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This is marked as [flag(NDR_ALIGN8)] DATA_BLOB _pad;
and ndr_push_dcerpc_request() will just ignore the content
and align to 8 bytes with zero padding.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
The 4 bytes of padding are always present and part of the header.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
This doesn't fix the partialAttrSetEx case, so the test is left in the
knownfail file.
Signed-off-by: Bob Campbell <bobcampbell@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Pair-programmed-with: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Bob Campbell <bobcampbell@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We got WERR_DS_DRA_SCHEMA_MISMATCH for linked attributes with 8418 error for
extended attributes when using same attid as attribute object.
Signed-off-by: Evgeny Sinelnikov <sin@altlinux.ru>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
These were never finished, were not tested and clearly will not be revived
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
The eventlog6 pipe is not a duplicate with the source3 code, so should be built even
for the default build with smbd for file serving
This fixes commit 0b4c741b9c
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12026
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
In contrast to source3, this is run as root and without substitution.
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
The logic in samdb_result_force_password_change() is incomplete
and the correct logic is already available via the constructed
"msDS-UserPasswordExpiryTimeComputed" attribute.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11441
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
The password_hash module will take care of translating "-1"
to the current time.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9654
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We should tell dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer() that we only want
auth data.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11982
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
We still use the same limit of 4 MByte (DCERPC_NCACN_REQUEST_DEFAULT_MAX_SIZE)
by default.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11948
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Jun 23 04:51:16 CEST 2016 on sn-devel-144
The two large stack-based arrays would overflow the stack, this avoids
a duplicate of the struct drsuapi_DsReplicaLinkedAttribute array
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11960
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
The order of linked attributes depends on comparison of the NDR packed
GUIDs (not its struct GUID form).
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11960
This avoids reparsing the linked attribute and schema refetching.
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11960
By reading the SID values from the memberOf links, we avoid an un-indexed search on
the member attribute.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Because of this typo, the primary group ID was returned as 0
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
We would build, but not use, many components of the NTVFS file server
even when we asked not to. They would then consume disk, but not be
of any use
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Our newly run repl_exop tests expect this, matching Windows 2012R2
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
W2K8 Clients ask for DRSUAPI_SUPPORTED_EXTENSION_LH_BETA2 on DsBind. W2K8
expect this to be set (with server fl 2k8) or else they do not call
DsGetDomainControllerInfo.
If DRSUAPI_SUPPORTED_EXTENSION_LH_BETA2 is set, DsGetDomainControllerInfo
must be able to return DCInfo Level 3.
If Samba4 AD ist set to work as 2k8, with >2k8 clients the following
will not work as expected:
* Group Policy Editor Infrastructure Discovery
* nltest /dclist:<domain>
* w32tm /monitor
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9971
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9976
Signed-off-by: Dirk Godau <voidswitch@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Autobuild-User(master): Douglas Bagnall <dbagnall@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu May 26 06:21:10 CEST 2016 on sn-devel-144
As in commit 841845dea3, this avoids
quoting problems in user DN's.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11751
Signed-off-by: Mantas Mikulėnas <grawity@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Unchecked return value of gnutls_global_init().
Signed-off-by: Robin Hack <hack.robin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
All presentation contexts of a connection use the same association group.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
It's a protocol error if the client doesn't send all fragments of
a request in one go.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Note this is not the negotiated fragment size, but a hardcoded maximum.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Following requests will generate a fault with ACCESS_DENIED.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
The basically matches Windows 2012R2, it's not 100%
but it's enough for our raw protocol tests to pass.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
BIND is the first pdu, which means the list of contexts is always empty.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
We should not use one "global" per connection variable to hold the
incoming and outgoing auth_info.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
The first pdu is always a BIND.
REQUEST pdus are only allowed once the authentication
is finished.
A simple anonymous authentication is finished after the BIND.
Real authentication may need additional ALTER or AUTH3 exchanges.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
On protocol errors we should send BIND_NAK or FAULT and mark the
connection as to be terminated.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
BIND_NAK or FAULT may mark a connection as to be terminated.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
For now we still force \\PIPE\\ in upper case, we may be able to remove
this and change it in our idl files later. But for now we better
behave like a windows server without changing too much.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
This depends on the type of the incoming pdu.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
These values are controlled by the client but only in a range between
2048 and 5840 (including these values in 8 byte steps).
recv and xmit result always in same min value.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
This will simplify checks in the following commits and avoids
derefencing dcesrv_auth->auth_info which is not always arround.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
pkt->u.*.auth_info.length is not the correct thing to check.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
This prevents man in the middle downgrade attacks.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11616
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
This prevents man in the middle downgrade attacks.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11616
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
With this option turned off we only allow DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_{NONE,INTEGRITY,PRIVACY},
this means the reject any request with AUTH_LEVEL_CONNECT with ACCESS_DENIED.
We sadly need to keep this enabled by default for now.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11616
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
This matches windows and prevents man in the middle downgrade attacks.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11616
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
This is required for the whole interface (which has just one opnum for now).
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11616
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
This matches windows and prevents man in the middle downgrade attacks.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11616
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
This matches modern Windows servers.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Mar 10 10:15:21 CET 2016 on sn-devel-144
Windows servers doesn't return the raw NT_STATUS_NO_USER_SESSION_KEY
error, but return WRONG_PASSWORD or even hide the error by using a random
session key, that results in an invalid, unknown, random NTHASH.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
If custom schema is used in a replicated DC environment, these are created as soon as
an attribute is modified on more than one DC. We have to prevent replication
as otherwise we will corrupt the client replica state.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11443
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Windows doesn't have any CA data set on the certificate.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Adam <obnox@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Nov 17 19:52:33 CET 2015 on sn-devel-104
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Adam <obnox@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Nov 6 13:43:45 CET 2015 on sn-devel-104
This way we avoid quoting problems in user's DNs
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Sep 1 23:49:14 CEST 2015 on sn-devel-104
This patch fixes an issue where NetApp filers joined to a
Samba/ADDC cannot resolve SIDs. Without this patch the issue
can only be avoided by setting "allow nt4 crypto = yes" in smb.conf.
The issue is triggered by NetApp filers in three steps:
1. The client calls netr_ServerReqChallenge to set up challenge tokens
2. Next it calls netr_ServerAuthenticate2 with NETLOGON_NEG_STRONG_KEYS
set to 0. Native AD and Samba respond to this with
NT_STATUS_DOWNGRADE_DETECTED. At this point Samba throws away
the challenge token negotiated in the first step.
3. Next the client calls netr_ServerAuthenticate2 again, this time with
NETLOGON_NEG_STRONG_KEYS set to 1.
Samba returns NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED as it has lost track
of the challenge and denies logon with the message
No challenge requested by client [CLNT1/CLNT1$], cannot authenticate
Git commit 321ebc99b5 introduced
a workaround for a different but related issue. This patch makes a minor
adjustment to that commit to delay flushing the cached challenge until
it's clear that we are not in a NT_STATUS_DOWNGRADE_DETECTED
situation.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11291
Signed-off-by: Arvid Requate <requate@univention.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Aug 6 20:29:04 CEST 2015 on sn-devel-104
This should only work on a forest root domain controller and a forest function
level >= 2003.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This collects the whole information about the local forest,
including all domains and defined top level names (uPNSuffixes and
msDS-SPNSuffixes).
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We redirect this to remote DC as netr_GetForestTrustInformation() via an IRPC
call to winbindd.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We pass NETLOGON_CONTROL_{REDISCOVER,TC_QUERY,TC_VERIFY,CHANGE_PASSWORD} to
winbindd and do the hard work there, while we answer NETLOGON_CONTROL_QUERY
directly.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This means we return mostly the same error codes as a Windows
and also normalize the given information before storing.
Storing is now done within a transaction in order to avoid races
and inconsistent values.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We need to make sure a trusted domain has 'flatName', 'trustPartner'
and 'securityIdentifier' values, which are unique.
Otherwise other code will get INTERNAL_DB_CORRUPTION errors.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
It needs to pass 'name' as 'netbios_name' and also 'dns_name'.
flatName and trustPartner have the same value for downlevel trusts.
And both are required.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We just need to call dcesrv_netr_ServerGetTrustInfo() and ignore trust_info.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
For domain trusts we need to extract NL_PASSWORD_VERSION from the password
buffer.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
For trust account we need to store version number provided by the client.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This is simplified by using DCERPC_AUTH_PAD_LENGTH() and changes the behaviour
so that we will use no padding if the stub_length is already aligned
to DCERPC_AUTH_PAD_ALIGNMENT (16 bytes).
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11061
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Don't send plaintext on the wire because of an internal error...
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11061
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
The sig_size could differ depending on the aligment/padding.
So should use the same alignment as we use for the payload.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This matches other forwarded calls
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Fixes bug:
https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11236
Based on code from Julien Kerihuel <j.kerihuel@openchange.org>
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Sat Apr 25 02:43:22 CEST 2015 on sn-devel-104
leaked_storage: Variable pk going out of scope leaks the storage it points to.
On failure get_pk_from_raw_keypair_params function should free up
the private key (pk) it allocates internally.
Signed-off-by: Rajesh Joseph <rjoseph@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ira Cooper <ira@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Apr 2 19:38:22 CEST 2015 on sn-devel-104
The number of current and previous elements need to match and we have to
fill TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_NONE if needed.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
We now check the requested access mask in OpenPolicy*()
and return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED if the request is not granted.
E.g. validating a domain trust via the Windows gui requires this
in order prompt the user for the credentials. Otherwise
we fail any other call with ACCESS_DENIED later and the
gui just displays a strange error message.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
We still grant all access in the access_mask, but we don't check the
mask at all yet...
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
'default' is already handled in an earlier switch statement,
so this won't be reached but avoids a warning.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
This avoids bad decrypts from falling down to later code and getting
the error code wrong, by strictly requiring the NDR parse to use all the
data. A bad decyrpt is very unlikely to get the length correct, and
so fall down to the other checks.
This should fix:
UNEXPECTED(failure): samba4.rpc.backupkey with seal.backupkey.server_wrap_decrypt_wrong_r2(ad_dc_ntvfs)
REASON: Exception: Exception: ../source4/torture/rpc/backupkey.c:1926: r.out.result was WERR_INVALID_ACCESS, expected WERR_INVALID_PARAM: decrypt should fail with WERR_INVALID_PARAM
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11174
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan (metze) Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
The gcrypt link will be disabled if gnutls is > 3.0.0
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11135
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
We no longer link against gcrypt if gnutls > 3.0.0 is found, as these
versions use libnettle.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11135
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
If there're no collisions we should not fill the collision_info pointer.
Otherwise Windows fails to create a forest trust.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
The meaning of lsa_ForestTrustRecordFlags is based lsa_ForestTrustRecordType,
but the type is not always available so it's not possible to use an union.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Different gcc versions complain at different places
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Mar 3 13:14:53 CET 2015 on sn-devel-104
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Feb 25 16:32:29 CET 2015 on sn-devel-104
Pair-programmed-with: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We use GnuTLS because it can reliably generate 2048 bit keys every time.
Windows clients strictly require 2048, no more since it won't fit and no
less either. Heimdal would almost always generate a smaller key.
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10980
This is done in both smbtoture and in our server
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
We implement both modes in BACKUPKEY_RESTORE_GUID, as it may decrypt
both ServerWrap and ClientWrap data, and we implement
BACKUPKEY_RESTORE_GUID_WIN2K.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/attachment.cgi?bugid=11097
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
This happen on the RODC, a case that we try not to permit at all.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
The values we return here are client-provided passwords or other keys, that we decrypt for them.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
This makes it clear that this is the data stored on the LSA secrets store
and not the client-provided data to be encrypted.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
This adds some IDL structs for the ServerWrap subprotocol, allowing
parsing of the incoming RPC calls and returning WERR_NOT_SUPPORTED
instead of WERR_INVALID_PARAM.
Signed-off-by: Arvid Requate <requate@univention.de>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
[MS-BKRP] 2.2.1 specifies "The Common Name field of the Subject name
field SHOULD contain the name of the DNS domain assigned to the server."
In fact Windows 7 clients don't seem to care. Also in certificates
generated by native AD the domain name (after CN=) is encoded as
UTF-16LE. Since hx509_parse_name only supports UTF-8 strings currently
we just leave the encoding as it is for now.
Signed-off-by: Arvid Requate <requate@univention.de>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
[MS-BKRP] 2.2.1 specifies that the serialnumber of the certificate
should be set identical to the subjectUniqueID. In fact certificates
generated by native AD have this field encoded in little-endian format.
See also
https://www.mail-archive.com/cifs-protocol@cifs.org/msg01364.html
Signed-off-by: Arvid Requate <requate@univention.de>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Check for talloc_memdup failure for uniqueid.data.
Signed-off-by: Arvid Requate <requate@univention.de>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
hx509_ca_tbs_set_notAfter_lifetime expects the lifetime value in
in seconds. The Windows 7 client didn't seem to care that the lifetime
was only 6'03''. Two other TODOs in this implementation:
* Since notBefore is not set explicietely to "now", the heimdal code
default of now-(24 hours) is applied.
* Server side validity checks and cert renewal are missing.
Signed-off-by: Arvid Requate <requate@univention.de>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
RSA_generate_key_ex doesn't always generate a modulus of requested
bit length. Tests with Windows 7 clients showed that they decline
x509 certificates (MS-BKRP 2.2.1) in cases where the modulus length
is smaller than the specified 2048 bits. For the user this resulted
in DPAPI failing to retrieve stored credentials after the user password
has been changed at least two times. On the server side log.samba showed
that the client also called the as yet unlimplemented ServerWrap sub-
protocol function BACKUPKEY_BACKUP_KEY_GUID after it had called the
ClientWarp function BACKUPKEY_RETRIEVE_BACKUP_KEY_GUID. After
enabling DPAPI auditing on the Windows Clients the Event Viewer showed
Event-ID 4692 failing with a FailureReason value of 0x7a in these cases.
Signed-off-by: Arvid Requate <requate@univention.de>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10980
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Jan 26 14:23:50 CET 2015 on sn-devel-104
dcesrv_lsa_OpenTrustedDomain() and dcesrv_lsa_OpenTrustedDomainByName()
need to use the same logic and make sure trusted_domain_user_dn is valid.
Otherwise dcesrv_lsa_OpenTrustedDomainByName() followed by
dcesrv_lsa_DeleteObject() will leave the trust domain account
in the database.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
We should return the our ip address the client is connected too.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
This requires an additional control to be used in the
LSA server to add domain trust account objects.
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10993
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Karolin Seeger <kseeger@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Jan 15 14:54:47 CET 2015 on sn-devel-104
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <idra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Jan 6 22:50:23 CET 2015 on sn-devel-104
This is triggered by lsa_lsaRSetForestTrustInformation()
with ForestTrustInfo elements using FOREST_TRUST_TOP_LEVEL_NAME.
The nb_name variable was uninitialized and dereferenced without checking.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>