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This patch add support to enables to send User Class option code 77
RFC 3004.
This option MAY carry multiple User Classes.
The format of this option is as follows:
Code Len Value
+-----+-----+--------------------- . . . --+
| 77 | N | User Class Data ('Len' octets) |
+-----+-----+--------------------- . . . --+
where Value consists of one or more instances of User Class Data.
Each instance of User Class Data is formatted as follows:
UC_Len_i User_Class_Data_i
+--------+------------------------ . . . --+
| L_i | Opaque-Data ('UC_Len_i' octets) |
+--------+------------------------ . . . --+
UserClass=
A DHCPv4 client can use UserClass option to identify the type or category of user or applications
it represents. The information contained in this option is an string that represents the user class
of which the client is a member. Each class sets an identifying string of information to be used by the DHCP service to classify clients. Takes a whitespace-separated list.
UserClass= hello world how are you
Closes: RFC: #5134
This adds a number of entries nspawn already applies to regular service
namespacing too. Most importantly let's mask /proc/kcore and
/proc/kallsyms too.
We need to do this in all cases, including on cgroupsv1 in order to
ensure the host systemd and any systemd in the payload won't fight for
the cgroup attributes of the top-level cgroup of the payload.
This is because systemd for Delegate=yes units will only delegate the
right to create children as well as their attributes. However, nspawn
expects that the cgroup delegated covers both the right to create
children and the attributes of the cgroup itself. Hence, to clear this
up, let's unconditionally insert a intermediary cgroup, on cgroupsv1 as
well as cgroupsv2, unconditionally.
This is also nice as it reduces the differences in the various setups
and exposes very close behaviour everywhere.
Let's not make /run too special and let's make sure the source file is
not guessable: let's use our regular temporary file helper calls to
create the source node.
This tightens security on /proc: a couple of files exposed there are now
made inaccessible. These files might potentially leak kernel internals
or expose non-virtualized concepts, hence lock them down by default.
Moreover, a couple of dirs in /proc that expose stuff also exposed in
/sys are now marked read-only, similar to how we handle /sys.
The list is taken from what docker/runc based container managers
generally apply, but slightly extended.
if we lack privs to create device nodes that's fine, and creating
/run/systemd/inaccessible/chr or /run/systemd/inaccessible/blk won't
work then. Document this in longer comments.
Fixes: #4484
Yes, the output is sometimes annyoing, but /dev/null is not the right
place...
I figure this redirection was left in from some debugging session, let's
fix it, and make the setup_basic_environment invocation like in all
other test scripts.
If dbus.service starts earlier than the dynamic user systemd-timesync
is realized, then the dbus policy file for timesyncd does not loaded
and timesyncd fails to request name.
To support such case, try to reload dbus configuration when requesting
name fails.
