b169ffde73 af_unix: fix lockdep positive in sk_diag_dump_icons()
[ Upstream commit 4d322dce82a1d44f8c83f0f54f95dd1b8dcf46c9 ]

syzbot reported a lockdep splat [1].

Blamed commit hinted about the possible lockdep
violation, and code used unix_state_lock_nested()
in an attempt to silence lockdep.

It is not sufficient, because unix_state_lock_nested()
is already used from unix_state_double_lock().

We need to use a separate subclass.

This patch adds a distinct enumeration to make things
more explicit.

Also use swap() in unix_state_double_lock() as a clean up.

v2: add a missing inline keyword to unix_state_lock_nested()

[1]
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.8.0-rc1-syzkaller-00356-g8a696a29c690 #0 Not tainted

syz-executor.1/2542 is trying to acquire lock:
 ffff88808b5df9e8 (rlock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: skb_queue_tail+0x36/0x120 net/core/skbuff.c:3863

but task is already holding lock:
 ffff88808b5dfe70 (&u->lock/1){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: unix_dgram_sendmsg+0xfc7/0x2200 net/unix/af_unix.c:2089

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #1 (&u->lock/1){+.+.}-{2:2}:
        lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x530 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
        _raw_spin_lock_nested+0x31/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:378
        sk_diag_dump_icons net/unix/diag.c:87 [inline]
        sk_diag_fill+0x6ea/0xfe0 net/unix/diag.c:157
        sk_diag_dump net/unix/diag.c:196 [inline]
        unix_diag_dump+0x3e9/0x630 net/unix/diag.c:220
        netlink_dump+0x5c1/0xcd0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2264
        __netlink_dump_start+0x5d7/0x780 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2370
        netlink_dump_start include/linux/netlink.h:338 [inline]
        unix_diag_handler_dump+0x1c3/0x8f0 net/unix/diag.c:319
       sock_diag_rcv_msg+0xe3/0x400
        netlink_rcv_skb+0x1df/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2543
        sock_diag_rcv+0x2a/0x40 net/core/sock_diag.c:280
        netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1341 [inline]
        netlink_unicast+0x7e6/0x980 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1367
        netlink_sendmsg+0xa37/0xd70 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1908
        sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
        __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline]
        sock_write_iter+0x39a/0x520 net/socket.c:1160
        call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2085 [inline]
        new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:497 [inline]
        vfs_write+0xa74/0xca0 fs/read_write.c:590
        ksys_write+0x1a0/0x2c0 fs/read_write.c:643
        do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
        do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b

-> #0 (rlock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{2:2}:
        check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline]
        check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline]
        validate_chain+0x1909/0x5ab0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869
        __lock_acquire+0x1345/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137
        lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x530 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
        __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline]
        _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xd5/0x120 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162
        skb_queue_tail+0x36/0x120 net/core/skbuff.c:3863
        unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x15d9/0x2200 net/unix/af_unix.c:2112
        sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
        __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline]
        ____sys_sendmsg+0x592/0x890 net/socket.c:2584
        ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2638 [inline]
        __sys_sendmmsg+0x3b2/0x730 net/socket.c:2724
        __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2753 [inline]
        __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2750 [inline]
        __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0xa0/0xb0 net/socket.c:2750
        do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
        do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b

other info that might help us debug this:

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&u->lock/1);
                               lock(rlock-AF_UNIX);
                               lock(&u->lock/1);
  lock(rlock-AF_UNIX);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

1 lock held by syz-executor.1/2542:
  #0: ffff88808b5dfe70 (&u->lock/1){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: unix_dgram_sendmsg+0xfc7/0x2200 net/unix/af_unix.c:2089

stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 2542 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc1-syzkaller-00356-g8a696a29c690 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/17/2023
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
  __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
  dump_stack_lvl+0x1e7/0x2d0 lib/dump_stack.c:106
  check_noncircular+0x366/0x490 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2187
  check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline]
  check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline]
  validate_chain+0x1909/0x5ab0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869
  __lock_acquire+0x1345/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137
  lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x530 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
  __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline]
  _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xd5/0x120 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162
  skb_queue_tail+0x36/0x120 net/core/skbuff.c:3863
  unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x15d9/0x2200 net/unix/af_unix.c:2112
  sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
  __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline]
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x592/0x890 net/socket.c:2584
  ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2638 [inline]
  __sys_sendmmsg+0x3b2/0x730 net/socket.c:2724
  __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2753 [inline]
  __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2750 [inline]
  __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0xa0/0xb0 net/socket.c:2750
  do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
  do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
RIP: 0033:0x7f26d887cda9
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 20 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f26d95a60c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000133
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f26d89abf80 RCX: 00007f26d887cda9
RDX: 000000000000003e RSI: 00000000200bd000 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00007f26d88c947a R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00000000000008c0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007f26d89abf80 R15: 00007ffcfe081a68

Fixes: 2aac7a2cb0d9 ("unix_diag: Pending connections IDs NLA")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240130184235.1620738-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-02-23 08:25:05 +01:00
Zhipeng Lu
b3dace37f1 net: ipv4: fix a memleak in ip_setup_cork
[ Upstream commit 5dee6d6923458e26966717f2a3eae7d09fc10bf6 ]

When inetdev_valid_mtu fails, cork->opt should be freed if it is
allocated in ip_setup_cork. Otherwise there could be a memleak.

Fixes: 501a90c94510 ("inet: protect against too small mtu values.")
Signed-off-by: Zhipeng Lu <alexious@zju.edu.cn>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240129091017.2938835-1-alexious@zju.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-02-23 08:25:05 +01:00
Pablo Neira Ayuso
f549f340c9 netfilter: nft_ct: sanitize layer 3 and 4 protocol number in custom expectations
[ Upstream commit 8059918a1377f2f1fff06af4f5a4ed3d5acd6bc4 ]

- Disallow families other than NFPROTO_{IPV4,IPV6,INET}.
- Disallow layer 4 protocol with no ports, since destination port is a
  mandatory attribute for this object.

Fixes: 857b46027d6f ("netfilter: nft_ct: add ct expectations support")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-02-23 08:25:05 +01:00
Pablo Neira Ayuso
06608603fa netfilter: nf_log: replace BUG_ON by WARN_ON_ONCE when putting logger
[ Upstream commit 259eb32971e9eb24d1777a28d82730659f50fdcb ]

Module reference is bumped for each user, this should not ever happen.

But BUG_ON check should use rcu_access_pointer() instead.

If this ever happens, do WARN_ON_ONCE() instead of BUG_ON() and
consolidate pointer check under the rcu read side lock section.

Fixes: fab4085f4e24 ("netfilter: log: nf_log_packet() as real unified interface")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-02-23 08:25:04 +01:00
Eric Dumazet
64babb17e8 llc: call sock_orphan() at release time
[ Upstream commit aa2b2eb3934859904c287bf5434647ba72e14c1c ]

syzbot reported an interesting trace [1] caused by a stale sk->sk_wq
pointer in a closed llc socket.

In commit ff7b11aa481f ("net: socket: set sock->sk to NULL after
calling proto_ops::release()") Eric Biggers hinted that some protocols
are missing a sock_orphan(), we need to perform a full audit.

In net-next, I plan to clear sock->sk from sock_orphan() and
amend Eric patch to add a warning.

[1]
 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in list_empty include/linux/list.h:373 [inline]
 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in waitqueue_active include/linux/wait.h:127 [inline]
 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sock_def_write_space_wfree net/core/sock.c:3384 [inline]
 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sock_wfree+0x9a8/0x9d0 net/core/sock.c:2468
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88802f4fc880 by task ksoftirqd/1/27

CPU: 1 PID: 27 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc1-syzkaller-00049-g6098d87eaf31 #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
  __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
  dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x1b0 lib/dump_stack.c:106
  print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
  print_report+0xc4/0x620 mm/kasan/report.c:488
  kasan_report+0xda/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:601
  list_empty include/linux/list.h:373 [inline]
  waitqueue_active include/linux/wait.h:127 [inline]
  sock_def_write_space_wfree net/core/sock.c:3384 [inline]
  sock_wfree+0x9a8/0x9d0 net/core/sock.c:2468
  skb_release_head_state+0xa3/0x2b0 net/core/skbuff.c:1080
  skb_release_all net/core/skbuff.c:1092 [inline]
  napi_consume_skb+0x119/0x2b0 net/core/skbuff.c:1404
  e1000_unmap_and_free_tx_resource+0x144/0x200 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:1970
  e1000_clean_tx_irq drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:3860 [inline]
  e1000_clean+0x4a1/0x26e0 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:3801
  __napi_poll.constprop.0+0xb4/0x540 net/core/dev.c:6576
  napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6645 [inline]
  net_rx_action+0x956/0xe90 net/core/dev.c:6778
  __do_softirq+0x21a/0x8de kernel/softirq.c:553
  run_ksoftirqd kernel/softirq.c:921 [inline]
  run_ksoftirqd+0x31/0x60 kernel/softirq.c:913
  smpboot_thread_fn+0x660/0xa10 kernel/smpboot.c:164
  kthread+0x2c6/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:388
  ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
  ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:242
 </TASK>

Allocated by task 5167:
  kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:47
  kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:68
  unpoison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:314 [inline]
  __kasan_slab_alloc+0x81/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:340
  kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:201 [inline]
  slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3813 [inline]
  slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3860 [inline]
  kmem_cache_alloc_lru+0x142/0x6f0 mm/slub.c:3879
  alloc_inode_sb include/linux/fs.h:3019 [inline]
  sock_alloc_inode+0x25/0x1c0 net/socket.c:308
  alloc_inode+0x5d/0x220 fs/inode.c:260
  new_inode_pseudo+0x16/0x80 fs/inode.c:1005
  sock_alloc+0x40/0x270 net/socket.c:634
  __sock_create+0xbc/0x800 net/socket.c:1535
  sock_create net/socket.c:1622 [inline]
  __sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1659 [inline]
  __sys_socket+0x14c/0x260 net/socket.c:1706
  __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1720 [inline]
  __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1718 [inline]
  __x64_sys_socket+0x72/0xb0 net/socket.c:1718
  do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
  do_syscall_64+0xd3/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b

Freed by task 0:
  kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:47
  kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:68
  kasan_save_free_info+0x3f/0x60 mm/kasan/generic.c:640
  poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:241 [inline]
  __kasan_slab_free+0x121/0x1b0 mm/kasan/common.c:257
  kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:184 [inline]
  slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2121 [inline]
  slab_free mm/slub.c:4299 [inline]
  kmem_cache_free+0x129/0x350 mm/slub.c:4363
  i_callback+0x43/0x70 fs/inode.c:249
  rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2158 [inline]
  rcu_core+0x819/0x1680 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2433
  __do_softirq+0x21a/0x8de kernel/softirq.c:553

Last potentially related work creation:
  kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:47
  __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xba/0x100 mm/kasan/generic.c:586
  __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x9a/0x7b0 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2683
  destroy_inode+0x129/0x1b0 fs/inode.c:315
  iput_final fs/inode.c:1739 [inline]
  iput.part.0+0x560/0x7b0 fs/inode.c:1765
  iput+0x5c/0x80 fs/inode.c:1755
  dentry_unlink_inode+0x292/0x430 fs/dcache.c:400
  __dentry_kill+0x1ca/0x5f0 fs/dcache.c:603
  dput.part.0+0x4ac/0x9a0 fs/dcache.c:845
  dput+0x1f/0x30 fs/dcache.c:835
  __fput+0x3b9/0xb70 fs/file_table.c:384
  task_work_run+0x14d/0x240 kernel/task_work.c:180
  exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:38 [inline]
  do_exit+0xa8a/0x2ad0 kernel/exit.c:871
  do_group_exit+0xd4/0x2a0 kernel/exit.c:1020
  __do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1031 [inline]
  __se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1029 [inline]
  __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3e/0x50 kernel/exit.c:1029
  do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
  do_syscall_64+0xd3/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88802f4fc800
 which belongs to the cache sock_inode_cache of size 1408
The buggy address is located 128 bytes inside of
 freed 1408-byte region [ffff88802f4fc800, ffff88802f4fcd80)

The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:ffffea0000bd3e00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x2f4f8
head:ffffea0000bd3e00 order:3 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
anon flags: 0xfff00000000840(slab|head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
page_type: 0xffffffff()
raw: 00fff00000000840 ffff888013b06b40 0000000000000000 0000000000000001
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080150015 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 3, migratetype Reclaimable, gfp_mask 0xd20d0(__GFP_IO|__GFP_FS|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC|__GFP_RECLAIMABLE), pid 4956, tgid 4956 (sshd), ts 31423924727, free_ts 0
  set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:31 [inline]
  post_alloc_hook+0x2d0/0x350 mm/page_alloc.c:1533
  prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1540 [inline]
  get_page_from_freelist+0xa28/0x3780 mm/page_alloc.c:3311
  __alloc_pages+0x22f/0x2440 mm/page_alloc.c:4567
  __alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:238 [inline]
  alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:261 [inline]
  alloc_slab_page mm/slub.c:2190 [inline]
  allocate_slab mm/slub.c:2354 [inline]
  new_slab+0xcc/0x3a0 mm/slub.c:2407
  ___slab_alloc+0x4af/0x19a0 mm/slub.c:3540
  __slab_alloc.constprop.0+0x56/0xa0 mm/slub.c:3625
  __slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3678 [inline]
  slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3850 [inline]
  kmem_cache_alloc_lru+0x379/0x6f0 mm/slub.c:3879
  alloc_inode_sb include/linux/fs.h:3019 [inline]
  sock_alloc_inode+0x25/0x1c0 net/socket.c:308
  alloc_inode+0x5d/0x220 fs/inode.c:260
  new_inode_pseudo+0x16/0x80 fs/inode.c:1005
  sock_alloc+0x40/0x270 net/socket.c:634
  __sock_create+0xbc/0x800 net/socket.c:1535
  sock_create net/socket.c:1622 [inline]
  __sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1659 [inline]
  __sys_socket+0x14c/0x260 net/socket.c:1706
  __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1720 [inline]
  __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1718 [inline]
  __x64_sys_socket+0x72/0xb0 net/socket.c:1718
  do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
  do_syscall_64+0xd3/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
page_owner free stack trace missing

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff88802f4fc780: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff88802f4fc800: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff88802f4fc880: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                   ^
 ffff88802f4fc900: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
 ffff88802f4fc980: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb

Fixes: 43815482370c ("net: sock_def_readable() and friends RCU conversion")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+32b89eaa102b372ff76d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240126165532.3396702-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-02-23 08:25:04 +01:00
Helge Deller
2a09d1784c ipv6: Ensure natural alignment of const ipv6 loopback and router addresses
[ Upstream commit 60365049ccbacd101654a66ddcb299abfabd4fc5 ]

On a parisc64 kernel I sometimes notice this kernel warning:
Kernel unaligned access to 0x40ff8814 at ndisc_send_skb+0xc0/0x4d8

The address 0x40ff8814 points to the in6addr_linklocal_allrouters
variable and the warning simply means that some ipv6 function tries to
read a 64-bit word directly from the not-64-bit aligned
in6addr_linklocal_allrouters variable.

Unaligned accesses are non-critical as the architecture or exception
handlers usually will fix it up at runtime. Nevertheless it may trigger
a performance penality for some architectures. For details read the
"unaligned-memory-access" kernel documentation.

The patch below ensures that the ipv6 loopback and router addresses will
always be naturally aligned. This prevents the unaligned accesses for
all architectures.

Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Fixes: 034dfc5df99eb ("ipv6: export in6addr_loopback to modules")
Acked-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ZbNuFM1bFqoH-UoY@p100
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-02-23 08:25:04 +01:00
Edward Adam Davis
12f58dce48 wifi: cfg80211: fix RCU dereference in __cfg80211_bss_update
[ Upstream commit 1184950e341c11b6f82bc5b59564411d9537ab27 ]

Replace rcu_dereference() with rcu_access_pointer() since we hold
the lock here (and aren't in an RCU critical section).

Fixes: 32af9a9e1069 ("wifi: cfg80211: free beacon_ies when overridden from hidden BSS")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+864a269c27ee06b58374@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Edward Adam Davis <eadavis@qq.com>
Link: https://msgid.link/tencent_BF8F0DF0258C8DBF124CDDE4DD8D992DCF07@qq.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-02-23 08:25:03 +01:00
Benjamin Berg
52240224e7 wifi: cfg80211: free beacon_ies when overridden from hidden BSS
[ Upstream commit 32af9a9e1069e55bc02741fb00ac9d0ca1a2eaef ]

This is a more of a cosmetic fix. The branch will only be taken if
proberesp_ies is set, which implies that beacon_ies is not set unless we
are connected to an AP that just did a channel switch. And, in that case
we should have found the BSS in the internal storage to begin with.

Signed-off-by: Benjamin Berg <benjamin.berg@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Miri Korenblit <miriam.rachel.korenblit@intel.com>
Link: https://msgid.link/20231220133549.b898e22dadff.Id8c4c10aedd176ef2e18a4cad747b299f150f9df@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-02-23 08:25:00 +01:00