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This tests the witness service and its interaction with
ctdb.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
It had the same workgroup as the nt4_dc environment:
$ grep workgroup st/nt4_dc/lib/server.conf st/nt4_dc_smb1/lib/server.conf
st/nt4_dc/lib/server.conf: workgroup = SAMBA-TEST
st/nt4_dc_smb1/lib/server.conf: workgroup = SAMBA-TEST
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15533
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Frankly, I can't remember why I added this as part of bug 13688. The
goal of the corresponding test is to verify a write on a read-only
file handle fails. As the file is opened O_RDONLY, the write will fail
anyway and there's no need to inject the error.
To make things worse, having the error injected meant we didn't notice
when the underlying logic of forcing the open to be done with O_RDONLY
was done as O_RDWR, resulting in the write on the handle to succeed.
This happened when we introduced reopen_from_fsp(): the initial
pathref open of a path with a twrp value was correctly detected and
handled by shadow_copy2_openat(). However, when converting the pathref
open to a real one via reopen_from_fsp(), shadow_copy2_openat() only
sees the magic /proc/fd path and has no way of inferring that this was
originating from a prevous version open with a twrp value.
Tl;dr: we can just remove this error injection, it is not needed, the
correct fix is to implement this in the SMB layer which is done in the
subsequent commits.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13688
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
This makes it easier to test things...
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15523
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Martin Schwenke <martin@meltin.net>
Time to fix the smget share to not have `guest ok = yes` set. A new
[smbget_guest] will be used for guest only tests. This way we can
correctly test different authentication mechanisms.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15532
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We should start using those in future. So we can distinguish which
privileges we want. Currently DC_USERNAME is the Administrator. Whatever
possible should use DOMIAN_USER instead.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15532
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This basically reverts commit b3cae8dcf1
with a few important differences:
* SMB3 UNIX extensions are always built, but disabled by default at runtime.
* They are globally enabled in the fileserver test environment.
* It's now a per-share option, so admins can selectively disable them
on a per-share basis. This allows clients to detect early that a share
doesn't support user mount requested POSIX and fail appropiately, passing
the failure to the requesting application (mount command).
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Oct 24 22:30:06 UTC 2023 on atb-devel-224
We're now able to build it on all linux systems and
the ci runners have at least a 5.4 kernel. That's
all the current vfs_io_uring requires.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Sun Sep 17 18:04:18 UTC 2023 on atb-devel-224
Adds share (to be used in later test) that has dfs node
but additionally has widelinks set to yes
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15435
Signed-off-by: Noel Power <noel.power@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
See the next patch, we assert in shadow_copy2_openat() over paths
passed in from shadow_copy2
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15358
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
The value of NSS_WRAPPER_HOSTNAME needs to match value
we put into the NSS_WRAPPER_HOSTS file.
We had a mismatch of
idmapridmember.samba.example.com
vs.
idmapridmember.addom.samba.example.com
This causes getaddrinfo() in nss_wrapper to fallback to
the libc version, which talks to a dns server.
It's not clear if recent glibc code will reach resolve/socket wrapper.
So it's not unlikely that idmapridmember.samba.example.com will
be passed via the internet, which causes delays up to 20 seconds.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15355
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Apr 12 20:29:05 UTC 2023 on atb-devel-224
This is required for the samba3.blackbox.guest test to work. Without it,
the test fails to find a group map.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Some of the most difficult to debug issues in Samba development are around
timing, so this changes our default logging format in the selftest system
to include a high-resolution timestamp to help correlate bad events with
what else is going on at the same time.
This fits in well with the timestamps already logged into st/subunit
and may assist with correlation.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Apr 6 13:44:47 UTC 2023 on atb-devel-224
Not a comprehensive test for all possible combinations, but it shows
the basic functionality, and it found a bug in the initial
implementation :-)
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
The bug we're testing for needs "strict rename = no" (the default),
but the existing streams_xattr share uses "strict rename = yes" from
the [global] section.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15314
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
This has the lower-case share, used in the next commit
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15313
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15287
Signed-off-by: Pavel Filipenský <pfilipensky@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Jan 26 15:07:57 UTC 2023 on atb-devel-224
Modify check_infected_read() test to use a 2-level deep
directory.
We must have vfs_default:VFS_OPEN_HOW_RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS = no
set on the virusscanner share as otherwise the openat flag
shortcut defeats the test.
Add knownfail.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15283
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
After s3 and s4 rpc servers merge we can avoid duplicated code.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Instead of using the generic deprecated option use the specific
server require schannel:COMPUTERACCOUNT = no in order to allow
legacy tests for pass.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Currently ad_member_s3_join is only used for testing samba-tool join and that'll
work just fine being joined to vampire_dc instead of ad_dc.
vampire_dc is an additional DC in the SAMBADOMAIN "started" by ad_dc_ntvfs, so
by joining ad_member_s3_join to the SAMBADOMAIN, it is member of a domain with
more then one DC.
Subsequently I'll add a test that needs such an environment.
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
The next commits will create symlinks via posix extensions to test the
smb2 symlink error return. Creating posix symlinks is not allowed with
follow symlinks = no, but it's currently our only way to create
symlinks over SMB. This could go away once we can create symlinks via
reparse points.
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Thanks to Metze for the hint that all file servers already listen on 2
addressess -- V4 and V6 :-)
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Nov 10 08:23:14 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
This one is tricky. It sends SMB2 DFS pathnames to a non-DFS
share, and sets the SMB2 flag FLAGS2_DFS_PATHNAMES in the SMB2
packet.
Windows will have non of it and (correctly) treats the pathnames
as local paths (they're going to a non-DFS share). Samba fails.
This proves the server looks as the share DFS capability to
override the flag in the SMB2 packet.
Passes against Windows. Added knownfail for Samba.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Noel Power <npower@samba.org>
Passes fully against Windows.
This shows that DFS paths on Windows on SMB2 must
be of the form:
SERVER\SHARE\PATH
but the actual contents of the strings SERVER and
SHARE don't need to match the given server or share.
The algorithm the Windows server uses is the following:
Look for a '\\' character, and assign anything before
that to the SERVER component. The characters in this
component are not checked for validity.
Look for a second '\\' character and assign anything
between the first and second '\\' characters to the
SHARE component. The characters in the share component
are checked for validity, but only ':' is flagged as
an illegal sharename character despite what:
[MS-FSCC] https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-fscc/dc9978d7-6299-4c5a-a22d-a039cdc716ea
says.
Anything after the second '\\' character is assigned
to the PATH component and becomes the share-relative
path.
If there aren't two '\\' characters it removes
everything and ends up with the empty string as
the share relative path.
To give some examples, the following pathnames all map
to the directory at the root of the DFS share:
SERVER\SHARE
SERVER
""
ANY\NAME
ANY
::::\NAME
the name:
SERVER\:
is illegal (sharename contains ':') and the name:
ANY\NAME\file
maps to a share-relative pathname of "file",
despite "ANY" not being the server name, and
"NAME" not being the DFS share name we are
connected to.
Adds a knownfail for smbd as our current code
in parse_dfs_path() is completely incorrect
here and tries to map "incorrect" DFS names
into local paths. I will work on fixing this
later, but we should be able to remove parse_dfs_path()
entirely and move the DFS pathname logic before
the call to filename_convert_dirfsp() in the
same way Volker suggested and was able to achieve
for extract_snapshot_token() and the @GMT pathname
processing.
Also proves the "target" paths for SMB2_SETINFO
rename and hardlink must *not* be DFS-paths.
Next I will work on a torture tester for SMB1
DFS paths.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reivewed-by: Noel Power <npower@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Aug 30 17:10:33 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
This is really expensive as share_mode_forall_entries() is currently
doing a talloc_memdup() of the whole record...
This is mainly used to avoid regressions, so only
use smbd:validate_oplock_types = yes in make test,
but skip it for production.
This improves the following test:
time smbtorture //127.0.0.1/m -Uroot%test \
smb2.create.bench-path-contention-shared \
--option='torture:bench_path=file.dat' \
--option="torture:timelimit=60" \
--option="torture:nprocs=256" \
--option="torture:qdepth=1"
From:
open[num/s=8852,avslat=0.014999,minlat=0.000042,maxlat=0.054600]
close[num/s=8850,avslat=0.014136,minlat=0.000025,maxlat=0.054537]
to:
open[num/s=11377,avslat=0.012075,minlat=0.000041,maxlat=0.054107]
close[num/s=11375,avslat=0.010594,minlat=0.000023,maxlat=0.053620]
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15125
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Shows we currently don't look at smb.conf veto files parameter
when opening a file or directory. Checks multi-component paths.
Also checks veto files that might be hidden behind a mangled
name.
Add knownfail.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15143
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
We should always test the code path without openat2 being available,
even if the kernel supports it.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Aug 15 16:00:26 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
When using vfs_streams_xattr, for a pathref handle of a stream the system fd
will be a fake fd created by pipe() in vfs_fake_fd().
For the following callchain we wrongly pass a stream fsp to
SMB_VFS_FGET_NT_ACL():
SMB_VFS_CREATE_FILE(..., "file:stream", ...)
=> open_file():
if (open_fd):
-> taking the else branch:
-> smbd_check_access_rights_fsp(stream_fsp)
-> SMB_VFS_FGET_NT_ACL(stream_fsp)
This is obviously wrong and can lead to strange permission errors when using
vfs_acl_xattr:
in vfs_acl_xattr we will try to read the stored ACL by calling
fgetxattr(fake-fd) which of course faild with EBADF. Now unfortunately the
vfs_acl_xattr code ignores the specific error and handles this as if there was
no ACL stored and subsequently runs the code to synthesize a default ACL
according to the setting of "acl:default acl style".
As the correct access check for streams has already been carried out by calling
check_base_file_access() from create_file_unixpath(), the above problem is not
a security issue: it can only lead to "decreased" permissions resulting in
unexpected ACCESS_DENIED errors.
The fix is obviously going to be calling
smbd_check_access_rights_fsp(stream_fsp->base_fsp).
This test verifies that deleting a file works when the stored NT ACL grants
DELETE_FILE while the basic POSIX permissions (used in the acl_xattr fallback
code) do not.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15126
MR: https://gitlab.com/samba-team/samba/-/merge_requests/2643
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Jul 19 00:10:10 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
