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Use a salted, unbound HMAC session with the primary key used as tpmKey,
which mean that the random salt will be encrypted with the primary
key while in transit. Decrypt/encrypt flags are set on the new session
with AES in CFB mode. There is no fallback to XOR mode.
This provides confidentiality and replay protection, both when sealing
and unsealing. There is no protection against man in the middle
attacks since we have no way to authenticate the TPM at the moment.
The exception is unsealing with PIN, as an attacker will be unable
to generate the proper HMAC digest.
Conceptually the feature is great and should exist, but in its current
form should be worked to be generic (i.e. not specific to
Windows/Bitlocker, but appliable to any boot entry), not be global (but
be a per-entry thing), not require a BootXXXX entry to exist, and not
check for the BitLocker signature (as TPMs are not just used for
BitLocker).
Since we want to get 251 released, mark it in the documentation, in NEWS
and in code as experimental and make clear it will be reworked in a
future release. Also, make it opt-in to make it less likely people come
to rely on it without reading up on it, and understanding that it will
likely change sooner or later.
Follow-up for: #22043
See: #22390
Apparently Grub is measuring all kinds of garbage into PCR 8. Since people
apparently chainload sd-boot from grub, let's thus stay away from PCR 8,
and use PCR 12 instead for the kernel command line.
As discussed here: #22635Fixes: #22635
It's not a pointer after all, but a numeric value. As such the const
applies to the value and not the target, but we genreally don#t do that
for value parameters. Hence drop the const.
So far we set the "trusted.delegate" xattr on cgroups where delegation
is on. This duplicates this behaviour with the "user.delegate" xattr.
This has two benefits:
1. unprivileged clients can *read* the xattr. "systemd-cgls" can thus
show delegated cgroups as such properly, even when invoked without
privs
2. unprivileged systemd instances can set the xattr, i.e. when systemd
--user delegates a cgroup to further payloads.
This weakens security a tiny bit, given that code that got a cgroup
delegated can manipulate the xattr, but I think that's OK, given they
have a higher trust level regarding cgroups anyway, if they got a
subtree delegated, and access controls on the cgroup itself are still
enforced. Moreover PID 1 as the cgroup manager only sets these xattrs,
never reads them — the xattr is primarily a way to tell payloads about
the delegation, and it's strictly this one way.
Add tests for enrolling and unlocking. Various cases are tested:
- Default PCR 7 policy w/o PIN, good and bad cases (wrong PCR)
- PCR 7 + PIN policy, good and bad cases (wrong PCR, wrong PIN)
- Non-default PCR 0+7 policy w/o PIN, good and bad cases (wrong PCR 0)
v2: rename test, fix tss2 library installation, fix CI failures
v3: fix ppc64, load module
Handle the case where TPM2 metadata is not available and explicitly
provided in crypttab. This adds a new "tpm2-pin" option to crypttab
options for this purpose.
This is unfinished: we don't have any way to actually query for PINs
interactively this way. It is similar to FIDO2 and PKCS#11 in this
regard.
Nonetheless, this code is capable of validating and dumping tokens, so
it is already useful as-is.
Add support for PIN enrollment with TPM2. A new "tpm2-pin" field is
introduced into metadata to signal that the policy needs to include a
PIN.
v2: fix tpm2_make_luks2_json in sd-repart
Modify TPM2 authentication policy to optionally include an authValue, i.e.
a password/PIN. We use the "PIN" terminology since it's used by other
systems such as Windows, even though the PIN is not necessarily numeric.
The pin is hashed via SHA256 to allow for arbitrary length PINs.
v2: fix tpm2_seal in sd-repart
v3: applied review feedback
It seems there exists a short time period that we cannot see the
loopback device after `losetup` is finished:
```
testsuite-58.sh[367]: ++ losetup -b 1024 -P --show -f /tmp/testsuite-58-sector-1024.img
kernel: loop1: detected capacity change from 0 to 204800
testsuite-58.sh[285]: + LOOP=/dev/loop1
testsuite-58.sh[285]: + systemd-repart --pretty=yes --definitions=/tmp/testsuite-58-sector/ --seed=750b6cd5c4ae4012a15e7be3c29e6a47 --empty=require --dry-run=no /dev/loop1
testsuite-58.sh[368]: Device '/dev/loop1' has no dm-crypt/dm-verity device, no need to look for underlying block device.
testsuite-58.sh[368]: Failed to determine canonical path for '/dev/loop1': No such file or directory
testsuite-58.sh[368]: Failed to open file or determine backing device of /dev/loop1: No such file or directory
```
The Ubuntu CI on ppc64el seems to have a issue on tmpfs, and files
may not be fsynced. See c10caebb98.
For safety, let's use /var/tmp to store disk images.
The current description for the factory reset target does not add any
value and doesn't respect the definition of the related property as
described in systemd.unit(5).
Starting the target currently results in the following log:
[ 11.139174] systemd[1]: Reached target Target that triggers factory reset. Does nothing by default..
[ OK ] Reached target Target that…set. Does nothing by default..
Simply update the target description to "Factory Reset".
Signed-off-by: Vivien Didelot <vivien.didelot@gmail.com>
/dev/urandom is seeded with RDRAND. Calling genuine_random_bytes(...,
..., 0) will use /dev/urandom as a last resort. Hence, we gain nothing
here by having our own RDRAND wrapper, because /dev/urandom already is
based on RDRAND output, even before /dev/urandom has fully initialized.
Furthermore, RDRAND is not actually fast! And on each successive
generation of new x86 CPUs, from both AMD and Intel, it just gets
slower.
This commit simplifies things by just using /dev/urandom in cases where
we before might use RDRAND, since /dev/urandom will always have RDRAND
mixed in as part of it.
And above where I say "/dev/urandom", what I actually mean is
GRND_INSECURE, which is the same thing but won't generate warnings in
dmesg.
