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<?xml version='1.0'?> <!-- * - nxml - * -->
< !DOCTYPE refentry PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.5//EN"
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"http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.5/docbookx.dtd">
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<!-- SPDX - License - Identifier: LGPL - 2.1 - or - later -->
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<refentry id= "systemd-stub" conditional= 'ENABLE_BOOTLOADER'
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xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude">
<refentryinfo >
<title > systemd-stub</title>
<productname > systemd</productname>
</refentryinfo>
<refmeta >
<refentrytitle > systemd-stub</refentrytitle>
<manvolnum > 7</manvolnum>
</refmeta>
<refnamediv >
<refname > systemd-stub</refname>
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<refname > sd-stub</refname>
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<refname > linuxx64.efi.stub</refname>
<refname > linuxia32.efi.stub</refname>
<refname > linuxaa64.efi.stub</refname>
<refpurpose > A simple UEFI kernel boot stub</refpurpose>
</refnamediv>
<refsynopsisdiv >
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<para > <simplelist >
<member > <filename > /usr/lib/systemd/boot/efi/linuxx64.efi.stub</filename> </member>
<member > <filename > /usr/lib/systemd/boot/efi/linuxia32.efi.stub</filename> </member>
<member > <filename > /usr/lib/systemd/boot/efi/linuxaa64.efi.stub</filename> </member>
<member > <filename > <replaceable > ESP</replaceable> /.../<replaceable > foo</replaceable> .efi.extra.d/*.addon.efi</filename> </member>
<member > <filename > <replaceable > ESP</replaceable> /.../<replaceable > foo</replaceable> .efi.extra.d/*.cred</filename> </member>
<member > <filename > <replaceable > ESP</replaceable> /.../<replaceable > foo</replaceable> .efi.extra.d/*.raw</filename> </member>
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<member > <filename > <replaceable > ESP</replaceable> /.../<replaceable > foo</replaceable> .efi.extra.d/*.sysext.raw</filename> </member>
<member > <filename > <replaceable > ESP</replaceable> /.../<replaceable > foo</replaceable> .efi.extra.d/*.confext.raw</filename> </member>
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<member > <filename > <replaceable > ESP</replaceable> /loader/addons/*.addon.efi</filename> </member>
<member > <filename > <replaceable > ESP</replaceable> /loader/credentials/*.cred</filename> </member>
</simplelist> </para>
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</refsynopsisdiv>
<refsect1 >
<title > Description</title>
<para > <command > systemd-stub</command> (stored in per-architecture files
<filename > linuxx64.efi.stub</filename> , <filename > linuxia32.efi.stub</filename> ,
<filename > linuxaa64.efi.stub</filename> on disk) is a simple UEFI boot stub. An UEFI boot stub is
attached to a Linux kernel binary image, and is a piece of code that runs in the UEFI firmware
environment before transitioning into the Linux kernel environment. The UEFI boot stub ensures a Linux
kernel is executable as regular UEFI binary, and is able to do various preparations before switching the
system into the Linux world.</para>
<para > The UEFI boot stub looks for various resources for the kernel invocation inside the UEFI PE binary
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itself. This allows combining various resources inside a single PE binary image (usually called "Unified
Kernel Image", or "UKI" for short), which may then be signed via UEFI SecureBoot as a whole, covering all
individual resources at once. Specifically it may include:</para>
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<itemizedlist >
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<!-- Let's keep this in the canonical order we also measure the sections by, i.e. as in
src/fundamental/uki.h's UnifiedSection enum -->
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<listitem > <para > A <literal > .linux</literal> section with the ELF Linux kernel image.</para> </listitem>
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<listitem > <para > An <literal > .osrel</literal> section with OS release information, i.e. the contents of
the <citerefentry > <refentrytitle > os-release</refentrytitle> <manvolnum > 5</manvolnum> </citerefentry> file
of the OS the kernel belongs to.</para> </listitem>
efi: from the stub measure the ELF kernel + built-in initrd and so on into PCR 11
Here we grab a new – on Linux so far unused (by my Googling skills, that
is) – and measure all static components of the PE kernel image into.
This is useful since for the first time we'll have a PCR that contains
only a PCR of the booted kernel, nothing else. That allows putting
together TPM policies that bind to a specific kernel (+ builtin initrd),
without having to have booted that kernel first. PCRs can be
pre-calculated. Yay!
You might wonder, why we measure just the discovered PE sections we are
about to use, instead of the whole PE image. That's because of the next
step I have in mind: PE images should also be able to carry an
additional section that contains a signature for its own expected,
pre-calculated PCR values. This signature data should then be passed
into the booted kernel and can be used there in TPM policies. Benefit:
TPM policies can now be bound to *signatures* of PCRs, instead of the
raw hash values themselves. This makes update management a *lot* easier,
as policies don't need to be updated whenever a kernel is updated, as
long as the signature is available. Now, if the PCR signature is
embedded in the kernel PE image it cannot be of a PCR hash of the kernel
PE image itself, because that would be a chicken-and-egg problem. Hence,
by only measuring the relavent payload sections (and that means
excluding the future section that will contain the PCR hash signature)
we avoid this problem, naturally.
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<listitem > <para > A <literal > .cmdline</literal> section with the kernel command line to pass to the
invoked kernel.</para> </listitem>
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<listitem > <para > An <literal > .initrd</literal> section with the initrd.</para> </listitem>
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<listitem > <para > A <literal > .ucode</literal> section with an initrd containing microcode, to be handed
to the kernel before any other initrd. This initrd must not be compressed.</para> </listitem>
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<listitem > <para > A <literal > .splash</literal> section with an image (in the Windows
<filename > .BMP</filename> format) to show on screen before invoking the kernel.</para> </listitem>
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<listitem > <para > A <literal > .dtb</literal> section with a compiled binary DeviceTree.</para> </listitem>
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<listitem > <para > A <literal > .uname</literal> section with the kernel version information, i.e. the
output of <command > uname -r</command> for the kernel included in the <literal > .linux</literal>
section.</para> </listitem>
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<listitem > <para > An <literal > .sbat</literal> section with
<ulink url= "https://github.com/rhboot/shim/blob/main/SBAT.md" > SBAT</ulink> revocation
metadata.</para> </listitem>
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<listitem > <para > A <literal > .pcrsig</literal> section with a set of cryptographic signatures for the
expected TPM2 PCR values after the kernel has been booted, in JSON format. This is useful for
implementing TPM2 policies that bind disk encryption and similar to kernels that are signed by a
specific key.</para> </listitem>
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<listitem > <para > A <literal > .pcrpkey</literal> section with a public key in the PEM format matching the
signature data in the the <literal > .pcrsig</literal> section.</para> </listitem>
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</itemizedlist>
<para > If UEFI SecureBoot is enabled and the <literal > .cmdline</literal> section is present in the executed
image, any attempts to override the kernel command line by passing one as invocation parameters to the
EFI binary are ignored. Thus, in order to allow overriding the kernel command line, either disable UEFI
SecureBoot, or don't include a kernel command line PE section in the kernel image file. If a command line
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is accepted via EFI invocation parameters to the EFI binary it is measured into TPM PCR 12 (if a TPM is
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present).</para>
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<para > If a DeviceTree is embedded in the <literal > .dtb</literal> section, it replaces an existing
DeviceTree in the corresponding EFI configuration table. systemd-stub will ask the firmware via the
<literal > EFI_DT_FIXUP_PROTOCOL</literal> for hardware specific fixups to the DeviceTree.</para>
efi: from the stub measure the ELF kernel + built-in initrd and so on into PCR 11
Here we grab a new – on Linux so far unused (by my Googling skills, that
is) – and measure all static components of the PE kernel image into.
This is useful since for the first time we'll have a PCR that contains
only a PCR of the booted kernel, nothing else. That allows putting
together TPM policies that bind to a specific kernel (+ builtin initrd),
without having to have booted that kernel first. PCRs can be
pre-calculated. Yay!
You might wonder, why we measure just the discovered PE sections we are
about to use, instead of the whole PE image. That's because of the next
step I have in mind: PE images should also be able to carry an
additional section that contains a signature for its own expected,
pre-calculated PCR values. This signature data should then be passed
into the booted kernel and can be used there in TPM policies. Benefit:
TPM policies can now be bound to *signatures* of PCRs, instead of the
raw hash values themselves. This makes update management a *lot* easier,
as policies don't need to be updated whenever a kernel is updated, as
long as the signature is available. Now, if the PCR signature is
embedded in the kernel PE image it cannot be of a PCR hash of the kernel
PE image itself, because that would be a chicken-and-egg problem. Hence,
by only measuring the relavent payload sections (and that means
excluding the future section that will contain the PCR hash signature)
we avoid this problem, naturally.
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<para > The contents of eight of these nine sections are measured into TPM PCR 11. It is otherwise not used
and thus the result can be pre-calculated without too much effort. The <literal > .pcrsig</literal> section
is not included in this PCR measurement, since it is supposed to contain signatures for the output of the
measurement operation, and thus cannot also be input to it.</para>
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<para > When <literal > .pcrsig</literal> and/or <literal > .pcrpkey</literal> sections are present in a
unified kernel image their contents are passed to the booted kernel in an synthetic initrd cpio archive
that places them in the <filename > /.extra/tpm2-pcr-signature.json</filename> and
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<filename > /.extra/tpm2-pcr-public-key.pem</filename> files. Typically, a
<citerefentry > <refentrytitle > tmpfiles.d</refentrytitle> <manvolnum > 5</manvolnum> </citerefentry> line then
ensures they are copied into <filename > /run/systemd/tpm2-pcr-signature.json</filename> and
<filename > /run/systemd/tpm2-pcr-public-key.pem</filename> where they remain accessible even after the
system transitions out of the initrd environment into the host file system. Tools such
<citerefentry > <refentrytitle > systemd-cryptsetup@.service</refentrytitle> <manvolnum > 8</manvolnum> </citerefentry> ,
<citerefentry > <refentrytitle > systemd-cryptenroll</refentrytitle> <manvolnum > 1</manvolnum> </citerefentry>
and <citerefentry > <refentrytitle > systemd-creds</refentrytitle> <manvolnum > 1</manvolnum> </citerefentry>
will automatically use files present under these paths to unlock protected resources (encrypted storage
or credentials) or bind encryption to booted kernels.</para>
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<para > For further details about the UKI concept, see the <ulink
url="https://uapi-group.org/specifications/specs/unified_kernel_image/">UKI specification</ulink> .</para>
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</refsect1>
<refsect1 >
<title > Companion Files</title>
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<para > The <command > systemd-stub</command> UEFI boot stub automatically collects three types of auxiliary
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companion files optionally placed in drop-in directories on the same partition as the EFI binary,
dynamically generates <command > cpio</command> initrd archives from them, and passes them to the kernel.
Specifically:</para>
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<itemizedlist >
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<listitem > <para > For a kernel binary called <filename > <replaceable > foo</replaceable> .efi</filename> , it
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will look for files with the <filename > .cred</filename> suffix in a directory named
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<filename > <replaceable > foo</replaceable> .efi.extra.d/</filename> next to it. If the kernel binary
uses a counter for the purpose of
<ulink url= "https://systemd.io/AUTOMATIC_BOOT_ASSESSMENT" > Automatic Boot Assessment</ulink> , this
counter will be ignored. For example, <filename > <replaceable > foo</replaceable> +3-0.efi</filename>
will look in directory <filename > <replaceable > foo</replaceable> .efi.extra.d/</filename> .
A <command > cpio</command>
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archive is generated from all files found that way, placing them in the
<filename > /.extra/credentials/</filename> directory of the initrd file hierarchy. The main initrd may
then access them in this directory. This is supposed to be used to store auxiliary, encrypted,
authenticated credentials for use with <varname > LoadCredentialEncrypted=</varname> in the UEFI System
Partition. See
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<citerefentry > <refentrytitle > systemd.exec</refentrytitle> <manvolnum > 5</manvolnum> </citerefentry>
and
<citerefentry > <refentrytitle > systemd-creds</refentrytitle> <manvolnum > 1</manvolnum> </citerefentry>
for
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details on encrypted credentials. The generated <command > cpio</command> archive is measured into TPM
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PCR 12 (if a TPM is present).</para> </listitem>
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<listitem > <para > Similarly, files
<filename > <replaceable > foo</replaceable> .efi.extra.d/*.sysext.raw</filename> are packed up in a
<command > cpio</command> archive and placed in the <filename > /.extra/sysext/</filename> directory in the
initrd file hierarchy. This is supposed to be used to pass additional system extension images to the
initrd. See
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<citerefentry > <refentrytitle > systemd-sysext</refentrytitle> <manvolnum > 8</manvolnum> </citerefentry> for
details on system extension images. The generated <command > cpio</command> archive containing these
sd-stub: measure sysext images picked up by sd-stub into PCR 13
Let's grab another so far unused PCR, and measure all sysext images into
it that we load from the ESP. Note that this is possibly partly redundant,
since sysext images should have dm-verity enabled, and that is hooked up
to IMA. However, measuring this explicitly has the benefit that we can
measure filenames too, easily, and that all without need for IMA or
anything like that.
This means: when booting a unified sd-stub kernel through sd-boot we'll
now have:
1. PCR 11: unified kernel image payload (i.e. kernel, initrd, boot
splash, dtb, osrelease)
2. PCR 12: kernel command line (i.e. the one embedded in the image, plus
optionally an overriden one) + any credential files picked up by
sd-stub
3. PCR 13: sysext images picked up by sd-stub
And each of these three PCRs should carry just the above, and start from
zero, thus be pre-calculatable.
Thus, all components and parameters of the OS boot process (i.e.
everything after the boot loader) is now nicely pre-calculable.
NOTE: this actually replaces previous measuring of the syext images into
PCR 4. I added this back in 845707aae23b3129db635604edb95c4048a5922a,
following the train of thought, that sysext images for the initrd should
be measured like the initrd itself they are for, and according to my
thinking that would be a unified kernel which is measured by firmware
into PCR 4 like any other UEFI executables.
However, I think we should depart from that idea. First and foremost
that makes it harder to pre-calculate PCR 4 (since we actually measured
quite incompatible records to the TPM event log), but also I think
there's great value in being able to write policies that bind to the
used sysexts independently of the earlier boot chain (i.e. shim, boot
loader, unified kernel), hence a separate PCR makes more sense.
Strictly speaking, this is a compatibility break, but I think one we can
get away with, simply because the initrd sysext images are currently not
picked up by systemd-sysext yet in the initrd, and because of that we
can be reasonably sure noone uses this yet, and hence relies on the PCR
register used. Hence, let's clean this up before people actually do
start relying on this.
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system extension images is measured into TPM PCR 13 (if a TPM is present).</para> </listitem>
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<!-- Note: the actual suffix we look for for sysexts is just *.raw (not *.sysext.raw), for
compatibility reasons with old versions. But we want people to name their system extensions
properly, hence we document the *.sysext.raw suffix only. -->
<listitem > <para > Similarly, files
<filename > <replaceable > foo</replaceable> .efi.extra.d/*.confext.raw</filename> are packed up in a
<command > cpio</command> archive and placed in the <filename > /.extra/confext/</filename> directory in
the initrd file hierarchy. This is supposed to be used to pass additional configuration extension
images to the initrd. See
<citerefentry > <refentrytitle > systemd-confext</refentrytitle> <manvolnum > 8</manvolnum> </citerefentry> for
details on configuration extension images. The generated <command > cpio</command> archive containing
these system extension images is measured into TPM PCR 12 (if a TPM is present).</para> </listitem>
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<listitem > <para > Similarly, files
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<filename > <replaceable > foo</replaceable> .efi.extra.d/*.addon.efi</filename> are loaded and verified as
PE binaries, and a <literal > .cmdline</literal> section is parsed from them. Addons are supposed to be
used to pass additional kernel command line parameters or Devicetree blobs, regardless of the kernel
image being booted, for example to allow platform vendors to ship platform-specific
configuration.</para>
<para > In case Secure Boot is enabled, these files will be validated using keys in UEFI DB, Shim's DB or
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Shim's MOK, and will be rejected otherwise. Additionally, if both the addon and the UKI contain a
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<literal > .uname</literal> section, the addon will be rejected if they do not match exactly. It is
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recommended to always add a <literal > .sbat</literal> section to all signed addons, so that they may be
revoked with a SBAT policy update, without requiring blocklisting via DBX/MOKX. The
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<citerefentry > <refentrytitle > ukify</refentrytitle> <manvolnum > 1</manvolnum> </citerefentry> tool will add
a SBAT policy by default if none is passed when building addons. For more information on SBAT see
<ulink url= "https://github.com/rhboot/shim/blob/main/SBAT.md" > Shim documentation</ulink> .</para>
<para > Addon files are sorted, loaded, and measured into TPM PCR 12 (if a TPM is present) and appended
to the kernel command line. UKI command line options are listed first, then options from addons in
<filename > /loader/addons/*.addon.efi</filename> , and finally UKI-specific addons. Device tree blobs are
loaded and measured following the same algorithm. Addons are always loaded in the same order based on
the filename, so that, given the same set of addons, the same set of measurements can be expected in
PCR12. However, note that the filename is not protected by the PE signature, and as such an attacker
with write access to the ESP could potentially rename these files to change the order in which they are
loaded, in a way that could alter the functionality of the kernel, as some options might be
order-dependent. If you sign such addons, you should pay attention to the PCR12 values and make use of
an attestation service so that improper use of your signed addons can be detected and dealt with using
one of the aforementioned revocation mechanisms.</para> </listitem>
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<listitem > <para > Files <filename > /loader/credentials/*.cred</filename> are packed up in a
<command > cpio</command> archive and placed in the <filename > /.extra/global_credentials/</filename>
directory of the initrd file hierarchy. This is supposed to be used to pass additional credentials to
the initrd, regardless of the kernel being booted. The generated <command > cpio</command> archive is
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measured into TPM PCR 12 (if a TPM is present).</para> </listitem>
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<listitem > <para > Additionally, files <filename > /loader/addons/*.addon.efi</filename> are loaded and
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verified as PE binaries, and <literal > .cmdline</literal> and/or <literal > .dtb</literal> sections are
parsed from them. This is supposed to be used to pass additional command line parameters or Devicetree
blobs to the kernel, regardless of the kernel being booted.</para> </listitem>
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</itemizedlist>
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<para > These mechanisms may be used to parameterize and extend trusted (i.e. signed), immutable initrd
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images in a reasonably safe way: all data they contain is measured into TPM PCRs. On access they should be
further validated: in case of the credentials case by encrypting/authenticating them via TPM, as exposed
by <command > systemd-creds encrypt -T</command> (see
<citerefentry > <refentrytitle > systemd-creds</refentrytitle> <manvolnum > 1</manvolnum> </citerefentry> for
details); in case of the system extension images by using signed Verity images.</para>
</refsect1>
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<refsect1 >
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<title > TPM PCR Notes</title>
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<para > Note that when a unified kernel using <command > systemd-stub</command> is invoked the firmware will
measure it as a whole to TPM PCR 4, covering all embedded resources, such as the stub code itself, the
core kernel, the embedded initrd and kernel command line (see above for a full list).</para>
<para > Also note that the Linux kernel will measure all initrds it receives into TPM PCR 9. This means
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every type of initrd will be measured two or three times: the initrds embedded in the kernel image will be
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measured to PCR 4, PCR 9 and PCR 11; the initrd synthesized from credentials (and the one synthesized
from configuration extensions) will be measured to both PCR 9 and PCR 12; the initrd synthesized from
system extensions will be measured to both PCR 4 and PCR 9. Let's summarize the OS resources and the PCRs
they are measured to:</para>
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<table >
<title > OS Resource PCR Summary</title>
<tgroup cols= '2' align= 'left' colsep= '1' rowsep= '1' >
<colspec colname= "pcr" />
<colspec colname= "definition" />
<thead >
<row >
<entry > OS Resource</entry>
<entry > Measurement PCR</entry>
</row>
</thead>
<tbody >
<row >
<entry > <command > systemd-stub</command> code (the entry point of the unified PE binary)</entry>
<entry > 4</entry>
</row>
<row >
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<entry > Core kernel code (embedded in unified PE binary)</entry>
efi: from the stub measure the ELF kernel + built-in initrd and so on into PCR 11
Here we grab a new – on Linux so far unused (by my Googling skills, that
is) – and measure all static components of the PE kernel image into.
This is useful since for the first time we'll have a PCR that contains
only a PCR of the booted kernel, nothing else. That allows putting
together TPM policies that bind to a specific kernel (+ builtin initrd),
without having to have booted that kernel first. PCRs can be
pre-calculated. Yay!
You might wonder, why we measure just the discovered PE sections we are
about to use, instead of the whole PE image. That's because of the next
step I have in mind: PE images should also be able to carry an
additional section that contains a signature for its own expected,
pre-calculated PCR values. This signature data should then be passed
into the booted kernel and can be used there in TPM policies. Benefit:
TPM policies can now be bound to *signatures* of PCRs, instead of the
raw hash values themselves. This makes update management a *lot* easier,
as policies don't need to be updated whenever a kernel is updated, as
long as the signature is available. Now, if the PCR signature is
embedded in the kernel PE image it cannot be of a PCR hash of the kernel
PE image itself, because that would be a chicken-and-egg problem. Hence,
by only measuring the relavent payload sections (and that means
excluding the future section that will contain the PCR hash signature)
we avoid this problem, naturally.
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<entry > 4 + 11</entry>
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</row>
<row >
2022-09-09 12:08:35 +03:00
<entry > OS release information (embedded in the unified PE binary)</entry>
efi: from the stub measure the ELF kernel + built-in initrd and so on into PCR 11
Here we grab a new – on Linux so far unused (by my Googling skills, that
is) – and measure all static components of the PE kernel image into.
This is useful since for the first time we'll have a PCR that contains
only a PCR of the booted kernel, nothing else. That allows putting
together TPM policies that bind to a specific kernel (+ builtin initrd),
without having to have booted that kernel first. PCRs can be
pre-calculated. Yay!
You might wonder, why we measure just the discovered PE sections we are
about to use, instead of the whole PE image. That's because of the next
step I have in mind: PE images should also be able to carry an
additional section that contains a signature for its own expected,
pre-calculated PCR values. This signature data should then be passed
into the booted kernel and can be used there in TPM policies. Benefit:
TPM policies can now be bound to *signatures* of PCRs, instead of the
raw hash values themselves. This makes update management a *lot* easier,
as policies don't need to be updated whenever a kernel is updated, as
long as the signature is available. Now, if the PCR signature is
embedded in the kernel PE image it cannot be of a PCR hash of the kernel
PE image itself, because that would be a chicken-and-egg problem. Hence,
by only measuring the relavent payload sections (and that means
excluding the future section that will contain the PCR hash signature)
we avoid this problem, naturally.
2022-07-25 18:44:24 +03:00
<entry > 4 + 11</entry>
2022-04-14 15:38:52 +03:00
</row>
<row >
<entry > Main initrd (embedded in unified PE binary)</entry>
efi: from the stub measure the ELF kernel + built-in initrd and so on into PCR 11
Here we grab a new – on Linux so far unused (by my Googling skills, that
is) – and measure all static components of the PE kernel image into.
This is useful since for the first time we'll have a PCR that contains
only a PCR of the booted kernel, nothing else. That allows putting
together TPM policies that bind to a specific kernel (+ builtin initrd),
without having to have booted that kernel first. PCRs can be
pre-calculated. Yay!
You might wonder, why we measure just the discovered PE sections we are
about to use, instead of the whole PE image. That's because of the next
step I have in mind: PE images should also be able to carry an
additional section that contains a signature for its own expected,
pre-calculated PCR values. This signature data should then be passed
into the booted kernel and can be used there in TPM policies. Benefit:
TPM policies can now be bound to *signatures* of PCRs, instead of the
raw hash values themselves. This makes update management a *lot* easier,
as policies don't need to be updated whenever a kernel is updated, as
long as the signature is available. Now, if the PCR signature is
embedded in the kernel PE image it cannot be of a PCR hash of the kernel
PE image itself, because that would be a chicken-and-egg problem. Hence,
by only measuring the relavent payload sections (and that means
excluding the future section that will contain the PCR hash signature)
we avoid this problem, naturally.
2022-07-25 18:44:24 +03:00
<entry > 4 + 9 + 11</entry>
2022-04-14 15:38:52 +03:00
</row>
2024-04-02 13:54:30 +03:00
<row >
<entry > Microcode initrd (embedded in unified PE binary)</entry>
<entry > 4 + 9 + 11</entry>
</row>
2022-04-14 15:38:52 +03:00
<row >
<entry > Default kernel command line (embedded in unified PE binary)</entry>
efi: from the stub measure the ELF kernel + built-in initrd and so on into PCR 11
Here we grab a new – on Linux so far unused (by my Googling skills, that
is) – and measure all static components of the PE kernel image into.
This is useful since for the first time we'll have a PCR that contains
only a PCR of the booted kernel, nothing else. That allows putting
together TPM policies that bind to a specific kernel (+ builtin initrd),
without having to have booted that kernel first. PCRs can be
pre-calculated. Yay!
You might wonder, why we measure just the discovered PE sections we are
about to use, instead of the whole PE image. That's because of the next
step I have in mind: PE images should also be able to carry an
additional section that contains a signature for its own expected,
pre-calculated PCR values. This signature data should then be passed
into the booted kernel and can be used there in TPM policies. Benefit:
TPM policies can now be bound to *signatures* of PCRs, instead of the
raw hash values themselves. This makes update management a *lot* easier,
as policies don't need to be updated whenever a kernel is updated, as
long as the signature is available. Now, if the PCR signature is
embedded in the kernel PE image it cannot be of a PCR hash of the kernel
PE image itself, because that would be a chicken-and-egg problem. Hence,
by only measuring the relavent payload sections (and that means
excluding the future section that will contain the PCR hash signature)
we avoid this problem, naturally.
2022-07-25 18:44:24 +03:00
<entry > 4 + 11</entry>
2022-04-14 15:38:52 +03:00
</row>
<row >
2022-04-25 04:06:08 +03:00
<entry > Overridden kernel command line</entry>
2022-04-14 15:38:52 +03:00
<entry > 12</entry>
</row>
2022-09-09 12:08:35 +03:00
<row >
<entry > Boot splash (embedded in the unified PE binary)</entry>
<entry > 4 + 11</entry>
</row>
<row >
<entry > TPM2 PCR signature JSON (embedded in unified PE binary, synthesized into initrd)</entry>
<entry > 4 + 9</entry>
</row>
<row >
<entry > TPM2 PCR PEM public key (embedded in unified PE binary, synthesized into initrd)</entry>
<entry > 4 + 9 + 11</entry>
</row>
2022-04-14 15:38:52 +03:00
<row >
<entry > Credentials (synthesized initrd from companion files)</entry>
2022-07-26 19:32:21 +03:00
<entry > 9 + 12</entry>
2022-04-14 15:38:52 +03:00
</row>
<row >
<entry > System Extensions (synthesized initrd from companion files)</entry>
sd-stub: measure sysext images picked up by sd-stub into PCR 13
Let's grab another so far unused PCR, and measure all sysext images into
it that we load from the ESP. Note that this is possibly partly redundant,
since sysext images should have dm-verity enabled, and that is hooked up
to IMA. However, measuring this explicitly has the benefit that we can
measure filenames too, easily, and that all without need for IMA or
anything like that.
This means: when booting a unified sd-stub kernel through sd-boot we'll
now have:
1. PCR 11: unified kernel image payload (i.e. kernel, initrd, boot
splash, dtb, osrelease)
2. PCR 12: kernel command line (i.e. the one embedded in the image, plus
optionally an overriden one) + any credential files picked up by
sd-stub
3. PCR 13: sysext images picked up by sd-stub
And each of these three PCRs should carry just the above, and start from
zero, thus be pre-calculatable.
Thus, all components and parameters of the OS boot process (i.e.
everything after the boot loader) is now nicely pre-calculable.
NOTE: this actually replaces previous measuring of the syext images into
PCR 4. I added this back in 845707aae23b3129db635604edb95c4048a5922a,
following the train of thought, that sysext images for the initrd should
be measured like the initrd itself they are for, and according to my
thinking that would be a unified kernel which is measured by firmware
into PCR 4 like any other UEFI executables.
However, I think we should depart from that idea. First and foremost
that makes it harder to pre-calculate PCR 4 (since we actually measured
quite incompatible records to the TPM event log), but also I think
there's great value in being able to write policies that bind to the
used sysexts independently of the earlier boot chain (i.e. shim, boot
loader, unified kernel), hence a separate PCR makes more sense.
Strictly speaking, this is a compatibility break, but I think one we can
get away with, simply because the initrd sysext images are currently not
picked up by systemd-sysext yet in the initrd, and because of that we
can be reasonably sure noone uses this yet, and hence relies on the PCR
register used. Hence, let's clean this up before people actually do
start relying on this.
2022-07-26 12:35:57 +03:00
<entry > 9 + 13</entry>
2022-04-14 15:38:52 +03:00
</row>
2023-11-08 21:02:03 +03:00
<row >
<entry > Configuration Extensions (synthesized initrd from companion files)</entry>
<entry > 9 + 12</entry>
</row>
2022-04-14 15:38:52 +03:00
</tbody>
</tgroup>
</table>
</refsect1>
2021-09-21 17:52:24 +03:00
<refsect1 >
<title > EFI Variables</title>
<para > The following EFI variables are defined, set and read by <command > systemd-stub</command> , under the
vendor UUID <literal > 4a67b082-0a4c-41cf-b6c7-440b29bb8c4f</literal> , for communication between the boot
stub and the OS:</para>
<variablelist class= 'efi-variables' >
<varlistentry >
<term > <varname > LoaderDevicePartUUID</varname> </term>
<listitem > <para > Contains the partition UUID of the EFI System Partition the EFI image was run
from. <citerefentry > <refentrytitle > systemd-gpt-auto-generator</refentrytitle> <manvolnum > 8</manvolnum> </citerefentry>
uses this information to automatically find the disk booted from, in order to discover various other
2023-08-22 19:52:36 +03:00
partitions on the same disk automatically.</para>
<xi:include href= "version-info.xml" xpointer= "v250" /> </listitem>
2021-09-21 17:52:24 +03:00
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry >
<term > <varname > LoaderFirmwareInfo</varname> </term>
<term > <varname > LoaderFirmwareType</varname> </term>
<listitem > <para > Brief firmware information. Use
<citerefentry > <refentrytitle > bootctl</refentrytitle> <manvolnum > 1</manvolnum> </citerefentry> to view this
2023-08-22 19:52:36 +03:00
data.</para>
<xi:include href= "version-info.xml" xpointer= "v250" /> </listitem>
2021-09-21 17:52:24 +03:00
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry >
<term > <varname > LoaderImageIdentifier</varname> </term>
<listitem > <para > The path of EFI executable, relative to the EFI System Partition's root
directory. Use
<citerefentry > <refentrytitle > bootctl</refentrytitle> <manvolnum > 1</manvolnum> </citerefentry> to view
2023-08-22 19:52:36 +03:00
this data.</para>
<xi:include href= "version-info.xml" xpointer= "v250" /> </listitem>
2021-09-21 17:52:24 +03:00
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry >
<term > <varname > StubInfo</varname> </term>
<listitem > <para > Brief stub information. Use
<citerefentry > <refentrytitle > bootctl</refentrytitle> <manvolnum > 1</manvolnum> </citerefentry> to view
2023-08-22 19:52:36 +03:00
this data.</para>
<xi:include href= "version-info.xml" xpointer= "v250" /> </listitem>
2021-09-21 17:52:24 +03:00
</varlistentry>
2022-07-26 19:32:21 +03:00
efi: from the stub measure the ELF kernel + built-in initrd and so on into PCR 11
Here we grab a new – on Linux so far unused (by my Googling skills, that
is) – and measure all static components of the PE kernel image into.
This is useful since for the first time we'll have a PCR that contains
only a PCR of the booted kernel, nothing else. That allows putting
together TPM policies that bind to a specific kernel (+ builtin initrd),
without having to have booted that kernel first. PCRs can be
pre-calculated. Yay!
You might wonder, why we measure just the discovered PE sections we are
about to use, instead of the whole PE image. That's because of the next
step I have in mind: PE images should also be able to carry an
additional section that contains a signature for its own expected,
pre-calculated PCR values. This signature data should then be passed
into the booted kernel and can be used there in TPM policies. Benefit:
TPM policies can now be bound to *signatures* of PCRs, instead of the
raw hash values themselves. This makes update management a *lot* easier,
as policies don't need to be updated whenever a kernel is updated, as
long as the signature is available. Now, if the PCR signature is
embedded in the kernel PE image it cannot be of a PCR hash of the kernel
PE image itself, because that would be a chicken-and-egg problem. Hence,
by only measuring the relavent payload sections (and that means
excluding the future section that will contain the PCR hash signature)
we avoid this problem, naturally.
2022-07-25 18:44:24 +03:00
<varlistentry >
<term > <varname > StubPcrKernelImage</varname> </term>
man: "the initial RAM disk" → "the initrd"
In many places we spelled out the phrase behind "initrd" in full, but this
isn't terribly useful. In fact, no "RAM disk" is used, so emphasizing this
is just confusing to the reader. Let's just say "initrd" everywhere, people
understand what this refers to, and that it's in fact an initramfs image.
Also, s/i.e./e.g./ where appropriate.
Also, don't say "in RAM", when in fact it's virtual memory, whose pages
may or may not be loaded in page frames in RAM, and we have no control over
this.
Also, add <filename></filename> and other minor cleanups.
2022-09-15 15:43:59 +03:00
<listitem > <para > The PCR register index the kernel image, initrd image, boot splash, devicetree
database, and the embedded command line are measured into, formatted as decimal ASCII string (e.g.
<literal > 11</literal> ). This variable is set if a measurement was successfully completed, and remains
2023-08-22 19:52:36 +03:00
unset otherwise.</para>
<xi:include href= "version-info.xml" xpointer= "v252" /> </listitem>
efi: from the stub measure the ELF kernel + built-in initrd and so on into PCR 11
Here we grab a new – on Linux so far unused (by my Googling skills, that
is) – and measure all static components of the PE kernel image into.
This is useful since for the first time we'll have a PCR that contains
only a PCR of the booted kernel, nothing else. That allows putting
together TPM policies that bind to a specific kernel (+ builtin initrd),
without having to have booted that kernel first. PCRs can be
pre-calculated. Yay!
You might wonder, why we measure just the discovered PE sections we are
about to use, instead of the whole PE image. That's because of the next
step I have in mind: PE images should also be able to carry an
additional section that contains a signature for its own expected,
pre-calculated PCR values. This signature data should then be passed
into the booted kernel and can be used there in TPM policies. Benefit:
TPM policies can now be bound to *signatures* of PCRs, instead of the
raw hash values themselves. This makes update management a *lot* easier,
as policies don't need to be updated whenever a kernel is updated, as
long as the signature is available. Now, if the PCR signature is
embedded in the kernel PE image it cannot be of a PCR hash of the kernel
PE image itself, because that would be a chicken-and-egg problem. Hence,
by only measuring the relavent payload sections (and that means
excluding the future section that will contain the PCR hash signature)
we avoid this problem, naturally.
2022-07-25 18:44:24 +03:00
</varlistentry>
2022-07-26 19:32:21 +03:00
<varlistentry >
<term > <varname > StubPcrKernelParameters</varname> </term>
<listitem > <para > The PCR register index the kernel command line and credentials are measured into,
man: "the initial RAM disk" → "the initrd"
In many places we spelled out the phrase behind "initrd" in full, but this
isn't terribly useful. In fact, no "RAM disk" is used, so emphasizing this
is just confusing to the reader. Let's just say "initrd" everywhere, people
understand what this refers to, and that it's in fact an initramfs image.
Also, s/i.e./e.g./ where appropriate.
Also, don't say "in RAM", when in fact it's virtual memory, whose pages
may or may not be loaded in page frames in RAM, and we have no control over
this.
Also, add <filename></filename> and other minor cleanups.
2022-09-15 15:43:59 +03:00
formatted as decimal ASCII string (e.g. <literal > 12</literal> ). This variable is set if a measurement
2023-08-22 19:52:36 +03:00
was successfully completed, and remains unset otherwise.</para>
<xi:include href= "version-info.xml" xpointer= "v252" /> </listitem>
2022-07-26 19:32:21 +03:00
</varlistentry>
sd-stub: measure sysext images picked up by sd-stub into PCR 13
Let's grab another so far unused PCR, and measure all sysext images into
it that we load from the ESP. Note that this is possibly partly redundant,
since sysext images should have dm-verity enabled, and that is hooked up
to IMA. However, measuring this explicitly has the benefit that we can
measure filenames too, easily, and that all without need for IMA or
anything like that.
This means: when booting a unified sd-stub kernel through sd-boot we'll
now have:
1. PCR 11: unified kernel image payload (i.e. kernel, initrd, boot
splash, dtb, osrelease)
2. PCR 12: kernel command line (i.e. the one embedded in the image, plus
optionally an overriden one) + any credential files picked up by
sd-stub
3. PCR 13: sysext images picked up by sd-stub
And each of these three PCRs should carry just the above, and start from
zero, thus be pre-calculatable.
Thus, all components and parameters of the OS boot process (i.e.
everything after the boot loader) is now nicely pre-calculable.
NOTE: this actually replaces previous measuring of the syext images into
PCR 4. I added this back in 845707aae23b3129db635604edb95c4048a5922a,
following the train of thought, that sysext images for the initrd should
be measured like the initrd itself they are for, and according to my
thinking that would be a unified kernel which is measured by firmware
into PCR 4 like any other UEFI executables.
However, I think we should depart from that idea. First and foremost
that makes it harder to pre-calculate PCR 4 (since we actually measured
quite incompatible records to the TPM event log), but also I think
there's great value in being able to write policies that bind to the
used sysexts independently of the earlier boot chain (i.e. shim, boot
loader, unified kernel), hence a separate PCR makes more sense.
Strictly speaking, this is a compatibility break, but I think one we can
get away with, simply because the initrd sysext images are currently not
picked up by systemd-sysext yet in the initrd, and because of that we
can be reasonably sure noone uses this yet, and hence relies on the PCR
register used. Hence, let's clean this up before people actually do
start relying on this.
2022-07-26 12:35:57 +03:00
<varlistentry >
<term > <varname > StubPcrInitRDSysExts</varname> </term>
2023-11-08 21:02:03 +03:00
<listitem > <para > The PCR register index the system extensions for the initrd, which are picked up from
the file system the kernel image is located on. Formatted as decimal ASCII string (e.g.
man: "the initial RAM disk" → "the initrd"
In many places we spelled out the phrase behind "initrd" in full, but this
isn't terribly useful. In fact, no "RAM disk" is used, so emphasizing this
is just confusing to the reader. Let's just say "initrd" everywhere, people
understand what this refers to, and that it's in fact an initramfs image.
Also, s/i.e./e.g./ where appropriate.
Also, don't say "in RAM", when in fact it's virtual memory, whose pages
may or may not be loaded in page frames in RAM, and we have no control over
this.
Also, add <filename></filename> and other minor cleanups.
2022-09-15 15:43:59 +03:00
<literal > 13</literal> ). This variable is set if a measurement was successfully completed, and remains
2023-08-22 19:52:36 +03:00
unset otherwise.</para>
<xi:include href= "version-info.xml" xpointer= "v252" /> </listitem>
sd-stub: measure sysext images picked up by sd-stub into PCR 13
Let's grab another so far unused PCR, and measure all sysext images into
it that we load from the ESP. Note that this is possibly partly redundant,
since sysext images should have dm-verity enabled, and that is hooked up
to IMA. However, measuring this explicitly has the benefit that we can
measure filenames too, easily, and that all without need for IMA or
anything like that.
This means: when booting a unified sd-stub kernel through sd-boot we'll
now have:
1. PCR 11: unified kernel image payload (i.e. kernel, initrd, boot
splash, dtb, osrelease)
2. PCR 12: kernel command line (i.e. the one embedded in the image, plus
optionally an overriden one) + any credential files picked up by
sd-stub
3. PCR 13: sysext images picked up by sd-stub
And each of these three PCRs should carry just the above, and start from
zero, thus be pre-calculatable.
Thus, all components and parameters of the OS boot process (i.e.
everything after the boot loader) is now nicely pre-calculable.
NOTE: this actually replaces previous measuring of the syext images into
PCR 4. I added this back in 845707aae23b3129db635604edb95c4048a5922a,
following the train of thought, that sysext images for the initrd should
be measured like the initrd itself they are for, and according to my
thinking that would be a unified kernel which is measured by firmware
into PCR 4 like any other UEFI executables.
However, I think we should depart from that idea. First and foremost
that makes it harder to pre-calculate PCR 4 (since we actually measured
quite incompatible records to the TPM event log), but also I think
there's great value in being able to write policies that bind to the
used sysexts independently of the earlier boot chain (i.e. shim, boot
loader, unified kernel), hence a separate PCR makes more sense.
Strictly speaking, this is a compatibility break, but I think one we can
get away with, simply because the initrd sysext images are currently not
picked up by systemd-sysext yet in the initrd, and because of that we
can be reasonably sure noone uses this yet, and hence relies on the PCR
register used. Hence, let's clean this up before people actually do
start relying on this.
2022-07-26 12:35:57 +03:00
</varlistentry>
2023-11-08 21:02:03 +03:00
<varlistentry >
<term > <varname > StubPcrInitRDConfExts</varname> </term>
<listitem > <para > The PCR register index the configuration extensions for the initrd, which are picked
up from the file system the kernel image is located on. Formatted as decimal ASCII string (e.g.
<literal > 12</literal> ). This variable is set if a measurement was successfully completed, and remains
unset otherwise.</para>
<xi:include href= "version-info.xml" xpointer= "v255" /> </listitem>
</varlistentry>
2021-09-21 17:52:24 +03:00
</variablelist>
<para > Note that some of the variables above may also be set by the boot loader. The stub will only set
them if they aren't set already. Some of these variables are defined by the <ulink
url="https://systemd.io/BOOT_LOADER_INTERFACE">Boot Loader Interface</ulink> .</para>
</refsect1>
2022-09-09 12:08:35 +03:00
<refsect1 >
<title > initrd Resources</title>
<para > The following resources are passed as initrd cpio archives to the booted kernel, and thus make up
the initial file system hierarchy in the initrd execution environment:</para>
<variablelist >
<varlistentry >
<term > <filename > /</filename> </term>
2023-11-24 17:19:50 +03:00
<listitem > <para > The main initrd from the <literal > .initrd</literal> PE section of the unified kernel
image.</para>
2023-08-22 19:52:36 +03:00
<xi:include href= "version-info.xml" xpointer= "v252" /> </listitem>
2022-09-09 12:08:35 +03:00
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry >
<term > <filename > /.extra/credentials/*.cred</filename> </term>
<listitem > <para > Credential files (suffix <literal > .cred</literal> ) that are placed next to the
unified kernel image (as described above) are copied into the
<filename > /.extra/credentials/</filename> directory in the initrd execution
2023-08-22 19:52:36 +03:00
environment.</para>
<xi:include href= "version-info.xml" xpointer= "v252" /> </listitem>
2022-09-09 12:08:35 +03:00
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry >
<term > <filename > /.extra/global_credentials/*.cred</filename> </term>
2023-11-24 17:19:50 +03:00
<listitem > <para > Similarly, credential files in the <filename > /loader/credentials/</filename>
directory in the file system the unified kernel image is placed in are copied into the
2022-09-09 12:08:35 +03:00
<filename > /.extra/global_credentials/</filename> directory in the initrd execution
2023-08-22 19:52:36 +03:00
environment.</para>
<xi:include href= "version-info.xml" xpointer= "v252" /> </listitem>
2022-09-09 12:08:35 +03:00
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry >
2023-11-08 21:02:03 +03:00
<term > <filename > /.extra/sysext/*.sysext.raw</filename> </term>
<listitem > <para > System extension image files (suffix <literal > .sysext.raw</literal> ) that are placed
next to the unified kernel image (as described above) are copied into the
2023-08-22 19:52:36 +03:00
<filename > /.extra/sysext/</filename> directory in the initrd execution environment.</para>
<xi:include href= "version-info.xml" xpointer= "v252" /> </listitem>
2022-09-09 12:08:35 +03:00
</varlistentry>
2023-11-08 21:02:03 +03:00
<varlistentry >
<term > <filename > /.extra/confext/*.confext.raw</filename> </term>
<listitem > <para > Configuration extension image files (suffix <literal > .confext.raw</literal> ) that are
placed next to the unified kernel image (as described above) are copied into the
<filename > /.extra/confext/</filename> directory in the initrd execution environment.</para>
<xi:include href= "version-info.xml" xpointer= "v255" /> </listitem>
</varlistentry>
2022-09-09 12:08:35 +03:00
<varlistentry >
<term > <filename > /.extra/tpm2-pcr-signature.json</filename> </term>
<listitem > <para > The TPM2 PCR signature JSON object included in the <literal > .pcrsig</literal> PE
section of the unified kernel image is copied into the
2023-11-24 17:19:50 +03:00
<filename > /.extra/tpm2-pcr-signature.json</filename> file in the initrd execution environment.</para>
2023-08-22 19:52:36 +03:00
<xi:include href= "version-info.xml" xpointer= "v252" /> </listitem>
2022-09-09 12:08:35 +03:00
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry >
<term > <filename > /.extra/tpm2-pcr-pkey.pem</filename> </term>
<listitem > <para > The PEM public key included in the <literal > .pcrpkey</literal> PE section of the
unified kernel image is copied into the <filename > /.extra/tpm2-pcr-public-key.pem</filename> file in
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the initrd execution environment.</para>
<xi:include href= "version-info.xml" xpointer= "v252" /> </listitem>
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</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
<para > Note that all these files are located in the <literal > tmpfs</literal> file system the kernel sets
up for the initrd file hierarchy and are thus lost when the system transitions from the initrd execution
environment into the host file system. If these resources shall be kept around over this transition they
need to be copied to a place that survives the transition first, for example via a suitable
<citerefentry > <refentrytitle > tmpfiles.d</refentrytitle> <manvolnum > 5</manvolnum> </citerefentry> line. By
default, this is done for the TPM2 PCR signature and public key files.</para>
</refsect1>
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<refsect1 >
<title > SMBIOS Type 11 Strings</title>
<para > <command > systemd-stub</command> can be configured using SMBIOS Type 11 strings. Applicable strings
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consist of a name, followed by <literal > =</literal> , followed by the value. Unless
<command > systemd-stub</command> detects it is running inside a confidential computing environment,
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<command > systemd-stub</command> will search the table for a string with a specific name, and if found,
use its value. The following strings are read:</para>
<variablelist >
<varlistentry >
<term > <varname > io.systemd.stub.kernel-cmdline-extra</varname> </term>
<listitem > <para > If set, the value of this string is added to the list of kernel command line
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arguments that are measured in PCR12 and passed to the kernel.</para>
<xi:include href= "version-info.xml" xpointer= "v254" /> </listitem>
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</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
</refsect1>
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<refsect1 >
<title > Assembling Kernel Images</title>
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<para > In order to assemble a bootable Unified Kernel Image from various components as described above, use
<citerefentry > <refentrytitle > ukify</refentrytitle> <manvolnum > 1</manvolnum> </citerefentry> .</para>
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</refsect1>
<refsect1 >
<title > See Also</title>
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<para > <simplelist type= "inline" >
<member > <citerefentry > <refentrytitle > systemd-boot</refentrytitle> <manvolnum > 7</manvolnum> </citerefentry> </member>
<member > <citerefentry > <refentrytitle > systemd.exec</refentrytitle> <manvolnum > 5</manvolnum> </citerefentry> </member>
<member > <citerefentry > <refentrytitle > systemd-creds</refentrytitle> <manvolnum > 1</manvolnum> </citerefentry> </member>
<member > <citerefentry > <refentrytitle > systemd-sysext</refentrytitle> <manvolnum > 8</manvolnum> </citerefentry> </member>
<member > <ulink url= "https://uapi-group.org/specifications/specs/boot_loader_specification" > Boot Loader Specification</ulink> </member>
<member > <ulink url= "https://systemd.io/BOOT_LOADER_INTERFACE" > Boot Loader Interface</ulink> </member>
<member > <citerefentry > <refentrytitle > ukify</refentrytitle> <manvolnum > 1</manvolnum> </citerefentry> </member>
<member > <citerefentry > <refentrytitle > systemd-measure</refentrytitle> <manvolnum > 1</manvolnum> </citerefentry> </member>
<member > <ulink url= "https://systemd.io/TPM2_PCR_MEASUREMENTS" > TPM2 PCR Measurements Made by systemd</ulink> </member>
</simplelist> </para>
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</refsect1>
</refentry>