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Turns out that part of systemd isn't covered by any fuzz targets and
that's not ideal considering that it parses data sent remotely. The
fuzzer triggers an infinite loop in lease_parse_routes as soon as it
starts so it seems to be working :-)
```
INFO: Running with entropic power schedule (0xFF, 100).
INFO: Seed: 23620602
INFO: Loaded 2 modules (182073 inline 8-bit counters): 176548 [0x7fdf511fc8d0, 0x7fdf51227a74), 5525 [0x5f6ef0, 0x5f8485),
INFO: Loaded 2 PC tables (182073 PCs): 176548 [0x7fdf51227a78,0x7fdf514d94b8), 5525 [0x5f8488,0x60ddd8),
./build/fuzz-dhcp-client: Running 1 inputs 1 time(s) each.
Running: test/fuzz/fuzz-dhcp-client/timeout-ed34161922c7075c4773f2ada3dee8685d220980
ALARM: working on the last Unit for 31 seconds
and the timeout value is 30 (use -timeout=N to change)
==80731== ERROR: libFuzzer: timeout after 31 seconds
#0 0x51b32e in __sanitizer_print_stack_trace (/home/vagrant/systemd/build/fuzz-dhcp-client+0x51b32e)
#1 0x4689e9 in fuzzer::PrintStackTrace() (/home/vagrant/systemd/build/fuzz-dhcp-client+0x4689e9)
#2 0x44a0f4 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::StaticAlarmCallback() (/home/vagrant/systemd/build/fuzz-dhcp-client+0x44a0f4)
#3 0x7fdf4f8b474f (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x4274f)
#4 0x465fee in __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp4 (/home/vagrant/systemd/build/fuzz-dhcp-client+0x465fee)
#5 0x57eee5 in lease_parse_routes /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/libsystemd-network/sd-dhcp-lease.c:495:23
#6 0x57baf3 in dhcp_lease_parse_options /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/libsystemd-network/sd-dhcp-lease.c:701:21
#7 0x572450 in parse_options /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/libsystemd-network/dhcp-option.c:348:33
#8 0x571cea in dhcp_option_parse /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/libsystemd-network/dhcp-option.c:381:21
#9 0x559a01 in client_handle_offer /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/libsystemd-network/sd-dhcp-client.c:1543:13
#10 0x5592bd in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/libsystemd-network/fuzz-dhcp-client.c:78:9
#11 0x44a379 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ExecuteCallback(unsigned char const*, unsigned long) (/home/vagrant/systemd/build/fuzz-dhcp-client+0x44a379)
#12 0x42ae1f in fuzzer::RunOneTest(fuzzer::Fuzzer*, char const*, unsigned long) (/home/vagrant/systemd/build/fuzz-dhcp-client+0x42ae1f)
#13 0x432ade in fuzzer::FuzzerDriver(int*, char***, int (*)(unsigned char const*, unsigned long)) (/home/vagrant/systemd/build/fuzz-dhcp-client+0x432ade)
#14 0x421f86 in main (/home/vagrant/systemd/build/fuzz-dhcp-client+0x421f86)
#15 0x7fdf4f89f55f in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2d55f)
#16 0x7fdf4f89f60b in __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2d60b)
#17 0x421fd4 in _start (/home/vagrant/systemd/build/fuzz-dhcp-client+0x421fd4)
SUMMARY: libFuzzer: timeout
```
A bind mount is added directly from private on the host to the actual
destination directory, no need for the symlinks (which cannot be created
as the bind mount happens first and creates the target as an actual directory)
Fixes https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/22264
If wait_operstate() is called super quickly after ip command, then the
up/down state may not be changed and propagated to networkd, and
wait_operstate() mistakenly pass with the previous state.
To avoid such situation, wait for a while to make networkd actually
detect the interface brought up/down.
This fixes the following race:
1. when a dummy interface is created, it is initially down state,
2. hence, wait_operstate() may pass before the link is activated,
3. and the ip command bring up the interface before the activation,
4. and networkd activates, that is, brings down the interface,
5. thus, next wait_operstate() timedout, as it waits for the interface up.
To fix the race, let's wait the link is activated, before enter the loop
of wait_operstate().
Fixes#22267.
Since the TEST-64-UDEV-STORAGE fails are quite frequent now and the root
cause is yet to be discovered, let's add a kludge that attempts to retry
the test up to two more times in case it fails, so we don't
unnecessarily disturb CIs while the issue is being investigated.
Revert this commit once #21819 is sorted out.
Tests DnsStream event handling, both for plain TCP DNS and DNS over TLS.
The DoT test requires the "openssl s_server" command line tool to mock a simple
TLS server. Thus the test's TLS part is skipped if openssl it not available.
The test works for both DNS_OVER_TLS_USE_GNUTLS and DNS_OVER_TLS_USE_OPENSSL.
The DoT case fails due to a bug, which is fixed on the next commit.
When sending multiple DNS questions to a DNS-over-TLS server (e.g. a question
for A and AAAA records, as is typical) on the same session, the server may
answer to each question in a separate TLS record, but it may also aggregate
multiple answers in a single TLS record.
(Some servers do this very often (e.g. Cloudflare 1.0.0.1), some do it sometimes
(e.g. Google 8.8.8.8) and some seem to never do it (e.g. Quad9 9.9.9.10)).
Both cases should be handled equivalently, as the byte stream is the same, but
when multiple answers came in a single TLS record, usually the first answer was
processed, but the second answer was entirely ignored, which caused a 10s delay
until the resolution timed out and the missing question was retried.
This can be reproduced by configuring one of the offending server and running
`resolvectl query google.com --cache=no` a few times.
To be notified of incoming data, systemd-resolved listens to `EPOLLIN` events
on the underlying socket. However, when DNS-over-TLS is used, the TLS library
(OpenSSL or GnuTLS) may read and buffer the entire TLS record when reading the
first answer, so usually no further `EPOLLIN` events will be generated, and the
second answer will never be processed.
To avoid this, if there's buffered TLS data, generate a "fake" EPOLLIN event.
This is hacky, but it makes this case transparent to the rest of the IO code.
These checks don't achieve anything of value. Assuming they were added to
check for corruption, they don't actually achieve this goal since other parts
of the data object can still get corrupted and we wouldn't notice unless we'd
recalculate the hash every time.
In theory, we could use the entry item hash to avoid a random access lookup
for the data object hash in the journal file in the future to speed up searching,
but for finding all entry objects containing a specific data objects, we already
have entry arrays per data object to get fast access to this information.
This means that duplicating the hashes in the entry item doesn't result in any
added value. In this commit, we remove the checks so that in future commits we
can remove the hashes from the journal file format in the new compact mode.
