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Author SHA1 Message Date
Ján Tomko
fc30929ffd api: disallow virConnect*HypervisorCPU on read-only connections
These APIs can be used to execute arbitrary emulators.
Forbid them on read-only connections.

Fixes: CVE-2019-10168
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bf6c2830b6)
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
2019-06-24 09:55:38 +02:00
Ján Tomko
38a16f7867 api: disallow virConnectGetDomainCapabilities on read-only connections
This API can be used to execute arbitrary emulators.
Forbid it on read-only connections.

Fixes: CVE-2019-10167
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 8afa68bac0)
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
2019-06-24 09:55:38 +02:00
Ján Tomko
6dc29a174a api: disallow virDomainManagedSaveDefineXML on read-only connections
The virDomainManagedSaveDefineXML can be used to alter the domain's
config used for managedsave or even execute arbitrary emulator binaries.
Forbid it on read-only connections.

Fixes: CVE-2019-10166
Reported-by: Matthias Gerstner <mgerstner@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit db0b78457f)
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
2019-06-24 09:55:38 +02:00
Ján Tomko
56fadbbb25 api: disallow virDomainSaveImageGetXMLDesc on read-only connections
The virDomainSaveImageGetXMLDesc API is taking a path parameter,
which can point to any path on the system. This file will then be
read and parsed by libvirtd running with root privileges.

Forbid it on read-only connections.

Fixes: CVE-2019-10161
Reported-by: Matthias Gerstner <mgerstner@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit aed6a032ce)
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>

Conflicts:
  src/libvirt-domain.c
  src/remote/remote_protocol.x

Upstream commit 12a51f372 which introduced the VIR_DOMAIN_SAVE_IMAGE_XML_SECURE
alias for VIR_DOMAIN_XML_SECURE is not backported.
Just skip the commit since we now disallow the whole API on read-only
connections, regardless of the flag.

Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
2019-06-24 09:55:38 +02:00
Daniel P. Berrangé
5c3dcd0dd4 logging: restrict sockets to mode 0600
The virtlogd daemon's only intended client is the libvirtd daemon. As
such it should never allow clients from other user accounts to connect.
The code already enforces this and drops clients from other UIDs, but
we can get earlier (and thus stronger) protection against DoS by setting
the socket permissions to 0600

Fixes CVE-2019-10132

Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit e37bd65f99)
2019-05-21 13:29:26 +01:00
Daniel P. Berrangé
257c5589fe locking: restrict sockets to mode 0600
The virtlockd daemon's only intended client is the libvirtd daemon. As
such it should never allow clients from other user accounts to connect.
The code already enforces this and drops clients from other UIDs, but
we can get earlier (and thus stronger) protection against DoS by setting
the socket permissions to 0600

Fixes CVE-2019-10132

Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit f111e09468)
2019-05-21 13:29:26 +01:00
Daniel P. Berrangé
4369e90f8c admin: reject clients unless their UID matches the current UID
The admin protocol RPC messages are only intended for use by the user
running the daemon. As such they should not be allowed for any client
UID that does not match the server UID.

Fixes CVE-2019-10132

Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 96f41cd765)
2019-05-21 13:29:26 +01:00
9 changed files with 34 additions and 12 deletions

View File

@@ -66,6 +66,28 @@ remoteAdmClientNew(virNetServerClientPtr client ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
void *opaque)
{
struct daemonAdmClientPrivate *priv;
uid_t clientuid;
gid_t clientgid;
pid_t clientpid;
unsigned long long timestamp;
if (virNetServerClientGetUNIXIdentity(client,
&clientuid,
&clientgid,
&clientpid,
&timestamp) < 0)
return NULL;
VIR_DEBUG("New client pid %lld uid %lld",
(long long)clientpid,
(long long)clientuid);
if (geteuid() != clientuid) {
virReportRestrictedError(_("Disallowing client %lld with uid %lld"),
(long long)clientpid,
(long long)clientuid);
return NULL;
}
if (VIR_ALLOC(priv) < 0)
return NULL;

View File

@@ -1073,9 +1073,7 @@ virDomainRestoreFlags(virConnectPtr conn, const char *from, const char *dxml,
* previously by virDomainSave() or virDomainSaveFlags().
*
* No security-sensitive data will be included unless @flags contains
* VIR_DOMAIN_XML_SECURE; this flag is rejected on read-only
* connections. For this API, @flags should not contain either
* VIR_DOMAIN_XML_INACTIVE or VIR_DOMAIN_XML_UPDATE_CPU.
* VIR_DOMAIN_XML_SECURE.
*
* Returns a 0 terminated UTF-8 encoded XML instance, or NULL in case of
* error. The caller must free() the returned value.
@@ -1091,12 +1089,7 @@ virDomainSaveImageGetXMLDesc(virConnectPtr conn, const char *file,
virCheckConnectReturn(conn, NULL);
virCheckNonNullArgGoto(file, error);
if ((conn->flags & VIR_CONNECT_RO) && (flags & VIR_DOMAIN_XML_SECURE)) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_OPERATION_DENIED, "%s",
_("virDomainSaveImageGetXMLDesc with secure flag"));
goto error;
}
virCheckReadOnlyGoto(conn->flags, error);
if (conn->driver->domainSaveImageGetXMLDesc) {
char *ret;
@@ -9497,6 +9490,7 @@ virDomainManagedSaveDefineXML(virDomainPtr domain, const char *dxml,
virCheckDomainReturn(domain, -1);
conn = domain->conn;
virCheckReadOnlyGoto(conn->flags, error);
if (conn->driver->domainManagedSaveDefineXML) {
int ret;
@@ -11288,6 +11282,7 @@ virConnectGetDomainCapabilities(virConnectPtr conn,
virResetLastError();
virCheckConnectReturn(conn, NULL);
virCheckReadOnlyGoto(conn->flags, error);
if (conn->driver->connectGetDomainCapabilities) {
char *ret;

View File

@@ -1041,6 +1041,7 @@ virConnectCompareHypervisorCPU(virConnectPtr conn,
virCheckConnectReturn(conn, VIR_CPU_COMPARE_ERROR);
virCheckNonNullArgGoto(xmlCPU, error);
virCheckReadOnlyGoto(conn->flags, error);
if (conn->driver->connectCompareHypervisorCPU) {
int ret;
@@ -1234,6 +1235,7 @@ virConnectBaselineHypervisorCPU(virConnectPtr conn,
virCheckConnectReturn(conn, NULL);
virCheckNonNullArgGoto(xmlCPUs, error);
virCheckReadOnlyGoto(conn->flags, error);
if (conn->driver->connectBaselineHypervisorCPU) {
char *cpu;

View File

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ Before=libvirtd.service
[Socket]
ListenStream=@localstatedir@/run/libvirt/virtlockd-admin-sock
Service=virtlockd.service
SocketMode=0600
[Install]
WantedBy=sockets.target

View File

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ Before=libvirtd.service
[Socket]
ListenStream=@localstatedir@/run/libvirt/virtlockd-sock
SocketMode=0600
[Install]
WantedBy=sockets.target

View File

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ Before=libvirtd.service
[Socket]
ListenStream=@localstatedir@/run/libvirt/virtlogd-admin-sock
Service=virtlogd.service
SocketMode=0600
[Install]
WantedBy=sockets.target

View File

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ Before=libvirtd.service
[Socket]
ListenStream=@localstatedir@/run/libvirt/virtlogd-sock
SocketMode=0600
[Install]
WantedBy=sockets.target

View File

@@ -6798,7 +6798,7 @@ qemuDomainSaveImageGetXMLDesc(virConnectPtr conn, const char *path,
if (fd < 0)
goto cleanup;
if (virDomainSaveImageGetXMLDescEnsureACL(conn, def, flags) < 0)
if (virDomainSaveImageGetXMLDescEnsureACL(conn, def) < 0)
goto cleanup;
ret = qemuDomainDefFormatXML(driver, def, flags);

View File

@@ -5226,8 +5226,7 @@ enum remote_procedure {
/**
* @generate: both
* @priority: high
* @acl: domain:read
* @acl: domain:read_secure:VIR_DOMAIN_XML_SECURE
* @acl: domain:write
*/
REMOTE_PROC_DOMAIN_SAVE_IMAGE_GET_XML_DESC = 235,