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BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15732
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Ralph Böhme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Oct 14 12:23:04 UTC 2024 on atb-devel-224
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14356
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Oct 10 15:17:46 UTC 2024 on atb-devel-224
I know finding any real logic in reading the patch,
doesn't really show what's going on. I tried hard
to simplify it, but this is the only way I found
that fixed the test_auth_pad_ntlm_2889_auth3 test
without breaking other tests...
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14356
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
This matches Windows (at least Server 2012_R2).
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14356
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
This matches Windows (at least Server 2012_R2).
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14356
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
We should use DCERPC_FAULT_ACCESS_DENIED as default for
gensec status results of e.g. NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE or
NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMTER.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14356
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
We already report that for gensec_start_mech_by_authtype() failures,
but we also need to do that for any invalid authentication.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14356
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Sometimes Windows sends 3 presentation contexts (NDR32, NDR64,
BindTimeFeatureNegotiation) in the first BIND of an association.
Binding an additional connection to the association seems to
reuse the BIND buffer and just changes the num_contexts field from
3 to 2 and leaves the BindTimeFeatureNegotiation context as padding
in places.
Note, the auth_pad_length field is send as 0 in that case,
which means we need to ignore it completely, as well as any
padding before the auth header.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14356
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
If dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer() returns NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR
it will return the BIND reject code in auth->auth_context_id.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14356
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
That what Windows also asserts.
It also makes sure that ndr_pull_dcerpc_auth() will
start with ndr->offset = 0 and don't tries to eat
possible padding.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14356
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Note the ad_member will keep these as expected failures,
as it doesn't provide the netlogon service,
while the knownfail for the ADDC is only temporary.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14356
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
The max fragment size depends on the transport.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14356
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Without an auth context using DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PACKET or higher
the fault to reject requests with an invalid auth level
should trigger a disconnect after sending the fault to
the client.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14356
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
We only want to test against
'allow dcerpc auth level connect:lsarpc = yes' once
in order to have the related code tests.
We use the ad_memeber for that special test and
use the default on the tested ADDC.
This reveals some knownfails, which will be fixed in
the next commit...
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14356
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
The server disconnects after the first fault.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14356
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
stat opens should not cause a oplock/lease downgrade if
they don't have a lease attached to itself.
Note that opens broken to NONE still count if they are
non-stat opens...
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15649
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15651
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Oct 10 13:59:18 UTC 2024 on atb-devel-224
These demonstrate which durables handles are kept and which are purged
because of various opens, writes or renames.
smb2.durable-v2-open.keep-disconnected-rh-with-stat-open
smb2.durable-v2-open.keep-disconnected-rh-with-rh-open
smb2.durable-v2-open.keep-disconnected-rh-with-rwh-open
smb2.durable-v2-open.keep-disconnected-rwh-with-stat-open
smb2.durable-v2-open.purge-disconnected-rwh-with-rwh-open
smb2.durable-v2-open.purge-disconnected-rwh-with-rh-open
smb2.durable-v2-open.purge-disconnected-rh-with-share-none-open
smb2.durable-v2-open.purge-disconnected-rh-with-write
smb2.durable-v2-open.purge-disconnected-rh-with-rename
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15649
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15651
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15708
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
It should be off by default, as this is not needed by default. It
crashes named on startup, if bind is built with jemalloc support.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15643
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
On a cluster we need to use the ctdb controlled database and not
a local secrets.tdb...
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15714
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Martin Schwenke <martin@meltin.net>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Sep 20 05:54:43 UTC 2024 on atb-devel-224
This will allow doing tests and make sure using anonymous credentials
doesn't cause false positive results...
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15714
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Martin Schwenke <martin@meltin.net>
Without this we leave stale sharemode entries around that can lead to all sorts
of havoc.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15624
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Sep 19 19:36:19 UTC 2024 on atb-devel-224
This demonstrates the dead lock after a durable reconnect failed
because the stat info changed, the file can't be accessed anymore
as we leak the incomplete share mode entry in a still running
process.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15624
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Creates and opens two files with leases, then tries
rename-with-overwrite on file_src -> file_dst.
Ensures we get a lease break on file_dst before
getting the access denied response.
Passes against Windows, fails against Samba.
Add knownfail.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Ralph Böhme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Sep 18 05:42:15 UTC 2024 on atb-devel-224
When inherting permissions on the created stream, we call into the VFS to fetch
the streams security descriptor via inherit_access_posix_acl() ->
copy_access_posix_acl() -> SMB_VFS_SYS_ACL_SET_FD() passing the stream fsp which
triggers the assert SMB_ASSERT(!fsp_is_alternate_stream(fsp)) in
vfswrap_sys_acl_set_fd() in vfs_default.
Just passing the base fsp to the VFS fixes this.
vfs_streams_depot which *does use* distinct backend filesystem files for the
streams, currently does not apply permissions to the stream files at all, so the
incomplete behaviour of vfs_streams_depot is not affected by this change.
If in the future someone want to fix this defficiency in vfs_streams_depot, the
module code can use fsp->stream_fsp to base decisions in VFS ops whether the
module should carry out some action.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15695
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Sep 2 08:55:28 UTC 2024 on atb-devel-224
As per MS-FSA 2.1.5.10.22 FSCTL_QUERY_ALLOCATED_RANGES, if response
range entries exceed in_max_output, then we should respond with
STATUS_BUFFER_OVERFLOW and a truncated output buffer.
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15699
Reported-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Disseldorp <ddiss@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Noel Power <npower@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): David Disseldorp <ddiss@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Aug 28 08:54:11 UTC 2024 on atb-devel-224
FSCTL_QUERY_ALLOCATED_RANGES responses with more than one range should
be truncated to account for a ioctl.smb2.in.max_output_response limit.
Add a test for this.
Flag the new test knownfail; fix in subsequent commit.
Signed-off-by: David Disseldorp <ddiss@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Noel Power <npower@samba.org>
These tests are not affected by the reserved_usn change, so there is
no need to run them twice.
The test_repl_get_tgt_multivalued_links fails with or without
reserved_usn set to zero, but it fails differently in either case.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15701
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Jennifer Sutton <josutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Azure AD will set reserved_usn to zero when we expect it to be
the number we gave them.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15701
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Jennifer Sutton <josutton@catalyst.net.nz>
This emulates the behaviour of Azure AD.
As this is quite slow we will later reduce the test load in this case,
but for now we want to run all the getncchanges tests this way.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15701
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Jennifer Sutton <josutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Currently we do this in mkdir_internal():
mkdirat(client_name);
if (EEXIST) {
return EEXIST;
}
prepare_acls(client_name);
Note 'prepare_acls()' is a placeholder for the complex steps
it is doing to prepare the directory. During these steps
we have the problem that other clients already see
the directory and are able to create files or subdirectories
in it and these may not inherit the correct acls as
the their parent directory is not created completely.
I think I found a good strategie even without relying on
renameat2(RENAME_NOREPLACE).
We would do this instead:
tmp_name = ".::TMPNAME:D:$PID:client_name"
mkdirat(tmp_name, mode=client_mode);
prepare_acls(tmp_name);
mkdirat(client_name, mode=0);
if (EEXIST) {
unlinkat(tmp_name);
return EEXIST;
}
renameat(tmp_name, client_name);
So instead of having a long windows during prepare_acls,
we just have a short window between mkdirat(client_name, mode=0)
and renameat(tmp_name, client_name);
And in that short window the directory with the client_name
has a mode of 0, so it's not possible for other clients
to create files or subdirs in it.
As the mkdirat(client_name, mode=0) still catches
EEXIST the race where two clients try to create
the same client_name is closed as before,
so we don't need any other protection.
Following patches will make use of renameat2(RENAME_NOREPLACE),
but this already a very good improvement.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15693
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
This reproduces a race where one client creates
a directory and other clients see it before
the directory is fully setup including the correct
permissions and similar things.
We have a DENY ACE for SEC_DIR_ADD_FILE, which means
that files can't be created. This is set on
a base directory 'mkdir_visible'.
Then we have a lot of async loops trying to create
a file called 'mkdir_visible\dir\file_NR'. These loop
as fast as possible expecting OBJECT_PATH_NOT_FOUND,
because 'mkdir_visible\dir' is not there.
Then we send a create for 'mkdir_visible\dir' and
expect that to work.
This should turn the 'mkdir_visible\dir\file_NR' loop
into getting ACCESS_DENIED, because the
DENY ACE for SEC_DIR_ADD_FILE should be inherited
before 'mkdir_visible\dir' is visible to other clients.
Because of the complex steps in mkdir_internal(),
smbd allows the creation 'mkdir_visible\dir\file_NR',
as 'mkdir_visible\dir' is already visible after the
mkdirat(), before the DENY ACE is inherited.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15693
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
