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This makes two major changes to the way systemd-random-seed operates:
1. We now optionally credit entropy if this is configured (via an env
var). Previously we never would do that, with this change we still don't
by default, but it's possible to enable this if people acknowledge that
they shouldn't replicate an image with a contained random seed to
multiple systems. Note that in this patch crediting entropy is a boolean
thing (unlike in previous attempts such as #1062), where only a relative
amount of bits was credited. The simpler scheme implemented here should
be OK though as the random seeds saved to disk are now written only with
data from the kernel's entropy pool retrieved after the pool is fully
initialized. Specifically:
2. This makes systemd-random-seed.service a synchronization point for
kernel entropy pool initialization. It was already used like this, for
example by systemd-cryptsetup-generator's /dev/urandom passphrase
handling, with this change it explicitly operates like that (at least
systems which provide getrandom(), where we can support this). This
means services that rely on an initialized random pool should now place
After=systemd-random-seed.service and everything should be fine. Note
that with this change sysinit.target (and thus early boot) is NOT
systematically delayed until the entropy pool is initialized, i.e.
regular services need to add explicit ordering deps on this service if
they require an initialized random pool.
Fixes: #4271
Replaces: #10621#4513
There's no reason why writing should work if reading and writing
doesn't. Let's simplify this hence. /dev/urandom is generally an r/w
device, and everything else would be a serious system misconfiguration.
I was debugging stuff during early boot, and was confused that I never
found the logs for it in kmsg. The reason for that was that /proc is
generally not mounted the first time we do log_open() and hence
log_set_target(LOG_TARGET_KMSG) we do when running as PID 1 had not
effect. A lot later during start-up we call log_open() again where this
is fixed (after the point where we close all remaining fds still open),
but in the meantime no logs every got written to kmsg. This patch fixes
that.
This reverts commit 971a7a1526.
These unit names are typically different on distributions, let's not
hardcode those. Stuff like this should probably live in the distro
RPM/.deb, but not upstream, where we should be distro agnostic and
agnostic to other higher level packages like this.
This reverts commit 72d967df3e.
Revert this because it broke the `norbind` option of the bind flags
because it does bind-mounts unconditionally recursive.
Let's bring the old logic back.
Fixes: #13170
This makes ping(8) work without CAP_NET_ADMIN and CAP_NET_RAW because
those aren't effective inside rootless Podman containers.
It's quite useful when using OSTree based operating systems like Fedora
Silverblue, where development environments are often set up using
rootless Podman containers with helpers like Toolbox [1]. Not having
a basic network utility like ping(8) work inside the development
environment can be inconvenient.
See:
https://lwn.net/Articles/422330/http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/icmp.7.htmlhttps://github.com/containers/libpod/issues/1550
The upper limit of the range of group identifiers is set to 2147483647,
which is 2^31-1. Values greater than that get rejected by the kernel
because of this definition in linux/include/net/ping.h:
#define GID_T_MAX (((gid_t)~0U) >> 1)
That's not so bad because values between 2^31 and 2^32-1 are reserved
on systemd-based systems anyway [2].
[1] https://github.com/debarshiray/toolbox
[2] https://systemd.io/UIDS-GIDS.html#summary
