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[ Upstream commit f7cfd871ae0c5008d94b6f66834e7845caa93c15 ]
Recently syzbot reported[0] that there is a deadlock amongst the users
of exec_update_mutex. The problematic lock ordering found by lockdep
was:
perf_event_open (exec_update_mutex -> ovl_i_mutex)
chown (ovl_i_mutex -> sb_writes)
sendfile (sb_writes -> p->lock)
by reading from a proc file and writing to overlayfs
proc_pid_syscall (p->lock -> exec_update_mutex)
While looking at possible solutions it occured to me that all of the
users and possible users involved only wanted to state of the given
process to remain the same. They are all readers. The only writer is
exec.
There is no reason for readers to block on each other. So fix
this deadlock by transforming exec_update_mutex into a rw_semaphore
named exec_update_lock that only exec takes for writing.
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Christopher Yeoh <cyeoh@au1.ibm.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Fixes: eea9673250db ("exec: Add exec_update_mutex to replace cred_guard_mutex")
[0] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/00000000000063640c05ade8e3de@google.com
Reported-by: syzbot+db9cdf3dd1f64252c6ef@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87ft4mbqen.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 5d069dbe8aaf2a197142558b6fb2978189ba3454 ]
Jan Kara's analysis of the syzbot report (edited):
The reproducer opens a directory on FUSE filesystem, it then attaches
dnotify mark to the open directory. After that a fuse_do_getattr() call
finds that attributes returned by the server are inconsistent, and calls
make_bad_inode() which, among other things does:
inode->i_mode = S_IFREG;
This then confuses dnotify which doesn't tear down its structures
properly and eventually crashes.
Avoid calling make_bad_inode() on a live inode: switch to a private flag on
the fuse inode. Also add the test to ops which the bad_inode_ops would
have caught.
This bug goes back to the initial merge of fuse in 2.6.14...
Reported-by: syzbot+f427adf9324b92652ccc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit edf7ddbf1c5eb98b720b063b73e20e8a4a1ce673 ]
Missing calls to mntget() (or equivalently, too many calls to mntput())
are hard to detect because mntput() delays freeing mounts using
task_work_add(), then again using call_rcu(). As a result, mnt_count
can often be decremented to -1 without getting a KASAN use-after-free
report. Such cases are still bugs though, and they point to real
use-after-frees being possible.
For an example of this, see the bug fixed by commit 1b0b9cc8d379
("vfs: fsmount: add missing mntget()"), discussed at
https://lkml.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20190605135401.GB30925@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/T/#u.
This bug *should* have been trivial to find. But actually, it wasn't
found until syzkaller happened to use fchdir() to manipulate the
reference count just right for the bug to be noticeable.
Address this by making mntput_no_expire() issue a WARN if mnt_count has
become negative.
Suggested-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit b6d49ecd1081740b6e632366428b960461f8158b ]
When returning the layout in nfs4_evict_inode(), we need to ensure that
the layout is actually done being freed before we can proceed to free the
inode itself.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 10f04d40a9fa29785206c619f80d8beedb778837 ]
The on-disk quota format supports quota files with upto 2^32 blocks. Be
careful when computing quota file offsets in the quota files from block
numbers as they can overflow 32-bit types. Since quota files larger than
4GB would require ~26 millions of quota users, this is mostly a
theoretical concern now but better be careful, fuzzers would find the
problem sooner or later anyway...
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 8d1ddb5e79374fb277985a6b3faa2ed8631c5b4c upstream.
Syzbot reports a potential deadlock found by the newly added recursive
read deadlock detection in lockdep:
[...] ========================================================
[...] WARNING: possible irq lock inversion dependency detected
[...] 5.9.0-rc2-syzkaller #0 Not tainted
[...] --------------------------------------------------------
[...] syz-executor.1/10214 just changed the state of lock:
[...] ffff88811f506338 (&f->f_owner.lock){.+..}-{2:2}, at: send_sigurg+0x1d/0x200
[...] but this lock was taken by another, HARDIRQ-safe lock in the past:
[...] (&dev->event_lock){-...}-{2:2}
[...]
[...]
[...] and interrupts could create inverse lock ordering between them.
[...]
[...]
[...] other info that might help us debug this:
[...] Chain exists of:
[...] &dev->event_lock --> &new->fa_lock --> &f->f_owner.lock
[...]
[...] Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:
[...]
[...] CPU0 CPU1
[...] ---- ----
[...] lock(&f->f_owner.lock);
[...] local_irq_disable();
[...] lock(&dev->event_lock);
[...] lock(&new->fa_lock);
[...] <Interrupt>
[...] lock(&dev->event_lock);
[...]
[...] *** DEADLOCK ***
The corresponding deadlock case is as followed:
CPU 0 CPU 1 CPU 2
read_lock(&fown->lock);
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->event_lock, ...)
write_lock_irq(&filp->f_owner.lock); // wait for the lock
read_lock(&fown-lock); // have to wait until the writer release
// due to the fairness
<interrupted>
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->event_lock); // wait for the lock
The lock dependency on CPU 1 happens if there exists a call sequence:
input_inject_event():
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->event_lock,...);
input_handle_event():
input_pass_values():
input_to_handler():
handler->event(): // evdev_event()
evdev_pass_values():
spin_lock(&client->buffer_lock);
__pass_event():
kill_fasync():
kill_fasync_rcu():
read_lock(&fa->fa_lock);
send_sigio():
read_lock(&fown->lock);
To fix this, make the reader in send_sigurg() and send_sigio() use
read_lock_irqsave() and read_lock_irqrestore().
Reported-by: syzbot+22e87cdf94021b984aa6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+c5e32344981ad9f33750@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit dc889b8d4a8122549feabe99eead04e6b23b6513 upstream.
Make the printk() [bfs "printf" macro] seem less severe by changing
"WARNING:" to "NOTE:".
<asm-generic/bug.h> warns us about using WARNING or BUG in a format string
other than in WARN() or BUG() family macros. bfs/inode.c is doing just
that in a normal printk() call, so change the "WARNING" string to be
"NOTE".
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201203212634.17278-1-rdunlap@infradead.org
Reported-by: syzbot+3fd34060f26e766536ff@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "Tigran A. Aivazian" <aivazian.tigran@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit cd3ed3c73ac671ff6b0230ccb72b8300292d3643 ]
Set rp_size to zero will be ignore during remounting.
The method to identify whether we input a remounting option of
rp_size is to check if the rp_size input is zero. It can not work
well if we pass "rp_size=0".
This patch add a bool variable "set_rp_size" to fix this problem.
Reported-by: Jubin Zhong <zhongjubin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: lizhe <lizhe67@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit b08070eca9e247f60ab39d79b2c25d274750441f ]
ext4_handle_error() with errors=continue mount option can accidentally
remount the filesystem read-only when the system is rebooting. Fix that.
Fixes: 1dc1097ff60e ("ext4: avoid panic during forced reboot")
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201127113405.26867-2-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 7f458a3873ae94efe1f37c8b96c97e7298769e98 ]
When defragmenting we skip ranges that have holes or inline extents, so that
we don't do unnecessary IO and waste space. We do this check when calling
should_defrag_range() at btrfs_defrag_file(). However we do it without
holding the inode's lock. The reason we do it like this is to avoid
blocking other tasks for too long, that possibly want to operate on other
file ranges, since after the call to should_defrag_range() and before
locking the inode, we trigger a synchronous page cache readahead. However
before we were able to lock the inode, some other task might have punched
a hole in our range, or we may now have an inline extent there, in which
case we should not set the range for defrag anymore since that would cause
unnecessary IO and make us waste space (i.e. allocating extents to contain
zeros for a hole).
So after we locked the inode and the range in the iotree, check again if
we have holes or an inline extent, and if we do, just skip the range.
I hit this while testing my next patch that fixes races when updating an
inode's number of bytes (subject "btrfs: update the number of bytes used
by an inode atomically"), and it depends on this change in order to work
correctly. Alternatively I could rework that other patch to detect holes
and flag their range with the 'new delalloc' bit, but this itself fixes
an efficiency problem due a race that from a functional point of view is
not harmful (it could be triggered with btrfs/062 from fstests).
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 3ceb6543e9cf6ed87cc1fbc6f23ca2db903564cd upstream.
There isn't really any valid reason to use __FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX or
FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID in a userspace program. These constants are
only meant to be used by the kernel internally, and they are defined in
the UAPI header next to the mode numbers and flags only so that kernel
developers don't forget to update them when adding new modes or flags.
In https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201005074133.1958633-2-satyat@google.com
there was an example of someone wanting to use __FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX in a
user program, and it was wrong because the program would have broken if
__FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX were ever increased. So having this definition
available is harmful. FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID has the same problem.
So, remove these definitions from the UAPI header. Replace
FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID with just listing the valid flags explicitly
in the one kernel function that needs it. Move __FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX to
fscrypt_private.h, remove the double underscores (which were only
present to discourage use by userspace), and add a BUILD_BUG_ON() and
comments to (hopefully) ensure it is kept in sync.
Keep the old name FS_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID, since it's been around for
longer and there's a greater chance that removing it would break source
compatibility with some program. Indeed, mtd-utils is using it in
an #ifdef, and removing it would introduce compiler warnings (about
FS_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_* being redefined) into the mtd-utils build.
However, reduce its value to 0x07 so that it only includes the flags
with old names (the ones present before Linux 5.4), and try to make it
clear that it's now "frozen" and no new flags should be added to it.
Fixes: 2336d0deb2d4 ("fscrypt: use FSCRYPT_ prefix for uapi constants")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.4+
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201024005132.495952-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 159e1de201b6fca10bfec50405a3b53a561096a8 upstream.
It's possible to create a duplicate filename in an encrypted directory
by creating a file concurrently with adding the encryption key.
Specifically, sys_open(O_CREAT) (or sys_mkdir(), sys_mknod(), or
sys_symlink()) can lookup the target filename while the directory's
encryption key hasn't been added yet, resulting in a negative no-key
dentry. The VFS then calls ->create() (or ->mkdir(), ->mknod(), or
->symlink()) because the dentry is negative. Normally, ->create() would
return -ENOKEY due to the directory's key being unavailable. However,
if the key was added between the dentry lookup and ->create(), then the
filesystem will go ahead and try to create the file.
If the target filename happens to already exist as a normal name (not a
no-key name), a duplicate filename may be added to the directory.
In order to fix this, we need to fix the filesystems to prevent
->create(), ->mkdir(), ->mknod(), and ->symlink() on no-key names.
(->rename() and ->link() need it too, but those are already handled
correctly by fscrypt_prepare_rename() and fscrypt_prepare_link().)
In preparation for this, add a helper function fscrypt_is_nokey_name()
that filesystems can use to do this check. Use this helper function for
the existing checks that fs/crypto/ does for rename and link.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201118075609.120337-2-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit bfc2b7e8518999003a61f91c1deb5e88ed77b07d upstream.
As described in "fscrypt: add fscrypt_is_nokey_name()", it's possible to
create a duplicate filename in an encrypted directory by creating a file
concurrently with adding the directory's encryption key.
Fix this bug on f2fs by rejecting no-key dentries in f2fs_add_link().
Note that the weird check for the current task in f2fs_do_add_link()
seems to make this bug difficult to reproduce on f2fs.
Fixes: 9ea97163c6da ("f2fs crypto: add filename encryption for f2fs_add_link")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201118075609.120337-4-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 76786a0f083473de31678bdb259a3d4167cf756d upstream.
As described in "fscrypt: add fscrypt_is_nokey_name()", it's possible to
create a duplicate filename in an encrypted directory by creating a file
concurrently with adding the directory's encryption key.
Fix this bug on ubifs by rejecting no-key dentries in ubifs_create(),
ubifs_mkdir(), ubifs_mknod(), and ubifs_symlink().
Note that ubifs doesn't actually report the duplicate filenames from
readdir, but rather it seems to replace the original dentry with a new
one (which is still wrong, just a different effect from ext4).
On ubifs, this fixes xfstest generic/595 as well as the new xfstest I
wrote specifically for this bug.
Fixes: f4f61d2cc6d8 ("ubifs: Implement encrypted filenames")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201118075609.120337-5-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 75d18cd1868c2aee43553723872c35d7908f240f upstream.
As described in "fscrypt: add fscrypt_is_nokey_name()", it's possible to
create a duplicate filename in an encrypted directory by creating a file
concurrently with adding the directory's encryption key.
Fix this bug on ext4 by rejecting no-key dentries in ext4_add_entry().
Note that the duplicate check in ext4_find_dest_de() sometimes prevented
this bug. However in many cases it didn't, since ext4_find_dest_de()
doesn't examine every dentry.
Fixes: 4461471107b7 ("ext4 crypto: enable filename encryption")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201118075609.120337-3-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c61b3e4839007668360ed8b87d7da96d2e59fc6c upstream.
Bounds checking tools can flag a bug in dbAdjTree() for an array index
out of bounds in dmt_stree. Since dmt_stree can refer to the stree in
both structures dmaptree and dmapctl, use the larger array to eliminate
the false positive.
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
Reported-by: butt3rflyh4ck <butterflyhuangxx@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 08cd274f9b8283a1da93e2ccab216a336da83525 upstream.
The jffs2 mount options will be ignored when remounting jffs2.
It can be easily reproduced with the steps listed below.
1. mount -t jffs2 -o compr=none /dev/mtdblockx /mnt
2. mount -o remount compr=zlib /mnt
Since ec10a24f10c8, the option parsing happens before fill_super and
then pass fc, which contains the options parsing results, to function
jffs2_reconfigure during remounting. But function jffs2_reconfigure do
not update c->mount_opts.
This patch add a function jffs2_update_mount_opts to fix this problem.
By the way, I notice that tmpfs use the same way to update remounting
options. If it is necessary to unify them?
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: ec10a24f10c8 ("vfs: Convert jffs2 to use the new mount API")
Signed-off-by: lizhe <lizhe67@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9afc9a8a4909fece0e911e72b1060614ba2f7969 upstream.
The log of this problem is:
jffs2: Error garbage collecting node at 0x***!
jffs2: No space for garbage collection. Aborting GC thread
This is because GC believe that it do nothing, so it abort.
After going over the image of jffs2, I find a scene that
can trigger this problem stably.
The scene is: there is a normal dirent node at summary-area,
but abnormal at corresponding not-summary-area with error
name_crc.
The reason that GC exit abnormally is because it find that
abnormal dirent node to GC, but when it goes to function
jffs2_add_fd_to_list, it cannot meet the condition listed
below:
if ((*prev)->nhash == new->nhash && !strcmp((*prev)->name, new->name))
So no node is marked obsolete, statistical information of
erase_block do not change, which cause GC exit abnormally.
The root cause of this problem is: we do not check the
name_crc of the abnormal dirent node with summary is enabled.
Noticed that in function jffs2_scan_dirent_node, we use
function jffs2_scan_dirty_space to deal with the dirent
node with error name_crc. So this patch add a checking
code in function read_direntry to ensure the correctness
of dirent node. If checked failed, the dirent node will
be marked obsolete so GC will pass this node and this
problem will be fixed.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Zhe Li <lizhe67@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 20f1431160c6b590cdc269a846fc5a448abf5b98 upstream.
Write buffers use a kmalloc()'ed buffer, they can leak
up to seven bytes of kernel memory to flash if writes are not
aligned.
So use ubifs_pad() to fill these gaps with padding bytes.
This was never a problem while scanning because the scanner logic
manually aligns node lengths and skips over these gaps.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 1e51764a3c2ac05a2 ("UBIFS: add new flash file system")
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Reviewed-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ebcd6de98754d9b6a5f89d7835864b1c365d432f upstream.
Mounts to Azure cause an unneeded warning message in dmesg
"CIFS: VFS: parse_server_interfaces: incomplete interface info"
Azure rounds up the size (by 8 additional bytes, to a
16 byte boundary) of the structure returned on the query
of the server interfaces at mount time. This is permissible
even though different than other servers so do not log a warning
if query network interfaces response is only rounded up by 8
bytes or fewer.
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e5cafce3ad0f8652d6849314d951459c2bff7233 upstream.
A NULL pointer dereference may occur in __ceph_remove_cap with some of the
callbacks used in ceph_iterate_session_caps, namely trim_caps_cb and
remove_session_caps_cb. Those callers hold the session->s_mutex, so they
are prevented from concurrent execution, but ceph_evict_inode does not.
Since the callers of this function hold the i_ceph_lock, the fix is simply
a matter of returning immediately if caps->ci is NULL.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
URL: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/43272
Suggested-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <lhenriques@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 46e294efc355c48d1dd4d58501aa56dac461792a upstream.
Xattr code using inodes with large xattr data can end up dropping last
inode reference (and thus deleting the inode) from places like
ext4_xattr_set_entry(). That function is called with transaction started
and so ext4_evict_inode() can deadlock against fs freezing like:
CPU1 CPU2
removexattr() freeze_super()
vfs_removexattr()
ext4_xattr_set()
handle = ext4_journal_start()
...
ext4_xattr_set_entry()
iput(old_ea_inode)
ext4_evict_inode(old_ea_inode)
sb->s_writers.frozen = SB_FREEZE_FS;
sb_wait_write(sb, SB_FREEZE_FS);
ext4_freeze()
jbd2_journal_lock_updates()
-> blocks waiting for all
handles to stop
sb_start_intwrite()
-> blocks as sb is already in SB_FREEZE_FS state
Generally it is advisable to delete inodes from a separate transaction
as it can consume quite some credits however in this case it would be
quite clumsy and furthermore the credits for inode deletion are quite
limited and already accounted for. So just tweak ext4_evict_inode() to
avoid freeze protection if we have transaction already started and thus
it is not really needed anyway.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: dec214d00e0d ("ext4: xattr inode deduplication")
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201127110649.24730-1-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit cca415537244f6102cbb09b5b90db6ae2c953bdd upstream.
When freeing metadata, we will create an ext4_free_data and
insert it into the pending free list. After the current
transaction is committed, the object will be freed.
ext4_mb_free_metadata() will check whether the area to be freed
overlaps with the pending free list. If true, return directly. At this
time, ext4_free_data is leaked. Fortunately, the probability of this
problem is small, since it only occurs if the file system is corrupted
such that a block is claimed by more one inode and those inodes are
deleted within a single jbd2 transaction.
Signed-off-by: Chunguang Xu <brookxu@tencent.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1604764698-4269-8-git-send-email-brookxu@tencent.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c57dd1f2f6a7cd1bb61802344f59ccdc5278c983 upstream
[BUG]
The following script can lead to tons of beyond device boundary access:
mkfs.btrfs -f $dev -b 10G
mount $dev $mnt
trimfs $mnt
btrfs filesystem resize 1:-1G $mnt
trimfs $mnt
[CAUSE]
Since commit 929be17a9b49 ("btrfs: Switch btrfs_trim_free_extents to
find_first_clear_extent_bit"), we try to avoid trimming ranges that's
already trimmed.
So we check device->alloc_state by finding the first range which doesn't
have CHUNK_TRIMMED and CHUNK_ALLOCATED not set.
But if we shrunk the device, that bits are not cleared, thus we could
easily got a range starts beyond the shrunk device size.
This results the returned @start and @end are all beyond device size,
then we call "end = min(end, device->total_bytes -1);" making @end
smaller than device size.
Then finally we goes "len = end - start + 1", totally underflow the
result, and lead to the beyond-device-boundary access.
[FIX]
This patch will fix the problem in two ways:
- Clear CHUNK_TRIMMED | CHUNK_ALLOCATED bits when shrinking device
This is the root fix
- Add extra safety check when trimming free device extents
We check and warn if the returned range is already beyond current
device.
Link: https://github.com/kdave/btrfs-progs/issues/282
Fixes: 929be17a9b49 ("btrfs: Switch btrfs_trim_free_extents to find_first_clear_extent_bit")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[sudip: adjust context and use extent_io.h]
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9076dbd5ee837c3882fc42891c14cecd0354a849 upstream.
While fixing up our ->last_byte_to_unpin locking I noticed that we will
shorten len based on ->last_byte_to_unpin if we're caching when we're
adding back the free space. This is correct for the free space, as we
cannot unpin more than ->last_byte_to_unpin, however we use len to
adjust the ->bytes_pinned counters and such, which need to track the
actual pinned usage. This could result in
WARN_ON(space_info->bytes_pinned) triggering at unmount time.
Fix this by using a local variable for the amount to add to free space
cache, and leave len untouched in this case.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 3cded66330591cfd2554a3fd5edca8859ea365a2 ]
Fix to return PTR_ERR() error code from the error handling case where
ubifs_hash_get_desc() failed instead of 0 in ubifs_init_authentication(),
as done elsewhere in this function.
Fixes: 49525e5eecca5 ("ubifs: Add helper functions for authentication support")
Signed-off-by: Wang ShaoBo <bobo.shaobowang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 4420440c57892779f265108f46f83832a88ca795 ]
The warning message from nfsd terminating normally
can confuse system adminstrators or monitoring software.
Though it's not exactly fair to pin-point a commit where it
originated, the current form in the current place started
to appear in:
Fixes: e096bbc6488d ("knfsd: remove special handling for SIGHUP")
Signed-off-by: kazuo ito <kzpn200@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit bf701b765eaa82dd164d65edc5747ec7288bb5c3 ]
nfsiod is currently a concurrency-managed workqueue (CMWQ).
This means that workitems scheduled to nfsiod on a given CPU are queued
behind all other work items queued on any CMWQ on the same CPU. This
can introduce unexpected latency.
Occaionally nfsiod can even cause excessive latency. If the work item
to complete a CLOSE request calls the final iput() on an inode, the
address_space of that inode will be dismantled. This takes time
proportional to the number of in-memory pages, which on a large host
working on large files (e.g.. 5TB), can be a large number of pages
resulting in a noticable number of seconds.
We can avoid these latency problems by switching nfsiod to WQ_UNBOUND.
This causes each concurrent work item to gets a dedicated thread which
can be scheduled to an idle CPU.
There is precedent for this as several other filesystems use WQ_UNBOUND
workqueue for handling various async events.
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Fixes: ada609ee2ac2 ("workqueue: use WQ_MEM_RECLAIM instead of WQ_RESCUER")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 9b82d88d5976e5f2b8015d58913654856576ace5 ]
NLM uses an interval-based rebinding, i.e. it clears the transport's
binding under certain conditions if more than 60 seconds have elapsed
since the connection was last bound.
This rebinding is not necessary for an autobind RPC client over a
connection-oriented protocol like TCP.
It can also cause problems: it is possible for nlm_bind_host() to clear
XPRT_BOUND whilst a connection worker is in the middle of trying to
reconnect, after it had already been checked in xprt_connect().
When the connection worker notices that XPRT_BOUND has been cleared
under it, in xs_tcp_finish_connecting(), that results in:
xs_tcp_setup_socket: connect returned unhandled error -107
Worse, it's possible that the two can get into lockstep, resulting in
the same behaviour repeated indefinitely, with the above error every
300 seconds, without ever recovering, and the connection never being
established. This has been seen in practice, with a large number of NLM
client tasks, following a server restart.
The existing callers of nlm_bind_host & nlm_rebind_host should not need
to force the rebind, for TCP, so restrict the interval-based rebinding
to UDP only.
For TCP, we will still rebind when needed, e.g. on timeout, and connection
error (including closure), since connection-related errors on an existing
connection, ECONNREFUSED when trying to connect, and rpc_check_timeout(),
already unconditionally clear XPRT_BOUND.
To avoid having to add the fix, and explanation, to both nlm_bind_host()
and nlm_rebind_host(), remove the duplicate code from the former, and
have it call the latter.
Drop the dprintk, which adds no value over a trace.
Signed-off-by: Calum Mackay <calum.mackay@oracle.com>
Fixes: 35f5a422ce1a ("SUNRPC: new interface to force an RPC rebind")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 046e5ccb4198b990190e11fb52fd9cfd264402eb ]
We can fit the device_addr4 opaque data padding in the pages.
Fixes: cf500bac8fd4 ("SUNRPC: Introduce rpc_prepare_reply_pages()")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 05ad917561fca39a03338cb21fe9622f998b0f9c ]
Currently, the client will always ask for security_labels if the server
returns that it supports that feature regardless of any LSM modules
(such as Selinux) enforcing security policy. This adds performance
penalty to the READDIR operation.
Client adjusts superblock's support of the security_label based on
the server's support but also current client's configuration of the
LSM modules. Thus, prior to using the default bitmask in READDIR,
this patch checks the server's capabilities and then instructs
READDIR to remove FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL from the bitmask.
v5: fixing silly mistakes of the rushed v4
v4: simplifying logic
v3: changing label's initialization per Ondrej's comment
v2: dropping selinux hook and using the sb cap.
Suggested-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <kolga@netapp.com>
Fixes: 2b0143b5c986 ("VFS: normal filesystems (and lustre): d_inode() annotations")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 3acc4522d89e0a326db69e9d0afaad8cf763a54c ]
When running fault injection test, if we don't stop checkpoint, some stale
NAT entries were flushed which breaks consistency.
Fixes: 86f33603f8c5 ("f2fs: handle errors of f2fs_get_meta_page_nofail")
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 4cb682964706deffb4861f0a91329ab3a705039f ]
There's a memory leak in afs_parse_source() whereby multiple source=
parameters overwrite fc->source in the fs_context struct without freeing
the previously recorded source.
Fix this by only permitting a single source parameter and rejecting with
an error all subsequent ones.
This was caught by syzbot with the kernel memory leak detector, showing
something like the following trace:
unreferenced object 0xffff888114375440 (size 32):
comm "repro", pid 5168, jiffies 4294923723 (age 569.948s)
backtrace:
slab_post_alloc_hook+0x42/0x79
__kmalloc_track_caller+0x125/0x16a
kmemdup_nul+0x24/0x3c
vfs_parse_fs_string+0x5a/0xa1
generic_parse_monolithic+0x9d/0xc5
do_new_mount+0x10d/0x15a
do_mount+0x5f/0x8e
__do_sys_mount+0xff/0x127
do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x3a
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Fixes: 13fcc6837049 ("afs: Add fs_context support")
Reported-by: syzbot+86dc6632faaca40133ab@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 40d6366e9d86d9a67b5642040e76082fdb5bdcf9 upstream.
When we try to visit the pagemap of a tagged userspace pointer, we find
that the start_vaddr is not correct because of the tag.
To fix it, we should untag the userspace pointers in pagemap_read().
I tested with 5.10-rc4 and the issue remains.
Explanation from Catalin in [1]:
"Arguably, that's a user-space bug since tagged file offsets were never
supported. In this case it's not even a tag at bit 56 as per the arm64
tagged address ABI but rather down to bit 47. You could say that the
problem is caused by the C library (malloc()) or whoever created the
tagged vaddr and passed it to this function. It's not a kernel
regression as we've never supported it.
Now, pagemap is a special case where the offset is usually not
generated as a classic file offset but rather derived by shifting a
user virtual address. I guess we can make a concession for pagemap
(only) and allow such offset with the tag at bit (56 - PAGE_SHIFT + 3)"
My test code is based on [2]:
A userspace pointer which has been tagged by 0xb4: 0xb400007662f541c8
userspace program:
uint64 OsLayer::VirtualToPhysical(void *vaddr) {
uint64 frame, paddr, pfnmask, pagemask;
int pagesize = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE);
off64_t off = ((uintptr_t)vaddr) / pagesize * 8; // off = 0xb400007662f541c8 / pagesize * 8 = 0x5a00003b317aa0
int fd = open(kPagemapPath, O_RDONLY);
...
if (lseek64(fd, off, SEEK_SET) != off || read(fd, &frame, 8) != 8) {
int err = errno;
string errtxt = ErrorString(err);
if (fd >= 0)
close(fd);
return 0;
}
...
}
kernel fs/proc/task_mmu.c:
static ssize_t pagemap_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
...
src = *ppos;
svpfn = src / PM_ENTRY_BYTES; // svpfn == 0xb400007662f54
start_vaddr = svpfn << PAGE_SHIFT; // start_vaddr == 0xb400007662f54000
end_vaddr = mm->task_size;
/* watch out for wraparound */
// svpfn == 0xb400007662f54
// (mm->task_size >> PAGE) == 0x8000000
if (svpfn > mm->task_size >> PAGE_SHIFT) // the condition is true because of the tag 0xb4
start_vaddr = end_vaddr;
ret = 0;
while (count && (start_vaddr < end_vaddr)) { // we cannot visit correct entry because start_vaddr is set to end_vaddr
int len;
unsigned long end;
...
}
...
}
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/1343258/
[2] https://github.com/stressapptest/stressapptest/blob/master/src/os.cc#L158
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201204024347.8295-1-miles.chen@mediatek.com
Signed-off-by: Miles Chen <miles.chen@mediatek.com>
Reviewed-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Song Bao Hua (Barry Song) <song.bao.hua@hisilicon.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [5.4-]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 778721510e84209f78e31e2ccb296ae36d623f5e upstream.
If gfs2 tries to mount a (corrupt) file system that has no resource
groups it still tries to set preferences on the first one, which causes
a kernel null pointer dereference. This patch adds a check to function
gfs2_ri_update so this condition is detected and reported back as an
error.
Reported-by: syzbot+e3f23ce40269a4c9053a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Bob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2bf509d96d84c3336d08375e8af34d1b85ee71c8 upstream.
'format_corename()' will splite 'core_pattern' on spaces when it is in
pipe mode, and take helper_argv[0] as the path to usermode executable.
It works fine in most cases.
However, if there is a space between '|' and '/file/path', such as
'| /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-coredump %P %u %g', then helper_argv[0] will
be parsed as '', and users will get a 'Core dump to | disabled'.
It is not friendly to users, as the pattern above was valid previously.
Fix this by ignoring the spaces between '|' and '/file/path'.
Fixes: 315c69261dd3 ("coredump: split pipe command whitespace before expanding template")
Signed-off-by: Menglong Dong <dong.menglong@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Wise <pabs3@bonedaddy.net>
Cc: Jakub Wilk <jwilk@jwilk.net> [https://bugs.debian.org/924398]
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/5fb62870.1c69fb81.8ef5d.af76@mx.google.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6988a619f5b79e4efadea6e19dcfe75fbcd350b5 upstream.
A customer has reported that several files in their multi-threaded app
were left with size of 0 because most of the read(2) calls returned
-EINTR and they assumed no bytes were read. Obviously, they could
have fixed it by simply retrying on -EINTR.
We noticed that most of the -EINTR on read(2) were due to real-time
signals sent by glibc to process wide credential changes (SIGRT_1),
and its signal handler had been established with SA_RESTART, in which
case those calls could have been automatically restarted by the
kernel.
Let the kernel decide to whether or not restart the syscalls when
there is a signal pending in __smb_send_rqst() by returning
-ERESTARTSYS. If it can't, it will return -EINTR anyway.
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@cjr.nz>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit ff04f3b6f2e27f8ae28a498416af2a8dd5072b43 ]
The memory leak addressed by commit fe5186cf12e3 is a false positive:
all allocations are recorded in a linked list, and freed when the
filesystem is unmounted. This leads to double frees, and as reported
by David, leads to crashes if SLUB is configured to self destruct when
double frees occur.
So drop the redundant kfree() again, and instead, mark the offending
pointer variable so the allocation is ignored by kmemleak.
Cc: Vamshi K Sthambamkadi <vamshi.k.sthambamkadi@gmail.com>
Fixes: fe5186cf12e3 ("efivarfs: fix memory leak in efivarfs_create()")
Reported-by: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 8d4c3e76e3be11a64df95ddee52e99092d42fc19 ]
If this is attempted by a kthread, then return -EOPNOTSUPP as we don't
currently support that. Once we can get task_pid_ptr() doing the right
thing, then this can go away again.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 1254100030b3377e8302f9c75090ab191d73ee7c upstream.
Mid callback needs to be called only when valid data is
read into pages.
These patches address a problem found during decryption offload:
CIFS: VFS: trying to dequeue a deleted mid
that could cause a refcount use after free:
Workqueue: smb3decryptd smb2_decrypt_offload [cifs]
Signed-off-by: Rohith Surabattula <rohiths@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> #5.4+
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ac873aa3dc21707c47db5db6608b38981c731afe upstream.
When reconnect happens Mid queue can be corrupted when both
demultiplex and offload thread try to dequeue the MID from the
pending list.
These patches address a problem found during decryption offload:
CIFS: VFS: trying to dequeue a deleted mid
that could cause a refcount use after free:
Workqueue: smb3decryptd smb2_decrypt_offload [cifs]
Signed-off-by: Rohith Surabattula <rohiths@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> #5.4+
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
