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Best reviewed with "git show -b", there's a "continue" statement that
changes subsequent indentation.
Decouple lookup status of ids from ID_TYPE_NOT_SPECIFIED
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14571
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
(backported from patch from master)
[backport by npower@samba.org as master commit
493f5d6b078e0b0f80d1ef25043e2834cb4fcb87 and
58e9b62222ad62c81cdf11d704859a227cb2902b creates conflicts
due to rename of WBC_ID_TYPE_* -> ID_TYPE_*]
[backport by jra@samba.org to work around a compiler
bug showing this error on gcc 5.6 -> 6.x, seen on
Debian 9 and Ubuntu 16.04 under -O3:
../../source3/passdb/lookup_sid.c:1246:6: error: assuming
pointer wraparound does not occur when comparing P +- C1
with P +- C2 [-Werror=strict-overflow]]
o BUG #14595: CVE-2020-27840: Heap corruption via crafted DN strings.
o BUG #14655: CVE-2021-20277: Out of bounds read in AD DC LDAP server.
Note this is exactly the same as 4.12.13, except that it
has a dependency on ldb version 2.1.5, which is needed if
someone builds against a system libldb.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Karolin Seeger <kseeger@samba.org>
o BUG #14595: CVE-2020-27840: Heap corruption via crafted DN strings.
o BUG #14655: CVE-2021-20277: Out of bounds read in AD DC LDAP server.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Karolin Seeger <kseeger@samba.org>
o BUG #14595: CVE-2020-27840: Heap corruption via crafted DN strings.
o BUG #14655: CVE-2021-20277: Out of bounds read in AD DC LDAP server.
Signed-off-by: Karolin Seeger <kseeger@samba.org>
We had the test in the Samba Python segfault suite because
a) the signal catching infrastructure was there, and
b) the ldb tests lack Samba's knownfail mechanism, which allowed us to
assert the failure.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14595
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
A DN string with lots of trailing space can cause ldb_dn_explode() to
put a zero byte in the wrong place in the heap.
When a DN string has a value represented with trailing spaces,
like this
"CN=foo ,DC=bar"
the whitespace is supposed to be ignored. We keep track of this in the
`t` pointer, which is NULL when we are not walking through trailing
spaces, and points to the first space when we are. We are walking with
the `p` pointer, writing the value to `d`, and keeping the length in
`l`.
"CN=foo ,DC= " ==> "foo "
^ ^ ^
t p d
--l---
The value is finished when we encounter a comma or the end of the
string. If `t` is not NULL at that point, we assume there are trailing
spaces and wind `d and `l` back by the correct amount. Then we switch
to expecting an attribute name (e.g. "CN"), until we get to an "=",
which puts us back into looking for a value.
Unfortunately, we forget to immediately tell `t` that we'd finished
the last value, we can end up like this:
"CN=foo ,DC= " ==> ""
^ ^ ^
t p d
l=0
where `p` is pointing to a new value that contains only spaces, while
`t` is still referring to the old value. `p` notices the value ends,
and we subtract `p - t` from `d`:
"CN=foo ,DC= " ==> ? ""
^ ^ ^
t p d
l ~= SIZE_MAX - 8
At that point `d` wants to terminate its string with a '\0', but
instead it terminates someone else's byte. This does not crash if the
number of trailing spaces is small, as `d` will point into a previous
value (a copy of "foo" in this example). Corrupting that value will
ultimately not matter, as we will soon try to allocate a buffer `l`
long, which will be greater than the available memory and the whole
operation will fail properly.
However, with more spaces, `d` will point into memory before the
beginning of the allocated buffer, with the exact offset depending on
the length of the earlier attributes and the number of spaces.
What about a longer DN with more attributes? For example,
"CN=foo ,DC= ,DC=example,DC=com" -- since `d` has moved out of
bounds, won't we continue to use it and write more DN values into
mystery memory? Fortunately not, because the aforementioned allocation
of `l` bytes must happen first, and `l` is now huge. The allocation
happens in a talloc_memdup(), which is by default restricted to
allocating 256MB.
So this allows a person who controls a string parsed by ldb_dn_explode
to corrupt heap memory by placing a single zero byte at a chosen
offset before the allocated buffer.
An LDAP bind request can send a string DN as a username. This DN is
necessarily parsed before the password is checked, so an attacker does
not need proper credentials. The attacker can easily cause a denial of
service and we cannot rule out more subtle attacks.
The immediate solution is to reset `t` to NULL when a comma is
encountered, indicating that we are no longer looking at trailing
whitespace.
Found with the help of Honggfuzz.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14595
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
For a string that had N spaces at the beginning, we would
try to move N bytes beyond the end of the string.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14655
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry-picked from commit for master)
This reverts some of the backport of 33a95a1e75b85e9795c4490b78ead2162e2a1f47
This is done here rather than squashed in the cherry-pick of the expanded testsuite
because it allows this commit to be simply reverted for the backport of bug 14044
if this lands first, or to be dropped if bug 14044 lands first.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14655
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14655
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry-picked from commit for master)
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14044
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Björn Jacke <bjacke@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry-picked from commit 33a95a1e75b85e9795c4490b78ead2162e2a1f47)
If dbwrap_watched_watch_recv() returns IO_TIMEOUT, "blockerdead" might
be an uninitialized non-false, and further down we'll remove the wrong
exclusive locker.
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14636
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Mar 5 11:22:07 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
(cherry picked from commit 654c18a244f060d81280493a324b98602a69dbbf)
Autobuild-User(v4-12-test): Karolin Seeger <kseeger@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(v4-12-test): Mon Mar 8 08:51:39 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
Recent talloc changes cause the current check for failure to allocate to be incorrectly triggered.
This patch checks to see if the original parameter to be checked for NULL if the talloc returns NULL. This allows for rapid passing in the ca
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14634
RN: Fix failure of vfs_virusfilter starting due to talloc changes
Signed-off-by: Trever L. Adams" <trever.adams@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Noel Power <noel.power@suse.com>
(cherry picked from commit 5a92810082c9a9d2833946ae0d83ce05a6bde597)
Autobuild-User(v4-12-test): Karolin Seeger <kseeger@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(v4-12-test): Fri Mar 5 13:17:14 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
Some OSes like Solaris based OmiOS don't support this.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14288
Signed-off-by: Bjoern Jacke <bjacke@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 996560191ac6bd603901dcd6c0de5d239e019ef4)
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14648
Signed-off-by: Peter Eriksson <pen@lysator.liu.se>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: David Mulder <dmulder@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): David Mulder <dmulder@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Feb 25 20:46:02 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
(cherry picked from commit 3d91fe071a29e2e0c54a10ba081a46cb5c324585)
Autobuild-User(v4-12-test): Karolin Seeger <kseeger@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(v4-12-test): Wed Mar 3 11:11:28 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
It's not useful to generate a python backtrace from within the cleanup code.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14628
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9883ac45939f253a63f3ff312fc3912c5f02cdac)
Autobuild-User(v4-14-test): Karolin Seeger <kseeger@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(v4-14-test): Tue Feb 2 10:29:44 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
(cherry picked from commit cc1568be4d4250390a9ad03c84f5e260fc7acffd)
That also tries to re-add write permissions before removing.
In future we'll have jobs changing there directory to read-only.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14628
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7a5df2deaaf62a7edd7c64251f75ab15abe94c07)
(cherry picked from commit c933135969be29072971f96481b05f499fd48b57)
These commands are just there as hints to debug possible problems.
In order to support autobuild.py on non-linux platforms we should
just ignore errors here.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Apr 2 07:36:07 UTC 2020 on sn-devel-184
(cherry picked from commit 9b1e96197e0983a16e73ce351eac7775801736d8)
On platforms like FreeBSD 12 cp doesn't accept the long options,
using the one letter options works there and keeps working on Linux
as well.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0312a10e09d8dc1295a4a80493761e91031e88e7)
.git is not always a directory, with 'git worktree' it's a file.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit f9374d0a4ecc11acc46884feec28d138accc6dab)
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14624
Signed-off-by: Bjoern Jacke <bjacke@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Feb 10 15:06:49 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
(cherry picked from commit df75d82c9de6977c466ee9f01886cb012a9c5fef)
Autobuild-User(v4-12-test): Karolin Seeger <kseeger@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(v4-12-test): Tue Feb 16 22:33:52 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
Various 'samba-tool domain backup' commands use this and will
fail if there's over ~1000 files in the sysvol folder.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13898
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit d8fa464a2dfb11df4e1db4ebffe8bd28ff118c75)
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12505
Signed-off-by: Paul Wise <pabs3@bonedaddy.net>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Original-author: Nicolas Williams <nico@twosigma.com>
(cherry-picked from heimdal commit b3db07d5f0e03f6a1a0a392e70f9675e19a6d6af)
(cherry picked from commit f9ed4f7028a5ed29026ac8ef1b47b63755ba98f8)
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14625
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0bdbe50fac680be3fe21043246b8c75005611351)
Autobuild-User(v4-12-test): Karolin Seeger <kseeger@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(v4-12-test): Fri Feb 5 12:14:09 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14625
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 00543ab3b29e3fbfe8314e51919629803e14ede6)
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14625
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit bebbf621d6052f797c5cf19a2a9bbc13e699d3f0)
This used to make a deep copy of either
cli->smb2.tcon or cli->smb1.tcon, but this leaves
the original tcon pointer in place which will then get
TALLOC_FREE()'d when the new tree connection is made on
this cli_state.
As there may be pipes open on the old tree connection with
talloc'ed state allocated using the original tcon pointer as a
talloc parent we can't deep copy and then free this pointer
as that will fire the destructors on the pipe memory and
mark them as not connected.
This call is used to temporarily swap out a tcon pointer
(whilst keeping existing pipes open) to allow a new tcon
on the same cli_state and all users correctly call
cli_state_restore_tcon() once they are finished with
the new tree connection.
Just return the existing pointer and set the old value to NULL.
We know we MUST be calling cli_state_restore_tcon() below
to restore the original tcon tree connection pointer before
closing the session.
Remove the knownfail.d entry.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13992
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Feb 2 21:05:25 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
(cherry picked from commit 4f80f5f9046b64a9e5e0503b1cb54f1492c4faec)
For this test only, explicitly copy the SMB1 tcon struct,
don't use cli_state_save_tcon()//cli_state_restore_tcon()
as these calls will soon change to just manipulate the pointer
to avoid TALLOC_FREE() on the tcon struct which calls
destructors on child pipe data.
In SMB1 this test calls cli_tdis() twice with an invalid
vuid and expects the SMB1 tcon struct to be preserved
across the calls.
SMB1 cli_tdis() frees cli->smb1.tcon so we must put back
a deep copy into cli->smb1.tcon to be able to safely call
cli_tdis() again.
This is a test-only hack. Real client code
uses cli_state_save_tcon()/cli_state_restore_tcon()
if it needs to temporarily swap out the active
tcon on a client connection.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13992
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit e93e6108837eff0cebad8dc26d055c0e1386093a)
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13992
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit f9ca91bd293e9f2710c4449c5d4f5d016a066049)
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13992
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit dc701959cad7bf15aa47cad6451212606520f67f)
Subtle extra test. Mark as knownfail for now.
'^ user1$' must appear MORE THAN ONCE, as it can read more than one
share. The previous test found user1, but only once as the bug only
allows reading the security descriptor for one share, and we were
unlucky that the first share security descriptor returned allows
user1 to read from it.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13992
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 068f4a977f0539f790809d580bf22d2362032e3d)
Under the following conditions a user from an ignored domain might be able to
authenticate:
- using Kerberos
- successfully previous authentication so the idmap and name caches are filled
- winbind not running (fwiw, winbindd is mandatory on a domain member)
- nscd running with a cached getpwnam for the ignored user (otherwise auth fails
because getpwnam fails)
- lookup_name() function being modified to look into the name cache before
contacting winbindd. Currently it talks directly to winbindd and that will
check the cache.
Currently, authentication will only fail because creating the local token for
the user fails because an LSA lookupname RPC call fails (because winbindd is not
running).
All of this makes a successfull authentication unlikelly, but that is more by
accident then by design.
To ensures that if winbindd is not running and as such winbindd itself can not
enforce the restriction, also implement the ignored domains check in the auth
system as a last line of defense.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14602
RN: "winbind:ignore domains" doesn't prevent user login from trusted domain
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit df5fe2d835169161d3930acf1e9c750dd2bc64b6)
Autobuild-User(v4-12-test): Karolin Seeger <kseeger@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(v4-12-test): Thu Jan 28 10:14:02 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14602
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit da474ddd13d84f07f5da81c843e651844f33a003)
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14602
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 88e92faace7ec17810903166fa3433aa4842a4e3)
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14602
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4bc17600bc50fbc0e54d9d019d8db67001fc3eef)
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14602
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4cefdf03fec91cdcf700922b1a5ceca02407e259)
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14602
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 894caca79476d25a0268d89b2ad8a5758b7e31f3)
